espinoza v. fly low dba king of diamonds rule 23 order certifying case as a class action

7/25/2019 Espinoza v. Fly Low dba King of Diamonds Rule 23 Order Certifying Case as a Class Action

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UNITEDSTATESDISTRICTCOURT

SOUTHERNDISTRICTOFFLORIDA

MIAMIDIVISION

CASENO.1421244CIVGOODMAN

[CONSENTCASE]

JASZMANNESPINOZA,etal.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GALARDISOUTH

ENTERPRISES,INC.,etal.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

ORDERONPLAINTIFFS

RENEWEDMOTIONFORRULE23CLASSCERTIFICATION

OFSTATELAWMINIMUMWAGECLAIMS

TheCourtpreviouslydeniedwithoutprejudice[ECFNo.165]PlaintiffsMotion

forRule23ClassCertification[ECFNos.33;34]becausethelegalandfactuallandscape

onwhich themotionwasbasedhad shifteddramatically since itwas first filed.The

Court allowed, however, Plaintiffs to file a newmotion, incorporating the relevant

changes incircumstances iftheywished tostillpursueaRule23classactionforstate

lawminimumwageclaims.[ECFNo.165].

Plaintiffs

have

now

filed

their

Renewed

Motion

for

Rule

23

Class

Certification

of

theirFloridastateminimumwageclaims.[ECFNos.178;179].Defendantsopposethe

motion.[ECFNo.186].Plaintiffsfiledareplyinsupportoftheirmotion.[ECFNo.187].

Asexplainedbelow,theCourtfindsthatclasscertificationofPlaintiffsstatelawclaims

Case 1:14-cv-21244-JG Document 193 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/11/2016 Page 1 of 31


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is appropriateand, therefore,grants, inpart,Plaintiffsmotion.TheCourt,however,

doesnotapprovePlaintiffsproposedclassnotice.ConsistentwiththeCourtsrulings

below, counsel shall confer regarding the proposed notice and submit a revised

proposednoticefortheCourttoreviewwithintendaysofthisOrder.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs are dancers who are suing Defendants for, among other things,

minimumwageandovertimeviolationsarisingfromtheirwork1atDefendantFlyLow,

Inc. d/b/a King ofDiamonds (Defendant or KOD), a strip club. [ECFNo. 140].

PlaintiffsallegeclaimsundertheFairLaborStandardsAct (FLSA)andFlorida law.

[Id.,atpp. 1925].TheCourtpreviouslygranted conditional certificationof anFLSA

collectiveactionagainstDefendants.[ECFNo.116].Morethan20claimantshaveopted

intothecollectiveaction.[ECFNos.123;126;128;129;137;142;149;151].

Plaintiffsinstantmotionseeksclasscertificationoftheirstatelawclaimsunder

FederalRuleofCivilProcedure23.[ECFNos.178;179].Plaintiffswanttocertifyaclass

basedonallegedviolationsofArticleX, 24of theFloridaConstitutionandFlorida

Statute448.110.Intheirmotion,PlaintiffsrequestthattheCourt:(1)certifytheirstate

lawclaimsclasses,and(2)approvetheirproposednoticetotheputativeclass.

1 TheCourtunderstandswhyPlaintiffscontendthattheyworkedatKOD,while

DefendantscontendthatPlaintiffsperformedatKOD.ForpurposesofthisOrder,the

Court uses those words interchangeably. Put another way, by using the word

perform or work, theCourt is not implying eitherwaywhether Plaintiffswere

employees(whoworked)orindependentcontractors(whoperformed).



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Defendants oppose themotion and contend that no class shouldbe certified.

[ECFNo.186].Defendantsalsocontendthat iftheCourtcertifiestheclasses,thenthe

Court should not approve Plaintiffs proposed notice because it is confusing and

misleading.[Id.atpp.1517].

In their reply,Plaintiffs agree that somemodifications to theproposed notice

shouldbemadeandhaveoffered toconferwithDefendantscounselregarding these

modifications.[ECFNo.179,pp.1415].

II.

LEGALSTANDARD

FOR

RULE

23

CLASS

CERTIFICATION

A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his

compliancewiththeRule[23] thatis,hemustbepreparedtoprovethattherearein

fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc. WalMart

Stores,Inc.v.Dukes,131S.Ct.2541,2551 (2011) (emphasis inoriginal). Inviewof the

broad discretion a court has in certifying a class, any such decisionmust rest on a

rigorousanalysisthatRule23srequirementsaremet.SacredHeartHealthSys.,Inc.v.

HumanaMilitaryHealthcareServs.,Inc.,601F.3d1159,1169(11thCir.2010)(citingVegav.

TMobileUSA,Inc.,564F.3d1256,1266(11thCir.2009)).

Whilethecourtsclasscertificationanalysismay entailsomeoverlapwiththe

meritsoftheplaintiffsunderlyingclaim,Rule23grantscourtsnolicensetoengagein

freerangingmeritsinquiriesatthecertificationstage.AmgenInc.v.Conn.Ret.Plans&

TrustFunds,133S.Ct.1184,1194 (2013) (citingDukes,131S.Ct.at2552n.6).Rather,



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[m]eritsquestionsmaybeconsideredtotheextentbutonlytotheextentthatthey

arerelevanttodeterminingwhethertheRule23prerequisitesforclasscertificationare

satisfied. Id.

Aparty seeking tocertifyaRule23classmust firstdemonstrate the following

fourrequirementsunderRule23(a):

(1) theclassissonumerousthatjoinderofallmembersisimpracticable;

(2) therearequestionsoflaworfactcommontotheclass;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the

claimsordefensesoftheclass;and

(4) therepresentativepartieswill fairlyandadequatelyprotect the interests

oftheclass.

Fed.R.Civ.P.23(a).

Theserequirementsarereferredtoasnumerosity,commonality,typicality,and

adequacy. If the party seeking class certification fails to demonstrate any of these

requirements,thenthecasemaynotcontinueasaclassaction.Aganv.Katzman&Korr,

P.A.,222F.R.D.692,696(S.D.Fla.2004)(internalcitationsomitted).

In addition tomeetingRule 23(a)s four requirements, theparty seeking class

certificationmustprovethatoneofRule23(b)srequirementsismet.Vega,564F.3dat

1265.Here, Plaintiffs are seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(3). Thatmeans they

must show predominance and superiority.Manno v.HealthcareRevenueRecovery



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Grp.,LLC, 289 F.R.D. 674, 689 (S.D. Fla. 2013).That is that questions of law or fact

common to classmemberspredominateover anyquestions affectingonly individual

members,and thataclassaction issuperior tootheravailablemethods for fairlyand

efficientlyadjudicatingthecontroversy.Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3);Vega,564F.3dat1265.

III. ANALYSIS

BecauseaRule23motionrequiresarigorousanalysis,thereareaplethoraof

issues that must be resolved here. First, the Court will examine whether it has

jurisdictionoverthestatelawclaims.Second,theCourtwillreviewtheproposedclass

definitions.Third,theCourtwillanalyzewhetherRule23(a)srequirementshavebeen

met. Fourth, the Court will determine whether Plaintiffs havemet Rule 23(b)(3)s

requirements.Fifth,theCourtwillexaminetheproposedclassnotice.Finally,theCourt

will review Plaintiffs request for Defendants to produce a master list of dancers

information.

Before delving into the required analysis, the Court makes the following

preliminary observation: this is not the first dancerwageclassactioncase against a

strip club (and it may not be the last). Indeed, the Courts cursory research has

uncoverednolessthan5otherfederalcourtsthathavefacedtheverysameissuesthis

Court is facedwithnow, i.e.,Rule 23 class certification ofdancers state law claims

againstastripclub.SeeFlynnv.N.Y.DollsGentlemensClub,No.13CIV.6530PKCRLE,

2014WL4980380(S.D.N.Y.Oct.6,2014);InrePenthouseExec.ClubComp.Litig.,No.10



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CIV. 1145KMW, 2014WL 185628 (S.D.N.Y.Jan. 14, 2014); Ruffin v.Entmt of theE.

Panhandle,No. 3:11CV19, 2012WL 5472165 (N.D.W. Va.Nov. 9, 2012); Trauth v.

SpearmintRhinoCos.Worldwide,Inc.,No.EDCV0901316VAP,2012WL4755682 (C.D.

Cal.Oct.5,2012);Hartv.RicksCabaretIntlInc.,No.09CIV3043JGK,2010WL5297221

(S.D.N.Y.Dec.20,2010).

Interestinglyenough,ineverysingleoneofthesecases,thedancersstatewage

lawclaimsRule23classwaseithercertifiedorapprovedintheclasssettlementcontext.

Infact,Defendantshavenotcitedtoanydecisionwithdifferentresults denyingthe

Rule 23 class certificationmotion.And theCourt has notbeen able to uncover one

either.Tobesure,theabovecasesarenotbindingonthisCourt.Buttheyarepersuasive

authority.

A.TheCourtsJurisdictionOvertheStateLawClaims

Federalcourtshaveanindependentobligationtopolicetheconstitutionaland

statutory limitsonourjurisdiction.Ebrahimiv.CityofHuntsvilleBd.ofEduc.,114F.3d

162, 165 (11th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted). While this maxim does not

necessarily apply to a courts exercise of its supplemental jurisdiction, the more

cautiousandprudentapproach is forcourts todo so.Germanv.Eslinger,No.608CV

845ORL22GJK,2008WL2915071,at*1n.1.(M.D.Fla.July25,2008)(internalcitation

omitted). Here,thereisnodisputethattheCourthasjurisdictionoverPlaintiffsFLSA

claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1331. The issue is whether the Court should exercise



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supplementaljurisdiction over the state law claims under 28U.S.C. 1367. In that

regard,neitherPlaintiffsnorDefendantsobject to theCourt exercising supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims. The Court has nevertheless conducted an

independentreviewof28U.S.C.1367(c)sfactors.

TheEleventhCircuithasarticulatedatwofold inquiry todeterminewhethera

jurisdictionalbasisexiststosupportaplaintiffsstatelawclaiminfederalcourt.Baggett

v.FirstNat.BankofGainesville,117F.3d1342,1352 (11thCir.1997).First,acourtmust

decidewhether it has the power to hear the state law claims. Second, a courtmust

decidein itsdiscretionif itwillretainjurisdictionoverthestate lawclaims.Id.(citing

UnitedMineWorkersv.Gibbs,383U.S.715,72526,(1966));28U.S.C.1367(a)and(c).

ThisCourt clearlyhas thepower tohear the state law claimsunder 28U.S.C.

1367(a)asPlaintiffs claims arise from the samealleged employment relationship

withDefendants and share a common nucleus of operative fact[s]with the FLSA

claims. Vitola v. ParamountAutomated Food Servs., Inc., No. 0861849CIV, 2009WL

3242011,at*5(S.D.Fla.Oct.6,2009).

Next,theCourtturnstothefactorsenumeratedin28U.S.C.1367(c).First,the

CourthasnotdismissedPlaintiffsFLSAclaims.Assuch,thisisnotasituationwhere

onlythestatelawclaimsremainpendingbeforetheCourt.Second,theCourtfindsthat

thestatelawclaimsdonotpredominateoverPlaintiffsFLSAclaims.Third,atthistime,



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theCourtcannotsaythatthestatelawclaimsraisenovelorcomplexstatelawissues.2

Finally, there isno exceptional circumstancehere andno compelling reasons for the

Court to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court will exercise

supplementaljurisdiction over the state law claims. Vitola, 2009WL 3242011, at *5

(exercisingsupplementaljurisdictionoverArticleX,24,FloridaConstitutionclaimin

FLSAcase);seealsoRuffin,2012WL5472165,at*25(rejectingdefendantsobjectionand

exercising supplementaljurisdictionoverdancers state law claims); accordHart,2010

WL5297221,at*8.

B. TheProposedClassDefinitions

Before consideringRule 23s requirements, theCourtmustdeterminewhether

theproposedclasseshavebeenadequatelydefinedandclearlyascertainable. Littlev.T

MobileUSA,Inc.,691F.3d1302,1304(11thCir.2012)([a]plaintiffseekingtorepresenta

proposedclassmustestablishthattheproposedclassisadequatelydefinedandclearly

ascertainable)(internalcitationsomitted);seealsoCMart,Inc.v.Metro.LifeIns.Co.,299

F.R.D.679,687(S.D.Fla.2014).Aclass isadequatelydefinedandascertainablewhere

[t]hedescriptionoftheclass[is]sufficientlydefinitetoenablethecourttodetermineif

aparticularindividualisamemberoftheproposedclass.Thedescriptionoftheclassis

2 SeeKwasnik v.Charlee FamilyCare Servs. ofCent. Florida, Inc.,No. 608CV926

ORL31KRS, 2009WL 1607809, at *6 (M.D. Fla.June 9, 2009) (declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over 448.110 claim because Court found presuit

requirementwasnovelcomplexissueofstatelaw).TheCourtdoesnotdecidethisissue

becausenoparryhasraisedit.



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sufficiently definite if anymember of the proposed classwould have the requisite

standingtosueonhisownbehalforinhisownright. Pottingerv.CityofMiami,720F.

Supp.955,957(S.D.Fla.1989)(internalcitationsandquotationsomitted).

Here, in proposing their class definitions, Plaintiffs have not been entirely

consistent.Intheirmotion,Plaintiffsproposedthefollowing:

[ArticleX,24FloridaConstitutionClass

(theFloridaConstitutionClass)]

All persons employed as entertainers at the King of DiamondsGentlemensClubatanytimebetweenApril9,2009andJuly19,2014,

specifically excluding all entertainerswho have optedin to the case

styledGeteretal.vGalardiSouthEnterprises,Inc.,etal,CivilActionFile

No.1:14cv219896CMA.See,ArticleX,Section24(e)(Actionstoenforce

thisamendmentshallbesubjecttoastatuteoflimitationsoffouryears,or

inthecaseofwillfulviolations,fiveyears[]).

[448.110,Fla.Stat.Class(the448.110Class)]

All persons employed as entertainers at the King of Diamonds

GentlemensClub inMiami, Florida, at any timebetweenMarch 24,

2009 andJuly 19, 2014, specifically excluding all entertainerswhohave

optedintothecasestyledGeteretal.vGalardiSouthEnterprises,Inc.,

etal,CivilActionFileNo.1:14cv219896CMA(suitfiledonApril8,2014,

plus fifteen days in which claims were tolled after Plaintiff Espinoza

submitted,onbehalfofherselfandallpersonssimilarlysituatedapresuit

noticeofstatelawwageclaims).

[ECFNo.178,pp.12 (emphasisadded)]. In theirattachedproposednotice,however,

Plaintiffsstatedthefollowing:

IfyouworkedasaDancer/Entertainerat theKingsofDiamondsatany

timebetweenMarch24,2009andJuly19,2014,andyoudonotrequestto

beexcluded from thecase,youareautomaticallyamemberof theclass



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andyoumaybeentitledtorecoverminimumwagedamages, liquidated

damages, overtime, andother amounts in this actionunder the Florida

Constitutionand/ortheFloridaMinimumWageAct.

[ECFNo.1796,p.3(emphasisadded)].

Thus,intheirmotionPlaintiffsproposetwoseparateclassdates:April9,2009for

theFloridaConstitutionClassandMarch24,2009forthe448.110Class.This15day

differencemakes sensebecause it isbasedon 448.110(6)(b)s15daypresuitnotice

tolling period. Plaintiffs, however, seek an omnibus March 24, 2009 date in their

proposednoticeforbothclasses.Plaintiffsdonotexplainthisinconsistency.Becauseit

isnotentirelyclearwhichdatePlaintiffsareseekingandbecausetheCourtiscertifying

the classes, counsel shall confer regarding this issue in submitting ajoint proposed

notice.3Ifcounselareunabletoagreeonthispoint,thentheyshallnotifytheCourt.

Settingasidethisminordateinconsistency, Defendantspresenttwoobjectionsto

theproposedclassdefinitions.

First,DefendantscontendthatPlaintiffsseparateclassdefinitionspresumethe

existenceofa causeofaction to recoverminimumwagesunderArticleX,Sec.24(e),

separateandapartfromacauseofactionundertheFMWA,Fla.Stat.448.110.[ECF

No.186,p.4].Defendantsfollowthissentencewithafootnoteaboutthepresuitnotice

3 TheCourt can thinkofmyriad solutions to this issue.For instance, thenotice

mayadviseputative classmembersof the two classdates.Or,Plaintiffsmay seek to

foregothis15day tollingperiodtohaveamoreuniform,andcleaner,classdate.The

Courtisnotimposinganyofthesesolutionsontheparties.



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being defective,but present no argument explainingwhy that is the case andwhat

consequencesflowfromthispresumption.[SeeId.,atp.4n.1].NeitherdidDefendants

movetodismissanyofPlaintiffscausesofaction.Instead,theyanswered.

Asnoted,aRule23analysisgrantscourtsnolicensetoengageinfreeranging

merits inquiriesat thecertificationstage.AmgenInc.,133S.Ct.at1194 (citingDukes,

131S.Ct.at 2552n. 6).Accordingly, thisCourt cannotundertakea suaspontemerits

analysisoftheviabilityofthestatelawclaims,wherenopartyhasfiledanappropriate

motionseekingsuchadetermination.4

Second,Defendants argue that thedefinition is unfair and arbitrary in its

exclusionof theplaintiffs inGeterv.GalardiS.Enter.,Inc.5[ECFNo.186,pp.56].The

plaintiffs inGeterarealsoentertainerswhoworkordidwork forDefendantsaround

the same period of time andwho filed a similar lawsuit againstDefendants in the

4 Moreover, theCourt cannotdefinitively say that the law isclearon this issue.

TheCourts cursory research shows that there isnoonpointFloridaSupremeCourt

case and that district courts in this circuit are split on the issue. Compare Bates v.

SmugglersEnters.,Inc.,No.210CV136FTM29DNF,2010WL3293347,at*4(M.D.Fla.

Aug.19,2010)(findingthatArticleX,24oftheFloridaConstitutioncreatedaseparate

causeofactionapartfrom448.110),withGarciaCelestinov.RuizHarveseting,Inc.,No.

2:10CV542FTM38,2013WL3816730,at*17(M.D.Fla.July22,2013) (rejectingBates

andstatingthatconstruingtheFMWA[i.e.,448.110]andtheAmendment[24],as

theBatescourtdid,toprovideseparatecausesofactiononewithanoticerequirement

andonewithoutignoresthepurposeoftheFMWAasanimplementinglegislationto

theAmendment.).

5 CaseNo. 1421896CIV (S.D. Fla. 2014) (FLSA collective action case filedby a

second group of entertainers against the same Defendants in this District in close

proximitytothecurrentaction,whichfeaturesmanyoverlappingissues).



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SouthernDistrictofFlorida in2014.CaseNo.1421896CIV(S.D.Fla.2014).TheGeter

plaintiffswould allvery likelybe encompassedby the classdefinitionsproposedby

Plaintiffswithouttheexplicitcarveout.

TheGeterplaintiffs filed their lawsuit exclusively as a federal collective action

undertheFLSAand,onthefirstdayofthejurytrialinthatcase,thepartiesreacheda

settlementagreementon thoseclaims.CaseNo.1421896CIV,ECFNo.305 (S.D.Fla.

July15,2015).ThedistrictcourtapprovedthesettlementinaccordancewithLynnsFood

Stores,Inc.v.UnitedStates,679F.2d1350,1353(11thCir.1982)onAugust11,2015.Geter,

CaseNo.1421896CIV,ECFNo.313(S.D.Fla.Aug.11,2015).

Defendantsarguethatexcluding theGeterplaintiffsfromtheclassdefinition in

this case is arbitrary andunfairbecause there isno evidence that theGeterplaintiffs

knowingly, voluntarily, or intentionally relinquished any statebasedwage andhour

claimswhentheychosetooptintotheGeterFLSAcollectiveaction.[ECFNo.186,pp.

56].Tosupportthisargument,DefendantsrefertoBocaRatonCommunityHospital,Inc.

v.TenetHealthcareCorp., inwhichadistrictcourtdeniedcertification, inpart,because

theclassdefinitionwasarbitraryandunfairinthatthere[was]nolegalorfactualbasis

forusing[aspecificthreshold]todistinguishbetweenhospitalsthatareintheclassand

thosethatarenot. 238F.R.D.679,68991(S.D.Fla.2006).

InBocaRatonCommunityHospital,theplaintiffswereunabletoprovidereasoned

supportforthethresholdthatseparatedclassmembersfromnonclassmembers,andso



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thecourtfoundthatthedefinitionwasnotworkableorpracticablebecauseit[was]not

grounded in fact or law and [did] not rationally separate hospitals that allegedly

receivedortransportedstolenoutlierfundsfromthosethatdidnot.Id.at691.While

DefendantsclaimtheoutrightexclusionofGeterplaintiffsisnotsufficientlyrational,

theCourtdisagrees.

Asnotedabove,theGeterplaintiffshaveallsettledtheirfederalwageclaimsin

the separate litigation. In the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the

Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiffs may not split causes of action to bring, for

example,statelawclaimsinonesuitandthenfileasecondsuitwithfederalcausesof

action.Jangv.UnitedTech.Corp.,206F.3d1147,1149(11thCir.2000).Toallowplaintiffs

todosowouldviolatethebasictenetsofresjudicata.Thesamewouldpotentiallyapply

inthiscontextiftheCourtweretoallowtheGeterplaintiffstosettletheirfederalwage

claimsinoneaction(anactioninwhichtheplaintiffsforewenttheopportunitytoalso

pursuestatewageclaims),but thensubsequentlyrecover forviolationsofstatewage

lawsonthesamefactualpredicateinthisseparateaction.Bothcaseswouldarisefrom

thesamenucleusofoperativefactandthusviolatetheprincipleofresjudicata.SeeJang,

206F.3d at1149 (citing IsraelDiscountBank,Ltd.v.Entin,951F.2d 311, 315 (11thCir.

1992)).

Accordingly, there isnothingarbitraryorunfairaboutPlaintiffsdecision to

specificallyexcludetheoptinplaintiffsintheGeteraction.



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NotwithstandingDefendants objections to the proposed class definitions, the

Court has undertaken an independent review of the proposed Rule 23 classes. The

Court finds thatPlaintiffsproposedclassesareascertainableandadequatelydefined

(settingaside theminordate inconsistency toberesolvedbefore thenotice is issued).

See,e.g.,Ruffin,2012WL5472165,at*11(certifyingclassofallpersonswho,duringthe

period ofMarch 8, 2006 and continuing through the entry ofjudgment in this case,

performedasanentertaineratoneormoreofDefendantsthreeexoticdanceclubsin

WestVirginia);Hart,2010WL5297221,at *5, *8 (certifying the following class[a]ll

persons who worked at Ricks New York or were employed by Defendant Ricks

Cabaret International Inc., RCI Entertainment (New York) Inc. and/or Peregrine

Enterprises,Inc.inthestateofNewYorkasentertainersatanytimesixyearspriorto

thefilingoftheComplainttotheentryofjudgmentinthiscase).

C. Rule23(a)sRequirements

Each of the following four requirements under Rule 23(a)mustbe satisfied:

numerosity;typicality;commonality;andadequacy.

1. Numerosity

Toestablishnumerosity,aplaintiffmustshowthattheclassissonumerousthat

joinderofallmembersisimpracticable.SeeVega,564F.3dat126667(quotingFed.R.

Civ.P.23(a)(1)).Rule23(a)(1) imposesagenerally lowhurdle,andaplaintiffneed

notshowtheprecisenumberofmembersintheclass.Vega,564F.3dat1267(internal



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citations omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff still bears the burden of making some

showing, affording thedistrict court themeans tomake a supported factual finding,

that the class actually certifiedmeets the numerosity requirement. Id. (emphasis in

original). As one court has noted, though mere numbers are not dispositive, the

generalruleofthumbintheEleventhCircuitisthatlessthantwentyoneisinadequate,

morethanfortyadequate,withnumbersbetweenvaryingaccordingtootherfactors.

Manno,289F.R.D.at684(citingCoxv.Am.CastIronPipeCo.,784F.2d1546,1553(11th

Cir.1986);Kuehnv.CadleCo.,245F.R.D.545,548(M.D.Fla.2007)).

Here, to support a numerosity finding, Plaintiffs cite to several sources,

including:(1)namedPlaintiffTiffanyThompsonsstatementinheraffidavitthatthere

are500orsodancersatKOD[ECFNo.341,p.42];(2)thetestimonyofKODsgeneral

manager,AkinyeleAdams,atanevidentiaryhearingthatonanygivenweekKODcould

have300dancersworking. [ECFNo.78,p.38];and (3)KODsunqualifiedadmission

that[t]henumberofentertainerswhohaveperformedatKODsinceApril9,2009 is

greaterthan300.[ECFNo.1792,p.15].

TheCourt finds that thenumerosityrequirement ismet,regardlessofwhether

thenumberisAdams300orThompsons500.SeeKilgov.BowmanTransp.,Inc.,789F.2d

859, 878 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming certification of a class of at least thirtyone

individualclassmembers);Collinsv.ErinCapitalMgmt.,LLC,290F.R.D.689,694(S.D.

Fla.2013) (plaintiffspreliminaryshowingof48classmemberswassufficient tomeet



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numerosityrequirement);Ruffin,2012WL5472165,at*6(157dancerswassufficientto

meetnumerosityrequirement).

Defendants present additional arguments concerning numerosity,but they all

arebasedonpure conjecture anddonotnecessarily apply tonumerosityper se.For

instance,Defendantsarguethatthereisnoshowingthatthe300dancersareeligibleto

participate as part of the Florida Constitutional Class, the 448.110 Class, orboth.

However,theclassdefinitionencompassesallentertainersfromtherelevanttimeframe

inwhichDefendants admit therewere at least three hundred dancers. This clearly

satisfiesnumerositydespiteDefendantscontraryargument.

Defendantsmakeotherstatementsaboutnumerositywhicharenotapplicableto

thiselementofaclassaction:Plaintiffsalsooffernoevidenceregardingthegeographic

diversityof theclassmembers, thesizeofeachPlaintiffsclaim, the inconvenienceof

tryingindividuallawsuits,ortheabilityorfeasibilityoftheindividualclassmembersto

institute individual lawsuits. None of these arguments goes to the subject of

numerosity,whichrequiresaplaintifftoshowthattheclassissonumerousthatjoinder

of all members is impracticable. See Vega, 564 F.3d at 126667 (emphasis added)

(quotingFed.R.Civ.P.23(a)(1)).Clearly,theseargumentsarenotapplicablehere.

Defendantsotherargumentthatpotentialplaintiffscouldhave,butdidnot,opt

in to thePlaintiffsFLSAcollectiveaction shouldbe takenasa strong indication that

suchdancershaveno interest inpursuing state lawwageandhourclaimseither, is



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alsonotpersuasive.Rule 23(a)(1) imposes a generally lowhurdle, and aplaintiff

need not show the precisenumber ofmembers in the class.Vega, 564 F.3d at 1267

(internalcitationsomitted). In thisaction,more than20plaintiffshaveopted into the

FLSAcollectiveaction.[ECFNos.123;126;128;129;137;142;149;151].Whilecertainly

less than 300, this level of participation is evidence of some interest to actively

participateinacase.BecauseRule23classactionsdonotrequirepartiestooptin(only

optout), theCourt cannot say for certain that only those 20 claimantswill seek to

recoveron the state law claims.What theCourt candetermine at thispoint though,

based onDefendants own admissions, is that there are at least 300 potential class

members,whichsatisfiesnumerosity.

2. Commonality

Thecommonalityrequirementdemandsonlythattherebequestionsoflawor

fact common to the class.Vega, 564 F.3d at 1268 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2)).

Commonality does not require that all the questions of law and fact raisedby the

disputebecommon,orthatthecommonquestionsoflaworfactpredominateover

individualissues.Id.(quotingCox,784F.2dat1557).Statedanotherway,commonality

requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the classmembers have suffered the same

injury, and the plaintiffs common contention mustbe of such a nature that it is

capableofclasswideresolutionwhichmeansthatdeterminationofitstruthorfalsity



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will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one

stroke.Dukes,131S.Ct.at2551(internalquotationsandcitationomitted).

Here,asDefendantsconcede[ECFNo.68,p.6],thecommonalityrequirementis

met because the issue of whether Defendants treated all dancers as independent

contractorsiscommontoalltheputativeclassmembers.SeeRuffin,2012WL5472165,at

*7 (finding commonalitymet in similar circumstance); Hart, 2010WL 5297221, at *6

(findingthatcommonalityrequirementwasmetwhereoneissuewastheproprietyof

thedefendantspolicyofcharacterizingentertainersasindependentcontractors,rather

thanemployees).

3.

Typicality

Typicalityrequiresthattheclaimsordefensesoftherepresentativeparties[be]

typicaloftheclaimsordefensesoftheclass.Manno,289F.R.D.at686(quotingFed.R.

Civ. P. 23(a)(3)). The [c]lassmembers claims need notbe identical to satisfy the

typicalityrequirement;rather,thereneedonlyexistasufficientnexusbetweenthelegal

claims of the named class representatives and those of individual classmembers to

warrantclasscertification.Aultv.WaltDisneyWorldCo.,692F.3d1212,1216(11thCir.

2012) (quoting PradoSteiman v.Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 127879 (11th Cir. 2000)). That

nexusexistsiftheclaimsordefensesoftheclassandtheclassrepresentativearisefrom

thesameeventorpatternorpracticeandarebasedonthesamelegaltheory.Ault,692



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19

F.3dat1216(quotingKornbergv.CarnivalCruiseLines,Inc.,741F.2d1332,1337(11thCir.

1984)).

Here,likewithcommonality,thetypicalityrequirementismetbecausePlaintiffs

allegation that theirmiscategorizationas independentcontractors thecentral issue

thatgivesrisetoalloftheirclaims waspursuanttoablanketpolicythatappliedtoall

membersof theputativeclass.Thus,Plaintiffsclaimsarise from thesamecourseof

conductasthatoftheputativeclassmembers,andthesamelegaltheoryunderliesthe

claimsofeach.Ruffin,2012WL5472165,at*8(findingtypicalitymet);accordHart,2010

WL5297221,at*6.

Defendants concede the above point (i.e., the central independent contractor

categorization issue).But theyneverthelessraise twomainargumentsagainst finding

thatthetypicalityrequirementismet.TheCourtwilladdresseachoftheirarguments.

First, Defendants note that several named Plaintiffs also have retaliation

claims,whichtheycontendmeansthetypicalityrequirementisnotmet.[ECFNo.186,

p.9].Thereare,infact,onlytwonamedPlaintiffswhohavepotentialretaliationclaims,

SeletaStantonandThompson.[ECFNo.116].Typicalitydoesnotrequirethattheclass

membersclaimbe identical.Accordingly, theCourtdoesnot find that twoplaintiffs

withpotentialretaliationclaimstobesufficienttofindthatthetypicalityrequirement

hasnotbeenmet.



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20

Second,Defendantscontend that it is impossible toknowwhichof thenamed

Plaintiffsfallintowhichproposedclass,theFloridaConstitutionClassorthe448.110

Class. [ECFNo.186,pp.910].TheCourtdoesnot find this tobeaviableargument

because,asnoted, typicalityrestsonwhethertheclaimsordefensesoftheclassand

theclassrepresentativearisefromthesameeventorpatternorpracticeandarebased

on the same legal theory.SeeAult, 692F.3d at 1216 (citationsomitted).Defendants

argument focuses on the completely separate and unrelated issue ofwhich class a

namedPlaintifffallsinto.Indeed,Defendantscitetonolegalauthoritytosupportthis

argument.Inanyevent,theCourtnotesthat intheamendedcomplaintallthenamed

PlaintiffsassertedcausesofactionunderArticleX,24oftheFloridaConstitutionand

448.110.[SeeECFNo.140,pp.3738].

4.

Adequacy

TosatisfyRule23(a)(4)sadequacyrequirement, thenamedPlaintiffsand their

counselmustdemonstratethattheywilladequatelyprotecttheinterestsoftheputative

class. SeeValleyDrugCo.v.GenevaPharm., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11thCir. 2003).

Theadequacyofrepresentationrequirement encompassestwoseparateinquiries:(1)

whetheranysubstantialconflictsofinterestexistbetween[Plaintiffsortheirattorneys]

and theclass;and (2)whether [theyand their lawyers]willadequatelyprosecute the

action.Busbyv.JRHBWRealty,Inc.,513F.3d1314,1323(11thCir.2008) (citingValley

DrugCo.,350F.3dat1189).



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21

Here,Defendantsconcedethatthattheadequacyofrepresentationrequirement

ismet. [ECFNo. 186, p. 10].6Despite this commendable concession, the Court has

conductedanindependentreviewofwhetherthisrequirementismet.TheCourtfinds

that the named Plaintiffs and their counselwill adequately representboth putative

classesinthiscaseforthefollowingreasons.

First, the named Plaintiffs and the putative class members seek to hold

Defendants liableforallegedlymiscategorizingthemas independentcontractors.The

claims and defenses applicable to the named Plaintiffs and the classes appear tobe

substantially the same and there is no antagonism between the named Plaintiffs

interestsandthoseoftheputativeclassmembers.Inotherwords,thenamedPlaintiffs

sharecommon interestswith theputativeclassmembersand theygenerally seek the

same typeof relief for themselvesas they seek for theclass.See,e.g.,Pottinger,720F.

Supp.at959;Hart,2010WL5297221,at*6.

Second,asforclasscounsel,becausePlaintiffscounselprimarilypracticesoutof

Georgia,thisCourtdoesnothavethebenefitofpriorexperiencewithPlaintiffscounsel

andhishandlingofaclassactioncaseinthisdistrict,asitdoesinothercasesbeforeit.

Assuch, theCourthasundertakena thorough reviewof leadcounselsaffidavitand

6 Defendants note, however, that if the Court rejected the class definition

excludingtheGeterplaintiffs,thentheadequacyofPlaintiffscounseltorepresentthose

partieswouldbe questionable. [ECFNo. 186, pp. 1011]. Because theCourt accepts

Plaintiffsclassdefinition thatexcludes theGeterplaintiffs, theUndersignedneednot

addressthispotentialissue.



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manyofthesimilarcasesinwhichhehasbeencounsel.See,e.g., [ECFNo.342];Caley

v.GulfstreamAerospaceCorp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 2005); Prickett v.DeKalb

Cnty., 349 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003) (FLSA collective action);Jones v. City of

Columbus,Ga.,120F.3d248,251(11thCir.1997)(FLSAaction); Kreherv.CityofAtlanta,

Ga.,No.1:04CV2651WSD,2006WL739572,(N.D.Ga.Mar.20,2006)(certifyingFLSA

collective action).After considering lead counsels qualifications and experience, the

Courtfindshimsufficientlyadeptandabletohandlethisclassactionlitigation.

D.

Rule23(b)(3)s

Requirements

In addition to establishing theRule 23(a) requirements, a plaintiffmust also

establishthattheproposedclasssatisfiesatleastoneofthethreerequirementslistedin

Rule23(b).Little,691F.3dat1304;seealsoPickettv.IowaBeefProcessors,209F.3d1276,

1279 (11th Cir. 2000). In this case, Plaintiffs move under Rule 23(b)(3). That rule

permitsclasscertificationifthecourtfindsthatthequestionsoflaworfactcommonto

classmemberspredominateoveranyquestionsaffectingonly individualmembers,and

that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently

adjudicatingthecontroversy.Little,691F.3dat1304(quotingRule23(b)(3))(emphasis

in original). These are commonly referred to as the predominance and superiority

requirements.Manno,289F.R.D.at68889(internalcitationomitted).



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1. Predominance

To satisfy the predominance requirement, a plaintiffmust establish that the

issuessubjecttogeneralizedproofintheclassaction,andthusapplicabletotheclassas

awhole,predominateoverthoseissuesthataresubjectonlytoindividualizedproof.See

Jacksonv.Motel6Multipurpose,Inc.,130F.3d999,1005 (11thCir.1997).Predominance

does not require that all the questions of law and fact raised by the dispute be

common. Cox, 784 F.2d at 1557. If the liability issue is common to the class, then

common questions predominate over individual questions. See Kirkpatrick v. J.C.

Bradford&Co.,827F.2d718,725(11thCir.1987).

Here,thereisnorealdisputethattheliabilityissueiscommontotheclass,i.e.,

the propriety of Defendants blanket categorization of the class members as

independentcontractors.Defendantsarguethatnotwithstandingthattheliabilityissue

is common, thepredominance requirement isnotmetbecauseof themyriad factual

issues that must be resolved to determine each dancers damages. In particular,

Defendantsarguethatclassmemberswill,amongotherthings,haveworkeddifferent

hoursperweek, including adistinction ofworkingmore or less than 40hours, and

madedifferent amountsofmoney. [ECFNo. 186,pp. 1213].Plaintiffsbrushoff this

argumentbystatingthatdifferencesindamagesisnotalegallysufficientgroundtonot

findpredominance.[ECFNo.74,p.3].



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TotheextentthatPlaintiffsargumentisthatdifferencesindamagesamongclass

members can never be a sufficient legal ground to find that the predominance

requirementisnotmet,theCourtrejectsthatargument.The lawisfarmorenuanced.

Tobesure,ingeneral,theCourtshouldbefocusedonliabilityissues,andthepresence

of individualized damages issues does not necessarily prevent a finding that the

common issues in the casepredominate.SeeAllapattahServs., Inc.v.ExxonCorp., 333

F.3d1248,1261(11thCir.2003).Butthatdoesnotmeanthatisalwaysthecase.Rather,as

theEleventhCircuithas said, individualizeddamages issueswillseldomupseta case

otherwisesuitedforclasstreatment:

Itisprimarilywhentherearesignificantindividualizedquestionsgoingto

liability that the need for individualized assessments of damages is

enough to preclude 23(b)(3) certification. Of course, thereare also extreme

casesinwhichcomputationofeachindividualsdamageswillbesocomplex,fact

specific, and difficult that the burden on the court system would be simply

intolerable[,]but

we

emphasize

that

such

cases

rarely,

ifever,

come

along.

OwnerOperatorInd.DriversAssn,Inc.v.LandstarSys.,Inc.,622F.3d1307,1326(11th

Cir.2010)(internalcitationsomitted)(emphasisadded).

Here, Defendants have raised some valid arguments about why individual

damagescalculationsmayprovedifficult in thiscase.Theproblem forDefendants is

that they have not sufficiently shown that these damages willbe so complex, fact

specific, and difficult that the burden on the court system would be simply

intolerable[.] Id. And the Court does not find that, at this time, these damages

calculationswillproveparticularlyonerous.TworeasonssupporttheCourtsdecision.



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First,multipledistrictcourtshavebeenabletodeterminetheamountofdamages

insimilarcases, i.e.,dancerstate lawclassactions. Indeed, todate, itappears thatno

less than three district courts have approved class settlements of state law claims

broughtby dancers. See, e.g.,Flynn, 2014WL 4980380; In rePenthouseExecutiveClub

Comp. Litig., 2014WL 185628; Trauth, 2012WL 4755682. The fact that three district

courtswereable toapproveadamagescalculationsseverelyunderminesDefendants

argumentthatdamagescannotbeeasilycalculated.

Second, as the Hart court noted, if individual damage calculations prove

necessary and cannotbe easilymanaged, then this Court, which has a continuing

obligationtomonitorclassactions,maydecertifytheclassifnecessary.Hart,2010WL

5297221,at*7;Shinv.CobbCnty.Bd.ofEduc.,248F.3d1061,1064(11thCir.2001)(the

district court retains the ability, and perhaps even a duty, to alter or amend a

certificationdecision,ascircumstanceschange).

2. Superiority

The focus of the superiority analysis is on the relative advantages of a class

actionsuitoverwhateverotherformsoflitigationmightberealisticallyavailabletothe

plaintiffs. SacredHeartHealthSys., Inc. v.HumanaMilitaryHealthcareServs., Inc., 601

F.3d 1159, 118384 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citation omitted). In this vein, the

predominance analysis has a tremendous impact on the superiority analysis for the

simple reason that, themorecommon issuespredominateover individual issues, the



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moredesirableaclassactionlawsuitwillbeasavehicleforadjudicatingtheplaintiffs

claims,bothrelativetootherformsoflitigationsuchasjoinderorconsolidation,andin

absolute terms of manageability[.] Id. at 1184 (internal citations and alterations

omitted).

Indeciding superiority, a courtmust consider at least some of the factors set

forth in Rule 23(b)(3), including: the class members interests in individually

controlling theprosecutionordefenseof separateactions;theextentandnatureof

anylitigationconcerningthecontroversyalreadybegunbyoragainstclassmembers;

the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the

particularforum;andthelikelydifficultiesinmanagingaclassaction.SeeVega,564

F.3dat1278n.19 (acomplete failure toaddress these factorsoranyotherpertinent

considerationwhenconductingaRule23(b)(3)inquiryisanabuseofdiscretion).

Here, Defendants assert the same individual damages argument they raise

regardingthepredominancerequirement.[ECFNo.186,pp.1113].Butthespecterof

individual damages trials bears more directly on predominance than superiority.

Manno,289F.R.D.at692n.9 (citingNewbergonClassActions4:54 (2012)). Inany

event,theCourtrejectsthisargumentforthesamereasonsstatedabove.

Regarding Rule 23(b)(3)s superiority factors inquiry, the Court finds the

following(whichDefendantsconcede):



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First,given thecostof litigationrelative toany likelyrecovery,it [is]unlikely

that themajorityofputativeclassmemberswouldhaveany interest inmaintaininga

separateaction.Ruffin,2012WL5472165,at*11.

Second,whiletherewasanotherlitigationwithpotentialclassmemberspending

inthisdistrict,theplaintiffsthereallegedonlyFLSAviolations.SeeGeter,CaseNo.14

21896CMA,ECFNo.1(S.D.Fla.May22,2014).TheGeterplaintiffsdidnotallegeany

StateLawClaims,andthecasehassettled.

Third,litigationofthiscaseinthisforumisdesirablebecauseitiswhereKODis

locatedanddoesbusiness,wheretheallegedunlawfulactsoccurred,andwherealarge

numberofputativeclassmemberspresumablyreside.Ruffin,2012WL5472165,at*11.

Finally,itisunlikelythatanydifficultieswillbeencounteredinthemanagement

ofthiscase,otherthantypicalissuesofthelanguageofthenoticetotheputativeclass

members.

Accordingly, having considered all of Rule 23(b)(3)s superiority factors, the

Courtfindsthattheclassactionvehicleissuperiorintheinstantmatter.CMart,Inc.,

299F.R.D.at692.

3.

Rule

23(b)(3)

and

Geter

Plaintiffs

Inaddition to theabovearguments,Defendantssecondarily raise thepotential

complicationof theGeter litigation in thecontextofpredominance. [ECFNo.186,pp.

1315]. Once again, however, Defendants argument of potential conflicts and



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complicationsonlycomesintoplayiftheCourtweretorejectPlaintiffsclassdefinition

thatexcludestheGeterplaintiffsfromtheclass.IftheCourtweretorejectthatportionof

the class definition, then therewould certainlybe problems concerning overlapping

representationoftheGeterplaintiffsbytwoseparateattorneysfordifferentportionsof

their claims. As noted above, though, Defendants arguments to reject the class

definition arewithoutmerit.Therefore, the exclusionof theGeterplaintiffs from the

statelawclassclaimsresolvesanypotentialissuesregardingtheRule23(b)(3)factors.

E.

PlaintiffsProposed

Notice

Plaintiffsproposednotice includes several references to theFLSA and creates

confusion. [SeeECFNo.1796,p.1].Before theCourtapprovesaNotice forthisclass

action,thoseconfusingreferencesmustberemoved.Inaddition,itisapparentthatthe

parties disagree concerning theblanket statement about the effect of the arbitration

agreements that Defendants mandated dancers to sign following the filing of this

lawsuit.Specifically,thelanguageintheproposednoticestates:

If you began working at KOD before April 8, 2014 and signed a

mandatoryarbitrationagreementafterthatdatebecauseyoubelievedyou

would be fired or terminated if you did not sign it, then you may

participateinthecaseeventhoughyousignedthemandatoryarbitration

agreement.

[Id.].

OnDecember31,2015,theUndersignedenteredanOrderrejectingDefendants

motiontoenforcethereferencedarbitrationagreementsagainstfouroptinclaimantsin



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theFLSA collectiveaction. [ECFNo.191]. In thatOrder, theUndersigned concluded

that Defendants arbitration policy was conducted with the clear purpose of

undermining this litigation. [Id., at p. 15]. The Undersigned refused to enforce the

agreementswithregard tofourspecificplaintiffs.But theUndersigneddidnotentera

blanketrulingconcerningtheenforcementofallarbitrationagreementsthough,asthat

issuehasnotbeenpresentedtotheCourt.

Accordingly,theUndersignedfindsthatthelanguageintheproposedNoticeis

toobroad,ascurrentlywritten.WhileitiscertainlytruethattheCourtsperspectiveof

Defendantsarbitrationpolicy isdecidedlynegativeonaccountofDefendants stated

intent, itremains tobedecidedwhetherotherarbitrationagreementssignedafter the

filingofthislawsuitareunenforceable.

Inevaluatinghowtoproceedonthisissue,theCourtnotesthefollowing.First,

this issue isnotproperlybefore theCourtbecausenopartyhas raised the issue.See

Rosenv.J.M.AutoInc.,270F.R.D.675,679(S.D.Fla.2009)(notingthatarbitrationissue

was not properlybefore court on class certificationmotion), order vacated inpart on

reconsideration(May26,2009)(theportionoftheearliercitedorderwasnotvacated).

Second, the fact that some members of a putative class may have signed

arbitration agreements or released claims against a defendant does not bar class

certification.Herrerav.LCSFin.Servs.Corp.,274F.R.D.666,681 (N.D.Cal.2011); see

alsoBittingerv.TecumsehProds.Co.,123F.3d877,884(6thCir.1997).Rather,courtswill



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30

rule on themerits of the class certificationmotion and reserve the right to create

subclasses or excludemembers from the class at a laterjuncture. Coleman v. Gen.

MotorsAcceptanceCorp.,220F.R.D.64,91(M.D.Tenn.2004)(internalcitationsomitted);

Bittinger,123F.3dat884;seealsoCollinsv.IntlDairyQueen,168F.R.D.668,677 (M.D.

Ga. 1996) (establishing subclasses where some of the classmembers had contracts

containing arbitration provisions). Accordingly, while Plaintiffs state law claims

classesarebeingcertified, theCourtreserves theright tocreatesubclassesorexclude

classmembersdependingonlaterdevelopments.

Whattheforegoingmeansfortheinstancenoticeisthefollowing:thenoticewill

advisethatanypotentialplaintiffwhosignedthearbitrationagreementwillbeallowed

intothestatelawclaimsclassesfornow,butthatshemaylaterbeexcluded.

To address the above changes (andpossibly others), counsel shall confer and

submitajointproposednotice to theCourt for considerationwithin tendaysof this

Order.

In conferring about the proposed notice, counsel shall follow the Courts

previousruling.[ECFNo.116,pp.1213].Toreiterate,thoserulings(asmodifiedhere)

areasfollows:

Thenoticewillbein12pointfontandhave1inchmargins.

References to Plaintiffs proposed FLSA collective action must be

removed.



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The notice shall make clear that it applies only to KOD

dancers/entertainers,notallKODemployees.

Thenoticeshalladviseputativeclassmembersthattheymayberequired

toparticipateindiscovery.

Thenoticeandtheenvelopescontainingthenoticewillnotuselanguage

tosuggestjudicialendorsementofthenotice.

The proposed notice must notify class members that if there is no

judgmentintheirfavor,thenDefendantsmayrequesttheCourttoorder

reimbursementoftheirlitigationexpensesagainstthem.

Toassistcounselwithpreparingtherevisednotice,counselaredirectedto

reviewtheRuffinnotice,ECFNo.345.

IV. CONCLUSION

Forthereasonssetforthabove,Plaintiffsmotionforclasscertificationisgranted

inpart.WithintendaysofthisOrder,thepartiesshallsubmitarevisedproposedclass

notice for theCourt toreview.ThepartiesshallalsoemailaWordversionof the

proposednoticetotheCourtsefileinbox.

DONEandORDERED,inChambers,inMiami,Florida,January11,2016.

Copiesfurnishedto:

AllCounselofRecord


espinoza v. fly low dba king of diamonds rule 23 order certifying case as a class action

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