eric s. heberlig - itamallman.rhon.itam.mx/~emagar/cv/cites/coxmagar/heberlig+larson200… ·...

Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the PermanentCampaignAuthor(s): Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. LarsonSource: Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Nov., 2005), pp. 597-624Published by: Comparative Legislative Research CenterStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598552 .Accessed: 26/05/2011 12:47

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ERIC S. HEBERLIG University of North Carolina at Charlotte

BRUCE A. LARSON Gettysburg College

Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign

In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of

campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election

cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and

principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise

surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.

As Jacobson (1985-86) pointed out, the individual reelection interests of House incumbents do not sit easily with the collective electoral interests of the congressional parties. But while incumbents will always give priority to their own reelections, there is clearly "a new accommodation between incumbents' individual and collective interests" (Sorauf 1992, 118). This new accommodation is illustrated by the increasing sums of campaign money provided by House incumbents to their fellow party candidates and to the congressional campaign committees (Bedlington and Malbin 2003; Herrnson 1997, 108-110; Herrson 2000, 97-100; Sabato and Larson 2002, 84-88).

This article offers an analysis of member-to-candidate and member-to-party contribution activity in the U.S. House. Earlier research by Wilcox (1989; 1990), Wilcox and Genest (1991), and Baker (1989) considerably advanced our understanding of member contribution activities, but these studies were conducted prior to the dramatic increase

LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY, XXX, 4, November 2005 597

Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson

in these activities that occurred during the 1990s. Moreover, this article builds on the primarily descriptive accounts of member contribution activities that have been offered by more-recent studies (Bedlington and Malbin 2003; Hermson 1997; Sabato and Larson 2002), providing a theoretical basis for understanding this activity.

House Incumbents as Campaign Contributors

House members have several ways of contributing to other candidates and to the party campaign committees. First, members can make contributions through their principal campaign accounts, the committees they use to raise and spend money for their own elections. Second, members may contribute through "leadership" political action committees, multicandidate committees sponsored by incumbents to raise and spend money on political activities outside of their own reelection campaigns. Contributions from both types of committees are, in effect, redistributions of the campaign funds that incumbents raise from individuals, political action committees (PACs), and political parties. Hence, we refer to this behavior generally as "redistribution activity."'

Different federal contribution limits govern donations from members' campaign committees and leadership PACs. For both types of committees, moreover, the regulations governing contributions to candidates differ from the regulations governing contributions to the national parties. (See Table 1 for a summary of the regulations.)

Theory and Hypotheses

We begin with the assumption that members desire reelection but also have goals of good public policy and power within the institution (Fenno 1973). We also assume that all members would prefer to serve in the majority party than in the minority party. Since it is the majority party that structures and controls the legislative process in the House, majority party members get policy outcomes closer to their ideal pref- erences than do minority party members (Sinclair 2002; but see Krehbiel 1998). Membership in the majority party also gives incumbents significant fund-raising advantages with corporate and trade PACs (Cox and Magar 1999), thereby helping to advance members' individual reelection goals. Thus, we expect contribution patterns to be responsive to the level of competition for majority control (see also Currinder 2003 and Kolodny and Dwyre 1998). As we will detail later, this responsiveness to competition will be especially important for members who have institutional positions that are more valuable to members of the majority party.

598

Redistributing Campaign Funds

TABLE 1 Federal Regulations Governing

Incumbent Hard-Money Contributions to Candidates and the Congressional Campaign Committees

Contributions to Contributions to the Congressional House Candidates Campaign Committees

Leadership PACs $5,000 per election $15,000 per calendar year

Incumbents' Campaign Committees $1,000 per election Unlimiteda

"The only condition is that the money must be unobligated (11 CFR 113.2). Source: Federal Election Commission.

An efficient redistribution of party campaign money-from financially flush members in safe seats to needy candidates in competitive contests-would benefit all party members by maximizing the party's chances of winning a House majority (Bianco 1999). But the promise of majority party control by itself may be insufficient to induce members to share their campaign resources. First, incumbents are notoriously nervous about the amounts of money they believe they need to win their own reelections (Jacobson 1997), and a member's surplus cash can be effectively employed to ward off challengers in future elections (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Epstein and Zemsky 1995). "Losers," as Jacobson (1985-86) noted, "do not share the collective benefits of the party's victory." Second, if a member's party wins a party majority, that legislator can reap the collective benefits associated with majority control (more-desirable policy outcomes, better fund- raising prospects) whether or not he or she contributed to the party's efforts. Thus, members would likely need selective incentives- exclusive benefits available only to members who contribute to the party's collective efforts-to motivate them to act in a way that serves the party (Olson 1965; Sandler 1992).

The primary incentive that parties have to offer is leadership positions. There are several types of leadership positions-elected and appointed party offices, committee and subcommittee chairs, and so on-with varying levels of responsibility to the party caucus. We argue that the greater the position's level of responsibility to the caucus, the greater the probability that the member will redistribute campaign funds for the collective benefit of the party and its members (for a similar argument on leadership powers generally, see Rohde 1991, 166).

599


Additionally, the greater the responsibility, the more valuable that position is likely to be to the individual member, which should make it likely that those who hold it or aspire to hold it will comply with fund-raising expectations.

The shared expectations of responsibility between the party caucus and its officeholders is important to explaining how and why fund- raising behavior has changed over time in the U.S. House and how it varies across different methods of making contributions. We hypothesize that fund-raising changes over time as party margins become closer and majority control is at stake. Members with the highest levels of collective responsibility, whose positions are most valuable when serving in the majority, should be most responsive to close party margins and should increase their contributions to others in order to maintain or capture majority status.

Members also have three different methods for making contributions: contributing to other candidates through their principal campaign account, contributing to their party's congressional campaign committee (CCC) through their principal campaign account, and contributing to other candidates through a leadership political action committee (LPAC).2 The methods members rely on are likely to tell us something about their goals and ambitions. Contributions to candidates, through a campaign account or an LPAC, allow the contributor to receive personal recognition by the recipient. That recipient, if elected, is then in a position to return the favor by voting for the contributor in party caucus for various positions. Thus, it is likely that contributions made through these methods are designed primarily to advance members' individual career ambitions, even if the indirect result also helps the party collectively. This motivation is especially likely within leadership PACs, as their name would imply.

Contributions to CCCs allow the party to target the money and do not allow a direct connection between the contributor and the ultimate candidate recipient. The contributor gives to the CCC to please the person(s) making the contribution request and to help the party achieve its goal of majority control. Those who contribute to CCCs, then, are likely to have some responsibility to the caucus or to party leaders.

In this section, we discuss one general set of hypotheses with two variations. Primarily we discuss which members are likely to redistribute their campaign funds to others. Our first variation on these hypotheses regards how the effect of the variable might differ over time in response to the competitiveness for majority control between the parties. The second variation on these hypotheses regards how a variable might have different effects on whether the contribution is made from a leadership PAC or from the member's campaign account to candidates or to CCCs. We summarize our expectations in Table 2.

600

TABLE 2 Summary of Hypotheses

Contributions to Congressional Contributions through Variable Contributions to Candidates Campaign Committees Leadership PACs

Position

Party Leader Chair/RM Contest for Position

Prestige Committee Subcommittee Leader Unelected Party Post

Partisanship Majority Party Party Loyalty Voting

Capacity to Contribute Electoral Margin Cash-on-Hand Grandfathered

Responsiveness to Potentialfor Majority Status Party Margin Chair x Party Margin Prestige x Party Margin Leader x Party Margin Unelected Party Post x Margin

+

+

+

+

+ ? ?

+

+

no relationship +

no relationship +

+

+

+

+

no relationship no relationship

+

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+-

no relationship NA NA

no relationship no relationship no relationship no relationship

7c

Ct Ct r-

s.

-c

fm

CI


Leadership Posts

Much of the contemporary literature on legislative parties char- acterizes leadership positions as a solution to overcoming collective action problems (Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995). The logic is straightforward: some House members are assumed to desire power and influence within the institution (Fenno 1973). Positions of power thus become a key resource in the party's arsenal of selective incentives. By creating well-endowed leadership positions and making them available only to members willing to serve the party's collective interests, parties harness members' individual power goals to achieve their own collective partisan ends. Biannual reselection to party posts and the greater value of majority over minority leadership positions ensure that members who occupy party leadership posts (and who desire reselection to them) continue to work for the party's collective electoral interests.3

The top elective party leadership positions are the most powerful party posts in each party's organization. Only a relatively small number of these party posts exist, making competition for each one fierce. Members who hold these positions are under pressure to meet members' expectations if they desire to remain in their posts or move up the leadership ladder. Those who fail to meet these expectations risk a challenge by an ambitious colleague who claims to be able to do better. If top leaders are expected by rank-and-file members to take the lead in serving the party's collective interests, as much of the literature on congressional parties emphasizes, then we should observe fund-raising behavior among the top leaders that aids the party collectively. This leadership behavior includes contributing to the party's candidates and to its congressional campaign committee, both of which advance the party goal of majority control. Thus, we expect a positive relationship between holding an elected party leadership position and all three types of redistribution activity.

Although the literature on congressional parties generally focuses on the top leadership positions as selective incentives, each party has an array of lower-level (mostly appointive) leadership positions designed to enlist broad involvement in leadership efforts (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983, 1995). In return for their efforts, members who hold these posts gain a voice in leadership decision making, the prestige of having a leadership title, and a perch from which to compete for higher leadership posts (Canon 1989; Price 2000). For several reasons, we expect party-directed fund-raising by members who occupy lower-level party posts. First, party leaders expect members holding these positions to be

602


supportive of the leadership's efforts on behalf of the party (Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1983, 1995). Members who aren't helpful risk being replaced with members who are. Second, ambitious members often use lower-level party posts to exhibit their leadership qualities as they groom themselves to compete for more-powerful positions (Canon 1989; Herrick and Moore 1993). Fund-raising ability and generosity are attributes that such members would likely want to display. In sum, members in lower-level party positions have considerable selective incentives to support the party's collective fund-raising goals, as well as to forge ties with individual members who may be voting in future leadership contests. Accordingly, we expect that members with lower- level party positions will redistribute more campaign dollars than members without such posts.

We qualify this hypothesis, however, in terms of how we expect members in lower-level party posts to contribute their funds. Although the number of members who sponsor LPACs has grown significantly during the past decade (Herrnson 2000; Sabato and Larson 2002), it probably remains true that only the most powerful members can raise the additional money necessary to underwrite a large PAC (Wilcox 1990, 171-72). Similarly, members who occupy lower-level party posts owe their positions to elected party leaders and thus are likely to be especially responsive to appeals to contribute to the CCCs. (Indeed, the member may have been appointed to the party's CCC.) Thus, we expect that occupying a lower-level party post will be positively associated with contributions from a member s principal campaign committee, particularly to the CCCs, but not with LPAC contributions.

In the contemporary Congress, party leaders have always- regardless of party margins-been expected to raise funds for individual party candidates (Baker 1989; Brown and Peabody 1992; Wilcox 1989, 1990). In doing so, leaders fulfill members' expectations that leaders help them individually (Sinclair 1983, 1995), while also helping to build the party's legislative numbers. Thus, we expect the effect of holding a party leadership post on contributing campaign money to individual candidates to be relatively stable across various levels ofparty margins. Yet, in terms of power, the value of a party leader's post is inextricably linked to the party's collective electoral fortunes. Thus, we hypothesize that contributions from party leaders to the congressional campaign committees should increase as party margins become smaller (and thus majority party control becomes at stake).

The parties also control numerous powerful committee positions that they can use to motivate responsible party behavior. Such positions primarily include committee leadership posts (chairs for the majority

603


party; ranking members for the minority) and prestige committee assignments. Party reforms imposed over the course of the past 30 years, such as caucuswide votes on committee leaders and increased leadership influence in the committee assignment process, have induced members who occupy these posts to act as responsible partisans (Deering and Smith 1997; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995). Under former Speaker Newt Gingrich's leadership, House Republicans went even further to bring committee leaders and members on prestige committees under party control (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Smith and Lawrence 1997), and the GOP continues to exercise significant control over important committee posts (Foerstel 2000; Hirschfield 2000).

Members who hold important committee positions have tradition- ally played primarily legislative roles. But with fierce competition for control of the House emerging in the mid-1990s, it seems likely that parties would expect members in important committee slots to step up their fund-raising efforts on behalf of the party and its candidates.4 After all, members who hold these positions enjoy greater fund-raising power (Grier and Munger 1993), and the value of these posts (in terms of power) is closely linked to the party's collective electoral fortunes. Prestige committee members, in fact, are expected to act as agents of the party (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Thus, we expect committee leaders and prestige committee members to redistribute more campaign funds than members without such posts, and the smaller the partisan margin, the larger the effect of holding a powerful committee post should be.

Each party also has numerous subcommittee positions to offer its members. We do not expect the same level of party fund-raising activity from subcommittee leaders as from committee leaders and prestige committee members. Our reasoning is straightforward: subcommittee leaders are chosen by partisan committee colleagues rather than by party leaders or through caucuswide votes. As Deering and Smith (1997) note, "[Their] accountability runs to committee colleagues rather than to the party caucus" (145). Although the value of subcommittee leaders' positions is linked to the party's electoral fortunes, the relative absence of caucuswide influence over who occupies these posts means that members who occupy them are likely to be judged on how well they serve the committee's, rather than the party's, goals. Subcommittee leaders' contributions are likely to go to individual members rather than to the party.

Members competing for a top party or committee leadership post also are likely to redistribute substantial sums. Since the late 1970s, contributing campaign money to candidates appears to have become

604


all but a requirement for members running for leadership slots (Baker 1989; Brown and Peabody 1992; Sabato and Larson 2002; Wilcox 1989, 1990), whether or not majority party control is at stake. Although contributions alone probably are insufficient for winning a post, we expect members running in party or committee leadership contests to contribute more than members not running in such contests. Moreover, the importance of getting direct credit for one's contributions implies that running in a leadership race will be associated primarily with contributions to candidates (from both LPACs and members 'principal campaign committees) rather than contributions to the CCCs.

Members' Policy Goals and Party Voting

Members have policy goals in addition to their goals of reelection and power. One way to evaluate the effect of members' policy goals on contributions is to look at the effect of party voting. The logic behind a relationship between party loyalty and redistributing campaign funds is as follows. In the House, majority party control enables a party to structure and control the legislative process, thereby allowing the majority party greater success in passing its policy agenda. But within each party, the importance of these structural advantages to a member should depend on the extent to which a member supports the party's policy positions. Majority party control should be more important to members who typically support their party's positions than to members who typically defect from their party's positions. Thus, the more supportive members are of their party on the floor, the more campaign money they will redistribute.

Members' Capacity to Raise Surplus Funds

Members' reelection goals should also affect their willingness to redistribute campaign money. As Jacobson (1985-86) argues, no incumbent would aid the party's collective electoral fortunes if doing so would endanger his or her own reelection prospects. Furthermore, parties do not want incumbents who are facing serious electoral threats to redistribute their campaign funds since an incumbent who loses reelection risks the party's goal of majority control. Thus, the more electorally secure members are in their districts, the more money they will redistribute through their principal campaign committees. We do not expect a relationship between a member's electoral security and LPAC contributions because members cannot use LPAC funds for their own reelections.

605


Members' capacity to raise surplus campaign funds-funds over and above what they need for their own reelections-should also be related to the sums of campaign money that they redistribute through their principal campaign accounts (although not through LPACs).5 Thus, we expect that the more campaign money with which a member begins the election cycle, the more campaign dollars that member will redistribute. Cash-on-hand also plays a particularly crucial role as a control variable in our model. Considering the fund-raising advantages that members in formal positions of power enjoy (Grier and Munger 1993), we think these members are likely to have larger campaign war chests than members without such posts. Including a cash-on-hand variable ensures that any relationship found between holding a leadership post and redistributing campaign funds is actually due to holding a leadership post, and not to the fund-raising advantages associated with holding a leadership position.

By affording members an advantage at raising money from corporate and trade PACs (Cox and Magar 1999), membership in the majority party provides incumbents with an increased capacity to raise surplus campaign funds. These advantages leave majority party members particularly well positioned to take advantage of the less- restrictive regulations associated with contributions to the CCCs through their principal campaign accounts and contributions to candidates through LPACs. As a result, we expect that members of the majority party will tend to channel greater sums of campaign money through the CCC and LPACs, whereas members of the minority party will give more money directly to candidates from their principal campaign accounts.

Members' willingness to contribute to collective goals also is likely to be affected by campaign finance rules. In the 96th Congress (1979- 80), Congress modified federal campaign-finance laws to prohibit retiring members from converting excess campaign funds into personal funds, but members of the 96th Congress "grandfathered" themselves from the prohibition. In 1989, Congress passed another law stating that after the 1992 elections, grandfathered members still serving in Congress would no longer be permitted to take advantage of the exemption (Fritz and Morris 1992, 83; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994). Thus, through 1992, grandfathered members should be less likely than nongrandfathered members to redistribute campaign funds from their principal campaign accounts.

606


Partisan Margins

Finally, we suspect that party margins will have an impact on members' redistribution activity. As margins narrow, the top party leaders should apply increasing pressure on all members to be more generous in financially supporting the party and its candidates (Kolodny and Dwyre 1998). Members have good reasons to respond more generously, lest they fall out of favor with the leaders who can do much to influence their legislative careers. They also can be more easily persuaded that their contributions make a difference when margins are slim. Thus, in addition to the interactive effects we hypothesize between party margins and various leadership positions, we expect that party margins will have an additive effect on all three types of redistribution activity. In particular, the smaller the margin between the two House parties, the more campaign funds each member will redistribute to the party and its candidates.

Data and Measurement

We collected data on U.S. House incumbent contributions to candidates and the CCCs from the 1989-90 through 1999-2000 election cycles. These data come from the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and serve as our dependent variables for the multivariate analyses. In the pooled analysis, we corrected contributions for inflation to make them comparable across time. Only contributions made by House incumbents to other House candidates and the House party campaign committees are included.

We obtained data on the following independent variables from Politics in America and The Almanac of American Politics for the relevant session of Congress. Party Leader is coded as 1 if a member holds an elected party leadership position, and as 0 otherwise.6 Com- mittee Leader is coded as 1 if a member occupies a committee chair- manship or ranking post, and as 0 otherwise. Involvement in a contest for a party or committee leadership position is coded 1 if Congres- sional Quarterly Weekly Report named the member in their coverage of the contest or if the most senior member of a committee became leader, 0 otherwise. Subcommittee Leader is coded 1 if a member is a subcommittee chair or ranking member; it is coded as 0 otherwise. Unelected Party Post is coded 1 if a member holds one of various lower-level party posts in the extended leadership structure, 0 otherwise.7 Prestige Committee is coded 1 if a member sits on Rules, Ways and Means, or Appropriations, 0 otherwise. Majority Party is coded 1

607


if the member was a Democrat in the 101st-103d Congresses or a Republican in the 104th-106th Congresses, 0 otherwise. Party Loyalty is a member's party loyalty voting score (as computed by Congres- sional Quarterly), adjusted for nonparticipation (z-score). Electoral Margin is a member's proportion of the vote in the previous election. Cash-on-Hand is the amount of money remaining in a member's principal account at the end of the previous election cycle. Party Margin is the difference between the number of seats held by the majority and minority parties at the beginning of the session of Congress. Members who were in Congress in 1980 and were Grandfathered under ethics rules that allowed them to keep campaign funds for personal use if they retired by 1993 are coded 1 for the 1990 and 1992 election cycles; after 1993, all members are coded 0 on this variable, as are members who did not qualify for grandfathering in the 1990 and 1992 election cycles. Finally, Party Margin is interacted separately with the member's status as a chair, prestige committee member, or party leader to test whether or not levels of contributions increase as margins decline and members' status hinges on the party's collective electoral fate.

In each case, measurement of the variables is taken from the Congress that corresponds to the concomitant election cycle (so, for example, the 101st Congress corresponds to the 1989-90 election cycle). Members who announced their retirements or their intention to run for higher office are excluded from the analysis.

The Financial Arms Race

Figure 1 shows the increase in contributions from members' campaign committees and LPACs to other House candidates and the CCCs across the election cycles of the 1990s. The increase in each category of contributions is dramatic. The smallest total increase from 1990 to 2000 in any category-contributions from one candidate to another-was 867% ($623,000 to $5.4 million). Contributions from candidates to the party campaign committees increased from less than halfa million per cycle to nearly $24 million-a 48,000% increase during the decade. Finally, House leadership PAC contributions to candidates increased by 4,234% (from $235,000 to nearly $10 million) over the same period. The increase in contributions on a percentage basis is most dramatic between the 1994 and 1996 elections in all categories, as both parties responded to the GOP's takeover of the House in 1994. These data show not only a massive increase in total giving but also a shift toward party organizations as the beneficiaries of the largess of members of Congress.

608


FIGURE 1 Campaign Contributions

by Members of the House of Representatives, 1989-2000

30

To Candidates 25 - -- To Congressional Campaign Committees

-.... To Candidates from Leadership PACs

,20 0 /

15

.g?'~~~~~~~~~~p / r~ /

I 10

5 . . r

0 I i

1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Election Cycle

Fueling, in part, the increased amount of money being redistributed was the increase in the number of members of Congress who participated. Figure 2 compares the extent of participation between the 1990 and 2000 election cycles. The percent of members who redistributed any money during the election cycle increased steadily from 61% in 1990 to 93% in 2000. The number of LPACs sponsored by House members increased from 21 in 1990 to 74 in 2000, with an increase of 47 between 1996 and 2000. Figure 2 shows that participation increased among all categories of members: Democrats, Republicans, party leaders, chairs and ranking members, members with prestige committee assignments, and rank-and-file members. The percentage of party leaders participating increased the least because 92% of them were already redistributing funds in 1990. All leaders redistributed by 1996.

Both parties' contributions skyrocketed. Democrats began the decade as the majority party and accounted for a disproportionate share of contributions during that period, making nearly 80% of all contributions and more than 98% of contributions to CCCs in the 1989-90 and 1991-92 cycles. Although Democratic contributions increased substantially (938%) by the end of the decade, Republican contributions

609


FIGURE 2 Percent Participation

in Redistributing Campaign Funds, 1990 vs. 2000 120 - -

2 0 1990 ? 100 I 100

1I *,8m 2000

80 11 m 1PI

60- ' ? !, ! ' flII ,,1

c- 40

20 -

I Party P

Party Prestige Total Democrats Republicans Leaders Chairs/RMs Committees Rank-and-File

Contributors

increased even more (2,412%). Figure 3 shows that the proportion of contributions made by Republicans increased substantially in the middle of the decade, rising to more than 60% of the total in the 1996 and 1998 cycles. The incumbent support program started by the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) during the 1993-94 election cycle (Babson and Donovan 1994) produced considerable increases in GOP contributions between 1992 and 1994, and contributions to the NRCC increased again during the 1995-96 cycle, as GOP incumbents rallied to defend their majority. LPAC contributions show the same patterns: Democrats dominated while they were in the majority (80% in 1990 and 1992), whereas Republicans made more than two- thirds of total LPAC contributions in 2000.

Some members of Congress, we hypothesized, have a greater ability and responsibility than others to raise and redistribute money to candidates and the party campaign committees. Contributions from party leaders increased in all categories over the course of the decade, but not evenly. Contributions from party leaders' campaign committees to candidates actually dropped by almost two-thirds between 1994 and 1996 ($618,000 to $243,000) and did not dramatically increase thereafter ($371,000 in 2000). In contrast, party leaders' contributions to CCCs increased by 1,400% across the same two election cycles. Leaders,

610


FIGURE 3 Contributions by Party, 1990-2000

100%

80% -

o , 60% -

0 c,

- 40%- 0

20% -

0%

1990 1992 1994 1996 Election Cycle

0 Democrats to Candidates

O Democratic Leadership PACs

* Republicans to CCCs

1998 2000

O Democrats to CCCs

[ Republicans to Candidates

E Republican Leadership PACs

then, are increasingly using LPACs to contribute to candidates but using their principal campaign committees to contribute to the party CCCs. Finally, although individual members in leadership positions clearly give a disproportionate share of total member contributions, this share declined across the decade in all categories. Figure 4 displays trends in the portion of funds contributed by party leaders, chairs and ranking members, prestige committee members, and rank-and-file members for the 1990-2000 election cycles. Leaders' proportion of contributions to candidates was more than halved (from 16% to 6%), and their share of contributions to the CCCs declined from 20% to 14%. Perhaps most significant, leaders accounted for one-half of the total LPAC contributions in 1990 but less than one-fourth of LPAC donations in 2000.

Contributions from committee chairs and ranking members grew from $220,000 in 1990 to $5.8 million in 2000, an increase of more than 2,500%. Moreover, the proportion of chairs and ranking members

r

611

-

:L:


FIGURE 4 Distribution of Contributions, 1990 vs. 2000 Elections

To Candidates To Candidates To CCCs To CCCs Leade (1990) (2000) (1990) (2000) PACs(

Type of Contribution (Election Cycle)

rship Leadership 1990) PACs (2000)

* Party Leaders U Chairs/RMs O Prestige Committees 0 Rank-and-File

contributing increased from 64% to 94% (Figure 2), reflecting the fact that the power that members enjoy in these posts hinges on their party's collective electoral success. Prestige committee members also increasingly used their leverage to redistribute funds as the decade progressed. Their contributions to the CCCs were especially generous, rocketing from $117,000 in 1990 to more than $9.5 million in 2000-an increase of 8,000%. In 1990, less than two-thirds (63%) of prestige committee members contributed; by 2000, the vast majority (87%) contributed (Figure 2). These figures are consistent with the heightened party responsibility that members on prestige committees have (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rohde 1991).

The contributions of rank-and-file members illustrate the extent to which redistributing campaign funds has become a widespread practice in the U.S. House. Rank-and-file members hold neither leadership positions nor key committee assignments that would allow them to raise extra funds to give to other candidates and the parties. Nor would such members have any special responsibility to contribute

612

100% -

80% - ._

o

0

'-D

0

o

o 40% - S. 0

20% -

0% -

20% -


funds to their party's election efforts. Nevertheless, total contributions from rank-and-file members increased almost 1,000% during the decade, including a 324% increase in contributions to candidates and a 6,100% increase in contributions to the CCCs. Somewhat more than half of rank-and-file members made some type of contribution in the 1990 cycle (57%), but 82% contributed by 2000. Moreover, rank-and-file members are increasingly giving through LPACs. In 2000, 10% of rank- and-file members had an LPAC (up from 2% in 1990), and these PACs doled out 25% of the total LPAC contributions in 2000 (up from 10% in 1990).

Contributions increased dramatically during the 1990s because nearly all members began chipping in, and they did so generously. Although raising money for party candidates and committees is seen as a leadership function-and leaders still generally redistribute the largest sums of campaign money-leaders' share of contributions declined over the decade. Other members of Congress are increasingly pulling their own weight. The role of the leadership now includes mobi- lizing other members to raise and contribute money, rather than single- handedly doing the fund-raising chores on behalf of everyone else.

Multivariate Analysis

We present tobit analyses of the sums of contributions given by individual House members. Specifically, we analyzed three dependent variables corresponding to our descriptive analysis: (1) contributions from a member's campaign committee to House candidates, (2) contributions from a member's campaign committee to his or her party's congressional campaign committee, and (3) contributions from a member's leadership PAC to House candidates. We used tobit as the analytic technique because contributions are censored at 0 (Long 1997). We first present a pooled model of all contributions across the decade, with contributions adjusted for inflation. We then present an analysis of selected variables in each election cycle to analyze changes in contribution behavior over time in more detail. The -2xLLR statistics indicate that all models are significant at the .01 level.

A brief explanation of the tobit estimates and their interpretation is in order. As in Long 1997 (75-79, 209), the estimates in Table 3 represent the discrete change in Ey, the expected actual contributions by members when a specific independent variable xk changes from one value to another, holding all other x's constant.8 For a dichotomous independent variable xk, the change in xk is from 0 to 1, with the remaining dichotomous independent variables set at 0 and the continuous

613


independent variables held at their respective means.9 For a continuous independent variable xk, change inxkis a one-standard-deviation change centered around xk's mean, with the dichotomous independent variables set at 0 and the remaining continuous independent variables held at their respective means.

We hypothesized that a member's position in Congress would be related to contributions. The evidence in Table 3 supports this contention. Party and committee leaders and prestige committee members give significantly more money to other candidates and to their CCCs; they also give significantly more money through LPACs than do other members of Congress. Not surprisingly, the results are substantively stron- gest for party leaders: a change from 0 to 1 on Party Leader produces, on average, a $9,200 increase in campaign contributions from a leader's principal campaign committee to other candidates, a $43,427 increase in contributions from a leader's campaign committee to the party's CCC, and a $70,744 increase in contributions from a leader's PAC to other candidates. Leaders' positions in Congress give them the responsibility to help their party retain power and the leverage to extract money from donors; in the interest of maintaining their positions, leaders comply.

Other positions are related to giving as well. As predicted, members serving in unelected party posts give more to the CCCs (p < .05) and to candidates (p < .10), although the estimates are considerably smaller than the estimates for the top party leaders. Also as expected, there is no statistically significant relationship between holding an unelected party post and LPAC contributions. Unlike the top party posts, unelected party positions do not provide members with the power to raise the additional sums of campaign money necessary to underwrite large PACs. The results in Table 3 show that subcommittee leaders also give slightly more to other candidates (p < .10), although not to the CCCs and not through LPACs. Owing their responsibility to party caucuses on their committees (rather than to the full party caucus), subcommittee leaders appear to escape the fund-raising responsibilities that now apply to full committee leaders.

Members running for top party and committee leadership posts also contribute greater sums of campaign dollars to other candidates through their principal campaign committees and LPACs. Substantively, a change from 0 to 1 on Contestfor Position produces, on average, a $3,047 increase in campaign contributions to other candidates from a member's principal campaign committee and a bigger $14,541 increase in contributions to candidates from the member's PAC. (Of course, a member running for a leadership post may well give through both types of committees.) As expected, moreover, leadership aspirants do not

614

TABLE 3 Tobit Analysis of Contributions by Members of the House of Representatives, 1990-2000 Election Cycles

Change in x Dollars to Candidates Dollars to the CCCs Dollars to Candidates Variable (from, to) from Campaign Committees from Campaign Committees from Leadership PACs

Position Party Leader Committee Leader Prestige Committee Unelected Party Post Subcommittee Leader Contest for Position

Partisanship Majority Party Party Loyalty Scores (z)

Capacity to Contribute Electoral Margin Cash-on-Hand Grandfathered

Responsiveness to Party Margins Party Margin

Interactive Terms Party Leader x Party Margin

Committee Leader x Party Margin

Prestige Committee x Party Margin

Unelected Party Post x Party Margin

Constant Ey at mean 1D(z) at mean N= -2xLLR

(0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 1)

(0, 1) (-.50, .50)

(61, 75) (33,187, 257,062)

(0, 1)

34, 68

(0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin (0, 1; Party Margin

Note: *p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.

70744*** 11627** 5039** 3172 1862

14541***

9200*** 1398*** 1726*** 1568* 495*

3047***

-818*** 629***

375*** 657***

-1765***

-1344***

7790** 10614**

1887 970

2261** 1255** 1400** 1712** -430 13078 .58 2266 539.39***

7675*** 1485*

1140

43427*** 5245*** 1460** 4767** -361 1887

2430*** 999**

499 2283***

17

-7944***

77582*** 20059***

8339** 2901** 2715**

506** 4833 2636 -3030 46816 .38 2267 798.00***

CD 0- cn 6.r

af

'IO

p0-.

C, -n

34) 68) 34) 68) 34) 68) 34) 68)

-7184***

77692 64356 12481 10834 5853 4324 3092 3221 -27715*** 78274 .08 2268 324.27***


give significantly more than other members to the party CCCs. Members vying for leadership positions clearly prefer to give directly to individual candidates, who-if they win-will be part of the electorate in the leadership contest.

Majority party control also affects contribution patterns. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that, as predicted, members of the majority party tend to route larger sums of contributions through the CCCs and LPACs, while members of the minority party give more money directly to candidates. Substantively, majority party membership has the biggest influence on LPAC contributions: majority party incumbents give an average of $7,675 more through LPACs than do members of the minority party. As noted earlier, majority party members have a greater capacity to raise money (Cox and Magar 1999) and can redistribute it through the venues with the least restrictive contribution limits. Majority status also confers the enhanced fund-raising ability necessary to market an LPAC successfully.

As expected, a member's support for party policy also influences contributions. In particular, the statistically significant estimates for Party Loyalty in all three equations indicate that the more that members support their party's majority on the House floor, the more campaign dollars they redistribute to other candidates and to the party's CCC. The Party Loyalty estimates are substantively modest, however: a one-standard- deviation increase in Party Loyalty centered around its mean produces an average increase of $629 in contributions from members' principal campaign committees to other candidates, $999 from members' campaign committees to the party CCCs, and $1,140 from members' LPACs to other candidates.

A member's capacity to contribute also affects contribution behavior. The more campaign cash a member begins the election cycle with, the more that member gives to candidates and to the CCCs.?1 But even relatively large increases in cash-on-hand spur only limited generosity among incumbents. For example, the Cash-on-Hand estimate in the CCC equation indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in cash-on-hand centered around its mean-a change from $33,187 to $257,062-led to an average increase ofjust $2,283 in contributions to the party CCCs. Members involved in uncompetitive races are significantly more likely than members in competitive contests to contribute through their campaign accounts to other candidates, although not to the CCCs or through LPACs. As predicted, members exempted from ethics laws prohibiting the conversion of campaign funds for personal use upon retirement gave less to other candidates but no more or less to the party CCCs.

616


In redistributing campaign funds, members also respond to the level of competitiveness for the control of the institution. Incumbents give significantly more money using all three methods as the seat margin between the parties declines (as indicated by the negative coefficients). For example, the Party Margin estimate in the CCC equation indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in Party Margin centered around its mean-a change from 34 to 68-led to an average decrease of $7,944 in contributions from members' principal campaign accounts to the party CCCs. This finding is consistent with our reasoning that party leaders will pressure members to be more generous as party margins tighten.

As predicted, moreover, the effect of several leadership variables on contributions is conditioned by party margins. When Party Margin is set at 34, for example, a change in the Party Leader variable from 0 to 1 produces a $77,582 increase in contributions from party leaders to the CCCs. By contrast, when Party Margin is set at 68, a change in Party Leader from 0 to 1 produces only a $20,059 increase in contributions from party leaders to the CCCs. We also found responsiveness to party margins in the committee system, although to a lesser degree. Committee leaders give more to the party CCCs as seat margins decline, a trend suggesting that the top party leaders have become a constitu- ency for chairs desiring to hold their positions (Smith and Lawrence 1997). Prestige committee members also respond positively to declining seat margins, by giving more both to the party CCCs and to other candidates. Substantively the estimates for Prestige Committee are modest, however, relative to those for committee and, especially, party leaders.

Yet not all forms of leadership giving are conditioned by party margins. The top party leaders, as well as members in unelected party posts, appear to contribute slightly less campaign money from their campaign committees to other candidates when party margins are smaller than when they are larger. Moreover, LPAC contributions are not conditional on party margins for any leadership variable. Members in these posts, it seems, use LPAC contributions to solidify their hold on their positions, and they do so regardless of party margins.

Across the six election cycles, there are obvious differences in relationships between the independent variables and contributions. Our concern is with the positional variables of greatest theoretical interest. Table 4 presents the results for the majority party, elected party leaders, committee leaders, and prestige committee members for each election cycle. We ran the full models to estimate the results shown in Table 4, excluding party margins (which are constant for each year), interactions,

617

TABLE 4 Tobit Estimates of Dollars Contributed by Institutional Position, 1990-2000 Election Cycles oo

Change (from, to) 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Contributions to candidates from members' campaign committee tT

Party Leader (0, 1) 10782*** 6120*** 22344*** 5008* 20889*** 4482 Committee Leader (0, 1) 254 572 -620 4882*** 138 6481*** Prestige Committee (0, 1) 348 340 995 3893*** 4502*** 3584*** Majority Party (0, 1) -1059** 658 -2479*** -53 -1723** -598 9

Ey at mean 8073 9096 18080 17895 17237 23211

Contributions to CCCs from members' campaign committees

Party Leader (0, 1) 2196*** 1775*** 3188** 114182*** 243002*** 155181*** Committee Leader (0, 1) 196 181 291 -183 15783** 49643*** Prestige Committee (0, 1) -35 39 98 481 3136 16718*** Majority Party (0, 1) 1799*** 2875*** -1133*** 4811 3320 5779*

Ey at mean 8074 5683 7207 87741 82788 89224

Contributions to candidates from members' leadership PACs

Party Leader (0, 1) 42710*** 46886*** 59092*** 63681*** 131819*** 120775*** Committee Leader (0, 1) 6407 5773** 12818** 13963* 23560** 15633 Prestige Committee (0, 1) 3074 2697 1939 -2193 4891 19695** Majority Party (0, 1) 3156 6661** 18263** 1199 10747* 16969**

Ey at mean 42730 35969 90463 105244 99858 141488

Note: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.


and the grandfather dummy variables after 1992.11 As in Table 3, the estimates in Table 4 reflect the discrete change in Ey when a specific dichotomous variable, xk, changes from 0 to 1, with the remaining dichotomous independent variables set at 0 and the continuous independent variables held at their respective means.

The results for Majority Party show a fair amount of stability, the GOP's ascension to the House majority party in the 1995-96 election cycle notwithstanding. As predicted, minority party members typically contribute more dollars to candidates from their principal campaign accounts than do majority party members, regardless of which party is in the minority. This finding holds true for all but one election cycle, and the relationship achieves statistical significance in three cycles. Also as expected, majority party members consistently contribute more to the CCCs and to candidates through LPACs than do minority party members. (The sole exception is for the 1994 election cycle, when Republicans gave more than Democrats to the CCCs, as Gingrich mobilized his party around the Contract with America.) Clearly, the fund-raising advantages of majority party control leave majority party members well positioned to take advantage of the less-restrictive regulations associated with contributions to the CCCs through their principal campaign accounts and contributions to candidates through LPACs.

The results in Table 4 also confirm the consistently critical role of party leaders in fund-raising. For each contribution method in each election cycle, party leaders contribute significantly more than do others. (The sole exception is contributions to candidates in the 2000 election cycle.) The importance of committee leaders and prestige committee members in the party's fund-raising efforts is more recent; they have contributed significantly more money to candidates and the CCCs only after party margins tightened following the Republican takeover in 1995.

Committee leaders contributed significantly more money than other members through LPACs in two of the three elections prior to the Republican takeover (and only at a .10 level in 1992). That committee leaders were using LPACs to contribute probably indicates that they were redistributing money to advance their own individual ambitions rather than to help the party win majority status per se during this era. After the battle for majority status intensified, however, their behavior became more like that of party leaders: they contributed generously through all possible hard-money avenues.

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Conclusion

Majority party control gives incumbents many individual benefits, including chairmanships, control of the legislative process, and enhanced fund-raising ability. Accordingly, many members are willing to divert resources from their own reelection efforts to help the party win majority control. As partisan majorities narrowed in the 1990s, the "permanent campaign" intensified (Orstein and Mann 2000). Congressional parties also became more polarized and homogenized and they delegated more power to party leaders (Rohde 1991). Given this political context, members of Congress became increasingly willing to support the collective electoral interests of their respective parties.

Specifically, House members have been increasingly willing to deploy their campaign funds to advance the collective electoral fortunes of their parties. As the evidence presented in this paper illustrates, redistributive efforts of all kinds have increased substantially over the course of the past decade, and greater numbers of incumbents have been involved in the party efforts. Party leaders still provide the largest aggregate sums of campaign contributions, but leaders' willingness and ability to persuade other incumbents to give has considerably broad- ened the overall party campaign. In particular, those members with institutional positions whose value is most dependent on majority status- elected party leaders, committee chairs and ranking members, and prestige committee members-have been most responsive to party margins in their redistributive activities.

These redistributive activities have important implications. First, to the extent that member contributions are now a prerequisite for advancing in House party and committee hierarchies, the ability and willingness to redistribute campaign money will play a role in determining who leads in Congress. Indeed, some political observers have criti- cized this apparent trend, arguing that legislative skills-and not fund- raising ability-should be the primary qualification for securing a leadership post in Congress. Second, the recycling of campaign money ultimately redistributes campaign funds from electorally secure incumbents to needy candidates in competitive contests (Hermson 1997; 2000). The result is a more-rational allocation of campaign resources that potentially enhances electoral competition in select House races. Finally, the intense competition for control of the House, combined with the soft-money ban that took effect following the 2002 elections, guaran- tees that member contribution activity will remain important into the early years of the 21st century.12 The ban on soft money critically advantages those who have large sums of hard money to contribute.

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As demonstrated in this article, members of Congress have shown a clear willingness to redistribute hard money to their party and its candidates over the past decade.

Eric S. Heberlig is Associate Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City Boulevard, Charlotte, North Carolina 28223-0001. Bruce A. Larson is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Gettysburg College, 300 North Washington Street, Box 406, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 17325-1486.

NOTES

1. Incumbents may also make contributions to other candidates or the party campaign committees from their own personal funds. This study limits itself to contributions from members' reelection committees and leadership PACs.

2. Leadership PACs make very few contributions to CCCs; thus, we do not analyze them separately. The fact that LPACs' contributions go almost entirely to other candidates, from whom the PAC sponsor can receive direct recognition, sub- stantiates the perception that the primary purpose of LPACs is to advance the sponsor's career ambitions.

3. As Sinclair (1983, 1995) reminds us, members expect leaders to assist them individually. Through fund-raising, leaders can advance the party's collective goals by assisting members individually. By contributing to an incumbent in a close contest, a leader fulfills the member's expectation of leadership assistance while advancing the collective goal of majority party control. A leader's contributions to the party's CCC provide the committee with funds to assist individual candidates in competitive contests, enhancing the party's likelihood of achieving or maintaining a majority.

4. Some anecdotal evidence exists in support of our hypothesis (see especially Timothy J. Burger. 1994. "Gingrich Hits Up Members for $3M to GOP." Roll Call (11 August): 1, 26; Amy Keller. 1998. "Helping Each Other Out: Members Dip into Campaign Funds for Fellow Candidates." Roll Call (15 June): 1,24, 26; Jim VanderHei. 1999. "Hastert Launches ROMP II for House Members." Roll Call (13 September): 1,58.

5. Leadership PACs are separate committees that members cannot use to support their own reelection. Thus, the sums redistributed by LPACs should generally be unrelated to the sums that members can raise through their principal campaign committees.

6. Elected party leaders include the Speaker, the party's floor leader, whip, caucus/conference chair and vice chair, conference secretary, Research Committee chair, Policy Committee chair, and chair of the CCC.

7. Members of the extended leadership organization include Steering Commit- tee members, Research/Policy Committee members, CCC members, and members in the whip system.

621


8. For the tobit model, expectedy comes from the equation Ey = >(z)xb + oa(z), where ( is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, ) is the standard normal density, z = xb/c, and a is the estimated standard deviation of the residuals (Long 1997, 209). Since I(z) depends on the value of the xb's, the partial derivatives and expected values must be calculated at specific values of the x's. The p-values presented refer to the tobit coefficients for latent y*, from which the discrete changes in Ey were generated; all discussions of statistical significance therefore pertain to these coefficients.

9. Thus, for example, when we hold all other x's constant, we calculate the

change in observed y when xk changes from 0 to 1 as E(ylx,xk = 1) - E( x,xk = 0). 10. Here, we exclude Cash-on-Hand since members cannot transfer extra money

from their principal campaign account to their PAC. 11. The results for the other variables are available from the authors. 12. The major provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act ban

soft-money donations to national party committees and limit contributions to state

party committees to $10,000; increase hard-money contribution limits for individual contributors from $1,000 to $2,000 per election cycle; and require that issue ads that refer to a federal candidate within 60 days of an election be paid for with hard money (see Malbin 2003).

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