THE HUMANIN THE LOOPby David Taudevin

Essentia White Papers | July 2015

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About Essentia

Essentia Analytics is a cloud-based software solution that uses behavioral data analytics to help professional investors to make more skilled investment decisions.

Essentia’s platform enables both hedge and traditional active fund managers to capture richer data about their own behavior and its context, to understand where their individual skills and weaknesses lie, identify patterns, and apply that enhanced self-awareness to achieve improved performance.

Investment excellence demands a feedback loop. Essentia supplies one.

Learn more about us, request a demo and subscribe to our white paper series at www.essentia-analytics.com.

The author, David Taudevin, is founder of WingPro, a UK-based technology and consultancy start-up. With clients in corporate aviation, the military and air display teams, WingPro works to enhance human performance and operational risk management in critical environments.

He originally trained as a fast jet pilot in the Royal Air Force where he was the receipient of several accreditations, including the Queen’s Medal in 2009 and the Sword of Honour as top graduate of his course at the RAF College, Cranwell. On leaving the RAF he joined and led the commercial team at a financial technology firm producing accounting and risk management software for hedge funds.

Email: david@wingpro.ioLinkedIn: uk.linkedin.com/in/davidtaudevinTwitter: @davidtaudevin

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Foreword

At Essentia, we’re very interested in how behavioral science is being applied to improving performance and reducing losses in industries outside of finance.

As you read this paper about how military organizations like the UK’s Royal Air Force (RAF) have embraced the practice of optimizing “the human in the loop”, I suspect you’ll note many parallels between fighter pilots and investment decision-makers.

You might consider, therefore, if your own organization can take a leaf from the RAF’s book:

• Do you have processes in place to recognize and mitigate behavioral risk? Does this form part of the formal training being offered to new traders, analysts and portfolio managers?

• To what extent is your pre-trade investment process captured through data, and analyzed for behavioral patterns?

• How is error treated within your organization? Are there cultural or personal factors which make it difficult for people to put their hand up and admit to errors or perceived weakness?

• What self-improvement loops do your investment decision-makers have in place?

• To what extent are data and feedback brought back into the risk management program, so that it can be improved and updated to better reflect the real drivers of error or underperformance ?

We hope you enjoy this whitepaper and look forward to discussing it with you.

Clare Flynn Levy

Founder and CEOEssentia Analytics

VIDEO: Demonstration of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s extreme agility. www.youtube.com/watch?v=QoVGz9xai1M

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The Human in the Loop

Fast jet flying is an inherently complex and demanding activity that remains dependent on the mindset and decision-making ability of the pilot. Recognizing the need to optimize this human performance in order to achieve its operational goals, the RAF has initiated a culture of self-improvement with dynamic feedback loops that seek out and capture the real sources of underperformance for consistently better outcomes.

Man and machine

Aviation technology and design has seen unprecedented advances in recent years and few aircraft represent this so well as the Eurofighter Typhoon.

First launched by a consortium of European manufacturers in 2011 and now being adopted by airforces around the world, the single-seater Typhoon is generally recognized as one of the most innovative fighter jets on the planet.

Built from advanced composite materials with a surface that is only 15% metal, the jet has a radar-resistant airframe that is light but also strong enough to support highly agile maneuvering at speeds of up to MACH2.

The Striker Helmet - visor and movement-tracking diodes. Photo: BAE Systems

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Inside, gone are the numerous levers, dials, analogue gauges that used to populate a cockpit. Instead, the Typhoon boasts technology that would be at home in Google’s test labs with four powerful onboard computers powering a range of performance and flight management functions.

Height, speed and tracking data are displayed directly onto the visor of the pilot’s “Striker” helmet. Each helmet, individually tailored to the pilot’s head, also displays live views from cameras positioned around the outside of the aircraft.

Much like an alternative reality simulator, when the pilot turns his head, movement in the diodes on the back of the helmet is captured by sensors within the cockpit so the aircraft always know where the pilot is looking in and which camera view to display. If the pilot looks down, he sees not his lap and feet but the sky and passing fields below the aircraft.

Control of the £90m ($130m) jet is through voice command and an ergonomic 24-function fingertip control throttle. To determine the coordinates of anything he sees, the pilot simply nudges the throttle and aligns the dynamic crosshairs seen on his visor with the object. Pulling the trigger then directs intelligent weaponry to the target without any need for the pilot to orient the aircraft towards it.

Onboard technology also supports the jet’s Flight Control System. ‘Carefree Handling’ constantly monitors the aircraft’s limits, optimizing aeronautical performance and even stabilizing the aircraft at the touch of a button should the pilot become disorientated or start to blackout.

Such advances throw an obvious spotlight on the role played by the individual sitting at the heart of all this. Indeed, if aviation technology and automation can now do so much, why do we even still need a pilot?

The Typhoon boasts technology that would be at home in Google’s test labs.

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In considering this question, the military has been at the forefront of the trend towards an increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles.

Controlled from the ground or autonomously following a pre-programmed mission, devices such as drones can be effective for surveillance or operations where the repetitive or prolonged nature of the sortie would be compromised by human fatigue issues. They are also attractive for military planners seeking to reduce cost and casualty rates.

Such unmanned operations, however, remain only a small part of military aviation’s total range of activities. This is because when it comes to highly dynamic environments involving complexity or combat, there remains consensus that a human pilot is still the most effective form of flight intelligence; no other resource is so effective at analyzing a changing situation and translating this into tactical (and ethical) decisions.

The flipside to this human involvement is that even the most experienced pilots can be prone to underperformance or poor decision-making; some 70% of aviation accidents have been found to result from human error – a risk exacerbated by the increased operational tempo seen since 9/11 and the pressure on resources caused by defense budget cuts.

In managing this human risk (and thus leveraging more effectively the investment made in hardware like the Typhoon jet), the RAF’s leadership has been forced to consider how to best optimize this highly capable, though error-prone, resource, namely ‘the human in the loop’.

Old and bold?

Based on experience and understanding that has evolved since the First World War, the RAF now adopts a broad, multi-disciplinary approach to understanding the drivers of pilot performance.

2007 saw the opening of the RAF’s Human Factors Centre where aviation psychologists carry out human performance research on how humans interact, reason and respond in order to reduce performance variability and improve safety. No subject is off-limits if it helps explain pilot behavior and Human Factors analysis, more broadly, now spans areas as diverse as psychology, behavioral science, communications and ergonomics.

The lessons learned from these disciplines are then fed into a continuous and embedded self-improvement loop that is supported by the RAF’s strong performance ethos and a willingness to embrace error or failure as an indicator of where change may be needed.

The organizational and individual self-awareness demanded by these initiatives is far from the bravado and swagger of Top Gun’s Maverick and Goose. But as

Even the most experienced pilots can be prone to poor decision-making.

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Major General G R Coward OBE has shrewdly noted, “The old adage recalls that there are old pilots and bold pilots but very few old and bold pilots. If it is the bold that take risks, I would suggest that it is the old who have considered these risks and taken measures to minimize them.”1

Game face

Research into the psychology of fast jet flying has shown that the single seat fighter cockpit is an acute laboratory for exploring human performance and the principles of decision-making behavior.

Despite advances in technology, fast jet pilots are regularly pushed to the limits of their ability to cope as they engage in high levels of tasking and tactical thinking where the smallest decision error can end in disaster.

They do this an unforgiving environment in which their senses are bombarded by multiple information streams and physiological stresses. (G-force, for example, ranging from -3G to 9G in a Typhoon, can impact sight and consciousness to the point of momentary black out).

Not surprisingly, the UK’s fast jet training program is famously rigorous. Only the best RAF pilot trainees – aged between 18 and 25 – are streamed to take part in the £12 million ($17m), four year course. The training is exhaustive in the detail of its assessment processes; flying skills are tested and honed through over 400 hours supervised flying time with additional training and testing in flight simulators.

Unlike other areas of the military where a willingness to follow orders is essential, the RAF needs to develop the tactical, decision-making capabilities of their pilots. Even when flying in formation with other aircraft, a fighter pilot’s role is predominantly a solo one where there is huge pressure on the individual to perform.

Fast jet trainees are trained to carry out independent evaluations of external factors (wingmen, weather, threats, etc) and determine their own actions using decision-making models such as RAPDAR (Recognize, Analyze, Prioritize, Decide, Act, Review).

Human Factors research and its incorporation into RAF training means that trainee pilots are also schooled in the psychological aspects of flying.

Well-established psychometric tests such as the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and Strength Deployment Inventory (SDI) are used by RAF instructors to support their evaluation of how pilots perform and any blind spots or personality traits that may be displayed. (Interestingly in Sweden, trainee pilots have their MBTI personality type printed on the back of their helmet so that an instructor sitting behind them can also evaluate their performance in this

Fast jet pilots are regularly pushed to the limits of their ability to cope.

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psychological context)2.

A pilot’s self-awareness of his state of mind when flying is also developed so he can understand and manage the effect this can have on his decision-making and flying performance.

Below, I review some of the main behavioral factors that are explored in the training and which are material to fast jet flying throughout an airman’s career. As you’ll see, some of the awareness and performance management approaches are often more commonly associated with non-military fields such as elite sports.

Behavioral factors in fast jet flying

VisualizationAlso called guided imagery, mental rehearsal and performance meditation, visualization is now an important technique used by many pilots as they prepare for a sortie. After the pre-flight briefing, pilots will move to a designated area on base which is free from distraction and interruption and where they can get in a ‘Mission Bubble’ and ready themselves mentally for the operation ahead.

Pilots are also known to ‘arm-chair fly’, sometimes with their hands in the positions they will be when flying. It’s not unusual to see pilots sitting quietly in the cockpit in the minutes before take off, visor down, quietly going through the mission they are about to perform.

Going back as far as the 1920’s, professional investors have been aware of the importance of psychology and behavioral factors in determining successfully they invest. More recently, academic research begun to quantify that impact.

Yet the financial services industry has been very slow to look at how to best optimize the “highly capable, though error-prone, resource” that is the trader or fund manager.

The natural inclination of investors is to focus on the behavior of other market participants. But as the RAF has recognized, in what is ultimately a solo pursuit, managing the ‘inner game’ is of critical importance, as is the disciplined implementation of an intelligent and comprehensive feedback loop.

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Tracking JuiceOnce in the air, pilots are trained to recognize that their ability to perform at the highest levels is limited and needs to be managed carefully. Known colloquially as ‘Tracking Juice’, the mental and physical concentration with which a fighter pilot can pursue and accurately keep in his sights an enemy jet is known to be as low as 15 minutes when pilots first start their training. After this surprisingly short time, pilots typically display a marked weakening in their tracking sharpness and aircraft handling. With greater experience and more measured self-control, concentration levels - whilst remaining finite - can be significantly extended.

Stress vs. ArousalStress and fear can be triggered by air-to-air combat as well as the risk of attack from the ground. It also has non-combat sources: control displays can suddenly go blank, landing gear can fail, fuel may leak or birds be ingested in an engine, partially destroying it.

Because stress is a key risk in pilot performance, instructors focus a lot on the ‘spare mental capacity’ a pilot has at a given moment and how this affects their ability to respond correctly to any threats or conditions that confront them.

A degree of stress - or arousal - is useful in keeping sharp a pilot’s observation and responses to such events. Too much stress, however, and judgement will be blurred, compromising performance and potentially escalating to panic.

Just how well a pilot performs under pressure is understood to be a function of the Arousal Curve. This is derived from the Yerkes Dodson Law3, which states that optimal task performance occurs at an intermediate level of arousal, with relatively poorer performance at both lower and higher arousal levels. This leads to an inverted U relation between arousal and performance, with the proposition that the peak occurs at a lower level of arousal for easy than for difficult tasks.

Graph: the relationship between arousal and performance.

The ability to perform at the highest levels is limited and needs to be managed carefully.

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In training, pilot stress can be addressed and better understood through coaching techniques. For instance, if a student pilot is getting too stressed and overwhelmed, the instructor sitting in the seat behind may remove one or more tasks from the student (such as radio communication and navigation) allowing the student to focus on just one or two aspects.

When flying solo, pilots are taught to monitor and be aware of their emotional state. The onus is on the pilot to recognize if he is becoming overwhelmed and to prioritize according to a set and well-ingrained priority hierarchy known as ‘Aviate-Navigate-Communicate’:

• AVIATE: Fly the aeroplane first and make sure you’re safe, ignoring everything else if need be – (after all, if you crash or lose control then everything else is moot). Then…

• NAVIGATE: Think about where you’re going and what you need to do - this is the next level of safety. Then, when you’ve got yourself together…

• COMMUNICATE: Talk to air traffic control, your formation, or whatever is required.

This order of actions is necessary because a natural reaction under stress is to have trouble prioritizing what needs doing. The Aviate-Navigate-Communicate hierarchy prevents, for example, a pilot from talking to someone (eg air traffic control) when they haven’t first properly controlled their aircraft.

Atul Gawande has documented in The Checklist Manifesto (Profile Books, 2010)how checklists have been used extensively in aviation since the Second World War when a new generation of increasingly complex jet engines entered into service.

In his work analyzing the risk-taking behavior of traders4, John Coates, of Cambridge University, has found a similar “ -shaped dose–response curve”. His studies show that “traders experience a rise in testosterone when their trades make money, which increases their confidence and appetite for risk, so that in the next round of trading they put on even larger trades. If they win again, as they are likely to during a rising market, their profits will increase their testosterone once more, until at some point confidence becomes overconfidence, trading positions grow to a dangerous size and the risk–reward profiles of the trades start to stack the odds against them”.

U

A natural reaction under stress is to have trouble prioritizing what needs doing.

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A checklist will often contain items that a pilot would ordinarily be expected to remember but, in times of high stress, they are effective because they ease the path to responding semi-automatically and in the right way.

FatigueWhilst procedural or routine activities are relatively resistant to the effects of fatigue, those which require creative thinking or real-time evaluation are more susceptible to the detrimental effects of fatigue and therefore the risk of error.

The military generally makes an effort to select people with a certain degree of fatigue resistance but this resilience can be easily stretched beyond its limits in situations of unrelenting operational activity with little down time to recuperate. Tours in hot countries also bring the de-energizing effects of dehydration and heat stress5.

In managing this, pilots are expected to monitor their own condition and consider the risks created by their fatigue. Unless in a total war scenario, it’s totally accepted that a pilot will flag when he feels unfit to fly. (Indeed, a wider awareness of the operational importance of sleep is reflected in RAF initiatives to provide better on-base sleeping accommodation for pilots and encourage power-napping during the day when needed).

Sensory detachment Whilst the increased sophistication in the range and digital presentation of data has clear advantages, it also creates the risk of negative side effects such as sensory detachment and information saturation; every pilot will know the feeling of being drawn into the screens and losing awareness of what’s going on around them.

Risk ToleranceProlonged exposure to operational action can become a risk in itself. Once deployed, pilots can quickly adapt to the norms of their new environment and

Pilots pilots are expected to monitor their own condition and consider the risks created by their fatigue.

Compared to military aviation, the risk for commercial airline pilots is very often the opposite: the risk of too-low arousal. Accident investigators have discovered that, due to autopilot functionality, pilots are often very calm at the moment before they realize there is a danger. As a result, their arousal levels increase very – too – quickly and they go past the point of medium arousal to panic. (Avoiding this risk-exaggerating lethargy is why commercial pilots tend to rotate every 1.5 to 2 hours).

Even when flying on a mission with other aircraft, there can be intense pressure on the individual pilot. Photo: Geoffrey H. Lee

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become anaesthetized to risk, often failing to notice a progressive shift towards becoming more comfortable with greater and possibly unacceptable risks.

Cognitive BiasRecent developments in behavioral science have also found their way into aviation.

Behavioral science is the systematic analysis and investigation of human behavior. Cognitive science, a subset, focuses on how information is represented, processed, and how decisions are made.

Research has revealed the presence of cognitive biases which can filter the perception of information and hinder our ability to make accurate or rational decisions. Such biases are unconscious and can be triggered or exacerbated by environmental, physiological or psychological cues.

Trainee pilots are taught about aviation specific cognitive biases and this is ingrained through refresher courses and continuous peer reviews.

Below are listed some of the more well-known cognitive biases known to exist within military aviation6:

Awareness of cognitive biases is ingrained through education and continuous peer review.

Table: Cognitive biases common to commercial and military aviation. Source: Capt Shem Malmquist

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Ambiguity effectDescribes where a person is more likely to select something that has an intuitively clear risk as opposed to one that seems relatively less certain. This could lead someone to choosing a more risky option, albeit a more certain risk.

Attentional biasHumans pay more attention to things that have an emotional aspect to them. This may lead to a person making a decision based on a perceived threat which is due to a past experience or ‘thermal scar’.

Attentional tunnellingThe focus and allocation of attention to a particular channel of information, diagnostic hypothesis, or task for a duration that is longer than optimal, given the expected cost of neglecting other events or tasks.

Confirmation biasDescribes a situation where a person ignores facts or information that do not conform to their preconceived model or understanding of the situation.

Automation biasAutomated aids and decision-support tools are rapidly becoming indispensable tools in high-technology cockpits and replacing a cognitively vigilant information seeking and processing, leaving one more exposed to making errors.

Availability heuristicDescribes how people will over-estimate the likelihood of an event based upon the emotional influence the event may have had, or how much personal experience a person may have had with that type of event. This can lead to incorrect assessments of risk.

Optimism biasThis is a situation in which people are overly optimistic about outcomes. This can be a common issue in aviation where pilots may have seen many bad situations turn out “okay”. As a result, their sense of urgency and risk can be reduced when it is not warranted by the circumstances at the time.

Plan continuationThis might be considered a subset of confirmation bias. Describes a strong tendency to continue to pursue the same course of action once a plan has been made. May also be influenced by some of the issues behind the ‘sunk cost effect’, where there is a greater tendency to continue an endeavour once an investment in money, effort, or time has been made.

The DebriefIn creating and maintaining awareness of these and other behavioral factors, one piece of old-school RAF process is critical: the debrief.

It is during their training that fighter jet pilots first learn the value of this structured feedback loop. For every hour flown, pilots can expect a debrief that will last twice as long with every aspect of their aircraft handling and mission management passed under an unforgiving microscope.

Using visual aids, video footage, and comments from instructors and peers, the intensely granular review process exists to identify mistakes and performance issues with a big emphasis on ‘lessons learnt’ and the Human Factor aspects of the sortie.

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The Birth of Military Human Factors

Early insights into the impact of pilot mindset were realized during World War One when aerial warfare was first used both in a concentrated way and as a tactical military tool.

James Birley, a wartime pilot, neurologist and early pioneer of aviation psychology, observed that psychological effects could be just as important as the physical in determining whether a pilot was fit to fly. Flyers, he observed, became ‘stale’ or ‘burnt out’ if not properly rested, with a negative impact on their ability to maneuver and perform other tasks.

One factor generating stress in those early days of aviation was the sheer strain caused in trying to control poorly designed and temperamental aircraft. As aircraft flew higher, other stresses were introduced such as the effect of cold and hypoxia (lack of oxygen).

Combat brought additional pressures. Though often far from the dangers of the front line, airmen worked alone under extreme pressure and lacked the comradeship and inspiration that came from leading men. Allan English wrote about the extreme contrasts in a pilot’s life: long spells of idle waiting on base punctured by urgent calls to action and dogfights during which pilots reported feeling “moments of intense fear”7.

World War Two saw marked advances in aviation technology, with increases in speeds, altitudes, mission ranges and bomber payloads. These brought commensurate increases in the risks faced by pilots. However, by this time, understanding about their impact on pilot performance had widened from concerned individuals to the RAF itself. It was now accepted that pilots could be pushed beyond their limits; studies at the time concluded that ‘human error’ accounted for 70-80% of all aircraft accidents and shortages of men deemed men fit to fly became a real issue as the war progressed.

Allied Jenny biplanes in World War One.

During the 1914-18 War, awareness grew that psychological factors were critical in determining whether a pilot was fit to fly.

VIDEO: The success of the debrief as an appraisal tool means it is now used in non-aviation sectors. In this video, Flt Lt Simon Stevens, a former Red Arrows pilot, talks about how it is used to improve performance. www.vimeo.com/86602145

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The debrief typically takes place in a private room and is organized as a rankless forum in which everyone can speak. The flat structure is a significant precondition because it allows lower-ranking airman to comment openly on the performance of more senior officers without fear of punishment. Criticism is encouraged and accepted because this is a forum dedicated to improving the safety and performance of both the individual pilot and the squadron as a whole.

The debriefs become less granular once a pilot has passed his training but remain a key tool in maintaining awareness of process and behavioral risks.

Embracing Error

Fundamental to these Human Factor initiatives is the RAF’s willingness to identify and explore performance risk wherever it exists.

Historically, there was little or no ‘organizational self-awareness’ of this kind; non-mechanical accidents were typically attributed to ‘pilot error’, with the pilot closest to the event sanctioned as a warning to others against making the same mistake.

However, with developments in psychology, ergonomics and aeronautics, the RAF gradually came to a more refined understanding of why accidents and underperformance occur. Rather than seeing them isolation, the RAF now tackles such performance weakness by looking for information about the chain of contributing factors that led to it – factors which need to be understood and managed before consistently better outcomes can be achieved.

The formal framework in which this feedback loop operates is the RAF’s Safety Management System (SMS). Increasingly adopted by organizations in non-aviation sectors looking to improve their performance, the SMS is based

The RAF has emerged as an organization that is willing to identify and explore performance risk wherever it exists.

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on four key components, or pillars: Policy, Risk management, Assurance and Promotion. Together, these components define a dynamic risk management approach that continuously refines itself to take account of new information and performance data:

A Just Culture

Central to the success of this approach is the RAF’s ability to capture good data about where underlying performance risk and error occur.

Collecting such information comes with very real challenges. In all organizations, there is some degree of stigma and fear attached to coming clean about mistakes and admitting the real reasons for underperformance. This is especially

Below: Graphical representation of the RAF’s Safety Management System.

Risk management is an area of utmost importance to the investment management industry, not least due to the rising tide of regulatory requirements. But how rich a picture are risk managers actually seeing? And to what extent are data and feedback brought back into the risk management program, so that it can be improved and updated to better reflect the real drivers of error or underperformance?

POLICY RISK MANAGEMENT ASSURANCE

Establishes the organiza-tional commitment to continually improving performance and safety; defines processes and resources available to achieving this.

Promotion and training that creates a risk-aware, performance-oriented mindset within the organization. This whole process is enabled by an

operational culture in which people feel comfortable admitting to error or areas of performance weakness - aka a ‘Just Culture’.

Builds a framework by which underperformance and Error Promoting Conditions (EPCs) can be measured and understood. Initiates preventative measures to control their impact.

Evaluation, using data and feedback, of implemented risk control strategies. Identification of new hazards.

PROMOTION

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the case when those reasons may be personal in nature, involve an admission of perceived weakness of impact negatively on relations with colleagues.

The RAF has sought to tackle this through its adoption of a ‘Just Culture’.

Developed by James T. Reason, a Just Culture is characterized by the principle that members of an organization should feel comfortable and safe about raising their hand when they have made a ‘bad decision’ or see a mistake being made.

Negligence or deliberate mistakes are not excused in this environment but neither is there blame for ‘honest errors’. Consequently, through transparency at the individual and team level, an organization can hope to gather the information it needs to identify the real causes of collective underperformance, as well as monitor previously hidden or developing occurrence trends.

How receptive are the confident and invariably competitive pilots to this kind of culture? RAF fast jet trainees are told from the beginning that they are the best but it’s also drilled into them - through activities such as the Debrief and a highly visible internal communications program - that there is always room for improvement and ‘incremental gains’.

This also chimes with the disciplined, respectful approach to risk and developing skill that is found throughout the more elite echelons of the military. Andy McNab said it well when he observed that the SAS weren’t looking for James Bond types but rather the kind of person who was “obsessive about their craft”.8

Trainee pilots are told that they are the best but that there is always room for further improvement.

“The dichotomy we face is the long held view that good commanders are the bold leaders that take risk in order to achieve success. Military history is littered with the accounts of distinguished commanders who were known for their apparent disregard for danger and who took great risks in the course of achieving success. However, this view may, in many situations, be an over simplification. I would suggest that in many cases it was less their daring that brought about success, but more their innate understanding of the risks involved.”1

Major General G R Coward, OBE

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The adoption of a culture where there is an open identification and review of ‘honest errors’ is far easier said than done, particularly in an industry as traditionally opaque as investment management. As the RAF has found, however, it starts with conveying constantly and visibly the message that self-reflection and an ethos of continuous improvement are to be lauded.

Conclusion

Despite impressive levels of innovation, military aviation remains an essentially human endeavor – one that is dependent on the psychology and decision-making ability of the individual pilot.

In optimizing this performance (and mitigating its inherent risk), the RAF has over time come to adopt a shrewd and realistic understanding of the physical and behavioral principles driving human performance.

A major part of this is the implementation of a culture in which error and underperformance - in all its varied and often hidden forms - can be examined and incorporated into an effective, systematic feedback loop. One can note that, just as the RAF looked to elite sports and cognitive science for some of its self-improvement techniques, so elements of its own organizational outlook and approach are now being adopted by businesses in non-aviation sectors, including investment management.

What will the future hold? Technology always advances and conceivably we could soon see widespread adoption of aircraft handling through eye-tracking or gesture control. Augmented reality is finding increasingly real-word applications and maybe pilots will come to be assisted by digital avatars that assist them with their decision-making.

However, even with this deepening of the relationship between man and machine, the human remains very much in the loop. Technology allows us to do more - how successfully it is exploited can still be very dependent on our own performance.

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References & Sources

1. Risk Appetite in Enduring Operations - by Major General G R Coward OBE, Commander Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) - Defence Aviation Safety Centre Journal 2008.

2. The Swedish Flying Training Philosophy - by Lt Col Robert Persson, Head of Flight Safety, Swedish Armed Forces - Air Clues Magazine / Issue 15 - http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/6547C11A_5056_A318_A8E29A8B2A7F8407.pdf

3. http://wikiofscience.wikidot.com/quasiscience:yerkes-dodson-law

4. The Hour Between Dog and Wolf: Risk-taking, Gut Feelings and the Biology of Boom and Bust - by John Coates - Published in 2012 by Fourth Estate (UK)

5. Fatigue and Human Performance - by Dr David Stevenson Colonel, USAF (Rtd) - Air Clues Magazine / Issue 1 (October 2009) - http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/807515EC_5056_A318_A81019921CF3F852.pdf

6. I’m grateful to Captain Shem Malmquist, Air Safety and Accident Investigator, for his work in compiling examples of some of the cognitive bias found to be active in military and commercial aviation. His excellent survey on behavioral factors and related aviation incidents can be found at https://airlinesafety.wordpress.com/2014/04/21/the-role-of-cognitive-bias-in-aircraft-accidents/

7. Cream of the Crop Canadian Aircrew, 1939-1945 - by Allan D. English - Published 1996 by McGill-Queen’s University Press.

8. The Good Psychopath’s Guide to Success - by Andy McNab & Professor Kevin Dutton - Published 2014 by the Bantam Press.

Despite the dramatic technological advances of recent years, military aviation still faces the challenge of getting the most

from its pilots whilst also respecting their psychological limits. In this Essentia white paper, David Taudevin, former RAF

fighter pilot, explores the psychological pressures faced by elite military aviators and examines some of the cultural and

organisational initiatives taken to optimise their flying skill and decision-making performance.

www.essentia-analytics.com