environmental typologies and pak securit, saira

Pakistan Institute of International Affairs

ENVIRONMENTAL TYPOLOGIES AND PAKISTAN'S SECURITYAuthor(s): Syed Farooq HasnatSource: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 40, No. 1 (First Quarter 1987), pp. 51-64Published by: Pakistan Institute of International AffairsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41403937 .Accessed: 19/10/2014 04:20

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ENVIRONMENTAL TYPOLOGIES AND PAKISTAN S SECURITY

Syed Farooq Hasnat

Security of a nation can be appropriately assessed by looking at factors which become responsible in altering the policy making apparatus. In the case of Pakistan the understanding of its environment must be

analysed if accurate results are to be achieved.

In this article we will be dealing with the types of environment the

policy makers of Pakistan encounter while executing their foreign policy options. A clarification must be made because, apart from the geographical setting, there are other variables which can account for the environment as they have the required capacity to influence the foreign policy making process. 1 However, we will confine ourselves to the criteria based on the

frequency and degree of foreign interactions. The distance of Pakistan from the regional as well as global actors, according to our scheme of

analysis, becomes less of an influencing factor.

If a unit has to survive, it must adapt itself to its environment or

alternatively should have enough capacity to change its surroundings as according to its requirements. The question of adaptability therefore remains the key to a nation's security. The manner in which it is achieved and the methods adopted could vary according to the circumstances of different countries. Nations adapt to enhance their military capabilities so that they can acquire a better bargaining leverage with the environmental

I . Harold and Margaret Sprout, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics," ed., James N. Rosenau, Internatiopal Politics and Foreign Policy : A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

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forces. However, countries like Austria, because of their peculiar circumstances, are able to rely more on their diplomatic manoeuvring rather than gaining in military strength. Countries with different requirements can combine both the factors so that their weakness in military capability can be bridged by diplomacy. The basic condition remains that environment should first be identified based on objective security interests of a nation. Negligence in performing the responsibilities cannot solve even minor problems. The following arguments are relevant to our propositions:

Vital interests cannot be defended by detachment and dissociation, but nor should they be defended by embracing the status quo or unattractive regimes. What is required is an enhanced reputation for decisiveness and credibility in defence of a country... and a diplomacy that is persistent, selective and modulated.2

In order to obtain the desired security objectives, the policy makers of Pakistan are expected to understand with clarity the number of actors involved in their environment. Moreover, the reading of signals in their proper perspective become necessary in the avoidance of security threats. 3

If we glance at the past history we observe that Pakistan's perception of its potential adversaries and friends has been almost consistent. Most of the time, the foreign policy has been constituted by the bureaucratic structures - unrepresented in nature - and thereby have failed to reflect the genuine desires of the population in their foreign policy pre- ferences. In our analysis we will base our findings on the actions taken

by the ruling elite but at the same instance would point out the misper- ceptions of the foreign policy making apparatus. In other words the environmental considerations of Pakistan's foreign policy would be taken as the global adjustments in terms of frequency of interaction with the international actors.

2. Shahram Chubin, "The United States and the Third World: Motives, Objectives, Policies," ed., Christoph Bertram, Third World Conflict and International Security (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 87.

3. Gerald Segal, The Great Power Triangle (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), p. 153.

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The above observations are made, keeping in view the fact that th

ignoring of "congenial environment" is not confined to Pakistan alone. The tendency exists in other developing nations as well. As noted above, the people at large do not participate in the formation of foreign policy. In these countries, vested interests like the bureaucratic structures with their links with such organizations as World Bank or International Monetary Fund is not uncommon. The military as well as the feudais along with the

newly emerging class of industrialists play an equally important role in the execution of a country's foreign behaviour - thus shifting a nation towards an environment which does not fulfill the genuine desires of the masses. In such circumstances the genuine security requirements are

ignored thus exposing the country to external dangers. The state which is unable to control the pressure groups of its society from permeating on its foreign policy endeavours can be regarded as the weakest.4 Here it should be clarified that we are discussing those pressure groups which have their own institutionalized interests, and do not represent the views of the general will of the people.5

The shifting of environment also occurs where a nation has no control over the circumstances. In this situation, necessary shifts and adjustments become inevitable in order to move a country away from potential dangers. The external environment of Pakistan has been in a state of flux quite frequently, thus desiring a degree of change in the policy orientations. The fluctuations in the global set-up, caused by the decline in the bipolar global system in the mid 1960s, was the first threshold. The second came in with the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. The third turning point was the

emergence of the Persian Gulf countries, i.e., their economic strength from 1973 onwards. In fact the changes in the global system has been a continuous process. The following description of changes further

explains our contentions:

4. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 56.

5. In democratic societies, the policies are formulated after thorough debate by various factions of the society. But there the pressure groups are not monopolized by one group. In fact the government in democratic societies on occasions compromises with the opposing views. In non-democratic countries, the opposing opinions are not accepted with an open mind.

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There has been change in the nature of the major issues, e.g., the cold war has turned into a detente and the North/South conflict, which had started on the issue of anti-colonialism still continuing about Southern Africa, has largely shifted to economic growth; there has been change in the salience of issue-areas - the gravity of international conflicts has moved from security to economics, resources, and ecopolitics - and the major danger spots which have gradually shifted from Europe to the Middle East and Africa....6

The first change in global set-up in the early sixties gave-way to more

flexibility in the regional mechanism, thus allowing the small and weak nations to pursue their policies in a somewhat unrestricted manner. However, there are some writers who still believe that the big powers, in the form of "military or industrial power", dominate the world politics and that the role of the "Third World is negligible.*'7 Our contention is that those militarily weak nations which enjoy the support of the masses and are desirous to pursue independent policies, can, in the prevailing international situation play their respective role. However, nations which have started to depend on the financial help of the big powers or rely on the help of the big powers in their armament requirements, loose their

independent character in the affairs of the international relations.

The foreign policy makers of Pakistan adopted a subservient position. Pakistan did not take full advantage of the "new reality" of the situation of detente and the ruling elite continued to pursue the status quo. An evidence to this effect is given when the outdated alliance system in the form of CENTO was carried well in the late 1978. The loss of East Pakistan in 1971 and the American-indifference towards our security should have been a powerful enough catalyst to quit CENTO, but it never materializ- ed. Moreover, the emergence of the Persian Gulf region in 1973 should also have been yet another reason to leave the American backed alliance

system. Such an action was necessary for a preference for more closer

6. Joseph Frankel, International Relations m a Changing World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 200.

7. Elie Kedourie, "A New International Disorder," eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 355.

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relations with the Persian Gulf countries in the field of common defence and security. We do recognize that half-baked efforts were made to establish close contacts with the western neighbours of Pakistan. More- over such relations were based on the principles of limited gains, in the form of getting foreign exchange remittance from the Pakistanis working in that area and getting some grants to purchase military equipment.

In other words, alternative security understanding as well as arrange- ments should have been made. In reality it was the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and its consequences which saw the collapse of this outdated alliance. Otherwise, apparently the policy makers were still not ready to quit CENTO. On the otherhand, SEATO became ineffective and

ultimately collapsed as the People's Republic of China and the United States began to develop new understanding of cooperation. The role of Pakistan should not have been that of a silent spectator. In fact, we should have been more vigilant to the changing circumstances in our regional as well as global milieus. James N. Rosenau, narrates a policy of adjustments as follows: "...The political organism is always experiencing both continuities and change, and thus it is always in motion, slipping behind, moving ahead, holding fast, or otherwise adjusting and changing in response to internal developments and external circumstances."8

The proposition that Pakistan is a militarily weak nation and, therefore, cannot freely exercise its foreign policy goals, is disputed by some analysts of foreign policy bahviour. There are a variety of factors which can com- pensate for being weak in military strength. For example, apart from skilful use of diplomacy, which we have already mentioned, there are such factors as mobilizing of the masses (Iran is a good example); effective leadership and economic and social advancement of a state. These elements, "often enable small states to exercise influence totally disproportionate to the rank and status accorded by the objective elements of power."9

8. James N. Rosenau, The Study of Political Adaptation (London: Frances Printer, 1981), p. I.

9. Agrippah T. Mugomba, "Small Developing States and the External Operational Environment," The Year Book of World Affairs 1979 , Vol. 33, p. 212; Published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs.

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The degree of importance given, either as a matter of option or imposed from the external surroundings, is the core of the formulation of the environmental typologies of Pakistan's security. The physical presence of a security threat, as well as the means to avoid it, should be taken in a similar conceptual meaning. The consideration of neighbours, as being the vital factors by themselves, will be accepted with reservation. How- ever, at the same instance the importance of geographical continuity cannot be overlooked. We agree with J.D.B. Miller when he writes,

Neighbours have traditionally been important to any state, because of the high incidence of communication with them through trade and travel; the possibility of quarrels over disputed borders; the problem of what kinds of restrictions are needed in order to ensure that

neighbours do not gain too much advantage from one's own situation; the effects of having similar or divergent ethnic stock; and so on. In a sense, neighbouring states always matter, even though they may not matter mostro

Miller's statement can be disputed in parts when judged in the context of Pakistani situation. For example, with India, Pakistan does not maintain either trade or travel to a degree which a neighbouring situation demands. Similar is the case with present day Afghanistan. However, even the absence of such a relationship pose security concerns as absence of normal conditions create tensions.

We can divide Pakistan's environment into three types. These environmental typologies are constructed keeping in view the security options which the policy makers of Pakistan should keep in consideration while executing the options of our foreign policy. The typologies areas follows:

1. Immediate Attention Type 2. Normal Circumstantial Type 3. Distinct Type.

10. J.D.B. Miller, The World of States (London: Croom Helm, 1981), p. 50.

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The first category consists of those actors which directly or indirectly affect the vital concerns of Pakistan's security - either to maintain its external postures, as according to its military and economic interests, or to adopt internal developmental programmes without interference from big powers and multinational corporations. The mere presence of external actors do not influence the policy orientation of Pakistan's security. But, once set in motion to pursue certain goals, the external actors create a situation which requires immediate attention from our side. The Immediate Attention Type environment not only includes situations which pose security threat but would also incorporate factors which, if

pursued, would not allow the emergence of the security threat to Pakistan.

We can divide the first category into the following five sub-divisions:

(i) Russian occupation of Afghanistan; (ii) The United States as a supplier of armament and economic aid; (iii) The historical mistrust with India; (iv) Regular pattern of understanding with the People's Republic of China; and (v) Sharing of security concerns with such Middle Eastern nations as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran.

(i) The Russian occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the continuous presence of the Russian troops focussed Pakistan's attention towards its western environment. Afghanistan has been a source of tension because of its Pakhtoonistan policy since the independence of Pakistan in 1947. However, it never became a serious threat for Pakistan's security and thus remained in the second category of the Normal Circumstantial Type. In March 1978, President Daud visited Pakistan among speculations that the future will witness closer ties between the two culturally and religiously similar countries. But Daud's assassination in April of the same year changed the situation for the worse as far as Pakistan's defence interests were concerned. According to a description of the Soviet invasion, the Russians "dramatically transformed Pakistan's geostrategic situation." All of a sudden Pakistan faced the spector of Soviet troops virtually everywhere along the thirteen-hundred-mile frontier. The

II. W. Howard Wriggins, "Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy after the Invasion of Afghanistan," Pacific Affairs (Summer, 1984), p. 285.

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presence of large number of Afghan refugees on the Pakistani soil along with the resistance activities of the Afghan freedom fighters further

aggravated the security environment with Afghanistan.

The policy makers of Pakistan had almost totally focussed their attention towards Afghanistan since December 1979, thus turning it into Immediate Attention Type environment. The environment turned into such a

category on which the Pakistani authorities had no control. However, once it had settled down to that stage, the policy makers were expected to control the crisis situation in their favour or at least curtail the security threat. The Pakistani society faced a direct security challenge and in order to counter that threat the masses should have been mobilised. In crisis the activation of a large number of people ascertains a powerful force to balance the deficiencies in the defence structures. Moreover, skilful diplomaty was required to move Pakistan away from the security threat that the Russians were posing in Afghanistan.

(ii) The United States gave $3.2 billion, starting from 1981 and ending in 1987, while as an aid with $4.02 billion is in the pipeline for the future. These figures also include credit for military purposes. The U.S. granted such a generous help for the sole purpose of strengthening Pakistan's posture as against the Russians in Afghanistan. "It was a step toward easing this problem, but it could not solve it."12 And, in this fashion the Americans became part of Pakistan's security environment of the first category. We can argue that by dragging the Americans in the Immediate Attention

Type the government in fact created more security hazards for their

country than achieving the status of a counter balance which was the

apparent intention. A West German scholar, Dieter Braun writes,

The Soviet Union does not lack leverages for propagandistically accusing Pakistan of being an accomplice of the U.S. In this connec- tion, it is constantly asserted that Pakistan ceded to the U.S. military rights on its territory, which are a threat to the Soviet Union...

12. Henry S. Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham, N.C.: Duke Press Policy Studies, 1983), p. 254.

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Numerous contacts between the two armed forces suggest that consultations are taking place concerning contingency planning. The same holds true for Pakistani and Western suspicions with regard to Indo-Soviet military cooperation... In this domain, the Zia/Junejo government must act with particular care.13

The U.S. factor in the Afghanistan crisis should have been limited to humanitarian help for the refugees and for the moral pressures on the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.

(iii) India's desire to be a mini-super power in the South Asian i-egion has been obstructed by the refusal of Pakistan to become a sub- ordinate state. That also goes for other countries of the region. To give an example of the Indian thinking about their hegemonial tendencies, Sarbjit Johal boasts:

As the dominant military power in South Asia, the Indian government has several capabilities to punish, coerce, or influence Pakistan. These capabilities have steadily increased since independence, and even though the Pakistan military has revitalized since 1979, India's present capabilities are much greater than Pakistan's. India's armed forces number I.I million men, a significant total, globally as well as regio- nally. 14

The long history of differences with India on vital issues, along with the reality of three major wars between the two countries, has created hurdles in any move to normalise relations with that country. The policy makers of Pakistan in recent years have tried to appease the new Indian leadership but without any positive response. In fact the basic differences between the two nations are such that drifting India towards the second category in our security considerations remains a distant possibility, at least in the near future.

13. Dieter Braun, "Pakistan's Balancing Act - Factors Determining its Foreign and Security Policy," translated from Europa - Archiv , Bonn, No. 15/1985 (10 August, 1985), p. 3.

14. Sarbjit Johal, "Regional Cooperation and Indo-Pakistan Relations," South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Villanova), Vlll:2 (Winter, 1984), p. 39.

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(iv) Pakistan's ties with the People's Republic of China has beeri consistent since their development from 1962. China proved to be a reliable friend and its policy towards Pakistan has been devoid of any hegemonial designs. The Chinese factor in the first category of our environment typology unlike the previously described environments goes in Pakistan's favour as far as security interests are concerned. Chinese extended a security help in 1965 war against India and thereafter became confirmed a force whose affiliation with Pakistan began to be regarded as a security asset.

(v) From 1971-1979, Pakistan gave full attention to Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia along with other Middle Eastern countries. Such a

policy was a success because when these nations were made first preference environment for Pakistan's security, we moved closer to "congenial environmental type". In other words Pakistan moved nearer to its natural external surroundings. After 1979, attention was diverted towards India, mainly to normalize relations. Pakistani policy makers wasted nearly nine years by creating an environment for our security which was just not there. In that effort they ignored the genuine environment like the Middle Eastern societies.

Pakistan's foreign policy options towards the Gulf states in particular and the Middle East in general should have been on the basis of ideological, economic and cultural commitments. General thrust resting on encourage- ment of contact on people to people level as relations relied solely on government to government basis are not strong enough for any permanent foundation. Growing communications, between the people of this region on the one hand and Pakistan on the other, are necessary for better understanding and permanence of contacts between the Muslim nations of the area. A cohesive understanding which is indispensable for better relations has not been given a fair trial in the past.

Tables I and 2 are confined to the Immediate Attention Type environment, explaining the behaviour of the actors of the first type.

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Table I is divided into conflict and cooperative conduct constructed on Pakistan's actions or statements towards external environment (from December 1979 to November 1985), as well as statements and actions chanelled towards Pakistan. The statements were carefully chosen and speculations of the newspapers and radio on various aspects of foreign policy were omitted.

From Table I we gather that inspite of the fact that during this period the Russian invasion in Afghanistan, was attracting the attention of the Pakistani policy makers, the conflict number of 228 in the Afghan case is 12 interactions, lower than 240 of the Indian case. On the other hand we note that the Indian conflicts in 1984-85 nearly doubled than those in the previous two years (1982-83). This can be attributed to increasing Indian hostility to" divert its domestic problems such as the Sikh agitation in Indian Punjab. Moreover, the Indian leaders were determined to take

advantage of the political weak structures in Pakistan. The Afghan rise in conflicts in 1984-85 is attributed to the increasing Afghan mujahideen's pressure to which the Kabul regime retaliated by bombarding the refugee camps in Pakistan.

Table 2 indicates that Pakistan had a fairly low percentage, i.e. 5.8 during our research period with our otherwise trustful and reliable friend like Turkey. Iran accounts for 10.2 per cent in the cooperative field while Saudi Arabia had 9.3 per cent of cooperative interactions with Pakistan. As discussed earlier, the policy makers of Pakistan during the

period of our research did not emphasize, the promotion of the genuine environment - the data confirms our propositions made in the beginning of the article. Instead the energies and efforts of the Pakistani policy makers were exercised to normalize relations with India - which is 24.2 per cent of the total relationship between our sample countries. We should note here that most of the cooperative gestures were initiated by the President of Pakistan. Fifty per cent of the conflict interaction with India indicates that they did not respond favourably to the President. It is also worthwhile noting that India opposed Pakistan on all matters which were of vital security concerns. For example, opposition to the

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military aid from the United States, nuclear capability even for peaceful purposes. Most important of all, the Indian leadership chose to occupy part of the Siachen Glacier. That is the reason why we see a surprisingly high percentage of 24.2 cooperative interactions with India. Apart from the Pakistani president's gestures of friendship, there were cooperations in various fields as facilitating the railway traffic as well as improvement of telephone systems.

The relation with China in the period of research remained constant with 14.9 per cent of the total cooperative actions while not a single case of conflict interaction was noted. The United States acquired a 19.1 per cent of cooperative actions due to its policy of supporting Pakistan against the Russian invasion in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Afghanistan's fairly high cooperative interactions with Pakistan accounts for the Afghan leaders' repeated statements of having direct talks with Pakistan. Moreover, the regular meetings in Geneva lead the cooperative percentage of interactions to a higher level.

The Normal Circumstantial Type consists of those countries which, in an indirect manner, impose their weight upon the ultimate security options of Pakistan. The development of economic relations with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; *5 Economic sanctions from the Western European Community: establishing communication links with the Muslim comm-

unity, and understanding with the countries of South Asia, are some of the prominent examples which can be bracketed in this category.

The Distinct Type includes those global actors which in normal circumstances do not occupy a prominent position in the security oriented foreign policy of Pakistan. Multinational Corporations as OPEC; developments in Africa; tension situation in South East Asia; and the unfolding of events in Latin America are included in the environment of Pakistan's foreign policy occupying the least important position.

15. For details of Pakistan economic relations with at least one country - Japan see R.G. Sawhney, "Pakistan-Japan: Growing Economic Relations," Strategic Analysis ( New Delhi) IX:6 (September, 1985), pp. 557-564.

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Article Contentsp. 51p. 52p. 53p. 54p. 55p. 56p. 57p. 58p. 59p. 60p. 61p. 62p. 63p. 64

Issue Table of ContentsPakistan Horizon, Vol. 40, No. 1 (First Quarter 1987), pp. i-xx, 1-253Front MatterPAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICYA QUARTERLY SURVEY [pp. iii-xx]THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USSR [pp. 1-16]PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONSLAST TWO YEARS [pp. 17-29]GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS IN PAKISTAN-INDIA RELATIONS [pp. 30-50]ENVIRONMENTAL TYPOLOGIES AND PAKISTAN'S SECURITY [pp. 51-64]US POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN [pp. 65-79]THE NEW WORLD INFORMATION ORDER [pp. 80-94]PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED NATIONS [pp. 95-105]BOOK REVIEWSReview: untitled [pp. 106-109]Review: untitled [pp. 109-111]Review: untitled [pp. 111-114]

CHRONOLOGY (January-March 1987) [pp. 115-154]CHRONICLE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (January-March 1987) [pp. 155-248]DOCUMENTS (January-March 1987) [pp. 249-253]Back Matter

environmental typologies and pak securit, saira

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