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Given the nature of the conflict in Afghani-stan, a definitive, conventional “victory” is not arealistic option. Denying a sanctuary to terroristswho seek to attack the United States does notrequire Washington to pacify the entire country,eradicate its opium fields, or sustain a long-termmilitary presence in Central Asia. From the sky,U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles can monitor vil-lages, training camps, and insurgent compounds.On the ground, the United States can retain asmall number of covert operatives for intelligencegathering and discrete operations against specifictargets, as well as an additional small group ofadvisers to train Afghan police and military forces.The United States should withdraw most of itsforces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to 18months and treat al Qaeda’s presence in theregion as a chronic, but manageable, problem.

Washington needs to narrow its objectives tothree critical tasks:

Security. Support, rather than supplant, in-digenous security efforts by training and assistingthe Afghan national army and police and, whereappropriate, paying off or otherwise co-optingregional militias. Training should be tied to clearmetrics. If those benchmarks are not achieved,Washington must cut its losses and cease furtherassistance. U.S. forces should not become Afghani-stan’s perpetual crutch.

Intelligence and Regional Relations. Sustainintelligence operations in the region through aeri-al surveillance, covert operations, and ongoingintelligence-sharing with the Afghan and Pakistanigovernments. Seek cordial relations with all of Af-

ghanistan’s neighbors, particularly Russia andIran, as each has the means to significantly under-mine or facilitate progress in the country.

Drugs. Dial back an opium eradication policyto one that solely targets drug cartels affiliatedwith insurgents rather than one that targets alltraffickers, including poor local farmers. Harassingthe latter alienates a significant portion of the rur-al population.

Central Asia holds little intrinsic strategic valueto the United States, and America’s security willnot be endangered even if an oppressive regimetakes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan terri-tory. America’s objective has been to neutralize theparties responsible for the atrocities committedon 9/11. The United States should not go beyondthat objective by combating a regional insurgencyor drifting into an open-ended occupation andnation-building mission.

Most important, Afghanistan serves as thecrossroads of Central Asia. From its invasion byGenghis Khan and his two-million strong Mon-gol hordes to the superpower proxy war betweenthe United States and the Soviet Union, Afghan-istan’s trade routes and land-locked position inthe middle of the region have for centuries ren-dered it vulnerable to invasion by external powers.Although Afghanistan has endured successivewaves of Persian, Greek, Arab, Turk, Mongol,British, and Soviet invaders, no occupying powerhas ever successfully conquered it. There’s a rea-son why it has been described as the “graveyard ofempires,” and unless America scales down itsobjectives, it risks meeting a similar fate.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. TedGalen Carpenter, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at Cato, is the author of 8 and the editor of 10books on international affairs. His most recent book is Smart Power: Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy forAmerica.

Executive Summary

GeneralMcChrystal hasalso called for a“cultural shift”

in America’sapproach to the

mission.

2

Introduction: ChangeComes to Washington—

and AfghanistanPresident Barack Obama coupled his wise

commitment to end the war in Iraq with an ill-advised campaign pledge to increase America’scommitment in Afghanistan. True to hisword, within his first 100 days in office, thepresident approved a nearly 50 percent in-crease in U.S. combat deployments to Afghan-istan. As of August 2009, 68,000 U.S. troopsand 30,000 NATO troops are deployed there.1

The new administration also replaced thecommander of the International Security As-sistance Force, General David McKiernan,who apparently was deemed “too convention-al” in his military strategy, with GeneralStanley McChrystal, who commanded specialoperations forces in Iraq and is expected to tryto win over the local population—the “centerof gravity”—in Afghanistan.2

Much of Afghanistan’s violence is concen-trated in the southern and eastern provinces, par-ticularly Kandahar, the heart of “Taliban coun-try.”3 New army units will deploy to Wardak,Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar, Nuristan, and Lagh-man provinces in Regional Command East, andKandahar and Zabul provinces in RegionalCommand South. Also, the 2nd Marine Expedi-tionary Brigade will assist British forces currentlyfighting in Helmand province.

Ground operations under the Obamaadministration clearly draw from the “clear-hold-build” model suggested in the Army andMarine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual(FM 3-24). That three-phased strategy advis-es counterinsurgents and host nation forcesto kill, destroy, or otherwise force the surren-der or withdrawal of insurgents from a givenarea (clear), restore security in the contestedarea (hold), and establish infrastructure andbasic services for the local population (build).

That model requires soldiers to move awayfrom big, forward-operating bases and immersethemselves into the local population. The JointReadiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Lou-isiana, where soldiers prepare for deployment,uses native-born Afghans to role-play as village

elders and interpreters, simulating day-to-daysituations.4 General McChrystal has also calledfor a “cultural shift” in America’s approach tothe mission. Officers and soldiers will beassigned to five-year deployment cycles, and berotated in and out in nine-month stints to bet-ter learn Afghanistan’s rough human and geo-graphic terrain.5

Traditional counterinsurgency missions,such as protecting the population, trainingindigenous forces, and conducting psycholog-ical operations, will be the centerpiece of thisapproach.6 But the choice of McChrystal mayalso signal a shift to the use of commandounits outside of the normal military chain ofcommand to target key individuals andgroups. These direct action activities, dubbed“collaborative warfare,” combine intelligenceintercepts with precision strikes to eliminatekey insurgent leaders. In Iraq, McChrystalspearheaded a series of top-secret special oper-ations that targeted key individuals in alQaeda and the Sunni insurgency, such asJordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, theleader of al Qaeda in Iraq. In Afghanistan,such limited operations could help the UnitedStates more effectively target combatants andminimize civilian casualties. Targeting topleaders, however, may also undermine theAfghan government’s engagement initiativeswith former insurgents. And according to twoU.S. officials who spoke to the Washington Post,McChrystal has the authority to go after high-value targets inside Pakistan without havingto seek permission first—an approach thatcould complicate the already tense situation inthat country.7

In March 2009 the Obama administrationreleased a wide-ranging strategic review of U.S.policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.8

Despite that review, the changes are more ashift in tactics, as the war effort still lacks aclearly defined strategy. The principal changeis a troop “surge,” but that will not be suffi-cient to achieve Washington’s ambitious goalsin Afghanistan.

The infusion of additional troops and thechange of top-level commanders might damp-en violence in the near term, but the in-

Transforming adeeply divided,tribal-based society into a self-sufficient,stable democracywould require amulti-decadecommitment.

3

tractable insurgency in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, as well as pervasiveAfghan government corruption, will plaguethe country in the long term. Notwithstand-ing the results of Afghanistan’s recent presi-dential elections, U.S. policy in the region wasalready committed to transforming what is adeeply divided, poverty stricken, tribal-basedsociety into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, sta-ble democracy. Such a project would require amulti-decade commitment—and even thenthere would be no assurance of success. In thatrespect, no tangible gains will outweigh thecosts of maintaining such a military presence

in this volatile region. The United Statesshould narrow its objectives and start bringingthe military mission to a close.

Why America Needs anExit Strategy

The war in Afghanistan has no simpleremedies. Eight years after the fall of theTaliban regime, the country still struggles tosurvive under the most brutal circumstances:corrupt and ineffective state institutions,thousands of miles of unguarded borders,

Figure 1

Afghanistan’s Provinces

Source: Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Report, June 2009, http://www.

carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf, p. 2.

pervasive illiteracy among a largely rural anddecentralized population, a weak president,and a dysfunctional international alliance. Asif that weren’t enough, some of Afghanistan’sneighbors have incentives to foment instabil-ity there.

Given Afghanistan’s numerous challenges,policymakers must consider the unpleasantlikelihood that the insurgency might outlastthe presence of international troops. But, asexplained below, the United States can contin-ue to disrupt terrorist havens without perpet-uating a large-scale military presence on theground.

The Obama administration’s March 2009strategic review declared, “[T]he core goal ofthe U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, anddefeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan,and to prevent their return to Pakistan orAfghanistan.” That statement suggests thatthe president does not wish to maintain a per-manent military presence. But, as in previousadministrations, conflicting public state-ments cloud a clear assessment of policy. In aninterview with 60 Minutes, President Obamainsisted, “There’s got to be an exit strategy. . . .There’s got to be a sense that this is not per-petual drift.”9 Yet less than a week later, thepresident appeared to drift toward open-end-ed nation building. He warned, “A return toTaliban rule would condemn their country tobrutal governance, international isolation, aparalyzed economy, and the denial of basichuman rights.”10

Although Obama understandably empa-thizes with the suffering of others, a president’sdecision to sacrifice thousands of lives and bil-lions of dollars warrants criteria more stringentthan countering a laundry list of negative traitsembodied by countless countries around theworld. North Korea, Haiti, Burma, Zimbabwe,and dozens of other states suffer from “brutalgovernance, international isolation, a paralyzedeconomy, and the denial of basic humanrights.”

Afghanistan is hardly unique, but policy-makers feel compelled to have a large-scale,long-term U.S. footprint remain. Reflexively,they posit the continuing threat from al Qaeda

as a justification for a presence. But that ratio-nale does not withstand close scrutiny.

Dangerous Myths

Myth #1: A U.S. Military Presence IsNeeded to Defeat a Lethal al Qaeda andTaliban Threat

Al Qaeda does have a presence in the regionand some people fear that if the United Stateswere to withdraw, the Taliban might retakecontrol of Kabul and once again provide shel-ter to al Qaeda. Bruce Riedel of the SabanCenter at the Brookings Institution, whoserved as Obama’s top Afghanistan adviserduring the 2008 presidential campaign, arguesthat NATO countries must “not let the globaljihad take over [Afghanistan and Pakistan] andfurther expand their sanctuaries.”11 FrederickKagan of the American Enterprise Instituteargues that “Afghanistan is not now a sanctu-ary for al-Qaeda, but it would likely becomeone again if we abandoned it. . . . AllowingAfghanistan to fail would mean allowing thesedetermined enemies of the United States toregain the freedom they had before 9/11.”12

Al Qaeda poses a manageable securityproblem, not an existential threat to America.Washington’s response, with an open-endedmission, is both unnecessary and unsustain-able. Technological advances over the pastdecade allow us to keep an eye on places with-out having tens of thousands of boots on theground.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs) surveil roads for improvisedexplosive devices, transmitting 16,000 hoursof video each month.13 UAVs are smaller,lighter, and cheaper than manned aircraft,because they don’t need equipment to supporta crew, and operations can run without com-bat search-and-rescue in place. UAV missionsare far less intrusive than a large-scale militarypresence, and they can help protect legitimateAmerican security interests. UAV technologywould also help to ensure we do not see arepeat of the 1990s, when the United Statesdocumented links between the Taliban and al

4

The Obamaadministration

appears to bedrifting toward

open-endednation building.

Qaeda, but hovered between indifference andbureaucratic paralysis when shaping policy inthe region. Today, we can target terroristswhere they do emerge via airstrikes and covertraids. Thus, denying a sanctuary to terroristswho seek to attack the United States does notrequire complete pacification of Afghanistan,much less a long-term, large-scale militarypresence in the region.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario—the res-urrection of the Taliban’s fundamentalistregime—does not threaten America’s sover-eignty or physical security. Many policymakerswho call for an indefinite military presence inAfghanistan conflate bin Laden’s network—atransnational jihadist organization—with theTaliban—an indigenous Pashtun-dominatedmovement. But the Taliban and other parochi-al fighters pose little threat to the sovereigntyor physical security of the United States. Thefear that the Taliban will take over a contigu-ous fraction of Afghan territory is not com-pelling enough of a rationale to maintain anindefinite, large-scale military presence in theregion, especially since the insurgency is largelyconfined to predominately Pashtun southernand eastern provinces and is unlikely to takeover the country as a whole, as we saw in the1990s.

Even if the Taliban were to reassert them-selves amid a scaled down U.S. presence, it isnot clear that the Taliban would again host alQaeda. In The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and theRoad to 9/11, Lawrence Wright, staff writer forNew Yorker magazine, found that before 9/11the Taliban was divided over whether to shel-ter Osama bin Laden.14 The terrorist financierwanted to attack Saudi Arabia’s royal family,which, according to Wright, would havedefied a pledge Taliban leader Mullah Omarmade to Prince Turki al-Faisal, chief of Saudiintelligence (1977–2001), to keep bin Ladenunder control. The Taliban’s reluctance tohost al Qaeda’s leader means it is not a fore-gone conclusion that the same group wouldprovide shelter to the same organizationwhose protection led to their overthrow.

America’s claim that the Taliban is its ene-my, and its preoccupation with the group’s

admittedly reprehensible practices, seems lessthan coherent. After all, although some U.S.officials issued toothless and perfunctory con-demnations of the Taliban when it controlledmost of Afghanistan from September 1996through October 2001, during that time theUnited States never once made a substantivepolicy shift toward or against the Talibandespite knowing that it imposed a misogynis-tic, oppressive, and militant Islamic regimeonto Afghans. For Washington to now pursuean uncompromising hostility toward theTaliban’s eye-for-an-eye brand of justice can beinterpreted as an opportunistic attempt tocloak U.S. strategic ambitions in moralisticvalues.

In June, Dutch army general Mart de Kruifestimated that there were between 10,000 and18,000 Taliban fighters in southern Afghan-istan.15 The number of al Qaeda operativesappears to be much smaller. According to aPakistani intelligence assessment provided tothe New York Times last February, al Qaeda hasadapted to the deaths of its leaders by shifting“to conduct decentralized operations undersmall but well-organized regional groups.”16

That dynamic underscores the importancethat President Obama resist the urge to in-crease America’s military presence in Afghan-istan beyond what he has already unwiselycommitted. As long as militants can exploitcollateral damage (civilian casualties) for theirpropaganda and continue to promulgate theperception that they are fighting against theinjustice of a foreign occupation, they will drawmore recruits to their cause and erode the legit-imacy of the Afghan government. Most impor-tant, troop increases are likely to push dis-parate Islamist groups to unite.

Finally, it is important to recognize thatpeople in Washington tend to exaggerate thespecter of the al Qaeda threat. “We must seejihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed andmiserable opponents that they are,” saysGlenn Carle, a 23-year veteran of the CentralIntelligence Agency who served as deputynational intelligence officer for transnationalthreats. “Al Qaeda,” Carle argued in the op-edpages of the Washington Post, “has only a hand-

5

Denying a sanctuary to terrorists doesnot require complete pacification ofAfghanistan,much less a long-term, large-scalemilitary presencein the region.

ful of individuals capable of planning, orga-nizing, and leading a terrorist operation . . .Its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”17

Al Qaeda is not an existential threat to theUnited States. It is increasingly unlikely that thegroup could mount another attack on the scaleof 9/11, much less anything larger. All of alQaeda’s attacks since 9/11 have been more mod-est, and they have grown more infrequent. Infact, Washington’s continued fixation on thegroup presents a bigger threat to genuineAmerican interests than the group itself canpose. Alarmism increases the group’s credibilitywhile diverting finite economic and militaryresources away from increased domestic securi-ty. And, as John Mueller, Woody Hayes Chair ofNational Security Studies at Ohio State Univer-sity argues, a national predisposition to overre-act to terrorism can make the United States amore appealing terrorist target.18 Though theUnited States should continue to monitor alQaeda carefully and carry out operations a-gainst it as opportunities arise, it does not meritthe strategic obsession that it currently receives.

In short, as the war in Afghanistan rageson, President Obama should be skeptical ofsuggestions that the defeat of al Qaedadepends on more and more U.S. troops. First,al Qaeda terrorist havens can be disruptedthrough covert operations and supported byunmanned aerial vehicles. Second, an oppres-sive regime in Afghanistan does not necessar-ily threaten the United States. Third, it is notclear that the Taliban, if they were to regaincontrol of much of the territory, would againharbor al Qaeda. And fourth, troop increasesare likely to incite fierce resistance to foreignforces rather than enhance the prospects ofsuccess in a country as large, rural, andimpoverished as Afghanistan.

Myth #2: America’s Presence Prevents theRegion’s Implosion

Some analysts, including Carnegie Endow-ment senior associate Robert Kagan, insist thatwere the United States to evacuate Afghan-istan, the political and military vacuum left byour departure would lead to serious instabilitythroughout the region.19 But instability, in the

sense of a perpetually anarchic state of naturedominated by tribal warlords and pervasivebloodshed, has characterized the region fordecades—even centuries. Thus, the claim thatAfghanistan would be destabilized if theUnited States were to decrease its presence ismisleading, since Afghanistan will be chroni-cally unstable regardless. Most Americans aresimply oblivious to the region’s history.

Numerous tribes along the border ofnorthwest Pakistan and southern and easternAfghanistan have a long history of war-mak-ing and rebellion, now erroneously branded as“Talibanism.”20 King’s College London profes-sor Christian Tripodi, an expert on Britishcolonial-era tribal policy, explains what Britishadministrators confronted when dealing withPashtun tribes along what is today the frontierbetween Afghanistan and Pakistan:

What the British refused to grasp wasthat tribal raiding and violence was notnecessarily a product of poverty or lackof opportunity. The tribes viewed raid-ing as honourable and possibly quitefun, an activity that was centuries old,rooted in their culture and one of thosethings that defined a man in a societythat placed a premium upon indepen-dence and aggression.21

Contrary to the claims that we should usethe U.S. military to stabilize the region andreduce the threat of terrorism, a 2008 study bythe RAND Corporation found that U.S. poli-cies emphasizing the use of force tend to createnew terrorists. In “How Terrorist Groups End:Lessons for Countering al Qai’da,” Seth Jonesand Martin Libicki argue that the U.S. military“should generally resist being drawn into com-bat operations in Muslim societies, since [aU.S. military] presence is likely to increase ter-rorist recruitment.”22

Some policymakers claim the war is worthwaging because terrorists flourish in failedstates. But that argument cannot account forterrorists who thrive in centralized statesthat have the sovereignty to reject externalinterference.23 That is one reason why mili-

6

The claim thatAfghanistan

would be destabilized if the

United Stateswere to decrease

its presence ismisleading;

Afghanistan willbe chronically

unstable regardless.

tants find sanctuary in neighboring, nuclear-armed Pakistan.

In this respect, and perhaps most impor-tant, is the belief that our presence in theregion helps Pakistan, when in fact the seem-ingly open-ended U.S. presence in Afghanistanrisks creating worse problems for Pakistan.Amassing troops in Afghanistan feeds the per-ception of a foreign occupation, spawningmore terrorist recruits for Pakistani militiasand thus placing undue stress on an alreadyweakened nation.

Christian Science Monitor correspondentAnand Gopal finds, “In late 2007, as many as27 groups merged to form an umbrella Talibanmovement, the Tehreek-e-Taliban, under guer-rilla leader Baitullah Mehsud.” He continues,“Three of the most powerful, once-feudingcommanders—Mr. Mehsud and Maulavi Naz-eer of South Waziristan and Hafiz GulBehadur of North Waziristan—formed analliance in response to US airstrikes.”24

America’s presence has already caused majorproblems for the government in Islamabad,which is deeply unpopular for many reasons,including its alignment with U.S. policies.25

There are also indications that it has raised ten-sions in Uzbekistan and other Central Asiancountries. For Islamic militants throughout theregion, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan—like the occupation of Iraq—is an increasinglypotent recruiting tool. Only by prolonging ourmilitary presence do we allow the Taliban,Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, theHaqqani network, and even Pakistani Talibanmilitants to reframe the conflict and their posi-tion within it as a legitimate defense against aforeign occupation. In this respect, policymak-ers should recognize that not everyone willingto resist U.S. intervention is necessarily an ene-my of the United States. Most importantly, wemust understand that not every Islamic funda-mentalist is a radical Islamist, let alone one whois hell-bent on launching a terrorist attackagainst the American homeland.

Myth #3: Withdrawal Would ErodeAmerica’s Global Status

Former national security adviser Henry

Kissinger, Council on Foreign Relations schol-ar Stephen Biddle, and many others, concedethat the war in Central Asia will be long,expensive, and risky, yet they claim it is ulti-mately worth waging because a withdrawalwould boost jihadism globally and makeAmerica look weak.26 But what we’ve investedin the Afghanistan mission could all fall apartwhether we withdraw tomorrow or 20 yearsfrom now. In fact, if leaving would makeAmerica look weak, trying to stay indefinitelywhile accomplishing little would appear evenworse. If the issue is preventing U.S. soldiersfrom having died in vain, pursuing a losingstrategy would not vindicate their sacrifice.And trying to pacify all of Afghanistan, muchless hoping to do so on a permanent basis, is alosing strategy.

Regardless, some people invoke memories ofAmerica’s ignominious withdrawals from Viet-nam, Somalia, and Lebanon to muster supportfor an open-ended commitment. President Bushin 2007 claimed that withdrawing from Vietnamemboldened today’s terrorists by compromisingU.S. credibility. “Here at home,” he said, “somecan argue our withdrawal from Vietnam carriedno price to American credibility, but the terroristssee things differently.”27 Michael Rubin of theAmerican Enterprise Institute agrees with thatreasoning, writing that “the 1983 withdrawalfrom Lebanon and the retreat from Somalia adecade later emboldened Islamists who saw theUnited States as a paper tiger.”28

When opinion leaders in Washington talkabout “lessons learned” from Vietnam, Somal-ia, Lebanon, and other conflicts, they typicallydraw the wrong lesson: not that Americashould avoid intervening in someone else’sdomestic dispute, but that America should nev-er give up after having intervened, no matterwhat the cost.29 But the longer we stay and themore money we spend, the more we’ll feel com-pelled to remain in the country to validate theinvestment. A similar self-imposed predica-ment plagued U.S. officials during the war inVietnam:

After 1968 it became increasingly clearthat the survival of the [government of

7

If leaving wouldmake Americalook weak, trying to stayindefinitely whileaccomplishing little wouldappear evenworse.

South Vietnam] was not worth the costof securing it, but by then the UnitedStates had another rationale for stay-ing—prestige and precedent setting.The United States said the [SouthVietnamese government] would stand,and even those in the administrationnow long convinced of the hollownessof the domino argument could agreethat a U.S. failure in South Vietnammight endanger vital US nationalinterests elsewhere or in the future.30

For decades, the fear of America losing theworld’s respect after withdrawing from a con-flict has been instrumental in selling theAmerican public bad foreign policy.

Perhaps most troubling about the reflexively“stay the course” mentality of some Americans isthe widespread insensitivity about the thou-sands of people—civilian and military, domesticand foreign—killed, maimed, and traumatizedin war. But when the stakes seem unrelated tovital national interests, the American publicrightly resents their country’s interference inthird party problems, and is extremely skepticalof nation building. History shows that, sooneror later, disenchantment will manifest in publicand congressional opposition. After nearly adecade in Afghanistan, even the memory of 9/11might not be sufficient to outweigh the sacrificein blood and treasure.

Perhaps the most important argumentagainst the “withdrawal is weak-kneed” memeis that America’s military roams the planet,controls the skies and space, faces no peercompetitor, and wields one of the planet’slargest nuclear arsenals. America is responsiblefor almost half of the world’s military spend-ing and can project its power around theglobe. Thus, the contention that Americawould appear “weak” after withdrawing fromAfghanistan is ludicrous.

Unfortunately, bureaucratic inertia and amisplaced conception of Washington’s moralobligations (an argument that more oftenthan not legitimizes America’s military occu-pation of a foreign people) threaten to trap theUnited States in Afghanistan for decades.

Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is morelikely to tarnish America’s reputation andundermine U.S. security than would with-drawal.

Myth #4: America Can Build a Modern,Stable Afghanistan

After nearly eight years, the pledge torebuild Afghanistan made at the BonnConference is no closer to being fulfilled. Nor isthe 2001 pledge “to withdraw all military unitsfrom Kabul and other urban centers or otherareas in which the UN- mandated force isdeployed.”31 Indeed, Marin Strmecki, a policycoordinator and special adviser on Afghani-stan from 2003 to 2005 for the Office of theSecretary of Defense, has urged the Obamaadministration to remain in the region untilAfghans “establish an effective and representa-tive government.”32 Scholars at the Center forAmerican Progress insist America must “builda national representative government that isable to govern, defend, and sustain itself.”33

Scholars and officials who believe that arepresentative government in Afghanistanought to be a central goal of U.S. policy haveyet to reconcile the imbalance between whatAfghanistan is—a complex tapestry of tradi-tional tribal structures—and what we want itto be—a stable, modern nation-state governedcentrally from Kabul. Accepting the argumentthat America must build a nationally repre-sentative government means that defeatingthe spreading Islamist insurgency will dependon the coalition’s commitment to increase theAfghan government’s ability to improve secu-rity, deliver basic services, and expand develop-ment for economic opportunity. Before com-mitting further to such an ambitious project,U.S. policymakers need to grasp the depths ofthe problems at hand.

Whereas the U.S. occupation has broughtmajor improvements in Afghan education andhealth care, creating a functioning economyand building infrastructure will take years—ordecades. About 70 percent of Afghans live onless than two dollars per day. Life expectancyruns between 42.5 and 44 years. Every 28 min-utes, a woman dies during childbirth, and one

8

For decades, thefear of America

losing the world’srespect after with-

drawing from aconflict has been

instrumental inselling the

American publicbad foreign

policy.

in four children will die before their fifth birth-day. Only 51 percent of Afghan men over theage of 15, and a mere 21 percent of women inthe same age group, can read and write.34

In addition to overcoming the structuralobstacles posed by Afghanistan’s poor eco-nomic development, the United States hastried to assist the growth of the rule of law.35

Inevitably, however, such attempts face stiffresistance. One glaring example is women’srights. Some Afghan experts, such as lawyerand entrepreneur Mariam Nawabi, recognizethat fully implementing women’s rights willtake years of cultural change and education.36

In 2003 Nawabi provided recommendationsto the country’s Constitutional Review Com-mission, which the Gender and Law WorkingGroup used in advocating the inclusion of aclause in the Afghan constitution to provideequality for men and women.

Such changes will be tough, consideringthe strictness of some social codes. For exam-ple, in March 2009, the manager of anAfghan television station was arrested forbroadcasting a woman’s bare arms. Manytelevision stations either cut or blur imagesof women that show more than their faces ornecks, so as not to violate government lawprohibiting media content not “within theframework of Islam.”37

In April 2009, Afghanistan’s parliamentpassed a bill that stripped Shia women of theright to leave their homes without permis-sion and sanctioned rape within marriage.The law rekindled memories of the country’sSunni fundamentalist government under theTaliban, in which girls were not allowed toattend school, women were not allowed toleave their homes unless escorted by a malerelative, and women who did leave theirhomes were required to wear a burqa, whichcovers a woman from head to toe.38 PresidentHamid Karzai later diluted the law after itattracted domestic and international con-demnation, but its passage indicates just howout of touch are America’s goals for rule oflaw and social liberalization in Afghanistan.

Sippi Azarbaijani-Maghaddam, who hasworked in Afghanistan for 13 years, finds

that despite laws prohibiting discriminationagainst women, many practices are appliedon the basis of rigid, one-sided, and patriar-chal notions of honor and female integrity.She argues the Afghan government can facil-itate the advance of women held back byoppression, but it must “perform a balancingact to avoid a backlash from conservative ele-ments at home.”39

U.S. and NATO officials can assist socialand cultural advancements when possible, butinitiatives should be undertaken with Afghansin the lead, as some will fiercely resist socialchanges if they perceive Westerners as forciblyliberalizing their culture.

The broader goal of long-term develop-ment and governance assistance is a Sisypheantask. Indeed, rather than rebuilding, theUnited States and NATO would be buildingmuch of the country from scratch, such aserecting infrastructure and tailoring a judicialsystem to make it both “modern” and com-patible with local customs. Moreover, the U.S.-led coalition would be undertaking such amonumental enterprise in a country awashwith weapons, notoriously suspicious of out-siders, and largely absent of central authority.That is an impossible mission. It’s critical thatU.S. policymakers narrow their objectives todisrupting those forces responsible for the9/11 attacks. The United States should notdrift further into a utopian nation-buildingoperation. Indeed, America has already sunktoo far into that morass.

Myth #5: Understanding Afghanistan’sTribes Will Lead to Success

During the Bush administration, theUnited States failed to identify the Afghantribes, leaders, and individuals who could haveassisted in bringing stability to the country.40

Consequently, coalition forces were unable torecruit local allies in their fight against theTaliban in the south, and the Haqqani networkand Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e IslamiGulbuddin groups in the east. That lack ofattention to tribal policies has drawn justifi-able criticism. Thomas Johnson, research pro-fessor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School,

9

The goal of long-term development andgovernance assistance is aSisyphean task.Indeed, ratherthan rebuilding,the United Stateswould be building much of the countryfrom scratch.

wrote in 2008, “We must understand thehuman terrain. We have to turn every soldierinto an ethnic-linguistic warrior. . . . Knowingthe culture, the cultural terrain and at leastsome language is critically important to suc-cess.” Johnson continued, “We have to under-stand and exploit the fissures between the dif-ferent insurgency groups.”41

The United States is only now beginning todevote more resources to learning the alle-giances of various tribes. This is important, astribal identity and other linkages of kinship(qawm) influence Afghan politics. But merelyincreasing our knowledge of tribal politics,while useful, will not guarantee success.Afghans have repelled foreign invaders for cen-turies. Tinkering with foreign people throughsuch social engineering schemes and presum-ing we can simply learn what groups can be“peeled off” from militants may prove unsuc-cessful, regardless of how well-intentioned.Not only do good intentions not ensure suc-cess, but even the most effective training andplanning does not necessarily mean we willreach the ends we seek or yield the outcomeswe want.

In a country like Afghanistan, where reli-gious, ethnic, and political loyalties are con-stantly shifting, a pledge of support to theAfghan government from a leader or clear fac-tion might be transitory. A village can be “pro-NATO” one day and “pro-Taliban” the next.42

Stability operations expert Nick Dowling, whokeeps a web-log of his adventures in Af-ghanistan at Small Wars Journal, illustrates thestruggle coalition soldiers have in engaginglocals in Kunar, one of Afghanistan’s 34provinces:

In small wars, we talk of human terrainas well as geographic terrain. In bothsenses, Kunar has some of the roughest,most inaccessible terrain in the world.Deeply isolated, xenophobic, indepen-dent tribes occupy steep northern val-leys of Gaziabad, Pech, and Korengalwith no roads in or out. Tribal conflictand smuggling interests incite violenceand well-established collaboration with

the Taliban. Attacks on [U.S.] forces area daily threat, including major coordi-nated operations.”43

Many tribes living in rural, isolated, andsparsely populated provinces have little inter-est cooperating with “foreigners,” a relativeterm considering the limited contact manyhave with their country’s own central govern-ment.

Afghanistan’s political and tribal rivalriesare incredibly complex and growing more so.The country’s estimated 33 million people hailfrom more than 20 diverse ethnic groups,including Uzbek, Tajik, Baluch/Baloch, Turk-man, Pashai, Nuristani, and others. Many ofthese groups have different tribal policies. Theyalso adhere to different religious traditions.Most Afghans are Sunni, but some, like theHazara, are Shia. Despite its diverse makeup,Afghanistan is most commonly associatedwith its largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns.Even this group is fragmented; there are morethan 50 tribes within the Pashtun ethnicgroup, including Ghilzai, Durrani, Wazirs,Afridis, and dozens more living in southernand eastern Afghanistan and along the borderin northwest Pakistan.44 Each Pashtun tribedivides into sub-tribes or clans (khels); there isestimated to be 30 clans in the Mehsud tribealone.45 Each clan then divides into sectionsthat split into extended families.

To win Afghan hearts and minds, theUnited States and the Afghan government notonly have to compete with the Taliban’s shad-ow government, but also contend with theamalgamation of mullahs and warlords, suchas Karim Khalili, Abdul Rashid Dostum, HajiAbdul Quadir, and others who have usurpedthe power of indigenous tribal chiefs. The issueof tribal and political rivalries has plagued theregion for centuries. As David B. Edwards, pro-fessor of Social Sciences at Williams College,writes in Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on theAfghan Frontier, “Afghanistan’s central problem[is] Afghanistan itself, specifically certain pro-found moral contradictions that have inhibit-ed this country from forging a coherent civilsociety.” Edwards continues, “These contradic-

10

Many tribes livingin rural, isolated,

and sparsely populated

provinces have little interest

cooperating with“foreigners.”

tions are deeply rooted in Afghan culture, butthey have come to the fore in the last one hun-dred years, since the advent of the nation-state,the laying down of permanent borders, and theattempt to establish an extensive state bureau-cracy and to invest that bureaucracy with nov-el forms of authority and control.”46

For the United States and its allies to navi-gate such complex tribal rivalries is an extremelydaunting task. For example, Durrani Pashtunshave traditionally served as Afghanistan’s politi-cal elite. President Karzai himself emerged fromthe Popalzai clan of the Durrani confederation.Many Ghilzai Pashtuns in the country’s east,unlike their Durrani counterparts, tend to berural, less well educated, and were the main footsoldiers of the Taliban. The Karzai governmentalienates some historically marginalized Dur-rani clans as well as some Ghilzai clans in theeast, which today have only token representa-tion in the Afghan government.47 The relation-ship between tribes and Afghanistan’s centralgovernment will continue to be tenuous.

Then there is the issue of what to do aboutthe Taliban. Tribal identity and governmentfavoritism aside, U.S. officials confirm thatthe White House and senior-level militaryofficials have actively considered taking partin talks with the Taliban, the rulers of mostof Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001.48

Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace Senior Associate Ashley Tellis argues thattalks with the Taliban might work, but con-cludes that the timing isn’t right. He argues thatthe United States and NATO must first scoredecisive victories on the battlefield, because rec-onciliation can only come about “through acoalition political-military victory that dimin-ishes the rewards for continued resistance.”49

Tellis has a compelling point, but as anaside, the debate over whether the UnitedStates and NATO should engage the Talibanrests on a false premise: external actors oftenundermine the legitimacy of the host govern-ment when they insist on having a say aboutwhich tribes, groups, leaders, and individualsthe host government engages. U.S. policy-makers should not decide for the Afghangovernment whom to incorporate into a for-

mal power-sharing deal or otherwise try tomicromanage the country’s internal politicalsystem, as Washington did on the nationallevel during Afghanistan’s 2004 presidentialelection. At the time, U.S. officials pressureda number of prominent candidates to dropout of the race to ensure Karzai’s victory.50

In any case, the Afghan government hasbeen trying to engage militants since February2004. The Program Takhim-e-Solhl, an initia-tive aimed at reconciling foot soldiers of theTaliban with the Afghan government, has thusfar convinced 2,000 rank-and-file insurgents topledge support to the Afghan state, out of anestimated pool of between 10,000 and 18,000Taliban fighters.51

Although the approach to gradually prythe loyalties of indigenous people away fromextremists is intended to weaken the Taliban’sability to exploit tribal rivalries, a better under-standing of tribes and warlords does not meanthat Washington will achieve its broader goals.

Myth #6: Anti-Drug Efforts Are Essentialto the Afghan Mission

Officials in both the Bush and Obamaadministrations have argued that weakeningthe drug trade is essential to the success ofthe broader mission to defeat al Qaeda andthe Taliban. Indeed, they argue that the con-tinued vigor of the drug trade poses a lethalthreat to Afghanistan’s entire economic andpolitical structure.

U.S. officials continue to stress that point.The U.S. State Department’s most recent Inter-national Narcotics Control Strategy Report con-tends that “Afghanistan’s narcotics industrycontinues to threaten efforts to establish secu-rity, governance, and a licit economy through-out the country.”52 Nongovernmental expertsand pundits make similar arguments. In Sep-tember 2006, Thomas Donnelly, at the time ascholar at the Center for Strategic and Inter-national Studies, asserted that the drug tradeis “a threat to the writ of the central govern-ment. I think that’s really the key.”53

The Extent of Drug-Related CorruptionIn addition to the general problem of cor-

11

U.S. policymakersshould not decidefor the Afghangovernmentwhom to incorporate intoa formal power-sharing deal.

ruption caused by drug money, U.S. officialsare deeply concerned about the opium tradeproviding a lucrative source of revenue for theTaliban, al Qaeda, and other enemies of theU.S.-backed government. The U.S. State De-partment concludes: “Taliban and other anti-government forces have extorted $50 millionto $70 million in protection payments fromopium farmers and an additional $200 to$400 million of income in forced levies on themore lucrative drug processing and traffickingin 2008.”54 Heritage Foundation analysts LisaCurtis and James Phillips in their October2007 report, “Revitalizing U.S. Efforts inAfghanistan,” argue that “Opium . . . fuels theTaliban’s drive for power, as well as the activi-ties of other insurgent groups and warlordsopposed to the government.” Therefore, theyconclude, U.S. forces “must do more to dis-rupt the narcotics trade.”55

There is little doubt that anti-governmentforces profit from the drug trade, although anAugust 2009 Senate Foreign Relations Com-mittee report concluded that the funds flowingto the Taliban were probably much lower—only$70 million to $125 million—than the $300 to$400 million estimated by the State Depart-ment and the United Nations. Moreover, thereport states: “Surprisingly, there is no evidencethat any significant amount of the drug pro-ceeds go to al Qaeda.”56 In any case, the UnitedStates faces a serious dilemma if it conducts avigorous drug eradication campaign in Af-ghanistan in an effort to dry up the funds flow-ing to the Taliban and other anti-governmentelements. Those are clearly not the only factionsinvolved in drug trafficking. Karzai’s politicalallies are also heavily engaged in such activi-ties.57 There are allegations that the president’sbrother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, is linked to drug-trafficking operations.58 The State Departmentnotes tersely: “Many Afghan government offi-cials are believed to profit from the drug trade.Narcotics-related corruption is particularly per-vasive at the provincial and district levels of gov-ernment.”59

In his investigative series on drug traffick-ing in Afghanistan, McClatchy correspondentTom Lasseter notes how government officials

enjoy a lavish lifestyle. “Locals call them ‘pop-py palaces,’ the three- or four-story marblehomes with fake Roman columns perchedbehind razor wire and guard shacks in Af-ghanistan’s capital. Most are owned by Afghanofficials or people connected to them, menwho make a few hundred dollars a month asgovernment employees, but are driven aroundin small convoys of armored SUVs that costtens of thousands of dollars.”60

Equal opportunity corruption is certainlyevident in Kandahar province. At harvest time,Taliban fighters pull up on their motorbikesto collect a 10 percent tax on the opium cropfrom each farmer. At roughly the same time inthe season, Afghan police arrive in U.S.-sup-plied pickup trucks to demand a percentage ofthe income from the crop in exchange forassurances that they will skip the farms duringannual eradication drives.61

Many politically well-connected warlordscontrol the drug trade in their respectiveregions. They use the revenues from that tradeto pay the militias that keep them in power intheir fiefdoms and give them national politicalclout. Some of these individuals backed theTaliban when that faction was in power,switching sides only when the United Stateslaunched its military offensive in Afghanistanin October 2001. There is a serious risk that ananti-drug crusade might cause them to changetheir allegiance yet again. The resistance ofregional leaders to anti-drug campaigns isvehement and pervasive. A January 2009 UNreport notes: “Although the Government andinternational stakeholders remain committedto eradication, no Governor-led eradicationhad been initiated in any part of the coun-try.”62

In addition to the cooperative warlords, theU.S.-led coalition relies on poppy growers asspies for information on movements ofTaliban and al Qaeda units. A disruption ofthe opium crop could alienate those crucialsources of information. Brookings Institutionscholar Vanda Felbab-Brown notes the “sub-stantially decreased willingness of the popula-tion to provide intelligence on the Taliban toNATO and the Afghan National Army” be-

12

A Senate ForeignRelations

Committee reportconcluded, “Thereis no evidence that

any significantamount of the

drug proceeds goto al Qaeda.”

cause of eradication efforts. Although thethreat of Taliban reprisals is a factor in thegrowing unwillingness to give information,“the alienation of the population throughcounter-narcotics strategies further hampersintelligence-gathering.”63

The Importance of the Drug Trade toAfghanistan’s Economy

Afghanistan is the world’s largest source–byfar–for opium, the raw ingredient for heroin. Itnow provides more than 90 percent of the glob-al opium supply. The United Nations concludesthe U.S.-led coalition’s opium poppy eradicationefforts have “failed to prevent a steady growth ofopium/heroin output and exports, have alienat-ed some Afghans without winning their sup-port, and have shifted growing pattern to thesouth where drugs have become a major sourceof income to the Taliban.”64

According to the UN, the number of Af-ghan families involved in opium poppy culti-vation reached an estimated 509,000 in 2007.Although that number supposedly declined to366,500 in 2008 (returning to the more “nor-mal” levels of 2005 and 2006), that stillamounts to more than 2.4 million people (6.5members per household) or 10.3 percent ofAfghanistan’s population.65

Given the role of extended families andclans in Afghan society, the number of peopleaffected is much greater than that. Indeed, it islikely that at least 30 percent of the populationis involved directly or indirectly in the drugtrade. For many of those people, opium poppycrops and other aspects of drug commercemake the difference between modest prosperi-ty (by Afghan standards) and destitution. Eventhe UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime concedesthat farmers have the highest incomes inprovinces where the cultivation of opium isthe most prevalent.66 Those farmers do notlook kindly on efforts to destroy their liveli-hood. Ekaterina Stepenova, a senior analyst atthe Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute who has studied drug economies inconflict zones in Afghanistan and other coun-tries, observes: “The most counterproductivething you can do is start an eradication cam-

paign, because it pushes the peasants furtherto support the Taliban.”67

A New Way Forward

In the long-term, the militancy centeredalong the Afghanistan-Pakistan border can bemanaged and to some extent contained withlow-key, limited U.S. assistance. Consequently,the United States should withdraw most of itsforces from Afghanistan within the next 12 to18 months. In the interim, Washington mustnarrow its military objectives in Afghanistanin three critical ways:

1. At a fairly low cost, the United Statescan provide trainers and advisers forAfghan security forces, but training isunlikely to create a self-sustaining armyor police force that can secure the coun-try anytime in the near future.

2. The United States should sustain intelli-gence operations in the region, throughaerial surveillance, covert operations, andongoing intelligence-sharing with theAfghan and Pakistani governments. U.S.policymakers should seek cordial rela-tions with all of Afghanistan’s neighbors,particularly Russia and Iran, as each hasthe means to significantly undermineprogress in the country, and conversely,has the ability to facilitate progress.

3. The United States should abandon itsbroad opium eradication policy andinstead only target drug cartels affiliatedwith insurgents. Above all, U.S.-NATOforces must not harass poor local farmerswho cultivate opium poppies. Targetingthe latter alienates a significant portionof the rural population, thereby benefit-ing insurgents and undermining ourstrategic objectives.

Recommendation #1: Work withAfghanistan’s Security Forces, but BeRealistic about Their Potential

In March 2009, President Obama commit-ted 4,000 U.S. trainers to Afghanistan, while

13

For manyAfghans, opiumpoppy crops andother aspects ofdrug commercemake the differencebetween modestprosperity (by Afghan standards) anddestitution.

NATO pledged an additional 5,000 militarytrainers and police.68 At that time, the AfghanNational Army (ANA) had about 82,000 sol-diers, a number scheduled to grow to 134,000by the end of 2011.69 The Afghan NationalPolice (ANP) stands between 85,000 and90,000;70 it currently covers 365 districts, 46city police precincts, and has a presence in all34 provinces.71

But numbers tell only part of the story. The Focused District Development pro-

gram (FDD) is a district-by-district trainingregimen for police units. The FDD is directedby the Combined Security Transition Com-mand Afghanistan, a joint service organizationunder the command and control of U.S.Central Command that is responsible forequipping and training Afghan security forces.Since it began in October 2007, a mere 52 of365 police districts have successfully complet-ed the program, despite training camps operat-ing at maximum capacity.72 The concept ofproper police procedures and respect for therights of citizens remains underdeveloped.“The first time they heard that they weren’tsupposed to beat people, and they weren’t sup-posed to take their money, (but) that they weresupposed to enforce laws and that their job wasto protect the people, most police were sur-prised,” said Army Col. Michael J. McMahon,the FDD’s director.73

According to Karen Hall, Police Programmanager in the Bureau of InternationalNarcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs at theU.S. Department of State, 75 percent of theAfghan National Police are illiterate, which pre-vents many officers from filling out arrestreports, equipment and supply requests, andarguing before a judge or prosecutor.74 “Paper-work, evidence, processing—they don’t knowhow to do it,” says Marine 1st Lt. Justin Greico.“You can’t get a policeman to take a statementif he can’t read and write.”75

Andrew Legon, research analyst for theU.K.-based Royal United Services Institute, de-scribes the ANP thus: “Bribes determine every-thing from recruitment to assignments andpromotion prospects. Payoffs are extracted notonly from criminals, drug runners and Taliban,

but also the general public, shopkeepers, andeven the victims of crime whom the ANP aremeant to be protecting. . . . Little wonder thatwidespread sentiment views the ANP as thievesin official uniform.”76

In some areas, ANP members apparentlykidnap and rape pre-teen children. Because ofthis practice, known as “bacha bazi,” localssometimes welcome the Taliban as liberators.Mohammad Gul, an elder in the village ofPankela, says, “If the boys were out in the fields,the police would come and rape them . . . Youcan go to any police base and you will see theseboys. They hold them until they are finishedwith them and then let the child go.”77

The performance and training of the Af-ghan National Army has been a bit better thanthat of police recruits; however, that’s not say-ing much. For example, command and controlstill remains weak, and operations involvingmore than 100 troops cannot operate indepen-dently of coalition forces.78

During Operation Strike of the Sword, theoffensive launched in July 2009, 650 Afghantroops deployed alongside 4,000 U.S. troops toclear Taliban fighters from the lower HelmandRiver valley. ANA personnel are certainly gain-ing valuable experience and have alreadydemonstrated some operational capacity. TheANA led 62 percent of operations in springand summer 2008, compared to 45 percent in2007.79 As of March 2009, 59 out of 95 ANAunits were capable of carrying out indepen-dent operations.80

Afghan Defense minister Abdul RahimWardak wants to increase the total number ofpolice officers, commandos, and border guardsto 400,000. Maintaining a force that largewould cost from $10 billion to $20 billion overthe next six or seven years. But for 2008, Af-ghanistan’s annual revenue was a mere $600million. U.S. officials have yet to address thatgargantuan funding problem. According toRory Stewart, Chief Executive of TurquoiseMountain Institute, a nongovernmental orga-nization based in Kabul, an Afghan securityforce of over 400,000 would cost $2 billion to$3 billion a year, which would force Af-ghanistan to spend 500 per cent of its budget.

14

Seventy-five percent of the

Afghan NationalPolice are illiterate.

That means the United States would be calledupon to spend many billions of dollars to beAfghanistan’s perpetual crutch.

But all of the money in the world, and eventhe best training, can never eliminate corrup-tion or timidity. Moreover, judging from pre-vious campaigns, we have little reason toassume that our training will produce compe-tent Afghan soldiers, much less an entire self-sustaining army. In some cases, sustained peri-ods of foreign-led training actually hinder thehost nation’s self-sufficiency. Thus, training isnot a panacea. It will neither rid the securityforces of corruption nor ensure that soldiersand police units operate harmoniously acrosstribal and ethnic lines.

Continuing training is not incredibly cost-ly to the United States, but that assistanceshould support, rather than supplant, indige-nous security. By dispatching more foreigntroops, the United States and NATO maydecrease the Afghan government’s incentivesto act responsibly, undermine its credibility,and discourage indigenous Afghan securityinitiatives.81 Going forward, training shouldbe tied to clear metrics, such as whether Af-ghans can operate independent of coalitionforces and can take the lead in operationsagainst insurgents. If such benchmarks arenot achieved within a reasonable timeframe,Washington should cut its losses and ceasefurther assistance.

Recommendation #2: Exploit IntelligenceAssets and Relations in the Region

The anti-Soviet jihad supported by theUnited States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan lat-er gave way to a grisly civil war among rival fac-tions of the Afghan mujahedeen. After Sovietforces withdrew from the region, America’sonly intelligence asset was a CIA station inIslamabad, and even there the United Statesdid not have Afghanistan on the official list ofintelligence-gathering priorities. Throughoutthe 1990s, Central Asia witnessed the growthof Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistanand, later, the advance of a Taliban govern-ment that would one day provide shelter to alQaeda, the organization directly responsible

for 9/11. Without intelligence assets on theground and monitoring overhead, the UnitedStates had no way to grasp the rising threat ofIslamist radicalism until it was too late.

Today, the United States has no broadinterests in the region justifying a large strate-gic footprint, but it does have a strong interestin gathering intelligence on militants whocould one day pose a threat to the UnitedStates.

Since 9/11, America’s capture of manyhigh-level al Qaeda operatives have stemmedfrom intelligence-collection, sharing, and co-operation with foreign governments. AlQaeda—a loose, decentralized network withcells around the world—will not be defeated byamassing thousands of troops in Afghanistan.David Heathcoat-Amory, a conservative mem-ber of the British Parliament, highlighted thecounterproductive nature of a heavy-footedpresence. He offered this well-reasoned cri-tique of the assertion that American andEuropean forces must remain in the region:

Does not the whole strategy supposethat there is something unique aboutAfghanistan? We know that the 9/11attacks were planned in plenty of othercountries, including some in Europe.Can we examine a little more carefullythe idea that if we succeed in Afghan-istan, that will make us more secure?That argument falls if the terrorists canmove to other bases, unless we are pre-pared to invade every country that mightharbour terrorism.82

Regrettably, by doubling down on the num-ber of U.S. troops in Afghanistan, the UnitedStates is giving al Qaeda leaders exactly whatthey want: America remains mired in a pro-tracted guerilla war, and U.S. tactics kill andalienate noncombatants, thereby facilitatingterrorist recruitment.

A smarter strategy would continue the CIAand the FBI’s close cooperation with foreignlaw enforcement and intelligence agencies.Such close cooperation with foreign govern-ments may be unglamorous, but it netted key

15

Training will neither rid thesecurity forces ofcorruption norensure that soldiers andpolice units operate harmoniouslyacross tribal andethnic lines.

al Qaeda operatives, including Khalid SheikMohammed, the principal architect of 9/11,and Ramzi bin al Shibh, the main communi-cations and support interface between the9/11 operatives and the al Qaeda leadership.Such old-fashioned police and spy workwould likely score future successes against keymembers of al Qaeda. Moreover, retainingpatrols by unmanned aerial vehicles andcovert operations against specific targets willensure that Osama bin Laden does not marchopenly through the streets of Kabul.

Additionally, regional stakeholders, espe-cially Russia and Iran, have an interest in a sta-ble Afghanistan. Both countries possess thecapacity to facilitate development in the coun-try and may even be willing to assist Westernforces. In July, leaders in Moscow allowed theUnited States to use Russian airspace to trans-port troops and lethal military equipmentinto Afghanistan. Yet another relevant region-al player is the Collective Security TreatyOrganization, made up of Russia, Kazakhstan,Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia,and Belarus. At the moment, CSTO appearsamenable to forging a security partnershipwith NATO. CSTO secretary general NikolaiBordyuzha told journalists in March 2009 ofhis bloc’s intention to cooperate. “The unitedposition of the CSTO is that we should giveevery kind of aid to the anti-terror coalitionoperating in Afghanistan. . . . The interests ofNATO and the CSTO countries regardingAfghanistan conform unequivocally.”83

Mutual interests between Western forcesand Afghanistan’s surrounding neighbors canconverge on issues of transnational terrorism,the Caspian and Central Asia region’s abun-dant energy resources, cross-border organizedcrime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced co-operation alone will not stabilize Afghanistan,but engaging stakeholders may lead to tighterregional security.

Recommendation #3: Adopt a SensibleDrug Policy

The United States must tailor a moresophisticated approach to the drug war, asattempts to wage a war against Afghanistan’s

involvement in the illegal drug trade impedethe mission to combat al Qaeda and its allies.84

U.S. Special Envoy for South Asia RichardHolbrooke admits that through our drug erad-ication efforts, “We are recruiting the Talibanwith our tax dollars.”85

Given the country’s economic and socialrealities, a comprehensive drug eradicationcampaign is an unrealistic and dangerousobjective. Efforts to eradicate poppy cropshave driven poor farmers into the arms of theTaliban.

U.S. and NATO military leaders have longrecognized that danger.86 Yet pressure frompoliticians and civilian drug warriors is makingit difficult for the military to continue thatwise restraint. In early 2009, NATO supremecommander General John Craddock respond-ed to political and diplomatic pressure by cir-culating a draft order to “attack directly drugproducers and facilities throughout Afghani-stan.” Commanders on the ground in Afghan-istan, however, quietly warned Craddock aboutthe dangers that such a dramatic escalation ofanti-drug efforts would pose to the overallcounter-insurgency mission. Craddock thenbacktracked and toned down his edict.87 Theresult is that NATO forces, while officiallycommitted to cracking down on the narcoticstrade, are still reluctant to fully satisfy theobjectives of zealous civilian officials regardingthat issue.

Under pressure from Washington, PresidentKarzai called on the Afghan people to wage waragainst narcotics with the same determinationand ferocity that they resisted the Soviet occu-pation in the 1980s.88 That is both unrealisticand dangerous. On the ground, Afghan-lederadication efforts should, at most, merely tar-get drug cartels affiliated with al Qaeda. TheObama administration’s recently announcedshift in drug policy, from eradication to inter-diction, is mildly encouraging.89

Too much U.S. pressure on the drug issuehas the potential to undermine anti-Islamistpolitical allies. That is especially true with croperadication schemes. If Afghan leaders contin-ue to cave in to U.S./NATO pressure on thedrug issue, they risk becoming entangled in a

16

Retainingunmanned aerial

vehicles andcovert operations

against specifictargets will ensure

that Osama binLaden does not

march openlythrough the

streets of Kabul.

needless war with a significant portion of theirown population.90 In fact, supporters of thedrug trade are already striking back withgreater frequency. An onslaught of attacks in2008 left dozens of counter-narcotics policedead and caused poppy eradication teams tobeat a hasty retreat. More recent efforts haverelied on NATO and Afghan army units tosupport the poppy police.91

An emphasis on counter-narcotics mea-sures is a worrisome mistake. Taliban and alQaeda forces are showing an alarmingstrength, especially in the southern part of thecountry. If zealous American drug warriorsalienate hundreds of thousands of Afghanfarmers, an already bad situation could be-come considerably worse.

U.S. officials need to keep their prioritiesstraight. The United States’ mortal enemy is alQaeda and its allies. The drug war is a danger-ous distraction in the campaign to defeatthose forces. Recognizing that security consid-erations sometimes trump other objectiveswould hardly be an unprecedented move byWashington. U.S. agencies quietly ignored thedrug trafficking activities of anti-communistfactions in Central America during the 1980swhen the primary goal was to keep thosecountries out of the Soviet orbit.92 In the early1990s, the United States also eased its pressureon Peru’s government regarding the drugeradication issue when President AlbertoFujimori concluded that a higher priority hadto be given to winning coca farmers away fromthe Maoist Shining Path guerrilla move-ment.93

U.S. officials should adopt a similar prag-matic policy in Afghanistan and not becomethe enemy of Afghan farmers whose liveli-hood depends on opium poppy cultivation.True, some funds from the drug trade willfind their way into the coffers of the Talibanand al Qaeda. That is an inevitable side effectof a global prohibitionist policy that createssuch an enormous profit from illegal drugs.But alienating pro-Western Afghan factionsin an effort to disrupt the flow of revenue tothe Islamic radicals is too high a price to pay.Washington should avoid putting pressure

on the Afghan government to pursue croperadication programs and undermine theeconomic well-being of its own population.U.S. leaders also should refrain from tryingto make U.S. soldiers into anti-drug cru-saders; soldiers have a difficult enough jobfighting their terrorist adversaries in Afghan-istan. Even those policymakers who opposeending the war on drugs as a general matterought to recognize that, in this case, the waragainst al Qaeda—not drugs—must take pri-ority.

Conclusion

Washington needs to “define successdown” with respect to its objectives in Af-ghanistan.94 Foreign policy, like domestic pol-itics, is the art of the attainable. The U.S.-NATO coalition can carry out the focusedand limited mission of training Afghan secu-rity forces, but even the best training mightnot produce a fully functioning and indepen-dent army or police force. Additionally, intel-ligence-collection in the region should con-tinue, so as not to repeat the mistakes madeprior to 9/11. And finally, as long as U.S. andNATO troops remain in the region, theyshould adopt a pragmatic approach to drugpolicy by not alienating Afghan farmers andnon-Islamist power brokers.

The United States should begin a promptwithdrawal of most of its military forces fromAfghanistan. Denying a sanctuary to terroriststhat seek to attack the United States does notrequire Washington to pacify the entire coun-try or sustain a large, long-term military pres-ence in Central Asia. The region holds littleintrinsic strategic value to the United States,and America’s security will not be endangeredeven if U.S. forces cannot achieve a knockoutblow against al Qaeda. America’s objectiveshould be to neutralize the parties responsiblefor the atrocities committed on 9/11. TheUnited States should not go beyond that objec-tive by combating a localized insurgency ordrifting into an open-ended occupation andnation-building effort.

17

Washingtonneeds to “definesuccess down”with respect to itsobjectives inAfghanistan.

Notes1. “International Security Assistance Force andAfghan National Army Strength and Laydown,”NATO Headquarters Media Operations Centre—Afghanistan, July 2009, http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf. The military’s pop-ulation-centric counterinsurgency doctrine sug-gests 20 to 25 troops per 1,000 indigenous people.For Afghanistan, that would bring foreign trooplevels to well above 650,000. Given the substantial-ly fewer number of troops able to be deployed, inthe years ahead, if the mission is not succeeding,people who support an open-ended presence willcry “surge,” “if only,” and “not enough.” However,the shortage of troops is not an argument for moretroops, but for not injecting U.S. troops intounwinnable, unnecessary, asymmetric wars.

2. According to the field manual, “The cornerstoneof any [counterinsurgency] effort is establishingsecurity for the civilian populace.” See The U.S.Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp.1–3.

3. “Progress toward Security and Stability in Af-ghanistan,” Department of Defense, January 2009,http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf, p. 30.

4. Paul Avallone, “Next Stop: Afghanistan,” ArmyMagazine 58, no. 4 (April 2008): 63–70.

5. Julian E. Barnes, “In Afghanistan Conflict, Pen-tagon Considers Structural Changes,” Los AngelesTimes, May 8, 2009.

6. Colin Jackson and Austin Long, “The FifthService: The Rise of Special Operations Command,”in U.S. Military Innovation since the Cold War, ed.Harvey Sapolsky, Benjamin Friedman, and BrendanGreen (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2009).

7. Dana Priest and Ann Scott Tyson, “Bin LadenTrail ‘Stone Cold,’” Washington Post, September 10,2006. As commander of the Joint Special Opera-tions Command (JSOC), McChrystal was giventhe authority to “follow the target” even if thatmeans entering Pakistan, as long as the target isone of extreme value, such as Osama bin Laden orAyman al Zawahiri.

8. “White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group’sReport on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan andPakistan,” March 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Afghanistan-Pakistan_White_Paper.pdf.

9. “Transcript: President Obama, Part 2,” CBSNews, March, 20, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/

stories/2009/03/24/60minutes/main4890687.shtml.

10. “More Troops, Civilian Trainers to Head toAfghanistan under New Strategy,” NewsHour withJim Lehrer, March 27, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/asia/jan-june09/afghan_03-27.html.

11. Bruce Riedel, “Are We Losing Afghanistan?”The Daily Beast, July 5, 2009, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-07-05/are-we-losing-afghanistan/.

12. Frederick W. Kagan, “Planning Victory in Af-ghanistan: Nine Principles the Obama Admini-stration Should Follow,” National Review Online,February 9, 2009.

13. Christopher Drew, “Drones Are Weapons ofChoice in Fighting Qaeda,” New York Times, March16, 2009.

14. For more, see Lawrence Wright, The LoomingTower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York:Knopf, 2006), p. 278.

15. Meredith Buel, “NATO Entering New Stage inAfghanistan,” Voice of America News, June 25, 2009.

16. A new fear gripping Washington is al Qaeda’sfinancing and technical assistance to Pakistani Tali-ban groups. See Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt,“Shaky Pakistan Is Seen as Target of Qaeda Plot,”New York Times, May 10, 2009; and Joby Warrick andR. Jeffrey Smith, “Gains in Pakistan Fuel PentagonOptimism for Pursuing Al-Qaeda,” Washington Post,June 13, 2009.

17. Glenn L. Carle, “Overstating Our Fears,” Wash-ington Post, July, 13, 2008.

18. John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and theTerrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threatsand Why We Believe Them (New York: Simon &Schuster, 2006).

19. “Afghanistan: Internationalism vs. Isolation-ism,” Foreign Policy Initiative, March 31, 2009, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/event_trans.php.

20. Juan Cole, “Obama’s Domino Theory,” Salon,March 30, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2009/03/30/afghanistan/print.html.

21. Christian Tripodi, “Britain’s Strategy towardthe North-West Frontier, 1901–1945,” The Journalof Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (February 2008): 135.

22. Seth Jones and Martin Libicki, How TerroristGroups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida (Santa

18

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741-1.pdf, p. xvi.

23. For more on this subject, see Christopher Prebleand Justin Logan, “Failed States and Flawed Logic:The Case against a Standing Nation-BuildingOffice,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 560, Jan-uary 11, 2006.

24. Anand Gopal, “Briefing: Who Are the Tali-ban?” Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2009.

25. Another U.S. practice that has increased terror-ist recruitment in the region is the launching of airstrikes into northwest Pakistan. Air strikes aremeant to disrupt terrorist sanctuaries across theborder, but they also metastasize the pool ofPakistani Taliban and further destabilize Islama-bad’s secular civilian government. David Kilcullen,counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus,and Andrew Exum, an Army officer who served inIraq and Afghanistan from 2002 to 2004, argue,“Every one of these dead noncombatants repre-sents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge,and more recruits for a militant movement thathas grown exponentially even as drone strikes haveincreased.” “Death from Above, Outrage DownBelow,” New York Times, May 16, 2009.

26. Henry A. Kissinger, “A Strategy for Afghani-stan,” Washington Post, February 26, 2009; andStephen Biddle, “Is It Worth It? The Difficult Casefor War in Afghanistan,” The American Interest, July-August 2009.

27. “Bush Invokes ‘Tragedy of Vietnam’ againstIraq Pullout,” CNN.com, August 22, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/08/22/bush.iraq.speech/index.html.

28. Michael Rubin, review of Exiting Iraq: Why theU.S. Must End the Military Occupation and Renew theWar against al Qaeda, by Christopher Preble, MiddleEast Quarterly (Fall 2004), http://www.aei.org/article/21570.

29. The editorial board of the Wall Street Journalembraced this rationale in their eulogy of RobertMcNamara, July 9, 2009.

30. Ivan Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: ATheory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge UniversityPress, 2005), p. 151.

31. Agreement on Provisional Arrangements inAfghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Per-manent Government Institutions (“Bonn Agree-ment”) [Afghanistan], S/2001/1154, December 5,2001, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3f48f4754.html.

32. Marin Strmecki, Testimony before the SenateArmed Services Committee Hearing on StrategicOptions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, February26, 2009, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/February/Strmecki%2002-26-09.pdf.

33. Lawrence J. Korb et al., “Sustainable Security inAfghanistan: Crafting an Effective and ResponsibleStrategy for the Forgotten Front,” Center for Ameri-can Progress, March 29, 2009, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/sustainable_afghanistan.html.

34. For an analysis of poverty in Afghanistan, seeAfghanistan National Development Strategy, 2008–2013,Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, April 21, 2008,http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/strategy.html, p. 27. For more on poor economic development,see William Maley, Rescuing Afghanistan (Universityof New South Wales Press, 2007), p. 79. For esti-mates on average life expectancy, see Patrick Cock-burn, “How the West Lost Its Way in the East,” TheIndependent, March 27, 2009; and “The Cost of Warin Afghanistan,” American Friends Services Com-mittee, April 14, 2009. To read more about prob-lems of infant mortality, see Martin Patience, “TheStruggle to Save Afghan Mothers,” BBC, October 4,2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7646821.stm; and Fawad Sahil, “UNICEF and PartnersCome Together to Help Reduce Maternal Mortalityin Afghanistan,” United Nations Children’s Fund,April 2, 2007, www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_39281.html;” and “Afghanistan: Background,” www.unicef.org/infobycountry/afghanistan_background.html. For statistics on literacy, seeLydia Mihelic Pulsopher and Alex Pulsipher, WorldRegional Geography: Global Patterns, Local Lives, 4th ed.(New York: W. H. Freeman, 2007), p. 455.

35. The United States is committed to helpingAfghanistan’s “judicial systems function openlyand equitably and can be trusted to protect andserve the population as a whole.” Description onUSAJOBS of a “PRT Rule of Law Advisor (ASO).”

36. Katie Carter, “For Love of Afghanistan,” Arti-zan Sarai, April 2007, http://www.artizansarai.com/press_divine.htm.

37. Heidi Vogt and Amir Shah, “TV ManagerArrested over ‘Bare Limbs,” The Sydney MorningHerald, March 26, 2009, http://www.smh.com.au/world/tv-manager-arrested-for-showing-womens-bare-limbs-20090325-9ahm.html.

38. Aria Abawi, “Afghanistan ‘Rape’ Law PutsWomen’s Rights Front and Center,” CNN, April 7,2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/04/06/afghanistan.law/; and Graeme Smith,“Air Strikes, War on Drugs Drive Taliban,” Globeand Mail, March 24, 2008.

19

39. “The Arrested Development of Afghan Wom-en,” The Future of Afghanistan, ed. J. Alexander Their(Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009), p. 65.Maliha Zulfacar, Afghan ambassador to Germany,also argues that the Afghan government must avoida pendulum effect, where moderate governmentreforms are followed by policies that concede tofundamentalist and conservative elements. SeeMaliha Zulfacar, “The Pendulum of Gender Politicsin Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 25, nos. 1 and2 (2006): 27–59.

40. It was first assumed that Afghan militiascould bring order to the country, but they weremore interested in terrorizing locals, extortingbribes and seizing land. See Nir Rosen, “How WeLost the War We Won: A Journey into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan,” Rolling Stone, October 30,2008.

41. Thomas Johnson, “Tribal Politics: Why WeMust Understand the Human Terrain,” Vanguard,2008, http://www.vanguardcanada.com/AfghanTribalPoliticsJohnson.

42. George Friedman, “Afghanistan: The Natureof the Insurgency,” Stratfor, June 1, 2009.

43. Nick Dowling, “Travels with Nick #4,” May 7,2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/travels-with-nick-4/.

44. “The Pashtuns’ social construction of tribe isbased on an idealized egalitarian model of seg-mentary lineages, although the actual structuresare far more various. . . . In order to make theseegalitarian tribes into a more effective militaryforce, the Safavid Shahs imposed elements of theTurco-Mongolian tribal structure onto thosePashtuns living in their territories. It was due totheir efforts that Abdali (later Durrani) andGhilzai Pashtuns developed Turkic-style confed-erations.” See Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentationof Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in theInternational System (New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1995), p. 28–29.

45. Hassan Abbas, “Pakistan’s Volatile North-WestFrontier: Pashtun Tribes, Taliban, and al Qaeda,”December 14, 2006, The Jamestown Foundation,http://www.jamestown.org/media/events/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=132&tx_ttnews[backPid]=19&cHash=054051a46e.

46. David B. Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral FaultLines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1996), p. 216

47. Influential Durrani Pashtun clans includePopalzai, Barakzai (Mohammadzai), Sadozai, Ali-kazai, and others. Many Ghilzai clans in the coun-

try’s east, such as Hotak, Tokhi, Nasr, and Taraki, aswell as some historically marginalized Durraniclans, such as those in the Panjpai Valley and somein Kandahar province, including Alizai, Ahmadzai,Noorzai, and Ishaqzai, have limited representationin the Afghan government.

48. “Petreaus Sees Value in Talking to Taliban,”Reuters, October 8, 2008; and Jonathan Karl andLuis Martinez, “Bush Administration to Talkwith Taliban?” ABC News, October 28, 2008.

49. Ashley J. Tellis, “Reconciling with the Taliban?Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghan-istan,” Carnegie Report, April 2009, p. 3.

50. Col. Sam Gardiner, USAF (ret.) and Erik Leaver,“Planning for Failure in Afghanistan,” Foreign Policyin Focus: Commentary, March 30, 2009, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/6000.

51. Tellis, “Reconciling with the Taliban? Towardan Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan,” p. 5;and Buel, “NATO Entering New Stage in Afghan-istan.”

52. Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, International Narcotics ControlStrategy Report, March 2009, p. 106.

53. Eric Felten, Interview with Thomas Donnelly,On the Line, Voice of America, September 2, 2006.

54. Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, p. 23.

55. Lisa Curtis and James Phillips, “Revitalizing U.S.Efforts in Afghanistan,” Heritage FoundationBackgrounder no. 2076, October 15, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg2076.cfm#_ftnref36.

56. “Afghanistan’s Narco War: Breaking the LinkBetween Drug Traffickers and Insurgents,” AReport to the Committee on Foreign Relations,United States Senate, 111th Congress, 1st Session,August 10, 2009, p. 10.

57. Ibid, pp. 4–5, 11–12.

58. James Risen, “Reports Link Karzai’s Brother toAfghanistan Heroin Trade,” New York Times, Oc-tober 5, 2008. Karzai has, however, vehementlydenied those allegations. Fisnik Abrashi, “Karzai’sBrother Denies Links to Drug Trade,” Reuters,October 6, 2008.

59. Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, p. 110.

60. Tom Lasseter, “West Looked the Other Way as

20

Afghan Drug Trade Exploded,” McClatchy, May10, 2009.

61. Tom Lasseter, “Thriving Afghan Drug TradeHas Friends in High Places,” McClatchy, May 10,2009.

62. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime(UNODC), “Afghanistan Opium Winter Assess-ment,” January 2009, p. 8.

63. Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Peacekeepers amongPoppies: Afghanistan, Illicit Economies, and In-tervention,” International Peacekeeping 16, no. 1(February 2009): 108.

64. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Analyzing theAfghan-Pakistan War,” Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, July 28, 2008, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080728_afghan_analysis.pdf, p. 12.

65. UNODC, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2008,Executive Summary,” August 2008, p. 1, 12.

66. Ibid., p. 18.

67. Quoted in Lasseter, “West Looked the OtherWay.”

68. Henry Chu and Christi Parsons, “NATOLeaders Name New Secretary-General,” Los AngelesTimes, April 5, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/05/world/fg-obama-nato5.

69. “Fact Sheet Afghan National Army,” CombinedSecurity Transition Command-Afghanistan, March15, 2009, http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/Afghan%20Army%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

70. Greg Bruno, “Afghan’s National SecurityForces,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 16,2009, http://www.cfr.org/publication/19122/afghanistans_national_security_forces.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F13554%2Fgreg_bruno.

71. “Progress toward Security and Stability in Af-ghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, January2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/OCTOBER_1230_FINAL.pdf.

72. Government Accountability Office, “Afghani-stan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop CapableAfghan Police Forces Face Challenges and Need aCoordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Ac-countability,” June 18, 2008, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-883T.

73. John J. Kruzel, “Afghan Police Culture Evolvesthrough ‘Focused District Development’,” Ameri-can Forces Press Service, May 19, 2008, http://www.

defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=49929.

74. United States Institute of Peace, “Policing Af-ghanistan: A Meeting of the Security SectorReform Working Group,” May 27, 2009.

75. Ann Scott Tyson, “Dearth of Capable AfghanForces Complicates U.S. Mission in South,”Washington Post, July 25, 2009.

76. Andrew Legon, “Ineffective, Unprofessional,and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Chal-lenge,” E-Notes, Foreign Policy Research Institute,June 2009, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200906.legon.afghannationalpolice.html.

77. Peter Graff, “Afghans Turn to Taliban in Fearof Own Police,” Reuters, July 12, 2009.

78. Gilles Dorronsoro, “The Taliban’s WinningStrategy in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Report, June 2009,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf, p. 19.

79. C. J. Radin, “Afghan National Army: February2009 Update,” The Long War Journal, February 23,2009, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/02/afghan_national_army_1.php.

80. Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, “Fact Sheet Afghan National Army,”March 15, 2009, http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/Afghan%20Army%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.

81. Rory Stewart, “How to Save Afghanistan,”Time, July 28, 2008, p. 33.

82. “Global Security: Afghanistan,” UncorrectedTranscript of Oral Evidence, House of Commons,Foreign Affairs Committee, February 25, 2009,http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/uc302-i/uc30202.htm.

83. Radio Free Europe, “Ex-Soviet States PledgeNATO Help on Afghanistan,” Radio Liberty, March2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/ExSoviet_Group_Pledges_NATO_Help_On_Afghanistan/1513854.html.

84. For an earlier discussion of the acute tensionsbetween the U.S./NATO counterinsurgency mis-sion in Afghanistan and counternarcotics efforts,see Ted Galen Carpenter, “How the Drug War inAfghanistan Undermines America’s War on Ter-ror,” Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 84,November 10, 2004.

85. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “U.S. Pursues a NewWay to Rebuild Afghanistan,” Washington Post,June 19, 2009; and Thom Shanker and ElisabethBumiller, “U.S. Shifts Afghan Narcotics Strategy,”

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New York Times, July 24, 2009.

86. Thomas Schweich, a former Bush administra-tion ambassador for counternarcotics and justicereform for Afghanistan, stated in May 2009 that theWestern military “didn’t want anything to do witheither interdiction or counternarcotics.” Whenasked what U.S. and NATO forces had done to haltthe flow of opium and heroin in southern Af-ghanistan (the center of the drug trade), an Afghanmilitary commander, Col. General Khodaidad, re-plied bluntly: “Nothing.” Quoted in Lasseter, “WestLooked the Other Way.”

87. “NATO Commander Tones Down Drug LordOrders,” Agence France Presse, February 4, 2009.

88. Sayed Salahuddin, “Afghan President Says ‘FightDrugs Like Soviets,” Reuters, December 9, 2004.

89. “U.S. Announces Revamp of Afghan DrugPolicy,” Associated Press, June 27, 2009.

90. Even reasonably useful analyses of the Afghandrug trade tend to underestimate that danger.See, for example, Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror:How Heroin Is Bankrolling the Taliban and al Qaeda(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2009).

91. Bronwen Roberts, “Afghan Poppy Police Callin Troops,” Agence France Presse, February 8,2009. An especially bad incident occurred in April2008. See Jon Hemming, “Suicide Bomb on PoppyTeam Kills 18 Afghans,” Reuters, April 29, 2008.

92. Walter Pincus, “CIA Ignored Tips AllegingContra Drug Links, Report Says,” Washington Post,November 3, 1998, p. A4.

93. Ted Galen Carpenter, Bad Neighbor Policy:Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 141–42.

94. Richard N. Haass, “Defining ‘Success’ Down,”Washington Post, May 14, 2009.

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