eoa 216 & 217: korean war 1950-1951 operational approach (broad actions) north korea originally...

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EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951 Operational Approach (Broad Actions) North Korea originally thought that by seizing Seoul that would end the war, did not realize that Rhee would escape and S Korea would continue to resist, then tried to remove UN forces from the Korean Peninsula. UN forces initially sought decisive battle (Inchon) to remove NK forces, and then tried to remove Communist forces from Korean Peninsula, China became involved, and became a war of attrition until armistice was signed. Commander’s Intent North Korea: Unification under N Korean rule China: World recognition, chance to modernize and receive Soviet arms, support fellow communist regime USSR: Distract US forces from Europe, Attrit forces and economy South Korea: Existence, then unification under S Korea US: Containment, Collective defense, show USSR that aggression would not be tolerated UN: Repel the N Korea attacks, restore international peace and security in the area The decision on whether or not to stop at the 38 th parallel or to work for unification went back and forth several times for the UN forces Operational Framework Close-Deep-Rear Tenants of ULO Lethality: Increased use of US firepower between aircraft, artillery, and naval gunfire was much greater than nK/China forces Adaptability: UN forces adapted to nK/Chinese tactics and were able to effectively defend and counter-attack after being defeated several times in the beginning of the war Synchronization: Ridgeway synchronized several distinct operations to apply pressure to the Chinese and get to the defensible position of PL KANSAS (RIPPER, TOMAHAWK, ROUNDUP, etc) all were supported with aircraft and artillery Combat Power M2: UN movement was limited due to the mountainous terrain or Elements of Operational Art/Design End state: Repel the N Korea attacks, restore international peace and security in the area COG: Chinese and Soviet Support OP Approach: Initially decisive battle, then annihilation, once China invaded turned to attrition Decisive Points: Pusan Perimeter, Inchon Landing, Chinese invasion, seizure of PL KANSAS Basing: Pusan as a steady LOC, Japan as a safe haven to prepare forces for Korea LOO: Single LOO, moving forces north to defeat nK/Chinese forces OP Reach: when near Yalu, was at the limit of LOCs, limited the amount of firepower that could support troops, withdrew to easier to support locations Tempo: UN was deliberate, when conducting offensive operations, US forces ensured conditions were set before attacking and did not move further than what could be supported Depth: air interdiction was constant during the war Phasing/Transitions: nK aggression – UN counter – Chinese invasion – UN counter - Stalemate Culmination: the stalemate led to the signing of the armistice Risk (strategic): Losing Korea would allow Communism to spread across the world Key Concepts of Clausewitz/Jomini Clausewitzian Trinity analysis: Tension between MacArthur (military), Truman (government), which ultimately ended with the firing of MacArthur. This tension complicated war aims. MacArthur wanted to destroy China. Truman wanted to contain communism within North Korea. Jomini: MacArthur violates principle of unity of command as he divides 8th Army with X Corps in their offensive to the Yalu along the ridge. It made sense for the Inchon invasion, but once complete, X Corps should have been assigned to 8th Army. Key Concepts of other Theorists

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EOA 216 & 217: Korean War Assumptions:Technology Keys: US -CAS was crucial for infantry to advance their attack -Lack of anti-tank weapons. No US infantry battalion by itself could hold the battlefield until it received CAS, medium tanks, and artillery. -8th Army (Mech.) was tied to the roads, Chinese didn't stick to the roads Chinese / nK / Korean People’s Army (KPA): -Soviet MiG-15s were superior than USAF, US lost air superiority quickly in the initial Chinese attack. -nK tanks -Lack of technology, allowed for smaller logistical requirements US: Truman- If US loses to communism in Korea, then Middle East and potentially Europe will follow MacArthur: Chinese will not enter the war Chinese/nK: -June 1950, US will not intervene if nK invades south of 38 th Parallel, S Korea people will rise up and support nK and create a “5 th Column”, ROK Army will dissolve or defect, Rhee’s government will collapse Context: Historical Context: As World War II winds down, the Yalta Conference (Feb 1945) and Potsdam Conference (Jul 1945) sets the stage for post-war division. In Apr-Jun 1945, the UN is created. In , the Cold War flares across Europe. In 1949, the Chinese Communists defeat Nationalists (Kuomintang) Cold War flares across Europe. Poland crisis ( ) not allowed to hold free and democratic elections. Truman Doctrine (1947) allocates money to contain communism. The Marshall Plan (1948) provides economic rebuilding of Europe, which Stalin perceives as economic warfare. In 1948, Stalin conducts the Berlin Blockade. The US responds with the Airlift operations to sustain Berlin. In 1949, NATO is formed. US conducts a post-war draw down, which includes military demobilization under an atomic umbrella. Kennan's Long Telegram (1946), was an article about a conjecture of Stalin’s plans to take over the world via communism. 2nd Red Scare (1946). National Security Act (1947), creates the National Security Council. Chinese Communists defeat Nationalists (Kuomintang), USSR explodes an atomic device (1949). NSC 68 (Apr 1950), more defense spending on Containment Strategic Context: In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and occupied Korea north of the 38 th Parallel, which the US approved. (Japan ruled Korea from 1910 until the Soviet occupation of Korea). US forces subsequently occupied Korea south of the 38 th Parallel. By 1948, there were two separate governments and both claimed to be the legitimate government of Korea. Kim Il-Sung heads the communist north, under Stalin's tutelage. Syngman Rhee heads the 'free' south, under US guidance. Campaign Context: On 25 June 1950, North Korea invades South Korea with Soviet provided tanks. The South Korean (ROK) Army did not have anti-armor or anti- air capabilities and were overmatched. UN condemns invasion and authorizes use of force (27 June 1950). US is worried that if communism wins here, that it will lead to the spread of communism across the world. China saw this as an opportunity to get modern weapons from the Soviets

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Page 1: EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951 Operational Approach (Broad Actions) North Korea originally thought…

EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951Operational Approach (Broad Actions)

North Korea originally thought that by seizing Seoul that would end the war, did not realize that Rhee would escape and S Korea would continue to resist, then tried to remove UN forces from the Korean Peninsula. UN forces initially sought decisive battle (Inchon) to remove NK forces, and then tried to remove Communist forces from Korean Peninsula, China became involved, and became a war of attrition until armistice was signed.

Commander’s IntentNorth Korea: Unification under N Korean ruleChina: World recognition, chance to modernize and receive Soviet arms, support fellow communist regimeUSSR: Distract US forces from Europe, Attrit forces and economySouth Korea: Existence, then unification under S KoreaUS: Containment, Collective defense, show USSR that aggression would not be toleratedUN: Repel the N Korea attacks, restore international peace and security in the areaThe decision on whether or not to stop at the 38th parallel or to work for unification went back and forth several times for the UN forces

Operational FrameworkClose-Deep-Rear

Tenants of ULOLethality: Increased use of US firepower between aircraft, artillery, and naval gunfire was much greater than nK/China forcesAdaptability: UN forces adapted to nK/Chinese tactics and were able to effectively defend and counter-attack after being defeated several times in the beginning of the warSynchronization: Ridgeway synchronized several distinct operations to apply pressure to the Chinese and get to the defensible position of PL KANSAS (RIPPER, TOMAHAWK, ROUNDUP, etc) all were supported with aircraft and artillery

Combat PowerM2: UN movement was limited due to the mountainous terrain or rice patties in the summer and their reliance on vehicles for supportMC: the terrain made communication between elements difficult, coalition partners had different equipment making it difficult to coordinate actionsLeadership: UN forces were feeling defeated, the Incheon landings brought back hope and fighting spirit to UN forces, but after the initial Chinese offensive, it took Ridgeway to personally motivate soldiers to fight the “godless communists”

Elements of Operational Art/Design

End state: Repel the N Korea attacks, restore international peace and security in the areaCOG: Chinese and Soviet SupportOP Approach: Initially decisive battle, then annihilation, once China invaded turned to attritionDecisive Points: Pusan Perimeter, Inchon Landing, Chinese invasion, seizure of PL KANSASBasing: Pusan as a steady LOC, Japan as a safe haven to prepare forces for KoreaLOO: Single LOO, moving forces north to defeat nK/Chinese forcesOP Reach: when near Yalu, was at the limit of LOCs, limited the amount of firepower that could support troops, withdrew to easier to support locationsTempo: UN was deliberate, when conducting offensive operations, US forces ensured conditions were set before attacking and did not move further than what could be supportedDepth: air interdiction was constant during the warPhasing/Transitions: nK aggression – UN counter – Chinese invasion – UN counter - StalemateCulmination: the stalemate led to the signing of the armisticeRisk (strategic): Losing Korea would allow Communism to spread across the world

Key Concepts of Clausewitz/JominiClausewitzian Trinity analysis: Tension between MacArthur (military), Truman (government), which ultimately ended with the firing of MacArthur. This tension complicated war aims. MacArthur wanted to destroy China. Truman wanted to contain communism within North Korea. Jomini: MacArthur violates principle of unity of command as he divides 8th Army with X Corps in their offensive to the Yalu along the ridge. It made sense for the Inchon invasion, but once complete, X Corps should have been assigned to 8th Army.

Key Concepts of other TheoristsMao- PLA and KPA avoided US strengths of attacking in the day. Instead, they moved and attacked at night and synchronized attacks outside of suspected CAS windows. Moltke- MacArthur thought that once Truman unleashed war, MacArthur had the ability to wage absolute war on his terms, disregarding the limited war that Truman sought. Warden- Truman's limited war aims prevented MacArthur to conduct a bombing campaign on Manchuria's airfields, oil fields, and critical infrastructure. MacArthur was not able to target a lot of Warden's 5 ring model to break down the enemy's system.Delbruck- The war eventually came to a stalemate when it became a war of attrition along the 38th parallel. Hence, an armistice was signed in 1953.

Page 2: EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951 Operational Approach (Broad Actions) North Korea originally thought…

EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951

Phasing:

Timeline:

15 AUG 48: Founding of the Republic of Korea, Syngman Rhee elected President9 SEP 48: Founding of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea with Kim Il Sung as Premier1949: US withdraw of forces upon successful elections4 APR 49: NATO formed1 OCT 49: Mao assumes control of China25 JUN 50: North Korean Troops cross the 38th Parallel15 SEP 50: Inchon Landing and Pusan Breakout7 OCT 50: UN authorizes MacArthur to enter North Korea14 OCT 50: Chinese “Volunteers” cross Yalu into North Korea26 DEC 50: Ridgway assumes command of 8th Army11 APR 51: MacArthur relieved of command27 JUL 53: Armistice signed

North Korean offensive (25 Jun 50)Pusan perimeter established (4 AUG 50)Inchon Landing and Pusan breakout (15 SEP 50)First Chinese offensive (25 OCT 50)Home by Christmas offensive (24 NOV 50)Second Chinese Offensive (25 NOV 50)Third Chinese Offensive (31 DEC 50)Fourth Chinese Offensive (15 FEB 51)Operation Ripper (7 MAR 51)Fifth Chinese Offensive (22 APR 51)Stalemate (15 JUL 51-27 JUL 53)

Page 3: EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951 Operational Approach (Broad Actions) North Korea originally thought…

EOA 216 & 217: Korean War 1950-1951

Assumptions:Technology Keys:

US- CAS was crucial for infantry to advance their attack- Lack of anti-tank weapons. No US infantry battalion by itself could hold the battlefield until it

received CAS, medium tanks, and artillery.- 8th Army (Mech.) was tied to the roads, Chinese didn't stick to the roads

Chinese / nK / Korean People’s Army (KPA):- Soviet MiG-15s were superior than USAF, US lost air superiority quickly in the initial Chinese

attack.- nK tanks- Lack of technology, allowed for smaller logistical requirements

US:Truman- If US loses to communism in Korea, then Middle East and potentially Europe will followMacArthur: Chinese will not enter the war

Chinese/nK:- June 1950, US will not intervene if nK invades south of 38 th Parallel, S Korea people will rise

up and support nK and create a “5th Column”, ROK Army will dissolve or defect, Rhee’s government will collapse

Context:

Historical Context: As World War II winds down, the Yalta Conference (Feb 1945) and Potsdam Conference (Jul 1945) sets the stage for post-war division. In Apr-Jun 1945, the UN is created. In 1946-1949, the Cold War flares across Europe. In 1949, the Chinese Communists defeat Nationalists (Kuomintang). 1946-1949- Cold War flares across Europe. Poland crisis (1945-1946) not allowed to hold free and democratic elections. Truman Doctrine (1947) allocates money to contain communism. The Marshall Plan (1948) provides economic rebuilding of Europe, which Stalin perceives as economic warfare. In 1948, Stalin conducts the Berlin Blockade. The US responds with the Airlift operations to sustain Berlin. In 1949, NATO is formed. US conducts a post-war draw down, which includes military demobilization under an atomic umbrella. Kennan's Long Telegram (1946), was an article about a conjecture of Stalin’s plans to take over the world via communism. 2nd Red Scare (1946). National Security Act (1947), creates the National Security Council. Chinese Communists defeat Nationalists (Kuomintang), 1949. USSR explodes an atomic device (1949). NSC 68 (Apr 1950), more defense spending on Containment

Strategic Context: In August 1945, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and occupied Korea north of the 38 th Parallel, which the US approved. (Japan ruled Korea from 1910 until the Soviet occupation of Korea). US forces subsequently occupied Korea south of the 38 th Parallel. By 1948, there were two separate governments and both claimed to be the legitimate government of Korea. Kim Il-Sung heads the communist north, under Stalin's tutelage. Syngman Rhee heads the 'free' south, under US guidance.

Campaign Context: On 25 June 1950, North Korea invades South Korea with Soviet provided tanks. The South Korean (ROK) Army did not have anti-armor or anti- air capabilities and were overmatched. UN condemns invasion and authorizes use of force (27 June 1950). US is worried that if communism wins here, that it will lead to the spread of communism across the world. China saw this as an opportunity to get modern weapons from the Soviets