Refugees Without Refuge:

A Study of the Nexus Between Egypt’s Geopolitics and its Policies Towards Three Disparate Refugee

Communities

Eric R. Olson '12

Honors Thesis Professor Jennifer Fluri, Advisor

Professor Carol Bohmer, Second Reader Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies

June 2012

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Acknowledgements First, and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Fluri for providing invaluable advice throughout this year long process. Without her extensive guidance, critical eye, and endless support this work would never have come close to completion. Writing a thesis has been the most rewarding academic experience of my Dartmouth career, and I sincerely appreciate the extensive time Professor Fluri devoted to working with me over the last year. It was truly a pleasure. I must also acknowledge three other individuals who greatly aided me over the course of the last year, especially my second reader Professor Carol Bohmer, my RWIT editor and good friend Jacob Batchelor ’12, and Professor Mostafa Ouajjani, who provided invaluable assistance with translation. I’d also like to thank my friends for supporting me throughout this process, in addition to my parents, Eric and Nancy Olson, who have ceaselessly supported me for twenty-two years. Finally, I wish to dedicate this thesis to my friends in the refugee community in Cairo, who I was fortunate enough to work and teach with in the fall of 2009. The nature of refugee flow complicates continued communication, and I have lost touch with many of my friends and students, but the impact these amazing, intelligent, and continually optimistic individuals had on my life directly influenced me to focus my thesis in the field of refugee studies. I owe them my deepest gratitude.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1:: Background and Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Why Egypt?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 History of Refugee Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Role of the Host State in Refugee Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Role of UNHCR in Refugee Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Nature of Contemporary Refugee Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

CHAPTER 2: Egyptian Governmental Policies Towards Refugees. . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Reservations on the 1951 Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 The 1954 Memorandum of Understanding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 UNHCR and RSD Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 CHAPTER 3: The Palestinian Refugee Experience in Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

The Nasser Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 The Sadat Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 The Mubarak Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 CHAPTER 4: The Sudanese Refugee Experience in Egypt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 History of Sudanese Refugee Flow in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Obstacles to Study of the Refugee Population in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The Sudan-Egypt Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Change in Policy Towards Sudanese Refugees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 CHAPTER 5: The Iraqi Refugee Experience in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Unique RSD Procedures For Iraqi Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 U.S. Influence On Egyptian Treatment of Iraqi Refugees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 CHAPTER 6: Recommendations and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Recommendations at the International Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Recommendations at the Egyptian Governmental Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 Recommendations at the UNHCR Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Recommendations at the Refugee Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Appendix 1 - Four Freedoms Agreement Translation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Works Cited. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

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Introduction

Massive refugee flows constitute one of the greatest contemporary humanitarian

challenges of our time. There is an urgent need to discern the most effective means of

administering to the nearly 43 million displaced persons across the globe.1 Refugee

protection primarily occurs as a humanitarian action because the very existence of

refugee populations indicates a failure on behalf of a national government to provide

adequate protection to its citizens. The absence of governmental protection greatly

increases the probability that refugee populations will endure gross human rights

violations, which in many instances can only be prevented by benevolent humanitarian

assistance. Upon displacement, refugees live under the protection of a number of

different organizations; refugee communities depend on humanitarian assistance for a

multitude of services, ranging from basic necessities such as water to the procurement of

a permanent solution to their plight through resettlement. Unfortunately, refugee

advocacy often fails to safeguard refugees from the detrimental effects that naturally

accompany displacement. Effective implementation of refugee protection hinges on the

efficacy of refugee administration: specifically, the means by which different

organizations classify, control, and manage domestic refugee populations. To discern the

most efficient manner of refugee administrative, it is necessary to identify the factors

influencing the sufficiency or inadequacy of refugee assistance at all levels of the refugee

phenomenon. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1 Sedghi, Amy and Simon Rogers. “UNHCR 2011 refugee statistics: full data,” The Guardian, 20 June

Background and Overview 1

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The framework of this study consists of a ‘top-down analysis,’ beginning at the

international level, and continuing to the domestic, national level, with particular focus

on how these two levels interact and influence refugee administration. The reason for

this methodology is that refugee flows are intrinsically linked at the international and

domestic levels. Mass migration occurs in response to instability at the domestic level, at

which point populations enter the international arena by seeking refuge in a ‘host state,’

the country that opens up its border to individuals fleeing persecution. Once residing in a

host state, refugee communities live under the aegis of both the host state government

and existing administrative bodies, subject to the policies outlined by both actors. The

administrative policies of a host state for refugee communities vary wildly, dependent on

the unique conditions of the specific host state. Economic, social, and political factors all

directly influence the refugee policy of a host state, combining idiosyncratically in a way

that is dependent on the distinct situation in the host state. Thus, the refugee issue is

herein examined always in the context of an individual host state, as removing the

refugee from the surrounding environment ignores a basic reality of refugee situations.

For this reason, this study narrowly focuses on a particular host state, Egypt, in order to

ascertain the best methods of refugee advocacy in that country.

This study analyzes Egypt’s international geopolitics through the historical

management of its domestic refugee populations. The disparate methods employed by

Egypt over time and across different categories of refugees reveal the important linkages

between international refugee management policy as connected more to international

geopolitical strategies than to the needs or actions of the refugee populations within its

borders. The relationship between domestic refugee populations and the Egyptian

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government often parallels the broader relationship between the population’s country of

origin and the Egyptian government. In this sense, the Egyptian government’s actions

towards refugee populations operate as a state-governing substitute. Its policies reflect

both the friendly and acrimonious nature of this relationship. Refugee communities lack

the power to resist sometimes-oppressive measures enacted by the Egyptian government.

Thus, geopolitics directly affects the daily lives and experiences of refugee communities

in Egypt. Analyzing the historical experience of three different refugee communities in

Egypt – the Palestinian, Sudanese, and Iraqi populations – will identify the broader trends

that improve or worsen the average refugee experience in Egypt; this analysis constitutes

the first primary objective of this study. Once determining the prevailing trends in

Egyptian refugee administration, the different levels of administration are examined in an

attempt to ascertain policy changes maximizing effective refugee administration and

advocacy. In keeping with the multi-tiered nature of contemporary refugee movements,

recommendations are posited at a specific level of the refugee regime in Egypt. If

implemented, these policy recommendations will drastically increase refugee protection

in Egypt.

Why Egypt?

For a number of reasons, Egypt is an appropriate and important focus of

this study. Historically, Egypt has acted as a haven for refugees fleeing instability,

indicating that an analysis of refugee administration in Egypt will have implications for

future refugee flows. Two factors directly foster Egypt’s status as a refugee sanctuary.

First, Egypt has an open-door policy that generally allows any individual seeking refuge

to reside within its borders. Second, Egypt’s geographical location, straddling the Middle

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East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Mediterranean, dictates its use “since

biblical times”2 as a refuge for many different populations fleeing from instability in their

homeland. The Middle East and North Africa currently contain “the largest refugee

population in the world,”3 with six million displaced persons currently residing in the

region. Today, Cairo hosts “one of the five largest refugee populations living in urban

areas,”4 comprised of communities of many different origins. Egypt’s status as “one of

the few stable countries in the region”5 coupled with the government’s tendency to be

“generous in opening up its border to refugees, especially those coming from neighboring

countries”6 greatly influences the decision of many refugees to seek at least temporary

refuge there. For example, since the Libyan revolution of 2011, 500,000 Libyans have

been displaced into neighboring Egypt,7 and the continuous presence of refugees

indicates the likelihood of future refugee flows through Egypt. Due to the historical

ubiquity of mass migration in Egypt, an analysis of the factors affecting refugee policy in

this country will help meaningfully administrate future displaced populations.

After the January 25th Revolution, which ended the thirty-year reign of Hosni

Mubarak, Egypt finds itself in the unique position to reformulate much of its policy

towards refugee administration. As will be discussed later, many of the integral features

of the refugee structure in Egypt have remained unchanged for over fifty years, impeding

the implementation of an effective and protective refugee administration. If Egypt seizes

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2 Zohry, Ayman. “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees.” Circulations migratoires et reconfigurations territoriales entre l’Afrique noire et l’Afrique du Nord, CEDEJ, Cairo 17-18 November, 1 3 Roudi, Farzaneh, “Population Trends and Challenges in the Middle East and North Africa,” Population Research Bureau, Dec. 2001, Web. 31 March 2012, 6 4 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 1 5 Grabska, Katarzyna. “Who Asked Them Anyway?: Rights, Policies and Wellbeing of Refugees in Egypt.” The American University in Cairo - Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, July 2006. Web. 8 Oct. 2011, 13 6 Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyway?,” 18 7 “UNHCR – Egypt,” UNHCR. UNHCR, 2012. Web. 1 June 2012.

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this unprecedented opportunity to implement a reformed refugee policy, subsequent

refugee communities will not endure the harsh nature characteristic of the average

refugee experience in Egypt. This will simultaneously increase the possibility of

reaching a reasonable solution to existing refugee situations. Thus, implementing

reformed, more effective refugee policies will benefit refugee communities by providing

greater protection, and the Egyptian government by decreasing the possibility of

intractable refugee flows within Egypt’s borders, which creates an immense social

burden.

Finally, I developed a personal interest in the study of refugees in Egypt over the

last four years. In the fall of 2009, I lived and worked in Cairo as an intern for the

refugee advocacy organization Student Action for Refugees (STAR), which aimed to

empower the refugee community in Egypt through free, weekly English classes. My

experience over the three months I spent working with members of the refugee

community exposed me a dynamic, vibrant population that exuded intelligence, interest

in learning, and boundless optimism in the face of constant hardship. Furthermore, I

witnessed firsthand the dire circumstances that many members of this community

experience in Egypt: a friend from Iraq disappeared for days after being detained by the

Egyptian security forces, students from Sudan felt unsafe walking through the streets of

Cairo, and another Sudanese student returned home after his family was kidnapped,

essentially trading his life for their safety. Clearly, the current measures taken to ensure

refugee advocacy in Egypt fall far short of providing adequate protection to this

community. In addition, next fall I will return to Cairo to intern at the Resettlement

Legal Aid Project (RLAP), where I will tangibly apply the research gleaned from this

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study in an everyday capacity. For these reasons, I believe that a study of the current and

historical trends of refugee administration and advocacy in Egypt will yield relevant and

applicable recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of Egypt’s refugee

protection apparatus.

History of Refugee Management

After the horrific genocides of World War II and ensuing mass migratory

movements, the international community recognized the need to protect individuals

whose home countries could not, by either choice or circumstance, provide them with

adequate protection. In hopes of preventing further atrocities, the United Nations in 1951

convened the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (CRSR), which laid the

groundwork for international refugee protection. This convention outlined the currently-

used definition of refugee as an individual who:

Owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.8

Importantly, this convention originally protected only the displaced peoples of Europe

until 1967, when the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugee removed geographical

criteria and globally extended protection for displaced populations. The original

definition composed by the 1951 United Nations Convention aids governments in

minimizing refugees, because “in the strictest sense, most of today’s refugees do not

qualify.”9 Although efforts have been made to revise the definition to be more inclusive,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8 UN General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, 1 June 2012, 1 9 Mayotte, Judy A. Disposable People?: The Plight of Refugees. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1992. Print. 3-4

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nations have routinely rejected any modifications in order to minimize legal obligations.10

These two treaties form the legal basis for the primary means of international refugee

humanitarian assistance with 147 states party to at least one of these instruments.11

Namely, its signatories are required to cooperate with the organization United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) “in the exercise of its functions.”12

Moreover, after the 1951 convention, UNHCR began to establish offices in many

countries prone to experiencing refugee flows. UNHCR’s function in Egypt is examined

in detail in Chapter 2.

Role of the Host State in Refugee Management

The majority of host states, Egypt included, enacted policies that minimize their

role in refugee protection, but still allow refugees to access their borders, providing a bare

minimum level of protection. A prominent scholar in the field of refugee studies, Gil

Loescher, succinctly describes the archetypical host state response:

Host country involvement has generally been quite limited, focusing on the admission and recognition of refugees on their territory; respect for the principle of non-refoulement … and the provision of security to refugees and humanitarian personnel.13

By limiting the amount of assistance extended to domestic refugee communities, host

states can create intractable refugee situations by minimizing refugee assistance to such

an extent that refugee populations cannot fund emigration from Egypt, stranding them

within its borders. Thus, although host state governments may intend to prevent local

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10 Haddad, Emma. The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Print, 27 11 “Status Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol,” UNHCR. UNHCR, April 1, 2011. Web. 1 June 2012 12 UN General Assembly, 3 13 Loescher, Gil. Protracted Refugee Situations: Political, Human Rights and Security Implications. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2008. Print, 124

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integration by enacting restrictive policies, in reality these measures may work

counteractively, lengthening the existence of domestic refugee communities.

In host states, refugees are seen as ‘outsiders’ for society, and governments

employ refugee communities as an ‘other’ in order to advance the government’s political

agenda. Host state governments manipulate societal perception of refugees, espousing

political rhetoric reflecting the current state of the relationship between the government

and domestic refugee populations. The media provides the most effective medium to

disseminate prevailing political discourse, and my analysis of three populations,

Palestinian, Sudanese, and Iraqi will illustrate how popular media, especially state-run

media, reflects the host government’s agenda.

As mentioned earlier, the host state plays the primary role in determining the

conditions of the average refugee experience. But, host state policy continually evolves,

dynamically responding to events at the international and domestic level. Factors

influencing host state policy include, but are not limited to, “migration, security,

development, trade, and peace-building,” 14 For this reason, the needs of refugee

communities continually changes in response to new policy, thus complicating refugee

advocacy efforts. The fickleness of refugee policy may appear to impede policy

recommendations for future refugee flows, but the historical analysis undertaken in

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrates a number of broad currents present throughout the

historical refugee experience in Egypt. Determining the historical trends existing

throughout refugee administration in Egypt will allow the construction of a more

effective refugee protection apparatus.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!14 Milner, James. Refugees, the State and the Politics of Asylum in Africa. Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Print, 3

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Role of UNHCR in Refugee Management

Aside from the host state government, UNHCR serves as the primary mechanism

for refugee administration in host states. UNHCR’s mandate outlines its primary mission

“to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee

problems worldwide.”15 Theoretically, this mandate obligates UNHCR to provide

protection to all individual refugees worldwide. Yet, due in part to the immense burden

of providing refugee protection globally, exacerbated by constraining host state policies,

UNHCR has failed to fully uphold its mission. UNHCR itself acknowledges the

limitations of its aid in regards to Egypt: “In view of the difficult socio-economic

conditions faced by refugees and asylum-seekers in Egypt, UNHCR and its partners

provide assistance to the most destitute and those with specific needs.”16

One of UNHCR’s primary functions in host states such as Egypt involves

administering refugees in the process known as refugee status determination (RSD),

perhaps the most important aspect of refugee administration for refugees. RSD is the

process by which an organization (typically the government or UNHCR) determines that

a refugee holds a valid claim to refugee status. By acknowledging that an individual

fulfills the criteria for refugee status, UNHCR also recognizes its obligation to provide

such individual with a number of basic social services. Significantly, UNHCR enacts

divergent RSD procedures for different refugee populations. UNHCR’s liberal or

conservative policy in granting RSD procedures often determines the conditions of a

refugee’s experience in Egypt, as the failure to obtain refugee status drives individuals,

now technically illegal immigrants, to the fringe of Egyptian society.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15 “What We Do,” UNHCR. UNHCR, 2012. Web. 1 June 2012. 16 “UNHCR – Egypt”

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In terms of resolving refugee situations, UNHCR has outlined three “durable

solutions” that allow refugees to “rebuild their lives in dignity and peace:” Repatriation,

Local Integration, and Resettlement.17 The repatriation of refugees occurs when

conditions in their country of origin have stabilized enough that returning to their home

no longer poses a serious threat to the community’s well-being. But as the length of the

average refugee situation has increased over the last twenty years (a development

discussed at length in the next section), the viability of repatriation as a solution for

refugee situations has decreased greatly. Local integration presupposes the existence of

favorable conditions in a host state that allow individual refugees to develop sustainable,

permanent livelihoods. Unfortunately, many host states, Egypt included, enact policies

that restrict the economic or social rights of refugees to the point where integration in the

host state cannot occur. The specific obstacles to local integration in Egypt are outlined

in the next chapter, but currently resettlement remains the most viable solution for ending

refugee situations. Resettlement opportunities are often limited to the most vulnerable of

refugees, whose continuing presence in a host state presents an immediate threat to the

individual’s safety. For most refugees, however, resettlement remains the ultimate

objective due to the obstacles preventing repatriation and local integration. The efficacy

and necessity of resettlement as a solution to refugee situations was directly

acknowledged by Sadako Ogata, the then-acting UN High Commissioner for Refugees,

who confirmed, “Resettlement can no longer be seen as the least-preferred durable

solution; in many cases it is the only solution for refugees.”18

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 “Durable Solutions,” UNHCR. UNHCR, 2012. Web. 1 June 2012. 18 “Understanding Resettlement to the UK: A Guide to the Gateway Protection Programme,” Refugee Council, Resettlement Inter-Agency Partnership, June 2004. Web. 1 June 2012.

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Nature of Contemporary Refugee Flows

In the fifty-plus years since the advent of the modern international refugee,

heralded by the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the

nature of the average refugee experience has dramatically changed, especially in terms of

length. Refugee flows contemporary to the CRSR, with the notable exception of the

Palestinian population, rarely lasted longer than a few years. Reflecting the smaller

nature of refugee situations, UNHCR originally lacked the ability to independently raise

funds.19 Protecting these refugee populations posed far less of a challenge for

governments and administrative bodies, but the increasing number of refugee flows led to

UNHCR’s primary role in refugee administration in countries such as Egypt.

In stark contrast, current refugees experience much longer periods of

displacement in phenomenon scholars have coined “protracted refugee situations” or

“PRS.”20 In the ten year period between 1993 and 2003, the average refugee experienced

almost doubled21 and approximately “two-thirds of refugees in the world today are not in

emergency situations, instead trapped in protracted refugee situations.”22 Refugee

scholar Gil Loescher provides the best definition of PRS: “protracted refugee situations

involve large refugee populations that are long standing, chronic or recurring, and for

which there are no immediate prospects for a solution.”23 Clearly, this shift dynamically

alters the global refugee landscape necessitating novel examination of PRS and its effects

on refugee policy making. Worryingly, this perception of refugee situations as temporary

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19 Loescher, Gil. The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Print, 8 20Loescher, Protracted Refugee Situations, 3 21 Milner, 168 22 Loescher, Protracted Refugee Situations, 3 23 Loescher, Protracted Refugee Situations, 23

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extends to the primary actors involved in refugee protection “including the government,

UNHCR, service providers and refugees themselves.”24 Examining the refugee question

through the lens of PRS allows a more realistic understanding of the current refugee

regime.

In addition to a general elongation, refugee flows have become increasingly

politicized over the previous three decades. Now, many international actors view

massive refugee flows as a threat to global security rather than humanitarian crises

requiring immediate assistance. This new perception of displaced populations has

profound importance for refugee protection, and populations deemed unimportant to

security interests often lack the humanitarian assistance provided to populations

considered crucial for security interests. For example, the United States largely refrains

from involvement in refugee situations in Africa, “where their strategic interests were

limited.”25 This study attempts to engage the politicization of refugee communities in

Egypt to reveal the geopolitical factors that can benefit or harm displaced populations.

Overview

Chapter 2 expands on the basic framework of contemporary refugee flows

outlined above, detailing how the international refugee has manifested itself in Egypt, and

the specific intra-country conditions affecting all refugee populations. Chapters 3, 4, and

5 undertake historical surveys of three different refugees populations—Palestinian,

Sudanese, and Iraqi, respectively—that currently reside in Egypt. Special attention is

paid to the international, domestic, and intra-population factors that affect treatment of

refugees in Egypt. Finally, Chapter 6 analyzes the implications of this study for the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24 Grabska, “Who Asked Them Anyway?,”53 25 Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, 13

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international and domestic refugee framework, with particular focus on methods to

maximize the efficiency of refugee advocacy at all levels of refugee administration in

Egypt.

The resolution of the three refugee situations examined in this study would have

profound benefits for global stability and prosperity by increasing the likelihood of a

Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement, in addition to signaling a new chapter in two of the

bloodiest wars in recent history, the Sudanese Civil War and the Iraq War. Identifying

the most effective means to maximize the protection offered by intra-host state refugee

policies will play a crucial role in fostering resolutions to contemporary and future

refugee situations.

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Building on the previous chapter’s outline of the refugee regime at the

international level, this chapter aims to contextualize refugee experience in Egypt in

general. Although the discussed-previously international refugee structure frames the

contemporary state of refugee aid and advocacy, host state policies have the greatest

effect on the refugee experience,26 necessitating a greater focus on the host state and its

administration of refugee communities. Egyptian governmental policies towards

refugees create harsh, trying conditions that affect almost every single refugee population

currently and historically residing within its borders.

A combination of factors, including Egypt’s willful ignorance of international

obligations, abdication of responsibility to NGOs, and the policies of the primary refugee

aid organization in Egypt, UNHCR, have seriously hampered the ability of refugees

residing within Egypt’s borders to maintain any sustainable livelihood. Significantly, the

harshness of the average refugee situation transcends all nationalities. This chapter aims

to convey the conditions experienced by refugees throughout Egypt, regardless of country

of origin, while the following three chapters examine the specific policies towards

specific refugee populations. Together, these four chapters provide insight to the most

effective means of refugee protection and advocacy in Egypt, which is expanded upon at

length in Chapter 6.

Egypt’s open door policy allows into its borders almost any refugee seeking

shelter, a laudable policy that provides temporary protection to endangered populations !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26 Jacobsen, Karen. “Livelihoods in Conflict: The of Livelihoods by Refugees and the Impact on the Human Security of Host Communities.” International Migration, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2002): 95-123, 101

Egyptian Governmental Policies Towards Refugees 21

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by generally sparing refugees “the threat of refoulement.”27 This does not mean,

however, that the country is opening itself up as a permanent residence to these

populations. To this end, the government makes significant efforts to ensure that

refugees eventually seek shelter in another country, either by asylum or repatriation.

Thus, almost all refugees in Cairo view “Egypt as a transit country”28 due to their

inability to successfully integrate into Egyptian society. An examination of Egypt’s

historical treaties regarding refugee populations explicates the primary obstacles to

refugee integration in Egyptian society.

Reservations on the 1951 Convention

Egypt placed a number of reservations on the 1951 Convention that exempt the

Egyptian government from many of the obligations required by signatories to this

convention; such obligations intend to protect the basic rights of refugees residing in host

countries. 29 Egypt specifically placed reservations on (i) Article 12.1, requiring host

countries to administer RSD procedures, (ii) Article 20, guaranteeing equal treatment for

refugees in regards to rationing, (iii) Article 22.1, obligating the host country to provide

refugees with free public education, (iv) Article 23, ensuring refugees receive the same

public relief as nationals, and (v) Article 24, the article providing refugees with economic

rights.30 Clearly, these reservations inhibit refugees from developing any sort of

sustainable livelihood in Egypt because they are prevented from engaging in the Egyptian

economy in a meaningful capacity.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27 Ohta, I. and Y.D. Gebre, (eds.) Displacement Risks in Africa. Kyoto U.P. (Japan) and Trans Pacific Press, Melbourne (Australia), 2005, 27 28 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 9 29 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 3 30 UN General Assembly, 20-26

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In addition to the 1951 Convention, Egypt is party to a number of domestic and

international treaties intended to provide protection to refugees, but oftentimes Egypt

fails to abide by these treaties’ obligations. For example, Article 53 of the Egyptian

Constitution broadly guarantees political asylum:

the right to political asylum shall be granted by the State to every foreigner persecuted for defending the people’s interests, human rights, peace or justice … the extradition of political refugees shall be prohibited31

In practice, however, this article rarely provides protection to any individual seeking

political asylum, as it is only invoked in cases involving prominent political figures such

as the Shah of Iran. Here, the highly politicized nature of refugee flow becomes clear;

Egypt is happy to receive global recognition as a refugee heaven, while the majority of

refugees do not receive the protection of the Egyptian government.

Egypt’s blatant disregard for its international obligations yields an obvious

question: why sign these treaties in the first place? The answer again lies with

international global politics. Humanitarian aid serves almost as a form of political

currency with which countries can advance other geopolitical interests. The appearance

of benevolent action does more political work than enacting actual humanitarian aid, as

states gain favor from other actors in the political realm by projecting an image of

humanitarianism.32 Hence, as signatory to many of the international treaties relating to

refugees, Egypt has projected an image of itself as a country hospitable to refugees, but

beyond this façade, it makes no real effort to provide protection. Egypt, however, is not

alone in its efforts to limit the amount of refugee protection, as many “governments and

intergovernmental organizations [that] assume legal responsibilities” for refugee !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 2 32 Haddad, 93

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communities have a “tendency … to limit these responsibilities to narrow categories.”33

To further limit governmental obligations regarding refugee protection, NGOs serve as

the primary administrative bodies for managing refugee populations in Egypt.

The 1954 Memorandum of Understanding

Refugees in Egypt live under the control of UNHCR, as opposed to the Egyptian

government, due to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed between the two

parties in 1954. This shift in responsibility from “state-to-UN … occurs because it serves

several state interests,”34 most importantly alleviating some of the burdens large refugee

flows place on host governments. The context surrounding this agreement is that it was

signed during a period when no significant refugee populations (aside from relatively

small Palestinian and Armenian communities) resided in Egypt.35 This fact explains the

rather expansive nature of the agreement, which broadly guaranteed protection for all

refugees on Egyptian soil. UNHCR and the Egyptian government never predicted the

immense refugee flows of the following decades. At the time of its founding, UNHCR

was intended to only exist temporarily,36 designed to solve the comparatively minor

contemporary refugee crises. The drastic change in the nature of refugee flow since

UNHCR’s establishment led a shift in its mandate, which legally guarantees all refugees

worldwide protection, to policies that must often choose between bad and less bad

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!33 Keely, Charles B, and Patricia J. Elwell. Global Refugee Policy: The Case for a Development-Oriented Strategy. New York, N.Y: Population Council, 1981. Print, 12 34 Kagan, Michael. “Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection.” The American University in Cairo - Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, Sept. 2011. Web. 8 Oct. 2011, 22-23 35 Badawy, Tarek. “The Memorandum of Understanding between Egypt and the Office of the United States Commissioner for Refugees: Problems and Recommendations.” CARIM Analytic and Synthetic Notes, Jul. 2010. Web. 1 June 2012, 8 36 Loescher, Gil, and Laila Monahan. Refugees in International Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989. Print, 188

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options due to realities on the ground.37 In practice, this agreement supersedes many of

Egypt’s obligations as signatory to international treaties, and the government’s

obligations under the 1951 Convention have been relegated to UNHCR due to the

aforementioned MOU.38 Due to the Egyptian government’s deferral of refugee

administration to UNHCR, the organization’s policies largely dictate the refugee

experience in Cairo.

UNHCR and RSD Procedures

The first UNHCR office in Egypt opened in 1954 and, in the five decades since,

UNHCR has continued to act as the primary administrator of refugees by determining

which individuals are granted refugee status through RSD procedures.39 The Egyptian

government’s abdication of responsibility for RSD to UNHCR “runs counter to the

general preference in international law that status determination be conducted by

states.”40 The reason state-run RSD is preferable in humanitarian assistance originates

from the common conception that the government can be held more accountable than

outside organizations. Yet, the Egyptian government’s historical predisposition to

disregard its international obligations indicates that governmental administration of RSD

in Egypt would not improve the average refugee experience. In fact, UNHCR’s RSD

procedures often respond to changes in the Egyptian political sphere rather than the needs

of the refugee communities, a tendency that detrimentally affects refugee populations in

Egypt.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37 Stedman, Stephen J, and Fred Tanner. Refugee Manipulation: War, Politics, and the Abuse of Human Suffering. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Print, 137 38 Badawy, 9 39 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 2 40 Kagan, Michael. “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt.” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 19, No.1 (2006): 45-68, 47

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The inevitable conflict of interest arising from UNHCR’s contradictory

international and domestic mandates often leads to problems ensuring effective refugee

protection. In other words, when UNHCR unburdens host countries from the obligation

of implementing and carrying out RSD procedures, the organization betrays its primary

mandate. To this end, a recent analysis of UNHCR’s prime directives in urban areas

reached the following conclusion:

UNHCR policy on refugees in urban areas has two principal objectives: to promote self-reliance of refugees and avoid their dependency on UNHCR assistance; and to discourage the irregular movement of refugees … by limiting the assistance made available to them.41

Scholars in the field of refugee studies refer to the type of protection provided by

UNHCR in Egypt as “A Bed for the Night Policy.”42 This type of policy provides

“unqualified short-term emergency relief to those in life-threatening circumstances,”43

but does not aim to foster any significant long-term protection. The limited nature of

refugee aid in Egypt “can come at a high cost to those who[se] lives are at risk”44

Importantly, these contradictory policies lengthen refugee situations by preventing

communities from developing sustainable livelihoods to fund emigration to a country of

asylum.

UNHCR as an organization should not be considered as intentionally robbing

refugees of international protection; instead, it is the victim of tight budgetary constraints

preventing the implementation of measures that adequately provide refugee protection. A

recent study of UNHCR policy in Cairo commissioned by the organization’s Evaluation

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41 Sperl, Stefan. “Evaluation of UNHCR’s policy in urban areas: A case study of review.” UNHCR – Evaluation and Policy Unit. June 2001. Web. 1 June 2012, 3 42 Loescher, Refugees in International Relations, 40 43 Ibid 44 Loescher, Refugees in International Relations, 42

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Policy an Analysis Unit concluded: “the office is in an unenviable position. It has neither

the staffing resources to deal adequately with the demands placed upon it by the asylum

seekers nor does it have the financial resources to implement an assistance

programme.”45 In addition to financial obstacles, UNHCR’s reliance on western donor

states for most of its budget compounds the problems of refugee administration at the

domestic level. In 1999, three international actors, the United States, Japan, and the

European Union, provided UNHCR with approximately 94% of its budget.46 By

providing financial backing to UNHCR, a small number of mostly western states can

greatly influence the organization’s operations. This influence often limits the operations

of UNHCR, preventing the organization from carrying out massive humanitarian

operations even when refugee communities desperately need assistance. In response to

the dominance of Western states in refugee administration, host states have similarly

taken actions to minimize refugee assistance. As the number of refugees globally has

drastically increased over the last three decades, “the prioritization of Western

geopolitical concerns over the concerns of African states … caused significant concern

for host states … and resulted in a marked change in their characterization of the

presence of refugees.”47 This change often inhibits any efforts to increase the efficacy of

refugee protection, as host states, including Egypt, constrain the NGOs operating within

their borders.

For most of its operational history in Egypt, UNHCR has carried out RSD in a

uniform, simplistic manner that often neglected to provide refugees with adequate

protection. Until 2002, refugees registering with UNHCR “were given a minute slip of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45 Sperl, 22 46 Loescher, UNHCR in World Politics, 349-50 47 Milner, 29

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paper that only showed the date of the interview and passport number,” documents which

served as the only means for a refugee to demonstrate his or her refugee status.48

Unfortunately, although Egyptian authorities are legally obligated under the MOU to

respect UNHCR in its capacity as overseer of the refugee communities in Cairo, “police

and security do not recognize” these slips of paper and regularly detain individual

refugees with adequate documentation.49 In 2002, UNHCR began revamping its RSD

procedures and took measures to better ensure Egyptian authorities’ respect for

UNHCR’s authority over refugee populations. New measures, implemented after

reaching an agreement with the Egyptian government,50 center around yellow cards, slips

of paper issued to all refugees who apply for refugee status, that “clearly explain that the

holder is the concern of UNHCR.”51 Yellow cards are valid for six months, and

renewable up to three times; the lengthier protection afforded by this new documentation

helps prevent refugees currently engaged in RSD with UNHCR, which often takes

months or even years. By lengthening the protection period, UNHCR prevents many

individuals from a de facto lapse into illegal status, which in turn helps avoid harassment

from Egyptian authorities.52 These cards are issued to everyone applying for refugee

status, rather than only being issued to those receiving refugee status, thus providing a

more effective protection blanket.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!48 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 8 49 Ibid 50 Kagan, Michael. “Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedure At UNHCR’s Cairo Office: 2001-2002.” Scholarly Works, Paper 643, 2002. Web. 1 June 2012, 3 51 Grindell, Richard. “A Study of Refugees’ Experience of Detention in Egypt.” The American University of Cairo – Center for Migration and Refugee Studies. 2002. Web. 1 June 2012, 109 52 Zohry, “Cairo: A transit city for migrants and African Refugees,” 8

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UNHCR’s RSD procedures are in many respects inadequate, as the process

disempowers the refugee community in Egypt due to its oblique nature. A recent study

of UNHCR’s RSD policies in Egypt scathingly concluded:

Of particular concern, applicants [for refugee status] are rejected without being given specific reason, negative credibility decisions are reached with unclear criteria and without as much interviewing as called for by the UNHCR handbook; most appeals are rejected without an in-person interview; many RSD procedures and policies remain withheld from the public; and there is reason for concern that the UNHCR-Cairo decision-making process violates the principle of res judicata and may be structure to scrutinize positive decisions more thoroughly than rejections.53

Recently, the number of applications for UNHCR decreased, with some citing the non-

transparent nature of RSD in Egypt as the cause, and reporting “UNHCR has a drastic

mistrust relationship with refugees in Cairo.”54 Oftentimes, UNHCR rejects refugee

applications for a possible multitude of reasons, in turn creating a large population of

now ‘illegal’ refugees, while simultaneously creating the appearance of a small refugee

population. Population estimates for these unregistered refugees vary wildly. Most

studies point to an extremely large ‘underground’ population, with some appraisals

reaching as high as 500,000.55 Again, the reasons for minimizing official refugee

statistics by pushing individuals into ‘illegal’ status lie in the intense politicization of the

refugee issue. The relationship between the Egyptian government and UNHCR allows

the former to influence official refugee numbers, which “can be the result of a particular

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!53 Kagan, “Assessment of Refugee Status Determination Procedures at UNHCR’s Cairo Office: 2001-2002,” 3 54 Salih, Assad Khalid. “Sudanese Demonstrations in Cairo: Different Stands and Different Opinions.” 4th Annual Migration Postgraduate Student Conference, University of London. 18-19 Mar. 2006, 10 55 Badawy, 8

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politicized dynamic, often reflecting a process of negotiation between the Office and the

host government.”56

Refugee protection in Egypt inherently presents many difficulties due to the

notoriously oppressive nature of the Egyptian security apparatus, which regularly

harasses and detains refugees. A recent study of the refugee experience in detention

observed that, although yellow cards explicitly state an individual is under UNHCR

protection, “only one respondent who explained [to Egyptian security forces attempting

to detain him] that he was under the protection of UNHCR was released immediately.”57

Detention often entails physical or mental abuse, and “everyone taken into detention in

Egypt is at risk of torture” according to Amnesty International.58 The possibility of

detention greatly influences the refugee experience in Egypt, and fosters a culture of fear

throughout the community. The risk of being absconded into the custody of the Egyptian

security forces discourages refugees from developing sustainable livelihoods in Egypt, by

extension discouraging individuals from even attempting to integrate in Egyptian society.

Due to the obstacles of integration outlined above, refugees often view

resettlement as the only solution to their plight once they are in Cairo. Unfortunately,

due to the limited number of resettlement spots available, most transients will not receive

a resettlement position through asylum in another country. In response to the lack of

resettlement opportunities, UNHCR has demonstrated initiative by reaching out to

countries of asylum, and “urg[ing] resettlement countries to help it resolve intractable, or

sticky, situations through targeted resettlement.”59 Similarly, NGOs have responded to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!56 Loescher, Protracted Refugee Situations, 22 57 Grindell, 109 58 Ibid 59 Loescher, Protracted Refugee Situations, 156

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this reality, and today “Egypt may have the largest and most developed asylum-seeker

legal aid initiatives of any country where UNHCR is solely responsible for RSD.”60 The

importance of resettlement as a durable solution for refugee situations must factor into

any reformulated refugee policy.

Societal perception of refugee group, largely negative, drastically impacts

domestic refugee policies, and significantly influences Egyptian governmental

administration of these communities. The centrality of public perception in the refugee

experience does not, however, inherently lead to the oppression of refugee communities,

as popular conceptions of a common bond between Egypt and other displaced nationals

often indicates that “positive and generous conceptions of distributive justice will

apply.”61 As discussed earlier, refugees in the broad sense often act as a means to

advance a governmental and societal agenda by serving as the ‘other’ for a particular

society. The Egyptian government may manipulate public perception of domestic

refugee flow for a variety of primarily political reasons, often times using refugee

populations as scapegoats, which in turn exacerbates the already intense societal

ostracization of these communities. When dealing with refugee populations, the

Egyptian government crafts policy delicately, as “Egypt receives refugees primarily from

countries with which it has delicate bilateral relationships.”62 Egypt’s reticence in

dealing with these populations from neighboring countries directly arises from a concern

over the misinterpretation of domestic refugee policy at the international level, fearing

“irritants in its foreign policy.”63 Condemnation of refugee communities by the Egyptian

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!60 Kagan, “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt,” 49 61 Milner, 81 62 Kagan, “Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection,” 23 63 Ibid

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government often occurs “when the cumulative growth of the encroachers and their

doings pass beyond a ‘tolerable point.’”64 Determining a rough threshold (determining a

specific threshold proves impossible) at which refugee communities trespass the point of

tolerability is a focus of the following chapters, which focus being on three populations

respectively. The conditions outlined above affect every refugee within Egypt’s borders,

and the following chapters should be understood in this context.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!64 Bayat, Asef. Life As Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010. Print, 62

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This chapter outlines the Palestinian refugee experience in Egypt, an experience

of multiple, incongruous narratives that reflects the given state of contemporary Egyptian

society at a distinct point. Examination of this experience as one narrative, however,

elucidates the intense shifts in Egypt that have occurred over the last seventy years, along

with the institutions integral to the refugee experience in the Egypt, including, but not

limited to, the media, UNHCR, and the Egyptian government. These geopolitical shifts

and actors in the refugee experience are not unique to Egypt’s Palestinian refugee

population. Instead, this discourse on the Palestinian refugee’s experience serves as

introduction to the factors affecting later mass migrations, the import of which is

elucidated in detail over the following two chapters.

The Palestinian refugee population within Egypt provides a useful starting point

for evaluating the local Egyptian refugee regime, as this population has the longest and

perhaps most tumultuous experience as a diaspora in Egypt. Although not a large

population (75,000 Palestinians are estimated to currently reside in Egypt65), a Palestinian

diaspora has existed within Egyptian borders since the events of 1948, which resulted in

the mass exodus of the Palestinian community from the land currently administered by

Israel. This chapter aims to avoid advocating for any party in the widely politicized and

polarized issue of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, while raising the issue to examine the

realities of the current global refugee structure. However, the Palestinian refugee

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!65 El-Abed, El-Abed, Oroub. Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt Since 1948. Beirut, Lebanon: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009. Print, 1

The Palestinian Refugee Experience in Egypt 3

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population is indeed intrinsically linked to larger political issues; Palestinian refugees in

Egypt recently interviewed by Palestinian refugee researcher Oroub El-Abed “all talked

about the effects on them every time wider political relations fluctuated.”66 In fact, for

six decades the Palestinian question has remained the central political topic in the Middle

East, and for most Arab governments remains an extremely delicate issue. Today, Arab

states, many of them host states for Palestinian refugees, must carefully craft their

responses to this issue in order to mitigate between the U.S.’s continued support of Israel

and broad Arab sympathy for the Palestinian cause, which often results in intra-policy

conflict.67

A significant difference between Palestinian refugees and other refugee

populations within Egypt must be noted. Unlike every other refugee population residing

in Egypt, the Palestinian population is not administered by UNHCR. Furthermore, no

special United Nations body exists to administer the Palestinian population in Egypt68 as

compared to all other Arab nations where Palestinians fled post-Nakba (the Arabic word

for catastrophe, which refers to the 1948 Palestinian exodus).69 National administration

of Palestinian refugees in Egypt contrasts greatly with the international organizations

present in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Rather than preventing a comparative approach,

this lack of an international body reveals a great deal about Egypt’s refugee policy, a

topic that is expounded upon at the end of this chapter. Finally, some scholars have

speculated that the Egyptian experience developing its own administration of the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!66 El-Abed, Oroub. “The Palestinians in Egypt: identity, basic rights and host state policies.” Refugee Survey Quarterly, 28 (23), 2009: 531-549, 540-1 67 Kagan, “Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection,” 23 68 Brand, Laurie A. Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Print, 3 69 Grabska, “Who Asked them Anyway?,” 26-27

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Palestinian population may have significantly influenced later Egyptian policy towards

new refugee populations flowing into Egypt.70

Governmental administration of the Palestinian diaspora can be identified as

having three unique periods, corresponding to the three contemporary Egyptian

presidents: Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. These periods do

not strictly match with each president’s tenure, as refugee administration does not

reinvent itself overnight, instead experiencing gradual shifts. However, the nature of the

Egyptian government during these periods allows construction of this broad framework

due to intense centralization of power around the Egyptian president. The primacy of the

Egyptian president prior to the January 25th revolution (which ended the thirty-year reign

of Hosni Mubarak in 2011) largely meant that governmental policies represented the

interests of the current ruling regime. In addition, discussion of Egyptian media

discourse will prove useful for this examination, as the media lies at the nexus between

governmental ideology and public opinion, and “the Egyptian media exert a decisive

influence on public opinion in Egypt.”71 Examined through the lens of the Egyptian

media, the development and changes in the Egyptian public’s perception of the

Palestinian refugee issue is traced throughout this chapter.

Before embarking on analysis of these three periods, the policies of Pre-Nasser

Egypt deserve a brief outline in order to better understand subsequent developments.

Outraged by the expulsion of the Palestinians in al-Nakba, the existing monarchy initially

demanded the return of taken land. After a few years, however, the infeasibility (at least

in the short-term) of the right of return became clear and the monarchy revised its policy

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!70 Zohry, “Egypt: Immigration to Egypt,” 47 71 Yehia, Karem. “The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982–1985”, Journal of Palestine Studies, 16(2), 1987, 62

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to advocate for “a policy of resettlement in the states where the refugees now find

themselves,”72 obviously including Egypt. In other words, the government tacitly

accepted the policy of Palestinian settlement in host states, a policy that has evolved over

the last sixty years. King Farouk, the Egyptian monarch overthrown by the 1952 Free

Officers’ Revolution, and his regime’s expectations seem to have been unrealistic as to

what exactly settlement in host states entailed, especially in regards to Palestinians

crossing the border into Egypt.

The monarchy hoped that the Palestinian population would settle in the liminal

territory of the Gaza Strip (possibly including Sinai) rather than in Egypt proper; a New

York Times article from this period postulated “that Egypt had placed a ‘virtual veto on

moving the refugees from the Gaza strip.’”73 Significant efforts were made to resettle the

Palestinian diaspora in the Sinai desert, but this plan did not come to fruition. The failure

of this resettlement, which was a joint Egypt-UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works

Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East) effort, known as the Sinai project,

significantly contributed to the lack of a United Nations organizational body in Egypt.74

Regardless, Palestinians in Egypt still enjoyed basic rights including access to education

and the ability to work.75

The Nasser Era

After al-Nakba, Palestinians refugees generally enjoyed many privileges

including the right to education, property, and in some cases Egyptian citizenship. Gamal

Abdel Nasser continued the policy of the overthrown monarchy, and Palestinian refugees

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!72 Schechtman. The Arab Refugee Problem. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952. Print, 64 73 Schechtman, 86 74 Rosenfeld, Maya. “From Emergency Relief Assistance to Human Development and Back: UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees, 1950-2009.” Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2-3 (2009): 286-317, 296 75 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 106

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still possessed “special legal status whereby its members were treated like Egyptian

nationals in most domains.”76 In fact, the Palestinian cause may have indirectly paved

the road for his ascent to power:

The defeat in Palestine and its perceived relation to the need for social and political change in Egyptian society provided much of the grounding for the Free Officers … the image of a progressive, egalitarian, and independent regime committed to the destiny of the Arabs – an image that the revolution’s propagandists were only too eager to propagate – was very appealing to Arabs who felt themselves victimized by the West [and] their own regimes.77

Nasser himself acknowledges this in his “Philosophy of the Revolution,” which outlined

Nasserist ideology: “Palestine was a significant, not just a peripheral factor, in

galvanizing the free officers to act.”78 By rooting his rule in the Palestinian issue, Nasser

assured himself legitimacy in the eyes of the Arab masses. Here, one can glean the

importance of public opinion in the creation of host state policies towards refugee

populations. The perception of Nasser as staunch defender of the Palestinian cause

ingratiated himself so strongly with the Egyptian and broader Arab public that, upon

Egypt’s complete and utter defeat in the Six-Day War and Nasser’s subsequent

resignation Egyptians took to the streets pleading for him to remain in office, and Nasser

yielded to the public’s appeal.79 This event provides a clear example of public opinion’s

influence on host state policy, which exists throughout the Palestinian experience in

Egypt.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!76 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 1 77 Miller, Aaron D. The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest. New York: Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Praeger, 1986. Print, 60 78 Hudson, Michael C. Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. Print, 240 79 Tignor, Robert L. Egypt: A Short History. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print, 273-4

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Although Nasser famously embraced the Palestinian issue, this integration of the

Palestinian cause into Egyptian nationalistic ideology appears less rooted in actual

concern for the well being of refugees and more founded in an attempt to establish Egypt

as the political leader of the Arab world. Widespread sympathy for the Palestinian cause

made it the perfect vehicle with which to advance “his larger political aims, both in terms

of advancing his pan-Arab agenda and strengthening his hand vis-à-vis the other Arab

states.”80 To this end, Nasser succeeded as politics in the Middle East largely revolved

around Egypt during this period, and the Palestine issue provided the perfect political

means to both “counter Syrian and Jordanian influence” and “rid the area of

colonialism.”81 Nasser’s ideological embrace of the Palestinian refugee problem,

however, far outlasted Nasser’s reign, significantly influencing Egypt’s position in

regards to Palestinian issue even today, decades after Nasser’s death.82

The centrality of the Palestine refugee problem as part of Nasser’s ideology, may,

in fact, have arisen from the relatively small number of Palestinian refugees in Egypt:

“the very ‘marginality’ of the local Palestinian population … made Nasser’s enthusiastic

support of Palestinian possible, because the community was too small to pose any kind of

threat.”83 In contrast, any political actions made by the far larger Palestinian community

in Gaza, were “from the outset … closely monitored by Egyptian intelligence and sharply

curtailed.”84 On the other hand, the Egyptian government comfortably settled

Palestinians who aided Egyptian military operations against Israel.85 Some have claimed

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!80 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 129 81 Miller, 60-61 82 Miller, 61-62 83 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 127 84 Ibid 85 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 181

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that his pro-Palestinian stance completely arose from larger political intentions,86 yet the

fact that this stance had tangible benefits for the Palestinian refugee community cannot be

ignored. The matter of disingenuous political motives creating real improvements in the

livelihoods of refugee communities is examined further in the final chapter.

Nasser’s discomfort at the prospect of powerful Palestinian political parties in

Egypt reinforced the notion that this position was a façade for a larger political motive,

namely to cement Egypt’s as the regional leader in the Middle East. This position held

great import due to the geopolitical significance of the Middle East, especially Egypt in

the wake of the Suez Crisis, for the two superpowers of the time, the United States of

America and the Soviet Union. Thus, the domestic administration of the Palestinian issue

only carried importance for Nasser vis-à-vis its importance at the global level. Aaron

David Miller, a prominent scholar on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, aptly describes

Nasser’s hopes: “Egypt … would probably have been far more comfortable with the

Palestine issue as an abstract symbol than with the reality of an independent Palestinian

movement.”87 Thus, Nasser must have been severely dismayed at the Palestinian factions

within Egypt that became the focal point for Palestinian political action. The centrality of

Egypt as a center for the development of Palestinian nationalistic forces cannot be

overstated: “A student union at Cairo University … was founded in 1950 by a young,

clean-shaven engineering student who had fought in the Palestine War of 1947-1949 and

was later to become known as Yasser ‘Arafat,”88 who would emerge as the leader of the

Palestinian Liberation Organization and for many symbolized the Palestinian struggles of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!86 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 42 87 Miller, 4 88 Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. Print, 180

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the twentieth century.89 The Palestinian political developments did not have the full

support of the Egyptian government, which feared the growing power of these fledgling

groups. This resistance to refugee political developments displays Egypt’s toleration of

refugee activism only up until a certain point. Importantly, the Egyptian government’s

tendency to oppose, from its perspective, an ‘overpoliticization’ of refugee communities

exists in almost every historical relationship between the Egyptian government and

refugee communities. The significance of Egypt’s resistance to refugee political action,

and its importance for refugee advocacy in host states, is expanded upon in the final

chapter.

In an unforeseen consequence, Nasser’s ideological rhetoric championing the

Palestinian cause may have been a significant factor leading to the development of these

strong political forces as “the gap between rhetoric and action only reinforces tension

between conservative Arab states fearful of radical changes in the status quo and a

Palestinian movement determined to alter it.”90 Nasser did not hesitate in responding

swiftly to these political groups, for example shuttering the PLO radio station

broadcasting out of Cairo after the station broadcasted a critique of the Egyptian

president.91 Furthermore, “unlike Syria or Jordan, Nasser never permitted the

Palestinians to use Egypt as a sanctuary for attacks against Israel.”92 Clearly, Nasser

tolerated the refugee community as long as they refrained from meddling in Egypt’s

political affairs, which were solely the domain of the Egyptian government.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!89 Kamrava, Mehran. The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since the First World War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011. Print, 122 90 Miller, 6 91 Brand, 57 92 Miller, 89

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On the other hand, the resistance to the notion of Palestinian self-governance may

have arisen from the Arab League members’ - especially Egypt’s - perception that the

Palestinian issue would soon be resolved through political means. Although founded in

the late 1950s, the Arab states did not allow Fateh (the largest political party in the PLO)

to gain any real power: “Fateh’s idea of self-organized Palestinian resistance policy did

not appeal to the Pan-Arab Palestinians, who were convinced they were on the brink of

liberating Palestine.”93 Efforts to prevent the development of autonomous Palestinian

institutions focused on allowing the development of institutions whose leaders supported

the efforts of the leading Arab states, mainly Syria and Egypt. Palestinian frustration, the

ineffectiveness of Nasserist ideology, and the failure to liberate any Palestinian lands,

however, drove refugees to begin forming organizations independent of any state

influence.

In fact, the Palestinian experience in Egypt largely cemented the two fundamental

aspects of Palestinian identity: Return and Resistance.94 Since al-Nakba, Palestinian

identity evolved to reflect these two central desires. The desired return of Palestinian

refugees to the land currently occupied by Israel, often referred to as the ‘right of return,’

remains the central demand of most Palestinian political organizations, many of which

engage in resistance against Israel with an aim to achieve return. The emergence of a

distinct Palestinian identity occurred directly in response to the non-enfranchisement of

Palestinians in Egypt, as Nasserist discourse often “emphasize[d] the preservation of

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!93 Dajani, Mana Ahmed. The Institutionalization of Palestinian Identity in Egypt. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986. Print, 21 94 Dajani, 2

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Palestinian identity by maintaining their status as refugees.”95 By refusing to integrate

Palestinian refugees into Egyptian society, through extension of citizenship or other

means, the Egyptian government galvanized the Palestinian community to construct their

own national identity. Palestinian identity, rooted in the community’s refugee status,

became intrinsically tied to Palestinian land, effectively ending any significant movement

to gain Egyptian citizenship for Palestinian refugees. In other words, return and

resistance had become intertwined. Palestinians resisted in order to return to their land;

anything short of return, including nationalization in a host country such as Egypt,

logically implied a continued resistance.

Yet, importantly, even during Nasser’s reign, divisions began to be drawn within

the Palestinian refugee population, as evidenced by different Refugee Status

Determination (RSD) procedures for those who arrived in the two decades after al-Nakba

and post-1967 refugees:

For Palestinians who arrived in Egypt before 1967 (and their offspring and descendants), permits are issued by the Department of Immigration, Passports, and Nationality … for those who arrived during or after the 1967 war (mainly from Gaza) and their offspring and descendants, the permits are issued by the [Administrative Office of the Governor of Gaza].96

This act established a precedent for the Egyptian government’s distinct policies towards

different refugee communities, a phenomenon later continued and expanded, especially

after the arrival of new refugee communities as discussed in the following two chapters.

Today, the Egyptian government currently administers Palestinian refugees separately

from any other refugee population: “Palestinian refugees are regulated by a separate

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!95 Shiblak, Abbas. “Residency Status and Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries,” Journal of Palestine Studies , Vol. 25, No. 3 (Spring, 1996), 36-45, 38 96 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 79

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office. When they apply for residence permits their cases are treated separately by the

interior ministry.”97 Chapter 6 elucidates the importance of these distinctions in crafting

effective refugee advocacy for populations in host states.

The Sadat Era

Following Nasser’s death in 1970, Anwar Sadat ascended to power in Egypt,

ushering in a new era for Egypt and the local refugee community. During Sadat’s tenure

as Egyptian president, tumultuous events, outlined in detail below, led to a severe shift in

Egyptian administration of Palestinian refugees, from a policy of general tolerance and

equal rights to a strong rebuke of the Palestinian cause and population. Sadat initially

continued Nasser’s pro-Palestinian policy, passing “Egyptian Law 58” his first year in

office, which gave “Palestinian workers with permanent residence status” exemption

“from having to acquire work permits.”98 From the beginning of his reign, however,

Sadat indicated that the Palestinian issue was no longer a central tenet of Egyptian

ideology. The Palestinian issue, however, did not directly cause this shift; the change

instead arose from Sadat’s desire for stability in the region. Sadat’s interest in creating

regional order dictated some resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue, as this issue

remained at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the origin of the Middle East’s

enduring instability. Upon assumption of power, Sadat had two opposing means to

resolve the Palestinian refugee question: (i) liberation, which required attaining

significant land concessions from Israel on the Palestinian’s behalf, or (ii) repression,

which removed the Palestinian question from the political arena by means of heavy-

handed control of the refugee population in Egypt. At the beginning of his tenure,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!97 Zohry, Ayman. “Immigration to Egypt.” Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 4(3), 33-54, 47 98 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 133

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Sadat’s strategy remained unclear; but an examination of his reign reveals his decisive

support of the latter approach, for a number of reasons worth expounding upon.

There was significant unrest from the Palestinian community in Egypt in the pre-

Sadat years, which, along with a drastic increase in the Palestinian population, influenced

the heavy-handed manner in which Sadat engaged the Palestinian issue. Firstly, in the

years before Sadat’s reign, mass demonstrations of Palestinian students occurred in the

two major Egyptian cities and “thousands of students from both Cairo and Alexandria

universities … participated in the unrest.”99 These demonstrations arose from the failure

of Nasserism to secure liberation for the Palestinian people, a marked shift in the

Palestinian community’s relationship with the ruling regime. Secondly, the Six-Day War

in 1967 created a much larger Palestinian community, as “members of the Gaza police

and the Palestinian Liberation Army retreated together, which doubled the number of

Palestinians in Egypt.”100 The increase in population from 15,000 to 30,000 further

burdened the Egyptian government and increased the visibility of the Palestinian refugee

population.101 Thirdly, from the years 1969 to 1971, Egypt and Israel engaged in an

unofficial war known as the ‘War of Attrition,’ over military installations in the Suez

region, and further public demonstrations accompanied this engagement.102 Although

militarily engaged with Israel, Egypt could not fulfill the fundamental desire of

Palestinians, the right of return, through armed conflict, a fact that spurred further

Palestinian unrest. Lastly, the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in

Cairo by the newly-formed militant Palestinian group Black September (most famous for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!99 Brand, 80 100 Schulz, Helena L, and Juliane Hammer. The Palestinian Diaspora: Formation of Identities and Politics of Homeland. London: Routledge, 2003. Print, 63 101 Brand, 46 102 Brand, 81

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the massacre of eleven Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympics) forced Sadat to

confront the increasingly militant Palestinian factions, which Nasser’s pro-Palestinian

ideology had ironically helped foster. The cumulative effect of these events drove Sadat

to institute increasingly draconian measures intended to “clamp down more forcefully on

… activism, particularly among Palestinians.”103 Sadat understood that this Palestinian

unrest would not cease without a resolution of the ‘Palestinian question,’ and he began to

pursue a solution to the refugee crisis, although not in the manner desire by the

Palestinian community. Thus, Palestinian militancy, rather than achieving its goal of

Palestinian statehood, counteractively led to intense political setbacks for the Palestinian

community, which lost the political support of Egypt, its largest ally in the international

arena.

Soon, Egyptian government ideology began to reflect Sadat’s new position on the

Palestinian issue: “the Sadat regime propagated the slogan ‘Egypt first, Egypt always’

and a related theme, mainly that the Egyptians had made enormous sacrifices for the …

Palestinian causes … these Egyptian sacrifices, the argument continued, were only met

with ungratefulness.”104 In its crusade on behalf of the Palestinian population, Egypt

managed to lose perhaps its most crucial land, the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal,

and Sadat remained determined to restore this land to Egyptian sovereignty.105

Furthermore, just as the Egyptian media espoused Nasserism’s pro-Palestinian rhetoric

during Nasser’s tenure, Sadat’s political rebuke of Palestinian refugees was soon

reflected in the Egyptian in the media. In the turbulent years after Sinai II, the first

Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, “there was an increase in negative press coverage that

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!103 Brand, 83 104 Dajani, 31 105 Miller, 65

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tended to promote what may be called the image of the ‘Bad Palestinian.’”106 Sadat’s

political machinations demonstrated a reformed position on the Palestinian issue; the only

question remaining was what effect would Sadat’s policies have on the refugee

community in Egypt.

In tandem with ideological changes, Sadat’s political actions aimed to foster

regional stability, culminating with the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty during

the Camp David Accords in 1978. During Nasser’s reign, Egypt gained prestige in the

Middle East as the staunch defender of the Palestinian people; in contrast, Sadat

attempted to establish Egypt as the leading Arab nation for the broader globalized society

by abdicating responsibility for the Palestinian diaspora in favor of regional stability.

The decisive event that signaled this shift to the local Palestinian community occurred

when “Sadat addressed a session of the People’s Assembly on November 9, 1977 – a

session that he had expressly invited Yasir ‘Arafat to attend – and announced his

intention to go to Jerusalem,” publicly embarrassing Arafat.107 The political relationship

between Egypt and the broader Arab world disintegrated even further, leading to Egypt’s

decade-long expulsion from the Arab League, while the global prestige of Egypt under

Sadat, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 for his peace efforts, continued to

rise.

Sadat, for the most part, succeeded in his political aims, and Egypt became

integrated into the new globalized society: “The Egyptian-Israeli peace process and the

political and economic cooperation it set in motion were realized within a wider

ideological and political framework that, in effect, articulated the new hegemonic project

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!106 Yehia, 46 107 Brand, 60

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of the Egyptian regime.”108 Egypt’s integration into the globalized economy further

alienated Egypt from the Palestinian issue and “the spread of consumer society values …

and a greater reliance on the central government have reinforced the isolationist and

individualistic orientation of the Egyptians,”109 undermining any idea of pan-Arabism,

the root of Egyptian support for the Palestinian cause. The Egyptian government and

Palestinian political factions soon came into conflict: “The breaking point came in

November 1977, when Sadat journeyed to Jerusalem. Anger among Palestinian students

exploded in anti-Sadat demonstrations.”110 Things devolved even further and, “with the

final signing of the Camp David accords in March 1979, the PLO ‘froze’ its relations

with Egypt.”111 Although at a historical nadir, the relationship between Sadat and the

PLO never reached a full break: “Sadat would never formally renounce Egypt’s support

for the PLO and even maintained contact with the PLO representative long after the

signing of the peace treaty.”112

The start of the Israeli-Egyptian peace process did not mean the end for the

privileges of Palestinian refugees in Egypt, who continued to enjoy access to social

services. Even after Sadat’s intention to exit from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

Palestinian refugees in Egypt experienced no tangible effects of this change in policy;

“The signing of the Sinai II disengagement agreement in September 1975, which

effectively confirmed Egypt’s withdrawal from the front[,] led to a brief strain in PLO-

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!108!Shukrallah, Hani. “The Street Reacts to Operation Defensive Shield: Snapshots from the Middle East” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002), 44-65, 48 109 Yehia, 49 110 Brand, 83 111 Brand, 62 112 Miller, 92

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Egyptian ties, but it had no real effect on the community in Egypt.”113 In fact, the special

legal status of Palestinian refugees in Egypt remained in place until the violent murder of

journalist and close associate of Sadat, Yusuf al-Siba’i114 in February 1978.115

Palestinian militants kidnapped and murdered Al-Siba’i in Cyprus, attempted to hijack a

plane, and killed Egyptian commandos sent to rescue the Egyptian national.116

Importantly, actions of rogue members of the Palestinian refugee community,

unsupported by Palestinian political organizations such as the PLO who deplored the act

of violence, had widespread implications for the broader Palestinian refugee

community.117 Soon, Palestinians in Egypt experienced drastic changes directly resulting

from this event: “as a corollary [to al-Siba’i’s murder], many of the privileges that

Palestinians in Egypt had enjoyed since the 1950s and early 1960s were gradually

reviewed and cancelled;”118 economic, property, and education rights became scarce for

the Palestinian community in Egypt. Some claim, however, that al-Siba’i’s murder

merely served as the justification for the policy change, which was actually rooted in the

Egyptian-Israeli peace process.119 Using acts of violence perpetrated by local refugee

communities as justification for repression of the greater community has clear parallels in

the Egyptian government’s relationship with every single refugee community; these

parallels is explicated in the following two chapters.

The effects of this sudden change from acceptance to repression cannot be

overstated. This account from a Palestinian shopkeeper reflects a common sentiment

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!113 Brand, 60-61 114 Mattar, Philip. Encyclopedia of the Palestinians. New York: Facts on File, 2000. Print, 143 115 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 73 116 Brand, 61 117 Ibid 118 Ibid 119 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 2

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found among Palestinians in Egypt: “There were hard moments for us [after al-Siba’i was

killed], when our treatment by Egyptians and the Egyptian administration changed …

We, Palestinians, were afraid. We used to sit in our closed shops to watch news and

avoid harassment from the Egyptians.”120 Changes included a significant increase in

security measures intended to harass the Palestinian community, which was “singl[ed]

out for surveillance.”121 Constant harassment severely affected the cohesion of the

Palestinian community in Egypt, and “left its effects on the population[,] specifically the

way people tend to be suspicious of one another.”122 In addition to repression of the

Palestinian community, the Egyptian government began systematically dismantling the

Palestinian political institutions established in the heyday of Nasserism. The violent

assassination of Sadat by rogue Egyptian military units, motivated by outrage over the

Camp David accords, signaled a new period in the relationship between the Egyptian

government and the Palestinian population.

The Mubarak Era

After Sadat’s assassination in 1981, Hosni Mubarak rose to power, and, as

discussed below, an analysis of Mubarak’s policy towards the Palestinian population

reveals his attempt to strike a balance between the ideological embrace of Nasserism and

the repression of the late-Sadat era. Mubarak understood the dangers of the Palestine

issue, which “had become an issue that threatened to diminish rather than enhance

Egyptian prestige as it had under Nasser.”123 A turning point, however, in Egyptian

policy occurred early in Mubarak’s tenure when Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982. These

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!120 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 73 121 Ibid 122 El-Abed, “The Palestinians in Egypt: identity, basic rights and host state policies,” 547 123 Miller, 66

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two events signaled another decisive shift in Egyptian policy; “Sadat’s passing and the

1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon led both Egyptian popular opinion and official policy to

move in a more sympathetic direction.”124 The 1982 Lebanon War drew widespread

condemnation from the Arab masses, and Mubarak, in a manner reminiscent of Nasser,

once again espoused pro-Palestinian political rhetoric. Again, like Nasser, Mubarak may

have seized this opportunity to appear as a defender of the Palestinian cause for political

reasons rather than a sincere desire for Palestinian liberation. By appearing as a stalwart

champion of the Palestinian people, Mubarak co-opted a central tenet of the Muslim

Brotherhood, the political movement that most threatened his grip on power, as the

Brotherhood “had a clear commitment to Palestine.”125

Interestingly, the reintroduction of the Palestinian issue in Egyptian governmental

discourse was not accompanied by tangible benefits for the Palestinian refugee

community as it did during the height of Nasserism. Instead, the primary beneficiaries of

Egypt’s reformed political position were the Palestinian political actors. The event

signifying the dynamic shift in Egyptian policy occurred early in Mubarak’s reign “when,

having just escaped the inter-Palestinian fighting in Tripoli, ‘Arafat and his men passed

through the Suez Canal on their way to Yemen and … debarked for a brief televised

meeting with President Mubarak.’”126 Moreover, the Egyptian media once again

reflected the dominant government ideology; during Mubarak’s tenure, Palestinians were

often portrayed as victims rather than resistors, which “reflects the dominant line in the

Egyptian media … favor[ing] a peaceful solution over the military option.”127 During

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!124 Brand, 93 125 Brand, 16 126 Brand, 62-63 127 Yehia, 62

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this time, the broader Egyptian public’s relationship with the Palestinian community

similarly evolved, although in a manner distinct from that of the government.

Mubarak reserved the right to repress the Palestinian community for any reason,

such as when “PLO offices were closed in the wake of the April 1987 of Palestinian

National Council (the PLO legislature) meeting in Algiers … during which certain

statements were made that angered Egypt.”128 Importantly, Mubarak possessed greater

power than his predecessors to repress the Palestinian community due to the

reinstatement of emergency law in light of Sadat’s assassination. Although continuously

in effect since 1967, the emergency law was not used nearly as brazenly by Sadat or

Nasser. Mubarak used this power to legitimize any action against perceived domestic

unrest: “Using the emergency law, authorities are able to strictly regulate the activities of

… the Palestinians, use surveillance, and powers of mass arrest.”129 The domineering,

patriarchal nature of the Egypt’s relationship with the Palestinian refugee community

cannot be doubted. Yet, during Mubarak’s reign Palestinian political factions

experienced a much larger degree of freedom than they had previously, and organizations

such as ESCPI, the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Intifada, were

tolerated without much harassment.130 Mubarak’s tolerance of these organizations, a

significant break from the policies of Sadat and Nasser, can be attributed to the growing

domestic and international support for the Palestinian cause, the starkest increase in

Palestinian solidarity since the heyday of Nasserism.

Mubarak’s reluctance to fully embrace the Palestinian issue arose from his desire

for domestic stability; the memory of the late 1970’s Palestinian student demonstrations

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!128 Brand, 63 129 El-Abed, “The Palestinians in Egypt: identity, basic rights and host state policies,” 547 130 Shukrallah, 46

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loomed large and “nothing on that scale has been seen since the leftish-led uprising of the

… 1970’s.”131 Here, another parallel between the three modern Egyptian presidents can

be extrapolated: Nasser achieved Egyptian primacy by embracing the Palestinian cause,

Sadat integrated Egypt into the emerging global economy by creating regional stability,

and Mubarak elevated Egypt’s global status by creating the perception of Egypt as a

domestically tranquil state in an extremely turbulent region. Miller succinctly explains

the importance of these parallels:

Egypt’s involvement in the affairs of Palestine was to a greater degree than elsewhere a political commitment voluntarily undertaken and fashioned by one man and his era. And it was Egypt’s to redefine this commitment that permitted Sadat and Mubarak to reshape Nasser’s vision according to their conception of state interests.132 In addition to domestic concerns, close ties between Mubarak and the United

States put pressure on the Egyptian regime to align itself with America’s interests,

indirectly leading to moderate repression of the Palestinian population. To this end,

“Mubarak, has left himself considerable room to maneuver on [the Palestine] issue and is

not about to undermine the peace treaty with Israel or [the] economic and military

benefits of his relationship with the United States for the benefit of the Palestinians.”133

The United States’ strong alliance with Israel also affected Egyptian treatment of

Palestinian refugees and “gradual improvement in American-Egyptian relations …

witnessed a concomitant deterioration in Egyptian-Palestinian relations.”134 The First

Gulf War provides an example of America’s influence on Egyptian policy: “the Egyptian

media (with the clear assent of the government, if not at its prompting) seized upon the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!131 Shukrallah, 45 132 Miller, 55 133 Miller, 67 134 Brand, 17

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PLO’s statements in support of Saddam and the pro-Saddam demonstrations by

Palestinians … to launch another full-blown propaganda assault.”135 These attacks,

however, conflicted with the broader Arab public opinion and “Egyptians renewed sense

of their Arab identity can be traced, paradoxically, to the most divisive moment in

modern Arab history – when their own government had been an enthusiastic partner in

the US-led coalition in Iraq.”136 The Egyptian government’s conflicting interests

produced an equally conflicted response in governmental discourse:

The government’s response was predictably confused as it tried simultaneously to (1) ride the wave of popular outrage by expressing similar if more restrained sentiments; (2) use popular anger as a potential bargaining chip vis-à-vis the United States … [and] (3) paradoxically, use popular anger against a foreign enemy to reinforce authoritarianism by appealing to national unity.137

Up until 2011, the relationship between the Egyptian government and Palestinian refugee

community remained stuck between Mubarak’s desire to appear as the new champion of

the Arab public, heir to Nasser’s pan-Arabism, and the realities created by Egypt’s

alliance with the United States. A number of trends can be extrapolated from this

examination of the historical relationship between the Egyptian government and the

Palestinian refugee population.

Conclusion

First, the disjointed policies towards Palestinian refugees do not indicate the

existence of a clear threshold for refugee tolerance. Although initially warm to the

Palestinian refugee community, the Egyptian government has increasingly repressed the

local diaspora, with some exceptions. No exact threshold for host state tolerance can be

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!135 El-Abed, Unprotected: Palestinians in Egypt since 1948, 50 136 Shukrallah, 48 137 Ibid

! 48

discerned, as the influential factors are largely dictated by the unique qualities of the

refugee population. Host state repression of local refugee communities, however, is

almost always preceded by two actions of the refugee community: acts of violence and

large-scale political action. Second, for the host state, broader political interests will

almost always take precedent over the interests of a local refugee community. This does

not mean, however, host states will always repress local refugee communities; when

political interests align with the desires of a local refugee community, the community

benefits, just as Palestinians did during Nasser’s reign. Third, broad public perception of

refugee communities can significantly affect a host state’s response to that community,

sometimes overriding the regime’s broader political interests.

The implications of these findings for broader refugee policy is discussed at

length in Chapter 6.

! 49

Historically, of the three refugee populations examined in this study, the Sudanese

community in Egypt has arguably endured the harshest conditions. The cause of this

marginalization rests with inappropriate and misinformed administrative policies of

UNHCR and the Egyptian government. In this sense, the broad Sudanese experience in

Egypt demonstrates the dangers of humanitarian assistance, when refugee administration

theoretically aimed to protect refugee communities adversely affect them instead. This

chapter’s study indicates an urgent need for administrative organizations to consider the

possible negative ramifications for refugee communities before implementing new

policies, especially in the case of RSD.

History of Sudanese Refugee Flow in Egypt

Starting with the outbreak of the violent Second Sudanese Civil War two decades

ago, refugees from the Sudan began fleeing north to Egypt, seeking refuge from the gross

human rights violations that threatened the lives and livelihoods of the millions affected

by the lengthy conflict. Sadly, an examination of the Sudanese experience in Cairo

indicates a stark failure to ensure the rights of this population, which often encounters

numerous obstacles in obtaining basic social services such as access to healthcare. A

complex multitude of factors, including ineffective and anachronistic international

treaties, the reluctance of UNHCR to act on behalf of this population, and broader

geopolitical events combined to create an extremely hostile and dangerous environment.

This is best expressed in one refugee’s sentiment that “Egypt has never become the

The Sudanese Refugee Experience in Egypt 43

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second home [for refugees] but second graveyard for them.”138 This chapter aims to

explore the roots of this harsh experience in an attempt to better understand the factors

that led to ineffective, at times counteractive, refugee advocacy on behalf of the Sudanese

population.

As outlined in Chapter 2, UNHCR serves as the primary instrument of refugee

administration in Egypt, and can generally be understood to reflect the Egyptian

government’s attitude towards refugee populations, due to the Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) signed in 1954 that has not since been updated. The MOU, which

authorizes the existence of UNHCR in Egypt, requires the international organization to

“cooperate with the governmental authorities in view of undertaking the census of and

identifying the refugees eligible under the mandate of the High Commissioner.”139 In

theory, this only authorizes UNHCR to complete the process of Refugee Status

Determination (RSD), exempting the Egyptian government from its obligations in an

attempt to alleviate the heavy societal burdens naturally arising from mass migration

movements.

In practice, however, the MOU allows the Egyptian government to wield

UNHCR’s refugee administration as a geopolitical tool to advance its domestic and

international interests. The conflict of interest between UNHCR’s stated mission of

humanitarian assistance and the Egyptian government’s domestic concerns almost always

leads to the prioritization of the latter at the detriment of the former. In other words,

UNHCR cannot uphold its stated mission of providing protection to all refugees residing

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!138 “Sudanese minister condemns Egypt for the killing of refugees,” Sudan Tribune, n.p., 17 Jan. 2006. Web. 1 June 2012. 139 Badawy, 22

! 51

in Cairo, while simultaneously abiding by the interests of the Egyptian government.

Understanding UNHCR’s actions through this lens will help elucidate the organization’s

seemingly contradictory policies in regards to the Sudanese refugee population.

Obstacles to Study of the Refugee Population in Egypt

Generally, study of the Sudanese refugee population in Egypt proves problematic

for a number of reasons. First, the difference between ‘refugee’ and ‘migrant’ remains

vague, as “historically, large numbers of Sudanese have lived for extensive periods of

time in Egypt.”140 Before the mass migration flow in the aftermath of the Second

Sudanese Civil War, many Sudanese lived in Egypt for educational or economic

purposes, rarely migrating to Egypt on the basis of a refugee claim. The historically

economic nature of Sudanese migration to Egypt, rather than displacement, significantly

influences the later Sudanese refugee experience. Second, Egypt severely limits the

amount of Sudanese refugees who are given official refugee status. In the early 2000’s,

the Egyptian government’s official estimate of the Sudanese refugee population was

under 3,000 individuals, a gross underestimate of the true number. Most estimates

suggest the number of total Sudanese nationals in Egypt lies between two and four

million people, but only a small percentage of this total population has applied for

refugee status, for reasons discussed below.141

UNHCR’s hesitancy to grant Sudanese nationals refugee status greatly contributes

to this population’s general non-engagement in RSD. In fact, only 30% of the Sudanese

refugees in Egypt who applied for official refugee status through UNHCR were granted

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!140 Grabska, Katarzyna. “Marginalization in Urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo.” Journal of Refugee Studies 19 (3), (Sep. 2006) : 287-307, 292 141 Grabska, “Marginalization in Urban Spaces of the Global South: Urban Refugees in Cairo,” 288

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refugee status.142 Clearly, the Egyptian government, by means of UNHCR, aims to

minimize the perceived presence of Sudanese refugees in Egypt, even if this perception

clashes directly with the reality of a larger Sudanese refugee population. The reluctance

of UNHCR to grant Sudanese refugees refugee status perpetuates the problem, as

refugees have become hesitant to approach the organization.143 An historical

examination of the Sudanese refugee, rather than migrant, flow reveals a far broader and

concerted effort to minimize the official number of Sudanese refugees due to Egypt’s

regional interests.

The Sudan-Egypt Relationship

The historical relationship between Egypt and Sudan hinges on stability in the

Nile region, and Egypt’s interest in preventing any disruption of its power flow, as the

country produces most of its electricity from the Aswan Dam in Upper Egypt, located

close to Sudan. As a US State Department cable leaked by Wikileaks revealed, stability

remains Egypt’s primary objective in its dealings with Sudan. In this cable, Egyptian

government officials voiced serious concerns over the possibility of an independent

South Sudan, favoring instead the preservation of the status quo. The government’s

concern over Nile control cannot be overstated, and “Egypt has in the past threatened to

go to war with any country tampering with the Nile.”144 Constant refugee flow from

Sudan indicates the lack of stability in that country, and the Egyptian government does

not have an interest in perpetuating the image of Sudan as a country rife with strife. The

Sudanese refugee experience in Cairo must be understood in this context, and bilateral

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!142 Segal, Uma A, Doreen Elliott, and Nazneen S. Mayadas. Immigration Worldwide: Policies, Practices, and Trends. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. Print, 331 143 Zohry, “Cairo: A Transit City for Migrants and African Refugees,” 5 144 Ross, Will. “Wikileaks memo reveals Egypt’s Nile fears over Sudan.” BBC News, 3 Dec. 2010. Web. 1 June 2012.

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treaties between Egypt and Sudan predating the current refugee crisis, which presupposed

a stable Sudan, have a drastic effect on the Sudanese refugee experience in Cairo.

Before Sudanese instability in the 1980’s, the two countries signed the bilateral

Wadi El Nil agreement of 1978 guaranteeing the citizens of both countries the “right to

enter and reside without the visas required of other nationals.”145 This treaty aimed to

promote the relationship between the two historically linked countries, and many

Sudanese immigrated to Egypt in the early 1980’s for educational purposes, “but as

political conditions deteriorated in Sudan, many never went back home”146 in order to

avoid the violence. This population, displaced by civil war, looked to the UNHCR for

protection and basic social services. Due to the Wadi el Nil agreement, however, these

individuals, who despite now meeting the United Nations criteria for refugee as persons

“who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted, is outside his country of origin

and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of its protection,”147 were not granted

protection by UNHCR.

Again, despite UNHCR’s stated mission to protect refugee communities, the

Egyptian government’s interest in minimizing the refugee population prevented the

Sudanese population from receiving refugee status, by extension inhibiting any form of

protection. UNHCR justified its reluctance to provide protection to Sudanese refugees on

the grounds that “granting status as a mandate refugee would do nothing to alter the

Sudanese position … whereas material assistance could conceivably give Sudanese an

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!145 “Refugees in limbo.” The Middle East, 1 Dec. 1992. Web. 1 June 2012. 146 Abdalla, Hassan. “Down and Out in Cairo.” Worldpress.org, n.p., 31 July 2000. Web. 1 June 2012. 147 Badawy, 2

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economic advantage over Egyptian nationals.”148 By refusing to provide social services

to the Sudanese refugee population due to the ‘unique’ status of Sudanese citizens under

the Wadi el Nil agreement, this population became “the only displaced peoples in Egypt

automatically disqualified from UN refugee status and benefits.”149 This reluctance to

extend much-needed protection to the constantly increasing Sudanese community in

Cairo drove the population to the margins of Egyptian society, vulnerable to abuse at

both the hands of Egyptian security forces and broader society, particularly due to the

pervasive racism against the Sudanese population in Egypt.

This racism, however, may not specifically arise from an inherent bias against

skin color, instead originating from economic fears. In fact, many Egyptians, especially

those from Upper Egypt (which refers to southern Egypt, the region bordering Sudan)

phenotypically resemble their Sudanese neighbors. Before the 20th century, the Nubian

people lived in the Egypt-Sudan border region, fostering a shared culture and identity that

largely still exists, although to a lesser extent after the mass Arabization of the early

1900’s. Instead, racism against Sudanese arises from an economic bias as they “are

see[n] as competing with Egyptians for work.”150 Mass unemployment and poverty in

Egypt have exacerbated this sentiment and “African refugees frequently experience

racism on the streets.”151 Yet, the Wadi al Nil agreement guaranteed economic freedoms

to Sudanese nationals that were not extended to other refugee populations. The “ability

to work in the Egyptian economy” allowed some members of the Sudanese refugee

population to maintain sustainable livelihoods, opportunities rarely available to other

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!148 “Refugees in Limbo” 149 “Refugees in Limbo” 150 Zohry, Cairo: A Transit City for Migrants and African Refugees, 9 151 Ibid

! 55

diaspora.152 These freedoms, however, were abruptly cancelled in the mid-1990’s, after a

traumatic event affecting the highest levels of the Egyptian government.

Change in Policy Towards Sudanese Refugees

The watershed moment for the relationship between Sudan and Egypt occurred in

June 1995, during Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

for a summit of African leaders. During this trip, Mubarak’s motorcade came under fire

from Islamist extremists, allegedly of Sudanese origin. The Egyptian president survived

the violent attack of machine-gun and RPG fire, but the relationship between the

Sudanese and Egyptian governments deteriorated greatly.153 Again, this event displays a

central theme of Egyptian government refugee policy, when a global political event

(often violent) has a direct adverse effect on the refugee population in Egypt. The

Egyptian government’s relationship with refugee communities residing within its borders

can be understood as parallel to its relationship with the diaspora’s country of origin.

Yet, the power dynamic between the Egyptian government and domestic refugee

communities inherently favors the former. Due to this disempowerment, refugee

communities cannot adequately respond to repression once in a host state, and

humanitarian actors must implement policies that prevent severe human rights violations.

As expected, the Egyptian government’s attitude towards the local Sudanese

refugee population immediately changed in the wake of the Addis Ababa attack. This

policy shift occurred at both the governmental and UNHCR level, and resulted in the

restriction the economic rights of Sudanese nationals (previously guaranteed by the Wadi

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!152 Sperl, 20 153 Turner, Craig. “Egypt’s Leader Survives Assassination Attempt: Africa: Muslim extremists suspected in attack on Mubarak’s motorcade in Ethiopia. President is unharmed.” Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles Times, 27 June 1995. Web. 1 June 2012.

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al-Nil agreement) and the prevention of access to UNHCR services, which the

community greatly needed after the cancellation of economic rights. Firstly, UNHCR

policies for RSD of Sudanese nationals became far more restrictive. As outlined above,

the Wadi el Nil agreement dictated that refugee status was rarely granted, preventing the

Sudanese population from obtaining UNHCR’s much-needed protection and services.

After the assassination attempt on Mubarak, UNHCR began implementing far stricter

policies. These policies had the effect of creating a massive illegal refugee population in

Egypt, vulnerable to abuses at the hands of Egyptian security authorities that often

detained any individuals lacking the rarely issued, proper documentation. Secondly, in

conjunction with the new restrictions on RSD, the economic rights previously extended

to Sudanese nationals were abruptly cancelled, exiling the Sudanese population from

engaging the Egyptian economy in any meaningful way. The inability to earn a livable

income compounded the problems faced in Cairo during the often interminable RSD

waiting period, which requires refugees to reside in Cairo for months, and sometimes

years, for a decision to be made regarding their application. In addition, new restrictions

placed on the Sudanese refugee population created a new set of obstacles for those

seeking RSD.

Currently, Sudanese nationals visiting Egypt are required to obtain a visa,

normally issued in the form of a six-month a tourist visa, and refugees seeking asylum

must then complete the normal UNHCR RSD procedure.154 If Sudanese nationals fail to

obtain a visa extension, a measure rarely granted, they then reside in Egypt illegally,

subject to far greater harassment at the hands of Egyptian society and security forces. In

addition, Sudanese in Egypt no longer received free public education and were banned !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!154 Segal, 331

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from owning property.155 Members of the Sudanese community in Egypt drew an

explicit parallel between the Addis Ababa assassination attempt, and the assassination of

Yusuf al-Siba’i (discussed in Chapter 3) as both resulted in the intense marginalization of

each refugee community. The significance of violent events for the refugee communities

in Cairo and the organizations aimed at protecting them is discussed at length in Chapter

6.

Sudanese refugees have not readily accepted their marginalization resulting from

the combination of Egyptian government and UNHCR refugee administration, and with

increasing frequency over the last decade turned to resistance as a means to improve their

current situation in Egypt. In July 2000, a minor traffic collision between a Sudanese

refugee and an Egyptian driver escalated into a full-scale riot between Sudanese and

Egyptians.156 Subsequently, Egyptian hostility towards refugees increased greatly, as

evidenced by the July 30th headline of “popular, pro-government weekly Rose el

Youssef,”157 “Refugees: Guests or Criminals?”158 This article’s inflammatory language

suggests that refugees pose an insidious threat to Egyptian society itself, describing the

riot as “a dangerous type of insurrection” that “will open the way to a new type of civil

unrest in Cairo.”159 These type of public invectives against refugee communities

occurred simultaneously with an ever-increasing crackdown on the communities’ rights

by both the government and the UNHCR.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!155 Grabska, Katarzyna. “Living on the Margins: The Analysis of the Livelihood Strategies of Sudanese Refugees with Closed Files in Egypt.” The American University in Cairo- Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, June 2005. Web. 8 Oct. 2011, 32 156 Hassan 157 Hassan 158 Hilal, Yusuf. “Refugees to Egypt...Are They Guests or Criminals?!.” Arab West Report, Rose al-Yusef, 29 July 2000. Web. 1 June 2012. 159 Hilal

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The Egyptian government’s response was not limited to the media, and Sudanese

refugees soon experienced pointed harassment at the hands of Egyptian security forces.

In January 2003, Egyptian forces raided refugee communities, detaining many African

refugees over three days, a period now referred to as the ‘Black Days,’ a name that

originated from the Egyptian police force, who, according to a detained refugee’s

allegation, used the phrase in reference to the raids due to the operation’s targets, black

Africans.160 As discussed in Chapter 2, the refugee experience in Egyptian detention

often entails significant harassment, sometimes torture, that poses serious threats to the

well being of the individual in detention. Harassment often intensifies due to events well

beyond the control of the Sudanese refugee community in Egypt.

In keeping with Egypt’s focus in perpetuating the image of a stable Sudan due to

the former’s interest in a stable Nile region, the government specifically harassed the

community in response to the continual upheaval in the country. For example, in 2000,

when John Garang, the rebel leader fighting against the government in Khartoum, visited

Cairo for a conference, the Egyptian government simultaneously detained many members

of the Sudanese community. The blatant harassment of Sudanese nationals sent Garang a

clear message from the Egyptian government of “what could happen to his fellow

countrymen and women in Egypt if he continued to pay only lip service to the Egyptian-

Libyan plan for Sudan.”161 Blatant rights abuses marginalized the Sudanese population

to the fringes of Egyptian society, until some members of the community took a political

stand to spotlight these injustices.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!160 Apiku, Simon. “Egyptian Authorities Target African Refugees: Black Day in Cairo.” Worldpress.org, n.p. 21 Apr. 2003. Web. 1 June 2012. 161 Grindell, 109

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The pivotal turning point in the relationship between the Sudanese refugee

population and the Egyptian government occurred in 2005, when Sudanese refugees

staged a massive sit-in protest on the steps of the UNHCR office in Cairo. The protest

initially did not arouse the wrath of the notoriously violent Egyptian security forces, even

though this type of gathering violated Egyptian law.162 Significantly, Egyptians staging a

similar type of protest would almost assuredly have experienced significant violence.

The restraint shown by the Egyptian government displays that a normally oppressive

government may give more political freedom to foreign nationals than it gives to its own

citizens. In this case, the government may have determined that preventing Egyptian

dissent in regards to the upcoming parliamentary elections took precedence over

repressing the dissent of a smaller refugee population.163 Furthermore, the Egyptian

government may have underestimated the persistence of Sudanese political action.

The impetus for Sudanese political action originated from a change in UNHCR

policy that went into effect in 2004. During this time, Egypt and Sudan began to repair

their relationship, and peace talks reached a level where a new peace treaty between the

two countries seemed imminent. In response, UNHCR again changed the policy of

Sudanese RSD, “giving Sudanese applicants temporary protection, while suspending

individual RSD for most of them.”164 By extending temporary protection to Sudanese

refugees as a blanket measure, UNHCR ostensibly guaranteed refugees access to basic

social services. However, Egypt’s reservations on the 1951 Refugee Convention,

previously outlined in Chapter 2, meant that in reality domestic displaced populations in

Egypt held no economic rights, and only the most basic access to social services. The

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!162 Salih, 10 163 Ibid 164 Kagan, “Frontier Justice: Legal Aid and UNHCR Refugee Status Determination in Egypt,” 49

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inability to maintain a livelihood can drive refugees into situations where their basic

human rights are violated, a dangerous side effect of UNHCR policy.

By continually forcing Sudanese refugees to the margins of Egyptian society,

UNHCR effectively prevents this population’s ability to attain any sustainable livelihood,

“which some believe is equivalent to forcing repatriation.”165 The real possibility of

UNHCR causing the de facto repatriation of refugees to a country still experiencing

violent tumult that threatens the lives of a large population is perhaps the starkest betrayal

of UNHCR’s mission examined thus far. UNHCR’s abdication of responsibility for

refugee protection does not stem from this one incident; instead, it's one manifestation of

an historical trend of refugee marginalization. Before this change in policy, UNHCR

“ha[d] faced allegations that it is unresponsive to refugee needs, and even occasionally

arbitrary in its decision to give refugee status or … to close the files in Kafkaesque

fashion.”166 UNHCR’s tendency to reject applicants for refugee status intensified

Sudanese frustration with the organization, driving them to seek alternate means for

improving their situation, eventually turning to nonviolent protest as a means to draw

attention to their plight.

As the protest grew in size, misinformation spread among the Sudanese refugee

community, as “some had been misled into coming, told that joining the sit-in might

mean the chance to get resettled in Canada or America.”167 UNHCR failed to rectify the

abounding rumors, instead compounding the problem by reducing office activity after the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!165 Meffert, Susan, et. al. “Feelings of betrayal by the United States High Commissioner for Refugees and emotionally distressed Sudanese refugees in Cairo.” Medicine, Conflict, and Survival Vol. 26, No. 2 (2010): 160-172, 161 166 Azimi 167 Ibid

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start of the demonstration.168 At this point, UNHCR’s poor reputation with the Sudanese

community prevented any significant reconciliation measures, and outreach occurred too

late into the demonstration to prevent the ensuing calamity. UNHCR’s inability to

effectively communicate with the Sudanese refugee community prevented the

organization from carrying out its stated mission of refugee advocacy. Again, by

prioritizing the interests of the Egyptian government over those of the refugee population,

UNHCR betrayed its core mission, and in fact exacerbated the already trying experience

of refugees in Egypt.

Eventually, Egyptian government forces responded to the sit-in protest in

December 2005 in an expectedly violent manner when 4,000 Egyptian riot police entered

the square in Mohandiseen and violently purged the 3,000 Sudanese refugees, resulting in

the deaths of 27 individuals.169 UNHCR and the Egyptian government quickly absolved

each other of any responsibility for the violence, instead blaming the Sudanese refugee

population for the failure to reach a non-violent resolution:

The Egyptian Ministry of Interior … was quick to absolve itself of any responsibility – announcing that it had simply responded to UNHCR’s request to remove the demonstrators. UNHCR representatives explained that they had put forward their best effort to resolve the standoff, holding more than nine rounds of negotiations with refugee leaders over three months. One last-ditch attempt at negotiation resulted in a signed agreement between the sit-in leaders and the agency on December 17 – but it was rejected after the fact by the more intransigent demonstrators who had stayed behind.170

By pointing to the recalcitrance of the refugee community as the reason for the deaths,

UNHCR and the Egyptian government indicated not only that large-scale refugee

political demonstrations would not be tolerated, but were ultimately futile and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!168 Ibid 169 Ibid 170 Ibid

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counteractive to achieving concessions from either organization. The media reflected the

Egyptian government’s disdain with the Sudanese refugee population, and stories about

the sit-in “had been rife with allegations that the Sudanese were in fact drunkards,

opportunists and AIDS carriers.”171 Interestingly, certain prominent members of

Egyptian society, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa,

publicly criticized the government’s response, invoking the concept of a common

Egyptian-Sudanese heritage.172

The Egyptian response to the Sudanese refugee sit-in protest reinforced the notion

that UNHCR only acts at the behest of the Egyptian government, but recent research

indicates that the measures taken by UNHCR to minimize the perceived presence of the

Sudanese population are, in fact, counterproductive by increasing the intractability of the

refugee situation in Cairo. Both the government and UNHCR have a vested interest in

shortening the refugee experience, a goal that cannot be achieved when refugee

communities find themselves mired in a host country without any means to realize one of

the three durable solutions for refugee situations: integration, repatriation, and

resettlement. The reluctance to allow refugees to integrate in Egyptian society arises

from Egypt’s fears over the societal burdens mass migration entails, but the same

measures taken by UNHCR and the government to prevent refugees from integrating

prevents the population from achieving the other two durable solutions for obvious

reasons; without any means of income refugees cannot save enough money to move to a

stable region at home or emigrate to a country of asylum.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!171 Ibid 172 Ibid

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More worryingly, UNHCR policies may push refugee communities towards

premature repatriation, when conditions on the ground still pose a severe threat to the

well being of a population. In fact, immediately before the sit-in demonstration, UNHCR

began to implement a policy based on the presumption that Sudan was now stable enough

to facilitate the repatriation of refugees, reflected in new diplomatic efforts between

Egypt and Sudan. The warming relationship between Egypt and Sudan culminated in the

signing of the Four Freedoms Agreement (see Appendix 1), which guaranteed Sudanese

and Egyptian nationals the “freedom of movement, residence, work, and ownership”173 in

both countries. Theoretically, the Four Freedoms agreement ensures the rights of

Sudanese nationals, including refugees, to a greater degree than previously guaranteed.

In practice, however, the Four Freedoms agreement had no effect on the everyday

experience of the Sudanese refugee population due the Egyptian government’s failure to

ratify the agreement, negating any possible benefits for the community. The failure to

implement the Four Freedoms Agreement significantly decreased the already minimal

rights possessed by the Sudanese refugee community Egypt, and has been cited as a

significant factor in UNHCR’s decision to suspend RSD on an individual basis. Like the

Wadi el Nil treaty, the Four Freedoms Agreement reveals the dangers bilateral treaties

can pose to refugee communities residing in a host state. The historical tendency for

bilateral treaties between Egypt and Sudan to disempower the domestic Sudanese refugee

population necessitates the tempered, careful implementation of new policy in response

to any new treaties. Refugee aid organizations, especially UNHCR, must intensely

scrutinize these agreements before implementing new policies based upon the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!173 Olson, Translation of Four Freedoms Agreement, 2

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presumption that these agreements will provide refugees the protection previously

provided by UNHCR’s services.

In response to the harsh conditions of daily life in Egypt, many Sudanese refugees

consider resettlement in a country of asylum as the optimal solution to their plight as

refugees. Yet, resettlement opportunities for Sudanese refugees are few and far between

for a number of reasons. Firstly, the aforementioned reluctance of UNHCR to grant

Sudanese refugee status prevents the 70% of Sudanese refugees denied refugee status

from even applying to a resettlement program, as refugee status from UNHCR is a

prerequisite for any resettlement opportunity.174 Secondly, and more troublingly, some

scholars in the field of refugee studies suggest that the western nations make a concerted

effort to prevent Sudanese refugees from obtaining resettlement by means of UNHCR:

Harrell-Bond thinks that the UNHCR is working to keep away from industrialized nations. ‘If you think of UNHCR as an instrument of northern countries … then they want to keep refugees from reaching their shores. And remember UNHCR is very dependent on those very same donor states for its budget.175

Here, UNHCR again serves as a geopolitical tool, in this case used by western nations to

prevent their countries from experiencing the burdening effects of mass migration.

Importantly, these western nations appear to have greater sway over UNHCR in Egypt

than the Egyptian government; host states desire the resettlement of refugees in countries

of asylum in order to alleviate the social and economic burden of refugee populations.

However, Western nations rarely offer resettlement positions to populations extraneous to

their geopolitical agenda. The primacy of Western nations in the global refugee apparatus

has great significance for every level of refugee administration and advocacy in Egypt,

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!174 Segal, 331 175 Hassan

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the implications of which is discussed at length in the next chapter. The current

conditions, however, continue to drive Sudanese refugees to desperate measures.

In lieu of resettlement opportunities, some Sudanese refugees in Egypt have

attempted to illegally emigrate from Egypt, primarily to Israel, often with tragic

consequences. At the Egyptian-Israeli land border, Egyptian soldiers employ a ‘shoot-to-

stop’ when dealing with Sudanese refugees attempting to flee into the neighboring

country from Egypt, and over 50 Sudanese refugees have been killed in illegal border

crossings.176 The practice of hiring a smuggler to attempt a border crossing highlights the

bleak conditions of the average refugee experience in Egypt. Although Egypt does want

refugees to eventually find a way out of Egypt, this policy indicates that the government

will strictly regulate channels of exit. The lethal force used against unarmed individuals

may arise from Egypt’s interest in preventing any type of international incident with

Israel, as the relationship between the two countries is a crux of each country’s foreign

policy. Specifically, the Israeli-Egyptian relationship largely revolves around mutual

border security to prevent arms trafficking, and illegal refugee border crossings indicate a

lack of a secure border. The two countries met in 2007 to discuss the issue, with Israel

vowing to return illegal aliens to Egypt, although many claim the “returnees were never

heard from again.”177 The persistence of illegal Sudanese migration into Israel indicates

a continuing threat to the population that still exists in Egypt and Sudan, despite

ostensible improvements in the security situation both countries.

After the end of the Second Sudanese Civil War, signaled by the signing of

Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, voluntary repatriation to Sudan became

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!176 Stack, Liam. “Human Rights Watch faults Egypt’s ‘shoot-to-stop’ policy.” The Christian Science Monitor, 13 Nov. 2008. Web. June 1 2012. 177 Ibid

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increasingly viable for many Sudanese refugees, but not all, especially those from South

Sudan. Historically, UNHCR has repatriated refugees, such as the Rohnigyas of Burma

and Afghans from Pakistan, to areas considered safe for return, but where volatility still

exists, with disastrous consequences.178 These precedents necessitate that the repatriation

of Sudanese refugees should only occur after a confirmation of stable conditions on the

ground. Importantly, the varying conditions within Sudan, with some regions peaceful,

and others still experiencing violent conflict, indicates repatriation should not be

implemented as a blanket measure for all Sudanese refugees in Egypt. Certain segments

of the population should be prioritized for resettlement based upon the regional stability.

For example, the Sudanese population from the Egypt-Sudan border region, a relatively

stable region, should be pinpointed for repatriation over the population originating from

the Sudan-South Sudan border region, an area currently experiencing instability. A

more-nuanced UNHCR initiative would help avoid repatriating individuals too early,

while also partially alleviating the burden refugee communities place upon the host state.

Unfortunately, the recent increase in violence between the now independent South

Sudan and Sudan indicates that the Sudanese refugee crisis will continue for the

foreseeable future, especially deleterious for the situation of Sudanese refugees that

criticize the government in Khartoum. In the aftermath of South Sudan’s independence,

the once unified countries squabbled over resources, especially oil, and both now appear

poised for war.179 The Egyptian government seemingly sided with the Sudanese

government, making efforts to harass the Southern Sudanese and Darfuri in Egypt. The

reasons for this alliance lie in the existing historical relationship between Cairo and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!178 Azimi 179 Kron, Josh. “In 2 Sudans, Familiarity With Path to War.” The New York Times, 10 May 2012. Web. 1 June 2012.

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Khartoum, a link that has apparently survived the tumultuous events of the past year. In

early May 2012, the Egyptian government arrested prominent activist, Menem Suleiman

Atram, who regularly campaigns against the government in Khartoum, and his

whereabouts are currently unknown. Efforts to locate him have heretofore failed, and his

predicament parallels the experience of countless Sudanese refugees in Cairo,

necessitating a clear and drastic change in refugee policy in Egypt.180

The Sudanese refugee experience in Egypt correlates a number of trends

previously discussed, including the danger that violent international incidents and marked

refugee political activism pose to refugee communities, while also revealing the harmful

effects of faulty administrative policies on displaced populations. As the above study

demonstrates, any new policy in regards to the Sudanese refugee population, and refugee

communities in general, must employ intense scrutiny regarding any possible negative

repercussions to displaced populations. Specifically, UNHCR must seriously consider

the implications of new RSD procedures for domestic refugee populations. The

escalating conflict between Sudan and South Sudan suggests the continued presence of

Sudanese refugees in Egypt; reformulating refugee administration policies to provide

greater protection to this community presents one of the greatest challenges for refugee

advocacy in Egypt today.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!180 Hanzal, Abdalla. “Statement arrest Menem Suliman Atron director of Sudan Centre Contemporary for Studies and Development.” Sudanese Online, 7 May 2012. Web. June 1 2012.

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As opposed to the intense marginalization experienced by the Sudanese refugee

population in Egypt, the domestic Iraqi refugee enjoys far favorable conditions due to a

combination of factors, most importantly the disproportionate resettlement positions

offered to this community compared to other displaced populations in Egypt. The Iraqi

population, unlike the Palestinian and Sudanese populations, factors greatly into the

geopolitical agenda of the United States, as this population emerged directly in response

to a crisis created by the US. Like Egypt, the United States has a vested interest in

portraying itself as a benevolent humanitarian actor and its actions on behalf of the Iraqi

refugee community help ameliorate the international fallout from the calamitous

intervention in Iraq. In addition, unique restrictions placed on the Iraqi community

prevent any serious political activism; these restrictions, in fact, fostered favorable

conditions for the domestic Iraqi community by preventing any large-scale crackdown as

experienced by other communities engaging in political activity. This combination of

geopolitical relevance and refrainment from political activism has aided the Iraqi refugee

community to avoid the intense marginalization experienced by other domestic refugee

populations.

Recently, Egypt experienced a massive influx of Iraqi refugees fleeing from

instability in the wake of the United States led invasion of Iraq. Throughout the early

years of the Iraq war, Iraqis tended to remain at home, but by 2006, hundreds of

thousands fled the country, “seeking to escape a collapse in security and deadly sectarian

The Iraqi Refugee Experience in Egypt 51

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violence.”181 Some assert that the bombing of the al-‘Askariyya mosque and shrine in

Sammara’ in February 2006 precipitated the Iraqi refugee crisis; in any case, the years

following these attacks saw 4 million Iraqis, 15% of the population, leave the country due

to instability.182 A mere year after the initial influx of Iraqi refugees into a myriad of host

countries, the Iraqi refugee population had swelled to enormous proportions. The

immense nature of the Iraqi refugee flow led some countries to avoid labeling Iraqis as

‘refugees,’ instead using the term ‘guest’ to describe this population,183 as the label guest

inherently connotes a temporary status.

Egypt, however, granted displaced Iraqis refugee status, ostensibly tolerating the

Iraqi refugee population to a greater degree than other refugee populations for a number

of significant reasons. Post-2006 marks the first period of significant Iraqi refugee flow

to Egypt, and this lack of precedent allowed the Egyptian government to craft unique

administrative policies in response to this crisis.184 Initially, the Egyptian government

resisted the influx of Iraqi refugees by making it more difficult for Iraqi refugees to

obtain tourist visas to enter the country.185 Egypt’s hesitance arose from both “security

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!181 Marfleet, Philip and Dawn Chatty, “Iraq’s Refugees: Beyond ‘Tolerance’.” Forced Migration Policy Briefing 4, Dec. 2009. Web. 1 June 2012, 1 182 Libal, Kathryn, and Scott Harding. “The Politics of Refugee Advocacy and Humanitarian Assistance.” Middle East Report Vol. 37, Fall (2007): 18-21, 18 183 Fargues, Philippe, Saeed El-Masry, Sara Sadek, and Azza Shaban. Iraqis in Egypt: A Statistical Survey in 2008. The American University in Cairo - Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, Dec. 2008. Web. 9 Oct. 2011, 10 184 Minnick, Emilie. "Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee 'Communities' in Cairo and Amman." Thesis. The American University in Cairo - Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, 2009, 14 185 “Egypt: Respond to the needs of Iraqi Refugees.” Refugees International, 12 Apr. 2007. Web. 1 June 2012

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concerns” and the wariness over “the massive influx experienced in Syria and Jordan.”186

187

Unique RSD Procedures For Iraqi Refugees

For reasons discussed later in this chapter, UNHCR (with the approval of the

Egyptian government) instituted unique RSD procedures for Iraqi refugees. Currently,

Iraqi refugees are not required to apply for refugee status and are instead issued a yellow

card, which grants them refugee status prima facie. The ability to obtain refugee status

without undergoing an application process differentiates the Iraqi population in Egypt

from other refugee populations, such as the Sudanese. The importance of this unique

administration of Iraqi refugees cannot be overstated, as prima facie recognition

“essentially acts as a favorable presumption that they do have legally valid claims.”188

The historical relationship between Iraq and Egypt significantly contributed to the

Egyptian government’s unique tolerance of the Iraqi refugee population. The friendly

nature of Iraqi-Egyptian relations allowed for some degree of integration into Egyptian

society, and Iraqis in Egypt “maintain links with Egyptians in the form of friendship,

neighborhood and business partnership.”189 Sometimes, however, this past relationship

does not work in the favor of Iraqi refugees. For example, in Egypt “there is a stereotype

that all Iraqis are rich,”190 a preconception that impedes advocacy efforts. This belief

arises from the historical memory of Egyptian laborers who worked in Iraq during the

1980’s, but the validity of this stereotype proves irrelevant, as “just became someone is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!186 Minnick, Emilie and Noheier Nashaat. “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq.” Report. The American University in Cairo – Center for Migration and Refugee Studies, 2009, 2 187 “Egypt: Respond to the Needs of Iraqi Refugees” 188 Kagan, “Shared Responsibility in a New Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection,” 15 189 Farques, et. al., 71 190 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 10

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rich, does not mean that he is not a refugee.”191 Refugee status requires specific aid that

oftentimes cannot be bought, instead requiring international organizations to coordinate

solutions to this humanitarian crisis. For example, resettlement opportunities, which

cannot be bought or traded, are only provided by humanitarian organizations such as

UNHCR.

Although officials estimate the Iraqi refugee population in Egypt to number

around 40,000, some scholars suggest the population actually reaches as high as

150,000.192 193 Currently, however, only 15,000 Iraqi refugees are registered with

UNHCR.194 The vast discrepancy between official and real figures of Iraqi refugees in

Egypt reflects the Iraqi community’s deep distrust of UNHCR and broad skepticism over

the organization’s ability to provide them with basic rights. The United States’

‘humanitarian’ rationale for its presence in Iraq may explain this mistrust of international

humanitarian actors. Importantly, however, many do not understand international law

pertaining to refugee crises, which plainly states “it is actually the host country’s

responsibility to protect refugees and provide them with rights.”195 Humanitarian

organizations must implement educational outreach programs to counter these

misperceptions.

The special treatment of the Iraqi refugee population by the Egyptian government

does not, however, mean this diaspora did not endure any mistreatment at the hands of

the Mubarak regime. Unlike other large refugee populations, Iraqis do not possess the

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!191 Ibid 192 Marfleet, 14, Table 1 193 Yoshikawa, Lynn. “Iraqi Refugees in Egypt” Forced Migration Review, Issue 29 (December) 2007, 54, 54 194 Marfleet, 14, Table 1 195 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 10

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right to assembly “as a matter of informal policy.”196 When challenged on this repressive

policy, the Egyptian government invoked a haphazardly-applied Egyptian law, which

requires “any association must have 51% of the board Egyptian.”197 Although other

populations, such as Somalian and Sudanese refugees may form community

organizations designed to advance the interests of their community, Iraqis have no ability

to do so.198 Many speculate the reason for Egypt’s reticence at allowing the Iraqi

population the freedom to organize arises from concerns “that extremists might infiltrate

the country or bring sectarian conflict under the banner of ‘organization.’”199 Egypt’s

acute aversion to violent extremism reflects the Egyptian economy’s reliance on tourism

(which accounts for 10% of Egypt’s GDP),200 as any sort of attack drastically affects the

tourism industry. Governmental regulation of community organizations intensified

greatly in the aftermath of the Luxor Massacre in 1997. This attack, perpetrated by the

Islamist group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya, occurred at a popular tourist attraction,

Hatshepsut’s Temple, and was specifically aimed at destabilizing Mubarak’s regime by

crippling Egypt’s tourism industry.201 Sixty-two tourists perished, their bodies brutally

mutilated with machetes.202 Today, especially after the 9/11 attacks that further

decreased tourism to the Middle East, the Egyptian government takes serious measures to

prevent any further attacks that could affect the tourism industry. In addition, the 9/11

attacks raised global concerns over domestic terrorism spreading internationally, allowing

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!196 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 83 197 Abouissa, Iraqi refugees in Egypt: living a nightmare 198 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 83 199 Abouissa, Iraqi refugees in Egypt: living a nightmare 200 Tignor, 306 201 Tignor, 290 202 Labevière, Dollars for Terror, 287-88

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Egypt to take forceful measures due to the climate of fear. The unique restrictions on

Iraqi community organizations can be interpreted as originating from both new security

concerns and the dearth of existing Iraqi community organizations before the most recent

refugee crisis.

Organizations advocating for other refugee populations such as the Sudanese and

Somali communities predated the new security concerns, and dismantling preexisting

organizations is far more difficult than implementing new restrictions that prevent the

creation of new community organization. The Iraqi refugee crisis only developed over

the last five years, thus distinguishing the Iraqi community as the first novel mass

migration through Egypt of the twenty-first century. No community organizations

existed before the current Iraqi refugee crisis and the current regulations prevent the

creation of any new institutions, leaving the Iraqi community without any population-

specific advocacy. The restrictions that prohibit the creation of Iraqi community

organizations severely inhibited political activity, thus helping the Iraqi refugees avoid

political setbacks on the scale of Palestinian unrest in the 1970’s or the Sudanese sit

Egypt. Unlike other refugee communities, the Iraqi community never experienced

intense marginalization in Egypt and never engaged in open protest or demonstration at

the same level of other refugee populations. Such non-marginalization and absence of

protest is due to the combination of the Iraqi community's inability to participate in large-

scale political activity, and the U.S. geopolitical interests regarding the Iraqi refugee

crisis.

A combination of factors led to the widespread perception of the Iraqi refugee

crisis as temporary. Iraqi refugees are often hesitant to register with UNHCR due to fears

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over retribution due to specific sectarian affiliations and their skepticism over UNHCR’s

ability to solve the Iraqi humanitarian crisis.203 Some refugee organizations acknowledge

that Iraqi refugees may be reluctant to officially register, fearful of religious persecution

associated with “specific ethno-religion affiliation.”204 UNHCR did not require refugees

to register their religious affiliation, but Shia Muslims in a Sunni-majority country took

all possible measures to minimize their visibility, which included refraining from

approaching UNHCR. In addition to the fears of the Iraqi population, the Egyptian

government also has a vested interest in minimizing the amount of Iraqi refugees in

Cairo, deepening the already immense gap between official and actual population figures.

Evidence indicates that the Iraqi refugee crisis, like the Palestinian refugee crisis,

may last much longer than officials are currently suggesting. In fact, the Iraqi refugee

crisis recently fulfilled the criteria of a Protracted Refugee Situation, which describes a

situation in which a population has “lived in exile for more than five years, and when

they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight.”205 An

Iraqi refugee recently expressed his feeling of being “Palestinised.”206 The most

significant contributing factor elongating the Iraqi refugee crisis originates from the

Egyptian reservations on the 1951 Refugee Convention, previously discussed in Chapter

2. These reservations exempt the Egyptian government from providing economic and

education access to refugee populations in Egypt, in theory lessening the burden of

refugee populations on the Egyptian government. Yet, these reservations often prove

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!203 Marfleet, 1 204 Marfleet, 15 205 Crisp Jeff. “No Solution in Sight: The Problem of Protracted Refugee Situations in Africa.” UNHCR – Evaluation and Policy Unit, Working Paper 68, Dec. 2002. Web. 1 June 2012, 1 206 Marfleet, 2

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counterproductive, often elongating refugee crises, which in turn drastically increases the

burden on the Egyptian government.

Severe economic hardships in Egypt have led some Iraqis to cite such financial

repression as “the main problem hindering their lives in Egypt.”207 Significantly, Iraqi

refugees lack the ability to return home, and a recent survey of Iraqis in Cairo found that

half had sold their property before leaving Iraq, and now cannot find work in Egypt,

surviving primarily on remittances from family members abroad.208 209 Many Iraqis in

Egypt expressed surprise at the expensive nature of life in Egypt. In addition to everyday

expenses such as rent, healthcare, and food, Iraqis also experience the financial drain

caused by widespread extortion of kidnappers in Iraq, who kidnap family members and

hold them hostage until relatives pay a ransom, a phenomenon symptomatic of Iraq’s

instability.210 Once in Egypt, Iraqis have no access to engage in the Egyptian economy,

preventing them from saving enough money to travel to a country of asylum. Thus, the

same restrictions implemented by the Egyptian government to ensure that the Iraqi

refugee population does not permanently reside in Egypt, ironically prevent most Iraqis

from immigrating to another country.

In addition to economic repression, Iraqis are not granted the right to education, a

significant worry among the generally-educated Iraqi population. Again, Egyptian

restrictions on access to education arise from the government’s desire to prevent Iraqi

refugees from gaining Egyptian citizenship. Currently, children of foreign nationals

attending private educational institutions in Egypt provide their parents with a path to

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!207 Farques, et. al., 72 208 Marfleet, 18 209 Farques, et. al., 53 210 Abouissa, Mona. “Iraqi refugees in Egypt: living a nightmare.” RT, n.p.,6 Feb. 2009. Web. 1 June 2012.

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citizenship, and “Iraqi parents are able to obtain legal residency if their children have [an]

education visa.”211 By minimizing the amount of educational opportunities for the Iraqi

population, Egypt in turn minimizes the amount of registered refugees. Yet, if given the

opportunity, the widely-educated Iraqi population, the majority of whom have completed

university education, 212 could provide invaluable services to Egyptian society, especially

the “many Iraqi teachers and doctors.”213 Clearly, Egypt would benefit more from

allowing at least some Iraqi refugees to integrate into Egyptian society, rather than

preventing the community from participating meaningfully in the economy.

Religious factors also significantly influence the Egyptian government’s

administration of Iraqi refugees, as the Sunni Muslim majority of Egypt does not foster a

welcoming environment for the predominantly Shiite Muslim Iraqi refugee population.

The Egyptian government legally prohibits Shiite Muslims from praying in Sunni

mosques, while simultaneously refusing to allow Shiites to build their own mosque.214

Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s political rhetoric strongly condemned Shiite

Muslims, while also “supporting Sunnis regionally.”215 Some scholars speculate that the

Egyptian government’s reticence in regards to Iraqi refugees derives from the perception

that most Iraqi refugees are Shiite, and “it does not want to facilitate Iraq becoming a

Shiite state.”216 Yet, the Egyptian government’s efforts to marginalize the Iraqi refugee

population prove inert due to its connection to western geopolitics.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!211 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 59 212 Farques, et. al., 55 213 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 12 214 Yoshikawa, 54 215 “Egypt: Respond to the needs of Iraqi Refugees.” 216 Ibid

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U.S. Influence On Egyptian Treatment of Iraqi Refugees

Importantly, the United States takes a vested interest in the plight of Iraqi

refugees, leading to significant improvements for Iraqi refugees in Egypt. It similarly

displays the importance of international relations “in host state government responses

toward Iraqi refugees.”217 Some interpret these gestures as an admission of “American

guilt”218 for the US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequent humanitarian disaster. Again,

however, these efforts must be examined in the context of the Iraqi refugee experience,

which improved markedly due to the United States’ efforts. In the early years of the Iraq

refugee crisis, Egypt imposed significant entry restrictions on Iraq refugees.219 Yet, as

outlined above, UNHCR now grants prima facie recognition to all Iraqi refugees arriving

on Egyptian soil, perhaps directly in response to the United States’ diplomatic efforts on

behalf of the Iraqi diaspora.220 Clearly, the link between the Iraqi refugee population and

the US’ geopolitical interests vastly increases the humanitarian assistance received by the

community.

Furthermore, due to the United States’ efforts, a far greater percentage of Iraqi

refugees are selected for resettlement than from any other refugee population in Egypt.

In response to the Iraqi humanitarian crisis, in 2008 the United States government began

implementing a number of programs, such as the Direct Access Program, 221 aimed at

resettling Iraqi refugees in the United States and other coalition nations.222 Even existing

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!217 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 77 218 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 79 219 Roman, 5 220 Ibid 221 Libal, 20 222 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 79

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resettlement programs adjusted their criteria for resettlement, allowing Iraqi refugees to

apply directly for resettlement by the US Refugee Admission program.223 These

advocacy efforts largely succeeded in creating resettlement opportunities for the Iraqi

refugee population, and the majority of the 712 refugees resettled by UNHCR to a

country of asylum in 2009 originated from Iraq.224 The influence of Western states in the

refugee resettlement process cannot be overstated; a few scholars even go so far as to

claim that “large-scale resettlement tended to be … driven by the foreign policy of

Western states.”225 Although resettlement remains the ultimate goal of almost every

refugee, only a select few receive resettlement positions, primarily due to their

connection to Western geopolitics. The reticence of Western countries to provide

resettlement opportunities requires advocacy organizations to implement policies that

acknowledge the larger geopolitics affecting refugee populations.

In addition to the major role Western states play in refugee resettlement advocacy,

the relationship between the United States and Egypt has great import for the latter

nation, due to the immense aid packages from the United States. After Sadat’s successful

peace efforts with Israel, the United States became the most important patron of the

Egyptian government; next to Israel, Egypt currently receives the largest amount of

foreign aid from the United States. The immense aid packages provided by the United

States are symptomatic, and perhaps the cause, of the immense geopolitical shift Egypt

has undergone since the days of Nasser; the previously ‘non-aligned’ state now

definitively abides by the geopolitical interests of the United States.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!223 Roman, 11 224 Kagan, “Shared Responsibility in Egypt: A Strategy for Refugee Protection,” 28 225 Milner, 49

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Recently, however, the newly-formed Iraqi government has made efforts to

convince displaced Iraqis to repatriate, with mixed success. In 2008, Iraqi Prime Minister

Nuri al-Maliki ordered occupants of homes deserted by Iraqis fleeing instability to vacate

these homes within one month, allowing for the displaced Iraq population to return to

their property.226 These efforts are part of a broader $195 million dollar program, aimed

at encouraging Iraqi citizens to return to their homeland.227 Humanitarian action on

behalf of the Iraqi refugee population may not originate from a sincere desire to aid Iraqi

diaspora, instead arising from the desire to make Iraq appear as a stable nation. Iraq

cannot, however, project this image globally in lieu of the continuing Iraqi refugee crisis,

as “the very existence of Iraqi refugees indicates a failure of the Iraqi state and the regime

in Baghdad.”228 In this case, unlike other disingenuous humanitarian actions such as

those directed at the Palestinian and Sudanese populations, this repatriation effort does

not seem to directly improve the situation of Iraqi refugees currently living in Cairo. As

a recent UNHCR report indicated, most Iraqi refugees “ha[ve] no intention of returning

[to Iraq] under any circumstances.”229 Further studies support the notion that “security

conditions in Iraq have not improved enough to warrant return.”230 A recent survey of

Iraqis in Egypt found that “almost all participants stressed the fact that return to Iraq is

impossible.”231 Stories of refugees who have returned to Iraq only to meet violent

demises abound in Egypt’s Iraqi community, further reinforcing the notion that return is

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!226 Roman, 13 227 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 3 228 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 79 229 Marfleet, 2 230 Minnick, “Between Return and Resettlement: The Formation of Iraqi Refugee ‘Communities’ in Cairo and Amman,” 52 231 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 6

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not an option.232 Despite the real possibility of violence upon return, UNHCR has begun

to offer financial incentives to Iraqis in Egypt who are considering returning to Iraq, by

covering travel costs in addition to paying each family members $600 to return.233 On

the other hand, a recent survey of Iraqis in Egypt revealed that many held the erroneous

belief “that once you return to Iraq, you must close your UNHCR file and you cannot

leave Iraq for five years after that.”234 Errant beliefs such as this compound the obstacles

preventing repatriation, one of UNHCR’s three durable solutions for refugee conflicts.

A population’s reluctance to return to a country of origin can create a protracted

refugee situation in and of itself. Thus, the only durable solution applicable to the Iraqi

refugee population in Egypt appears to be resettlement, but a number of obstacles greatly

hinder the Iraqi community from obtaining resettlement positions. Interminable waits for

security clearance, sometimes lasting years, often prevent the male members of a

household from obtaining any resettlement offer due to the Hussein regime’s policy of

compulsory military service.235 In addition, UNHCR prioritizes single mothers for

resettlement, due to their inability to return to Iraq or to make a stable living in Cairo.236

Oftentimes, female family members obtain resettlement before the male members of the

household, dividing families, in some cases permanently. For this reason, prioritizing

refugee aid by gender may greatly increase its effectiveness and importance for refugee

communities.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!232 Abouissa 233 Ibid 234 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 8 235 Abouissa 236 Ibid

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The lengthy resettlement process has led to the common sentiment expressed by

the Iraqi community in Egypt that “Iraqis receive different and less preferential treatment

at the UNHCR in Egypt” compared to other countries such as Syria and Jordan.237

Although based solely off anecdotal evidence, UNHCR may in fact function better for

Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan due to the sheer size of the refugee population in those

countries, which drastically increases the visibility of the Iraqi community, in turn

increasing advocacy efforts on their behalf.238 In addition, UNHCR and other refugee

advocacy organizations “were ill prepared” for the massive influx of refugees,

compounding preexisting difficulties for the Iraqi community.239

A number of important conclusions are drawn from this examination of the Iraqi

populations experience Egypt. First, Western and Egyptian geopolitical interests

continue to dictate the specific policies pursued regarding the treatment of a specific

refugee population. Again, however, the fluidity of Egypt’s geopolitical interests leads to

stark changes in refugee administration. Here, the United States’ political interest in

providing humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi refugee population led to a complete turn

around in Egyptian government policy, rendering all other factors that would normally

contribute to harsh treatment of a refugee population, such as religious differences,

irrelevant in the wake of the Egypt’s status as a primary beneficiary of massive United

States aid packages. Although the United States’ efforts on behalf of the Iraqi refugee

community may originate from a disingenuous political motive intended to save face in

the wake of the Iraq invasion, these efforts have drastically improved the Iraqi refugee

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!237 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 9 238 Minnick, “‘Stuck’ in Egypt: Iraqi refugees’ perceptions of their prospects for resettlement to third countries and return to Iraq,” 11 239 Roman, 3

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experience in Egypt. Second, notwithstanding that the refugee framework in Egypt

severely restricts refugee rights, especially the right to political activism, the Iraqi

community never experienced a severe crackdown, perhaps due to their inability to

engage in political activism. Third, misinformation thrives in regards to many aspects of

the Iraqi refugee crisis. From basic population statistics to Iraqi conceptions of

UNHCR’s role in refugee advocacy, the Iraqi refugee situation in Egypt is oftentimes

obfuscated in a haze of hearsay. This partially arises from vast research gaps, as until

recently “personal stories and rumors provide the only picture of Iraqi life in Egypt’s

teeming capital.”240 But at more fundamental level, ubiquitous misperceptions of the

Iraqi refugee crisis, especially those from Iraqi refugees themselves reflect a failure of

refugee advocacy organizations in Egypt to successfully carry out their mission of

refugee protection and administration.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!240 Stack, Liam. “Iraqis in Cairo Struggle to Rebuild.” Al-Jazeera 16 Aug. 2009. Web. 1 June 2012.

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As discussed in the previous five chapters, the refugee aid structure in Egypt

contains many gaps that prevent sufficient refugee advocacy and assistance for refugees

in Egypt to sustain any livelihood. This chapter proposes a number of measures that aim

to close these aid gaps and provide more effective assistance to refugee communities in

Egypt. In keeping with the multifaceted nature of refugee administration and advocacy in

Egypt, I assert different proposals for the four primary actors in the refugee experience:

western donor nations (especially the United States), the Egyptian government, UNHCR,

and the refugee communities themselves.

Recommendations at the International Level

Chapter 1 established the importance of resettlement as a solution, perhaps the

only solution, for extended refugee situations, and Western nations play the largest role in

providing refugee communities with resettlement opportunities. Unfortunately, many

countries of asylum open their borders reluctantly, and in these cases only when a refugee

community figures prominently into specific geopolitical interests. Western nations

should implement resettlement programs that encompass many different refugee groups,

not just those relevant to geopolitical interests. In fact, many refugee communities factor

indirectly to the political interests of Western nations, as the perpetual existence of

refugee communities in Egypt directly increases regional instability. For example, the

development of Palestinian militancy in Egypt severely undermined Israeli-Palestinian

peace efforts, the success of which figures prominently in the United States’ current

Recommendations and Conclusions 61

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geopolitical agenda. By allowing refugee communities to resettle in western nations, the

U.S. will greatly increase prospects for achieving many of its geopolitical goals, despite

the historical tendency to implement policies directly related to geopolitical interests.

Recommendations at the Egyptian Governmental Level

Due to the Egyptian government’s well-documented, historical reluctance to

provide substantial aid to refugee communities residing within its borders, drastic

changes in policy appear unlikely. The recent January 25th revolution, ending (for the

time being) the primacy of the Egyptian president provides an unprecedented opportunity

for Egypt to reformulate its approach to refugee policy. Due to the counteractive nature

of current measures, which directly and indirectly elongate the average refugee

experience in Egypt, it is actually in the Egyptian government’s best interests to

implement new policies that provide services to refugee communities that help diaspora

achieve one of UNHCR’s three durable solutions - repatriation, integration, or

resettlement. A number of measures will drastically increase the ability of domestic

refugee populations to reach a durable solution.

First, the Egyptian government should begin to uphold its obligations as signatory

to many international treaties pertaining to the refugee issue, in addition to removing its

reservations on the 1951 Convention Relating to the status of refugees. Egypt’s

adherence to these obligations is at best spotty, and from a cynical perspective evidence

of their complete disregard for the well being of refugees in Egypt. Convincing the

Egyptian government to take this measure will prove difficult, but significant economic

and political incentives, in the form of a generous aid package, will greatly increase the

chance of Egyptian compliance. Absent significant economic pressure from the

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international community, it is highly unlikely that Egypt will remove these reservations.

Second, due to the severe limitations of UNHCR, the Egyptian government should create

an administration solely devoted to refugee administration.. In Egypt, the sheer scale of

the refugee community requires UNHCR to focus mostly on discerning which individuals

possess valid claims for refugee status, in other words, RSD. If the Egyptian government

created a new administration to complete RSD procedures for domestic refugee

communities, UNHCR could devote its resources to providing more effective protection,

rather than merely administering refugee populations. Framing this measure as an

empowerment of the Egyptian government after the January 25th revolution provides a

possible means to justify the establishment of a new administrative organization. Third,

the Egyptian government should allow refugee communities to achieve some level of

integration. Although the integration of refugee communities into Egyptian society

admittedly creates greater societal burdens, the continued presence of marginalized

refugee communities in Cairo creates greater societal burdens than allowing a small level

of integration. In addition, these communities, if permitted, could constructively engage

in Egyptian society, as in the case of the highly-educated Iraqi community. Awareness

by the broad Egyptian public that refugee integration increases societal benefits will

provide the Egyptian government with greater leverage to implement reformed refugee

administrative policies.

Recommendations at the UNHCR Level

UNHCR’s centrality to refugee administration in Egypt coupled with the

widespread suspicion with which refugee communities approach the organization,

indicates a significant failure on the part of UNHCR to successfully carry out its mission.

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UNHCR must reformulate its policies in a meaningful and effective manner in order to

win back the trust of refugee communities, if the organization wishes to fulfill its mission

statement and provide adequate protection. Due to UNHCR’s status as a NGO

established to provide refugee protection, I believe that this organization has the best

opportunity to implement new, more effective policies. UNHCR occasionally

reevaluates specific office policies, indicating an organizational interest in improving

administrative practices.

If the organization remains the primary administrator of refugee communities,

UNHCR must streamline its Refugee Status Determination procedures, while

simultaneously increasing the process’ transparency to regain the trust of refugee

communities in Egypt. RSD remains the foremost priority of all refugees arriving in

Egypt, and the structure of UNHCR in Egypt should reflect this concern. The new

measures taken by UNHCR in the early 2000’s are a positive first step; the introduction

of yellow cards tangibly increased UNHCR’s protection of the refugee community by

lengthening the legal stay of individuals applying for refugee status and providing

documentation that Egyptian authorities recognize as indicative of UNHCR’s authority

over refugee communities.

UNHCR, however, must implement new RSD procedures with the utmost care

and delicacy as an errant implementation could cause the number of ‘illegal’ refugees in

Cairo to drastically increase. This also undermines its reputation within the broader

refugee community. As the Sudanese sit-in demonstration shows, the implementation of

faulty RSD procedures will lead refugee communities to take desperate measures to

preserve one of their few rights in Egypt. By cancelling all individual RSD, UNHCR

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ignored the realities of the Sudanese refugee flow into Egypt, treating this migration as

near a resolution; whereas the ground realities (especially in Darfur) continued to cause

significant displacement, although of a different origin.

Broader global political dynamics have a direct effect on the Egyptian

government’s relationship with each refugee population residing within its borders, and

UNHCR should devote some of its resources to constantly monitoring these international

political dynamics. By creating a division that studies day-to-day world events for

possible ramifications on the refugee community in Cairo, UNHCR would be able to

mitigate, even prevent, the deleterious effects that global political currents have on

refugees in Egypt. Special attention must focus on violent attacks affecting the high

levels of the Egyptian government; the Sudanese experience after the assassination

attempt on Hosni Mubarak in 1995 and the Palestinian travails after violent murder of

Sadat’s good friend in the mid-1970’s dictate that these events have a marked effect on

the refugee experience in Egypt. UNHCR should interpret global events through a

historical lens, looking to the past for how current events will affect the refugee

community.

Again, UNHCR must interpret these global events in a delicate manner, as the

possibility of enacting policies based on premature conclusions may lead refugee

communities to resort to extreme measures, as in the case of the Sudanese community.

By halting RSD procedures for the Sudanese refugee community in response to the Four

Freedoms Agreement, which was never ratified, UNHCR removed one of the few

protective nets available to the community. On the other hand, UNHCR should

acknowledge that certain populations, such as the Iraqi community, benefit from its

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centrality to the geopolitical interests of Western donor nations, and may not require as

much as assistance as other populations peripheral to geopolitics, such as refugee flows

originating from Sub-Saharan Africa. In conjunction with monitoring the global political

situation as it relates to refugees in Cairo, UNHCR should investigate the possibility of

responding to extreme change in the refugee experience caused by new political

dynamics. Devoting resources to the creation of a division aimed at responding to new

political dynamics will in fact save UNHCR from embarrassment and suspicion in the

future.

UNHCR should also reconsider the nature of its aid in Egypt, perhaps shifting its

resources from one central office on the outskirts of Cairo to multiple satellite offices,

each located in a neighborhood populated mostly by refugee communities, reflecting the

varying needs of different refugee communities. The current UNHCR’s office location,

situated well outside Cairo after its move from Mohandiseen (a central Cairo

neighborhood), in the aftermath of the Sudanese sit-in protest prevents refugees from

accessing UNHCR services without advance planning. Yet, refugee communities often

settle in one neighborhood; for example, the Iraqi population generally resides in 6th of

October City, and the Sudanese community has large enclaves in neighborhoods adjacent

to Mohandiseen due to the presence of community service organizations and churches

directed towards providing refugee services to Sudanese nationals. UNHCR would

increase its ability to provide adequate protection and timely services by fragmenting its

office into a number of smaller offices located around Cairo. In addition, the previous

three chapters detail concerns of different refugee communities, revealing that no

singular, uniform policy can adequately address the wants of every refugee community in

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Egypt. By fragmenting itself, UNHCR would be able to better form different policies for

the refugee communities residing in the neighborhood of its office, effectively increasing

the benefits for all refugee communities.

Recommendations at the Refugee Level

Due to the diversity of different refugee populations, blanket recommendations

rarely apply to the refugee community in Egypt as a whole. But the trend of refugee

communities’ political activism counteractively leading to a broad crackdown on any

politically active community remains present throughout the previous chapters’ historical

studies, and for this reason I believe the minimization of political activity will foster

favorable conditions for refugee communities in Egypt. The crackdown on Palestinian

communities in the 1970’s and the new restrictions on the Sudanese community after

2005 occurred directly after these communities engaged in prominent, public political

activity. The Iraqi refugee community, however, has not endured any harsh repression on

the same level as other communities in Egypt, due to the restrictions preventing the

establishment of Iraqi community organizations. Advocating that refugee communities

refrain from political activity proves difficult, especially due to the harsh, everyday

conditions of the refugee experience in Egypt, but if refugees avoid public political

action, it will greatly benefit their communities by evading the ire of Egyptian authorities.

Any political activity should remain strictly non-public. If representatives of refugee

communities privately approach UNHCR to outline the community’s grievances, it will

not attract the attention of the Egyptian authorities in the same way as sit-in

demonstrations and street protests.

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Conclusion

These recommendations, especially at the international and Egyptian

governmental level, require a drastic change in refugee policy, to one not directly

originating from geopolitical interests. Benevolent, humanitarian actions from both the

Egyptian government and the western states will actually help achieve the geopolitical

interests, especially regional stability in the Middle East, by solving and preventing the

development of protracted refugee situations. Refugee advocacy that acknowledges the

effects of refugee communities on geopolitical interests will provide the best means to

implement reformulated policy. Although disingenuous, humanitarian international and

Egyptian refugee protection efforts have the greatest chance of improving the average

refugee experience in Cairo. In the absence of international and Egyptian governmental

changes in refugee administration, UNHCR must reformulate its current policies to

reflect the realities of the average refugee experience in Egypt, and possesses the greatest

ability to do so. If implemented, the above-outlined recommendations for UNHCR will

drastically increase the protection afforded to refugee communities. As refugee flows

continue to migrate through Egypt, the urgent need to implement effective, protective

measures to improve the harsh experience of the average refugee in Egypt increase every

day and UNHCR will hopefully seize the unprecedented opportunity in the wake of the

January 25th Revolution to realize a new, better strategy for refugee administration.

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Appendix 1-Four Freedoms Agreement Translation

Decision of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Number 144 for the year 2004 In the matter of approval of an agreement of freedom of movement and residence and work and Ownership Between the governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Sudan Signed in Cairo on the date 4/4/2004 President of the Republic After reviewing the second paragraph of article (151) from the constitution Decrees: (Preamble) According to the deal of freedom of movement and residence and work and ownership between the governments of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Sudan of signed in Cairo on the date 4/4/2004 with reservations until ratification Issued at the Presidential office on the 21st of Rabi al-Awwal in the year 1425 AH (Signed 11th May in the year 2004 CE) Hosni Mubarak

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Agreement of Freedom of Movement, Residence, Work, and Ownership between the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the government of the Republic of Sudan To meet and fulfill the needs of the brotherly people of Egypt and Sudan, and their aspirations towards unity and progress and achieving of a new life along the Nile Valley. Based on the political leadership’s suggestions from both countries during the summit meetings in Cairo on 18 January 2004 in regards to the facilitating of freedoms in movement, residence, work, and ownership of the citizens of both countries. In reinforcement of the concept of profound strategic complementary partnership which was expressed in the decisions of the high joint committee. It is agreed between the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the government of Sudan that this agreement will be carried out. The principle of reciprocity in the implementation of the provisions of this agreement that is as follows: (Article One) Explanation For the purposes of this agreement the following words and expressions refer to the following:

1. Two countries-Refers to the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Sudan

2. The high committee-Joint Egyptian-Sudanese committee

3. Ministerial committee-Refers to the preparatory ministerial committee of the joint Egyptian-Sudanese high committee

4. Citizen-Any person belonging by citizenship to either of the two countries

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(Article Two) Freedom of Movement and Residence Residence and Moving to and from the two countries takes place only with a valid passport or any other document or documents agreed on between the two sides in the two countries and through any means of transit – land, sea, or air – by any gateway which is officially recognized by the two countries (Article Three) Freedom of Work and Ownership

1. The citizens in the two countries have the right to work and occupy any position or job in the two countries taking into account the international and Arabic agreements signed by the countries.

2. The two countries agree to give their citizens the right to own and take advantage

of the lands, buildings, and properties including the right to free administration, to incorporate businesses and partnerships. The two countries have also agreed to take legal action to put this into practice.

(Article Four) Guarantee of Acquired Rights The rights of any citizen from the two countries acquired from this agreement are not affected in case the agreement is terminated for any reason. (Article Five) Means of Implementation A joint technical committee from specialized parties in both countries is hereby founded and will convene regularly to undertake the following:

1. Following ratification of this agreement, eliminate existing obstacles

2. According to a timeframe agree on by the two sides, submit regular reports to the ministerial committee, who in turn will submit them to the high committee

3. Deal with any other related issues that the ministerial committee decides

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(Article Six) General Matters Without violating the rules of this agreement, the procedures to protect the health of citizens, and maintain security and general order must be taken into consideration. (Article Seven) Amendment and Ratification

1. This agreement is modified by a written request from either side with the consent of the other side. However, it will be effective based on the third clause of this article.

2. This agreement is valid for five years and it is renewed automatically for the same

period or periods as long as each side does not notify the other side in writing of a desire to terminate the agreement three months before renewal.

3. The rules of this agreement supersede any laws in the two countries that may

contradict the rules of this agreement. This agreement comes into effect beginning the thirty days following the sealing of the documents.

This agreement has been signed in Cairo in the Arabic Republic of Egypt on the 14th of Safir 1425 AH, Sunday 4th of April 2004, with two copies written in Arabic, each possessing legal authority. On behalf of the government, The Republic of Sudan, Mustafa Uthman Ismail Minister of Foreign Relations On behalf of the government, The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ahmed Muhir Al-Saeed Minister of Foreign Affairs

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