enron-corporate governance
TRANSCRIPT
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
1/58
Enron and the Economics of Corporate Governance
June 2003
Peter Grosvenor Munzig
Department of Economics
Stanford University, Stanford CA 94305-6072Advisor: Professor Timothy Bresnahan
ABSTRACT
In the wake of the demise of Enron, corporate governance has come to the forefront of
economic discussion. The fall of Enron was a direct result of failed corporate governanceand consequently has led to a complete reevaluation of corporate governance practice inthe United States. The following paper attempts to reconcile our existing theories on
corporate governance, executive compensation, and the firm with the events that tookplace at Enron. This paper first examines and synthesizes our current theories oncorporate governance, and then applies theoretical and economic framework to the
factual events that occurred at Enron. I will argue that Enron was a manifestation of theprincipal-agent problem, that high-powered incentive contracts provided management
with incentives for self-dealing, that significant costs were transferred to shareholders dueto the obscurity in Enrons financial reporting, and that due to the lack of boardindependence it is likely that management rent extraction occurred.
Acknowledgements : I would like to thank my family and friends for their continuedsupport throughout this paper. In particular, my mother Judy Munzig was instrumentalwith her comments on earlier drafts. I also thank Professors Geoffrey Rothwell and
George Parker for their help, and finally to my advisor Professor Bresnahan, for withouthis support and advice this paper would not have been possible.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
2/58
3
When a company called Enron ascends to the number seven spot on the Fortune
500 and then collapses in weeks into a smoking ruin, its stock worth pennies, its
CEO, a confidante of presidents, more or less evaporated, there must be lessons in
there somewhere.
-Daniel Henninger,
The Wall Street Journal
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
3/58
4
CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................3
II. THE THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE..............................7Corporate Governance and the Principal-Agent Problem ...............7
Executive Compensation and the Alignmentof Manager and Shareholder Interests ...........................................11
Corporate Governances Role in Economic Efficiency.................14Recent Developments in Corporate Governance ...........................15
III. WHAT HAPPENED: FACTUAL ACCOUNT
OF EVENTS LEADING TO BANKRUPTCY......................................17
Background/Timeline.....................................................................18Summary of Transactions and Partnerships...................................19
The Chewco/JEDI Transaction......................................................20The LJM Transactions ...................................................................22
IV. ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES ...................26
Corporate Structure........................................................................27Conflicts of Interest........................................................................30
Failures in Board Oversight and FundamentalLack of Checks and Balances ......................................................33
Audit Committee Relationship With Enron and Andersen............35Lack of Auditing Independence and the PartialFailure of the Efficient Market Hypothesis ...................................38
Director Independence/Director Selection.....................................41
V. POST-ENRON GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND OTHERPROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS............45
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002..........................................................45Other Governance Reforms and Proposed Solutions.....................48
VI. CONCLUSION.......................................................................................51
I. INTRODUCTION
Often referred to as the first major failure of the New Economy, the collapse of
Enron Corporation stunned investors, accountants, and boardrooms and sent shockwaves
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
4/58
5
across financial markets when the company filed for bankruptcy on December 2, 2001.
At that time, the Houston-based energy trading companys bankruptcy was the largest in
history but was surpassed by WorldComs bankruptcy on July 22, 2002. Enron
employees and retirement accounts across the country lost hundreds of millions of dollars
when the price of Enron stock sank from its peak of $105 to its de-listing by the
NASDAQ at just a few cents. Arthur Andersen, once a Big Five accounting firm,
imploded with its conviction for Obstruction of Justice in connection with the auditing
services it provided to Enron. Through the use of what were termed creative accounting
techniques and off-balance sheet transactions involving Special Purpose Entities (SPEs),
Enron was able to hide massive amounts of debt and often collateralized that debt with
Enron stock. Major conflicts of interest existed with the establishment and operation of
these SPEs and partnerships, with Enrons CFO Andrew Fastow authorized by the board
to manage the transactions between Enron and the partnerships, for which he was
generously compensated at Enrons expense.
In addition to crippling investor confidence and provoking questions about the
sustainability of a deregulated energy market, Enrons collapse has precipitated a
complete reevaluation of both the accounting industry and many aspects of corporate
governance in America. The significance of exploring the Enron debacle is multifaceted
and can be generalized to many companies as corporate America evaluates its governance
practices. The fall of Enron demands an examination of the fundamental aspects of the
oversight functions assigned to every companys management and the board of directors
of a company. In particular, the role of the subcommittees on a board and their
effectiveness are questioned, as are compensation techniques designed to align the
interests of shareholders and management and alleviate the principal-agent problem, both
theoretically and in application. Companies such as Worldcom, Tyco, Adelphia, and
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
5/58
6
Global Crossing have all suffered catastrophes similar to Enrons, and have furthered the
need to reevaluate corporate governance mechanisms in the U.S.
My question then becomes, what lessons can be learned from the fundamental
breakdowns that occurred at the corporate governance level at Enron, both from an
applied and theoretical standpoint? This paper attempts to offer an analysis that
reconciles the events that occurred inside the walls of Enron and our current theories on
corporate governance, the firm, and executive compensation. In particular, I look at the
role the principal-agent problem played at Enron and attempt to link theories of
managements expropriation of firm funds with the Special Purpose Entities Enron
management assembled. I question Enrons executive compensation practices and the
effectiveness of shareholder and management alignment with the excessive stock-option
packages management received (and the resulting incentives to self-deal). Links between
the information asymmetry and the transfer of costs to shareholders is explored, as well
as the efficient market hypothesis in regards to Enrons stock price. And finally, the lack
of director independence at Enron provides a foundation for the excessive compensation
practices given managers were extracting rents.
From an applied standpoint, I argue that following can be learned from Enron:
Enron managed their numbers to meet aggressive expectations. They were lessconcerned with the economic impact of their transactions as they were with thefinancial statement impact. Creating favorable earnings for Wall Street
dominated decision making.
The Board improperly allowed conflicts of interest with Enron partnerships and
then did not ensure appropriate oversight of those relationships. There was afundamental lack of communication and direction from the Board as to whoshould be reviewing the related-party transactions and the degree of such review.The Board was also unaware of other conflicts of interests with other transactions.
The Board did not effectively communicate with its auditors from Arthur
Andersen. The idea that Enrons employed accounting techniques were"aggressive" was not communicated clearly enough to the board, who were
blinded by its trust in its respected auditors.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
6/58
7
The Board did not give enough consideration when making important decisions.
They were not really informed nor did they understand the types of transactionsEnron was engaging in, and they were too quick to approve proposals put forth by
management.
The Board members had significant relationships with Enron Corporation and itsmanagement, which may have contributed to their failure to be more proactive intheir oversight.
The Board relied too heavily on the auditors and did not fulfill its duty of ensuring
the independence of the auditors. Given the relationship between managementand the auditors, the Board should not have been so generous with its trust. The
Board is entitled to rely on outside experts and management to the extent it isreasonable and appropriate - in this case it was excessive.
From a theoretical standpoint, I argue that the following are lessons learned from
Enron:
Enron was a manifestation of the principal-agent problem. The ulterior motivesof management were not in line with maximizing shareholder value.
The high-powered incentive contracts of Enrons management highlight more of
the costs associated with attempting to align shareholders with management tocounter the principal-agent problem and provided management with extensive
opportunities for self-dealings.
Significant costs were transferred to shareholders associated with asymmetric
information due to managements sophisticated techniques for obscuring financialresults. Such obscuring also lead to a partial failure of the efficient market
hypothesis.
Due to the lack of board independence, the theory of rent extraction more likely
explains managements actions and compensation than the optimal contractingtheory.
This analysis of the Enron case attempts to explain what happened at Enron in the
context of existing theories on the firm, corporate governance, and executive
compensation, as they are innately linked. Section II discusses the general theory of
corporate governance defined from two perspectives, first from an applied perspective
and then from a theoretical perspective. Next is an attempt to answer the question of why
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
7/58
8
we need corporate governance and to explore its function theoretically. The section ends
with information on changes made in corporate governance over the last two decades.
Section III details the factual account of events leading to the fall of Enron. It
includes the history and background of the corporation, beginning with its inception with
the merger of Houston Natural Gas and Internorth in 1985 through its earnings
restatements and eventual bankruptcy filing in December of 2001. It also focuses on the
partnerships and transactions that were the catalysts for the firms failure, in particular the
Special Purpose Entities like Chewco, JEDI, and LJM-1 and LJM-2.
Section IV provides analysis of the corporate governance issues that arise within
Enron from a theoretical approach. That is, a theoretical and economic framework are
applied to Enrons corporate structure and compensation schedules, highlighting
opposing theories such as optimal contracting and rent extraction with regards to
executive compensation. Further discussed is the principal-agent problem in the context
of Enron and managements expropriation of shareholders capital. Highlighted also are
managements conflicts of interest that were allowed and that then went unmonitored by
the board. Also included is an analysis on the lack of material independence on the board
and the theory that management had bargaining power because of the close director-
management relationships. I also discuss the relationship between the audit committee
and Arthur Andersen, as well Andersens lack of auditing independence. Included is an
analysis on the partial failure of the efficient market hypothesis in the case of Enron and
the transfer of costs to the shareholders because of the asymmetric information due to
managements sophisticated techniques for obscuring financial results.
Section V looks at the primary legislative reform post-Enron, the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, including its key points and the likely effects and costs of its implementation on
corporate governance and financial reporting. The section includes other developments
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
8/58
9
in corporate governance, and provides some solutions to improving governance and
executive compensation.
II. THEORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate Governance and the Principal-Agent Problem
Before applying theory to the case of Enron, it is important to first discuss the
nature of the principal-agent problem and the reasons for a governance system, as well as
to define corporate governance from an applied and theoretical approach. I then will
discuss why corporate governance helps improve overall economic efficiency, followed
by the general developments in corporate governance over the past two decades. On its
most simplistic and applied level, corporate governance is the mechanism that allows the
shareholders of a firm to oversee the firms management and managements decisions. In
the U.S., this oversight mechanism takes form by way of a board of directors, which is
headed by the chairman. Boards typically contain between one and two dozen members,
and also contain multiple subcommittees that focus on particular aspects of the firm and
its functions.
However, the existence of such oversight bodies begs the questions: why is there
a need for a governance system, and why is intervention needed in the context of a free-
market economy? Adam Smiths invisible hand asserts that the market mechanisms will
efficiently allocate resources without the need for intervention. Williamson (1985) calls
such transactions that are dictated by market mechanisms standardized, and can be
thought of as commodity markets with classic laws of supply and demand governing
them. These markets consist of many producers and many consumers, with the quality of
the goods being traded the same from producer to producer.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
9/58
10
These market mechanisms do not apply to all transactions though, particularly
when looking at the separation of ownership and management of a firm and its associated
contracts. The need for a corporate governance system is inherently linked to such a
separation, as well as to the underlying theories of the firm. The agency problem, as
developed by Coase (1937) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) as well as others, is in
essence the problem associated with such separation of management and ownership. A
manager, or entrepreneur, will raise capital from financiers to produce goods in a firm.
The financiers, in return, need the manager to generate returns on the capital they have
provided. The financiers, after putting forth the capital, are left without any guarantees or
assurances that their funds will not be expropriated or spent on bad investments and
projects. Further, the financiers have no guarantees other than the shares of the firm that
they now hold that they will receive anything back from the manager at all. This
difficulty for financiers is essentially the agency problem.
When looking at the agency problem from a contractual standpoint, one might
initially think that such a moral hazard for the management might be solved through
contracts. An ideal world would include a contract that would specify how the manager
should perform in all states of the world, as dictated by the financiers of the firm. That is,
a complete contingent contract between the financiers and manager would specify how
the profits are divided amongst the manager and owners (financiers), as well as describe
appropriate actions for the manager for all possible situations. However, because every
possible contingency cannot be predicted or because it would be prohibitively costly to
anticipate such contingencies, a complete contract is unfeasible. As Zingales (1997)
points out, in a world where complete contingent contracts can be costlessly written by
agents, there is no need for governance, as all possible situations will be anticipated in the
contract.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
10/58
11
Given that complete contingent contracts are unfeasible, we are therefore left with
incomplete contracts binding the manager to the shareholders. As a result of the
incomplete contracts, there are then unlimited situations that arise in the course of
managing a company that require action by a manager that are not explicitly stated in the
managers contract. Grossman and Hart (1986) describe these as residual control rights--
the rights to make decisions in situations not addressed in the contract. Suppose then,
that financiers reserved all residual control rights as specified in their contract with
management. That is, in any unforeseen situation, the owners decide what to do. This
would not be a successful allocation of the residual control rights because financiers most
often would not be qualified or would not have enough information to know what to do.
This is the exact reason for which the manager was hired. As a result, the manager will
retain most of the residual control rights and thus the ability to allocate firms funds as he
chooses (Shleifer and Vishny 1996).
There are other reasons why it is logical for a majority of the residual control
rights to reside with management, as opposed to with the shareholders. It is often the
case that managers would have raised funds from many different investors, making each
individual investors capital contribution a small percentage of the total capital raised. As
a result, the individual investor is likely to be too small or uninformed of the residual
rights he may retain, and thus the rights will not be exercised. Further, the free-rider
problem for an individual owner often does not make it worthwhile for the owner to
become involved in the contract enforcement or even be knowledgeable about the firms
in which he invests (Shleifer and Vishny 1996) due to his small ownership interest. This
results in the managers having even more residual control rights as the financiers remove
themselves from the oversight function.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
11/58
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
12/58
13
the agency problem and firm theory. Previously discussed is why operating under the
incomplete contract approach tends to leave managers with a majority of the residual
control rights of a firm. As a result of these residual control rights, managers have
significant discretion and are not directly (or are incompletely) tied to the interests of the
shareholders. Acting independently of shareholders interest, managers may then engage
in self-interested behavior and inappropriate allocation of firm funds may occur.
In an effort to quell such misallocations by a manager, a solution is to give the
manager long term, contingent incentive contracts that help to align his interests with
those of the shareholders. This view of executive compensation is commonly referred to
as the optimal contracting view. It is important with this contracting that the marginal
value of the managers contingent contract exceed the marginal value of personal benefits
of control, which can be achieved, with rare exceptions, if the incentive contract is of a
significant amount (Shleifer and Vishny 1996). When in place, such incentive contracts
help to encourage the manager to act in the interest of the shareholders. Critical to the
functioning of these incentive contracts is the requirement that the performance
measurement is highly correlated with the quality of the management decisions during his
tenure and that they be verifiable in court.
The most traditional form of shareholder and management alignment under the
optimal contracting view of executive compensation is through stock ownership by the
manager. This immediately gives the manager similar interests as the general
shareholding population and acts to align their interest. Stock options also help to align
interests because it creates incentive for the manager to increase the stock price of the
firm, which consequently increases the value of his options when (if) he chooses to
exercise them. Another form of an incentive contract that helps to align the interests of
shareholders and a manager is to remove the manager from office if the firm income is
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
13/58
14
too low (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Again, this provides quite a strict incentive for
management to produce strong earnings, which aligns his interest with those of the
shareholders, and hopefully serves to maximize shareholder value.
It is important to mention that these incentive contracts for agents are not without
costs and have come under immense scrutiny recently, particularly with the recent
corporate governance scandals like Enron. They provide ample incentive for
management to misrepresent the true earnings of a firm and do not completely solve the
agency problem, an issue that will be discussed further in section IV.
A second and competing view of executive compensation is the rent extraction
view, or as Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) call it, the skimming view. This rent
extraction view is similar to the optimal contracting view in that they both rely on the
principal-agent conflict, but under the rent extraction view executive compensation is
seen as part of the [agency] problem rather than a remedy to it, (Bebchuk, Fried and
Walker 2001, p.31). Under this view, an executive maintains significant power over the
board of directors who effectively set his compensation. This power the executive, or
management team, holds stems from the close relationships between management and the
directors, and thus the directors and executives may be bonded by interest, collegiality,
or affinity, (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2001, p.31). Also, directors are further tied to
management, and in particular the CEO, because the CEO is often the one who exerted
influence to have the director placed on the board, and thus the director may feel more
inclined to defer to the CEO, particularly with issues surrounding the bargaining over
managements compensation.
As a result of the power that management maintains, management has the ability
to bargain more effectively with the board over compensation, and can effectively extract
more rents as a result. These rents are referred to as the amount of compensation a
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
14/58
15
CEO, or management, receives over the normal amount he would receive with optimal
contracting. Therefore it is logical to anticipate seeing higher pay for executives
governed by weaker boards, or boards with little independence, which is consistent with
Bertrand and Mullainathans (2000) findings. That is, one of their conclusions was that
boards with more insiders (or less independence) are inclined to pay their CEO more. In
other words, CEOs with fewer independent directors on their boards are likely to gain
better control of the pay process.
More generally, it is important to mention that incentive contracts for executives
are common components of their compensation packages, and there is a vast amount of
literature on the effectiveness of incentive contracts. Murphy (1985) argued from an
empirical standpoint about the positive relationship between pay and performance of
managers. Murphy and Jensen (1990) later examined stock options of executives and
showed that a managers pay increased by only $3 for every $1000 increase in
shareholder wealth. Murphy and Jensen concluded that it was evidence of inefficient
compensation arrangements, arrangements that included restrictions on high levels of
pay. Others suggest that there needs to be a better approach in screening out performance
effects that are outside an executives control when looking at incentive contracts.
Rappaport (1999), in particular, argues that incentive contracts for executives would
provide more incentive and be better measures of executive performance if the stock
option exercise prices were indexed by broad movements in the market. This would
imply that an executive would not be compensated simply because of broad movements
in the market, but more by his individual firms performance relative to other firms.
Corporate Governances Role in Economic Efficiency
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
15/58
16
Given the role executive compensation and incentive contracts play in attempting
to solve the agency problem, there remains the question of what role governance plays in
improving economic efficiency. In the ex-ante (which Zingales (1997) defines as the
time when specific investments should be made) period, there are two situations where
governance improves economic efficiency. The first is that rational agents will focus on
value-enhancing activities that are most clearly rewarded, and therefore governance must
help allocate resources and reward value-enhancing activities that are not properly
rewarded by the market. Secondly, managers will engage in activities that improve the
ex-post bargaining in their favor. As Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue, a manager will
be inclined to focus on activities that he is best at managing because his marginal
contribution is greater, and this consequently increases his share of ex-post rents, or his
bargaining power for residual control rights.
Another area where governance may improve economic efficiency is in the ex-
post bargaining phase for rents. That is, governance may affect the level of coordination
costs or the extent to which a party is liquidity-constrained. If residual control rights are
assigned to a large, diverse group, the existence of free-riders in the group may create an
inefficient bargaining system. Also, if a party wishes to engage in a transfer of control
rights but he is liquidity-constrained, inefficient bargaining may again occur as the
transaction may not be agreed upon (Zingales 1997).
A third way that governance may effect overall economic efficiency is through
the level and distribution of risk. Assuming that the engaged parties have different risk
aversions, corporate governance can then act to efficiently allocate risk to those who are
least risk-averse (Fama and Jensen 1983), which improves the total surplus for the parties
involved.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
16/58
17
From a more general standpoint, it is also important to recognize that strong
governance in a system of capital markets such as the U.S. promotes an efficient medium
for those who are lending money and those who are borrowing, as well as provides some
security outside of the legal framework for lenders of capital. The nature of the firm
requires that financiers, or lenders of capital, will indeed lend their money to managers
who will in turn run a firm and hopefully create a return for the financiers. If the
financiers did not feel comfortable that they would be receiving their capital back at some
point in the future, they would not be inclined to provide managers with capital and, as a
result, innovation and industrial progression would be slowed tremendously. Strong
governance helps to maintain investors confidence in the capital markets and helps to
improve overall efficiency in this manner.
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance
Besides the theoretical basis of efficiencies provided by governance, it is
important to consider a more applied look at governance and how it has evolved over the
past two decades in the U.S. Indeed, corporate governance has changed substantially in
the past two decades. Prior to 1980, corporate governance did little to provide managers
with incentives to make shareholder interests their primary responsibility. As Jensen
(1993) discusses, prior to 1980 management thought of themselves as representatives of
the corporation as opposed to employees and representatives of the shareholders.
Management saw their role as one of balancing the interests of all related parties,
including company employees, suppliers, customers, and shareholders. The use of
incentive contracting was still limited, and thus managements interests were not well
aligned with that of its shareholders. In fact, in 1980, only 20% of the compensation of
CEOs was tied to stock market performance, (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003, p.5). Also,
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
17/58
18
the role of external governance mechanisms like hostile takeovers and proxy fights were
rare, and there tended to be very little independence on a board of directors.
The 1980s, however, were defined as an era of hostile takeovers and restructuring
activities that made companies less susceptible to takeovers. Leverage was employed at
high rates. As Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) argue, the difference between actual firm
performance and potential performance grew to be significant, or in other words, firms
were failing to maximize value, which lead to a new disciplining by the capital markets.
The 1990s, by contrast, included an increase in mergers that were designed to take
advantage of emerging technologies and high growth industries.
Changes in executive compensation throughout the two decades also changed
significantly. Option-based compensation for managers increased significantly as
executives became more aligned with shareholders, specifically, equity-based
compensation in 1994 made up almost 50% of CEO compensation (up from less than
20% in 1980), (Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003, p.9).
There were also changes in the makeup of U.S. shareholders during the two
decades, as well as changes in boards of directors. Institutional investors share of the
market increased significantly (share almost doubled from 1980 to 1996, Holmstrom and
Kaplan 2003), which came alongside an increase in shareholder activism throughout the
period. The increase in large institutional investors suggests that firms will be more
likely to be effective monitors of management. The logic follows because if an investor
(take a large institutional investor for example) owns a larger part of the firm, he will be
more concerned with the firms performance than if he were small because his potential
cash flows from the firm will be greater. It is important to note that often the large
shareholders are institutional shareholders, which means that presumably more
sophisticated investors with incentives to show strong stock returns own an increasing
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
18/58
19
share of firms. Such concentration of ownership tends to avoid the traditional free-rider
problem associated with small, dispersed shareholders and will lead to the large
shareholders more closely monitoring management. Large shareholders thus address the
agency problem in that they both have a general interest in profit maximization, and
enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interests respected, (Shleifer and
Vishny 1996, p.27).
Other developments in corporate governance over the two decades, aside from the
regulatory and legislative changes post-Enron, include the fact that boards took great
strides to remove their director nominating decisions from the CEOs control through the
use of nominating committees. The number of outside directors (referring to those
directors who are not members of management) also increased during the period, as did
directors equity compensation as a percentage of their total director compensation
(Holmstrom and Kaplan 2003).
However, despite such improvements over the past two decades, the case of
Enron suggests that corporate governance was not immune from failure, and it highlights
many of the theoretical and applied issues with the current theories on corporate
governance, the firm, and executive compensation.
III. WHAT HAPPENED AT ENRON: FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF EVENTS
LEADING TO BANKRUPTCY
Background/Timeline
Enron was founded in 1985 through the merger of Houston Natural Gas and
Internorth, a natural gas company based in Omaha, Nebraska, and quickly became the
major energy and petrochemical commodities trader under the leadership of its chairman,
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
19/58
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
20/58
21
partnership created out of the need to redeem an outside investors interest in another
Enron partnership and will be discussed at length in the following section.
Such restatements sparked a formal investigation by the SEC into Enrons
partnerships. Other questionable partnerships were coming to light, including the
Raptors partnerships. These restatements were colossal, and combined with Enrons
disclosure that their CFO Mr. Fastow was paid in excess of $30 million for the
management of LJM-1 and LJM-2, investor confidence was crushed. Enrons debt
ratings subsequently plummeted, and one month later, on December 2, 2001, Enron filed
for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.
Summary of Transactions and Partnerships
Many of the partnership transactions that Enron engaged in that contributed to its
failure involved special accounting treatment through the use of specifically structured
entities known as a special purpose entities, or SPEs. For accounting purposes in 2001,
a company did not need to consolidate such an entity on to its own balance sheet if two
conditions were met: (1) an owner independent of the company must make a substantive
equity investment of at least 3% of the SPEs assets, and the 3% must remain at risk
throughout the transaction; and (2) the independent owner must exercise control of the
SPE, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002, p.5). If these two conditions were met, a
company was allowed to record gains and losses on those transactions on their income
statement, while the assets, and most importantly the liabilities, of the SPE are not
included on the companys balance sheet, despite the close relationship between the
company and the entity.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
21/58
22
The Chewco/JEDI Transaction
The first of the related party transactions worthy of analysis is Chewco
Investments L.P., a limited partnership managed by Mr. Kopper. Chewco was created
out of the need to redeem California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)
interest in a previous partnership with Enron called Joint Energy Development
Investment Limited Partnership (JEDI).
JEDI was a $500 million joint venture investment jointly controlled by Enron and
CalPERS. Because of this joint control, Enron was allowed to disclose its share of gains
and losses from JEDI on its income statement, but was not required to disclose JEDIs
debt on its balance sheet. However, in order to redeem CalPERS interest in JEDI so that
CalPERS would invest in an even larger partnership, Enron needed to find a new partner,
or else it would have to consolidate JEDIs debt onto its balance sheet, which it
desperately wanted to avoid.
In keeping with the rules regarding SPEs, JEDI needed to have an owner
independent of Enron contribute at least 3% of the equity capital at risk to allow Enron to
not consolidate the entity. Unable to find an outside investor to put up the 3% capital,
Fastow selected Kopper to form and manage Chewco, which was to buy CalPERS 3%
interest. However, Chewcos purchase of CalPERS share was almost completely with
debt, as opposed to equity. As a result, the assets and liabilities of JEDI and Chewco
should have been consolidated onto Enrons balance sheet in 1997, but were not.
The decision by management and Andersen to not consolidate was in complete
disregard of the accounting requirements in connection with the use of SPEs, despite the
fact that it is was in both Enrons employees interest and in the interest of Enrons
auditors to be forthright in their public financial statements. The consequences of such a
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
22/58
23
decision were far-reaching, and in the fall of 2001 when Enron and Andersen were
reviewing the transaction, it became apparent that Chewco did not comply with the
accounting rules for SPEs. In November of 2001 Enron announced that it would be
consolidating the transactions retroactively to 1997. This consequently resulted in the
massive earnings restatements and increased debt on Enrons balance sheet.
Not only was this transaction devastating to Enron, but its manager, Mr. Kopper,
received excessive compensation from the transaction, as he was handsomely rewarded
more than $2 million in management fees relating to Chewco. Such a financial windfall
was the result of arrangements that he appears to have negotiated with Fastow,
(Powers, Troubh, and Winokur 2002, p.8). Kopper was also a direct investor in Chewco,
and in March of 2001 received more than $10 million of Enron shareholders money for
his personal investment of $125,000 in 1997. His compensation for such work should
have been reviewed by the boards Compensation Committee but was not.
This transaction begins to shed light on a few of the many corporate governance
issues arising from Enron, one being the dual role Kopper played as manager and
investor of the partnership while an employee of Enron. This is a blatant conflict of
interest, explicitly violating Enrons own Code of Ethics and Business Affairs, which
prohibits such conflicts unless the chairman and CEO determined that his participation
does not adversely affect the best interests of the Company, (Powers, Troubh and
Winokur 2002, p.8). The second governance issue is in connection with the
Compensation Committees lack of review of Koppers compensation resulting from the
transactions. The third governance issue deals with the lack of auditing oversight from
the Audit and Compliance Committee concerning the decision not to consolidate the
entity.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
23/58
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
24/58
25
against the downside of an investment by contracting with another firm or entity that
accepts the risk of the investment for a fee. However, in June of 1999 with the Rhythms
investment, instead of the LJM partnerships committing the independent equity necessary
to act as a hedge for the investment should the value of the investment decline, they
committed Enron stock that would serve as the primary source of payment. The idea
was to hedge Enrons profitable merchant investment in Rhythms stock, allowing Enron
to offset losses on Rhythms if the price of Rhythms stock declined, (Powers, Troubh and
Winokur 2002, p.13). These hedging transactions did not stop with Rhythms, but
continued through 2000 and 2001 with other SPEs called Raptor vehicles. They too were
hedging Enron investments with payments that would be made in Enron stock should
such a payment be necessary.
Despite Andersens approval of such transactions, there were substantial
economic drawbacks for Enron of essentially hedging with itself. If the stock price of
Enron fell at the same time as one of its investments, the SPE would not be able to make
the payments to Enron, and the hedges would fail. For many months this was never a
concern, as Enron stock climbed and the stock market boomed. But by late 2000 and
early 2001 Enrons stock price was sagging, and two of the SPEs lacked the funds to pay
Enron on the hedges. Enron creatively restructured some transactions just before
quarters end, but these restructuring efforts were short-term solutions to fundamentally
flawed transactions. The Raptor SPEs could no longer make their payments, and in
October of 2001 Enron took a $544 million dollar after-tax charge against earnings- a
result of its supposed hedging activities.
Though they eventually contributed to Enrons demise, these related party
transactions concerning LJM-1 and LJM-2 resulted in huge financial gain for Fastow and
other investors. They received tens of millions of dollars that Enron would have never
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
25/58
26
given away under normal circumstances. At one point Fastow received $4.5 million after
two months on an essentially risk-free $25,000 investment relating to LJM-1 (Powers,
Troubh and Winokur 2002).
As discussed earlier, one of the downfalls of the principal-agent problem under
the incomplete contract paradigm lies with the allocation of residual control rights to
managers. Because managers have much discretion associated with the residual rights,
funds may be misallocated. This exact problem, the misallocation of firm funds, arose in
the case of Enron. Enron shareholders had invested capital in the firm and management
was then responsible for the allocation of such funds. With the residual control rights
management maintained due to the separation of ownership and management,
management, vis--vis the firms CFO Andrew Fastow and Michael Kopper, was able to
expropriate the firms funds.
There are many different methods a manager may employ in the expropriation of
funds. A manager may simply just take the cash directly out of the operation, but in the
case of Enron, management used a technique called transfer pricing with the partnerships
they had created. Transfer pricing occurs when managers set up independent companies
that they own personally, and sell output (or assets in this case) of the main company they
run to the independent firms at below market prices, (Shleifer and Vishny 1996, p.9
excluding parenthesis). The independent firms mentioned above were the partnerships,
like Chewco, JEDI, and the LJMs that Fastow and Kopper managed and had partial
ownership of. With the partnerships like the LJMs making a profit on nearly every
transaction, it is clear that Enron must have been selling those assets at below market
levels, which defines expropriation by way of transfer pricing. It then makes sense that
as the partnerships sold back the assets, they profited each time because Enron would re-
purchase the assets at prices higher than what the partnerships had paid. Therefore,
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
26/58
27
because Enrons asset sales and purchases were enriching the investors in the
partnerships, management was effectively expropriating firm funds. Managements
expropriation of funds to the manager-owned and operated partnerships is a manifestation
of the principal-agent. Management was literally enriching itself and the other owners of
the partnerships with firm funds, a problem that stems from the separation of ownership
and management in a corporation.
It is important to note that the expropriation of firm funds in this case was really a
breakdown in the first layer of the corporate governance institutions that exist to protect
shareholders. These mechanisms of corporate governance take many different forms,
ranging from management decision-making and compensation, to board oversight, to
outside professional advisors and their roles to monitor the workings of a company.
Management of a firm, and in particular its CFO, has a fiduciary duty to the shareholders
of the company, which serves to act as a governance mechanism. In this case,
management abandoned their responsibility to shareholders in favor of enriching
themselves and manipulating financial statements, and thus undermined one of the many
mechanisms of corporate governance that contribute to its effectiveness.
The expropriation of funds through transfer pricing is not an Enron-specific
phenomenon. As Shleifer and Vishny (1996) mention, within the Russian oil industry
managers often sell oil at below market prices to independent manager-owned
companies. Korean chaebol also have reportedly sold subsidiaries to the founders of the
chaebol at below market prices (Shleifer and Vishny 1996).
At the formation of the LJM partnerships it was brought to the attention of the
board that having Fastow both invest in the partnerships and manage the transactions
with Enron would present a conflict of interest. Management, however, was in favor of
the structure because it would supply Enron with another buyer of Enron assets, and that
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
27/58
28
Fastows familiarity with the Company and the assets to be sold would permit Enron to
move more quickly and incur fewer transaction costs, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur
2002, p.10). After discussion, the board voted to ratify the Fastow managed partnerships,
despite the conflict. The board was under the impression that a set of procedures to
monitor the related party transactions was being implemented, and that because of the
close scrutiny the partnerships would face this would mitigate the risk involved with
them. However, the Enron Board failed to make sure the controls were effective, to
monitor the fairness of the transactions, or to monitor Mr. Fastows LJM-related
compensation (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.24), and will be discussed further in
section IV.
Despite the foregoing disparaging remarks regarding SPEs, it is important to note
that SPEs are not inherently bad transaction vehicles, and can actually serve valid
purposes. They are in fact very appropriate mechanisms for insulating liability, limiting
tax exposure, as well as maintaining high debt ratings. They are widely used in both
public and privately held corporations and are fundamental to the structuring of joint
venture projects with other entities. It was the expropriation of firm funds by Enron
management that was illegal, not the transaction vehicles themselves.
IV. ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES
Corporate Structure
In order to fully analyze the corporate governance issues that arose within Enron,
a certain amount of background information regarding its corporate structure and the
implications of its high power incentive contracts is necessary. By any standards,
Enrons Board structure with five oversight subcommittees could have been characterized
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
28/58
29
as typical amongst major public American corporations. The Chairman of the Board was
Kenneth Lay, and in 2001 Enron had 15 Board Members. Most of the members were
then or had previously served as Chairman or CEO of a major corporation, and only one
of the 15 was an executive of Enron, Jeffrey Skilling, the President and CEO. In his
testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, John Duncan, Chairman of
Enrons Executive Committee, spoke of his fellow board members as being well
educated, experienced, successful businessmen and women and experts in areas of
finance and accounting. Indeed they had a wealth of sophisticated business and
investment experience and considerable expertise in accounting, derivatives, and
structured finance, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.8). The board had five annual
meetings, and conducted additional special meetings as necessary throughout the year.
As provided in U.S. Senate Subcommittee report on The Role of Enrons Board
of Directors in Enrons Collapse (2002, p.9), the five subcommittees, consisting of
between four and seven members each, had the responsibilities as follows:
(1) The Executive Committee met on an as needed basis to handle urgent
business matters between scheduled Board meetings.
(2) The Finance Committee was responsible for approving major transactions
which, in 2001, met or exceeded $75 million in value. It also reviewedtransactions valued between $25 million and $75 million; oversaw Enrons risk
management efforts; and provided guidance on the companys financial decisionsand policies.
(3) The Audit and Compliance Committee reviewed Enrons accounting andcompliance programs, approved Enrons financial statements and reports, and was
the primary liaison with Andersen.
(4) The Compensation Committee established and monitored Enrons
compensation policies and plans for directors, officers, and employees.
(5) The Nominating Committee nominated individuals to serve as Directors.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
29/58
30
At the full Board meetings, in addition to presentations made by Committee
Chairmen summarizing the Committee work, presentations by Andersen as well as
Vinson & Elkins, the Enrons chief outside legal counsel, were common. Vinson &
Elkins provided advice and assisted with much of the documentation for Enrons
partnerships, including the disclosure footnotes regarding such transactions in Enrons
SEC filings (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002). Andersen regularly made
presentations to the Audit and Compliance Committee regarding the companys financial
statements, accounting practices, and audit results.
Board members received $350,000 in compensation and stock options annually,
which was significantly above the norm, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.56).
Compensation to Enron executives in 2001 was extraordinarily generous too, as shown
by the following chart (Pacelle 2002), which includes the value of exercised stock options
and excludes compensation from the partnerships:
Kenneth Lay (Enron Chairman/CEO)...$152.7 (in millions)
Mark Fevert (Chair and CEO, Enron Wholesale Services).$31.9
Jeffrey Skilling (Enron CEO)......$34.8
J. Clifford Baxter (Enron Vice-Chairman)..$16.2
Andrew Fastow (Enron CFO)..$4.2
In 2000, Mr. Lays compensation was in excess of $140 million, including the
value of his exercised options. This level of compensation was 10 times greater than the
average CEO of a publicly traded company in that year, which was $13.1 million (U.S.
Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.52). It is important to note that $123 million of that $140
million came from a portion of the stock options he owned, which represents a significant
percentage of total compensation from stock options.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
30/58
31
As discussed in section II, the theory behind such extensive stock option grants to
the firms management and its directors is to align the interests of shareholders and
management as a solution to the principal-agent problem. However, one of the major
drawbacks of alignment of manager and shareholder interest by way of stock options is
that it provides huge incentives for self-dealings for the managers. As Shleifer and
Vishny (1996, p.14) discuss, high powered incentive contracts may entice managers to
manipulate accounting numbers and investment policy to increase their pay. They also
argue that the opportunities to self-deal increase with weak or unmotivated boards
overseeing the compensation packages. With the case of Enron, management had
significant financial incentive through its stock options to manipulate their earnings to
boost stock prices, which created enormous windfalls for those with equity-based
compensation when such manipulations occurred.
More specifically, as Gordon (2002) argues, the value of the stock option will
increase not only with the value of the underlying security but with the stocks variance,
according to the Black-Scholes option pricing. As a result, managers with significant
stock options have incentive to increase the stock price of their firm, and variance, by
taking on more risk. Costly risk taking was employed at Enron with the use of the highly
structured and hedged partnerships. As a result, Enron in a sense became a hedge fund,
taking leveraged bets in exotic markets that if successful would produce a huge,
disproportionate bonanza for its executives the downside seemed a problem only for
the shareholders, (Gordon 2002, p.1247). That is, Enron management had huge
potential and realized payoffs by way of their stock options, which provided them
incentive to take on unnecessary risk and manipulate earnings.
As mentioned earlier, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2000) discuss aspects of such
stock compensation practices as they examine two competing views of executive pay,
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
31/58
32
one being the contracting view and the other being the skimming view (or rent extraction
view). Included in their analysis is the mention of the constraints that limit the amount
managers take from the firm within their equity compensation packages. Such executives
are restrained by the amount of funds in the firm, by an unwillingness to draw attention
of shareholder activist groups, or by fear of becoming a takeover target, (Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2000, p.3). Thus, while executive stock options do provide a solution to
aligning management and shareholder interests, there are significant costs associated with
them, as they often come with the serious threat of manager self-dealings that are not in
line with maximizing shareholder value.
We have thus seen a breakdown in another one of the institutions of corporate
governance with the ineffectiveness of equity compensation for executives. Stock-based
compensation is another mechanism that helps to align manager and shareholder interests
and hopefully solve the principal-agent problem. This mechanism is indeed a tool of
corporate governance designed to help protect investors and shareholders in the firm.
However, in the case of Enron such a technique essentially failed because of the massive
incentives for management self-dealings and to manipulate financial statements.
Conflicts of Interest
As mentioned earlier, one of the major governance issues brought to light by the
bankruptcy of Enron was the blatant conflict of interest involved with having financial
officers of a company both manage and be equity holders of entities that conducted
significant business transactions with Enron. Enrons Code of Ethics and Business
Affairs explicitly prohibits any transactions that involve related parties unless the
Chairman and CEO determined that his participation does not adversely affect the best
interests of the Company (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002, p.8). With respect to the
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
32/58
33
Chewco transaction, which was managed by Mr. Kopper, the Powers Report concluded
that there was no evidence that his participation was ever disclosed to, or approved by,
either Kenneth Lay (who was Chairman and CEO) or the Board of Directors, (Powers,
Troubh and Winokur 2002, p.8). Mr. Koppers involvement in the Chewco transaction as
both general manager and investor therefore was in direct violation of Enrons Code of
Ethics and Business Practices, and should have never occurred. The management of
Enron should have recognized the conflict and either sought approval from Mr. Lay, in
which case one would hope the transaction would have been restructured with a different
general manager, or it should have been abandoned completely. In either case, such a
conflict should not have been allowed.
Again with the LJM transactions, conflicts of interest were abundant and should
have been avoided. However, the LJM transactions differed from Chewco in one major
respect: the conflict of interest arising from having the CFO, Mr. Fastow, manage and
invest in the entities was approved by the Chairman and Board of Directors. Along with
the Boards ratification of the Chairman and CEOs approval was the Boards
understanding that a set of controls to monitor the partnerships and ensure fairness to
Enron was being implemented by management. Concerns about such a conflict of
interest were expressed amongst senior personnel at Andersen, in which it is clear that
such a conflict should have never been allowed. In an email dated 5/28/99 between
Andersen employees Benjamin Neuhausen to David Duncan, Neuhausen clearly
identifies the issue at hand: Setting aside the accounting, idea of a venture entity
managed by CFO is terrible from business point of view. Conflicts galore. Why would
any director in his or her right mind ever approve such a scheme? Mr. Duncans
response on 6/1/99 was as follows: [O]n your point 1 (i.e., the whole thing is a bad
idea), I really couldnt agree more. Rest assured that I have already communicated and it
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
33/58
34
has been agreed to by Andy [Fastow] that CEO, General [Counsel], and Board discussion
and approval will be a requirement, on our part, for acceptance of a venture similar to
what we have been discussing, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.26).
Because the board was under the impression that a system of controls was being
implemented, and because members of management had not objected to such a
structuring, it seems more clear why the board came to the conclusion to support such a
flawed structure. According to Board Member Mr. Blake, the LJM transactions were
described as an extension of Enron and as an empty bucket (U.S. Senate
Subcommittee 2002, p.27) for Enron assets. Further, the proposal for LJM transaction
was faxed to Board members only three days before the special meeting took place, and
discussion within the meeting about the transaction was limited. The special meeting
lasted only an hour, and amongst the approval of the conflict of interest were substantial
topics such as resolutions authorizing a major stock split, changes in companys stock
compensation plan, acquisition of a new corporate jet, and discussion on an investment in
a Middle Eastern power plant. This suggests that the board did not devote significant
attention to consideration of the conflicts of interest. Thus, again Enron was saddling
itself with more related-party transactions, transactions that would eventually lead to its
demise.
With the Chewco partnership, management, in particular Kopper, again took
advantage of the residual control rights he retained. The manager used these control
rights to expropriate funds to the manager-owned and operated partnerships. This is a
prime example of the agency problem associated with the separation of ownership and
management, and is very similar to the other example of Fastows expropriation of funds
through transfer pricing. Koppers expropriation of funds is again a breakdown in one of
the corporate governance institutions that was in place to protect shareholders. As an
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
34/58
35
employee in the finance division, Kopper had a fiduciary duty to the shareholders, yet he
elected to enrich himself and other investors in the partnerships and thus another layer of
the corporate governance mechanisms had failed.
Failures in Board Oversight and Fundamental Lack of Checks and Balances
These conflicts of interest highlight more of the fundamental breakdowns in
governance within Enron and the lack of Board oversight once such conflicts had been
approved. After approving such related-party transactions, the Board of Directors had a
general and specific fiduciary responsibility to closely monitor the partnerships and
ensure that the policies and procedures in place were in fact regulating the partnerships.
This is where they failed. Though management told the Board it was monitoring such
transactions to protect the interests of Enron, the Board did not go far enough in its
monitoring of the monitors.
The procedures and controls included the review and approval of all LJM
transactions by Richard Causey, the Chief Accounting Officer; and Richard Buy, the
Chief Risk Officer; and, later during the period, Jeffrey Skilling the President and COO
(and later CEO). The Board also directed its Audit and Compliance Committee to
conduct annual reviews of all LJM transactions, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002,
p.10). A system of controls as those mentioned would have provided Enron with a
safeguard of checks and balances to protect the interests of Enron. Unfortunately the
controls were not rigorous enough, and their implementation and oversight was
inadequate at both the Management and Board levels, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur
2002, p.10). Both Causey and Buy interpreted their roles in reviewing the transactions
very narrowly, and did not provide the level of scrutiny that the Board thought was
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
35/58
36
occurring, which, of course, eventually resulted in the massive earnings restatements and
reduction in shareholder equity.
More specifically, the Finance Committee should have taken a more proactive
role in examining and monitoring the transactions. As was defined by the role of the
Finance Committee, they were responsible for approving major transactions which, in
2001, met or exceeded $75 million in value. It also reviewed transactions valued
between $25 million and $75 million; oversaw Enrons risk management efforts; and
provided guidance on the companys financial decisions and policies, (U.S. Senate
Subcommittee 2002, p.9). It can be concluded that the Finance Committee failed in its
responsibility of such monitoring, especially given that they were aware of the precarious
nature of the related-party transactions. A forum for more extensive questioning from
directors regarding the transactions was the reason that such a committee existed. Their
job was to probe and take apart the transactions that they reviewed and to oversee risk,
neither of which they did for these related-party transactions.
Further, the Audit and Compliance Committee also failed to closely examine the
nature of the transactions, as is outlined in their duties. Indeed the annual reviews of the
LJM transactions by the Audit and Compliance Committee appear to have involved only
brief presentations by Management and did not involve any meaningful examination of
the nature or terms of the transactions, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002, p.11). Such
complex and risky transactions with related-parties deserved close scrutiny, not the
cursory review it received.
And finally, the Compensation Committee failed in its duty to monitor Enrons
compensation policies and plans for directors, officers, and employees, (U.S. Senate
Subcommittee 2002, p.9) as was specified. Had they been reviewed by the
Compensation Committee, both Fastows and Koppers excessive compensation for their
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
36/58
37
management of the partnerships as well as their return on private investments in the
partnerships would have immediately illuminated the conflicts and abuses associated with
the transactions, but no such review occurred. In fact, neither the Board nor Senior
Management asked Fastow for the amount of his LJM-related compensation until
October 2001, after media reports focused on Fastows role in LJM, (Powers, Troubh
and Winokur 2002, p.11). This lack of oversight by the Compensation Committee was a
major contributor to the financial failure of Enron, as both Fastow and Kopper received
disproportionate compensation for their management of the partnerships at Enrons
expense.
Audit Committee Relationship with Enron and Andersen
During Board meetings Andersen auditors briefed the Enron Audit and
Compliance Committee members about Enrons current accounting practices, informed
them of their novel design, created risk profiles of applied accounting practices, and
indicated that because of their unprecedented application, certain structured transactions
and accounting judgments were of high risk (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.16).
However, as provided in the charter of the Audit and Compliance Committee, it was the
Committees responsibility to determine and provide reasonable assurance that the
Companys publicly reported financial statements are presented fairly and in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.16).
Materials from Audit Committee meetings indicate that its members were aware of such
high-risk accounting methods being employed by Enron, but did not act on them. An
example is a note written by Andersens David Duncan, who states that many of the
accounting practices push limits and have a high others could have a different view
risk profile, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.17). A more diligent Audit and
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
37/58
38
Compliance Committee would have probed such comments like this and questioned the
accounting techniques applied.
Certainly within Andersen it was clear that Enron was engaging in Maximum
Risk (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.18) accounting practices. In fact, amongst
Andersen personnel it was noted that [Enrons] personnel are very sophisticated and
enter into numerous complex transactions and are often aggressive in structuring
transactions to achieve derived financial reporting objectives, (U.S. Senate
Subcommittee 2002, p.18). These concerns, however, were never properly addressed and
were not effectively communicated to the Audit and Compliance Committee by
Andersen. As Mr. Jaedicke, the Chairman of Enrons Audit and Compliance Committee,
stated before the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations about the Audit Committee
meetings with Andersen, when we would ask them [Andersen], even in executive
session, about, okay, how do you feel about these, the usual expression was one of
comfort. It was not, these are the highest risk transactions on our scale of one to ten
(U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.19-20). Despite Andersens wrongful approval of
such transactions, the Audit and Compliance Committee had a duty to ensure that
accurate financial statements were produced.
The blame for such major accounting errors is not easily assigned, and includes a
web of poor decisions by management, Andersen auditors, and the Audit and Compliance
Committee. First, management should not have structured their deals with such high-risk
techniques, especially those involving known conflicts of interest. Second, Andersen
formally admitted that it erred in concluding that the Rhythms transaction was structured
properly under the SPE non-consolidation rules, (Powers, Troubh and Winokur 2002,
p.24). As a result, financial statements from 1997 to 2000 had to be revised. The
governance issues arise when one looks at the role of the Audit and Compliance
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
38/58
39
Committee. While its not reasonable to expect Audit Committee members to know the
intricacies of off-balance sheet accounting and non-consolidation rules for Special
Purpose Entities, it is reasonable to expect them to ask the right questions which get at
the heart of a potential problem as well as to create a framework within their oversight
duties that allows for conversation, open, candid conversation with management and with
external consultants like Andersen. This idea of questioning that which is approved by
the supposed experts on the topic, of course, is a most delicate issue, and lies at the core
of governance and oversight measures. However, again the emphasis should be on the
atmosphere in which the Audit and Compliance Committee operated: it was not one that
continually challenged themselves to ensure accurate financial statements for Enron.
It is important to emphasize that Enron went to great lengths to employ such
highly structured SPEs and partnerships, and such entities were only described to outside
investors in the footnotes of Enrons disclosure documents. The non-consolidation rules
did not require that such entities be included on the balance sheet, making such
transactions difficult to recognize and understand, even for sophisticated analysts and
investors. In effect, Enron was using technologies (or complex financial techniques) that
helped to obscure the firms true financial results. Had investors been more aware of and
understood the significance of such highly structured partnerships, they would not have
been as deceived by the financial results and would have looked more skeptically at the
firms financial condition. Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2001) describe such technologies
for obscuring executive compensation as camouflaging. They argue that efforts will
be made to obfuscate the compensation data and otherwise plausibly justify the
compensation programs, (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2001, p.34).
The effects of such technologies that obscure financial results are far reaching and
directly impact the shareholders of the firm. By obscuring financial results through the
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
39/58
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
40/58
41
The Board of Enron also failed in its duty to ensure the objectivity and
independence of Arthur Andersen as its auditor, providing yet another area in which the
oversight of Enrons Board broke down. It was well understood that Andersen provided
not only internal auditing services to Enron, but consulting services as well. These two
services were closely linked, and often were referred to as an integrated audit. The
problems inherent to an integrated audit are of major concern, as the independence of the
auditors is forfeited. The lack of independence occurs because Andersen might audit its
own work, in which case Andersen auditors might be reluctant to criticize Andersen
consultants for the LJM or Raptor structures that Andersen had been paid millions of
dollars to help design, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.57). Therefore Andersens
auditing objectivity was sacrificed because of the concurrent employment of their
consulting services.
The onus then falls on the Audit and Compliance Committee to assess the
objectivity and independence of the auditor. As Senator Collins said to Audit Committee
Chairman Mr. Jaedicke in the Senate Subcommittee Investigation, when you are making
over $40 million a year, the auditor is not likely to come to the Audit Committee and say
anything other than they are independent, (U.S. Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.58).
which gets right to the point that the job to determine objectivity and independence is not
the auditors, but the board overseeing the auditors, the Audit Committee. Indeed,
Andersens consulting and auditing fees were substantial, totaling $27 million for
consulting services and another $25 million for auditing services performed in 2000 (U.S.
Senate Subcommittee 2002, p.58). Enrons Audit and Compliance Committee did very
little to investigate the independence of Andersens auditing services, but had they been
more interrogative, they might have preserved the independence of its auditors by
prohibiting other services other than audit work, hopefully producing more accurate
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
41/58
42
financial statements. Again, this is a breakdown in yet another level of the corporate
governance institutions. The Audit Committees role was one of oversight, and it failed
to monitor and oversee the production of accurate financial statements. This level of
oversight is designed to catch failures in other layers of corporate governance like the
independence of the outside auditor, yet it failed in its oversight duty.
Not only should have the Audit Committee done a better job in scrutinizing the
accountants independence, but so should have sophisticated market participants who
placed such a high value on the stock. The result is the partial failure of the efficient
market hypothesis for Enron stock. Gordon (2002) argues that the efficient market
hypothesis, which says the prices of securities fully reflect available information
(Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2002, p.981), was indeed disrupted when one looks at the
pricing of Enron stock. It was widely understood that Andersen was providing both audit
and consulting services to Enron, which, according to Gordon (2002, p.1233-4) should
have sharply diminished [the] value of Andersens certification for a company like
Enron with complicated accounting, abundant consulting opportunities, and obvious
accounting planning [and] should have been impounded in Enrons stock price
Further evidence in support of the partially failed efficient market hypothesis is that the
analysts that were tracking Enron knew that Enron was engaging in complex, off-balance
sheet transactions that were discreetly described in disclosures. Such financial reporting
obscurity should have caused more skepticism from the financial community, and
consequently such skepticism should have been ingrained in the companys stock price.
Such skepticism, however, was not ingrained in the price and the stock continued to soar
into 2000.
I refer to it as a partial failure of the hypothesis because there are indications
that perhaps the stock price was adjusting due to leaked news of the partnerships and
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
42/58
43
Enrons looming accounting crisis. The gradual fall in the stock price from January 2001
at $80 per share down to almost $40 per share by that fall, despite increased earnings
throughout the period, suggest that the market was in a period of correction. However,
because the supposed correction was so slow, this still suggests that there may have
been a partial failure in the market efficiency.
Director Independence/Director Selection
It is important to identify the lack of independence and its implications when
looking at the directors of Enrons Board. The independence of directors can play a
critical role in evaluating ones ability to provide objective judgment. As the Business
Roundtable (2002, p.11) suggests,
The board of a publicly owned corporation should have a substantialdegree of independence from management. Board Independence depends
not only on directors individual relationships- personal, employment orbusiness- but also on the boards overall attitude toward management.Providing objective independent judgment is at the core of the boards
oversight function, and the boards composition should reflect thisprinciple.
From an outside vantage point it would appear that Enron indeed had an
independent board, as it contained only one Enron executive. Financial ties, however,
between Enron and a majority of its directors seem to have weakened their objectivity in
their oversight of Enron. The following are examples of such financial ties contributing
to the lack of true independence amongst Enron Board members, as cited was cited in the
U.S. Senate Subcommittee report on The Role of Enrons Board of Directors in Enrons
Collapse (p.55):
Lord Wakeham received $72,000 in 2000 for his consulting services to Enron, in
addition to his Board compensation.
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
43/58
44
John Urquhart received $493,914 in 2000 for his consulting services to Enron, in
addition to his Board compensation.
Herbert Winokur also served on the Board of the National Tank Company, a
company which recorded significant revenues from asset sales and services to
Enron subsidiaries from 1997 to 2000.
From 1996 to 2001, Enron and Chairman Kenneth Lay donated almost $600,000
to M.D. Anderson Cancer Center in Texas. Both Dr. Lemaistre and Dr.
Mendelsohn, both of whom were currently Enron directors, served as president of
the Cancer Center.
Donations from Enron and the Lay Foundation totaled more than $50,000 to the
Mercatus Center in Virginia, where Board member Dr. Wendy Gramm is
employed.
Hedging arrangements between Belco Oil and Gas and Enron have existed since
1996 worth tens of millions of dollars. Board member Mr. Belfer was Chairman
and CEO of Belco.
Frank Savage was a director for both Enron and the investment firm Alliance
Capital Management, which since the late 1990s was the largest institutional
investor in Enron and one of the last to sell off its holdings (Green 2002).
Such relationships with Enron may have made it difficult for such board members
to be objective or critical of Enron management. Unfortunately too often supposedly
independent directors have been anything but-- steered on to the board by powerful
executives, on whom they are too often dependent for favors, loans or business, (The
Economist 2002). As Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan notes, few
directors in modern times have seen their interests as separate from those of the CEO,
who effectively appointed them and, presumably, could remove them from future slates
of directors submitted to shareholders, (Greenspan 2002). This clearly seems to have
been the case with Enron, given the long list of close business ties with supposedly
independent directors. Many of these Enron Board members may have felt that their
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
44/58
45
compensation (as a director or to the directors affiliated organizations) might be
jeopardized by probing and questioning extensively in Board meetings, producing weak
nodders and yes-men (The Economist 2002) as directors and thus weakening the
imperative oversight role of the Board and contributing to the fall of Enron.
The theoretical implications of a board that lacked independence at Enron fit well
with the previous discussion on executive rent extraction. I argued, as presented by
Bebchuk, Fried and Walker (2001), that managers will be able to extract rents when they
are connected to the directors, either through friendship, employment, association, or
other means. The directors, because of their close relations with management, will not be
inclined to question management, and will defer to management in bargaining over
executive compensation. This lack of independence on the board at Enron then likely
contributed to managements engagement in rent extraction, which could be one
explanation for the abnormally high compensation Enron executives received. That is,
had there been more truly independent directors on Enrons board, one would have
expected to have seen lower compensation for executives, compensation that more
appropriately fit the optimal contracting view that maximizes shareholder value.
These predictions again are consistent with Bertrand and Mullainathans (2000)
findings, that compensation for executives is lower with more independent boards,
suggesting that rent extraction cannot occur as easily with better governed (more
independent) boards. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) present a model in which board
effectiveness is a function of its independence. In their model they predict, among other
things, that poor firm performance lowers the directors assessment of the CEO, which
results in a loss of bargaining power for the CEO (and presumably a loss of rent
extraction) and an increase in the probability that the number of independent directors
will increase. Thus, because the Enron directors were so closely tied to management and
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
45/58
46
Enron as a firm, they were not as objective as they needed to be, which supports the
theory of management rent extraction. The lack of independence also helps to explain
the fundamental lack of oversight exhibited by the Board with regards to the conflicts of
interest presented with the partnerships.
The lack of independence on Enrons Board suggests another breakdown of one
of the most fundamental corporate governance institutions. The lack of independence
gets to the core oversight function of a board of directors. It is imperative that a board be
capable of looking objectively at the management and outside professional advisors of a
firm, and Enrons Board was not capable in this respect. This layer of corporate
governance, that is the board oversight function, should act as a final mechanism to
protect investors when other governance institutions have broken down. It should serve
to help avoid conflicts of interest, ensure auditing independence and accurate financial
reporting, oversee compensation practices, as well as many other breakdowns that
occurred within Enron. This last layer, however, failed to serve its purpose and was
compromised largely because of the relationships between Enron, management, and the
directors themselves.
While there clearly were incentives for inside directors of Enron to remain quiet
and accept without question the approaches taken by Enron management, perhaps the
alternative of a completely independent board of directors would not be as successful as
one might initially think. Chairman Greenspan (2002) argues that shackling [the CEO]
with an interventionist board may threaten Americas entrepreneurial business culture
by slowing down the CEO too much. Greenspan (2002) also suggests that having solely
independent directors would create competing power centers within a corporation, and
thus dilute coherent control and impair effective governance. It is also important to
have directors with relevant business and industry experience, some of whom may have
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
46/58
47
ties with the company he or she oversees, which can provide an important perspective on
issues that may arise in boardroom settings. Thus, while it is important for directors of
companies who are not members of management to maintain a certain degree of distance
from the company and management, eliminating all ties and having truly independent
directors might prove to actually hinder effective corporate functioning
V. POST-ENRON GOVERNANCE REFORMS AND OTHER PROPOSED
SOLUTIONS TO GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS
It would be incomplete to discuss the fall of Enron without briefly discussing the
legislative reforms and other proposed solutions to the issues relating to the principal-
agent problem and governance today. This section will highlight some of the key points
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and some potential costs associated with its implementation,
as well some other developments in corporate governance and other potential solutions to
solving the principal-agent problem.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
In response to both the collapse of Enron and the general influx of corporate
malfeasance recently in the U.S., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law on July 30, 2002.
Its federal securities provisions are the most far-reaching of any since those of the 1930s
under President Roosevelt and constitute substantial changes for corporate governance
and financial reporting. Many of these changes were instituted in direct response to the
case of Enron. While some of the provisions will require further resolution and
rulemaking, others have gone into effect ranging anywhere from one month to one year
-
8/7/2019 Enron-corporate governance
47/58
48
from the date of their enactment. Some of the key provisions of the Act are summarized
below.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act substantially affects the executive officers and directors
of public companies. It requires the certification of both CEO and CFO that they have
reviewed the financial report and that based on their knowledge the report accurately
represents the material respects of the companys financial position. It also bans personal
loans to exe