Essential Histories

The Korean War 1950-1953

Essential Histories

The Korean War1950-1953

Carter MalkasianOSPREYPUBLISHING

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Contents

Introduction 7

Chronology 9

Two Koreas, the Superpowers, and China 10

The Communists strike 15

The fighting

Avoiding a third world war 18

Portrait of a soldier

Patrolling, raiding, and digging 66

The world around war

The domestic and international impact 71

Portrait of a civilian

Kyonshill Kang 75

How the war ended

Closing moves 80

Conclusion and consequences

The significance of the Korean War in the history of warfare 88

Bibliography 93

Index 94

Introduction

From 1950 to 1953, the most powerful countriesin the world engaged in a major conventionalwar on the Korean peninsula. Arguably, theworld has never been so close to a third WorldWar, not even during the Cuban Missile Crisis.At times, both combatants thought the war wasa preamble to a much larger and moredestructive global conflict. It was the onlyoccasion in the Cold War when the militaryforces of the People's Republic of China (PRC),the Soviet Union, and the USA (plus its Westernallies) met in combat. On the ground, Chinesearmies engaged in huge battles with theAmerican-led United Nations Command (UNC).In the air, hundreds of Soviet, Chinese, andAmerican jet aircraft fought for air supremacyover North Korea. Thus, the Korean War wasnot merely a war fought between proxies of themajor powers, like the later conflicts in Vietnamor Afghanistan, but a much more significantconflagration. The war changed how the Eastand the West dealt with one another and waspart of a revolution in the conduct of war.

The Korean War was a conflict over twoprizes: first, political control of Korea; andsecond, power in east Asia and the world as awhole. Historically, Communists and right-wing Nationalists vied for political control ofKorea. Following the Second World War, theCommunists gained control of North Koreaand rightists gained control of South Korea.Both then wanted to unify the entire peninsulaunder their respective authority. This was whatmotivated North Korea to invade South Koreain June 1950. However, Korea was also anobject of Cold War superpower competition.After 1945 the USA was the dominant power inthe Pacific. The other superpower, the SovietUnion, led by the paranoid Josef Stalin, wascautiously seeking to expand its global powerby promoting Communism in regionsimportant to its security. Korea was one ofthose areas. The Soviet Union and the PRC

believed that a Communist Korea providedinsurance against American aggression; hencethe Soviet Union's backing of the North Koreaninvasion and China's later intervention in thewar. The USA reacted to the North Koreaninvasion as a threat to its influence in east Asia.More broadly, American leaders believed that ifthe invasion were not confronted, the Sovietswould be encouraged to engage in militaryexpansionism elsewhere in the world.

The course of the Korean War can be dividedinto two periods, one of maneuver and one ofattrition. The first six months of the war was aperiod of maneuver. First, North Korea invadedmost of South Korea in a blitzkrieg assault on25 June 1950. Next, US General DouglasMacArthur conducted a brilliant amphibiousattack at Inchon and drove the North Koreansout of South Korea. Then, threatened by theUNC advance into North Korea, the PRCintervened and pressed the UNC back intoSouth Korea. Instead of unifying Korea orending the war, each of these decisive victoriesled to an escalation of the war. To prevent theconflict from spiralling into a Third World War,the USA abandoned its goal of attaining a totalvictory and decided to fight a limited war inDecember 1950.

The remainder of the war, from 1951 to1953, was marked by indecisive attrition. TheUNC's object was to hold the Communists onthe battlefield while seeking a resolution of theconflict based not on unifying Korea, but onpreserving the integrity of South Korea. TheCommunists agreed to negotiations followingthe defeat of their Fifth Phase Offensive in June1951. Negotiations proceeded slowly becauseneither side wanted to compromise on issueslike the location of the cease-fire line and thefate of the prisoners of war. Military operationscontinued in the form of limited attacks, air-to-air battles, and strategic bombing campaigns.An armistice was finally concluded on 27 July

8 Essential Histories • The Korean War

1*53 after the Chinese and North Koreaneconomies could no longer support war, theUSA was threatening to escalate the conflict,and Stalin had died.

Ironically, the Korean War is well known asthe USA's 'Forgotten War.' This is because itdoes not figure nearly as highly in the nationalconsciousness as the Second World War, theVietnam War, or the 1991 Gulf War. Onereason that the Korean War has been'forgotten' is that, with the exception of theInchon landing, it seems boring and featureless.However, there are actually several majorbattles that were as important as Inchon, if notmore so. Two stand out in particular. First, theinitial Chinese intervention in the war inNovember 1950 resulted in the resoundingdefeat of the UNC and the longest retreat inAmerican military history. The ensuing panicamongst American leaders nearly caused themto take actions that probably would have led toa Third World War. Second, the Communistssuffered an even worse defeat when the UNCcrushed their Fifth Phase Offensive in April andMay 1951. This was a turning point in the war,the Communists being forced to abandon theirquest to unify Korea and accept that the warwould end through compromise.

Besides battles, there are a number ofgenerals in the Korean War who should not beforgotten. MacArthur is obviously massivelyimportant. His brilliant victory at Inchon andhis later dismissal have made him a magnetic-historical figure. The decisive strategies that heespoused are a rallying point for those whoagree that the only aim in war should be totalvictory. But MacArthur was outshone in nearlyevery respect by his subordinate and latersuccessor, General Matthew Ridgway. Hisdynamic leadership revitalized the defeatedEighth US Army and prevented theCommunists from capturing South Korea.Ridgway understood that, in the Cold War,seeking total victory was an outmoded militarystrategy. Therefore, he developed an operationaldoctrine of attrition that did not result inescalation, yet enforced the UNC bargainingposition in negotiations. Two other generals areworthy of note. The young South Korean,General Paik Sun Yup, won several victories

with his underequipped men and wasinstrumental in modernizing the army of theRepublic of Korea (ROK). On the Communistside, the innovative and insightful GeneralDeng Hua reformed the Chinese forces inKorea, known as the Chinese People'sVolunteers (CPV), into a modern army capableof holding its own against the UNC.

Historically, the Korean War was asignificant turning point in the Cold War. Thisconflict in a small peninsula in east Asiaaffected the entire international system and thebalance of power between the two superpowers.Through the conflict, the West demonstratedits resolve to thwart Communist aggression.The USA and its allies strengthened NATO andtook steps to defend their interests throughoutthe world. The conflict convinced the Americanleadership of the need to engage in a massiverearmament, setting the tone for the arms racesthat marked the remainder of the Cold War.The Korean War also marked the rise of Chinaas a military power. After the impressiveperformance of the CPV, the USA was forced totreat the PRC as a major power in east Asia. Ingeneral, the UNC success in the Korean Warprobably deterred China and the Soviet Unionfrom instigating further conventional warsagainst the West or its interests.

Finally, the Korean War defined the newstrategic context of warfare that emerged in theCold War. Wars were conducted in an entirelynew manner. Before 1945, the aims of mostwars had been total victory: the annihilation ofan opponent. After 1945, the advent of nuclearweapons and the increasing power ofconventional weapons made total warprohibitively dangerous. The risk of mutualdestruction could not be countenanced. Insteadof total victory, limited aims were now soughtin most wars. In turn, the means of warfarebecame more limited as careful measures weretaken to reduce the risk of a conflict escalatinginto a Third World War. The Korean War wasthe first example of such a limited war. Thestrategies and operational doctrines employedwere the first adaptations to limited war. Assuch, the Korean War was the formativeexperience in the strategy and operationaltechniques developed during the Cold War.

Chronology

Chronology

1950 25 June North Korea invades South

Korea

7 July UN Security Council creates the

United Nations Command

1 August-22 September Battles

around the Pusan Perimeter

15 September Inchon landing

2 October Chairman Mao Zedong

decides that China will intervene in the

war

7 October American forces cross the

38th Parallel

15 October President Harry Truman

and General Douglas MacArthur meet

on Wake Island

27 October-2 November Communist

First Phase Offensive

25 November-9 December

Communist Second Phase Offensive

27 November-25 December Battle of

the Chosin Reservoir

8 December Truman-Attlee

communique

23 December General Matthew

Ridgway is appointed commander of the

Eighth Army

31 December-24 January

Communist Third Phase Offensive

1951 25 January-11 February Operation

Thunderbolt

11-18 February Communist Fourth

Phase Offensive

14 March Eighth Army recaptures

Seoul

11 April Truman dismisses MacArthur;

Ridgway replaces him

22 April-20 May Communist Fifth

Phase Offensive

23 June Soviet Ambassador to the UN,

Jakob Malik, proposes cease-fire

negotiations

10 July Cease-fire negotiations open

at Kaesong

23 August Communists suspend cease-fire

negotiations over alleged UNC violation of

the neutral zone around Kaesong

3-18 October Operation Commando

25 October Truce talks resume at new

neutral site of Panmunjom

27 November Agreement reached on

the location of a cease-fire line

1952 8 April Screening begins of

Communist prisoners of war

7 May Brigadier General Dodd is seized

in Koje-do prison riots

12 May General Mark Clark replaces

Ridgway as commander of the UNC

24 May Rhee declares martial law in

South Korean temporary capital, Pusan

23 June Air strikes against North

Korean hydroelectric plants

11 July First strike on Pyongyang

29 August Second strike on

Pyongyang, the largest bombing raid of

the war

8 October Clark recesses cease-fire

negotiations indefinitely

4 November Dwight Eisenhower is .

elected President of the United States

1953 5 March Death of Josef Stalin

28 March Zhou Enlai accepts 'Little

Switch'

26 April Cease-fire negotiations

resume

13 May Beginning of UNC air strikes

on North Korean dams

25 May UNC delegation presents its

'final position'

10-16 June Communists assault the II

ROK Corps in the Kumsong bulge

16 June First cease-fire concluded

18 June Rhee unilaterally releases

25,000 North Korean prisoners of war

13-27 July Final Communist offensive

27 July The UNC and the Communists

sign the armistice, ending hostilities

Warring sides

Two Koreas, the Superpowers,and ChinaThe Korean War took place in two differentcontexts: the superpower competition of theCold War and the regional competition forpolitical control of Korea. Both are importantto understanding the motivations of thewarring parties.

The Cold War

After the Second World War, the USA andthe Soviet Union were the two remainingtruly great powers. Their interests began toclash as each asserted its influence over thepostwar world. This competition had a deepideological tone. The USA and its allies,collectively known as the West, promoteddemocracy and capitalism, while the SovietUnion and its supporters sought to expandCommunism. With the declaration of the

Truman Doctrine in 1947, the USA adopted apolio." of containment: opposing Communistexpansion where it threatened thedevelopment of democracy. In 1948, theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)was established to defend Western Europeagainst Soviet aggression. Nevertheless, untilJune 1950 the degree of the Soviet threat wasunclear. Therefore, the West had notundertaken significant military preparationsto confront Soviet or Communistexpansionism. NATO was only a skeletalorganization without the conventional andnuclear strength that would be associatedwith it later in the Cold War. The Americanarmed forces were also in a low state ofreadiness. Following demobilization after theSecond World War, the Republican Congresshad drastically cut American defenseexpenditure, pegging at less than 3 percentof the gross domestic product (GDP).

The Cold War represented a new militarysituation as well as a new international one.After 1945, warfare underwent a revolution.Before 1945, most wars had been foughtwith the goal of decisively annihilating anenemy's armed forces. Warfare continueduntil one side unconditionally surrendered.After 1945, such total warfare becameprohibitively costly. There were three basicreasons for this. First, the advent of atomicweapons multiplied the destructiveness ofwarfare. Seeking a total victory became avery dangerous endeavor when an opponentmight use atomic or nuclear weapons if facedwith a major defeat on the battlefield.Second, the First and Second World Wars

US President Harry Truman. Truman implemented theTruman Doctrine, which stated that the USA would opposeaggression against democratic countries. This was the basis ofthe containment policy that guided American diplomacythrough the Cold War (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

Warring sides 1

showed that conventional warfare itself wasan exhausting affair. In 1950, the SovietUnion, Japan, China, and Europe had notyet fully recovered from the world wars andlacked the economic strength to enteranother one. Third, the bipolar nature of theinternational system meant that evenperipheral conflicts were often the concernof the superpowers. Any gain by onesuperpower was a loss for the other.Therefore, there was a risk that any conflictinvolving a superpower or one of its alliescould escalate into a Third World War.

The Korean, peninsula

From 1905 to 1945, Korea was under thecontrol of Japan. During this time, Koreansfervently sought to form their own nation-state. Unfortunately, Communists andrightists disputed who would rule anindependent Korea. The Korean Communist

movement conducted a low-level guerrillawar against the Japanese. Meanwhile, exilednon-Communist Koreans formed aNationalist provisional government inShanghai. Dr Syngman Rhee was a SouthKorean leader who, for a brief period in theearly 1920s, was president of the provisionalgovernment. During the Second World War,Rhee lived in the USA, where he vociferouslycondemned Japan. His actions earned himpopular recognition in Korea.

US President Franklin Roosevelt wanted toplace Korea under international trusteeshiponce Japan was defeated. At the TehranConference in 1943, the Soviet Union, theUK, and the USA agreed that Korea shouldbe run under an international trusteeshipbefore becoming fully independent.However, the details of trusteeship were notdetermined before the Soviet Red Armyannihilated the Japanese army in Manchuriaand pressed into Korea in August 1945.Stalin agreed to divide Korea with the USA

East Asia and the Korean peninsula in 1950

12 Essential Histories - The Korean War

along the arbitrary line of the 38th Parallel.The bulk of the Korean population as well asthe capital city of Seoul fell into theAmerican zone. The northern industrial halfof Korea went to the Soviets.

At the end of the Second World War, theUSA was the dominant power in east Asia.Having fought the Pacific War to eliminateJapanese economic and military strength, theUSA now considered the entire Pacific Oceanto be its sphere of influence. However,American leaders were unsure of how Koreafell into this sphere of influence. Many,including the supreme commander in theFar East, General Douglas MacArthur,believed that Korea was irrelevant.

The domestic political scene in Korea wasturbulent as rightists and Communists viedfor power. General John Hodge wascommander of the American occupationalzone. Extremely anti-Communist. Hodgefirst relied on the Japanese police andadministrators to run South Korea. TheShanghai government was disregarded.Rightists like Rhee appealed to Hodge forsupport, which he readily gave.

The Soviets unsurprisingly supported thedevelopment of Communism in NorthKorea. Their interest in Korea derived fromtheir desire to maintain a sphere of influence

North Korean leader Kim II Sung (left) and ChinesePremier Zhou Enlai (right) at a cocktail party Kim II Sungwas the main advocate for invading South Korea.Zhou was the PRC's number one diplomat Heconducted most of the negotiations with the SovietUnion regarding China's entry into the war.(China Photo Service/Eastphoto)

in east Asia. Stalin did not want Korea tobecome a staging ground for an invasion ofthe Soviet Union. However, Control of all ofKorea could not easily be attained in themidst of American hegemony over thePacific. Stalin was not ready to risk a majorconflict and preferred to protect Sovietsecurity by establishing North Korea as abuffer. The Soviets and Korean CommunistsPurged all non-Communists from leadershippositions in North Korea. The North KoreanCommunist Party was officially formed inJuly 1946. With Soviet support, Kim Il Sungestablished authority over other prominentfigures within the party. Kim had beentrained by the Soviet Union and, in theSecond World War, had fought the Japaneseas a guerrilla in Manchuria With thesedevelopments, North Korea was progressing

At the Moscow Conference in December1945, the USA and the Soviet Union made anagreement on the future of Korea. Their

Warring sides 13

respective occupational commands wouldform a joint commission to advise on theformation of a provisional governmentTrusteeship would occur after a provisionalgovernment had been established. Theagreement suited Soviet interests because itstipulated that the new government must beamenable to the Soviet Union. The SouthKorean people were hostile to the agreement.They opposed trusteeship of any sort. The firstmeeting of the joint commission was heldbetween March and May 1946. It dealt withthe identification of Korean groups that couldbe approached for the eventual formation of agovernment. The Soviets refused to recognizegroups that rejected the 1945 MoscowConference agreement, meaning nearly everyimportant South Korean political party.Disagreement could not be overcome and thecommission adjourned to resume its debatethe following year. When the jointcommission reconvened in May 1947,proceedings quickly became bogged downover the same issues. In September, the USAdecided to hand the problem of Korea over tothe United Nations (UN).

In September 1947, the US Joint Chiefs ofStaff (JCS) assessed that the USA had littleinterest in maintaining troops and bases inKorea. In April 1948, the National SecurityCouncil (NSC) recommended withdrawingAmerican military forces but providingmilitary and economic aid to bolster SouthKorea's security. President Harry Trumanadopted this recommendation even thoughit failed to address how the USA shouldrespond to overt Communist aggression. UStroop withdrawal began on 19 May 1948.

Meanwhile, in November 1947, the UNGeneral Assembly recognized Korea's right toindependence and established a commissionto supervise elections, the United NationsTemporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK).The elections were intended to create aconstituent assembly that would unify thenation prior to the withdrawal of foreignoccupation forces. The resolution passed overthe objection of the Soviet Union.Consequently, the Soviets would not allowUNTCOK to enter North Korea. Nevertheless,

the USA secured UN authorization forUNTCOK to supervise elections solely in theSouth for a 'National Government' of Korea.

The elections took place on 10 May 1948.UNTCOK's supervision was superficial due toa lack of manpower. Amidst widespreadcorruption and even violence, Rhee andrightist political parties gained a majority inthe National Assembly. The NationalAssembly chose Rhee to be president and heformed a government that claimed torepresent all of Korea. In October 1948, theUN General Assembly recognized the newRepublic of Korea (ROK). However, a Sovietveto in the Security Council prevented theROK from actually joining the UN. In turn,the Soviets proceeded with their own'elections' in North Korea. On 25 August1948, a Supreme People's Assembly wassupposedly elected. One month later, theNorth Korean Communists formed theDemocratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK), with Kim as the premier.

Both governments considered themselvesto be the legitimate rulers of all Korea.Violent skirmishes and raids wracked theborder between North and South Korea. Kimfocused on gaining control of South Koreathrough internal subversion. North Koreahad been attempting to subvert South Koreainternally since the end of the Second WorldWar. Guerrillas in South Korea receiveddirection and arms supplies from NorthKorea. Many North Korean leaders hadoriginally been Communist leaders in theSouth. Civil disorder spread to coastal andmountainous regions of South Korea.

The guerrilla war in South Korea came toa head in April 1948 when a major rebellionexploded on Cheju-do, an island off thesouthern coast. The island was disaffectedfrom the rest of South Korea by its clannishsocial structure and radical political leanings.In short order, the rebellion spread to Taeguon the mainland. Police sent to suppress therebellion themselves rebelled around Yosu inOctober 1948. Rhee instituted harshmeasures to suppress the Cheju Rebellionand subversion throughout South Korea,including purging his police force. By the

14 Essential Histories • The Korean War

time fighting finally ended after January1949, 30,000 people had died. In March1950, North Korea sent thousands ofinsurgents south to resuscitate the guerrillawar. However, the ROK army was now veryefficient at counterinsurgency. Fiveregiments and 10,000 national policequashed the renewed insurgency.

China

The People's Republic of China also had aninterest in events in Korea. American power inthe Pacific threatened the PRC. ImpressiveAmerican air and naval forces and a string ofbases in the western Pacific were poised offChina's coast. Furthermore, the ChineseNationalists had received American militaryassistance throughout the Chinese Civil War.After the civil war. the USA did not recognizethe PRC and used its veto power to preventthe PRC from taking the seat designated forChina in the UN Security Council. In April1950, the USA embargoed nearly all goodsinto China. Mao Zedong, the Chinese leader,was also concerned about maintaining themomentum of the Communist revolution. ForCommunism in China to develop further, hebelieved it was necessary to make a firm breakwith the USA and its imperialist ideology.

In spite of their ideology, the ChineseCommunists did not have close ties withthe Soviet Union during the Chinese CivilWar. Stalin was not forthcoming with

military assistance or political support. Hehad even signed a treaty with theNationalists. In early 1949, with the civilwar drawing to a close, Mao outlined futurePRC foreign policy, it was based on theprinciples of making a fresh start,consolidating the Chinese CommunistParty's (CCP) domestic Position, fosteringeconomic growth, and 'leaning to one side.'The last phrase meant that, in the contextof the superpower competition of the ColdWar, the PRC would build ties with theSoviet Union. Mao officially declared thatChina would ' lean to one side' andestablished a Special relationship with theSoviet Union on 30 June 1949. Thisalignment was due partly to sharedCommunist ideology, but also to increasingconfrontation with the USA.

Following Mao's 'lean to one side'statement, the PRC and the Soviet Unionbecame much closer. In August 1949, theSoviet Union sent experts to China toadvise in economic reconstruction andmilitary expansion. Stalin offered the PRC$300 million in loans. In early 1950, Maosought an alliance with the Soviet Union.Consequently, the Sino-Soviet Treaty ofFriendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistancewas signed on 14 February 1950. The treatyobliged each country to aid the other in theevent of an attack by a third party. Chinaalso received another loan of $300 million,which was to be spent on purchasing armsfrom the Soviet Union.

Outbreak

The Communists strike

When the revolutionary movement in SouthKorea began to falter, Kim turned to moreovert means of unifying the peninsula. InMarch and April 1949, he visited the SovietUnion and signed an economic and culturalagreement. The two countries also signed anarms pact in March 1949, in which the SovietUnion promised to expand the North Koreanarmed forces. While in Moscow, Kim pressedStalin to support a North Korean invasion ofSouth Korea. Stalin would not agree. He didnot want to take any actions that mightprovoke the USA or South Korea into a war.Throughout 1949, Kim lobbied Stalin to backmilitary action.

By September 1949, Stalin and the SovietPolitburo were beginning to consider themerits of military action. Stalin did so forfour reasons. First, the victory of the ChineseCommunists in the Chinese Civil Warincreased the strength of the Communistbloc in east Asia. Second, the Soviet Unionsuccessfully detonated its first atomic bombin September, eliminating a major handicapin a war with the USA. Third, theestablishment of NATO and worseningrelations with the West reduced the prospectsof attaining Soviet foreign policy goalsthrough diplomacy. Fourth, there was aperceived weakening of Washington's resolveto fight a war over Korea.

Two events occurred in 1950 that signalledto the Communists that the USA would notfight over Korea. First, on 12 January 1950,Secretary of State Dean Acheson made hisinfamous speech before the National PressClub in which he implied that South Koreawas not an American interest. He stated thatthe USA was forming a defensive perimeter inthe Pacific from the Aleutians to Japan to theRyukyus and the Philippines. South Koreawas not listed within the defensive perimeter.Given the lack of military support already

shown for South Korea, the speech seemed toconfirm that the USA would stand aside ifthe Communists invaded. Second, on19 January, the House of Representativesnarrowly rejected the administration's KoreanAid Bill. Although the vote was reversed inFebruary, the rejection enforced theimpression that Americans did not greatlycare about Korea.

While the USA waffled over committing toKorea, its policy was solidifying against theSoviet Union. A joint State-DefenseDepartment group completed NSC 68 on14 april 1950. This document was a reaction,to perceived Soviet expansionism. Itsimplistically viewed international relationsas a confrontation between Communism,representing slavery, and the West,representing freedom. It surmised that withinfour to five years the Soviet Union would beable to attack the USA with nuclear weaponsand win a world war. Therefore, Americanmilitary spending needed to be drasticallyincreased in order to confront Communismnot just in Europe but everywhere in theworld. Truman supported the document'ssuggestions. However, many policymakerswere sceptical that high military expenditureswere necessary or good for the economy. Forthe next months, NSC 68 sat awaitingapproval and implementation.

Stalin entertained three reasons to back aNorth Korean invasion of South Korea. First,capturing South Korea would increase Sovietsecurity in east Asia. In particular, he wantedto bolster the Soviet position before Japanre-emerged as a major economic and militarypower. Second, Stalin worried that Rhee mightsoon attack North Korea. This could create anuncontrollable situation in which the SovietUnion would be forced to intervene. Third, hebelieved that a war would tie the PRC morefirmly to the Soviet Union. A war over Korea

I 6 Essential Histories • The Korean War

would make Chinese rapprochement with theUSA nearly impossible.

Kim secretly visited the Soviet Union inApril 1950. Here, Stalin finally permitted aNorth Korean invasion of South Korea. Heasked only that Kim assure him that adecisive victory could be achieved and thatescalation was impossible. Stalin alsoemphasized that there would be no directSoviet intervention. He felt the Soviet Unionitself was not yet reach" for a military conflictwith the West. However, all requested warmaterial would be delivered. Kim then visitedMao in Beijing. Mao agreed that only militaryaction would unify Korea. He doubted thatthe USA would concern itself over a war inKorea. Kim was also confident and told Maothat his army would capture all of Korea intwo to three weeks, long before Americanintervention would be possible.

On 25 June 1950, North Korea invadedSouth Korea. North Korean propagandaclaimed that the offensive was in reaction to aSouth Korean attack. The invasion took theROK and the USA completely by surprise.Truman was outraged. When he disembarkedfrom his airplane in Washington, havingflown from Missouri, he was rumoured tohave uttered: 'By God, I'm going to let themhave it.' For Truman, the invasion was a clearindication of Communists' willingness to useovert aggression to support the expansion oftheir influence. Both Truman and Achesonbelieved that Korea was a test of the West'scommitment to stand up to Communistaggression. Not fighting would repeat themistakes of the appeasement of the 1930s andinspire the Communists to conduct furtheracts of aggression throughout the world.

Despite the previous equivocation, theNorth Korean invasion was viewed as aclear-cut threat to American interests. IfSouth Korea were conquered, Communistgovernments would control the entire eastAsian mainland (minus Hong Kong) north ofIndochina and Communist insurgencies werewell underway in Malaya and French Indo-China. This would be a tremendous boon tothe Soviet Union. The security of Japan was ofparticular concern to decision-makers in

Washington. American leaders weredetermined to keep Soviet influence out ofJapan. In fact, the peace treaty with Japan wasbeing delayed in order to prevent the SovietUnion from participating in negotiations overthe fate of the country. The victory of theCommunists in the Chinese Civil War hadalready worried American leaders, especiallyMacArthur, about the safety of Japan. Nowthe North Korean invasion seemed tothreaten this vital interest imminently.

.Acheson and Truman immediatelybrought the issue before the UN SecurityCouncil. The Soviet Union had beenboycotting the Security Council since January1950. It was protesting the representation ofthe Chinese Nationalist government inTaiwan, instead of the PRC, as one of the fivepermanent members of the Security Council.Without a Soviet delegation to obstructdeliberations, the Security Council quicklyadopted a resolution that deplored the NorthKorean invasion. It urged a cessation ofhostilities and the withdrawal of NorthKorean forces to the 38th Parallel. A secondresolution two days later recognized thenecessity of urgent military measures andrecommended that member states assistSouth Korea to repel the attack and restorepeace. Although Truman and Achesonsupported the ideal of collective security, theyused the UN mainly as a vehicle forachieving American interests. Securinginternational peace was a secondary goal.

Truman, Acheson, Louis Johnson (Secretaryof Defense), and the JCS met for dinner on25 June to devise an immediate reaction to thecrisis. The capable and level-headed GeneralOmar Bradley, of Second World War fame,chaired the JCS. Three recommendations werediscussed: first, to use air power against theNorth Korean forces; second, to deploy theUS Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan, whichmight also become threatened soon; and third,to send American military forces directly toSouth Korea. Johnson and the JCS opposedthis last recommendation. They onlysupported air and naval action. Dispatchingground forces to Korea would weaken theUSA's global military position.

Outbreak 17

Consequently, on 29 June, MacArthurreceived instructions to use his naval and airforces to defend the ROK. The US SeventhFleet was placed under his command andhe was to ensure that Taiwan was safeagainst attack. In order to reduce the risk ofthe conflict escalating into a wider war,operations were to stay clear of the bordersof the Soviet Union and China. MacArthurtravelled to South Korea on 30 June andobserved the military situation. Heconcluded that only the introduction ofAmerican ground forces could save theROK. MacArthur requested that twodivisions be sent to Korea. The JCS, nowmore confident that the attack was not aprelude to a major battle in WesternEurope, approved of the move.

A third resolution was passed in the UNSecurity Council on 7 July. It recommendedthe establishment of a United Nations

Command to defend South Korea, under theauthority of the USA. MacArthur was dulyappointed its commander. Fifteen stateswould eventually contribute troops to theUNC. Britain, New Zealand, Netherlands,France, Canada, Australia, Thailand, andTurkey were the first to offer militaryassistance. Taiwan's offer of ground forces wasdeclined due to the deleterious effect thatsuch a move would have on relations withthe Communists. However, American andROK forces always far outnumbered the totalcontribution of all other states.

The Korean War had now begun as thefirst open war between the USA and a proxyof the Soviet Union. For the two Koreas, theirpolitical identity and the very survival oftheir peoples were at stake. But for thesuperpowers, influence within east Asia wasat issue. Korea was a regional battlegroundfor their global competition.

The fighting

Avoiding a third world war

The war of maneuver

From July to September 1950, South Korea wason the brink of falling to the North Koreans.Only brilliant and aggressive action by theUSA averted this possibility. Both the NorthKoreans and the Americans utilized highlyeffective and aggressive operational doctrinesthat had been refined during the SecondWorld War. However, rather than decisivelyend the war, these doctrines prolonged it.

For the most part, the North Koreanarmed forces had been trained and equippedby the Soviet Union. Large numbers of tanks,artillery, aircraft, and small arms had beeninvested into the North Korean armed forcesin 1949 and early 1950. The North KoreanPeople's Army (NKPA) comprised ten

infantry divisions plus an armored brigade,for a total of 130,000 men plus100,000 trained reserves. Five of the infantrydivisions were very well trained andcontained troops with combat experience inthe Chinese Communist People's LiberationArmy (PLA). In the late 1940s, Kim had senttens of thousands of Koreans to assist theChinese Communists fighting against theNationalists in the Chinese Civil War. ThePLA released soldiers of Korean nationality,together with their equipment, to join theNKPA in 1949 and 1950. In fact, two PLAdivisions directly entered the NKPA,changing in name only. The key formationin the NKPA, though, was the well-trained105th North Korean Armored Brigade. It wasequipped with 120 Soviet T-34 tanks, which

The fighting 19

were armed with 85mm guns. North Koreaalso possessed an air force of 180 Soviet-builtYak fighters and Ilyushin bombers.

Soviet operations advisers devised theinvasion plan. It embodied a blitzkriegassault across the 38th Parallel. Two majorarmored thrusts were aimed on convergingpaths towards Seoul. The western thrust, the1st and 6th North Korean Divisions (aformer PLA division) and a detachment fromthe 105th North Korean Armored Brigade,would strike through Kaesong. The easternthrust, the 3rd and 4th North KoreanDivisions and the rest of the 105th NorthKorean Armored Brigade, would attackthrough Uijongbu, the traditional invasionroute. In central Korea, the 2nd and 7thNorth Korean Divisions would mount asecondary assault on Chunchon.Additionally, independent regiments were toadvance down the east and west coasts.Division-level planning and reconnaissancewere carried out with the help of Sovietadvisors. The North Koreans spotted targetsfor the artillery barrage and probed South

Korean positions for weak spots. NorthKorean soldiers even mingled with civiliansin order to infiltrate South Korean lines.General Kim Ch'aek. a veteran partisan ofthe Chinese Civil War, commanded theNorth Korean forces.

The ROK army was not nearly as wellTrained or equipped as its North Koreancounterpart. It numbered 100.000 men ineight weak infantry divisions. Most of thesedivisions contained only six of their requisitenine infantry battalions. There were onlythree artillery battalions in the entire army.The South Korean infantry was woefullyundertrained: only a handful had seencombat against Communist guerrillas. TheROK lacked both an air force and anti-aircraft batteries to counter North Korean airsupport. The only American troops in South

Supplied by the Soviet Union, the T-34 tanks of the 105th

North Korean Armored Brigade spearheaded the invasion

of South Korea. The South Koreans and Americans initially

had no defense against the T-34's heavy armor and high-

powered 85mm gun. (The Tank Museum. Bovington)

20 Essential Histories -The Korean War

Korea were the 500 men of the KoreanMilitary Advisory Group (KMAG)

South and North K o r e a were more evenlymatched on the sea. The North Korean navywas composed of approximately 50 smallvessels; a mix of patrol boats, minesweepers.torpedo boats, and one escort. South Koreahad 39 small craft, primarily patrol boats andminesweepers. By neglecting seapower, Kimabandoned virtually any capability to interferewith possible UK and US naval operations.These two naval powers would easily be ableto reinforce South Korea and mount strikesanywhere along the Korean littoral.

The terrain of Korea is not optimal for ablitzkrieg. Only about 150 miles (240km) wide,the peninsula is suited for a strong in-depthdefense. Most of the country is comprised ofrugged hills with steep slopes, intersected byvalleys. The roads primarily run through thesevalleys. The Taebaek mountain range runsnorth to south through the entire eastern halfof the peninsula. Even in the flatter westernhalf, narrow valleys, rice paddies, and jaggedhills make mobile warfare difficult. Climaticconditions are no more conducive to military

South Korean soldiers marching to battle in July 1950The ROK army was extremely unprepared for war in1950. Many of the men had no military training and littleproper equipment. (US Army)

operations. The summers are very hot andHumid. The Winters, on the other hand, areextremely cold, with near-Arctic conditions.The Yellow Sea often freezes. In the spring,Melting snow creates large floods andmudslides, which restrict movement.

Nevertheless, the dispositions of the ROKarmy made a blitzkrieg entirely viable.Major-General Chae Pyongdok, a veteran ofthe Japanese army, commanded the ROKarmed forces. He wanted to contain anyNorth Korean attack at the 38th Parallel andrejected a planned withdrawal to strongerpositions, such as behind the Han river. The38th Parallel was on comparatively flatground, lacking ridges or river-lines on whichto form a defensive. Chae strung out fourdivisions and one regiment along the parallel.

On 25 June, at 4.40 am, the North Koreansattacked. Soviet advisors guided the initialbreakthrough. The general pattern of theattack was as follows. First heavy artillerybombarded the attack zones. Next the infantryand tanks moved forward, smashing thebewildered South Korean defenders. Finallythe mechanized North Korean units pressedon to their objectives, cutting South Koreansupply lines and pursuing defeated units.

The 1st ROK Division defended theapproach to Seoul via Kaesong, known as the'western corridor.' Colonel Paik Sun Yup

The fighting 21

commanded the division. At only 29 years ofage, he was the youngest divisionalcommander in the ROK army. On 25 June,the veteran 6th North Korean Divisionoverwhelmed Paik's forward regiment andcaptured Kaesong, the ancient capital ofKorea, in four hours. Paik put up a fiercefight with his remaining two regiments.Commanding from the front, he withdrewto a pre-arranged defensive line on the Imjin

A North Korean command group Soviet advisors guided

the initial breakthrough. Thereafter the North Koreans

controlled operations. But without the Soviets'

experience, North Korean officers were less able to

conduct combined-arms operations. (US Army)

river. Artillery fire supported counterattacksand was directed against North Koreanpenetrations. Nevertheless, unable to counterthe North Korean tanks, Paik was pushedback. He wrote in his memoirs that manysoldiers acquired T-34 disease' and panickedat the sight of tanks. Some of Paik's menresorted to Japanese suicide tactics. Ladenwith high explosives, they threw themselvesupon oncoming tanks.

The 6th ROK Division, under the able KimChong O, also fought well and managed tohalt the 2nd and 7th North Korean Divisionsfor three days before Chunchon. Elsewhere,however, the front was crumbling. Inparticular, the undermanned 7th and2nd ROK Divisions on Paik's right flankdisintegrated against the North Korean

Paik Sun Yup stands third from the far left with this groupof senior officials, including Matthew Ridgway (secondfrom far right), for a photo in 1951. In 1950, Paik wasthe 29-year-old commander of the 1 st ROK Division.Generally considered to be the best South Korean fieldofficer in the war Paik would command the ROK armedforces by the end of the war. (US Air Force)

22 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Under Soviet supervision, the North Koreans rapidly broke through the ROK army's lines in ablitzkrieg assault on South Korea on 25 June 1950.

The fighting 23

armored column advancing towardsUijongbu. In the ROK military headquartersin Seoul, there was disorder. Withcommunications disrupted, Chae had noidea of the situation at the front. By the endof 26 June, the North Koreans had investedUijongbu and looked upon an open road toSeoul. Consequently, Paik sought towithdraw across the Han, but Chae orderedhim to 'Fight to the death in your presentpositions.' The roads and trains out of Seoulwere clogged with people trying to flee. Inthe confusion, the sole bridge across the Hanwas prematurely blown up. Hundreds ofcivilians were crossing the bridge at thatmoment. Forty-four thousand soldiers andmost of the army's heavy equipment werenow cut off to the north. Although in adisorganized state, Paik managed to pull hisdivision across the Han near the westernoutskirts of Seoul. Thus, by 28 June, the ROKarmy had been completely routed and Seoulhad fallen.

Major-General Chung Il Kwon, Chae'ssuccessor, decided to withdraw and preservethe ROK army rather than engage in furtherlast-ditch defensives. Major-General Kim HongIl took charge of delaying actions as the ROKarmy withdrew to the Naktong river. Kim

Hong Il had been a senior officer with theChinese Nationalists in the Second World Warand had experience of commanding largeformations. His steady efforts provided thetime needed for the build-up of Americanforces in Korea and the construction of thePusan Perimeter (see page 24).

Upon the outbreak of war, the US andBritish navies quickly deployed to the waterssurrounding Korea. Because the US SeventhFleet was dispatched to the Taiwan Straits,the initial US navy commitment to Koreaconsisted of only one fleet carrier (USS ValleyForge), one heavy cruiser, and eightdestroyers, known as Task Force 77.Eventually, the bulk of the Seventh Fleetdeployed off Korea. On 27 June, the Britishgovernment decided to place ships of theRoyal Navy Far East Fleet, which included alight fleet carrier (HMS Triumph) at thedisposal of Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy, thecommander of American naval forces in theFar East. The fleets blockaded North Korea,

A group of South Korean soldiers in a rice paddy wait to

advance on 6 September 1950. Despite their initial rout, the

ROK army survived the opening North Korean onslaught

and continued fighting throughout the war South Korea

provided over half of the UNC's manpower (US Army)

24 Eessential Histories -The Korean War

and naval aircraft from both carrierslaunched strikes against enemy targets.Meanwhile, the US Far East Air Force quicklyswept the skies of North Korean aircraft.

After the decision to commit groundforces, the USA hurriedly ferried formationsinto South Korea. The Eighth US Army wassent to Korea, commanded by GeneralWalton Walker. Rhee placed the ROK armyunder UNC command. The firstreinforcements, the 24th and 25th USInfantry Divisions, arrived directly fromJapan. Their men had been enjoying thecomforts of occupational life in Japan andwere not ready for combat. Like the ROKarmy, the two divisions were not equipped tocombat T-34s. On 5 July, a detachment of the24th US Division, known as Task Force Smith,was assigned to defend Osan. North Koreanarmor pressed the Americans back to Taejon,an important road hub, within a week. There,the entire division, attempting to make astand, was overrun. Its commander, Major-General William Dean, was personallyinvolved in the front-line combat and wascaptured in the ensuing rout. One NorthKorean officer, Lieutenant Oak Hyung-uk,later told historian John Toland that manyAmericans were too frightened to fight.

As ROK and American formations foughtdelaying actions, Walker established the PusanPerimeter, a defensive line which ran northalong the Naktong river and then east to thewest. Pusan was a vital port on the southerntip of the peninsula through which mostAmerican forces arrived. The first threat camefrom the 6th North Korean Division. Theseveterans of the Chinese Civil War had made arapid, if circuitous, advance through south-western Korea and were now threatening tooutflank Walker's line in the south. The 25thUS Division barely stopped them less than 30miles (48km) from Pusan. Kim Ch'aek tried toexploit this breach in the First Battle of theNaktong Bulge. His headquarters hoped to pre-empt further American reinforcements. But by24 August, the attacks here and at Taegu hadbeen thrown back with heavy casualties.

Reinforcements were now arriving daily.Better American bazookas and heavy M-26

Pershing tanks had arrived that couldcounter the T-34s. The North Koreans waiteduntil 3 September to make their majorassault in the Second Battle of the NaktongBulge. However, by then North Koreanstrength was ebbing. With only 98,000 men,they faced 180,000 UNC soldiers. Walkerused his superior firepower and reserveseffectively and threw back the attackers.Exact North Korean casualties from thebeginning of the war to this point areunknown, but some American estimatesplace them as high as 60,000. The ROK armyand the American forces suffered 70,000 and16,000 casualties respectively.

While Walker halted the North Koreansaround the Pusan Perimeter, MacArthur wasplanning a more decisive action to thenorth. MacArthur is one of the great figuresof the Korean War. At the beginning of thewar, his reputation was gigantic from hisvictories in the Pacific War. After 1945, hehad governed the occupation andreconstruction of Japan. So great was hisinfluence that Washington made few-attempts to control his actions. MacArthurwas a devout exponent of decisive warfare.Throughout the Pacific War, he had engagedin a series of amphibious assaults to outflankthe Japanese, get behind their supply lines,and bypass their strongpoints. Thus, in Koreahe did not want to continue a frontal battleat Pusan, but sought to annihilate the NorthKoreans in one swift stroke.

MacArthur proposed an amphibiouslanding at Inchon, the port for Seoul. Alanding there offered the opportunity tosever North Korea's lines of communicationand trap its army to the south. Inchon wasan extremely dangerous and risky point toattack. City-fighting is costly under the bestof circumstances; it is even more so whensoldiers must first disembark from assaultcraft directly under defending fire.Additionally, the Inchon harbor had deeptidal shifts, high sea walls, a narrow channel,broad mudflats, and fortified islands. Thetide fell 20 feet (6m) twice per day.MacArthur, though, believed that thesefactors actually made Inchon an attractive

The fighting 25

Marines climb from their landing craft to assault Inchonon 15 September 1950. Inchon harbor had large tidalshifts, mudflats, a narrow channel, fortified islands, and ahigh seawall. In this photo. Marines are using ladders toascend part of the seawall. (The Historical Branch,United States Marine Corps)

point to attack. The North Koreans wouldnever expect it. The JCS initially weresceptical about the attack. But MacArthurwon them over through skilfully presentinghis case to the Chief of the Arm)7, GeneralLawton Collins, and the Chief of NavalOperations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, at astrategic planning conference in Tokyo.

The 1st US Marine and 7th US InfantryDivisions would mount the assault as part ofthe newly formed X US Corps. Lieutenant-General Edward Almond, MacArthur's chiefof staff, was given command of the corps.Circumventing Walker, Almond answereddirectly to MacArthur. The X US Corpsrepresented the last of MacArthur's reserves.If his gamble failed and disaster struck atInchon, there would be no troops left toretake South Korea.

The troops were to be put ashore on15 September in tidal 'windows' - theperiod when the tide was high enough forlanding craft to reach the shore. First, the

Marines would seize Wolmi-do, the islandcontrolling the harbor. Then, they wouldpress into the city and on to captureKimpo Airfield. Next, Seoul, the mostimportant rail and road hub in South Korea,would be assaulted. Finally, both divisionswould block the enemy retreat from thePusan Perimeter. Ironically, Kim Il Sungand Kim Ch'aek were aware of thelikelihood of an American amphibiousattack at Inchon. However, they decidedto stake everything on the Second Battleof the Naktong Bulge and left Inchonrelatively undefended.

Early on 15 September, UNC naval and airforces bombarded Wolmi-do. MacArthur waspersonally present aboard the flagship of theamphibious assault force, the USS MountMcKinley. At 6.33 am, the first battalion ofthe 5th Marine Regiment landed and tookthe key point on the island without a singlefatality. The remaining battalions of theregiment assaulted Inchon itself at the nexttidal window at 5.30 pm. The disembarkingMarines clambered over the sea wall andthrough enemy bunkers to capture thedominating ground surrounding thebeachhead. Meanwhile, the 1st MarineRegiment landed on the city's southernoutskirts. By morning the Marines had

26 Essential Histories • The Korean War

The Pusan Perimeter and Inchon landing,5 August-17 September 1950

To halt the North Koreans. Eighth Army commander Walton Walker formed a defensive line in thesoutheast corner of Korea, known as the Pusan Perimeter in August 1950.

The fighting 27

A dramatic picture of Marines engaged in street fightingduring the battle for Seoul. American incendiary bombs,artillery shells, and tanks reduced the city to rubble.(US Army)

pressed 6 miles (10km) inland and controlledthe Inchon-Seoul supply route.

The North Koreans, facing the X USCorps, retreated to Seoul where 20.000 heldout in a last-ditch stand. Major-General O. P.Smith, commander of the Marine Division,planned a two-pronged attack to take Seoulfrom the north and southwest. Kimpo fell tothe northern group on 18 September.Anxious to capture Seoul, Almond threw the7th US Division's 32nd Regiment into theattack from the southeast. The fight for Seoulwas ferocious. UNC artillery fire and close air

OPPOSITE1. On 11 August, the 6th North Korean Division tried to

outflank the Eighth Army line in the south, initiating theFirst Battle of the Naktong River Bulge.

2. The bulk of the North Korean forces attacked the apexof the Eighth Army line.

3. Unsuccessful in the first battle, the North Koreans madea carefully prepared attempt to break the PusanPerimeter in the Second Battle of the Naktong Bulge(3-10 September), but again the Eighth Army held fast

4. Meanwhile. MacArthur landed the X US Corps atInchon on 15 September threatening the North Koreansupply lines. This caused the collapse of the entire NorthKorean People's Army in the following week.

support struck the city heavily. Napalmcaused incendiary fires. Many civilians diedin the fighting. The North Koreans foughtfanatically, using suicide squads to destroyAmerican tanks. They were finally defeatedby 27 September when the American andUN flags were raised over the capitol.

Walker broke out from the Pusan Perimeteron 23 September. Three days later, the 1st USCavalry and 7th US Divisions linked at Osan,trapping large numbers of Koreans. The NKPAfell into a rout. Trapped, the North Koreanforces west of Osan were smashed. Those tothe east collapsed as they retreated north.Many soldiers took refuge in the Taebaeks asguerrillas. Ranking officers frequentlysurrendered to the American and ROK forces.The battered 13th North Korean Division'schief of staff even shot its commandinggeneral - who wanted to continue recklessassaults - in order to allow the men to retreat.By the time they were back across the 38thParallel, the North Koreans had lost over150,000 men. The UNC captured 125,000prisoners. UNC losses in the offensive,including Inchon, were 18,000.

Inchon was a stunning and brilliantvictory for the UNC. The threat to SouthKorea was completely overturned and theNKPA virtually annihilated. However, whileMacArthur's maneuver warfare was

28 Essential Histories • The Korean War

outstandingly effective in annihilating theNorth Koreans, it did not create a stable basisfor peace. Rather, the decisiveness of thevictory greatly threatened the Soviet Unionand the PRC.

The Chinese enter the war

American entry into the Korean War greatly-concerned the Chinese Communists. AnAmerican victory in Korea would threatentheir security and ideological interests. Indeed,Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai viewed theAmerican intervention as part of a grand planto control east Asia. Accordingly, on13 July 1950, four armies were dispatched tothe Korean border to form the NortheastBorder Defense Army (NBDA). It would defendChina's border and support the operations ofthe North Korean armed forces. HistorianChen Jian describes in China's Road to theKorean War how, at a meeting of the ChinesePolitburo on 4 August 1950, Mao said: 'If theUS imperialists won the war they wouldbecome more arrogant and would threaten us.We should not fail to assist the Koreans. Wemust lend them our hands in the form ofsending our military volunteers there.'However, Mao could not yet intervene becauseof the unpreparedness of the PLA.

The Inchon landing brought the questionof Chinese intervention to a head. As theNKPA disintegrated, first Pak Il-yu, NorthKorean Minister of Interior Affairs, and thenKim himself requested immediate Chineseintervention to save North Korea. For Maoand the CCP, the annihilation of the NKPAincreased the threat that the USA posed toChina. The battle line was rapidlyapproaching Manchuria, a vital industrialregion. On 24 September, Zhou protested theaccidental American bombing of Andong tothe UN. Two days later, Nie Rongzhen, theacting PLA chief of staff, told K. M. Panikkar,Indian ambassador to the PRC, that the PRCwould not passively await an Americanadvance to the Sino-Korean border.

The American landing at Inchon alsoshocked Stalin. If the USA occupied all of

Korea, the entire balance of power in east Asiawould be upset. American forces would bedirectly on Soviet borders as well as China's.Nevertheless, Stalin was still unwilling to risk adirect military confrontation. Therefore, Stalinasked Mao if China was in a position tointervene. He promised military equipmentand that the Soviet air force would provide airsuperiority over the Chinese armies.

Mao did not respond to Kim and Stalin'srequests until 2 October. At a speciallyconvened meeting of the CCP Politburo,Mao announced his intention to intervene.After the meeting, with the Politburo'stentative support, Mao sent a telegram toStalin, comprehensively summarizing hisplans. A portion of the PLA would be sent toKorea as the Chinese People's Volunteers(CPV). Although he expected Americanretaliation against Chinese soil, Mao's goalwas nothing less than the decisiveannihilation of the UNC forces in Korea. Hehoped to avoid a stalemate, which woulddrain China's resources and stunt itseconomic reconstruction.

Zhou was sent to Moscow to ask for largeamounts of aid and weapons, as well asreconfirmation of Soviet air support. Beforehis departure, at midnight on 2 October,Zhou told Panikkar that if the USA crossedthe 38th Parallel, the PRC would 'not sit stilland do nothing.' Nevertheless, in alllikelihood, there was little the USA couldhave done to dissuade Mao from interveningat this point. Zhou's message was probablyjust meant to buy time for the CPV toconcentrate in North Korea. On 3 October,Mao appointed Peng Dehuai to commandthe CPV. Peng was one of the PLA's bestleaders and was known for his courage intough situations. The final orders to the CPVto enter Korea were issued on 8 October.

The Chinese decision to intervene gaveStalin what he wanted. When he met withZhou on 11 October, Stalin said that theSoviet Union would provide all of theartillery, armor, aircraft, and militaryequipment required, but that the PRC wouldhave to pay for it. Mao tried unsuccessfullyto bargain with Stalin. Given the threat that

The fighting 29

the USA posed, though, he had no choicebut to continue with intervention.

Meanwhile, the Eighth Army approachedthe 38th Parallel. MacArthur was hypnotizedby the allure of total victory and disregardedthe repeated Chinese warnings. Nor didmany in the American government take thewarnings seriously. MacArthur and theAmerican government sought to unify Koreaunder the ROK. In late September, the JCSand Acheson decided to pursue the NKPAnorth of the parallel as long as there was nothreat of major Soviet or Chineseintervention. Secretary of Defense George C.Marshall even told MacArthur that thegovernment wanted him to 'feel unhamperedtactically and strategically to proceed northof the 38th parallel.' On 1 October, ROKtroops crossed the 38th Parallel, followed bythe rest of the Eighth Army on 7 October.Despite the increasing momentum to unifyKorea, Truman was concerned about therepercussions of crossing the 38th Parallel. Hearranged a meeting with MacArthur on WakeIsland to discuss the situation. At the hugelypublicized meeting on 15 October,MacArthur reassured Truman that there wereno signs of Chinese or Soviet intent tointervene.

A UN resolution in the General Assemblyon 7 October permitted the UNC to advanceacross the 38th Parallel and unify Korea. TheSoviet Union had returned to the SecurityCouncil in August. To overcome its veto, theUSA pushed through a special procedure inNovember 1950, known as 'Uniting forPeace.' It stipulated that, if a veto paralyzedthe Security Council in an emergency, theGeneral Assembly could rule on theconcerned matter as long as a two-thirdsmajority pertained.

Back in Korea, MacArthur deployed hiscorps on diverging lines of advance. TheEighth Army advanced in the west, takingPyongyang on 20 October and then movingon toward the Yalu. The X US Corps, stillacting directly under MacArthur, conducteda belated amphibious landing at Wonsan on26 October (which the I ROK Corps hadalready beaten them to), and drove north.UNC front-line strength was approximately200,000 men.

A column of Chinese infantry crossing the Yalu river intoKorea. In October and November 1950. the People'sLiberation Army, under the pseudonym of the ChinesePeople's Volunteers, massed in the northern reaches ofKorea, waiting to spring their trap against the carelesslyadvancing UNC forces. (Chinese News Agency)

30 Essential Histories -The Korean War

The CPV, unlike the NKPA, was poorlyequipped. It lacked artillery and was notmechanized. Despite the recent increase inSoviet assistance, most of its small arms andammunition had been captured from theNationalist Chinese or the Japanese. Logisticswere primarily organized through civilianlaborers who carried supplies to the front onfoot. Thus, the CPV could not advance farwithout suffering supply difficulties.However, tremendous manpower and astrong base of recent combat experienceoffset these disadvantages. Most CPV soldiershad experienced combat in the large fieldoperations at the end of the Chinese CivilWar. They were hardy marchers and adept atoff-road movement. Peng emphasized thequick and bold movement of infantry toencircle and overwhelm the enemy. Attackswere to be conducted at night when theelement of surprise would facilitate abreakthrough. Most Chinese leaders, buoyedby their success in the Second World Warand the Chinese Civil War, believed thatdeception, stealth, and night fighting wouldenable their poorly armed soldiers toovercome Western technological andmateriel superiority.

The CPV was composed of theThirteenth and Ninth CPV Army Corps, for

OPPOSITEThe Chinese entered the Korean War in force on25 November 1950. In the west the Thirteenth CPVArmy Corps threatened to encircle the Eighth Army. The2nd US Division was cut off at Kunu-ri and virtuallyannihilated struggling south. The entire army was forcedsouth in a disorganized rout. In the east, the Ninth CPVArmy Corps encircled the 1st US Marine Division of theX US Corps at the Chosin reservoir

a total of about 300,000 men. The former,commanded by General Deng Hua,contained four CPV armies, of threedivisions each. Deng had carefully trainedthe Thirteenth CPV Army Corps. Its soldierswere of a very high caliber. For example,the 38th CPV Army of the Thirteenth CPVArmy Corps was known as an eliteformation from its performance in theChinese Civil War. The three armies of theNinth CPV Army Corps, on the other hand,had been preparing for an invasion ofTaiwan and were not ready to face themountainous terrain and freezing winterweather of Korea. The North Korean armed

General Peng Dehuai. seated on the left, commanded

the Chinese People's Volunteers. He was a realistic and

level-headed commander. Unfortunately, he was

executed during the Cultural Revolution after privately

questioning Mao's policies. (Xinhua)

The fighting 31

The Communist Second Phase Offensive, 25 November 1950

32 Essential Histories • The Korean War

forces, although given some autonomy, alsofell under Peng's command.

The Thirteenth CPV Army Corps firstcrossed the Yalu on 14 October 1950. Twoweeks later, it mounted a limited attack onthe II ROK Corps in order to stunt theEighth Army advance; this attack wasknown as the First Phase Offensive. Aftersmashing an ROK and an Americanregiment, Peng returned to the defensive,waiting for the UNC to advance andoverextend itself. Although Walker ordered atactical withdrawal, MacArthur did notappreciate the gravity of what had occurred.He believed that only a small number ofChinese troops were actually in Korea andthat a quick advance would pre-empt furtherintervention. On 24 November, MacArthurand Walker resumed the UNC advance,falling into Peng's trap. Expecting a quickand painless end to the war, UNC soldiersand officers advanced recklessly. Formationsbecame strung out and did not take properprecautions against a counterattack. Rumourspread that the American troops would be'home by Christmas.'

On the evening of 25 November, Peng andthe CPV sprung upon the renewedUNC advance to open the Second PhaseOffensive. The Thirteenth CPV Army Corps, of180,000 men, was to crush the II ROK Corps

in central Korea and then cut off the retreat ofthe I and IX US Corps to the west. Mao andPeng hoped this offensive might unify thepeninsula under Communist control. Theassaulting Chinese infantry moved off-road toencircle and then overwhelm UNC units.Lacking sufficient radios, the Chinese usedbugles, drums, and other instruments tocoordinate their movements. These surpriseattacks were very disorienting to the averageUNC soldier. By the end of 26 November, theII ROK Corps had completely disintegrated,and the Chinese were surrounding the 2nd USInfantry Division. Meanwhile, the Chinesepressed the fronts of the two American corpsin order to pin them against the flankingmovement. The I US Corps was forced toretreat hurriedly down the coast. The entireEighth Army was threatened withencirclement.

Disregarding reports from the front,Walker and MacArthur would not permitthe 2nd US Division to retreat until28 November. By then, the 38th CPV Armyhad cut off the division's escape route, the

American infantry under Chinese attack in NorthKorea in late 1950. American soldiers had beenexpecting to be shipped home, but instead foundthemselves in a new. much more difficult, conflict.(US Army Military History Institute)

The fighting 33

Chinese infantry advancing at night. The Chinese were

adept at infiltration tactics, night combat, and off-road

movement. Their surprise attacks, accompanied by eerie

whistles and bugles, disconcerted UNC soldiers.

(Chinese National Army Museum)

road from Kunu-ri to Sunchon. The Chineseensconced themselves on the hillsidesoverlooking the road and maintained aconstant rain of small arms fire on to theroad-bound 2nd US Division. They usedsatchel charges, grenades, and mortarshelling to destroy American vehicles andequipment. American troops quickly lost all

cohesion. The road became filled with thewreckage of American tanks, artillery, andtransport vehicles. UNC air strikes napalmedthe hillsides and hampered the CPVencirclement. The 38th CPV Army wasunable physically to block the road, allowingdisordered American soldiers to escape.

The Ninth CPV Army Corps marching in North

Korea about the time of the battle for the Chosin

reservoir. These men had been training for an amphibious

landing on Taiwan and were not prepared for the

near-Arctic conditions of the Chosin reservoir

Thousands died from the cold. (Xinhua)

34 Essential Histories • The Korean War

By 30 November, the remnants of the2nd US Division met with the forwardpositions of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade,which had been attempting to relieve them.The division had taken 5,000 casualties.Meanwhile, the rest of the DC and I US Corps(with some elements of the 2nd US Division)retreated to safety via Anju on the west coast.The Chinese had not moved fast enough toblock this escape r o u t .

In the mountains around the Chosinreservoir, the Ninth CPV Army Corps of120,000 men was preparing to encircle theX US Corps. In accordance with MacArthur'sorders for an offensive to the Yalu, the 1st USMarine Division had advanced along thewestern edge of the Chosin reservoir towardthe Yalu. To Almond's ire, Smith had wiselyslowed the advance of the Marine Division in

order to concentrate his forces and maintaina steady flow of supplies. As the Marinesmarched north, the temperature droppedbelow freezing and it began to snow.

The 1st US Marine Division was an eliteformation. Many of the Marines hadextensive combat experience in the PacificWar. This foundation of combat experiencewas one of the major reasons that theMarines performed well in Korea. .Anotherwas the degree to which the Marinesemphasized loyalty and unit cohesion. TheMarines woe committed to standing togetherand fighting it out in difficult situations.

On the night of 27 November, the Ninth CPV ArmyCorps encircled the Marines at the Chosin reservoir Inthe ensuing battle, the Marines fought their way out.driving south to Chinhung-ni.

Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, 27-28 November 1950

The fighting 35

On the night of 27 November, theChinese struck. They cut off the lead 5th and7th Marine Regiments at Yudam-ni andsurrounded the 1st Marine Regiment atHagaru and Koto-ri. In mass numbers, theChinese mounted frontal assaults on theMarine positions. Corporal Arthur Koch, asquad leader in the 5th Marine Regiment,described the experience of a Chinese attackin Martin Russ's book Breakout.

It was enough to make your hair stand on

end ... When the bugles died away we heard a

voice through a megaphone and then the blast of

a police whistle. I was plenty scared, but who

wasn't? I couldn't believe my eyes when I saw

them in the moonlight. It was like the snow

coining to life, and they were shouting and

shaking their fists - just raising hell ... The

Chinese didn't come at us by fire and maneuver

... they came in a rush like a pack of mad dogs.

Even though I was ready it was a terrible shock.

Nearly every man took part in the fighting.All Marines, whatever their specialization,

were trained to fight as infantrymen. SergeantJames H. Fearns was a mechanic who quicklydeparted from his duties to serve as afront-line infantryman. He found the Chineseto be much more determined opponents thanthe North Koreans. The North Koreans wouldretreat once pushed off a position. TheChinese, on the other hand, would stand andfight However, the Chinese often made grosstactical errors. Besides frontally attacking thesame strong positions repeatedly, they did notknow bow to exploit a breakthrough. Theywould mill around on captured hills, makingwonderful targets. Despite beingoutnumbered, the Marines inflicted hideouscasualties on the Chinese frontal assaults.Every time the Chinese captured a ridge, theMarines counterattacked and drove themback off it.

A load of napalm dropped from a Corsair explodesagainst the Chinese blocking the retreat of the Marinesfrom the Chosin reservoir. In spite of being surrounded,the Marines fought their way out, destroying several CPVdivisions in the process. (US Naval Institute)

36 Essential Histories • The Korean War

On 29 November, Smith ordered ColonelHomer Litzenberg, commanding the7th Marine Regiment at Yudam-ni to breakout to Hagaru. One battalion attackedcross-country and broke through theChinese block at the Toktong Pass, while thebulk of the two regiments pressed down theroad frontally. Steep hills and ridges linedboth sides of the road. The Chinese wereable to fire upon the column and injureMarines, destroy transports, and temporarilyblock the road. Individual Marinesindependently remedied problems as theyarose, such as clearing wreckage in the road.assisting wounded men, or engaging theChinese. In the daytime, US Marine CorpsCorsair fighter-bombers napalmed, strafed,and bombed the hillsides. Through theircombined efforts, the column trudgedforward.

On 3 December, the vanguard of thecolumn entered Hagaru. From Hagaru, theentire Marine force pressed on to Koto-ri andthen to the X US Corps lines and safety atChinhung-ni. Smith allegedly told reporters:'Retreat, hell - we're attacking in anotherdirection.' The entire X US Corps evacuatedHungnam and left North Korea on ChristmasDay. The Marines suffered 4.400 battlecasualties in the fighting around the Chosinreservoir. The Ninth CPV Army Corps wasbadly mauled and had to be withdrawn toManchuria for reorganization. More than20,000 dead Chinese, most killed by thecold, littered the hillsides, frozen andcovered with snow.

However, the Marines' heroism at Chosincannot mask the catastrophic results of theChinese intervention for the UNC. TheUNC fell back all the way to the 38th Parallelin the longest retreat in American militaryhistory, known by the troops at the front asthe 'Big Bug-Out.' Even though only13,000 casualties were suffered, the UNCground forces, for the most part, weretransformed into a disorganized mob.Captain Charles Bussey, of the 77th USEngineer Combat Company, described hisrecollections of the retreat in his bookFirefight at Yechon:

We'd been humiliated, debased, overwhelmed- routed ... The news writers would slant it all tosound like a minor setback. Take it from me,however, it was carnage. Intelligence said they hitus with one-third of a million men. I believe it.They turned our Army into a leaderless horde,running headlong for Pusan. Our soldiers had lostevery bit of confidence in all of their leaders, fromthe commander in chief down to platoon leaders.

American decision-makers now believedthat they were faced with the choice ofeither withdrawing entirely from Korea -tantamount to surrendering - or escalatingthe conflict further. Escalation could bringthe Soviet Union directly into the fighting.Thus, the conflict in Korea threatened totrigger a Third World War.

The war of attrition

The rout of the Eighth Army placed UNCgeneral headquarters in a state of total panic.MacArthur dispatched a series of franticreports to Washington warning of theimpending annihilation of the UNC. Despitethe risk of further escalation, he called fordirect military action against China. The useof atomic weapons was not excluded in hisdemands. Despite MacArthur's reports,escalating the war appeared very dangerousto the Truman administration and the USA'sallies. Seeking total victory against NorthKorea had already brought China into theconflict. Waging total war against Chinamight cause the Soviet Union to intervene aswell. With very weak conventional forces inEurope, the West could not risk a war withthe Soviet Union. Even if the Soviet Uniondid not intervene, the USA and UNCwould be immersed in a wider war in Asiathat would demand a huge militarycommitment. In the following weeks,although still searching for a course ofaction, the USA hesitantly supported tworesolutions in the UN for an immediatecease-fire. Zhou rejected the resolutions. Itwas evident that the USA needed to find analternative between withdrawal and

The fighting 37

escalation: in other words, a means offighting a limited war.

In a limited war, the total defeat of theopponent is not a goal. Examples of aims of alimited war are seizing a piece of land, causingthe enemy to compromise on a particularissue in negotiations, or simply defendingone's own territory. In early December, JCSand State Department discussions regardingfighting a limited war were very tentative.There was a great deal of uncertainty overwhether the UNC could actually withstandthe Communist onslaught.

In a press conference on 30 November,Truman stated that the USA would 'take anysteps necessary to meet the militarysituation.' When asked if this included theuse of the atomic bomb, he replied: 'Therehas always been active consideration of itsuse ...' Although Truman had no intention ofusing atomic weapons, the statement greatlyfrightened Western governments. The BritishPrime Minister, Clement Attlee, immediatelyflew to Washington for a meeting withTruman. He and Truman agreed on the need

to fight a limited war and hold the UNCposition in Korea as long as possible. Thegoal of liberating North Korea wasabandoned. In the Truman-Attleecommunique of 8 December, the two leaderscalled for negotiations with the Communists.

The JCS issued MacArthur a strategicdirective on 29 December 1950. It stated thata decisive victory would not be sought inKorea or against the PRC. MacArthur wasinstructed to hold his position in Koreawithout risking the safety of his forces. Inreply, MacArthur put forth his own strategyof escalation. He called for a blockade ofChina; air strikes and naval bombardmentsagainst China's industry; the reinforcementof the Eighth Army with Chinese Nationalisttroops; and diversionary attacks from Taiwanagainst the Chinese mainland. MacArthur

Ridgway and MacArthur near the front line on28 January 1951. MacArthur is on the far right. Ridgwaystands in the center with sunglasses and a grenadestrapped to his shoulder Unlike MacArthur. Ridgwayunderstood that it was in the best interests of theUSA to fight a limited war in Korea. (US Army)

38 Essential Histories • The Korean War

wanted nothing less than to remove the PRC'as a threat to peace in Asia for generations tocome.' The JCS rejected MacArthur's request.Truman personally told MacArthur to avoidactions that might cause a general war.

The Eighth Army commander WaltonWalker died on 23 December in a jeepaccident. Lieutenant-General MatthewRidgway replaced him. A renowned airbornecommander in the Second World War,outwardly Ridgway seemed a flamboyantcharacter. For example, he always sported agrenade on his webbing. Inwardly, though,Ridgway was extremely thoughtful andperceptive. Ready to adapt to difficultcircumstances, he was determined toreinvigorate the Eighth Army and stop theCommunists on the ground.

In his first week in Korea, Ridgway touredthe front line and visited nearly everydivisional commander. Speaking directlywith the men at the front, he was overtakenby their demoralization. He wrote in hisbook, The Korean War.

The men 1 met along the road, those I stoppedto talk to and to solicit gripes from - they too allconveyed to me a conviction that this was abewildered army, not sure of itself or its leaders,not sure what they were doing there, wonderingwhen they would hear the whistle of thathomebound transport.

The men were prone to retreating.Because units failed to keep contact with theenemy, Eighth Army intelligence had no ideaof the opposing enemy strength. Also, manysoldiers were simply not interested infighting. Civilian life was much moreappealing. Veterans, in particular, did notappreciate being called up for a second warin five years. Problems extended beyond theenlisted men to the officers. Ridgway wrote:

The leadership I found in many instancessadly lacking, and I said so out loud. Theunwillingness of the army to forgo certaincreature comforts, its timidity about getting offscanty roads, its reluctance to move withoutradio and telephone contact, and its lack of

imagination in dealing with a foe whom theysoon outmatched in firepower and dominated inthe air and surrounding seas - these were not thefault of the GI . . .

Ridgway immediately acted to revitalizethe Eighth Army. He demanded that officerscommand from the front. Divisionalcommanders were to be with their forwardbattalions, and corps commanders were to bewith the regiment 'that was in the hottestaction. 'He ordered commanders to deploytheir units off the roads and into the hills.Officers were rebuked for failing to keepcontact with the enemy. He forcefullyrepeated the army slogan: 'Find them! Fixthem! Fight them! Finish them!' Officerswere also encouraged to breed groupcohesion and unit loyalty in their men. Tomake the army more 'offensive-minded' andcertain of their cause, Ridgway issued ageneral statement to the troops, which saidthat they were fighting to uphold freedomand fight the slavery of Communism. TedWhite, an enlisted man in the African-American 24th US Infantry Regiment, relatedRidgway's doctrine from the private soldier'sperspective in Rudy Tomedi's book No Bugles,No Drums:

We were there to kill Chinese. That's whatthey told us. The army was done with retreating.General Ridgway was in charge now, and hewasn't a retreating general. We heard it everyday from the officers. 'Fix 'em, find 'em, kill'em.' We went out every day and we attacked.Seems like that's all we did was attack. Wehardly ate. We hardly slept. We just attacked. IfI'd known what I was getting myself into, I don'tknow if I'd of [sic] volunteered.

In the midst of these reforms, Ridgwayinstituted attrition as the new operationaldoctrine of the Eighth Army. He supportedfighting a limited war and understood thatwarfare had changed since the Second WorldWar. He especially opposed the use of atomicweapons. Instead of annihilating theCommunists, he sought to wear down theirmanpower. To do so, superior UNC firepower

The fighting 39

was to be exploited to the maximum effect.The hallmark of Ridgway's doctrine ofattrition was his directive to his subordinatesto maximize enemy casualties whileminimizing those of the Eighth Army. Giventhe daunting Communist numericalsuperiority, conserving casualties wasabsolutely crucial. Not a single company -wasto be sacrificed. There was to be no fightingsimply to hold terrain. Rather than fightingthe expected Communist attack in forwardpositions around Seoul, Ridgway intended towithdraw carefully to the Han river.

Ridgway's first use of attrition wassuccessful. Peng launched the Third PhaseOffensive in sub-zero conditions on31 December 1950. Although Ridgway wasforced to abandon Seoul, his withdrawalstretched the Communist supply lines tobreaking point, forcing Peng to call off theoffensive. Ridgway was anxious to seize theinitiative. On 15 January 1951, he mounteda reconnaissance in force, OperationWolfhound, followed by a full-blowncounteroffensive, Operation Thunderbolt,10 days later. In Operation Thunderbolt, theI and IX US Corps made a careful and step-

by-step advance northwards, with heavyartillery and close-air support. The 25th USDivision and the renowned Turkish Brigadepummelled the opposing 50th CPV Army inthe first day of fighting. Ridgway observedthe progress from the air. Frequently, heappeared at corps and divisionalheadquarters, or even on the front line, toguide and observe operations. By 9 February,the Eighth Army was back on the Han river.

The counteroffensive surprised the CPVcommanders, who had not expected such aquick UNC recovery. Overconfident, Maoordered another attack, the short-lived andill-advised Fourth Phase Offensive. On11 February. Chinese forces, led by DengHua, broke through the III ROK Corps andthreatened the important road hub ofWonju. Further west, the 23rd RCT (2nd US

1. Ridgway's first major counteroffensive was OperationThunderbolt, which took the Eighth Army back to theHan river by 11 February.

2. Meanwhile, Operation Roundup brought the armyforward in the east.

3. From 11 to 20 February, the Eighth Army defeatedthe Communist Fourth Phase Offensive, after heavyfighting around Wonju and Chipyong-ni.

The Eighth Army's resurgence, January-February 1951

40 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Division) and an attached French battalionwere encircled at Chipyong-ni. Supplied byair, they fought stubbornly and took themomentum out of the Communist advance.By 20 February, the Communists had beenhalted at the cost of 17,000 UNC casualties.Communist casualties were probably greater.Because of this defeat, Peng instituted atemporary strategy of withdrawing beforeUNC attacks in order to conserve his forcesbefore launching another major offensive.

Hoping to bring the Communists to thenegotiating table, Ridgway outlined anoffensive doctrine for attrition inmid-February. Soldiers often called it 'themeatgrinder.' It was based on the limitedobjective attack. A limited objective attackwas a concentrated and carefully preparedset-piece assault meant to killCommunists, not capture ground.Inflicting the maximum damage on theenemy with the minimum loss to theUNC remained the principle behind alloperations. Massive use of superior UNCfirepower was emphasized. No attackswould be made in unfavorable or risky

circumstances. Pursuit of the defeatedenemy was to be cautious and coordinated,avoiding the kind of reckless advance thathad made the Eighth Army vulnerable inNovember 1950. This also enabled Ridgwayto ensure that his forces always had stronglogistical support.

In late February and March, Ridgwaylaunched a series of colorfully namedlimited objective attacks: Operations Killer,Ripper, and Rugged. Due to Peng's newstrategy, the Communists generallywithdrew and avoided a serious battle. Thisallowed Ridgway to steadily expand histerritorial objectives. UNC units advancedinto an empty and devastated Seoul on14 March. Thereafter, Ridgway and the JCSdecided to cross the 38th Parallel in orderto secure stronger defensive positions to the

French soldiers on patrol. Their commander; Lieutenant-

Colonel Ralph Monclar had asked to be reduced in

rank from lieutenant-general so that he could command

the French battalion in Korea. The French served

valiantly in several actions, including Chipyong-ni and

Heartbreak Ridge. (ECP Armees)

The fighting 4

immediate north. The positionssubsequently taken became known as theKansas Line. Sited on strong defensiveterrain, it ran along the lower Imjin in thewest to Hwachon and then to the eastcoast, just north of Taepo-ri. TheCommunists suffered more than53,000 casualties in Ridgway's limitedobjective attacks. Total UNC casualties wereprobably less than 20,000. By now it wasclear that Ridgway had turned the EighthArmy into a highly efficient fighting force.

MacArthur never accepted the newstrategy of attrition. Indeed, his rhetoricbecame more inflammatory the furthernorth Ridgway marched. But Ridgway'ssuccesses undermined MacArthur'sarguments. The advances of the EighthArmy during February and March solidifiedconsensus in Washington that the strategicobjective of the UNC was to bring theCommunists to the negotiating tablethrough continued attrition.

Aware of the deliberations inWashington, MacArthur issued a statementto the press on 24 March that escalating thewar would quickly cause the PRC's militarycapability to collapse. By advocating apolicy contradictory to the one set out bythe JCS and the Truman administration,MacArthur was flouting their authority.Then, on 5 April, Senator Joe Martin read aletter from MacArthur in the US House ofRepresentatives. In the letter, MacArthurapproved of the idea of landing ChineseNationalists on the Chinese mainland. Heended the letter with an endorsement oftotal victory.

Because of these two incidents, Trumanacted to relieve MacArthur. Truman wrote inhis memoirs:

Time and again General MacArthur hadshown that he was unwilling to accept thepolicies of the Administration. By his repeatedpublic statements he was ... setting his policyagainst the President's ... If I allowed him todefy the civil authorities in this manner, I myselfwould be violating my oath to uphold anddefend the Constitution.

After some thought, Marshall, Acheson,and the JCS all agreed that MacArthur wouldhave to go. On 14 April, MacArthur wasrelieved of command of the UNC. Ridgwayreplaced him, and immediately issued adirective to all of his principal subordinatesthat no actions were to be taken that riskedescalating the conflict.

In early April, Peng was finally ready tolaunch the major offensive to annihilate theEighth Army, known as the Fifth PhaseOffensive. The plan was for two convergingthrusts to break through the UNC line andencircle the Eighth Army divisions one by one.The Third and Nineteenth CPV Army Corps,the western thrust, would cross the Imjin andseize the Seoul-Uijongbu area. Simultaneously,the Ninth and Thirteenth CPV Army Corps,the eastern thrust, would strike in the directionof Kapyong from Kumwha and Hwachon. Thiswas the first action for the Nineteenth andThird CPV Army Corps. They were fullyequipped with Soviet weapons, including tanksand artillery. In all, 14 Communist divisionswould attack the Eighth Army.

General James Van Fleet replaced Ridgwayas commander of the Eighth Army. Van Fleet

General James Van Fleet. Ridgway's successor ascommander of the Eighth Army. Van Fleet was an avidproponent of firepower He espoused massive artillerybombardments, which the troops dubbed the 'Van FleetDay of Fire.' (National Archives)

42 Essential Histories • The Korean War

had previously commanded the Americanforces that had assisted the Greekgovernment to defeat Communist guerrillasin the late 1940s. In the west, where theCommunist offensive was aimed. Van Fleethad seven divisions (five American) andthree brigades at his disposal. Eighth ArmyOperational doctrine remained based onattrition. Without micromanaging, Ridgwaysupervised Van Fleet's planning. Heemphasized that the Eighth Army was towithdraw before the expected Communistoffensive. Thereby, the Communists wouldbe exposed to UNC firepower and denied theopportunity to cut off any UNC formations.

On the night of 22 April 1951, the FifthPhase Offensive began. On the eastern axisof advance, the Ninth CPV Army Corpsquickly smashed through the 6th ROKDivision. By morning, there was a gapinghole between the 24th US Division to thewest and the Marine Division to the east.Elements of the Ninth and Thirteenth CPVArmy Corps poured into the gap, threateningto cut off the 24th and 25th US Divisionsto the northwest. However, the27th Commonwealth Brigade conducted a

successful delaying action north of thecritical road junction at Kapyong from 23 to26 April. This prevented the easternCommunist pincer from cutting off anyUNC formations.

Meanwhile, the western Communist thrustengaged in a pitched battle to penetrate the

On the night of 22 April, the Communists, intent onannihilating the UNC. launched the Fifth Phase Offensive.The basis of the initial attack was a two-prongedencirclement of the UNC forces in the west.

1. The Ninth and Thirteenth CPV Army Corps smashedthrough the 6th ROK Division and drove deep intothe Eighth Army rear; threatening to encircle theAmerican divisions to the northwest.

2. This caused the 1 st Marine Division to quickly refusetheir left flank.

3. Meanwhile, the other prong of the offensive, theNineteenth CPV Army Corps, attacked the29th British Brigade along the Imjin river but theCommunists were held back until 25 April.

4. Back to the east, the 27th Commonwealth Brigadedelayed the Communists at Kapyong from 28 to30 April, preventing them from encircling any UNCformations.

5. Starting on 25 April, the American divisionsthreatened with encirclement withdrew toward Seoul.

6. The Eighth Army fell back to the No Name Line,where it halted the Communist advance by 30 April.

Fifth Phase Offensive, First Stage, 22-30 April 1951

The fighting 43

A medic applies first aid while under heavy fireduring the Fifth Phase Offensive. (US Army MilitaryHistory Institute)

UNC line along the Imjin. The focal point ofthis fighting was the stand of the 1st Battalion,the Gloucestershire Regiment (the Glosters).The Glosters were part of the 29th BritishBrigade, along with two other British infantrybattalions and the 8th King's Royal IrishHussars. The 8th Royal Irish Hussars was anarmored regiment, equipped with thefearsome Centurion tank. Mounting anextremely accurate 20pdr (83.4mm) gun, theCenturion was debatably the best tank in theworld. The British units contained a mix ofregular soldiers and conscripted NationalServicemen. These were steady andprofessional troops. Known as two of the mostreliable formations in the Eighth Army, thetwo Commonwealth brigades had beenrepeatedly assigned to vital rearguard actions.

The 29th British Brigade, commanded byBrigadier Thomas Brodie, was disposed directlybehind the Imjin, guarding two crossings. Thebrigade was under the direct authority ofMajor-General Robert Soule, commander ofthe 3rd US Infantry Division. The British werethe hinge between the 1st ROK Division onthe lower Imjin and the American divisions tothe northeast. If the Chinese annihilated theBritish, the 3rd and 25th US Divisions wouldbe outflanked. This was indeed the goal of the

Nineteenth CPV Army Corps. The army corps'advance depended upon the quickannihilation of the 29th British Brigade.

The Glosters, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Carne, were located on thewestern flank of the British line. On thenight of 22 April, the Chinese surged overthe Imjin at 'Gloster Crossing.' Carne couldnot retreat without uncovering the flanks ofthe British battalion to the east and the1st ROK Division to the west. The Chineseattacked the Glosters' positions four times intwo and a half hours. Mortar, artillery, andVickers machine-gun fire inflicted heavylosses on the attackers. The Glosters lost noground and suffered few casualties. The restof the 29th British Brigade was also attacked.

On the evening of 23 April, increasingpressure forced the Glosters to withdraw fromtheir position before 'Gloster Crossing' to thenearby Hill 235, dubbed 'Gloucester Hill.'However, the Chinese had infiltrated almostcompletely around Gloucester Hill. On theafternoon of 24 April, Soule asked Brodieabout the Glosters' situation. Brodie replied:'A bit sticky; things are pretty sticky downthere.' To the subtle British, 'pretty sticky'meant critical. But to forthright Americans, itmerely meant unpleasant. Therefore, Souleordered the Glosters to continue to hold. OnGloucester Hill, the Chinese attacked fromthree directions throughout that night.Engaged in close combat with the Chinese,

44 Essential Histories • The Korean War

the British repeatedly called artillery firedown upon their own positions. TheGlosters' ranks were filled with wounded menwho would not leave the firing line. Bymorning, ammunition was nearly exhausted.

With the Communists threatening tobreak through all along his line, Lieutenant-General Frank Milburn, commander of theI US Corps, finally ordered a generalwithdrawal on the morning of 25 April.Unfortunately, Soule and Brodie lacked thereserves to break the Glosters out. Brodieordered the battalion to disperse and try toescape in small independent parties. Only39 men made it back to UNC lines. The rest,including Carne, were killed or takenprisoner. The remainder of the 29th BritishBrigade successfully withdrew from the Imjin.Supported by a squadron of Centurions, theinfantry cut through the Communistsattempting to block the line of retreat.

The Glosters' stand blunted the westernCommunist thrust. The Nineteenth CPV ArmyCorps had been delayed for three vital days.Human wave attacks exposed the Chinese todevastating losses from British and Americanfirepower. One of the divisions of the attacking63rd CPV Army was entirely destroyed. The29th British Brigade lost 1,091 men in thethree days of fighting. Approximately half ofthese casualties were borne by the Glosters.

A sketch by Bryande Grineau of the last stand of1 st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment, on the Imjin.The stand enabled several American divisions to escapeencirclement, but most of the battalion was killed ortaken prisoner in the process. Van Fleet called it 'the mostoutstanding example of unit bravery in modern warfare.'(Illustrated London News)

Shortly thereafter, Van Fleet ordered the 1 andIX US Corps to fall back 25 miles (40km) to theNo Name Line before Seoul. When the Chineseadvanced again, they could not dislodge theentrenched and prepared UNC forces. VanFleet later said that the loss of the Glosters hadbeen necessary to save the whole Eighth Army.Nevertheless, the destruction of an entirebattalion outraged Ridgway. It violated hisbasic dictum of never ordering units to hold aposition at all costs.

In early May, Peng shifted his weight for asecond blow in the eastern half of thepeninsula. The Ninth and Third CPV ArmyCorps were transferred east to attackalongside the II and V North Korean Corps.On 16 May, the Communists slammed intothe III ROK Corps and the adjacent ROKdivisions of the X US Corps. The III ROKCorps was virtually annihilated and fledsouth. In accordance with Van Fleet's orders,the X US Corps fell back. This extendedCommunist supply lines and provided timeto move UNC reinforcements into the front

The fighting 45

These riflemen of the 65th Regimental Combat Team

(RCT). 3rd US Division, are participating in the UNC

counterattacks to the Fifth Phase Offensive. The

65th RCT was composed almost entirely of Puerto

Ricans. (US Army Military History Institute)

line. Intense artillery fire and close airsupport inflicted heavy casualties on theexposed Communist forces. On 21 May,running out of food and ammunition, theCommunist advance ground to a halt.

Ridgway was intent on exploiting theCommunists' defeat and forcing them tocome to the negotiating table. The EighthArmy counterattacked across the front on20 May. UNC spearheads cut Communistlines of retreat. Many Chinese panicked andlarge numbers of prisoners were taken. TzoPeng, a machine-gunner, said that thesituation was pure chaos and that there wasnothing to eat for five days. He found theshelling horrifying. Unable to fight or escape,he surrendered. The Eighth Army had

recaptured the Kansas Line by 15 June.Additionally, the lower half of the IronTriangle was seized. The Iron Triangle was theroad and rail complex connectingPyonggang, Chorwon, and Kumwha. Itsunique position made it the communicationshub between the Communist front line andthe rest of North Korea. Thus, it was a majorCommunist supply center. The extension ofthe UNC line in this area was known as theWyoming Line.

Ridgway did not press the offensive furtherbecause he believed that the price of advancingto Pyongyang or the Yalu would be too great.The rugged terrain of North Korea was optimalfor a strong Communist defensive. UNC supplylines would become extended while theCommunists drew nearer to their supplycenters on the Yalu. Furthermore, there was therisk that such an action would cause the PRCor even the Soviet Union to escalate the war.

The Fifth Phase Offensive was the mostimportant battle of the Korean War. The

46 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Fifth Phase Offensive, Second Stage, 16-20 May 1951

After being defeated in the west, the Communistsshifted their offensive to the east. They effected amajor breakthrough, but the planned UNCwithdrawal caused their advance to quickly losemomentum and grind to a halt.

UNC lost about 25,000 men, followed byanother 14,700 in the counteroffensiveoperations in June. These were heavy losses.However, the Communists suffered at least85,000 casualties. This does not includenumbers for the UNC counteroffensive, inwhich the UNC captured 17,000 prisoners andprobably killed or wounded many more thanthat. The defeat caused a major change inChinese strategy. Mao realized that the lossesincurred since January meant that the UNCcould not be decisively defeated. Rather, hedecided that cease-fire negotiations were nowacceptable. Stalin agreed. Since 31 May,representatives of the USA and the SovietUnion had been tentatively discussing thepossibility of commencing cease-firenegotiations. On 23 June 1951, Jacob Malik,the Soviet Ambassador to the UN, implied inthe UN radio program The Price of Peace that

the Communists would accept negotiations.Notwithstanding this decision, Mao and Pengwere intent on winning more victories on thebattlefield before actually agreeing to acease-fire. Nevertheless, the Communists'willingness to enter into negotiations andfight a limited war marked the abandonmentof their goal of reunifying Korea. While it didnot end the war immediately, the UNC victoryin the Fifth Phase Offensive laid the basis for anegotiated settlement to the conflict.

Negotiations

Cease-fire negotiations began on 10 July1951 behind Communist lines at Kaesong.No political issues were to be discussed, only'military' issues related to the initiation of acease-fire. Vice-Admiral C. Turner Joy headedthe UNC delegation. North Korean GeneralNam Il led the Communist delegation.However, Stalin, Mao, and the JCS wereintimately involved in negotiations andcontrolled the bargaining positions of theirrespective delegations. The final agenda was

The fighting 47

The UNC delegation to the cease-fire negotiations.

From left to right are Major-General Henry Hodes

Major-General Laurence Craigie, Vice-Admiral C. Turner

Joy, Major-General Paik Sun Yup, and Rear-Admiral

Arleigh Burke. Joy was the head UNC delegate.

(Defence Department)

confirmed on 26 July. It comprised fiveitems: first, the adoption of an agenda;second, the establishment of a cease-fire line;third, supervisory arrangements for thecease-fire; fourth, the exchange of prisonersof war (POWs); and, fifth, recommendationsfor a political settlement of the conflict. Inthe process of establishing a final agenda,the UNC delegation had prevented the

Communists from including one of theirbasic demands, the mutual withdrawal offoreign troops from Korea, as an item. Thenegotiators then turned to discussing ItemTwo, which seemed to be the mostimportant issue on the agenda.

Given the new context of negotiatingwhile fighting, Ridgway updated his strategy.Attrition would now be used to enforce theUNC bargaining position by increasing the

The Communist delegation to the cease-fire negotiations. Fromleft to right are Major-General Hsieh Fang and Lieutenant-General Deng Hua, the Chinese delegates; and then, GeneralN a m Il, Major-General Lee Sang Cho, and General ChangPyong San. the N o r t h Korean delegates. Nam II was the mainCommunist spokesman. (Defence Department)

48 Essential Histories • The Korean War

costs of war for the Communists. TheKansas-Wyoming Line would be thefoundation of the Eighth Army's defensivepositions and the basis for a cease-fire line.Limited objective attacks would take smallportions of ground in order to wear downthe Communists and make minorimprovements in the Eighth Army'sdefensive positions. As before, Ridgway tookcareful steps to ensure that no actions weretaken that might be costly or escalate theconflict. In particular, he vetoed severalambitious plans advocated by Van Fleet for amajor offensive to the waist of Korea.

With the initiation of negotiations, Maoand Peng adopted a doctrine of attrition onthe battlefield. Given the virtuallyinexhaustible Chinese manpower supply,Mao and Peng believed that the USA couldnever defeat China in a war of attrition. Likethe UNC, the Communists' goal for attritionwas to enforce their bargaining position.Tactically, human wave attacks wereabandoned. Instead, Peng endorsed'small-scale annihilation' - methodicallydestroying individual enemy battalions. Heparticularly sought to engage in 'see-sawbattles.' In a 'see-saw battle,' the

Communists would attack a certain UNCposition repeatedly until they held it,regardless of how many times UNC forcescounterattacked and recaptured the position.Even if they suffered heavier losses than theUNC in the ebb and flow of a 'see-sawbattle,' the Communist commandersbelieved that their superior manpower wouldmake the UNC relatively worse off. TheCommunists also fortified their front lineand increased their strength in artillery.

Negotiations proceeded very slowly atKaesong. The Communists wanted the38th Parallel to be the cease-fire line. TheUNC and USA, on the other hand, wantedthe current front line - the line of contact -to be the cease-fire line. The rugged terrainalong the Kansas-Wyoming Line was muchmore defensible than the flat ground alongthe 38th Parallel. As a temporary bargainingploy, the UNC delegation initially called fora line north of this, within current

Men of the 3rd US Division advance upon a hill held by

the Chinese during the summer fighting of 1951. The

smoke rising from the hill is the result of the preceding

artillery bombardment. American assaults received

intense artillery support. (US Army)

The fighting 49

Communist positions. This only made theCommunist delegation more obstinate. Thefollowing quote from 14 August is a goodexample of Nam Il's rhetoric:'We stand firmfor making the 38th Parallel the militarydemarcation line because it reflects themilitary and is hence fair and reasonable. Weoppose resolutely your proposal of pushingthe military demarcation line completelyinto our positions because it is absurd,arrogant, and intolerable.' Unshakablysomber, the Communists would even insultthe UNC delegates as a means of rejectingtheir demands. This negotiating style wasinfuriating to the UNC delegation.

By mid-August, the Eighth Army's limitedobjective attacks had convinced the Chinesethat military action to seize the 38th Parallelwas impossible. Nevertheless, Stalin and Maopreferred to continue fighting, in hopes ofan improvement in Communist fortunes.The Communist delegation suspendednegotiations on 23 August because ofsupposed UNC violations of the neutral zone

around Kaesong. The next two monthswould be consumed by tangentialdiscussions between UNC generalheadquarters and the Communists overwhere and how to reconvene negotiations.Ridgway intensified (united objectiveattacks in the fall of 1951 in order toincrease the pressure on the Communists toconcede on Item Two. These offensivesmauled the Communist armies. In theprocess, the Eight Army sufferedsubstantial, if sustainable, losses. This wasparticularly the case in a series of sloggingmatches around the Punchbowl. BloodyRidge, and Heartbreak Ridge - terrainfeatures on the eastern half of the peninsula.Determined to capture Communist positionsoverlooking the Eighth Army front line, VanFleet was induced into fighting just the sortof 'see-saw battle' that Peng had planned for,with the same pieces of terrain changinghands repeatedly. By the end of the fightingin October, the Eighth Army had suffered8,000 casualties, 3,300 of which fell on the

Bloody Ridge, the scene of a massive 'see-saw battle'between the North Koreans and the 2nd US Division inAugust and September 1951. (US Army)

South Korean laborers bringing supplies to the front.They are carrying the ubiquitous Korean A-Framebackpack. (US Military History Institute)

50 Essential Histories • The Korean War

The fall offensives, September-October 1951

In the fall of 1951, the Eighth Army pressed theCommunists back in a series grinding offensives. This mapshows the two most important.

1. From July to October the 1 ROK Corps, MarineDivision, and 2nd US Division engaged in a series ofslogging matches over possession of terrain featuresknown as the Punchbowl, Bloody Ridge, andHeartbreak Ridge.

2. From 3 to 18 October several UNC divisions woredown the Communists and seized dominating terrainto the north in Operation Commando.

2nd US Division alone. Communist losseswere probably much greater due to theimmense firepower of the Eighth Army.

The most effective of the fall offensiveswas Operation Commando. In addition towearing down the Communists, Ridgwayand Van Fleet wanted to seize a range ofsteep hills north of the Imjin, known as theJamestown Line. The line formed excellentdefensive positions because there was nodominating terrain to the immediate north.Three divisions of the I US Corps and one ofthe IX US Corps would mount the attack.They would be opposed by the 47th and64th CPV Armies. One of the I US Corps'

attacking divisions would be the1st Commonwealth Division. Its operationsin Operation Commando would epitomizeRidgway's dictum of maximizing enemycasualties while minimizing one's own.

In July 1951, the 25th Canadian Brigade,the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, and the29th British Brigade joined to form the1st Commonwealth Division. The formationof the division united the Commonwealthground forces in Korea. As noted above,Commonwealth infantry was of a very highcaliber. The division also boasted a strongand highly professional artillery arm and thearmored support of the 8th Royal IrishHussars. There was even an Indian FieldAmbulance unit.

The Commonwealth Division's objectiveswere Hills 235, 355 (Kowang San), and 317(Maryang San). With steep faces, they were themost difficult objectives of all the attackingdivisions. The attack began on 3 October. The28th Commonwealth Brigade assaultedKowang San and Maryang San, defended bythe 191st CPV Division. The Communists heldwell-entrenched and in-depth positions. The

The fighting 5

The Battle of Maryang San, 3-8 October 1951

As a part of Operation Commando, the28th Commonwealth Brigade seized the highpointsof Maryang San and Kowang San.1. On 4 October the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian

Regiment (3 RAR) seized Pt 199, in preparation forthe advance on Maryang San. Additionally, anAustralian company outflanked Kowang San, while the1 st Battalion, the King's Own Scottish BorderersRegiment attacked frontally.

2. The next day, the 3 RAR took the Maryang Sanridgeline from the flank, while the 1 st Battalion, theRoyal Northumberland Fusiliers Regiment pressedthe Chinese front.

ridges were lined with covered trenches,bunkers, and dug-in artillery batteries. Onehundred and thirty guns and heavy mortarssupported the attack, including those of the16th Field Regiment, Royal New ZealandArtillery. The 3rd Battalion, the RoyalAustralian Regiment (3 RAR), commanded byLieutenant-Colonel Frank Hassett, spearheadedthe assault. Ever since Gallipoli, the Australianshad enjoyed a reputation for fighting hard,innovating quickly, and being more cunning

than the enemy. For the operation, Hassettespoused bold flanking movements alongridgelines - a tactic learned fighting theJapanese in New Guinea - in order to attackthe Chinese from unexpected directions.

The Australians smashed through theChinese defenses, first outflanking KowangSan and then Maryang San from the east,while two British battalions held the fronts ofthese positions. The fighting was very intense.The New Zealanders expended 50,000 roundsin support of the operation. Centurions fireddirectly on the Chinese from theCommonwealth starting positions. Thefollowing quote by Lieutenant Maurie Pears,from the book Korea Remembered, illustratesthe combined-arms and infiltration tacticsused in the final assault on Maryang San:

C Company was to rush across the valley andmove through B and D Companies, which wereheld up under Point 317, to take the summitfrom the rear. Surprise was again the tactic, the

52 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Chinese being used to the previous massedfrontal attacks of the Americans. The battalionartillery and tanks would support us withenfilade fire during the final assault, as theapproaches to the summit were clear from theobservation post.

Once successful, the Australians quicklyconsolidated and dug-in on the MaryangSan ridgeline. The ensuing Chinese

The British Centurion tank; arguably the finest tank inthe world during the Korean War. Its 20pdr gun wasextremely accurate. Its ability to knock out T-34semplaced in the Communist lines was renowned.(The Tank Museum, Bovington)

counterattacks were repulsed, causing the191st CPV Division to withdraw. In thesecounterattacks, the Australians withstoodsome of the heaviest Communist artilleryconcentrations of the war. The Australianshad destroyed two enemy battalions andcaptured 50 prisoners. There were 109Australian casualties. Along the rest of theline, the remaining attacking UNC divisionswere also successful after vigorous fighting.

The Communists launched a majorcounteroffensive to retake the ground lost tothe I and IX US Corps. On 4 November, twoCPV regiments with heavy artillery supportfell on Maryang San, now held by the1st Battalion, the King's Own ScottishBorderers Regiment. Rather than sufferexorbitant casualties in a see-saw battle, thebattalion fell back to Kowang San. There, theCommonwealth Division, with its formidablefirepower, decimated the attackers from

Australians on the march. In addition to air and naval

commitments, Australia deployed the 3rd Battalion, Royal

Australian Regiment, to Korea in 1950. followed by the

1 st Battalion in 1952. (Australian War Memorial)

The fighting 53

strong in-depth positions. Thus, despite theloss of Maryang San, the CommonwealthDivision maximized Chinese casualties whileminimizing its own. Since 3 October, thedivision had suffered 1,159 casualties.Chinese casualties are unknown, butprobably were much greater, given the futilityof their attacks. The Chinese made nosignificant headway against the UNCelsewhere either. By mid-November, the47th and 64th CPV Annies were exhaustedand had to be withdrawn from the front line.

More importantly, just four days after thestart of Operation Commando, theCommunists indicated their willingness toreopen negotiations. On 21 October, the twodelegations finally agreed to resumenegotiations at Panmunjom, a new neutralsite located between the two front lines. Asnegotiations reopened, Mao decided to acceptthe line of contact as the cease-fire line. TheUNC was not about to crack and the costs ofwar for the Chinese were rising. Additionally,the rugged ground on the line of contactbore defensive advantages for theCommunists, just as it did for the UNC.However, Kaesong was an obstacle toagreement. Ridgway and Joy wanted it on theUNC side of the cease-fire line, even thoughit was not in their military possession.

Over Ridgway's objection, the JCS offereda compromise on 17 November. It stipulatedthat the current front line would be frozen asthe actual cease-fire line as long asagreement was reached on the remainingagenda items within 30 days. Thereafter, theline of contact would become the cease-fireline. Subsequently, on 27 November, the twosides reached agreement on Item Two. Thisessentially created a de facto one-monthtruce because further offensives served noterritorial purpose.

Unfortunately, the impact of the falloffensives was not enough to end the war.Discussion on Item Three, supervisoryarrangements for the cease-fire, stalled overthe composition of an armistice commissionand the number of airfields permitted inNorth Korea after the war. To overcome theimpasse, attention shifted to Item Four, the

The air war

While the Eighth Army fought theCommunists on the ground, dramatic battleswere being fought in the air. The Korean Warwas the first jet war and the one occasion inthe Cold War where American and Sovietmilitary forces regularly engaged each otherin combat.

From July to November 1951, the UNCconducted air operations as if fighting a totalwar. The North Korean air force wasimmediately swept from the air, and bombersdirectly targeted North Korea's industry.However, once the Chinese intervened, the warin the air became limited. There was a tacitunderstanding that the Communists would notbomb Japan, South Korea, or UNC naval forcesas long as the UNC did not strike Chinese orSoviet territory. With MacArthur's dismissal, theJCS delineated explicit restrictions on airoperations. Aircraft were forbidden from flyingwithin 3 miles (5km) of China and 20 miles(32km) of the Soviet Union. China could onlybe struck in retaliation to a major Communistattack, and targets on the Yalu were off-limitswithout Ridgway's explicit permission.

In spite of these restrictions, several USpoliticians and military officers frequentlycalled for Communist airfields inManchuria to be bombed. Althoughcontingency plans existed to do so, the JCSnever authorized the strikes for two mainreasons. First, there was the continuing fearthat attacking China would escalate thewar. Second, the USA and UNC actually

return of POWs. However, negotiationsquickly stalled here as well. Meanwhile, astalemate appeared on the battlefield.Neither side engaged in major offensiveoperations. In spite of their recent militarysuccesses, American leaders were reluctant toreturn to an intense operational tempobecause of the heavy casualties incurred inthe offensives since July. The Communists,on the other hand, had been greatly

weakened by the fall offensives and focusedon rebuilding their forces.

54 Essential Histories • The Korean War

lacked the capability to fight an air warover China. It would require stripping theother US commands, including in Europe,of aircraft. Aircraft losses would certainly behigh, weakening the global Westernmilitary position.

Recent evidence suggests that a largepercentage of the air-to-air combat of theKorean War involved Soviet pilots. Somehistorians even believe that the Chineseeffort was a mere sideshow. Over 200 of thebest Soviet aircraft, pilots, and crews werestationed in Andong, China. Several hadexperience flying in the Second World Warand more than a few were aces. Stalin wasadamant that no Soviet pilot be captured.The Russians dressed in Chinese uniformsand flew aircraft with Chinese or NorthKorean markings. One of their major roleswas equipping and training the PLA air force.The Chinese flew out of air bases in northernChina and North Korea. The PLA air forcedid not begin major air operations untilSeptember 1951. From then until the end ofthe war, the Chinese always deployed threedivisions (135 MiG-15s) into combat.Additionally, the Communists possessed

hundreds of MiG-15s in reserve.Communist air operations focused on

fighting for air supremacy over North Korea.Virtually the only bombing missions werenight-time harassment of the UNC front lineby Polikarpov Po-2 biplanes, known as'Bed-check Charlies.' The MiG-15 jet fighterwas the primary Communist aircraft. It wasan outstanding fighter. Its swept wingsenabled great speed and maneuverability.Additionally, it could operate at highaltitudes around 40,000 feet (12,000m) andhad a strong rate of climb. A combination ofone 37mm and two 20mm cannonsprovided armament.

The US Far East Air Force (FEAF)conducted most of the UNC air operations.The FEAF employed an assortment of aircraft.Many were propeller-driven stalwarts of theSecond World War. In the beginning of thewar, F-51 Mustangs were still being used inan air superiority role. With its large payload

A MiG-15 in take-off. With this tighten the Communistschallenged the UNC for air supremacy over MiG AlleySwept wings gave the fighter high speed and maneuverability.(US Air Force)

The fighting 55

and long range, the B-29 Stratofortress wasthe mainstay of the FEAF bomber force. TheB-26 Invader served in close support,interdiction, and strategic bombing roleswhere more accuracy was needed. Two newjet aircraft were the F-80 Shooting Star andF-84 Thunderjet. Both were straight-winged,heavy, and reliable. Although they could beemployed in a fighter role, the FEAF preferredto use them as fighter-bombers because oftheir inferiority to the MiG-15. Additionally,the South Africans and Australians eachcontributed a squadron of Mustangs thatwere eventually upgraded to Sabres andGloster Meteors (a British jet) respectively.

Only the US F-86 Sabre, the sole UNCaircraft with swept wings, could equal theMiG-15. Designed as a fighter-bomber, theSabre was heavy, durable, stable, and easy tofly. In general, the two aircraft were evenlymatched. At high speeds, the Sabre was moremaneuverable and easier to handle than theMiG-15. However, the Sabre could neitherclimb as fast nor fly as high as the MiG-15.Furthermore, its six .50 caliber machine-gunslacked the stopping power of the MiG-15'scannons. The USA's most importantadvantage in the Korean War, though, wasthe superior training and experience of itsfighter pilots. The UNC had more pilots withextensive experience fighting over Europe orthe Pacific during the Second World Warthan the Communists had.

In November 1950, the first MiG-15s(Soviets) appeared over North Korea. Theyestablished control over the northwest cornerof North Korea between the Chongchon andYalu rivers. This area would becomeinfamously known as MiG Alley. The FEAFregularly sortied into MiG Alley to protecttheir bombers and challenge theCommunists for air supremacy. Both theSabre and the MiG-15 had a low combatradius. However, due to Communist strategy,the MiG-15s were always a short distancefrom their bases over the Yalu. The Sabres, onthe other hand, flew from South Korea andcould patrol in MiG Alley for a very limitedamount of time. A common Communisttactic was to dive in on Sabres from above,

fire a few bursts, and then streak back tosafety across the Yalu. In spite of strict ordersto the contrary, Sabre pilots often chasedfleeing MiG-15s across the Yalu in 'hotpursuit.'

Air-to-air combat tactics had not changedsignificantly since the Second World War. Jetengines simply made everything happenmuch faster. A pilot's objective in air-to-aircombat was still to hold a commandingposition over an opponent long enough toshoot him down with gunfire at a range of1,000 feet (300m) or less. The basic tacticalrule was that each individual aircraft pairedup with a wingman to provide support.Using this sound tactic, Sabre squadronswould try to break up Communistformations and shoot down the MiG-15s oneby one. However, the Sabres were alwaysfighting an outnumbered battle. GeneralOtto Weyland, commander of the FEAF,repeatedly requested more Sabre squadrons.But Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenbergcould not deploy significant Sabrereinforcements to Korea without dangerouslyweakening American military strengthelsewhere in the world.

Interdiction, the disruption of an enemy'slines of communications, became theprimary FEAF bombing mission in early 1951when it was necessary to limit the supply ofthe Communist forces advancing into SouthKorea. At that time, interdiction was highlyeffective because the Communists requiredan intense rate of supply to sustain theiroffensives. Bombing bridges and roadsoverburdened the already elongatedCommunist supply lines.

Interdiction intensified in May 1951when the FEAF initiated Operation Strangle.Weyland agreed with Ridgway's strategy ofusing military force to coerce theCommunists. Given its success earlier in theyear, he believed that interdiction would bethe most effective means of doing so.Initially, Operation Strangle started as a shortcampaign against Communist supply lineswithin 60 miles (100km) of the front. But inAugust 1951, the operation was extended inboth length and scope to target bridges, rail

56 Essential Histories • The Korean War

A flight of four F-86 Sabres. The Sabre handled betterthan the MiG-15 at high speeds and was more resilient.The true edge that American fighter pilots possessed,though, was their extensive training and combatexperience from the Second World War. (US Air Force)

tracks, and locomotives throughout NorthKorea. The object of these operations was toincrease the long-term costs of supplyingtheir front line and force the Communistseither to accept UNC terms in the truce talksor to retreat further north.

Partly as a response to Operation Strangle,the Communists pressed their numericaladvantage in a major fighter offensive in thefall of 1951. This marked the entry of theChinese into the air war in force. The Sovietscoordinated their activities with the Chineseand matched the number of aircraft theydeployed into major air battles. Americanpilots found that the inexperienced Chinesewere very brave but lacked skill. The Sovietsreceived more respect. Occasionally, a loneSoviet pilot would tangle with the Sabres,

The fighting 57

showing off his skill and daring. TheAmericans used the term 'honcho' todescribe such pilots.

On 18 October, Weyland initiateddaylight bombing raids into MiG Alley tothwart Communist airfield construction. TheSuperfortresses could not be effectivelyprotected from intercepting MiG-15s.Exploiting their ability to fly at highaltitudes, the MiG-15 pilots would divethrough the fighter screen, fire upon thebombers, and then escape across the Yalu.

A few bursts from their cannon had adevastating effect on the bombers. The blackday for FEAF Bomber Command came on23 October. Fifty MiG-15s interceptednine B-29 Superfortress bombers attackingNamsi airfield. Three bombers weredestroyed. Another eight received majordamage. With a total force of only90 operational Superfortresses, continuedlosses at this rate would be catastrophic.Therefore, at the end of October,Superfortress daylight bombing raids were

58 Essential Histories • The Korean War

MiG Alley and the air war

MiG Alley was the area of North Korean air space inwhich the Communists fought for air superiority.

permanently abandoned. Weylandeventually curtailed all fighter-bomberoperations in MiG Alley as well.

Nevertheless, in spite of increased Sabrelosses, superior American tactics weredefeating the MiG-15s in most air-to-airengagements. The Communists finallyabandoned their air offensive after13 December. On that day, 150 MiG-15sattacked the Sabres flying in MiG Alley. TheCommunists lost 13 jets. These losses cooledtheir enthusiasm for major air battles. Theend result of the offensive was that theCommunists held air superiority withinMiG Alley over FEAF bombers andfighter-bombers but not the Sabres.

Fighting continued in MiG Alley for theremainder of the war. There was another setof major air battles in the late summer and

early fall of 1952. These did not alter theUSA's tactical dominance. Chinese skill inair-to-air combat improved as the warprogressed, but superior American tacticsand experience continued to win mostengagements.

When limited objective attacks weresuspended after the agreement on Item Two,UNC general headquarters and the JCSlooked to air power as a means to coerce theCommunists without the high costs ofoffensive ground operations. Consequently,in the first half of 1952, Operation Stranglewas the focus of UNC military operations.However, Operation Strangle was not asuccess. In a period of static warfare, theCommunist forces did not require the highrate of supply that had been necessaryduring their offensive operations in the firsthalf of 1951.

Moreover, the FEAF was unable to inflictserious permanent damage on the

The fighting 59

Communist supply system. This was not theage of smart weapons. Piloting a high-speedaircraft through heavy flak and planting adumb bomb on a rail track a few feet widewas no easy task. The Communists were alsoadept at repairing and preventing damage totheir supply lines. Destroyed bridges werequickly rebuilt, and cut roads and railroadtracks were bypassed. Obvious targets, likebridges, were surrounded with anti-aircraftguns.

The economic cost of Operation Stranglewas unsustainable. The UNC lost 330 aircraftin the operation. The cost of losing ahigh-performance aircraft far offset the costthat the Communists incurred in repairing adirt road, steel rail track, or concrete bridge.Meanwhile, the Communist front linebecame stronger than ever. By 1952 animpressive amount of tanks, artillery pieces,and ammunition supplies were positioned atthe front.

When the failure of Operation Stranglebecame clear, FEAF headquarters begansearching for a new strategy. In April 1952,

two staff officers in FEAF headquarters,Colonel Richard Randolph and Lieutenant-Colonel Ben Mayo, created the sustained airpressure strategy, which envisionedconcentrated strikes against key NorthKorean industrial and political targets. Thiswould severely damage the North Koreanindustrial base and undermine civilianmorale. It was hoped that this damage wouldtranslate into concessions at the negotiatingtable. Randolph and Mayo's superior, GeneralJacob Smart, FEAF Deputy for Operations,enthusiastically advocated the plan.

General Mark Clark replaced Ridgway ascommander of the UNC on 12 May 1952.Outwardly, Clark supported the Americanstrategy of limited war, but inwardly hebelieved that much more drastic measureswere required to coerce the Communists.Accordingly, Clark, along with Weyland,

A fantastic picture of a napalm strike against a marshalingyard in North Korea. Most interdiction strikes were notthis effective. Small rail tracks, bridges, and roads werevery difficult to hit with a dumb bomb. (US Air Force)

60 Essential Histories • The Korean War

strongly endorsed the sustained airpressure strategy.

On 23 June 1952, the first strikes of thenew strategy were conducted against NorthKorean hydroelectric plants at Kojo, Fusen,Kyosen, and Suiho. These plants providedpower to virtually all of North Korea andmuch of Manchuria. Suiho. on the Yalu, wasthe fourth largest hydroelectric facility in theworld. All four plants were severely damaged.Power was reportedly lost throughout NorthKorea. The UNC continued striking theseand other plants as the North Koreansscrambled to get them back into operation.

On 11 July, the sustained air pressurecampaign entered its next stage when theFEAF, along with Australian Meteors andRoyal Navy strike aircraft, bombedPyongyang. Pyongyang was struck again on29 August, in the largest air raid of theKorean War (1,403 sorties). Although bothraids were directed against military targets,tremendous collateral damage leveledPyongyang. Several targets were napalmed.Kim told Stalin that 6,000 civilians hadbeen killed. International outrageaccompanied the attack. The British were

particularly upset that they had not beenbriefed on the raid.

After Pyongyang, Smart focused thesustained air pressure campaign on theremnants of North Korea's industry. NorthKorea's extensive mining facilities wereespecially targeted. Oil refineries and theremaining power plants were also hit. But as1952 drew to a close, the number ofimportant industrial and political targets wasrapidly dwindling. Therefore, operationsfocused on striking major supply points andproviding close-air support.

The sustained air pressure strategy waslargely a success. UNC air losses weresignificantly reduced and severe damage wasdealt to the North Korean industrial base.Soon after it had begun, Kim and Mao beganasking Stalin about the possibility ofagreeing to an armistice. However, therewere two major drawbacks to the sustainedair pressure strategy. First, most of theindustry vital to the Communist wareffort was located in the Soviet Union andChina, not North Korea. Second, NorthKorea itself was relatively unindustrializedand did not contain a large number ofhigh-value targets. In general, the sustainedair pressure strategy represented a gradualweakening rather than a significantreduction in Communist military capability.It alone could not coerce the Communiststo concede.

The naval war

Naval operations formed an important, ifperipheral, role in UNC operations.Command of the sea ensured that the UNChad a secure line of communications toJapan and the USA. The US Seventh Fleet,centered on Task Force 77, primarily

General Mark Clark replaced Ridgway as Supreme

Commander of the UNC on 12 May 1952. Clark had

commanded the US army in Italy during the Second

World War In Korea, he did not like the idea of

fighting a limited war but loyally obeyed JCS instructions.

(Defence Department)

The fighting 61

FEAF and US Navy fighter-bombers struck the Suihohydroelectric plant the fourth largest in the world, on23 June 1952. It was the opening strike of the newsustained air pressure strategy, which sought to coercethe Communists by destroying valuable industrial andmilitary targets. (Defence Department)

operated off the east coast of Korea. TheCommonwealth navies, based around theRoyal Navy Far East Fleet, usually including aBritish aircraft carrier, operated in the YellowSea. For four months, the Royal Australian

62 Essential Histories • The Korean War

The battleship USS New Jersey fires a 16-inch broadsideat targets near the 38th Parallel. One Iowa-classbattleship was always deployed with Task Force 77.Theyfrequently engaged in gunnery duels with North Koreancoastal artillery around Wonsan. (Defence Department)

Navy's aircraft carrier HMAS Sydney alsoparticipated in these operations.

With varying degrees of success, the UNCnaval command tried to translate itscommand of the sea into effectiveness in theland war. The guns of American cruisers andbattleships could strike far inland. Shore

bombardment interdicted supply lines andprovided support fire for the ground unitsof the Eighth Army. Eighth Army soldiersoften commented upon the accuracy anddevastating effect of the 16-inch guns ofthe Iowa-class battleships. British, Australian,and American destroyers and frigatesengaged small Communist craft, conductedbombardments, and supported commandoraids in the shallows and small islandsalong Korea's littoral. Naval forces keptWonsan in a state of virtual siege. InOctober 1952, the Seventh Fleet even

The fighting 63

conducted an amphibious feint at Kojo, justsouth of Wonsan.

Task Force 77 was intimately involved inboth Operation Strangle and the sustained airpressure strategy. Task Force 77 generallyconsisted of two Essex-class fleet carriersconducting air operations, a thirdreplenishing at sea, and a fourth in port inJapan. Their aircraft participated in theattacks on Suiho power station andPyongyang. The carriers were uniquely ableto launch strikes from anywhere off NorthKorea's coast and hit targets inaccessible to

the land-based FEAF. For example, the largestnaval strike of the war was against the Aojioil refinery on 1 September 1952. Eight miles(13km) from the Soviet frontier, only aircraftfrom Task Force 77 could get within range ofthe target with minimal risk of violatingSoviet territory.

There were three main types of navalaircraft: the F-4U Corsair, AD Skyraider, andF-9F Panther. The gull-winged F-4U Corsairwas a renowned fighter from the PacificWar. In Korea, it served primarily as afighter-bomber and was the principal aircraft

64 Essential Histories • The Korean War

The USS Valley Forge (Cv-45). an Essex-class fleet carrierwas the first American aircraft carrier on duty off Korea.Later, the USS Valley Forge was joined by three sisterships as part of Task Force 77. (US National Archives)

used by the Marine Air Wing. The ADSkyraider was the workhorse of the USnavy's attack aircraft. Operating from acarrier, it could carry a 7,500lb (3,400kg)payload. The Korean War was the firstconflict where jets took off from aircraft

carriers. F-9F Panther jet aircraft served inthe dual role of fighter and strike aircraft.Unfortunately, its straight wings placed it ata disadvantage against the fast andmaneuverable MiG-15.

A US navy Sikorsky HO35-I helicopter Helicopters

made their first appearance in war in Korea. They

proved their usefulness as a means of light

transport and frequently engaged in search and

rescue and medical evacuation missions.

(US National Archives)

The fighting 65

This Panther is conducting an interdiction strike against a small highway bridge. The pilot hasalready dropped one bomb and is in the process of dropping another. The smoke before thePanther's left wing is from a rocket that he has just launched. (US Naval Institute)

Portrait of a soldier

Patrolling, raiding, and digging

After November 1951, operations on thefront settled into static warfare. CorporalMartin Russ served in the 1st US MarineDivision in the last year of the war. Hisexperiences are indicative of the life of afront-line soldier during the period of staticwarfare in the Korean War. Russ joined theMarines after completing his undergraduateeducation at St Laurence College. He was amember of Able Company, 1st MarineRegiment. During his time in Korea, he kepta daily journal of his experiences. It was laterpublished as a book, The Last Parallel.

As a corporal, Russ was a non-commissioned officer. He carried a Browningautomatic rifle (BAR), a 20 lb light machine-gun that provided rapid and long-range fire.Most infantry carried the semi-automatic

M-l Garand Rifle. Another valuable item inRuss's kit was his armored flak vest. Theflak vest made its first appearance in Korea.It contained fiberglass or nylon paddingthat reduced the impact of shell fragmentsbut could not stop a bullet. By 1953, thevest had become a standard piece ofpersonal equipment.

As static warfare set in, the Eighth Armyfront line began to resemble the WesternFront of the First World War. The front lineconsisted of a Main Line of Resistance (MLR)

This Marine is removing a piece of shrapnel from his

armored flak vest. It is probably exactly the same kind of

vest that Corporal Martin Russ wore during his time on

the front line. The vest consisted of fiberglass plates

woven together (Defence Department)

Portrait of a soldier 67

and a line of outposts. The MLR was a stringof mutually supporting strongpoints,constructed to absorb and stop any enemyblow. Outposts were forward of the MLRwithin No Man's Land. They served to detectand slow an enemy advance. Bunkers, severalaprons of barbed wire, and minefieldsprotected most defensive positions. Bunkerswere largely underground, with a roof of thicklogs and sandbags to protect against artilleryand mortar hits. Underground passagewaysoften interconnected several bunkers. Eachoutpost and various points in No Man's Landwere pinpointed so that mortars and artillerycould deliver quick and accurate fire.Generally around a half mile (0.8km) wide,No Man's Land became familiar territory forboth sides. In Russ's sector, it was littered withempty ration cans, discarded weapons,minefields, patrol paths, a burnt-out tank,downed Corsairs, and dead men.

Russ's platoon occupied an outpost, NewBunker Hill, for 16 days in March 1953. Hedefended a listening post within the front-linetrench with one other man. There was abunker directly behind his position and barbedwire in front of it. Further to the rear, there was

another bunker for sleeping. During the night,Chinese snipers observed and intermittentlyfired on New Bunker Hill. Russ always had tokeep his head down and sleep curled up.

Patrols into No Man's Land wereconducted both day and night. The object ofa patrol was generally reconnaissance orcombat. A reconnaissance patrol observedand kept contact with the enemy, reportingon unit identification, headquarters,locations, and the layout of his forwarddefenses. Combat patrols sought to fight theenemy, usually through staging an ambush orprobing a Communist outpost. Patrols variedin size from a mere fire team to an entireplatoon. Most front-line UNC companiesconducted one patrol per night. Raids wereconducted in platoon to battalion strength.They were mounted in order to seize a smalloutpost, capture prisoners, or simply harassthe enemy.

An M-26 Pershing tank fires in support of the24th US Division in January 1952. The Pershing wasthe only American tank that could stand up to a T-34.To provide the infantry with direct fire support, tankswere often positioned in fortified emplacements withinthe MLR. (The Tank Museum, Bovington)

68 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Russ became adept at patrolling. Helearned how to move stealthily and guidea patrol as a point-man. The Chinesefrequently fired upon these patrols withmortars and machine-guns and, on anumber of occasions, Russ engaged inactual firelights. In the dark, the enemywas rarely seen and aiming consisted offiring as much ammunition as possible inthe general direction of the enemy's muzzleflashes. In April 1953. Russ became anacting squad leader and began leadingmore patrols.

For many UNC units, patrolling andraids proved burdensome. Raiding enemyoutposts and capturing prisoners resulted inhard-fought battles and heavy casualties.Russ recorded that one proposed raid tocapture a prisoner required 50 men, all ofthe regimental artillery and mortars, threetanks, two flame-throwing tanks, and aflight of Corsairs. Russ was very scepticalabout American estimates of Chinesecasualties from raids and patrols. He wroteof one particular estimate:

We scoffed at the estimate of Chinesecasualties. From the little experience I've had inraids and from the stories I've heard of otherraids, I'll bet the Chinese suffered half thenumber of casualties that we had. When we raidthe Chinese, we get clobbered. When the Chineseraid the marines, they get clobbered worse. Butthey are a bit more intelligent about it; theydon't make raids very often.

Nevertheless, formations that did notcontrol No Man's Land, unlike the Marine orthe Commonwealth Divisions, sufferedheavy casualties and lost terrain toCommunist surprise attacks.

Shortly before the end of the war, Russwas temporarily sent to Fox Company. AbleCompany was about to relieve them andRuss was to familiarize himself with FoxCompany's positions and No Man's Land inthat area. On his second night with FoxCompany, Russ joined a 30-man combatpatrol sent out to assault an enemy outpost.As the column approached the objective, the

point-man discovered a trip wire across thepath. The lieutenant followed the trip wireinto a clump of bushes. Then, a burst of firebrought him down. The patrol had walkedinto a Chinese ambush. Russ described thefollowing moments:

A tremendous volume of fire, coming fromour right front, at a distance varying fromtwenty to fifty yards. These were the first muzzleblasts I noticed . . . Fire of equal intensity camefrom our left but at a greater distance. Theambush had been deployed in an invertedV formation and the fire from its apex wasobviously the most deadly.

Nine of the first 10 Marines in thecolumn were hit. A staff sergeant died inhand-to-hand combat trying to rescue thelieutenant, who was captured. Further back,after overcoming his surprise, Russ began toreturn fire with the BAR, along with theremaining members of the patrol. Thefirefight lasted for less than five minutes.Once the Marines had suppressed theChinese fire, they aggressively began towithdraw.

The Chinese were still trying to surroundthe patrol and the Marines had to fighttheir way out. Moving back down the path,Russ spotted two Chinese approaching twoprone Marines in a ditch less than 50 feet(15m) away. Later, Russ wrote whathappened as the Chinese tried to drag oneof the Marines away:

/ was mesmerized ... It's taken me a monthto even think about writing a description ...The BAR was not in firing position; it wasnecessary to bring it up from my side. I didthis quickly, planting both elbows on theground with an audible thud. I squeezed off anunnecessarily long burst before the Chinesecould react. The muzzle blast was blinding ...When my eyes became again accustomed tothe dark, I saw that one of the Chinese laycrumpled up near the edge of the paddy. Theother was nowhere in sight. The Marine hadbeen dragged only a few feet and anklesprotruded from the first level or step of the

Portrait of a soldier 69

paddy. At this moment - as 1 took notice ofthese things - I was fired upon from that areain which the two Chinese had appeared ... Iheaved grenades in that direction. After theexplosions I could still hear people movingaround in the paddy. Someone fell noisily intoa puddle off to the left.

Of the two prone Marines, one was acorpsman (medic) playing dead and theother was unconscious. Russ and thecorpsman lifted the unconscious Marine andwithdrew to friendly lines. Six Marines werekilled, 14 were wounded, and one was

captured in the ambush. Chinese casualtieswere impossible to estimate in the confusionand uncertainty of night fighting.

Russ safely returned to the USA at theend of the war. In his last month in Korea,he was promoted to sergeant, a job whoseduties he had been performing for sometime as acting squad leader. He also earneda Purple Heart. Tiny splinters from agrenade and barbed wire had injured himduring a combat patrol in May. He wenton to write several books on Marines incombat in the Second World War, Korea,and Vietnam.

70 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Members of 3 RAR out on patrol. Australian and British infantry were adept atpatrolling. Regular and aggressive patrols kept the Chinese bottled up on their sideof No Man's Land. (Imperial War Museum)

The world around war

The domestic and internationalimpact

One of the remarkable characteristics of theKorean War was its significance to eventsoutside of the Korean peninsula. The conflictaltered the domestic politics, economics, andsecurity of regions far removed from theactual fighting.

Prisoners of war

By May 1952, the cease-fire delegationshad reached an agreement on Item Three(cease-fire supervisory arrangements)through the establishment of a NeutralNations Supervisory Commission and aMilitary Armistice Commission. Item Four(the exchange of prisoners of war), however,proved intractable. This issue typified theideological conflict between democracy andCommunism. In January 1952, Achesonand Truman decided to demand voluntaryrepatriation. This meant that every prisonerwould have the right to return to his homecountry or seek residence in a new country.For the USA, voluntary repatriation was aninalienable right of all peoples. For theCommunists, the potential defection ofover 100,000 North Korean and Chineseprisoners would contradict the supposedUtopia of their ideology. Both sides believedthat conceding on this one issue wouldhave dire effects on the acceptance ofdemocracy or Communism throughout theworld. Consequently, neither side waswilling to yield.

The situation worsened in early 1952when pro-Communist prisoners beganviolently resisting UNC authority in theprison on Koje-do, off the southern coastof South Korea. On 7 May 1952,pro-Communist prisoners captured theprison commandant, Brigadier-GeneralFrank Dodd. China and North Korea

exploited the disorder to show that mostprisoners indeed wanted to be repatriatedand that the UNC demand for voluntaryrepatriation was unfounded. The crisis didnot end until June 1952 when Brigadier-General Haydon Boatner, withconsiderable bloodshed, brought thesituation under control.

American domestic politics

Within the USA, there was widespreadapathy to the Korean War. Americans wereparticularly uneasy with the concept oflimited war. The frequent reference to thewar by government officials and the mediaas a 'police-action' seemed like a cynicalunderstatement when Americans weredying in major battles. The phrase 'Whydie for a tie?' was frequently used byopponents of limited war. Opposition tothe war was fuelled by the RepublicanCongress, which sought to undermine theTruman administration. The strategy oflimited war was presented as yet anotherexample of the administration'sappeasement of Communism.

The climax of the domestic Americandebate over limited war was sparked byMacArthur's dismissal. The American publicand Congress were outraged. A Gallup Pollgave Truman a mere 29 percent approvalrating. MacArthur returned to the USA as ahero. On 19 April 1951, he spoke before theUS Congress and attacked the concept oflimited war as immoral. He said: 'once war isforced upon us, there is no other alternativethan to apply every available means to bringit to a swift end . . . War's very object isvictory, not prolonged indecision. In warthere is no substitute for victory.' He endedthe speech with the famous line: 'Old Soldiers

72 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Communist prisoners in a compound at Koje-do

holding a demonstration against voluntary repatriation.

Actions like this undermined the UNC stand for

voluntary repatriation in the eyes of the world.

(Defence Department)

never die, they just fade away.' SeveralSenators and Congressmen were in tears.

Looking for further political gains, theRepublican Senate opened the MacArthurHearings in June 1951 as a means ofindicting the Truman administration for thedismissal of MacArthur and the strategy oflimited war. MacArthur again appearedbefore the Congress and attacked theconcept of limited war. Then, Acheson,Marshall, and Bradley testified in defense ofthe Truman administration's actions. Bradleyconvincingly stated that MacArthur haddisobeyed a presidential order to clear hispublic statements with Washington. In doingso, he had promulgated an American foreignpolicy to the world that contradictedTruman's actual policy. Bradley also argued

that fighting a total war with the PRC wouldinvolve a major diversion of Americanresources from confronting the Soviet Unionin more critical areas. He said: 'Red China isnot the powerful nation seeking to dominatethe world. Frankly, in the opinion of theJoint Chiefs of Staff, this strategy wouldinvolve us in the wrong war, at the wrongplace, at the wrong time, and with thewrong enemy.' Partly because of Bradley'stestimony, the MacArthur Hearings failed todiscredit the Truman administration'shandling of the war.

After the MacArthur Hearings, popularopposition to the war died down, but itnever faded away. The country grew tired ofinterminable peace negotiations and thestalemate on the battlefield. Consequently,there was broad support for Eisenhower'scampaign promises in 1952 to 'Go to Korea'and bring a swift end to the war. Thisdomestic attitude provided impetus forEisenhower's preparations to escalate the warin 1953. Nevertheless, there was always a

The world around war 73

substantial percentage of the population infavor of peace talks and a compromisesolution to the war. Indeed, many Americansdisliked the indecisive way the war wasfought, yet approved of the cease-fire talksand the values of compromise andmoderation they embodied.

Geostrategic implications

One of the most important effects of theKorean War was the degree to which itmobilized the West against Sovietexpansionism. By signaling that theCommunists truly had aggressive intentions,the Korean War led to a massivemobilization of Western resources for warand gave the Cold War its notoriouscomplexion of two armed campsirreconcilably opposed to one another.

The outbreak of the Korean War causedthe USA to undergo a massive rearmamentprogram. The attack confirmed theassumptions about Communist aggressionmade in NSC 68. Accordingly, NSC 68'sprescriptions were rapidly implemented. Asearly as July 19S0, Truman requested thatCongress add $10 billion to the $14 billionUS defense budget, remove the manpowerlimit on the size of the American armedforces, and provide greater military aid tofriendly countries. In September, Congressapproved. Military expansion continuedthroughout the Korean War. For example,by July 1951, the USA's military strengthhad doubled and the defense budget for1952 was four times that of 1949.

The defense of Western Europe was alsobolstered. The West feared that the KoreanWar was merely a prelude to a Sovietinvasion of Western Europe. In 1950, only14 weak divisions were assigned to NATOand there was no unified commandstructure. No American divisions were evendeployed in Europe. Shortly after theoutbreak of the Korean War, the USA putforward a 'one package' proposal for anincrease in American divisions assigned toNATO, a build-up of the French and British

armed forces, German rearmament, and anintegrated and centralized commandstructure. In the first three months of thewar, France and Britain took significantsteps to build their armed forces. By 1953,15 well-armed divisions, including sixAmerican, were deployed in West Germanyas part of NATO. The percentage of grossdomestic product spent on militaryexpenditures increased from an average of5.5 percent to 12 percent for NATOcountries. The Supreme Headquarters AlliedPowers Europe was established to integrateplanning and to command NATO forces inthe event of war. Finally, seriousdeliberations began on German rearmament.

The Korean War also led the USA torecognize east Asia as an area of vitalstrategic importance. Prompted by theurgency of the Korean War, on 8 September1951 the USA and Japan signed a peacetreaty, normalizing their post-Second WorldWar relations. A military alliance, theJapan-US Security Treaty, was establishedshortly thereafter, in 1952. Partly to offsetfears of a resurgence of Japanese militarismand partly to oppose Communism, the USAsigned security pacts with Australia, NewZealand, and the Philippines in the samemonth. In addition to these moves, the USAincreased its support of France in its waragainst Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. At theconclusion of the war the US also signed amutual security treaty with South Korea.

The economic situation in thePRC and North Korea

The Communists were feeling the strain ofextended warfare by 1953. China's and NorthKorea's poorly industrialized economic systemswere not suited to sustaining high-intensitymodern warfare. For the PRC, the Korean Warhad come too soon after the Second WorldWar and the Chinese Civil War. Mao's plansfor a gradual and peaceful transition tosocialism - including continued trade with theWest - had to be set aside in order to mobilizethe economy in support of the war effort.

74 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Socialism was rapidly instituted in the PRCalong Soviet, instead of Chinese, models ofeconomic development, and forced economicactivity caused inflation to run rampant. In1951, 50 percent of the PRC's revenues werededicated to the war, but despite heavytaxation, the Chinese government lacked therevenues to pay for its expenditures and thePRC was burdened with a hefty debt The CCPwas also concerned about the possibility ofinternal dissension. After decades of conflictthe Chinese people were becomingincreasingly war weary. These economic andpolitical concerns compelled Mao to end thewar. In the fall of 1952, Zhou met with Stalinin Moscow. Zhou sought to conclude anarmistice if the UNC made some motorconcessions at the negotiating table. But Stalinopposed the idea because he did not want toend the drain on US military resources.

North Korea was in even worse conditionthan China. The economy was in ruins andthe country was wracked by food shortages.The air campaign had destroyed thecountry's industrial facilities and caused heavy

bomb damage to every major city. Towns andvillages, often the location of supply depots,were repeatedly targeted for UNC air strikes.Most North Korean civilians fled to thecountryside to escape the bombing. Major-General William Dean, a prisoner of war,reported that by 1952 the majority of thetowns he observed were 'rubble or snowyopen spaces.' And most North Koreans he methad lost a relative in an air strike. In thesummer of 1952, Kim pleaded with Stalin toimplement a more decisive strategy in orderto reduce North Korea's hardship. Thus, thecumulative costs of war were driving bothNorth Korea and the PRC to seek to end thefighting. Only Stalin's obstinacy anddetermination to wear down the Westperpetuated the conflict.

The devastated industrial area of Chongjin inNorth Korea. North Koreas industry was almostentirely destroyed in the course of the war In theera before smart weapons, collateral bomb damagewas inescapably high. Significant portions of all of themajor cities and towns in North Korea were reducedto rubble. (Defence Department)

Portrait of a civilian

Kyonshill Kang

As noted previously, Korea was torn apartduring the three years of the Korean War.The war might have been a limitedendeavor for the USA and the SovietUnion, but it was nothing less than a totalwar for the Korean people. As a young girl,Kyonshill Kang went through the ebb andflow of Communist and UNC offensives inSouth Korea. She described her experiencesin her book, Home was the Land of MorningCalm: A Saga of a Korean-American Family.Her family was originally from Tanchon, acity near the east coast of North Korea.The increasing Communist control ofNorth Korea after 1945 caused her family

to move to South Korea in 1946. In fact,her grandmother crossed the border fivetimes in order to guide all of the familymembers into South Korea. Living inSeoul, her father, a teacher, attained arespectable position and earned areasonable standard of living. Kangremembered hearing Rhee speak once.Most Koreans were impressed with himbecause he was the first Korean to haveearned a PhD in the USA.

A Korean family treks southward during the Fifth PhaseOffensive. The mobile warfare of the first year of the warresulted in a huge number of refugees. (US Army)

76 Essential Histories • The Korean War

Kang's family first heard about the war on26 June 1950 through the radio. Rhee made asubsequent radio broadcast that it was safe toremain in Seoul. Although her grandmotherand mother (her father was in the USA as aFulbright scholar) were worried about theinvasion, they were reassured by Rhee'sannouncement. Six days later, they learnedthat Rhee and most of his government hadactually fled Seoul immediately after theradio broadcast. This caused the populationof Seoul to panic. Nevertheless, by that time,Kang's grandmother had decided that it waswisest to stay in Seoul. At night, they couldhear artillery fire. Meanwhile, thousands fledsouth on foot or by train. The roads wereclogged with refugees. By the end of July,

25,000 Koreans per day were crossing UNClines. Many died during the journey.

The North Koreans tried to reconstructSouth Korea into a Communist state. Theyinstituted people's committees and createdCommunist socio-political organizations.Land reform was implemented and tenantfarming was abolished. Leftist SouthKoreans assisted the North Koreans. Manymembers of the National Assembly wereneither as cowardly nor as wise as Rhee toflee Seoul. Several were executed by theNorth Koreans for their political beliefs. AsDavid Rees related in Korea: The LimitedWar, one captured Communist guerrilladiary read: 'Apprehended twelve men;National Assembly members, police

portrait of a civilian 77

sergeants, and Myon [a town] leaders.Killed four of them at the scene, and theremaining eight were shot afterinvestigation by the People's court.' TheNorth Koreans committed similar atrocitiesthroughout South Korea against Christians,rightists, and anyone else suspected ofopposing Communism.

When the North Korean soldiersentered Kang's neighborhood, manyCommunist sympathizers spontaneouslyappeared. They formed block committeesand observed the activities of everyone inthe neighborhood. Every household wasrequired to display pictures of Kim andStalin. For a time, young high schoolgirls who supported the North Koreans

boarded with Kang's family and extolledthe virtues of Communism to her. Theneighborhood even had to learn aCommunist song:

Marks of blood on every ridge of the JangbaekMarks of blood on every ridge of AmnolStill now over the blooming free KoreaThose sacred marks shed brilliant raysO dear is the name, our beloved generalO glorious is the name. General Kim Il Sung.

North Korean soldiers ana South Korean civilians dancein Seoul following its occupation in the summer of 1950.Many South Koreans were apathetic towards theNorth Korean invasion, but some actively supported it.(US National Archives)

78 Essential Histories • The Korean War

All adult males were conscripted formanual labor, serving as porters andhauling ammunition for the NKPA. Womenwere eventually recruited as well. To avoidtheir conscription, Kang's family hid heruncle and a family friend. 'Teacher' Song, insmall uncomfortable spaces in the house.The men remained there, only emerging torelieve themselves, until August. Kang wasgiven the duty of signaling whenever anypossible informants entered theneighborhood. As the weeks drifted intomonths, food supplies became scarce. Thefamily hid their rice so that theCommunists could not requisition it.

The family witnessed frequent Americanair strikes. They took shelter in thebasement whenever the shiny fuselage of aB-29 was spotted. Air raids usually lastedover an hour. Although most of theAmerican targets were supply depots, once aschool was mistakenly bombed wherecivilians were taking refuge; several died. InSeptember 1950, Kang's family heard theartillery of the approaching Marines. Kangremembered the arrival of 'pink-faced'Americans and the widespread andnewfound optimism about the course of thewar. This was quickly shattered, though, bythe Chinese intervention. Her uncle and'Teacher' Song were respectively conscriptedinto the ROK army and manual labor.When the Communists approached Seoulagain in January 1951, the family fled toPusan through Taejon, leaving behind mostof their possessions. Kang and her mothertraveled on the rooftop of a train againstthe bitterly cold winter wind. Kang'smother kept her awake throughout the tripto prevent hypothermia.

In Pusan, the family entered a packedrefugee camp in Pusan. Thin partitions ofsheets and rags separated each family'sliving space. Life was very difficult. Pusanwas crowded and dirty, and there werefrequent power outages and watershortages. Kang remembered standing inline for hours for water. Many Koreanwomen became prostitutes to earn money,which only gained them the condemnation

of the rest of the Korean community.Children jeered at any Korean womanwalking with an American soldier as a'Western whore.'

Many Koreans believed that Americansand other white UNC troops viewed themas inferior. While still in Korea, Kang'sfather had felt that Americans looked downupon Koreans. The slang name for allKoreans, 'gook,' certainly was notendearing. Of greater infamy is themassacre of South Korean civilians at NoGun Ri by the 7th US Cavalry Regiment inJuly 1950. Units of the regiment wereretreating from the North Koreans andfound their path underneath a bridgeblocked by refugees. Fearing that NorthKorean soldiers might be hiding among thecrowd, the Americans opened fire, killingperhaps 100 South Korean civilians.However, racism and brutality to civilianswere by no means universal. ManyAmericans were impressed by the hardshipsendured by the Korean people as well as thecourage of their soldiers.

South Koreans generally did not supportthe UNC strategy of fighting a limited war.They wanted Korea unified. Even before thewar, Kang remembered singing songs aboutunification. Kang's father was resentful thatthe superpowers had arbitrarily divided thepeninsula. He despised Roosevelt forabandoning democracy in Korea. Given hisplans to unify Korea, most South Koreansadmired MacArthur. They considered manyof MacArthur's bad qualities - hisarrogance, authoritarianism, and vanity -necessary in a strong leader. Kang's familywas shocked when he was dismissed.

Rhee's government was authoritarian anddespite Rhee's example, corruption existed.His police forces executed and imprisonedhundreds of Communist collaborators. Rheeand the National Assembly were in constantconflict. The ROK President was chosen bythe National Assembly, not directly electedby the people, among whom Rhee was morepopular. Therefore, Rhee wanted theNational Assembly to change the ROKconstitution so that he would be elected

Portrait of a civilian 79

directly. To effect this, Rhee declaredmartial law and imprisoned severalmembers of the National Assembly in May1952. The National Assembly conceded inJuly, after the domestic political stability ofSouth Korea had been placed in questionfor months, and the principles for whichthe UN allies were fighting had been treatedwith contempt.

South Korea endured many morehardships before the war ended, such asrampant inflation and slow economic

growth. For Kang's family, life eventuallyimproved. They were given a room in Pusanoutside of the refugee camp and Kang'sresourceful grandmother began peddlinggoods. Kang herself attended a refugeeschool and learned new songs about UNC,instead of Communist, valor. In thesummer of 1951, they discovered that herfather was working in UNC generalheadquarters in Tokyo. In late 1952, thefamily left for Japan, and from there theywould eventually move to the USA.

How the war ended

Closing moves

In the last nine months of the Korean War,the USA and the Chinese searched forpolitical and military means to end the war.Heightened combat matched the final stepstoward peace, as both sides tried to usemilitary force to strengthen their respectivebargaining positions.

New armies

One of the important outcomes of the KoreanWar was the modernization of the ROK armyand the Chinese People's Volunteers. After1951, the major events in the ground warinvolved battles between these two reformedarmies. The South Korean army was veryimportant to the USA in lessening the burdenplaced on American military resources. Afterthe Fifth Phase Offensive, Van Fleet, who hadbeen instrumental in rebuilding the Greekarmy after the Second World War, wasdetermined to modernize the ROK army. TheEighth Army initiated a program,'Concentrated Training for the ROK Army,' toguide modernization. A Field TrainingCommand used American officers and NCOsto train each ROK division in operations fromindividual to company level. Selected ROKofficers went to infantry or artillery school inthe USA. Additionally, a staff school and amilitary academy were established in Korea.Meanwhile, the divisions were given properlevels of equipment. In January 1952, VanFleet decided to rebuild the II ROK Corps andplace it under the command of Major-GeneralPaik Sun Yup. Unlike previous ROK corps, thenew corps headquarters would have artillery,engineer, and quartermaster supporting unitsdirectly under its command. The II ROK Corpsentered the line in April 1952 between theIX and X US Corps, a symbol of the newROK army.

The CPV also underwent major reforms in1952. The first half of 1952 was spentstrengthening the front line, bringingforward reinforcements and new equipment,and indoctrinating tactical lessons. TheChinese extended and improved theirfortifications from the front line to the waistof Korea. Several Communist armies were

. echeloned behind the front line and alongthe North Korean coasts. Concrete bunkersdotted the Communist positions. Gianttunnels, some 100 feet (30m) deep,interconnecting trenches, and fieldworkswere constructed, to protect the soldiersfrom UNC firepower. Assault units used thetunnels to approach UNC outpostsundetected. Logistics were also developedand improved. Over 180,000 rear servicemenwere dedicated to supporting theCommunist fighting units. Against thesedefenses, any major UNC offensive wouldnow be extremely difficult.

Mao was still resolved to fight aprotracted war, believing that the USA wouldcave in under prolonged attrition. But to doso, a method of fighting needed to bedeveloped that would reduce Chinesecasualties. In April 1952, Peng returned toBeijing to oversee the Central MilitaryCommission (the PLA high command).Although Peng was still officiallycommander of the CPV, Deng Hua becamethe acting commander and Yang Dezhi,commander of the Nineteenth CPV ArmyCorps, was given charge of all combatoperations. 'Active positional defense'became the new doctrine of the CPV. AnyUNC advance would be immediatelycounterattacked with CPV reserves. Smallattacks on enemy outposts would seize theinitiative and destroy UNC units piecemealin 'see-saw battles'. In the course of thecontinuing battles, the tactics of 'see-saw

How the war ended 81

Chinese soldiers conferring underground. The

Communists built extensive underground fortifications

along their MLR and back to the waist of Korea from

the summer of 1951 until the end of the war Large

tunnels cut through their defensive positions.

(Chinese National Army Museum)

battles' were modified in order to reducecasualties. Chinese infantry rarely made thekind of unsupported mass frontal assaults

that had marked their earlier tactics. Rather,careful reconnaissance, combined-armstactics, artillery preparation, andconcentration of forces were emphasized.Army commanders were to be certain ofsuccess before launching an attack.

In early September 1952, Deng and Yangbegan a series of attacks against a salientheld by the II ROK Corps, known as theKumsong bulge. In October, the CPV

82 Essential Histories • The Korean War

captured several outposts and brieflypenetrated the Eighth Army MLR. Once theChinese attacks lost momentum, Van Fleetordered the IX US Corps to launch acounterattack, Operation Showdown, on10 October. Given that this area had beenthe focus of operations for the past month.the Chinese were ready for the attack. For sixweeks, a major 'see-saw' battle persisted in anarea of less than three square miles(7.75km2).

Deng was pleased with the opportunity todestroy UNC manpower. The mountainousarea, laced with Communist fortifications,was well suited for defense. Once more, theSouth Koreans did most of the fighting.Supported by American firepower, they drovethe Chinese into their tunnels during theday. The Chinese would then counterattackat night and regain their positions. Oneposition, Sniper Ridge, changed hands14 times. Deng and Yang fed reinforcementsinto the battle until they held all of theimportant terrain. Given the heavy UNCcasualties and under pressure from Clark andCollins, Van Fleet broke off OperationShowdown on 28 November.

The battles of fall 1952 were the firstsignificant Communist successes since theSecond Phase Offensive. Van Fleet hadcommitted a major operational error insubmitting to this kind of slugfest. UNCcasualties were over 9,000. The CPV lost11,500 men but could sustain these losses.By emphasizing concentration, firepower,and better infantry tactics, Deng and Yanglearned that they could wear down the UNCwithout suffering exorbitant losses to theirown forces in the process.

Threats of escalation

Dwight Eisenhower was elected President ofthe United States in November 1952. It waswidely believed that he would embrace adecisive military strategy. However,Eisenhower was actually very cautious. Hewas wary of making any reckless moves thatmight cause the Soviets to intervene.

Nevertheless, he and his administration werefirmly resolved to end the war quickly. Bysignaling that the USA was willing to fight amuch bigger and more destructive war,Eisenhower and Secretary of State John FosterDulles hoped to convince the Communiststhat further fighting was not worthwhile.

The use of atomic weapons was a verydangerous proposition. In the early 1950s, theUSA did not possess a large stock of atomicbombs. A saturation bombing of the PRC oreven the Communist front line was out of thequestion. Atomic weapons could only be usedto support an Eighth Army advance or destroycertain military and industrial targets inNorth Korea or the PRC. On the other hand,the UNC was very vulnerable to atomicattack. The huge supply base at Pusan and thecities of Japan would be particularly lucrativetargets for the Communists. Escalating thewar conventionally was not an easy taskeither. The UNC lacked the manpower andmateriel to launch a major ground offensiveagainst the strong Communist defenses. Atleast six months would be required to buildthe forces necessary for an offensive to thewaist of the peninsula.

In the fall of 1952, Clark began pressing forescalated American military action. On8 October, after weeks of deadlock, Clarkrecessed negotiations indefinitely. He thenpresented the JCS with a plan to compel theCommunists to agree to a cease-fire onAmerican terms. He wanted to blockadeChina, bomb targets in north China andManchuria, and launch a ground offensiveto the Yalu. Clark requested that the JCS planto use nuclear weapons in the attack. TheJCS would not authorize the plan. WhenEisenhower visited Korea in late 1952 aspresident-elect, Clark pressed for the plan'simplementation. Eisenhower also rejected it.Nevertheless, when Eisenhower returned tothe USA, and later in his State of the Unionaddress, he hinted that he might escalatethe war.

As noted previously, by the end of 1952both the Chinese and the North Koreanswere feeling the strain of war and looking fora way out. However, Stalin had been refusing

How the war ended 83

to end the war. Predicting that a Third WorldWar with the West was inevitable, hebelieved that compromise in Korea woulddamage Communist prestige and end thedrain on Western resources that the warentailed. Stalin died on 5 March 1953. Thenew Soviet leadership wanted to pursue aless confrontational mode of competitionwith the USA. Thus, at Stalin's funeral, theywere receptive to Zhou's proposal forcompromising on a cease-fire in Korea. TheSoviet leadership appreciated that thecontinued costs of war were too high andagreed that the stand on forcible repatriationshould be abandoned.

Accordingly, on 28 March 1953, Zhouaccepted a February proposal by Clark,dubbed 'Little Switch,' for an exchange ofsick and wounded prisoners of war. Progressin negotiations followed. On 26 April, thesix-month recess in negotiations finallyended. In early May, the Communistsproposed a Neutral Nations RepatriationCommission. The commission wouldtemporarily supervise the POWs in Koreaafter the armistice. Each side would beallowed to send representatives to convincetheir prisoners to return home. However, noprisoner would be repatriated against hiswishes. Unfortunately, minor disagreementsimpeded the quick conclusion ofnegotiations, leading to a new round ofheightened military activity.

Despite compromising at the negotiationtable, Deng and Mao continued to pressurethe UNC on the battlefield. This was partly ameans of saving face while makingconcessions. More importantly, though,Deng and the other CPV generals seriouslybelieved that the UNC would not come toterms unless they suffered unsustainablelosses. The initial attacks focused on the ROKarmy in the east and American andCommonwealth forces in the west. But whenRhee opposed UNC compromises atPanmunjom, Deng and Yang refocused theirattacks upon ROK formations.

On 10 June, the Chinese attacked theII ROK Corps around Kumsong. With heavyartillery support, the Chinese pressed forward

2 miles (3.2 km) and into the MLR by 14 June.The South Koreans fought back hard. Theyestablished blocking positions and movedreserves to the front. The onslaught continueduntil the first cease-fire was concluded on16 June. The CPV had suffered 6,600 casualtieswhile the South Koreans had lost 7,300 men.CPV commanders were convinced that thisoffensive brought the UNC to terms. Actually,American decision-makers were too focused onthe possibility of escalating the war to beaffected by this relatively minor defeat,especially as most of the casualties wereSouth Koreans, not Americans.

While the Communists attacked on theground, the USA and UNC intensified the airwar. For the first time, Sabre squadrons wereinstructed to seek out and destroy the MiG-15s in MiG Alley, rather than merely to wardoff their attacks. The object was to destroythe enemy aircraft faster than new pilotscould be trained for combat. Sabre sortiesdoubled in the last months of the war.Unfortunately for the Chinese, the Sovietsdecided to withdraw their air divisions inlate April. The Chinese were decimated. TheSabres shot down over 150 MiG-15s in May,June, and July 1953; by far the greatestCommunist monthly losses of the war.

Additionally, Clark targeted 20 dams inNorth Korea for destruction. Doing so wouldflood North Korea's rice fields and inhibitthe country from feeding itself. In the past,such agricultural targets had been avoidedbecause of humanitarian concerns and therisk of escalation. Starting on 13 May, FEAFfighter-bombers struck five dams, includingToksan, near Pyongyang. The rice fields wereflooded and 70 nearby villages were allegedlysubmerged. The North Koreans scrambled torepair the damage and enact preventivemeasures as the strikes continued. Bombingwas also renewed against the North Koreanhydroelectric plants, some of which hadbeen repaired.

In March 1953, the JCS and the NSC,believing that the Communists were notfeeling sufficient military pressure, begandiscussing ending restrictions on alloperations. Specifically, they studied NSC

84 Essential Histories • The Korean War

A South Korean mortar team on Capitol Hill.Capitol Hill was one of the several terrain featuresfiercely fought over during the 'see-saw' battles offall 1952. Although it was eventually lost, theSouth Koreans defended the hill staunchly andinflicted numerous casualties on the Chinese.

(Defence Department)

147, which outlined options for an advanceto the waist of Korea, bombing air bases inManchuria, and the use of atomic weapons.Bradley and Eisenhower worried that the lastoption could dramatically escalate theconflict and cause Soviet retaliation. Aftermuch deliberation, on 19 May, the JCSendorsed the implementation of optionswithin NSC 147, including the use of atomicweapons, if there was no progress innegotiations in the next months. Eisenhowerapproved NSC 147 as a rough guide for

strategy if escalation became necessary.Following the endorsement of NSC 147,

American leaders issued a series of nuclearthreats. First, on 21 May, Dulles told IndianPrime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru that theUSA would expand military action if thecurrent round of talks failed. Dullesexpected that his statement would berelayed to the Chinese. Second, on 27 May,Clark sent Kim and Peng a letter stating thatnegotiations had reached their final stage.Third, on 3 June, Ambassador CharlesBohlen in Moscow told Soviet ForeignMinister Vyacheslav Molotov that thefailure of armistice talks would create asituation that the USA hoped to avoid. Allof these statements were meant to conveyAmerican intent to escalate the war, andpossibly use atomic weapons, if the

How the war ended 85

Communists did not concede soon innegotiations.

The UNC delegation presented their 'finalposition' on 25 May 1953. It accepted the

Communist proposal for a Neutral NationsRepatriation Commission and made a numberof concessions on the details of an agreement.If the Communists did not accept the 'final

South Koreans demonstrating against an armistice in Seoul.

Most South Koreans supported President Rhee's stance that an

armistice should not be concluded until North Korea was liberated.

(Defence Department)

86 Essential Histories • The Korea War

position,' Clark was authorized to endnegotiations and escalate military action,including implementing his offensive planfrom October 1952. In the event theCommunists accepted the final position. Thisallowed a cease-fire agreement to be concludedto take effect on 27 July. On that day the15 nations supporting South Korea signed theChina Warning Statement, which threatenedthat renewed aggression would make themreturn to hostilities, which probably could notbe confined within the borders of Korea.

South Korean President Syngman Rhee speaking withUS Ambassador Muccio. In June 1953. Rhee unilaterallyreleased 25,000 North Korean prisoners of warbecause of his opposition to the armistice accords.(Defence Department)

Rhee vociferously opposed the armistice.He wanted Korea unified and all Chineseforces withdrawn from Korea. Koreans filledthe streets of Seoul and other citiesthroughout South Korea to demonstrateagainst an armistice. The climactic eventoccurred on 18 June when Rhee unilaterallyreleased 25,000 North Korean prisoners ofwar. Clark and Eisenhower were surprisedand angered. Urgent negotiations ensuedbetween Rhee and Clark. Clark finallysecured Rhee's acceptance of the armisticeagreement by promising that the USAwould sign a security treaty with the ROKand continue to build the ROK armedforces after the war.

Not surprisingly, the Communists wereoutraged by Rhee's intransigent act. Mao

How the w a r ended 87

The Kumsong bulge and the final armistice line, 27 July 1953

From September 1952 to July 1953, a series of see-sawbattles' were fought for the Kumsong bulge. By the endof the war the Chinese had captured most of it.

ordered another offensive in order topunish Rhee and demonstrate Chineseresolve. On 13 July, five CPV armies(150,000 men) again attacked the II ROKCorps defending the Kumsong bulge.Exploiting tactical surprise, darkness, andoverwhelming numbers, the Chinese brokethrough the MLR along 21 miles (34km) offront. The South Koreans were forced towithdraw 19 miles (31km) to avoidencirclement. Nevertheless, the SouthKoreans were fighting hard and notpanicking. Once again, the new ROK armyproved its resilience. Morale was high andunits were not dissolving. After 16 July,ROK formations began to counterattackand even pushed the Communists back5 miles (8km). But the Chinese were notseeking to scrap the armistice agreement.After attaining success on the battlefield,

the Communists signed a second cease-fireon 27 July 1953.

Conventional wisdom claims thatEisenhower's nuclear threats compelled theCommunists to compromise and end theKorean War. There is actually little evidence tosupport that claim. Eisenhower's nuclearthreats were important, in that they signaledthat the USA countenanced continued andheightened warfare. But the Communistswere motivated to compromise primarily bythe exhaustion of nearly three years of war.The cumulative loss of manpower, destructionof industry, and military expenditureswere a heavy burden. By early 1953,continuing to bear this burden was notworthwhile, even though the CPV was amore efficient fighting force than ever before.The key event that facilitated the Communistdecision to compromise was Stalin's death.The institution of more moderate leadershipin Moscow enabled the PRC and NorthKorea to make the concessions necessaryto reach an armistice.

Conclusion and consequences

The significance of the KoreanWar in the history of warfare

In spite of its limited nature, the KoreanWar was tremendously destructive. Korea'sindustrial base was wiped out. Four millionKoreans, 10 percent of the population, wererendered casualties and five million becamerefugees. The North Korean armed forceslost approximately 600,000 men in thefighting, in addition to two million civiliancasualties. The Chinese suffered anestimated one million casualties. Losses tothe ROK armed forces are estimated at70,000 killed, 150,000 wounded, and80,000 captured (the majority of whom diedfrom starvation or mistreatment). Onemillion South Korean civilians were killed orinjured. The USA lost 33,600 men killed and103,200 wounded.

The Korean peninsula was divided alongthe line of contact at the end of the war andremains so to this day. A political conferencecalled for in the armistice agreement washeld in Geneva in 1954, but the two sides'demands were too far apart to permit anycompromise. The peninsula became amicrocosm of the Cold War itself. Heavily-armed, North and South Korea faced eachother across the demilitarized zone. But,other than desultory skirmishing, a secondwar has not broken out.

South Korea emerged from the warmilitarily secure but domestically unstable.The ROK armed forces had grown to number600,000 men. They could hold their ownagainst the North Koreans and, to a lesserextent, the Chinese. Following his unilateralrelease of North Korean POWs, Rhee hadsecured from the USA a mutual defensetreaty, long-term economic aid, andassistance in expanding the ROK armedforces. Additionally, the Eighth Armyremained in South Korea throughout theCold War. The ROK was now an importantbulwark against Communist expansionism

in east Asia. It would be one of the fewnations to provide a sizable militarycontribution to the American war effort inVietnam. However, South Korea would notexperience substantial economic growthuntil the 1960s. The constant threat of warled Rhee toward greater authoritarianismand high levels of military spending, whichdetracted from economic development. Thepolitical context of South Korea was markedby authoritarian governments andintermittent student protests. Rhee himselfwas overthrown in a coup d'etat in 1961.

North Korea remained a potent militarypower after the war. Close ties weremaintained with the Soviet Union and thePRC. Indeed, North Korea became intensely-Communist. The re-indoctrination ofCommunism was necessary to mobilizesufficient resources for economic-reconstruction. The effort was largelysuccessful, and the North Korean economywas rebuilt by the late 1950s. Politically, thedefeats of the Korean War undercut Kim IlSung's leadership position. In order to stayin power, he executed a number of hisopponents. He then built a cult ofpersonality around the myth that NorthKorea had won the Korean War. Kimultimately survived the Cold War, andNorth Korea remains a Communist state tothis day under his son's leadership.

The Korean War is often considered adraw or even a defeat for the UNC. TheSoviet Union and the PRC had achievedtheir minimal goal of defending theirpositions in east Asia. The two countriesremained powerful obstacles to Americanhegemony in the area. The independence ofNorth Korea had been preserved. However,this reasoning assumes that the lack of totalvictory was a defeat. In fact, the Korean Warwas an unmistakable victory for the UNC.

Conclusion and consequences 89

First, the important UNC demands were metin negotiations. Concessions were onlymade on minor points. The line of contact,not the 38th Parallel, became the borderbetween North and South Korea, andvoluntary repatriation was enforced. Second,in the course of military operations, theCommunists suffered far greater manpowerand economic losses than the UNC. For thePRC and North Korea, the opportunity costof these lost resources for internaldevelopment was great. Third, the Westhalted the first major Communist attempt atovert aggression. Without delving into acounterfactual, it is reasonable to assumethat if South Korea had not beensuccessfully defended, China and the SovietUnion would have continued with a moreovertly aggressive foreign policy against theWest. Instead, for the remainder of the ColdWar, they resorted to guerrilla warfare as theprimary means of expanding their influence.

There were no truly decisive battles in theKorean War. Success for the Communists orthe UNC ultimately depended on theirability to sustain protracted warfare througha combination of economic strength andmilitary efficiency. The Communists provedless able to do so. Despite their numericalsuperiority, the Communists needed tobreak the military ascendancy of the UNCbefore the weakness of their economicsystems made continued warfareunacceptably expensive. Instead, the clumsyCommunist tactics in the first year of thewar and Ridgway's generalship crippled theirwar effort. Deng Hua and Yang Dezhi did aremarkable job reforming the CPV in 1952.But by the time these reforms took effect,the Chinese could no longer shoulder thecosts of war.

After overcoming the initial Chineseintervention, the UNC became anexceptionally efficient military force. TheUNC mounted offensives without sustainingheavy casualties; repeatedly haltedCommunist attacks; conducted air strikesthroughout North Korea; and controlledthe seas surrounding the peninsula.Technological superiority, abundance of

firepower, a core of experienced soldiers,and innovating commanders engenderedmilitary efficiency. Moreover, the economicstrength of the USA meant that the UNCcould fight the war virtually indefinitely.China's economy, on the other hand, hadnever recovered from the Chinese Civil Waror the Second World War. As the Korean Wardragged on, the need for internal economicdevelopment and an end to the burden ofmilitary expenditure created an impetus forcompromise. For the Soviet Union, theheavy costs of financing and supplying amajor regional war were not worth themarginal reward of enforcing theCommunist bargaining position innegotiations. Hence, by 1953, theCommunists preferred to compromise ratherthan overburden their economies with aninterminable war.

The Korean War had wide implicationsfor the entire international system. First, astechnically a United Nations action, theKorean War was pivotal in the developmentof that organization. Second, in the area ofmilitary strategy, Korea was significant asthe first limited war. Hard practicalexperience in the Korean War had raisedmajor questions regarding the usability ofnuclear weapons. Third, and mostimportantly, the war affected the balance ofpower between the two superpowers.

It was in Korea that the UN firstauthorized the use of force in the name ofcollective security. Unfortunately, theKorean War showed that, in reality, the UNwas not a guarantor of collective security.UN action was a fluke resulting from Sovietabsence in the Security Council. The UN wasnot acting out the will of the entireinternational community, but that of theWest. Later in the Cold War, UN action insupport of collective security was usuallyimpossible because of opposition fromeither the USA or the Soviet Union,depending on whose sphere of influence theUN was considering intervening in.Nevertheless, several important diplomaticinitiatives originated in the UN, includingthe first cease-fire resolution in December

90 Essential Histories • The Korean War

1950 and Jacob Malik's proposal fornegotiations in June 1951. The 'Uniting forPeace' procedure was also created in theKorean War. It would be used again in theCold War, most notably as a means for theUSA to punish the British and French duringthe Suez Canal Crisis. Most importantly, thefact that the Korean War was heavilydebated in the UN by all member statesvalidated the UN's role as the legitimatemediator of international conflicts and aforum for diplomacy.

Regarding military strategy, the KoreanWar was the first illustration of the newcontext of warfare that emerged in the ColdWar. The former aim of warfare, the totalannihilation of an opponent, wasexcessively dangerous. The dramaticvictories of the North Korean blitzkrieg, theInchon landing, and the Second PhaseOffensive caused a rapid escalation of theKorean War that brought each combatant tothe brink of world war. A limited aim wasnow the goal of most wars. In Korea, andfrequently thereafter, a limited aimembodied seeking minor political gainsthrough a negotiated resolution of the war.Military operations were carefully restrainedin order to reduce the risk of escalation.Similar restrictions on military operationswould reappear in subsequent wars, such asVietnam, the Arab-Israeli Wars, and theIndo-Pakistani Wars. The methods of warfareimplemented under these restrictions in theKorean War - attrition, air power, andnuclear threats - were the first adaptationsto limited war. Consequently, the KoreanWar was the formative experience in thestrategic thought and operational doctrinesdeveloped during the Cold War.

Attrition was the first method of warfarethat the UNC applied to fighting a limitedwar. Ridgway found that gradual and carefulattrition could defeat the Communists onthe battlefield and enforce the UNCbargaining position yet not escalate theconflict. The significance of attrition wasunderlined when Peng Dehuai and DengHua adopted it as the operational doctrineof the CPV. However, because of its

protracted nature, attrition on the groundentailed a steady flow of casualties for boththe UNC and the Communists. Indeed, after1953, the Eisenhower administrationforswore the use of conventional forcelargely because of the costs of attrition inKorea. Nevertheless, attrition would beapplied as a strategy in many later conflictsin the Cold War - not always successfully -such as Vietnam, the Egyptian-Israeli War ofAttrition, and the Iran-Iraq War.

The use of air power was less effective as ameans of fighting a limited war. It could notinflict the damage necessary to make theCommunists crack. Nevertheless, it remaineda preferred, if often overrated, means ofapplying force after Korea. In the US airforce, the perceived success of the aircampaign was used to confirm thedecisiveness of air power in modern warfare.Strategic air campaigns that were very similarto Operation Strangle and the sustained airpressure strategy were implemented inVietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 1999conflict in Kosovo. Although rarely decisive,the allure of a painless and quick victorymakes air power the West's principal meansof waging war to this day.

Eisenhower's nuclear threats representedthe final new method of warfareimplemented in Korea. As noted above,while the nuclear threats signaled that theUSA was resolved to fight a heightened warif necessary, they probably had only amarginal effect on the Communist decisionto compromise. Historically, the nuclearthreats were a part of the development ofdeterrence strategy, which dominatedstrategic discourse in the Cold War. In 1954,Eisenhower and Dulles instituted the NewLook doctrine, hoping to repeat thesupposed success of their nuclear threats atthe end of the Korean War. The New Lookthreatened that Communist aggressionanywhere in the world would be the subjectof a devastating American nuclear strike. Itwas believed that this threat of massiveretaliation would deter future Communistexpansionism. Although massive retaliationwas eventually discredited, nuclear threats,

Conclusion and consequences 91

as a component of deterrence, were usedagain in international crises such as theCuban Missile Crisis and the 1973Yom Kippur War.

In terms of the balance of power, theKorean War motivated the Western powers toview Communism as an imminent threat totheir security and take a more determinedstance against its expansion. The USAmobilized meaningfully to enforcecontainment throughout the world. As theSoviet Union strove to match this impressivemilitary build-up, Western rearmament setthe tone for the arms races that marked theremainder of the Cold War. The size of theAmerican armed forces multiplied. Massiveprograms for new ships, missiles, tanks, andaircraft were implemented. In Europe,England and France also increased the size oftheir armed forces. NATO was greatlystrengthened through the establishment ofunified command with strong military forcesunder its authority. Moreover, the impetushad been created to rearm West Germany asa part of NATO, which would actually occurin 195S.

Outside Europe, the USA ceasedneglecting east Asia in its geostrategicplanning. The Japan-US Security Treatyfacilitated the long-term stationing offormidable American air, ground, and navalforces in Japan. Additionally, increasedAmerican military spending in Japan duringthe Korean War helped it on the path toeconomic recovery. With its relatively secureisland status, large population, and growingeconomy, Japan became the centerpiece ofAmerican security architecture in east Asia.The USA also took greater interest in thedefense of Taiwan. In the Taiwan offshoreislands crises of 1954-55 and 1958, the USAappeared willing to defend Nationalistterritory against Communist encroachment.But the Korean War also caused the USA toembrace global containment and theprecepts of NSC 68 too tightly. InIndochina, the USA was paying for80 percent of France's military operations by1954. With the losses of Korea fresh inmind, Eisenhower would not send military

forces to fight the Viet Minh, nor would heagree to use nuclear weapons to save theFrench at Dien Ben Phu. Lateradministrations were less cautious andbelieved that the ultimate success of theKorean War in halting Communism meantthat the USA would also be successful in awar in Vietnam.

The growth of American power in eastAsia was inhibited by the emergence of thePRC as a military power in the region. Theworld now viewed the PRC as a majorCommunist military power and not abackward agricultural state. The Chinesemilitary had proven that they couldcontend with the best forces of the West.The catastrophic defeat of the US EighthArmy in November and December 1950showed that liberating Communistcountries could be excessively dangerous.After the defeat, the USA never again triedto liberate a Communist state by invasion.For example, in the Vietnam War, the USAwould not invade North Vietnam for fearof Chinese intervention. The PRCenjoyed increased influence in eastAsia and the Third World. Its veteranofficers became advisors in numerousnational liberation movements,particularly in Vietnam. Mistakenly, theUSA predominantly treated China as theunswerving and unpredictably dangerousally of the Soviet Union. In fact, thePRC was denied entry into the UN untilNixon's presidency.

The Korean War also had implications forChina's relationship with the Soviet Union.In the short term, fighting the USAreinforced the Sino-Soviet Alliance. Thelevel of military and economic assistanceprovided during the war continued after1953, with a tremendous amount oftechnology being transferred to the PRC.However, the war also caused thebeginning of cracks in the alliance. TheChinese had fought the war largely on theirown and were disappointed by the limitedmilitary involvement of the Soviet Union.The Soviet demand that China pay for all ofthe military equipment provided was

92 Essential Histories • The Korean War

particularly galling. More fundamentally, bythe late 1950s, Mao found deep Sovietinvolvement in Chinese economicdevelopment and military affairs to becurtailing the PRC's independence. Bythe mid-1960s, these cracks would widenand the Sino-Soviet Alliance wouldbreak apart.

Finally, the Korean War symbolizes thesuperpower competition of the Cold War. Itwas the only occasion in the Cold Warwhen the armed forces of the Soviet Union,the People's Republic of China, and theUnited States - plus the other Westernpowers - were regularly in direct combatwith one another. Later in the Cold War, thesuperpowers only fought each other'sproxies or client states. But in Korea, Sovietfighter pilots engaged in dogfights with

American pilots, and Chinese infantrygrappled with American infantry. Hundredsof thousands of men were taken prisoner,injured, or killed. Some of the most modernnew weapons were utilized and the bestgenerals of the three countries plannedoperations for the war. Historian WilliamStueck has gone so far as to describe it as asubstitute for a Third World War. In anyevent, the Korean War brought thesuperpowers to the brink of world war. Lessdramatically, the Korean War was the pointwhere the differences between Communismand democracy, the Soviet Union and theUSA, actually warranted major conventionalwarfare. The fact that the Korean War was aconflagration of this magnitude andintensity is sufficient reason that it shouldnot be forgotten.

Bibliography

Published primary sources

Bussey, C, Firefight at Yechon: Courage andRacism in the Korean War, New York:Brassey's, 1991.

Kang, K., Home was the Land of MorningCalm: A Saga of a Korean-American Family,New York, 1995.

Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Paimninjoni,

Washington, DC, 1992.Pears, M., and F. Kirkland (eds), Korea

Remembered: The RAN, ARA, and RAAF inthe Korean War of 1950-1953, GeorgesHeights, 1998.

Ridgway, M., The Korean War, New York,1967.

Russ, M., The Last Parallel: A Marine's War

Journal, New York, 1957.Russ, M., Breakout: The Chosin Reservoir

Campaign, Korea 1950, New York, 1999.Weathersby, K., 'New Russian documents on

the Korean War,' Cold War InternationalHistory Project Bulletin, issues 6-7, winter1995-96.

Secondary sources

Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War:The Making of the Sino-AmericanConfrontation, New York, 1994.

Foot, R., The Wrong War: American Policy andthe Dimensions of the Korean Conflict,1950-1953, Ithaca, 1985.

Foot, R., 'Nuclear coercion and the ending ofthe Korean conflict,' International Security,vol. 13, winter 1988-89.

Futrell, F., The United States Air Force in Korea,New York, 1961.

Grey, J., The Commonwealth Armies and theKorean War: An Alliance Study,Manchester, 1988.

Hastings, M., The Korean War, New York,1987.

O'Neill, R..)., Australia in the Korean War,1950-1953, vols 1 and 2, Canberra, 1981,1985.

Rees, D., Korea: The Limited War, New York,1964.

Stueck, W., The Korean War: An International

History, Princeton, 1995.Tomedi, R., No Bugles, No Drums: An Oral

History of the Korean War, New York, 1993.Zhang Shu Guang, Mao's Military

Romanticism, Lawrence, 1995.

Index

Figures in bold refer to illustrations

Acheson, Dean 15, 16, 29. 41. 71air warfare 53-60, 54, 56-57, 61, 65Almond, Lieutenant-General Edward 25, 27Andong 28, 54armistice 7-8, 85, 87arms pact, Soviet Union/North Korea 15artillery 18-19,. 48Attlee, Clement 37attrition, war of 36-46, 47, 48, 90

blitzkrieg 7, 19, 20, 22Bloody Ridge 49Boatner, Brigadier-General Haydon 71Bradley, General Omar 16British Army 43-44, 44British Commonwealth forces 50-53, 52, 61-62Brodie, Brigadier Thomas 43-44

Capitol Hill 84Carne, Lieutenant-Colonel James 43casualties 27, 34, 36, 40, 41, 43, 44, 49-50, 60, 83, 88cease-fire negotiations 46-53Chae Pyongdok, Major-General 20Cheju Rebellion 13China see Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV); People's

Republic of China (PRC)China Warning Statement 86Chinese Civil War 14, 15, 16Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 14, 15, 28, 40-41Chinese Nationalists 14, 16, 41Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) 8, 28, 30-34, 33, 42,

80-82, 87Chongjin 74Chosin Reservoir, Battle of the 34, 34-36Chung Il Kwon, Major-General 23Clark, General Mark 59-60, 60, 82, 83, 84, 86Cold War 7, 8, 10-11, 14Collins, General Lawton 25Communism 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15, 88-89

Dean, General William 23defense expenditure, US 10Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) 13Deng Hua, General 8, 30, 39, 47, 80, 83Dodd, Brigadier-General Frank 71Dulles, John Foster 82

East Asia 11Eighth US Army 24, 29, 36-39, 39, 41-42, 48-50, 62Eisenhower, Dwight 82, 84, 87elections 13Europe 11expansion, military 73

F-86 Sabres 56-57

fall offensives 50Far East Air Force (FEAF) 24, 54-55, 58, 61Fifth Phase Offensive 7, 8, 9, 41-46, 42, 43, 45, 46First Phase Offensive 9, 32Fourth Phase Offensive 39-40French soldiers 40front-line warfare 66-69

Gloucestershire Regiment 43-44, 44guerrilla war 13-14

Hagaru 36Han river 23, 39Hodge, General John 12

Imjin river 43-45Inchon landing 24-28, 26, 28independence 13infantry

American 32Chinese 29, 33South Korean 19-20

Iron Triangle 45

Jamestown Line 50Japan 12, 16Japanese Army 11Japan-US Security Treaty 73, 91Johnson, Louis 16Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), US 13, 16, 46Joy, Vice-Admiral C. Turner 23, 46, 47

Kaesong 20, 46Kang, Kyonshill 75-79Kansas-Wyoming Line 53Kim Cha'ek, General 19, 24, 25Kim Chong O 21Kim Hong II, Major-General 23Kim Il Sung 12, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 25, 28, 60, 84Kimpo 27Korean peninsula 11, 11-14Kumsong bulge 87

Litzenberg, Colonel Homer 36

MacArthur Hearings 72-73MacArthur, General Douglas 7, 8, 12, 16, 17, 24-25, 27,

29, 32, 34, 37, 37-38, 41, 78Main Line of Resistance (MLR) 66-67Malik, Jacob 46, 89Manchuria 11, 12, 28maneuver warfare 18-28Mao Zedong 14, 28, 46, 48, 60, 80, 83Marshall, George C. 29Martin, Joe 41Maryang San, Battle of 51, 52-53Mayo, Lieutenant-Colonel 59

Index 95

MiG Alley 55, 58MiG-15 54, 54Milburn, Lieutentant-General Frank 44Moscow Conference 12

Naktong BulgeFirst Battle of the 24Second Battle of the 25

Nam 11, General 46, 47napalm 27, 35, 60National Assembly 13National Security Council (NSC) 13, 17

NSC 68 15, 73NSC 147 84

Nationalists 7, 11, 13see also Chinese Nationalists

naval power 20naval warfare 60-66, 62-63, 64Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 83, 85-86No Name Line 44North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 8, 10, 73North Korea 13, 73-74, 74North Korean Communist Party 12North Korean invasion of South Korea 7, 16, 20-24,

22, 76-77North Korean People's Army (NKPA) 18-19, 27, 28, 29North/South division 11-13Northeast Border Defense Army (NBDA) 28nuclear warfare 8, 10, 84, 87

Oak Hyung-uk, Lieutenant 23Operation Commando 51, 53Operation Killer 40Operation Ripper 40Operation Rugged 40Operation Showdown 82Operation Strangle 55-59, 63Operation Thunderbolt 39Operation Wolfhound 39Osan 27

Paik Sun Yup, General 8, 20-23, 21, 47Pak Il-yu 28Panikkar, K. M. 28Peng Dehuai, General 30, 32, 39, 40, 44, 46, 48, 80, 84People's Liberation Army (PLA) 18, 28People's Republic of China (PRC) 7, 8, 14, 15, 28-36,

73-74prisoners of war (POW) 71, 72, 83, 86Pusan Perimeter 23, 24, 26, 27Pyongyang 60

Randolph, Colonel Richard 59Red Army, Soviet 11reform, military 80refugees 75Republic of Korea (ROK) 8, 13, 17, 29

army 19-20, 20Rhee, Syngman 11, 12, 13, 15, 24, 86, 86-87, 88Ridgway, General Matthew 8, 23, 37, 38-42, 45, 48, 59rightists see NationalistsRongzhen, Nie 28Roosevelt, Franklin, US President 11Royal Navy Far East Fleet 23-24

Russ, Corporal Martin 66, 66-69

Second Phase Offensive 9, 31, 32-39'see-saw battles' 48, 49, 84Seoul 12, 23, 27, 75-77

see also Inchon landingSherman, Admiral Forrest 25Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual

Assistance 14Smart, General Jacob 59Smith, Major-General O. P. 27, 34Soule, Major-General Robert 43South Korea 13South Korean army 19-20, 23Soviet Union 7, 10-11, 12-13, 14, 15-17

intervention 28-29, 36Stalin, Josef 7, 8, 11-12, 14, 15-16, 28-29, 46, 60,

82-83Superfortresses 57-58supply lines 44-45, 49Supreme People's Assembly 13

tactics 35, 48, 80-81, 81Taiwan 16, 17tanks 18-19, 52, 67Task Force 77 60, 63Tehran Conference 11Third Phase Offensive 3938th Parallel 12, 16, 19, 20, 28, 29, 48Truman Doctrine 10Truman, Harry, US President 10, 13, 15, 16, 29, 36, 41,

71, 73

unification 29United Kingdom 20

see also British Army; Royal NavyUnited Nations (UN) 13, 29United Nations Command (UNC) 7, 8, 17, 24, 25, 27,

29, 32, 42, 45-46cease-fire negotiations 46-53, 47, 71

United Nations Security Council 14, 16United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea

(UNTCOK) 13United States of America 7-8, 10, 11-13, 14, 15-17, 20,

36, 71-73US Army 24US Infantry 25US Marines 25-27, 25, 27, 34-36, 66US Navy 23, 61

Van Fleet, General James 41, 41-42, 44, 48-50, 80, 82Vandenberg, Hoyt 55voluntary repatriation 71

Walker, General Walton 24, 32warfare 8, 10-11, 20Wolmi-do 26Wonsan 29

X US Corps 25, 27, 29, 36

Yang Dezhi 80, 81-82

Zhou Enlai 12, 28, 36