environmental health & safety plan · i a-4500 hov project environmental health & safety...

WOODS HOLE OCEANOGRAPHIC INSTITUTION

WOODS HOLE, MA 02543

Environmental Health & Safety Plan

Document Control No.: 0000000

22-October-2009

6500m HOV Project

Stage 1: A-4500 HOV

i A-4500 HOV Project


Document Control Sheet

Date Originator Description

07-09-09 P.Hickey Initial Draft

07-14-09 S. Humphris Draft 2 Review/Remarked

08-10-09 P. Hickey Draft 3 Edit Humphris

Remarks

08-31-09 P. Hickey Draft 4 (1) Incorporate

Askew Comments;

Renumber versions for

consistency

10-13-09 P. Hickey Edit of 5.2 Audit Program

ii

Table of Contents

Page

Document Control Sheet i

Table of Contents ii

1.0 Introduction 1

1.1 Purpose 2

1.2 Scope 3

1.3 Objectives 4

2.0 Applicable Documents 4

2.1 Contracts and Subawards 4

2.2 Federal and State Laws 5

2.3 Other Standards, Requirements and Regulatory Drivers That

May be Applicable During Various Program Phases 5

2.4 Organizations and Guidelines 5

3.0 Health and Safety Program 6

3.1 System Safety Design Requirements 7

3.1.1 System Safety Precedence 8

3.1.2 Process for EH&S Management Plan Decisions 9

4.0 Location EH&S Plans 10

4.1 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution Campus 10

4.2 Submersible Support Vessel – R/V Atlantis 11

4.2.1 Submersible Support Vessel Upgrades 12

4.2.2 Submersible Launch and Recovery System 12

4.2.3 Battery Charging and Maintenance Requirements 12

4.3 DSV Alvin – Existing Systems, Upgrades, Operations and Support 13

4.3.1 Existing Systems and Documentation 13

4.3.2 Upgrades and New Equipment 14

5.0 Health and Safety Systems Assurance 14

5.1 Personnel Training and Certification 14

5.2 Audit Program 15

5.3 Industrial/Public Safety 16

6.0 Acronyms and Definitions 17

6.1 Standard Acronyms Used in System Safety and Health 17

6.2 Definitions 18

1 A-4500 HOV Project


1.0 Introduction

Since its inception and commissioning in 1964, the deep submergence vessel Alvin has been the

workhorse of the United States National Deep Submergence Facility, and of the international

science community as a whole, with regards to a human presence in the deep ocean.

From its modest beginnings in 1964 when it made its first dive off the WHOI pier to a depth of 8

meters, to more recent dives off Costa Rica to depths of 4364 meters, Alvin, whose maximum

certified depth is 4500 meters, has made more than 4525 excursions with a total water time in

excess of 31,500 hours. It has carried more than 13,560 science observers into the deep ocean

and down to the seafloor. Alvin has played a role in many of the major discoveries in the deep

ocean. In 1974, it took part in Project FAMOUS (French-American Mid-Ocean Undersea Study)

– the first submersible dives to a mid-ocean ridge. In 1977, dives were conducted on the

Galapagos Rift, where discoveries of hydrothermal vents and their associated exotic animals

sparked a new series of deep sea biological, chemical, and geological studies. It has also taken

part in such historic missions as assisting in the recovery of a lost hydrogen bomb off the coast of

Spain in 1966, and the first Human Occupied Vehicle dives to the wreck of the RMS Titanic in

1986. A full history of other such accomplishments can be found at

http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10737.

Throughout 45+ years of operations, the Alvin Submersible Engineering and Operations Group

(SE&OG) has maintained a safety record second to none. While Alvin has aged gracefully over

the last 45 years, a poll of science community users, conducted beginning in 1999 (Summary of

Deep Submergence Community Questionnaire on Improved Submersible Capabilities), set the

baseline for future use, needs and capabilities of an HOV

(http://www.unols.org/committees/dessc/replacement_HOV/replacement_hov.html)

A second study published in 2004 (Future Needs In Deep Submergence Science by the National

Research Council) stated that “NSF/OCE should construct a new, more capable HOV….

Capable of operating at significantly greater depths (6000 meters plus) should be undertaken

only if additional design studies demonstrate that this capability can be delivered for a relatively

small increase in cost and risk”. The original concept of this venture was to construct an entirely

new vehicle with the required/requested increased science capabilities. A competitive bid process

culminated in a contract award to Lockheed Martin for a submersible design for this vehicle.

After receiving Lockheed Martin’s cost estimates for such construction, it was decided that it

was cost prohibitive to follow this route.

In response to this, WHOI recommended a staged approach. The first stage (referred to as the A-

4500 HOV) would incorporate the newly constructed 6500m-rated personnel sphere and support

sub-systems, as well as currently proven and operating systems from the present submersible,

http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10737

http://www.unols.org/committees/dessc/replacement_HOV/replacement_hov.html



into the current Alvin frame, thereby maintaining the current 4500 meter depth capability. The

second stage (referred to as the A-6500 HOV) would subsequently modify and upgrade the

remaining components during future overhauls to reach the desired 6500 meter capability.

1.1 Purpose

This document establishes the Project Environmental Health and Safety Plan (EHSP) for Stage 1

of the project – construction of the A-4500 HOV – and governs procedures for conducting the

SE&OG Environmental Health and Safety Program. It encompasses not only policies and

procedures for the new submersible vehicle, but also policies and procedures currently in place

for work conducted at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI) and on board R/V

Atlantis -- the submersible support vessel. These have been developed and written to meet State,

Federal and International regulatory requirements, as well as the science community needs. This

systematic program will provide a means to identify and eliminate or control identified

environmental health and safety risks and to provide an assessment of those risks in the use of

the submersible.

The total health and safety activity will assure that an acceptable risk level is achieved by

providing insight into the system design and activities, and that the SE&OG Manager can certify

that the operational system is safe to utilize. This will be accomplished by health and safety

training, hazard identification, hazard elimination or hazard control, and the

management/technical approaches used to minimize the risk of mishaps.

The EHSP presented here will detail current policies in place for the three major locations (see

Section 4.0: Location EH&S Plans) where these plans are applicable, as well as proposed

changes to meet the requirements for the new submersible. Those areas are:

- WHOI campus and docks

- WHOI vessels and, in particular, the support ship, R/V Atlantis

- HOV operations and support.

This overview briefly describes the proven and in place WHOI campus and vessel plans, noting

specific changes that will be required for the A-4500 HOV, but will mainly concentrate on the

submersible construction and operations. Documents and procedures referenced are available for

review online at the secure website established for the Preliminary Design Review.

Vendors involved in Contracts/Subawards are expected to initiate and employ EH&S plans as

appropriate to the activities such Contracts or Subawards involve. As required, vendors will

supply WHOI with their individual EH&S Plans.



1.2 Scope

Directions and guidelines for governing and evaluating the A-4500 HOV Project health and

safety aspects are provided in this EHSP. Provisions are made for safety and interface activities

involving, but not limited to, the design, construction, fabrication, integration, test, operations

and maintenance of the submersible. These operations are performed by project staff from

WHOI consisting of the A-4500 HOV project engineering team and the SE&OG, which includes

the current Alvin Operations (ALOPS) team. In addition, this plan is applicable to any Project

Furnished Equipment or required Support Equipment, referred to in this document as

Operational Site Support Equipment (OSSE), to the degree that any OSSE affects the safety of

personnel or critical hardware during manufacture, integration, test, operations and maintenance

activities under the Project responsibility.

It is only reasonable to expect that, as the A-4500 HOV is put into operation and is then

upgraded to the A-6500 HOV, the EHSP will require updates as the vehicle ages, overhauls are

accomplished, and different equipment and sensors become available and are incorporated. For

example, battery charging and maintenance procedures for the current vehicle are well

established and proven, but should a change in battery type be made to attain increased duration

capabilities, a revision of all battery procedures from use, maintenance, and charging, will be

required. Also, as the project progresses, the health and safety schedule will require updates due

to changes in priorities to match the design and operational maturity. Such changes to health and

safety will normally be incorporated as a part of the entire process for change to the vehicle’s

sub-systems, and such changes will be initiated, reviewed and approved as part of the Change

Control Authorization procedures currently employed by the present system. This process

ensures that all project personnel understand the impacts of the changes and are able to meet or

provide the required health and safety support.

In all areas of fabrication, development, testing, handling, or operations and maintenance of the

A-4500 HOV and its subsystems and equipment, system health and safety is concerned with

providing a program that is structured and managed to attain the following:

a. Provide for the identification and elimination/control of personnel or critical hardware health

and safety hazards by performing preliminary hazard analysis and, on safety critical items, by

developing and implementing appropriate system, sub system and operational hazard

analysis, as well as defining health and safety design criteria, verification tests, inspections,

and assessment reports.

b. Minimize mishap risk to prevent the occurrences of accidents resulting in personnel injury or

death, catastrophic facility or equipment damage, or project delay.



c. Translate government and industry imposed health and safety requirements into specific

safety criteria, engineering requirements, and formal procedures.

d. Disseminate health and safety information to appropriate design, engineering, operations, and

program management groups.

e. Apportion the health and safety effort and resources in a manner commensurate with the

magnitude of the hazards and risks to minimize costs and complexity.

f. Establish and maintain an effective administrative procedure for reporting, cataloging,

tracking and resolving identified hazards.

g. Establish and maintain an effective training program to involve A-4500 HOV project

personnel in identifying, cataloging, and precluding health and safety issues from occurrence.

The implementation of the program specified in this document shall conform to, and dovetail

with, the EHSP of Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

1.3 Objectives

This EHSP documents requirements and defines the approach used to ensure the health and

safety of personnel, equipment, and facilities throughout all stages of the A-4500 HOV project

activities with an acceptable risk consistent with project goals and resources. The objective of

this health and safety implementation plan is to identify: (1) processes for determining the

potential hazards associated with the A-4500 HOV project and subsequent submersible

operations, and (2) courses of action for reducing these hazards to an acceptable level.

In addition, this activity will be documented, reviewed and approved. The results will be the

basis for generating the site-specific EHSPs and the various Health and Safety Procedures (ie.

Vehicle Operation Manual) that will implement the risk reducing courses of action, to include

corrective activities in the event of a mishap. Other projected/potential documents will be

generated from this process. Due to the maturity of the health and safety analysis, this list of

documents is not complete and will most likely grow as the Health and Safety system is designed

and built.

2.0 Applicable Documents

2.1 Contracts / Subawards

Southwest Research Institute – Design, Manufacture, Testing and Certification of the 6500 meter

Personnel Sphere.

Lockheed Martin – Design of the Personnel Sphere Internal Arrangements



Lockheed Martin – Design of the Sphere Life Support Systems.

2.2 Federal and State Laws

29 CFR Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) General Industry Standards

40 CFR U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Protection of the Environment

49 CFR Department of Transportation (DOT)

2.3 Other Standards, Requirements, and Regulatory Drivers That may be

Applicable During Various Program Phases

ABS Rules for Building and Classing Underwater Vehicles, Systems and Hyperbaric Facilities -

2002

ABS Part 1 - Rules for Conditions Of Classification – 2002

ABS Part 4 Chapter 4 – Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels – 2009

ABS Part 4 Chapter 8 – Rules for Building and Classing Steel Vessels – 2009

ABS Part 7 – Rules for Survey After Construction

ASME PVHO-1-2007 – Safety Standard for Pressure Vessels From Human Occupancy

ASME PVHO-2-2003 – Safety Standard for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy: In-Service

Guidelines For PVHO Acrylic Windows

USCG NVIC 5-93 – Guidelines for Stability Of Small Passenger Submersibles

NAVSEA SS800-AG-MAN-010/9290 Rev A -- System Certification Procedures And Criteria

Manual For Deep Submergence Systems

UNOLS Safety Standards for Human Occupied Vehicles

UNOLS Vessel Safety Procedures

NFPA-75 Fire Protection for Essential Electronic Equipment

American National Standards Institutes (ANSI) Safety Standards

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Fire Codes and Handbook Of Fire Protection

National Safety Council (NSC), Accident Prevention Manual for Industrial Operations

Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)

Material Safety Data Sheets (various)

2.4 Organizations/Guidelines

American Society of Mechanical Engineers

American Society of Steel Constructors

American Welding Society

American Bureau of Shipping

United States Coast Guard

Naval Sea Systems Command



University-National Oceanographic Laboratory System

3.0 Health and Safety Program

Many of the resources for the application of system environmental health and safety criteria to

the A-4500 HOV Project are drawn from existing source documents that promote the use of

good design practices and the application of consensus standards to the product or service. The

application of such criteria is, in some cases, dictated by law and little discretion is left to the A-

4500 HOV Project, subawardees, or contractors. Examples are individual state, OSHA and DOT

standards. In these cases, the A-4500 HOV Project Environmental Health and Safety task is to

research and apply these standards in a professional manner.

Application of consensus standards is not a guarantee of a safe product for two reasons: 1)

consensus safety standards are written to address all possible situations, based on experience, but

they can never anticipate all environments and uses for a product, and 2) all requirements must

be interpreted and applied in an effective manner to meet the intent of the requirement.

Requirements documents seldom explain the intent of any particular requirement. Therefore, it is

extremely important that everyone involved in the A-4500 HOV Project (each staff member and

all employees) recognize that they are personally responsible for their own health, safety, and

safe practices and that they are also responsible for the health, safety, and safe practices of the

others that work on the project.

Other requirements can be identified through the research of past mishaps associated with

submersible operations, both at WHOI and worldwide, and the lessons learned. Risks and the

means to mitigate them can also be derived from the analytical results of other disciplines, such

as failure modes and effects analysis of human factors engineering.

It is therefore essential that the requirements be interpreted and applied with the care and

understanding of someone experienced in system health and safety. This is the essence of the

system health and safety approach. System health and safety analysis and assessment provide the

basis for the application of existing criteria or the derivation of new requirements. The

application and interpretation of health and safety requirements, standards or principles to the

design of the submersible, then, are not merely the research and application of written

requirements. It requires the identification and interpretation of those requirements and the

development of design/process solutions to apply the requirements. The ability to do this is based

upon three factors: knowledge of the system or product, knowledge of the principles of the

system health and safety discipline, and knowledge of the intent of the applied criteria or

requirements. This knowledge will help assure that a process is in place that will cause the

design to be reasonably safe.



Everyone attached to the A-4500 HOV Project (design members and operational personnel alike)

is personally responsible for their health, safety, and safe work practices. All individuals who

identify hazards must bring them to the attention of the Project Manager, SE&OG Manager,

Expedition Leader, Ship’s Master, or Project Engineers. This can initially be accomplished

verbally but should be followed up by submitting an Engineering Change Authorization (ECA)

request (see Appendix 1.c, Alvin Quality Program Manual, Chapter 11), supplying a detailed

description of the hazard along with suggested corrective actions to be taken, if known. The ECA

is then to be submitted to SE&OG engineering for review and action. This tried and true method

will include not only existing systems, but new systems following final design review. A graded

approach to safety issues will be allowed so that all A-4500 HOV project and operations co-

workers are encouraged to identify safety issues and are encouraged to suggest corrective actions

without complex reporting processes. Included in this collective identification and reporting

process are the science users who, as part of an operations team, can make independent and

significant contributions to the safety of all concerned.

3.1 System Safety Design Requirements

System safety design requirements will be specified after review of pertinent standards,

specifications, regulations, design handbooks, safety design checklists, and other sources of

design guidance for applicability to the system design. The SE&OG Manager shall establish the

safety design criteria derived from all applicable data, including the preliminary hazard analyses

as well as applicable State and Federal regulations. These criteria shall be the basis for

developing system specification safety requirements using a typical system safety process flow.

The System Design and Safety Flow Chart (Figure 1) is generic in nature and is meant only to

demonstrate the design process. Initial safety aspects are incorporated into a given design, and

the ongoing review modifies and enhances the safety considerations as the design is taken from

concept to completion. Some general system safety design requirements are:

a) Eliminate identified hazards or reduce associated risk through design, including material

selection or substitution. When potentially hazardous materials must be used, select those

with least risk throughout the life cycle of the system.

b) Isolate hazardous substances, components, and operations from other activities, areas,

personnel, and incompatible materials.

c) Locate equipment so that access during operations, servicing, maintenance, repair, or

adjustment minimizes personnel exposure to hazards (e.g., hazardous chemicals, high

voltage, electromagnetic radiation, cutting edges, or sharp points).

d) Minimize risk resulting from excessive environmental conditions (e.g., temperature, pressure,

noise, toxicity, acceleration and vibration).



e) Design to minimize risk created by human error in the operation and support of the system.

f) Consider alternate approaches to minimize risk from hazards that cannot be eliminated. Such

approaches include interlocks, redundancy; fail safe design, system protection, fire

suppression, and protective clothing, equipment, devices, and procedures.

g) Protect the power sources, controls and critical components of redundant subsystems by

physical separation or shielding.

h) When alternate design approaches cannot eliminate the hazard, provide safety and warning

devices, and warning and caution notes in assembly, operations, maintenance, and repair

instructions, and distinctive markings on hazardous components and materials, equipment,

and facilities to ensure personnel and equipment protection. These shall be standardized in

accordance with commonly accepted industry or military practice or with certifying authority

accepted requirements for conditions in which prior standards do not exist. Copies of all

warnings, cautions and distinctive markings proposed shall be provided for review and

comment.

i) Minimize the severity of personnel injury or damage to equipment in the event of a mishap.

j) Design software controlled or monitored functions to minimize initiation of hazardous events

or mishaps.

k) Review design criteria for inadequate or overly restrictive requirements regarding safety.

Recommend new design criteria supported by study, analyses, or test data.

Figure 1. System Design and Safety Flow Chart

3.1.1 System Safety Precedence

The order of precedence for satisfying system safety requirements and resolving identified

hazards shall be as follows:



Design for minimum risk. From the start of the project, design the project elements to

eliminate hazards. If an identified hazard cannot be eliminated, reduce the associated risk to an

acceptable level, as defined by the Project Manager/Group Leader, through design selection.

Incorporate safety devices. If identified hazards cannot be eliminated or their associated risk

adequately reduced through design selection, that risk shall be reduced to a level acceptable to

the Project Manager through the use of fixed, automatic, or other protective safety design

features or devices. Provisions shall be made for periodic functional checks of safety devices

when applicable.

Provide warning devices. When neither design nor safety devices can effectively eliminate

identified hazards or adequately reduce associated risk, devices shall be used to detect the

condition and to produce an adequate warning signal to alert personnel of the hazard. Warning

signals and their application shall be designed to minimize the probability of incorrect personnel

reaction to the signals and shall be standardized within like types of systems.

Develop procedures and training. Regardless of whether it is impractical to eliminate hazards

through design selection or adequately reduce the associated risk with safety and warning

devices, procedures and training shall be developed and used. Procedures may include the use of

personal protective equipment. Precautionary notations shall be standardized as specified by the

Project Manager. Tasks and activities judged to be safety critical by the SE&OG Manager or

certifying authority may require certification of personnel proficiency.

Note that the basic methods for controlling hazards are: a) engineering controls, where feasible,

b) administrative controls, and c) personal protective equipment (PPE). Effective engineering

controls are always preferred, as they can eliminate or substantially mitigate the hazard. Some

hazards cannot be eliminated and PPE is required, e.g., safety glasses, hard-hat, safety shoes, etc.

Hazard control methods are selected during the hazard analysis process, which can be

prospective (design review) or retrospective (after an accident). In some cases, all three of these

controls may need to be implemented simultaneously.

3.1.2 Process for EH&S Management Plan Decisions

The A-4500 HOV engineering leads, the SE&OG personnel, as well as the WHOI EH&S office

(for mandatory regulatory requirements) will be used for various A-4500 HOV health and safety

management plan decisions. This will be a constant and ongoing process, usually conducted at,

but not restricted to, weekly engineering meetings, as situations dictate. This will be the process

used for identification of critical and catastrophic hazards, controls to eliminate or minimize

these hazards, corrective action taken for mishaps or malfunctions, waivers to safety



requirements, changes in safety personnel, and program safety deviations. However, the

management process for abating any imminently dangerous situation must be easy and

expedient. That process must not be so rigid as to require going through layers of management to

prevent a potential fatality or serious injury/event in the field. Figure 2 shows the Safety

Decision Matrix Chart for such decisions which follows the guidelines as set forth for

submission of an ECA for corrective actions.

Figure 2. Safety Decision Matrix

4.0 Location EH&S Plans

Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution has in place EH&S plans for the Institution as a whole, as

well as for the Institution’s ships and vehicle systems. This section will detail those existing

plans and provide listings for changes or additional considerations that will result from the A-

4500 HOV and its subsequent operation. Many systems documents that are required to be

incorporated into the overall EH&S Plan are still under development. Such documents will be

listed with highlights for consideration and, as development of those documents is finalized, be

updated for review.

4.1 Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution Campus

The Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution has established, and maintains, an onsite

Environmental Health and Safety office. The EH&S Office is responsible for the development

and implementation of environmental health and safety programs at WHOI. EH&S has three

primary areas of responsibility: Waste Management, Occupational Health and Safety, and

Radiation Protection. Waste Management covers hazardous waste management, universal waste



management, waste minimization, and hazardous materials spill response. Occupational Health

and Safety covers emergency response, hazard communication, laboratory safety, indoor air

quality, ergonomics and material handling, fire protection, industrial hygiene and chemical

safety, construction safety, industrial safety, fall protection, confined space entry, accident and

injury prevention, and incident investigation. Radiation Protection covers ionizing and non-

ionizing radiation safety programs. Ionizing radiation programs include: radioactive materials

use, radioactive waste management, and radiation generating devices (e.g., X-ray machines,

accelerators, radiography). Non-ionizing radiation safety programs include: lasers, microwaves,

radiofrequency radiation, static magnetic fields, infrared radiation, and ultraviolet radiation. In

accordance with WHOI’s Mission and Policy, the EH&S Office works with the Institution Safety

Committees and Department Safety Committees to administer and implement the Environment,

Health, and Safety programs at the institution. The EH&S Office reports to the Vice President

for Finance and Administration.

All HOV operations personnel are required to take, and maintain, certain basic training courses

to meet WHOI safety standards and operator criteria of associate equipment utilized during

overhaul periods.

Per WHOI policies, the WHOI EH&S office personnel conduct periodic inspections of the

working areas that will be utilized during the A-4500 HOV Project, and provide input as to

deficiencies found and improvements to be made.

Further details of the WHOI EH&S office’s role, policies and procedures can be found at:

http://ehs.whoi.edu/ehs/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=1&itemID=6

4.2 Submersible Support Vessel – R/V Atlantis

The Research Vessel Atlantis (http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=8143) is the designated

support ship for the current submersible Alvin operations, and it will also be the support ship for

the new A-4500 HOV. R/V Atlantis has a longstanding record for safe and efficient operations

since its commissioning in 1997. As a Navy owned, American Bureau of Shipping Classed,

UNOLS member ship (http://www.unols.org/publications/manuals/saf_stand/contents.htm), R/V

Atlantis must meet all regulatory requirements, including the International Safety Management

Guidelines – ISM (http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10115#1), as set forth by those agencies.

This involves regular yearly inspections by ABS, the United States Coast Guard, and the Naval

Sea Systems Command. In addition, the submersible handling A-frame is subject to 5-year

certifications and yearly sustaining inspections.

http://ehs.whoi.edu/ehs/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=1&itemID=6


http://www.unols.org/publications/manuals/saf_stand/contents.htm

http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=10115#1



R/V Atlantis has a well established EH&S Plan (http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=13305). As

part of the vessel requirements, all newly arriving personnel, both science and crew alike, must

participate in a mandatory safety briefing and orientation. Additionally, on a weekly basis,

emergency drills to simulate various conditions such as fire, man overboard and vessel

abandonment, are conducted. Again, mandatory attendance by all personnel, unless directly

involved in critical diving operations, is required. Personnel involved in submersible operations,

swimmers, small boat operators and launch system operators, require formal training and

qualification as per the ISM manual. Such training also involves safety aspects of equipment

failure, various sea state operations, as well as normal operations.

4.2.1 Submersible Support Vessel Upgrades

Due to the nature of differences in specifications of the A-4500 HOV and the current Alvin, some

additional modifications to the R/V Atlantis may be required. Because of the current maturity of

this project, not all changes have been identified, but a critical area of high priority is the launch

and recovery system. For the upgrade to the A-6500 HOV, a change in battery type will require

revision of all battery procedures including use, maintenance, and charging.

4.2.2 Submersible Launch and Recovery System

The installed A-frame aboard R/V Atlantis is currently certified for human lifts by Naval Sea

Systems Command in concert with the requirements of SS-800-AG-MAN-010/9290 Rev 2

Appendix H. NAVSEA will continue as the certification authority for the A-frame into the

foreseeable future. The system is qualified for 40,000 lb loads in its current state but, dependent

upon preliminary and final design weight estimates of the new submersible, the A-frame may

require upgrading to a 60,000 lbs load capacity. The A-frame primary structure is identical to

that used for the Navy’s submersible Sea Cliff, and was certified for 60,000 loads. When initially

installed aboard R/V Atlantis II, the A-frame was de-rated to 40,000 lb capacity by a reduction in

the size of the main rams that extend and retract the A-frame, and by downsizing the main lifting

winch.

In anticipation of the possible need to upgrade the A-frames lifting capacity, engineering studies

of deck loading, sea state capabilities, component sizing requirements and factor of safety

requirements have begun. As design factors and requirements are refined, these will be

incorporated into the overall EH&S Plan.

4.2.3 Battery Charging and Maintenance Requirements

Alvin has a well established and proven battery maintenance plan for the currently utilized lead

acid batteries. The same batteries will remain in service for the A-4500 HOV project vehicle, so




there will be little or no change to the currently employed procedures. However, it is anticipated

that the A-6500 HOV will employ lithium-based battery chemistry at some time in the future.

This will require that new charging equipment, procedures and safety protocols be developed and

installed to support this change. Much of the required safety aspects, as yet to be determined, of

such a battery change will be dictated by State, Federal, International, U.S. Coast Guard and

Navy regulatory requirements for operations of lithium chemistry batteries aboard maritime

vessels.

4.3 DSV Alvin – Existing Systems, Upgrades, Operations and Support

In the more than 45 years of operations, DSV Alvin (http://www.whoi.edu/page.do?pid=8422)

has had only one major incident. That incident, which occurred during the vehicle launch in

1968, resulted in the sinking and loss of the Alvin for almost 1 year. A chain used to raise and

lower the launch cradle on the then support vessel Lulu broke, allowing the submersible to slide

off the cradle and into the sea with the hatch still open. The crew escaped the submersible but

flooding of the personnel sphere caused the vehicle to sink. The “lessons learned” from this

accident resulted in a complete rework of the handling system and launch requirements. The

submersible was never again launched with the hatch open and, since that time, the safety and

operations record has been exemplary. Systems design and reliable operations play a key factor

in all health and safety plans; however, the role of well-trained and experienced personnel cannot

be overemphasized. While documentation of those years of experience by the operations

personnel have culminated in a set of manuals which detail Quality Assurance, Operations and

Maintenance of the vehicle systems, constant and continuous personnel training and systems

review is paramount.

4.3.1 Existing Systems and Documentation

Key to the present submersible’s productivity and safety are the various manuals that have been

developed over the years to totally encompass the certification, operations and maintenance of

the vehicle. These controlled documents, which detail the permissible parameters and envelopes,

allow a safe and productive operation for both SE&OG personnel and the vehicle’s science

users. These manuals will be used as the basis for the development of future operations and

safety plans and methods for the A-4500 HOV. The list and purpose of such manuals, which are

viewable online at the PDR secure website, are, but not necessarily limited to:

a. Management Plan for the Submersible Engineering and Operation Group

This manual defines the Group Functions and Position Descriptions, the Organization as a

whole, General Cruise Operations Requirements, Maintenance Schedules and Requirements,

ECA Submissions and Requirements, System Certification and Sustaining Requirements,




Training and Qualification Requirements, Launch and Recovery System Certification, and

Sustaining Requirements and Data Archiving Policies.

b. Scope of Certification

The Scope of Certification manual defines the systems and sub-systems which, if a failure

occurred, might possibly result in injury or loss of life, hence requiring special attention and

possibly special training with regards to maintenance and repair.

c. Quality Program Manual

Defines the methods for Quality Control and tracking of Scope orientated items, such as Quality

Maintenance Processes, Personnel Qualification and Training, In-process Control, Materials

Control, Testing Requirements, Departures from Specification, Audits and Internal Surveys,

Quality Assurance Records, Calibration Requirements and Document Management.

d. Alvin Operations Manual

Defines the Normal Operating Procedures, Emergency Operating Procedures, Vehicle

Information and Performance Data, Casualty Procedures and Information for

Observers/Passengers, Maintenance and Documentation and Emergency Contact Information

and Procedures in the Event of SubMiss/SubSunk.

e. Alvin Maintenance Manual

Details all service and maintenance procedures, on a system and sub system basis, for all

equipment and instrumentation associated with repairs, scheduled and required maintenance for

the entire submersible and its support equipment.

4.3.2 Upgrades and New Equipment

As the design of the new A-4500 HOV continues to mature, all aspects of the above manuals will

be applied to ensure that, as required, procedures, new support equipment, and existing

transferred systems, are examined so that the requirements of section 3 of the Environmental

Health and Safety Plan are applied to the fullest extent possible.

5.0 Health and Safety Systems Assurance

5.1 Personnel Training and Certification

The A-4500 HOV Project team, WHOI EH&S office staff, as well as outside independent

auditors as required, will review areas needing personnel training and certification relating to



hazardous operations. Team leads and the SE&OG Manager assure that such requirements are

met.

This certification may include activities such as confined space access, ship operations, high-

voltage electrical safety, equipment handling, storage, hardware removal/maintenance

installation, equipment operations, and test operations. Training will be conducted by

organizations and personnel best qualified to do so, and/or by organizations having operational

responsibility. Personnel training shall comply with OSHA and ANSI standards as defined or

required and monitored by the WHOI EH&S Office.

5.2 Audit Program

An audit program will be established for the A-4500 HOV Project. Initially, during the design

and construction of the vehicle, consideration will be given to any hazardous condition which

might result as part of the design, the periodic maintenance requirements of designed

components and systems, and the safety of personnel operating the completed vehicle system.

Each A-4500 HOV Project team lead or the SE&OG Manager will periodically survey the

hazardous project activities under his/her responsibility. Each A-4500 HOV Project team lead

and the SE&OG Manager is responsible for design and design changes, along with interfaces and

interface changes that may affect health, safety and periodic maintenance requirements, or cause

a change in any hazardous conditions. Suspected changes in health, safety and periodic

maintenance requirement items or operations will be communicated to the Project Manager and

the SE&OG Manager.

The SE&OG Manager also overviews activities associated with the Operational and Test

Systems. The WHOI EH&S office staff may require/request special health and safety audits of

any areas at their discretion. Formal reviews may serve as an audit if sufficient details of the

hazardous activities and the safety precautions to be used are a part of the review.

Following construction and transition to operations, an annual system audit program, as is

currently in place for sustaining Navy certification, will be maintained and will coincide with

ABS annual and special (3 year) inspection/survey requirements. This audit program will be

conducted by audit team members composed of SE&OG engineers and individuals outside of the

SE&OG, who will review documentation generated by the systems periodic maintenance

program, as well as any failures that have occurred during the previous year.

Documentation for review shall consist of, but not be limited to, Periodic Maintenance Logs,

Inspection Reports, Failure Reports, Work Logs, Pre- and Post-Cruise Check Logs, Pre- and

Post-Dive Check Sheets, Surface Control Logs, Engineering Change Authorizations, Scope of

Certification Purchase Documents, System Manuals, and any other documents requested by the



audit team. Additionally, an annual functional at sea operations review will be conducted,

normally during engineering dives or during shorter science legs. The process of a confidential

cruise-by-cruise review by the Chief Scientist for Deep Submergence with the cruise PI will

continue, and any safety issues cited during this review by the science party will immediately be

addressed.

5.3 Industrial/ Public Safety

Industrial and/or public safety is part of the total consideration of health and safety activities

under this plan insofar as they affect or are affected by project activities. These conditions

include requirements of local, state, and Federal governments regarding such items as design and

maintenance of facilities, test constraints, transport and storage of hazardous items, etc.



6. Acronyms and Definitions

6.1 Standard Acronyms Used in System Safety and Health

Acronyms used in System Health and Safety, but not necessarily used in this plan.

AE Architect and Engineering Firm

CDRL Contract Data Requirements List

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

COTS Commercial Off The Shelf

CSP Certified Safety Professional

DID Data Item Description

DOD Department of Defense

DoDI DOD Instruction

DOT Department of Transportation

ECP Engineering Change Proposal

ECA Engineering Change Authorization

ECPSHSR Engineering Change Proposal System Health and Safety Report

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EH&S Environmental Health & Safety

GFE Government-Furnished Equipment

GFP Government-Furnished Property

GIDEP Government-Industry Data Exchange Program

HHA Health Hazard Assessment

HHAR Health Hazard Assessment Report

HRI Hazard Risk Index

IRS Interface Requirements Specifications

IO Integrating Organization

ISSPP Integrated System Safety Program Plan

MA Managing Activity

MIL-STD Military Standard

MRAR Mishap Risk Assessment Report

NavSea Naval Sea Systems Command

NDI Nondevelopmental Item

NSF National Science Foundation

O&SHA Operating & Support Hazard Analysis

OPR Office of Primary Responsibility



OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration

OSSE Operational Site Support Equipment

PE Professional Engineer

PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis

PHL Preliminary Hazard List

PM Program Manager

P/N Part Number

RFP Request for Proposal

R/V Research Vessel

SAR Safety Assessment Report

SCCSC Safety Critical Computer Software Components

SCN Specification Change Notice

SDR System Design Review

SE&OG Submersible Engineering & Operations Group

SHA System Hazard Analysis

SHRI Software Hazard Risk Index

SOW Statement of Work

SPR Software Problem Report

SRCA Safety Requirements/Criteria Analysis

SRR System Requirements Review

SRS Software Requirements Specifications

SSG System Safety Group

SSHA Subsystem Hazard Analysis

SSPP System Safety Program Plan

SSPPR System Safety Program Progress Report

SSR Software Specification Review

SSS System/Segment Specification

SSWG System Safety Working Group

TBD To Be Determined

TLV Threshold Limit Value

WDSSR Waiver or Deviation System Safety Report

WHOI Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution

6.2 Definitions

Common definitions presently supported by a Health and Safety System.

Condition - An existing or potential state such as exposure to harm, toxicity, energy source,

activity, etc.



Contractor - A private sector enterprise or the organizational element of a Government agency

engaged to provide services or products within agreed limits specified by the MA.

Environmental Health and Safety Program Plan - A description of the planned tasks and

activities to be used by the contractor to implement the required system safety program. This

description includes organizational responsibilities, resources, methods of accomplishment,

milestones, depth of effort, and integration with other program engineering and management

activities and related systems.

Fail-safe - A design feature that ensures that the system remains safe or in the event of a failure

will cause the system to revert to a state which will not cause a mishap.

Hazard - A condition that is prerequisite to a mishap.

Hazard Probability - The aggregate probability of occurrence of the individual events that create

a specific hazard.

Hazard Severity - An assessment of the consequences of the worst credible mishap that could be

caused by a specific hazard.

Hazardous Material - Anything that due to its chemical, physical, or biological nature causes

safety, public health, or environmental concerns that result in an elevated level of effort to

manage.

Managing Activity - The organizational element assigned acquisition management responsibility

for the system, or prime or associate contractors or subcontractors who impose system safety

tasks on their suppliers.

Mishap - An unplanned event or series of events resulting in death, injury, occupational illness,

or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment. Accident.

Nondevelopmental Item -

a) Any item of supply that is available in the commercial marketplace;

b) Any previously developed item of supply that is in use by a department or

agency of the United States, a State or local government, or a foreign

government with which the United States has a mutual defense cooperation

agreement;

c) Any item of supply described in definition a or b above that requires only minor

modification in order to meet the requirements of the procuring agency; or



d) Any item of supply that is currently being produced that does not meet the

requirements of definition a, b, or c, above, solely because of the item is not yet

in use or is not yet available in the commercial marketplace.

Risk - An expression of the possibility/impact of a mishap in terms of hazard severity and hazard

probability.

Risk assessment - A comprehensive evaluation of the risk and its associated impact.

Safety - Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness, or

damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.

Safety Critical - A term applied to a condition, event, operation, process or item of whose proper

recognition, control, performance or tolerance is essential to safe system operation or use; e.g.,

safety critical function, safety critical path, safety critical component.

Safety Critical Computer Software Components - Those computer software components and

units whose errors can result in a potential hazard, or loss of predictability or control of a system.

Subsystem - An element of a system that, in itself, may constitute a system.

System - A composite, at any level of complexity, of personnel, procedures, materials, tools,

equipment, facilities, and software. The elements of this composite entity are used together in the

intended operational or support environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific

purpose, support, or mission requirement.

System Safety - The application of engineering and management principles, criteria, and

techniques to optimize all aspects of safety within the constraints of operational effectiveness,

time, and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle.

System Safety Engineer - An engineer who is qualified by training and/or experience to perform

system safety engineering tasks.

System Safety Engineering - An engineering discipline requiring specialized professional

knowledge and skills in applying scientific and engineering principles, criteria, and techniques to

identify and eliminate hazards, in order to reduce the associated risk.

System Safety Group/Working Group - A formally chartered group of persons, representing

organizations initiated during the system acquisition program, organized to assist the MA system



program manager in achieving the system safety objectives. Regulations of the military

components define requirements, responsibilities, and memberships.

System Safety Management - A management discipline that defines system safety program

requirements and ensures the planning, implementation and accomplishment of system safety

tasks and activities consistent with the overall program requirements.

System Safety Manager - A person responsible to program management for setting up and

managing the system safety program.

System Health and Safety Program - The combined tasks and activities of system safety

management and system safety engineering implemented by acquisition project managers.