establishing a civil society mirror tracking, analyzing, and communicating indicators of...
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Establishing a Civil Society MirrorEstablishing a Civil Society Mirror
Tracking, Analyzing, and Tracking, Analyzing, and Communicating Indicators of Communicating Indicators of
Proliferation PropensityProliferation Propensity
Jack BourestonJack BourestonFirstWatch International (FWI)FirstWatch International (FWI)
My task: To track proliferationMy task: To track proliferationtrends in the region trends in the region
To proliferate or not? To proliferate or not? That is the question, That is the question, but how can we tell? but how can we tell?
Proliferation propensityProliferation propensity: : a working definitiona working definition
The probability that a country or non-state actor will decide to acquire and deploy nuclear weapons.
• SaganSagan– Security model to counter threatsSecurity model to counter threats– Domestic politics model to advance domestic interestsDomestic politics model to advance domestic interests– Normative model, following norms to provide as symbol of identityNormative model, following norms to provide as symbol of identity
• Berriman, Leslie, and CarlsonBerriman, Leslie, and Carlson– Evidence of procurement of materials and itemsEvidence of procurement of materials and items– Capability to produceCapability to produce– Motivation and intentMotivation and intent
• Jo and GartzkeJo and Gartzke– OpportunitiesOpportunities– WillingnessWillingness
• Singh and WaySingh and Way– Technological Technological – External External – InternalInternal
Consider various determining factorsConsider various determining factors
Internal determinantsInternal determinants
• Ideological grounding Ideological grounding - - Preservation of state or regime Preservation of state or regime sometimes manifested throughsometimes manifested throughnationalism & extremismnationalism & extremism
- Power projection aspirations - Power projection aspirations
• AttitudesAttitudes - - View of nuclear weapons (among those of influence)View of nuclear weapons (among those of influence)- Nuclear taboo - Nuclear taboo - Nuclear culture - Nuclear culture - Perceived sphere of influence on policy process- Perceived sphere of influence on policy process
External determinantsExternal determinants
• Security environment Security environment – Threats: military, culture, religion, economy Threats: military, culture, religion, economy – Regional/balance of power and alliancesRegional/balance of power and alliances
• Globalization - economic interdependenceGlobalization - economic interdependence– Economically integrated Economically integrated – Trade balance/imbalanceTrade balance/imbalance– Dependence on foreign investmentDependence on foreign investment
• Foreign policy - sanctions, treatiesForeign policy - sanctions, treaties– Cooperation with International organizationsCooperation with International organizations– Nonproliferation regime & Int’l normsNonproliferation regime & Int’l norms– Compliance with international regimes Compliance with international regimes – Participation in international norms & regimes Participation in international norms & regimes
Technological determinantsTechnological determinants
• Acquisition Acquisition of sensitive materials and equipmentof sensitive materials and equipment– Evidence of procurement (what & from whom?)Evidence of procurement (what & from whom?)
• ResearchResearch in sensitive technologies in sensitive technologies– Enrichment and reprocessingEnrichment and reprocessing
Some important points about Some important points about plotting propensityplotting propensity
• Best explained as Best explained as qualitativequalitative assessments not assessments not quantifiablequantifiable assessments assessments
• Hard to quantifyHard to quantify
• Subjective Subjective
• Best evaluated by expertsBest evaluated by experts
• Need to start at a baseline, then plot propensity over Need to start at a baseline, then plot propensity over timetime
Plotting propensityPlotting propensityDeterminants Proliferation
Propensity
Internal Motivators: Range: -2 to 2
Ideological grounding – Preservation of state or regime, Power projection aspirations -1 Very stable 0 Stable+1 Unstable
Attitudes - View of nuclear weapons (among those of influence); Nuclear taboo vs. prestige; Nuclear Culture – Perceived sphere of influence on policy process-1 Does not allow development 0 Not developing+1 Is developing or aspires to develop
External Motivators: Range: -4 to 4
Security environment - Threats: culture, religion, military, economy; Balance of power: alliances-2 No direct threat0 Threats but equalizing deterrence+2 Threats to invade or attack
Globalization - Economic interdependence (trade balance); Nonproliferation regime & Int’l norms; Foreign policy: sanctions, new treaties-1 Cooperation with Int’l norms & regimes -1 Trade imbalance0 Entry but No compliance with Int’l regimes 0 Economically integrated +1 No participation in Int’l norms & regimes +1 Independent on foreign investment
Technological Determinants: Range: -2 to 2
Acquisitions of sensitive materials and research - Evidence of procurement (what & from who?); R & D in enrichment and reprocessing-1 No evidence of R&D -1 No evidence of procurement0 Suspicion of program 0 Suspicion of acquisitions+1 Evidence of R&D +1 Evidence of acquisitions
Total: -8 to 8
Sample - Japan 2006Sample - Japan 2006Determinants Proliferation
Propensity
Internal Motivators: Range: -2 to 2
Ideological grounding – Preservation of state or regime, Power projection aspirations -1 Very stable 0 Stable+1 Unstable
0
Attitudes - View of nuclear weapons (among those of influence); Nuclear taboo vs. prestige; Nuclear Culture – Perceived sphere of influence on policy process-1 Does not allow development 0 Not developing+1 Is developing or aspires to develop
0
External Motivators: Range: -4 to 4
Security environment - Threats: culture, religion, military, economy; Balance of power: alliances-2 No direct threat0 Threats but equalizing deterrence+2 Threats to invade or attack
1
Globalization - Economic interdependence (trade balance); Nonproliferation regime & Int’l norms; Foreign policy: sanctions, new treaties-1 Cooperation with Int’l norms & regimes -1 Trade imbalance0 Entry but No compliance with Int’l regimes 0 Economically integrated +1 No participation in Int’l norms & regimes +1 Independent on foreign investment
-1
0Technological Determinants: Range: -2 to 2
Acquisitions of Sensitive Materials and Research - Evidence of procurement (what & from who?); R & D in enrichment and reprocessing-1 No evidence of R&D -1 No evidence of procurement0 Suspicion of program 0 Suspicion of acquisitions+1 Evidence of R&D +1 Evidence of acquisitions
11
Japan’s propensity to proliferateJapan’s propensity to proliferate
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
2006 2007 2008 2009
Propensity toProliferate
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
2006 2007 2008 2009
Propensity toProliferate
EXAMPLE ONLYEXAMPLE ONLY
This would be accompanied with an explanationThis would be accompanied with an explanationof the data points, score and probable trendsof the data points, score and probable trends
Combined indices-trend analysisCombined indices-trend analysis
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006 2007 2008 2009
Japan
S. Korea
Taiwan
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2006 2007 2008 2009
Japan
S. Korea
Taiwan
EXAMPLE ONLYEXAMPLE ONLY
Information monitoringInformation monitoring
• Manual processManual process of following activities, attending of following activities, attending meetings, talking to peoplemeetings, talking to people
• Following organizationsFollowing organizations that would be the that would be the originators of informationoriginators of information
• Automating the processAutomating the process using the Internet and using the Internet and software toolsoftware tool
Evidence of indicators: where to look?Evidence of indicators: where to look?Determinants Where to find them
Ideological grounding - Preservation of regime manifested through nationalism & extremism, power projection aspirations
- Official statements
- Interviews
- media reports
Attitudes - View of NW (among those of influence); Nuclear taboo vs. prestige; Nuclear culture – perceived sphere of influence on policy process
- Press releases- Conferences
Security environment - Threats: culture, religion, military, economy; Balance of power: alliancesthreats but equalizing deterrence Threat of invasion or attack
- Conferences/forums- Defense white papers- Official statements-- Government papers/press releases
Globalization - Economic interdependence (trade balance); Nonproliferation regime & Int’l Norms; Foreign policy: Sanctions, New TreatiesCooperation with Int’l norms & regimes Trade ImbalanceEntry but No compliance with Int’l regimes Economically integrated Participation in Int’l norms & regimes Independent on Foreign Investment
- Government papers/statements/press releases-bi-lateral/multilateral meetings and/or agreements- Plenary sessions- Economic news- Organization meetings
Acquisitions of Sensitive Materials and Research - enrichment and reprocessingEvidence of procurementSuspicion of program Suspicion of acquisitionsEvidence of R&D Evidence of acquisitions
-Business news-Trade journals-Technical publications- Conference proceedings- Opposition statements- Industry news- University theses
Providing info to IAEAProviding info to IAEA
• OrganizeOrganize by each determinates by each determinates
• UseUse a parallel IAEA State evaluation report (SER) a parallel IAEA State evaluation report (SER) structurestructure– Political/legalPolitical/legal– Elements of nuclear fuel cycleElements of nuclear fuel cycle– ResearchResearch– Non-nuclear (dual-use equipment, missiles and other)Non-nuclear (dual-use equipment, missiles and other)– TraffickingTrafficking– Import/exportImport/export– WeaponizationWeaponization
• State the significance State the significance of each section, with of each section, with headlines or citations?headlines or citations?
IAEA’s SERIAEA’s SER
• Part A: Presentation of structurePart A: Presentation of structure– History of nuclear programHistory of nuclear program– Current nuclear programCurrent nuclear program– Nonproliferation commitmentsNonproliferation commitments
• Part B: Consistency of informationPart B: Consistency of information– General consistency of current and planned programGeneral consistency of current and planned program– Consistency of specific nuclear activities Consistency of specific nuclear activities
(follows the “physical model” (follows the “physical model” nuclear fuel nuclear fuel cyclecycle))
• Consistency of nuclear material flowsConsistency of nuclear material flows• Consistency of equipment imports/exportsConsistency of equipment imports/exports
• Part C: ConclusionsPart C: Conclusions– Unresolved inconsistenciesUnresolved inconsistencies– RecommendationsRecommendations
Communicating propensityCommunicating propensitythree methodsthree methods
1.1. Ongoing reporting Ongoing reporting
2.2. Periodic brief for policy makers Periodic brief for policy makers
3.3. Annual event and statement to be posted on a website Annual event and statement to be posted on a website and distributed as a policy/press releaseand distributed as a policy/press release
1. Ongoing reporting1. Ongoing reporting
• Provide indicators of propensity using Provide indicators of propensity using information found in the public domaininformation found in the public domain
• Categorize by country then by indicatorCategorize by country then by indicator
• Possible analysis/concluding remarks?Possible analysis/concluding remarks?
SAMPLE
2. Periodic brief for policy makers2. Periodic brief for policy makers
• Develop issues briefsDevelop issues briefs– Report on indicators with assessments of their impact on Report on indicators with assessments of their impact on
the proliferation propensity of a state.the proliferation propensity of a state.
• Deliver via list-serveDeliver via list-serve– Policy makersPolicy makers– Public action groups (public forums etc.)Public action groups (public forums etc.)
SAMPLE
3. Annual statement/annual event3. Annual statement/annual event
• Statement Statement – Communicating individual state and overall propensity in Communicating individual state and overall propensity in
regionregion
• Hold a seminarHold a seminar– Explain project (English and other languages)Explain project (English and other languages)– DefinitionsDefinitions– Indicators (explaining why they are determinants)Indicators (explaining why they are determinants)– Display graphsDisplay graphs– Statement/declaration to policy makersStatement/declaration to policy makers– Press release to the publicPress release to the public– Post on websitePost on website
ReferencesReferences
1) 1) Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search a Bomb,” Models in Search a Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996-1997, pp. 54-86.Winter 1996-1997, pp. 54-86.
2) 2) Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “Paths to Non-Proliferation: The Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, “Paths to Non-Proliferation: The Need For A Quantitative Test of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Need For A Quantitative Test of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Theory,” Pre-Print Draft, later published under “The Correlates of Theory,” Pre-Print Draft, later published under “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Nuclear Proliferation: A Quantitative Test,” Journal of Conflict Journal of Conflict ResolutionResolution, 2004., 2004.
3) Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear 3) Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke, “Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation” Journal of Conflict Resolution, February, 2007.Proliferation” Journal of Conflict Resolution, February, 2007.
4) Annette Berriman, Russel Leslie, and John Carlson," Assessing 4) Annette Berriman, Russel Leslie, and John Carlson," Assessing Motivation As a Means of Determining The Risk of Proliferation,” Motivation As a Means of Determining The Risk of Proliferation,” Presented at Presented at INMM Conference, INMM Conference, July 2004. July 2004.