erasmus university rotterdam the dutch reforms, gresham college, london, 27jan11 1 choice of...

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Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms Gresham College 27 January 2011 Wynand P.M.M. van de Ven Erasmus University Rotterdam [email protected]

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Page 1: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1

Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers:

the Dutch reforms

Gresham College

27 January 2011

Wynand P.M.M. van de VenErasmus University Rotterdam

[email protected]

Page 2: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 2

The Netherlands

• Kaartje Europe

Page 3: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 3

Three waves of health care reforms

In many OECD-countries three consecutive waves of health care reforms can be discerned:

1. Universal coverage and equal access;

2. Controls, rationing, and expenditure caps;

3. Incentives and competition.

David Cutler, Journal of Economic Literature 2002(40) 881-906.

Page 4: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 4

Key elements of reform debate

1.Who is the purchaser of care on behalf on the consumer?

2.Yes/No competition among:

– Providers of care?

– Purchasers of care (= insurers)?

3.Which benefits package? Which premium structure?

Page 5: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 5

Dutch health care system• Health care costs 2006: 10% GDP;• Much private initiative and private

enterprise: physicians, hospitals, insurers;• Still much (detailed) government regulation;• GP-gatekeeper;• Health insurance before 2006 a mixture of:

mandatory public insurance (67%),voluntary private insurance (33%).

• From 2006: mandatory private insurance (100%).

Page 6: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 6

Reforms since the early 1990s

The core of the reforms is that:Risk-bearing insurers will be the

purchasers of care on behalf on their members;

Government will deregulate existing price- and capacity-controls;

Government will “set the rules of the game” to achieve public goals.

Page 7: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 7

Health Insurance Act (2006)

• Mandate for everyone in the Netherlandsto buy individual private health insurance;

• Standard benefits package: described in terms of functions of care;

• Broad coverage: e.g. physician services, hospital care, drugs, medical devices, rehabilitation, prevention, mental care, dental care (children);

• Mandatory deductible: €165 per person (18+) per year.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 8

Consumer choice• Annual consumer choice of insurer

and choice of insurance contract:– in kind, or reimbursement, or a

combination;– preferred provider arrangement;– voluntary higher deductible: at most

€650 per person (18+) per year;– premium rebate (<10%) for groups.

• Voluntary supplementary insurance.

Page 9: Erasmus University Rotterdam The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 1 Choice of providers and mutual healthcare purchasers: the Dutch reforms

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 9

Health Insurance Act (2)

• Much flexibility in defining the consumer’s concrete insurance entitlements;

• Selective contracting and vertical integration in principle allowed;

• Open enrolment & ‘community rating per insurer’ for each type of health insurance contract;

• Subsidies make health insurance affordable for everyone;

• Risk equalization.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 10

Risk Equalization Fund (REF)

premium (18+)

REF-payment based on risk adjusters

REF

Insured Insurer

Income-related contribution

Gov’t contribution (18-)

(50%)

(45%)

Two thirds of all households receive an income-related care allowance (at most € 1,464 per household per year, in 2008)

)

(5%)

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 11

Regulated Competition• Competition among health insurers:

consumers have a periodic choice among health insurers or ‘health plans’ (‘organizations in which insurer and providers are integrated’);

• Competition among providers of care:insurers may selectively contract with

providers;• Not a free market; regulation to achieve

society’s goals.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 12

Evaluation Health Insurance Act dec09

The HI Act-2006 is a succes in the sense that:

• No political party or interest group has argued for a return to the former system with a distinction between sickness fund and private health insurance.

• There is broad support for the option to annually choose another insurer or health insurance contract.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 13

Positive effects

• Good system of cross-subsidies (‘solidarity’);

• Standard benefits package available for everyone, without health-related premium;

• Annual choice of insurer/contract;

• Strong price competition among the insurers;

• Increasing information about price and quality of insurers and providers of care);

• Increasing insurers’ activities in purchasing care;

• Quality of care is on top of the agenda.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 14

Preconditions managed competition

1. Risk equalization2. Market regulation:

a. Competition Authority;b. Quality Authority;c. Solvency Authority;d. Consumer Protection Authority;

3. Transparencya. Insurance products

(Mandatory Health Insurance & Voluntary Supplementary Insurance)

b. Medical products

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 15

Preconditions managed competition4. Consumer information;5. Freedom to contract;6. Consumer choice of insurer;7. Financial incentives for efficiency;

a. Insurers;b. Providers of care;c. Consumers;

8. Contestable markets:a. (sufficient) insurers;b. (sufficient) providers of care.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 16

Are the preconditions fulfilled?Precondition 1990 (SF) 2010

Risk equalization - - +

Market regulation:Competition Authority;

Quality Authority;

Solvency Authority;

Consumer Protection Authority;

-

+

NA

NA

+ +

+

+ +

+

TransparencyMandatory Health Insurance

Voluntary Supplementary Insurance

Medical products

+ +

-

- -

+

-

- / +

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 17

Are the preconditions fulfilled?Precondition 1990 (SF) 2010

Consumer information - - - / +

Freedom to contract - - - / +

Consumer choice of insurer - - +

Financial incentives for efficiency:Insurers;

Providers of care;

Consumers;

- -

-

- -

- / +

- / +

+

Contestable markets:(sufficient) insurers;

(sufficient) providers of care.

- -

- -

+ +

- / +

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 18

Key issues• Insurers are reluctant to selectively contract

because of a lack of information on the quality of the (selected) providers of care;

• Good risk equalization is a precondition to make insurers responsive to the preferences of the chronically ill people;

• Who bears responsibility if a hospital goes bankrupt: government or the insurers?

• Supplementary insurance should not hinder chronically ill people to switch insurer;

• Managed competition under a global budget?

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 19

Conclusions• Evaluation of Health Insurance Act:

On balance positive, despite some serious problems.

• So far the reforms were focussed on the health insurance market;

• Although insurers have some degree of freedom to contract with providers of care, there is still a lot of government regulation with respect to prices.

• The next years the reforms will focus on the provider market.

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The Dutch Reforms, Gresham College, London, 27jan11 20

Challenges

• Are insurers capable of being a prudent buyer of care on behalf of their insured?– If NOT, what then is the rationale of a competitive

insurance market with all problems of risk selection?

• Is government prepared to give up its traditional tools (i.e.: supply-side regulations) for cost containment?

• The Dutch health care reform is work-in-progress. So far, the jury is still out.