environmental inspections as coordinated by belgian environmental prosecutors
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Environmental inspections as coordinated by Belgian Environmental Prosecutors. Dr. Carole M. Billiet U.Gent, Center for Environmental and Energy Law & Flanders Environmental Enforcement Court Malta, IMPEL-Conference 1-4 October 2013. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Environmental inspections as coordinated by Belgian
Environmental Prosecutors
Dr. Carole M. Billiet U.Gent, Center for Environmental and Energy Law & Flanders Environmental Enforcement CourtMalta, IMPEL-Conference 1-4 October 2013
Informal system-induced coordination of environmental inspections by
prosecutors
I. IntroductionII. The public prosecutor’s system position:
some essential featuresIII.Dependency of the criminal sanctioning
track from the input of inspections / policeIV. Cost-effectiveness issues higher up should
shape the work bottom down: the proof issue
V. Informal complementarities creating coordination
I. Introduction Enforcement pyramid:
sanctions (punitive, remedial), ‘teeth of the law’
Public prosecutors decide about the access to criminal sanctions (principally punitive)
Environmental Lawforce project (2007-2011) A.o. database criminal sanctioning track Full environmental case-load of the resort of
the Court of Appeal of Ghent in 2003-2007 1156 judgments, 1882 defendants, 3561
accusations
II. The public prosecutors system position: some essential features1/ Dependency from environmental inspections and police: a case-load by notices of violation2/ A legally protected privilege/duty to develop an enforcement policy (no prosecution guideliness)
Prioritized offences - Agreement 2000 and 20123/ A system-position as sanctioning playmaker
Untill 1999/2009: 3 optionsSince then: 4 options (+ administrative fining)
4/ Necessity of cost-effectivenessToo scarce means for too much work
5/ Burden and risk of proof in accordance to the presumption of innocence (art. 6(2) ECHR)
III. Dependency of the criminal sanctioning track from the input of inspections/police
Far reaching dependency of the criminal sanctioning track from the input of environmental inspections
and police
Some empirical data
III. …III.1. Notices of violation open files General descriptive statistics (2007)
98% of the environmental files is opened because of a notice of violation (NOV)
The remainder (direct complaints): 2%
Confirmation – Data Flemish Region 2010 NOV police: 65,5% NOV environmental inspections: 29% Other (NOV too): 4,5% (other files, …) Direct complaint: 1%
III. …III.2. The focus of inspections Not a single accusation regarding
Non-ionizing radiation Act 1985 Environmental Taxes Act 1993 Ionizing radiation Act 1994 Ecolabel Act 1994 Cooperation Agreement 1995 on Packaging Waste Product Standards Act 1998 Marine Environment Act 1998 Seveso II Cooperation Agreement
Near to no accusations regarding Air Pollution Act 1964 European environmental regulations in general
III. …III.2. The focus of inspections … Many accusations regarding
Environmental Permitting Act 1985 (38%) Waste Act 1981 (31%) Manure Act 1991 (9%) Noise Act 1973 (5%)
Accusations regarding Pesticides Act 1969 Surface Water Act 1971 Groundwater Act 1984 General Environmental Policy Act 1995 Soil Cleanup Act 1995
III. …III.3. The quality of notices of violation
Data 1993-2002: 57% dismissals, of which half for technical reasons (lack of proof of the illegal facts, the offender (‘unknown offender’))
2010 (Flemish Region):55% dismissals, of which still 40% for technical reasons
III.III.4. For discussion
What to make about the non-existence of half of the (EU-based) environmental legislation in the sanctioning process?
The drafting technique of notices of violation keeps needing conceptualisation (‘NOV’s for Dummies’) and training
▫ For local police only?
IV. Cost-effectiveness issues higher up (should) shape the work bottom-down
The issue of proof - of the illegal behavior/facts and
of the criminal liability - is at the heart of the prosecution decision,
shapes the prosecution policy,in terms of cost-effectiveness too.
IV. …IV.1. The burden and risk of proof
Art. 6(2) ECHR: “Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent untill proved guilty according to law” Barberà, Messegué and Jebardo v. Spain (1988)
Burden of proof Risk of proof
Proof of the constitutive elements of the offence
IV. IV.2.Enforceability of legal provisions
Proof of the constitutive elements of the offence
Some examples- Air plane noise (Brussels)- Forest protection decree (Flemish Region)
> Be aware of this crucial point when drafting NOV’s
IV. …IV.2. Enforceability of legal provisionsThe technical side of the formulation of standardsSome examples:Noise-Constatation through the senses-as opposed to measurementsEmission and immission standards- specific physical/chemical/microbiologic parameters-in specific units, simple to more complex-+ specified levels (instantaneous vs. calculated, avarage/ percentile over given time spans)
IV. …IV.3. Alpha provisions
‘Alpha provision’: the concept
Three categories … Obligation to have an authorization (‘permit’,
…) Secundary standards that contribute to the
transmission of information to the administration Examples Remember Al Capone
IV.IV.4. For discussion
The drafting of a NOV serves the prosecution (punitive sanctioning). As such, an eye for the issue of proof matters, even if it means a selection of the offences reported in the NOV
V. Informal complementarities creating informal coordination
One example: the use of the prosecution decision to achieve remedial action
Environmental Lawforce project▫ PO: opportunity dismissals and transaction
proposals are linked to remedial action, ▫ EPA: a systematic practice of precise
recommendations for remedial action linked to delays, leading to remediation in +90% of cases
Since 2009?
V. …For discussion
Informal complementarities need to be detected and taken into account in policy development by enforcement actors
Thank you for your presence and attention