eric steinberg - newman's distinction between inference and assent

Newman's Distinction between Inference and AssentAuthor(s): Eric SteinbergSource: Religious Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 351-365Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20019228 .Accessed: 17/12/2014 13:21

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Rel. Stud. 23, pp. 351-365

ERIC STEINBERG Brooklyn College of the City University of New York

NEWMAN'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN INFERENCE AND ASSENT

The Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent is now generally recognized as the culmination of John Henry Newman's longstanding preoccupation with

what might be called the 'Catholic problem of faith'. In numerous places Newman noted1 that prior to writing this work he had made sporadic and fruitless attempts to deal with the problem. In the widely cited insight of 18662 he received new ideas about the concepts involved in the problem and

work on the Grammar ensued.

Any attempt to clarify Newman's proposed solution to the problem of faith and the nature of the Grammar, itself, must come up against one of the two major distinctions in the work, that between inference and assent. I believe that this distinction has not been fully understood by commentators on Newman. Although the distinction appeared in Newman's writings long before he began to write the Grammar, the distinction as presented in that work represents a major departure from Newman's prior use of the terms.

Moreover, contrary to some writers (and presumably Newman, himself) who think his approach to the problem of faith in the Grammar is a major advance

over his earlier work, I shall contend that the opposite is the case and that

any proposed solution to the problem which depends on the distinction between inference and assent as presented in the Grammar is untenable.

In Part One of this paper I sketch the history of Newman's treatment of the Catholic problem of faith and his concepts of inference and assent. I also seek to explicate these concepts as they occur in the Grammar. In Part Two I speculate on reasons for the change in the sense of

'

inference '

and '

assent '

and examine an argument Newman offers in support of the distinction

presented in the Grammar. I argue that Newman's argument fails and claim that even if valid it would fail to solve the problem of faith.

1

What is the 'Catholic problem of faith?' It is first mentioned in Newman's papers of the late 1840s and is expressed in perhaps the most important 1 See the Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S. J. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), Volume xxv, pp. 29-30. 2 In John Henry Newman: Autobiographical Writings, edited by H. Tristam (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), pp. 269-70.


352 ERIC STEINBERG

paper of this period, 'On the Certainty of Faith', as the problem of how 'reasonings short of demonstration can lead to an infallible conclusion'.1

The problem is that Newman takes Catholicism to hold that faith is jus? tifiably certain yet based on evidence that is not demonstrative of the objects

or propositions of that faith. If, as an empiricist like Locke2 (or perhaps Hume3) is wont to do, we express a reasonable or rational belief as one in which the degree of confidence or certainty is proportioned to the strength of evidence for the belief, the problem is how one can ever be absolutely confident or certain about a proposition that is not demonstrated and admits of the possibility of more evidential support or additional evidence relevant to its truth or falsity.

In 'On the Certainty of Faith' Newman opposes the Lockean model by distinguishing two forms of certainty -'objective' and 'subjective'.4 The first concerns the connection between evidence and conclusion, the second

(which Newman implies is the true or proper sense of the term) concerns the strength of belief or acceptance of the conclusion. Newman's general strategy is to contend that since the two concepts of certainty are diverse, it does not follow that from a conclusion being uncertain in one sense, that is, not demonstrated or entailed by the evidence, that it is or ought to be uncertain in the other sense.5 Newman proceeds to sketch an account of how reason, in the form of what he calls

'prudentia' can judge that a particular object or proposition is worthy of subjective certainty, while recognizing its logical incompleteness or non-demonstrative nature.6 Seemingly for Newman 'pru?

dentia' has both an evaluative and a creative role: It can critically assess how well supported a conclusion C is, given a body of evidence E and can also draw out or infer a hitherto unseen conclusion C from a body of evidence E. Yet (and this is a major emphasis of the paper and others of the same period) the act of

'

prudentia '

is an act of judgement -

'Prudence judges in the particular case whether the evidence, motiva, be sufficient for credi?

bility',7 'the power or habit of mind which determines us to this conclusion, that revelation is credible is prudentia'8

-

not to be equated with the act of

actually believing or accepting what has been judged to be worthy of belief or subjective certainty. It is significant that preceding his discussion of '

prudentia '

Newman distinguishes the two questions : '

What is the faculty or

1 'On the Certainty of Faith', in the Birmingham Oratory Archives, file B.9.11, p. 1. 2 See John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by A. C. Fraser (New York: Dover

Books, 1959), iv, 19, 1, Volume 2, pp. 428-9. 3 See David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1977), Section X, pp. 73-4. Hume, however, seems to agree with Newman that conclusions that are not demonstrated may nevertheless be reasonably believed with the 'last degree of assurance'. 4

'On the Certainty of Faith', p. 7. 5 Ibid. pp. 11 and 13. '...in a case in which it is not an intellectual absurdity to suppose the contradictory of the conclusion, it would be a sheer absurdity to feel doubt or even fear about its truth

'

(p. 14). 6 Ibid. pp. 28-32. 7 Ibid. p. 31. 8 Ibid. p. 28.


NEWMAN ON INFERENCE AND ASSENT 353

habit which determines that sufficiency [of evidence] ? How does that faculty or habit act on the mind so as to produce subjective certainty?'1 The answer to the former is

'prudentia', but in answering the latter and bridging the

conceptual gap between judgement and subjective certainty, Newman in? vokes the will.2 Although the fact that a body of evidence does not entail a

given conclusion does not imply for Newman that the conclusion is unworthy of subjective certainty, a verdict rendered by 'prudentia' that the conclusion is worthy is still not a sufficient condition of subjective certainty.3 To put it

bluntly, individuals do not necessarily believe what their own best reason

tells them they ought to believe. When Newman resumed consideration of the problem of faith in a series

of papers in 1853, he introduced the concepts of assent and inference. The first is clearly a concept of acceptance or belief for Newman

-

'Assent is the

acceptance of a proposition as true. Assent is either absolute or conditional'.4 The difference in the two kinds of assent is one of strength or degree of

certainty. On the other hand, inference appears to be the successor concept to

'prudentia', that is, a judgemental concept concerned with assessing the strength or cogency of arguments and evidence

- ' 1. An argument is an

inducement made to the reason to judge a certain proposition to be true. 2. An inference is the judgement following on that inducement'.5 Like the earlier distinction between prudentia and subjective certainty, the point of the new distinction seems to be that although ideally we ought to assent in conformity to our inferences, we do not always do so.

The duality of inference and assent as representative of the domains of reason and actual acceptance is retained in Newman's papers of the late

1850s and early 1860s. In 'Lecture on Logic',6 written in 1859, Newman refers to logic as the 'Science of Proof or Inference' and notes that his definition is in close agreement with Aristotle's as an 'instrumental art'.7 He

goes on to say that '

It follows from this that it is not concerned with the truth or falsity of the subject matter, but is hypothetical. The only truth it is concerned with is that of the act of inference'.8 In the paper 'Assent and Intuition'9 Newman reaffirms the 1853 distinction between two sorts of acceptance

-

absolute and conditional assent - and refers to inferences as 1 Ibid. p. 20. 2 Ibid. pp. 20 and 33. 3 In Doubt and Religious Commitment: The Role of the Will in Newman's Thought (Oxford : Clarendon Press,

1980), M. Jamie Ferreira correctly notes that for Newman there need be no epistemic gap to be bridged between evidence and conclusion. But she fails to see (pp. 55-7) that this is not the only kind of gap concerning belief or assent for Newman. There is also a gap between the judgement of reason and the actual belief, itself. The latter gap requires bridging by the will. 4

'Papers of 1853 on the Certainty of Faith', in The Theological Papers of John Henry Newman on Faith and Certainty, edited by Hugo M. de Achaval, S. J. and J. Derek Holmes (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1976), p. 11. 5 Ibid. pp. 10?1. Cf. a paper of May 11, 1853 in the Oratory file A.23.1. : 'The usual course is first to infer and then to accept the inference, therefore, to reason and to believe are distinct'. 6 Achaval and Holmes, op. cit. pp. 51-62. 7 Ibid. p. 53. 8 Ibid.

9 Ibid. pp. 63-80.


354 ERIC STEINBERG

'acts ofjudgement'. In each case an inference seems to be a bit of reasoning or the evaluation of same, whose conclusion is finally accepted by an act of assent. But then we come to the Grammar, itself.

In the Grammar1 the problem of faith has become the problem of assent. For as we shall see to assent to a proposition is to accept it absolutely or with

certainty. The distinction of the 1850s between assent and inference is

retained, but is introduced by Newman in the first few pages of the work as a distinction between 'modes of holding propositions' (4). It is preceded by and presumably parasitic on a distinction between different propositional forms - inference on what Newman calls the

'

conditional '

form, assent on what he calls the

'categorical' form (3). Given the discussion of propositional form and the fact that Newman repeatedly refers to inference and assent as '

conditional '

and '

unconditional '

respectively, it might seem as if the dis? tinction in the Grammar is identical with that found in the papers of the

1850s, where assent is actual acceptance and inference hypothetical or conditional reasoning. On this view one infers P or P is an inference in

reasoning such as the following : If Q then P or '

Given Q then P '

; whereas one assents to P or P is an assent when P is accepted.

Although occasionally Newman does give cases of conditional reasoning as illustrative of the concept of inference in the Grammar,2 the fact remains that unlike the earlier writings in the Grammar inference is itself a kind of

acceptance. Newman notes that ' assent and inference are each of them the

acceptance of a proposition' (130), calls 'inference' the 'conditional accept? ance of a proposition' (119) and lists under the heading of 'inference' such

mental attitudes as Lockean belief, conviction and even moral certainty (132). Moreover, in listing the grammatical expressions that flag infer?

ences, Newman identifies 'for', 'therefore', and 'so that', but not 'if...then'

(200). The point is simply this. On a reading of 'inference ' as hypothetical

reasoning, in inferring P one need not accept P, whereas on the reading suggested by Newman's remarks in the Grammar, acceptance is essential to inference. If I say

'

If pitcher X wins twenty games, Team Y will win the

pennant', I am surely saying something quite different from 'Team Y will win the pennant, for pitcher X will win twenty games'. For in the latter case

unlike the former I am accepting that team Y will win the pennant. In the

latter case I cannot intelligibly add, 'But of course I don't accept that team

Y will win the pennant'.3 The difference between the concepts of inference and assent, therefore, is

a difference between two kinds of acceptance -

conditional and uncondit? ional. In introducing the notion that inference is conditional in the Grammar,

1 John Henry Newman, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (New York, London and Toronto :

Longmans, Green and Co., 1947). References to this work are in parentheses. 2 For instance, Ibid. p. 47 and (the example noted by H. H. Price in Belief (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969)), PP; 137-8.

The distinction is noted in Price, op. cit. pp. 141-5.



Newman refers to the dependence of the inference on other propositions. Yet even this description is ambiguous. An accepted proposition may be de?

pendent on one or more propositions causally, evidentially or in some other

way. We should not I think interpret Newman to be saying either:

(A) P is an inference if and only if the acceptance of P is causally dependent on the acceptance of one or more propositions Q, or

(B) P is an inference if and only if the acceptance of P is based on reasons, evidence or the acceptance of one or more other propositions Q.

Since Newman says the following about assent in the Grammar: 'I cannot be taken to mean... as if assent did not always imply grounds in reason, implicit, if not explicit, or could rightly be given without sufficient grounds' (129) and 'acts of assent require previous acts of inference' (32), the criteria in (A) and (B) would hardly distinguish inferences from assents!

Newman, however, talks of the dependence esential to inferences in a somewhat different manner when he notes, 'An act of Inference includes in its object the dependence of its thesis upon its premises... but an act of Assent rests wholly on the thesis as its object' (32). This passage is extremely reminiscent of an earlier distinction between 'contuition' and 'intuition'1 and like the earlier distinction suggests that the difference between the two

concepts concerns the way in which a proposition is thought. When one thinks of an accepted proposition P as dependent on one or more propositions

Q (which one accepts) or when one 'justifies' an accepted proposition P by considering its dependence on Q, P is an inference ; when one thinks of an accepted proposition P without considering or thinking of its dependence on

any other proposition, P is an assent. It would appear that this is what David Pailin means when he states, 'When Newman speaks of the "conditionality

"

of conclusions, he is not referring to their logical relationship to their premises but to the way in which we entertain them'.2 He goes on to add 'This con?

ditionality is not the logical conditionality of an hypothesis but a psycho? logical "conditionality" which arises from the fact that the conclusion is entertained in connexion with its premises'.3 Like the earlier distinction between intuition and contuition, the above interpretation of inference and assent would make the latter concepts relative to a given individual at a

given time, so that one and the same individual can assent to and infer the same proposition at different times. Let us call the manner in which a

proposition is thought or considered, whether in its dependence on other 1 Achaval and Holmes, op. cit. pp. 64-5: 'When the assent which I give to a truth...is simple and

absolute, I shall call it an intuition...When it is complex, I call it a contuition, as being a sight of a thing through and by means of the things which lie about it.' 2 David A. Pailin, The Way to Faith: An Examination of Newman's 'Grammar of Assent' as a Response to the

Search for Certainty in Faith (London: Epworth Press, 1969), p. 139. 3 Ibid. p. 176.


356 ERIC STEINBERG

propositions or not, the 'Phenomenological Criterion' or PC. Although undoubtedly PC is a distinguishing characteristic of inferences and assents, it is not the sole one for Newman. To put the same point somewhat dif?

ferently, contrary to what Pailin contends, when Newman talks of ' con?

ditional' and 'unconditional' he is referring to more than to PC. Consider what Newman says about Locke's view of mental acts like in?

ference and assent:

When I assent, I am supposed, it seems to do precisely what I do when I infer, or rather not quite so much, but something which is included in inferring; for, while the disposition of my mind towards a given proposition is identical in assent and in

inference, / merely drop the thought of the premises when I assent, though not of their influence on the proposition inferred... if this be really the state of the case, if assent

in no real way differs from inference, it is one and the same thing with it. It is another name for inference, and to speak of it at all does but mislead (124-5 Italics are

mine).

In the preceding passage Newman is both criticizing Locke for thinking that the sole difference between 'inference' and 'assent' concerns PC and sug?

gesting that in fact they differ because they involve different '

dispositions of minds towards propositions'. From the context in which this passage occurs

the expression seems to refer to kinds of assurance or confidence one has in

propositions. The suspicion that assent and inference differ in terms of the strength of

acceptance or certainty, and that this is part of the sense of the terms '

conditional '

and '

unconditional '

is confirmed by various comments in the Grammar. In arguing that there are no degrees of assent, Newman says,

'

In

the case of all demonstration, assent, when given is unconditionally given. In one class of subjects, then, assent certainly is always unconditional; but if the

word stands for an undoubting and unhesitating act of the mind once, why does it not denote the same always' (130).1 I believe it is obvious that '

unconditional '

is being used in the above passage to mean '

certain ' -

perfectly understandable given that Newman seeks to show that there are no

degrees of assent. A similar use of the term '

unconditional '

occurs when

Newman discusses those philosophers who 'condemn an unconditional assent in concrete matters' (120).

If '

unconditional '

often means '

certain '

for Newman as applied to assent, to say that inference is conditional would be to say that inference is not

certain - a claim Newman makes in the Grammar: '

...whether it is assent or

inference, whether the mind is merely without doubt2 or whether it is actually certain' (31).

'

Inference is in its nature and by its profession conditional and

uncertain' (45-6). 1 Cf. Achaval and Holmes, op. cit. p. 123: 'A first and essential characteristic, then, of certitude is, that

it cannot coexist with hesitation or doubt.' 2

'Doubt' is used here (as throughout the work) to mean 'a suspense of mind, in which sense of the word, to have "no doubt" about a thesis is equivalent...either to inferring it or else assenting to it'

(6-7)



Let us call the different dispositions of the mind involved in assent and

inference the 'Certainty Criterion' or CC. My point is that for Newman the

terms 'conditional' and 'unconditional' refer to both PC and CC. This is

not at all surprising. For if we consider two of Newman's previously men?

tioned papers in which he talks of 'conditional assent', the 1853 paper and

'Assent and Intuition', we find that in the former '

Conditional assent is such as belief, doubt, conjecture, suspicion' opposed to absolute assent, which includes certainty,1 while in the latter paper 'Conditional...assent is that

which I give to a thought as true, viewed with and within another

thought'.2 In short, in the former Newman is talking about the CC, in the

latter the PC. If I am correct 'inference' and 'assent' are complex concepts for Newman

in the Grammar', the conditional-unconditional distinction refers to two cri?

teria, PC and CC. Most commentators on Newman treat the distinction as a

simple one. We have already noted this in the case of Pailin. H. H. Price

believes the distinction is merely one concerning CC : '... the character which inference has and assent lacks is something like doubtfulness or dubiety...

This is what he appears to mean by calling inference conditional and assent

unconditional'.3 Although Ferreira realizes that '"conditionality" means

two things for Newman '

she lists the wrong things : '

First, it means having degrees... Secondly,... being dependent on premises'} The first, though not strictly

what the term means, is a consequence of the CC of conditionality. But as

we have already indicated, the second is simply incorrect, for it fails to

distinguish unconditional assent from conditional inference. In fact an assent, which is unconditional, is a certain acceptance of a proposition which is not

thought in relation to any proposition. An inference, which is conditional, is a less than certain acceptance of a proposition which is thought in relation to or as dependent on at least one other proposition. The complex nature of

these concepts comes out clearly when Newman introduces the distinction between inference and assent in the Grammar. He notes,

Assent is unconditional...Inference is conditional, because a conclusion at least

implies the assumption of premises, and still more, because in concrete matter on

which I am engaged, demonstration is impossible (7). The

'

assumption of premises '

undoubtedly refers to PC and the fact that in an inference one proposition is thought or considered as dependent on

another, but the failure to be demonstrated cannot also refer to PC, for Newman admits (130) that even in cases of demonstration, assumptions and premises are involved. The failure to constitute a demonstration must refer to CC and the fact that inferences are not certain. That is, for Newman, '

inference ' or strictly speaking

' concrete inference

'

is conditional because it is non-demonstrative and in being non-demonstrative, it cannot yield certain conclusions.

1 Achaval and Holmes, op. cit. p. 11. 2 Ibid. p. 64. 3

Price, op. cit. pp. 148-9. 4

Ferreira, op. cit. pp. 21-2.


358 ERIC STEINBERG

One should not, however, read Newman as merely denying what he had

formerly called 'objective certainty' or entailment, when he denies that inferences are certain in the Grammar. For if Newman were to hold that inferences could indeed be

'subjectively' but not 'objectively' certain (to use the older terminology), why the Grammar should focus on assent, rather than inference would be inexplicable. Newman's architectonic and his set of

concepts are in the service of a grammar of assent. Yet if inferences could also be certain, such labour would be unnecessary and misplaced. The impli? cation of the work is clear: only assents are certain acceptances.

I think we can also call the concepts of assent and inference, particularly the latter, hybrid concepts. As already noted prior to the preparation of the

Grammar, 'inference' was thought by Newman to be an act of reason;

consequently it was always evaluated in terms of PC as involving the thought or consideration of other propositions. With the shift of what had formerly been in the realm of assent to the realm of inference, CC suddenly becomes

applicable to inferences. Similarly, prior to the preparation of the Grammar, neither PC nor CC could be comployed to demarcate the domain of assent; yet both can serve to do so given Newman's view in the work, itself.1'2

In the Second Part of this paper I want to consider possible reasons for Newman's shuffling of the deck of mental concepts and the implications of

the revised concepts for his treatment of the problem of assent.

11

The first clear indication of a change in Newman's concept of inference is found in one of the papers that constitutes an early draft of the Grammar,

where Newman talks of an 'inferential acceptance'. The paper is dated

August 13, 1866.3 By October of the same year Newman is prepared to say just what he does hold in the Grammar, itself:

'

Inference is the acceptance of a second proposition by virtue of the previous acceptance of a first'.4 In?

terestingly, the timing of the change in the meaning of '

inference '

coincides with that of Newman's insight about the relation between assent and cer

1 Given the preceding analysis of'inference' and '

assent' we have at least a partial explanation of why there is virtually no reference to the will in Newman's discussion of assent in the Grammar, although even

after the publication of the work Newman continued to espouse a voluntarist theory of belief (see the Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, Volume 25, pp. 323-5). Formerly, Newman had appealed to the will to bridge the conceptual gap between reason and acceptance. But since inference is itself a kind of

acceptance, there is no gap to be bridged in the major issue under scrutiny in the work, namely, how do we go from inference to assent? 2 It must be admitted that traces of the old view of 'inference' and 'assent' remain in the Grammar, particularly in (a) Newman's analysis of opinion and the claim that what seem to be less than certain acceptances of propositions are actually certain acceptances of the probability of propositions (132) and (b) the discussion of inferential acts as acts of justification or reasons for assent in Chapter Six of the work (ia5ff.). 3

'Assent' in the Oratory file B.2.6. 4 October 29, 1866 paper, 'Inference' in the Oratory file B.2.6.



titude and the proper order of a work on the problem of faith. And this I

think is not mere coincidence. In that insight of August 1866 Newman said that he realized that 'cer?

titude is only a kind of assent'. What he realized is that all assent is certain and that certitude (not certainty) is just one of many ways of assenting. If this is so, however, what becomes of the sort of

'

conditional acceptance' that

formerly had been included under the banner of ' assent

'

? Given the insight it cannot be a kind of assent at all. Still, as long as the concept of a less than certain acceptance is a possible one, some place must be found for it.

Yet without some additional consideration, the insight of 1866 cannot

explain why Newman makes inference a kind of acceptance or puts less than certain acceptances of propositions under that rubric. Perhaps the additional considerations is the following argument formulated in a paper written in

1865:

A first and essential characteristic, then, of certitude is, that it cannot coexist with

hesitation or doubt...On this follows close a second. Such a state of mind, it is plain, cannot be immediately dependent on the reasons which are its antecedents, and

cannot rightly be referred back to them as its producing cause. If it were the direct result of...argument, then as it has been gradually created...so might it be gradu?

ally destroyed...But, as I have been saying, certitude does not admit of more or

less.1

In the preceding argument Newman is in effect connecting, the CC and PC of inference and assent, by contending that if a proposition is accepted with

certainty (CC) it cannot 'rightly be referred back' to reasons, which I take to be a way of expressing the manner in which an accepted proposition is

thought in relation to other propositions (PC). Conversely, to say that a proposition is thought in relation to other propositions, as it would be in an act of inference, is to say that it cannot constitute a case of certainty. What

I suspect happened is this : Newman had always thought of '

inference '

as

involving reasons and referring a conclusion back to them. Yet as long as he

thought of assent as including all acceptance or belief, there was no reason to draw the implications of this argument with respect to 'inference'. Given the insight of 1866 and the revision of the concept of assent to include only certain acceptance, the 1865 argument becomes pertinent, implying that

any mental act that involves the consideration of reasons for a given con? clusion must involve a less than certain acceptance of the proposition.

The preceding argument also helps us to understand something that otherwise seems extremely perplexing, namely, why Newman appears to characterize 'assent' and 'inference' essentially in terms of both PC and CC,

when these seem independent criteria.2 If the two criteria PC and CC were 1 Achaval and Holmes, op. cit. pp. 123-4. 2 What is equally perplexing is why commentators accept the dependence without question or

criticism. Pailin, op. cit. p. 159, seems to move from 'conditionality' as he has interpreted it, that is PC, to the denial of certainty, without explanation. In Newman s Dialogues on Certitude (Rome: Catholic Books,


360 ERIC STEINBERG

not taken by Newman to be dependent, the very concepts of inference and assent would be arbitrary and artificial. Moreover, were one to accept the

independence of the criteria and hold that a mental act in which one accepts a proposition while recognizing its dependence on other propositions could be certain, the emphasis on the concept of assent as the key to the problem of faith or certainty would seem misplaced. Instead, we would expect the focal point of Newman's discussion to be the mental act which combines a

consideration of reasons and certainty -

similar to the earlier role of '

pru? dentia' with a form of acceptance added.

Whatever the historical importance of the argument on page nine in

shaping Newman's distinction between the concepts of assent and inference, I believe that the argument can be shown to be invalid. In fact PC and CC are independent criteria.

Newman's argument seems to be as follows: (1) Certitude (or certainty) does not admit of more or less. (2) Because certitude does not admit of more or less, it cannot be gradually destroyed.1 (3) If certitude were dependent on reasons, arguments or antecedents, it could be gradually destroyed. (4)

Therefore, certitude cannot be dependent on reasons, arguments or ante?

cedents.

Presumably what Newman means in ( 1 ) is that certitude or certainty is an absolute state or property. Either one is certain, that is, has absolutely no

doubt or one is not. If we say of one that he is less certain than before, we

are saying that he is not certain at all. Likewise, if we say of an individual

that he is more certain than before, we are implying that he was not

previously certain.2 In short there are no degrees of certainty or certitude.

With this in mind let us define the notion of an absolute state and that of an

absolute term:

For any object O, A is an absolute state = (a) If O can be increased with respect to A, then O is not A,

and (b) If O is decreased with respect to A, O is not A.

We can then define the notion of a non-absolute state as equivalent to

whatever states do not satisfy the above analysis.

1978) James Lyons does similarly when he notes, 'Again we must employ the word "conditional" in speaking about the manner in which an inference "arrives at a proposition "...special characteristic of assent is by distinct contrast that it is unconditional. Assent excludes the presence of any doubt

'

(P-28). 1 It is not clear from the paper in which this argument occurs whether Newman also thinks that certainty can be gradually created. He says that certainty cannot be strengthened, which seems to be true of any state which does not admit of more ', but this still leaves open the possibility that it can be gradually created. In the Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, xm, pp. 266-7 he implies that certainty cannot be gradually created. 2 For a discussion of

'

certainty ' as an absolute term along these lines see Peter Unger,

' A Defense of

Skepticism', The Philosophical Review, lxxx (1971), pp. 198-218, reprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, edited by George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 317-36 and Peter Unger, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1975), Chapter II.


NEWMAN ON INFERENCE AND ASSENT 361 If instead of talking about absolute states we prefer to talk of absolute

terms, we can characterize this notion as follows :

T is an absolute term = T refers to or is instantiated by an absolute state.

Consequently

T is a non-absolute term = T refers to or is instantiated by a non-absolute state.

According to the preceding distinctions, "Being supported by reasons, argu? ment or evidence" is

clearly a non-absolute state or term, and Newman's

argument seems to assume therefore,

(Ai) That absolute states (or the instantiation of absolute terms) cannot be grad? ually destroyed,

and

(A2) That if a state of M (or the instantiation of a term) depends on some non absolute state (or the instantiation of some non-absolute term), then the state of M

(or the instantiation of the term) can be gradually destroyed.

(Ai) and (A2) entail (C) Absolute states (or the instantiation of absolute terms) cannot depend on non

absolute states (or the instantiation of non-absolute terms),

which is a generalized version of (4), the conclusion of Newman's argument. The problem with Newman's argument is not only that (Ai) and (A2) are

not clearly acceptable, but that (C) seems clearly false. Consider a term which like

'certainty' or 'certitude' appears to be an absolute term: 'co?

mplete set of Buffalo Nickels'. Like 'certainty' the instantiation of this term seems to be an all or nothing thing. Either you have a complete set, that is, at least one coin of each year and mint mark or you don't. If we say of a given set that it could be more complete than it is, we are saying that it is not

complete at all, just as when we say of someone that he could be more certain about a given proposition than he is, we are saying that he is not certain at all. If we say of a given set that it is not as complete as it was, we are either

saying that it is no longer complete or that it is not as close to completion as

before, just as when we say of someone that he is no longer as certain as he was, we are either saying that he is no longer certain or that he is farther removed from certainty, that is, has greater doubts, than before. Yet to have

any, even the slightest doubt is not to be certain and to have any, even the

slightest gap in one's set is not to have a complete set. Still, I think it is obvious that whether or not a set of Buffalo Nickels is complete is dependent on and

must be referred to something which is a non-absolute state (or the in? stantiation of a non-absolute term), which does admit of degrees or the adjectives 'more' or 'less' while remaining in the state

-

namely, the number of different coins.

In addition, (Ai) and A2) are not unproblematic. Again consider the


362 ERIC STEINBERG

instantiation of the term 'complete set of Buffalo Nickels'. Suppose one were

to take some concentrated sulphuric acid and put it on one of the nickels in a

complete set so that gradually the date became obliterated, couldn't we say that the completeness of the set was gradually destroyed (contrasting this

with the manner in which the completeness might be destroyed by a thief who steals the most valuable coin in the set) ? If so, we have a counterexample to (Ai). But if we resist this example as a genuine counterexample by contending that in the case described there would still be one distinct time

when the date became invisible and thus when the set went from being complete to being incomplete, we are in effect giving up (A2). For a complete set then depends on the number of different coins and yet the complete set cannot be gradually destroyed. Whatever our attitude may be concerning the sulphuric acid example, a counterexample to (A2) is available: Imagine that the government begins to produce a series of Buffalo nickels from an

alloy that cannot be obliterated by acid or gradually destroyed. It would seem from the preceding discussion, therefore, that 'certitude' or

'

certainty ' can be absolute terms as Newman claims and yet can depend on

evidence (or reasons) that admits of degrees. If we suppose, at least in the case of a purely rational being, that there would be a perfect correlation

between the strength of the evidence and the degree of confidence, we would have to allow that even the slightest decrease in or weakening of the evidence

would rule out certainty. Yet it needn't follow that certainty would be

gradually destroyed. In any event, the question of whether certainty as an

absolute state is attainable is not simply a question of whether or not it is

dependent on evidence or reasons, but instead a matter of whether or not

there can be a maximal state of evidence or relevant evidence. Newman's

argument does not address this issue. To suggest, as his argument does, that

evidence can be gradually strengthened, is not to exclude there being a

maximal state, any more than noting that a set of coins can be gradually

completed, e.g. by purchasing a new coin each month, excludes there being a maximal state, i.e. a complete set.

It is not surprising that Newman did not produce a valid argument for the

connection of PC and CC, for I believe that a little reflection will show that

they are independent criteria. It should first be noted that there is an

ambiguity about CC, itself. Does 'accept with certainty' refer to a de facto condition or psychological state in which one feels certain or does it refer to

a normative condition in which one is justified in feeling or being certain? If the former only empirical evidence could establish whether or not PC and

CC are related in the manner Newman claims; prima facie it does not

appear unlikely that one who thinks of a particular proposition as dependent on other propositions might feel certain about the proposition.

I take it, however, that when Newman talks of '

accepting with certainty '

he is talking about a justified acceptance; this would assuredly be the case



if the treatment of the problem of assent in the Grammar is to be continuous with the treatment of the problem of faith in Newman's earlier writings. Yet if Newman is talking about justified acceptance with certainty when em?

ploying CC, his account seems perverse. For he would then be claiming that if one justifiably accepts a proposition with certainty he must not think of the

proposition as dependent on evidence, reasons, etc. Not only does this turn the conventional notion of justification on its head, but since as we have already noted Newman has conceded that assents depend on if not require reasons or evidence, one is bewildered as to why in justifiably accepting a proposition with certainty or assenting, one cannot consider these reasons.

Assuming a justificatory notion of CC there just is not a connection with PC. We can be justified in accepting a proposition with certainty when that proposition is thought in relation to reasons, evidence or arguments. For

instance, consider the case of a patient who had been anaesthetized in

preparation for an operation and who is now recovering in bed from the

operation and feels pain. He then performs the following bit of reasoning: Since I feel pain (Q) I am not completely anaesthetized (P).1 According to PC this must be a case of inference, since the accepted proposition P is considered in relation to or as dependent on another proposition Q. But given the (justified) certainty with which the subject accepts Q, there seems no reason to contest his or her justified claim to be certain that P. It is also the case (although Newman's 1865 argument does not challenge this) that from the fact that a given proposition is considered or thought without any connection to other propositions, nothing follows about whether one is or is not justified in accepting it with certainty.

Suppose that after writing a philosophy paper I am troubled by the

nagging feeling that there is some point that I have overlooked that affects the conclusions of my paper. Let us also suppose that quite frequently when I have felt this way in the past, there actually have been points I have

overlooked, although in the present case there are not particular arguments or points I can put my finger on. In such a case it is plausible to say that I

simply accept the proposition '

I have made some error in the argumentation of this paper' without considering its connection with another proposition. Furthermore, let us suppose that in accepting this proposition I am far from certain that it is true - a perfectly natural attitude given that I have no

particular reason for my acceptance.2 finally, let us suppose that my ace

1 Interestingly Newman claims that Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum' is a case of reasoning in the

Philosophical Notebook of John Henry Newman, edited by Edward J. Sillem (Louvain: Nauwerlaerts, 1970), Volume 11, p. 37.

2 Undoubtedly Newman would want to dispute the claim that in such cases assent is not present by

arguing that one is actually assenting to 'It is probable that P', that is, that one is certain of another statement in which P is embedded. But even conceding that in this way every acceptance involves the

certainty of some proposition, will not help Newman's general position. For then inferences, which after all are acceptances, will involve certainty and the basis for the distinction between inference and assent

will be obliterated.


364 ERIC STEINBERG

eptance is justified in light of the past history of similar feelings and errors. We then have a case that meets the PC criterion of assent but not the CC

criterion. Just as there are cases of acceptances which are certain and involve the consideration of reasons, it would seem that there are cases of less than certain acceptances which do not.

Newman's failure to see PC and CC as independent criteria not only results in an incomplete list of ways in which propositions may be held or accepted, but also leads to a tension in his own account of rational inference and the role of what he calls the 'illative sense'.

It seems clear from Chapters Eight and Nine of the Grammar that the illative sense is considered by Newman to be a ratiocinative or reasoning faculty (251, 262) and undoubtedly it is for this reason that it is referred to as the

'controlling principle in inferences' (270). As such the illative sense seems to be the successor to what was called

'

prudentia '

in Newman's earlier

papers. Like 'prudentia' the illative sense seems capable of judging that given a particular body of evidence, a particular conclusion is entitled to be

accepted with certainty (see 250, 262). But this role of the illative sense as the principle of rational inference comes into conflict with Newman's charac? terization of'inference'. For either the illative sense makes judgements of certainty which cannot be justifiably accepted as such, because of Newman's claim that inferences are by their nature conditional and uncertain, or the

judgements of the illative sense can be accepted as such, in which case Newman's distinction between inference and assent is obliterated.1

I believe that the tension between the official role of the illative sense and Newman's concepts of inference and assent may explain why he sometimes

assigns a quite different role to the illative sense, namely, to account for one's

passing from inference to assent (197, 250). In other words, whereas in its official role the illative sense was the guiding principle of inference, in this new role the illative sense is the guiding principle of assent.2 Unfortunately, even given a new role for the illative sense, Newman's problems are not over.

For now the illative sense looks intellectually suspect; it is producing cer?

tainty when the certainty is not derivable from the evidence -

since if it were

derivable inferences of the sort, '

Given the evidence, I accept P with cer?

tainty' would be legitimate. The preceding point can be put succinctly as follows : Although the act of

1 Is there a way for Newman to avoid this predicament? In the discussion of'natural inference' in the Grammar (211, 255-6; cf. 230-1). There is the suggestion that the 'reasoning' of the illative sense may not constitute inference, since unlike the former the latter is dependent on propositions and does not deal with

the concrete qua concrete. However, it should be noted that according to Newman (32) even real assents, which presumably do deal with the concrete qua concrete, involve propositions. In any case there would still be many things on Newman's view to which we can and properly do assent (179-80) which would no longer be in the purview of the reasoning illative sense according to PC and CC. Hence the problem noted in this paper would still exist with respect to this class of ostensible truths. 2 A similar ambiguity is pointed out by N. D. O'Donoghue in 'Newman and the Problem of Privileged Access to Truth', Irish Theological Quarterly, xlii (1975), p. 245.



detaching a proposition from its premises or grounds, characteristic of assent

and certainty for Newman, may indicate, as he contends, that the proposition has a special place among our beliefs, still the detachment cannot be the

grounds of our certainty or a magical device whereby what was formerly incapable of being justifiably accepted with certainty is now able to be

justifiably accepted. Yet anything less than a treatment of the grounds of certainty

- an explanation of how we come to feel certain about propositions

to which we assent, for example -

will fail to come to grips with the problem with which Newman was ostensibly dealing.

To return to the papers of the 1840s, the 'Catholic problem of faith' cannot be solved merely by showing how it is that people come to have certain faith, but only by showing how they can be justified in their faith.

Non-Catholics would be only too willing to concede to Newman that there are explanations of why Catholics feel certain. What they question is whether one is entitled to feel this way, i.e. whether there are grounds for certainty. To hold, as Newman's analyses of inference and assent seem to commit him to holding, that one can never reason to a conclusion which recognized as a conclusion can be justifiably accepted with certainty, is to concede a negative answer. It is also to forget one theme of the earlier papers, that logical completeness is a quite different thing from subjective certainty.


Article Contentsp. [351]p. 352p. 353p. 354p. 355p. 356p. 357p. 358p. 359p. 360p. 361p. 362p. 363p. 364p. 365

Issue Table of ContentsReligious Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 309-433, iJudaism's Eternal Triangle [pp. 309-323]Some Reflections on the Ethics of Knowledge and Belief [pp. 325-336]The Faith/History Problem, and Kierkegaard's "A Priori" 'Proof' [pp. 337-345]The Impossibility of Miracles [pp. 347-349]Newman's Distinction between Inference and Assent [pp. 351-365]Subject and Object in Worship [pp. 367-375]Uchimura Kanz and His 'No Church Christianity': Its Origin and Significance in Early Modern Japan [pp. 377-390]The Buddha of Christendom: A Review of the Legend of Barlaam and Josaphat [pp. 391-406]Pure Land Buddhism and the Buddhist Historical Tradition [pp. 407-421]ReviewsReview: untitled [pp. 423-425]Review: untitled [pp. 425-427]Review: untitled [pp. 427-428]Review: untitled [pp. 428-430]Review: untitled [pp. 430-433]

Back Matter

eric steinberg - newman's distinction between inference and assent

Documents

grammar of assent

catholic problem of

newmans argument

newmans prior use

newmans papers

newmans writings

concepts of inference

jstor terms