ennismore european smaller companies fund

Ennismore European Smaller Companies FundHigh Performance, Margin of Safety Investment

ENNISMORE FUND MANAGEMENT

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CONTENTS

3. Introduction4. Our Performance – The Track Record5. Our Performance – What, Why & How6. Long Term, Low Risk Approach7. Margin of Safety Philosophy8. Smaller Companies Focus9. Independent Idea Generation and Research10. Research in Action – Conergy11. Research in Action – Xing12. Fundraising Rationale & Details13. Summary14. Appendices

The Team – Geoff Oldfield, founder of Ennismore in 1998 and one of its 5 fund managers, has over 20 years of investment experience in European small caps

The Company – unchanged business model and investment approach, designed 12 years ago to invest in a small cap universe; two funds with the same investment strategy, hard closed since 2000

The Fund – UCITS III (fund AuM c. EUR 100m pre-roadshow) absolute return European small cap fund with an average return of more than 15% for more than 10 years – achieved with no leverage, ever

The Clients – a quarter of total AuM is in-house (18%) or family and friends’(7%) monies, with clients who have been invested with us for more than 10 years accounting for over 85% of the remaining AuM

The Roadshow – raising max EUR 70m to bring total AuM to c. EUR 230m leaves substantial room to grow through performance

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INTRODUCTION

Experienced team, consistent approach, long-term client base

Fund Nav % Change

HSBC Index % Change

MSCI Index % Change

Annualised 16.0 9.8 2.41999* to date 489.9 203.9 32.62010 18.4 21.9 6.82009 (1.6) 47.7 27.72008 (5.7) (36.8) (38.9)2007 9.1 3.1 6.02006 8.4 30.5 19.12005 30.4 32.6 24.92004 23.5 24.6 12.22003 29.3 48.8 19.82002 6.2 (19.8) (29.4)2001 1.5 (18.3) (16.4)2000 35.7 (3.2) (2.2)1999* 49.0 27.2 29.8*From inception on 27/1/99

-50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

350%

400%

450%

500%

550%

Ennismore European Smaller Companies FundReturn since inception: 27/01/1999 - 31/12/2010 (£)

Fund NAV, Source: Administrator, net income reinvested

HSBC JC EU+UK (£), Source: Bloomberg, Total Return

MSCI Europe 15 (Large Cap), Local currency, Source: Bloomberg, Total Return

4More than 15% a year, on average, for over 10 years

OUR PERFORMANCE – THE TRACK RECORD

Smaller companies focus

Less competition

Limit AuM / Fee structure

Margin of Safety philosophy

Proven investment strategy

In-house development of investors

Independent ideas and research

High conviction ideas / Avoid the herd

Bottom up research / Individual fund manager books

Long term, low risk approach

Take advantage of irrational market long and short

No external shareholders / Remuneration system

OUR PERFORMANCE – WHAT, WHY & HOW

5The same approach for over 10 years

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LONG TERM, LOW RISK APPROACH

We take a genuinely long term approach, both in investing and to our own business

The investment management company has no external shareholders so we don’t have to focus on short term profitability or maximising AuM

Fund managers’ remuneration has always been transparent, meritocratic and rewarded long-term performance; bonuses are subject to 3-year clawback

Our short positions are profit centres and we only short stocks directly, as opposedto index hedging. We have a long successful track record shorting which means wecan make money regardless of market returns

We have never used leverage and the Fund has low volatility as a result

Internal ownership allows complete focus on performance

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Our fund managers invest independently but share a common philosophy – margin of safety investing; put simply, this means buying a company for significantly below its intrinsic value

Cash is king – the generation and predictability of free cashflow is central to our analysis of intrinsic value, which is simply the net present value of estimated future cashflows. Over the long run cashflow cannot be manipulated by accounting

We only invest in industries and business models we really understand, where we can genuinely forecast future financial performance with some degree of certainty. When forecasting we believe that it’s better to be roughly right than precisely wrong

Detailed analysis of a company’s competitive position (Porter’s five forces) is key to determining how confident we can be in our forecasts

Ennismore investors are brought up in-house on the margin of safety approach; we will not hire in senior fund managers

MARGIN OF SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

The only proven investment strategy we understand

SMALLER COMPANIES FOCUS

We focus on smaller companies because they are a structurally inefficient niche in equity markets with enormous choice – our universe includes around 5,000 companies

On the sell side, commission levels are too low to fund high quality sell-side research; fees from M&A relationships are much more significant, creating a conflict of interest with independent research

On the buy side, many funds are too large to invest in smaller companies while the traditional investment management fee structure is insufficient to enable smaller funds to pay for detailed, stock specific research across such a large universe

Smaller companies are therefore often under researched by both the buy and sell sides which can lead to mispricing; this is our opportunity to generate premium returns from independent idea generation and in-house research

The fund size has been capped since 2000 to ensure we are always able to invest in the smaller end of the universe. The average fund manager book was only about EUR 32m pre-roadshow

8Smaller companies offer huge mispricings and enormous choice

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INDEPENDENT IDEA GENERATION & RESEARCH

Our core competencies are independent idea generation and research

Good sources of ideas include screens, meetings with management, other companies in the industry, trade shows and media; not broker recommendations

Much of our time is spent researching company and industry fundamentals with a focus on the quality of a business, which is reflected in its sustainable return on capital; we always meet with management and endeavour to validate the investment story with customers, suppliers and competitors

The accumulation of research combined with a long term approach allows us to wait for market valuations to become attractive – share prices change much more quickly than the value of most businesses. This approach allows us to take advantage of irrational markets, which tend to focus on the short run and alternate between extremes of greed and fear

Ennismore has specialised in smaller companies for over 10 years; on average our fund managers also have over 10 years experience individually in this asset class, with 8 of those spent at Ennismore

We find investment opportunities by working independently

Date initiated: March 2007 Price initiated: €20.7 Price at Dec 31: €0.50 Weighting: -1.7% Mkt Cap: EUR 200m Net Debt: EUR 269m

Source of Idea: We first looked at the company after meeting them at a trade show in 2005

Conergy is a German manufacturer and supplier of solar modules

Weak competitive position reflected in its inability to generate operating profits:High competition from other German and, more problematically, from lower cost (c. 20%), expansive Asian companiesCustomers are typically large utilities with strong bargaining powerBarrier to entry is only capital as product is commoditised and production machines are available “off the shelf”. Exit is likely to be delayed as long as cash is being generated

Operational risk:Low gross margins and a fixed cost base means capacity utilisation heavily influences bottom line profitabilityDemand is volatile, depending on dynamics in government subsidies. Pricing has trended steadily downwards over timeOverall environment for the industry is likely to deteriorate further over the coming years for inefficient producers (such as Conergy)Due to its old facility relative to many competitors and inability to invest, Conergy is finding it harder to competeFrequent management changes bode poorly with most recently the CEO designate’s contract not being renewed

Financial riskEUR 269m net debt, with leverage of over 240%. A significant proportion of this is to be converted to equity via a swapCompany’s accounts are not transparent and dissemination of information is poor with no public conference calls

Valuation risk:Expected to make an underlying operating loss this year versus EV of almost EUR 500m, no prospect of earnings improving going forwardWith a debt for equity swap and likely further equity issuance there is a high probability of significant dilution for shareholders

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is good, c.4 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excluding non-notified trading, which is material in some markets

RESEARCH IN ACTION – SHORT: CONERGY

10Fully focused on all risk aspects to find margin of safety stocks

Date initiated: March 2010 Price initiated: €28.5 Price at Dec 31: €36.35 Weighting: 5.8% Mkt Cap: EUR 190m Net Cash: EUR 56m

Source of Idea: We have followed the company since its IPO in 2006

Xing is a professional networking website focused on the German speaking DACH region of Europe

Strong competitive position reflected in high ROCE of more than 100% over the past 12 months:High entry barrier – network effect of existing users Little competition – Xing has 10-15 times as many page views as LinkedIn in GermanyNo key suppliersCustomer base is highly fragmented – over 700,000 paying subscribers despite free competitor, almost 10m members overallSubstitutes – traditional networking tools such as trade publications and events are more complementary, Facebook has similar functionality but users tend to separate professional and private lives

Operational risk:Cost base is largely fixed, demand highly predictable due to subscription modelGrowth in core DACH markets all organic

Financial riskEUR 56m net cash, management proposing ongoing share buybacks once reserves are available (late 2010)Working capital negative, deferred income trend positive (i.e. increasing percentage of quarterly sales)Capitalisation of R&D could be used for short term earnings manipulation, monitored closely by Ennismore for any warning signsAcquisitions overseas by previous management (founder) unsuccessful, unlikely to be repeated by current management

Valuation risk:Current rating of c.12.5x 2010 EV/EBIT (EUR 11m) is undemanding compared to profit growth; EBIT +44% in H1 10Earnings include losses of over EUR 2.5m from international (Spain, Turkey) operations that are likely to be discontinuedPeer LinkedIn is privately owned but recent secondary market transactions value the business at an enterprise value of over USD 2bn –this equates to about 9.5x forecast 2010 revenue and about EUR 24 per member; on the same multiples Xing would be valued at betweenEUR 231m and EUR 500m compared to its current EV of EUR 140m

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is low, c.130 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excluding non-notified trading, which is material in some marketsc.30% owned by German media group Hubert Burda Media, Ennismore in regular contact with them

RESEARCH IN ACTION – LONG: XING

11Fully focused on all risk aspects to find margin of safety stocks

12Further diversification of the client base with like-minded investors

The purpose of the fundraising is to diversify further our client base – the current top 5 investors should reduce to below 30% of the Fund’s AuM from 45% pre-roadshow

22% of the Fund’s AuM (25% of total AuM) is internal money or family and friends; investors accounting for more than 80% of the Fund’s external assets have been with us for more than 10 years

We are looking for new like-minded investors who are able to invest for the long-term and targeting new subscriptions of c. EUR 2-10m

Approximately half of new money can be invested in existing holdings and half will be in new positions - about 10-15 new investments, or 2-3 per fund manager

Fundraising will be a maximum of EUR 70m, followed by hard closure for a minimum of 12 months

FUNDRAISING RATIONALE & DETAILS

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Our business model is unchanged, making us confident future returns in our UCITS III Fund can match its c. 12 year track record of over 15% p.a. on average

Investment team of 5 fund managers has on average more than 10 years investment experience in smaller companies, 8 of those at Ennismore

Margin of Safety philosophy leads to attention on high return, low downside stocks – on ‘proper’ long term investing

Smaller companies is the area to find bargains – due to structural mispricing and the enormous choice on offer

Independent idea generation results in finding many significantly mispriced stocks and in-house, independent research gives conviction to our investment decisions

Raising max EUR 70m before once again hard closing, gives plenty of room to grow through performance

SUMMARY

High Performance, Margin of Safety Investment

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APPENDICES

15. Term Sheet16. Liquidity Management17. Illiquid Holding – Trader Media East18. Key Fund Statistics19. Top 5, sector, market cap and country exposures20. Annual Performance (GBP)21. Monthly Track Record (GBP)28. Annual Performance (EUR)29. Portfolio Risk Management30. Operational Risk Management31. Company Structure32. Biographies36. Company History37. Porter’s Five Forces38. Additional Research Examples

- 38. Sto- 39. Compugroup Medical- 40. Vitec- 41. Avanti Communications

42. Basis of Presentation43. Disclosures

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Fund Name Ennismore European Smaller Companies Fund

Description Absolute return – long/short – equity

Investment Style European small cap – long term – margin of safety

Minimum Investment GBP 5,000, subsequent GBP 1,000

Investment Mgmt Fees 2% annual mgmt fee; 20% performance fee on value added

Anti-dilution levy 2% on redemptions payable to the Fund

Dealing Daily

Currency Sterling and Euro share classes (Euro class launched 01/01/2011)

Custodian Northern Trust

Administrator Northern Trust

Auditor KPMG

Legal Advisors McCann Fitzgerald

Structure Sole sub-fund of Ennismore Smaller Companies plc, Irish regulated open-ended investment company

TERM SHEET

LIQUIDITY MANAGEMENT

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We have always managed the Fund with significant exposure to micro-caps alongside daily dealing

Even with significant net redemptions in 2008 and 2009 we met all cash calls and maintained three month liquidity at our target level of c. 75% assuming both Ennismore funds trade simultaneously

High average cash balance – historically over 15% – allows for flexibility in funding both investment opportunities and redemptions

Anti-dilution levy of 2% on redemptions paid by all investors (including internal) to the Fund covers costs of related dealing; benefits longer-term investors

22% of pre-roadshow Fund AuM was internal or family and friends monies, providing long-term capital

Fund liquidity as % NAV at 31st December 2010

Trading for: Fund only Both FundsCash 12.2 12.21 week 35.2 29.22 weeks 47.7 39.31 month 64.9 55.03 months 86.4 79.0

Assumes Ennismore trades at one third of average daily volume in prior 6 months excluding non- notified trades, which are material in some markets

Inception date: August 2006 Price at inception: $7.00 Price at Dec 31: $2.52 Weighing: 2.6% Mkt Cap: USD 125m Net Debt: USD 55m

Source of Idea: Meeting with John MacBain, founder of Trader Classified Media, which was the parent company of TME up until its IPO in February 2006

Trader Media East publishes classified advertising magazines and websites, primarily in Russia.

Liquidity risk:Listed Turkish newspaper publisher Hurriyet acquired two thirds majority control of TME in early 2007 for USD 10 per shareTrading has been limited due to the free float being tightly held by a small number of shareholders and, since April 2009, no trades have been reportedIn October 2009, following a recommendation by Ennismore, it was decided that the quoted market price of USD 4.40 no longer reflected a functioningmarket in the shares and instead determined to value the position at the lowest of:

Ennismore’s worst-case DCF valuation, currently USD 4.37 per sharePeer group multiple, currently USD 3.38 per shareReported net asset value (NAV), currently USD 2.524 per share

Classified advertising media are effectively local marketplaces for cars, property and other goods. The market leader tends to be highly dominant due to the need for liquidity which creates a powerful network effect – sellers want to advertise where most buyers are looking, buyers want to go where they can find the most choice. TME’s print business is a classic example but the company faces a challenge to successfully migrate its competitive position online over the next few years:Entry barriers – liquidity, particularly recognition with buyers; established print franchise allows them to attract users online without heavy marketingCompetition – in print TME is typically a local monopoly or has one significant competitor; online several startups are attempting to compete with themSuppliers – there are no materially significant suppliersCustomers – the customer base is highly fragmented, reflecting limited consolidation of car dealerships and estate agenciesSubstitutes – auction sites such as eBay provide a comparable market for low ticket items but are not suitable for the main categories, cars and property, where a buyer will almost always want to meet the seller and the see the goods before transacting (allowing them to cut out the middleman)

Operational risk:Clear leader in print, online leadership is up for grabs but progressing well e.g. over 200m page views for core Russian site irr.ru in September 2010 (+66% y-o-y) with online revenue growing at a similar rate despite overall revenues continuing to decline in H1 10

Financial riskBreached financial covenants in 2009 and refinanced its debt in H1 10; current financing expected to be sufficient as organic revenue growth is forecast inH2 10. Debt is long-term and is repayable in instalments through 2014. Net debt is currently at c. 2.5x EBITDA vs a target capital structure of 2x EBITDA

Valuation risk:Current profitability is depressed by the financial crisis (2009 EBITDA USD 21m, compares to 2004-2008 average of USD 60m), which severely restrictedloans for cars and property in particular, and by print to online migration; future level of ongoing profitability is hard to predict due to both cyclical andstructural driversFrench online peer Leboncoin.fr was acquired by listed Norwegian publisher Schibsted for EUR 400m in September 2010, a multiple of 22 times 2009revenue and c.11 times expected 2010 revenue

ILLIQUID HOLDING – TRADER MEDIA EAST

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KEY FUND STATISTICS

ENNISMORE EUROPEAN SMALLER COMPANIES FUNDKey statistics as at 31st December 2010

Max. redemption 4.4% 01/08/2008 Number of Longs 71Peak Fund AuM (GBP, m) 210 11/05/2006 Number of Shorts 34Peak Strategy AuM (GBP, m) 398 30/04/2006 Median Mkt Cap (Long, £m) 112High watermark £57.90 31/12/2010 Median Mkt Cap (Short, £m) 590Max. drawdown (month end NAV, peak-to-trough) -21.3% May 08-Apr 09Long Turnover (annualised) 39.9% FY 2010 Beta Adj. Net Exposure 30.5%Standard deviation (ann.) 13%Sharpe ratio (ann.) 1.3Gain standard deviation (ann.) 10%Loss standard deviation (ann.) 7%Avg Fund Return, neg index quarters -1.1% - Avg Index Return in neg quarters -8.1%Correlation 0.61Correlation (down markets) 0.55Beta 0.37Alpha (ann.) 12.4%

Attribution Average weighting Implied return Attribution Average

weighting Implied return

2010 18.4 27.5 85 32.4 -2.2 -30 7.1 99 1532009 -1.6 20.5 64 31.9 -19.0 -38 49.8 88 1532008 -5.7 -46.4 76 -61.1 40.7 -48 -85.7 147 2312007 9.1 2.8 83 3.3 8.7 -45 -19.4 179 3652006 8.4 17.0 74 22.9 -5.0 -24 20.8 178 3692005 30.4 45.4 84 53.8 -5.1 -15 34.0 170 3292004 23.5 34.2 88 38.7 -0.9 -13 6.9 129 2522003 29.3 36.1 59 61.0 -2.5 -8 31.3 99 1942002 6.2 -2.2 52 -4.3 7.3 -8 -91.3 69 1332001 1.5 -3.8 60 -6.3 5.1 -7 -72.9 64 1182000 35.7 76 -5 60 1081999 49.0 68 -1 35 39

Strategy AuM( GBP m)

Performance (%)

Long performance (%) Short performance (%)Fund Size( GBP m)

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TOP 5, SECTOR, MARKET CAP AND COUNTRY EXPOSURES

Exposure by Country, Market Cap and Sector as % of NAVCountry Gross% Net% Market Cap Gross% Net% Sector Gross% Net%Bermuda 1.7 -0.7 >£2bn 8.5 -1.9 Construction 16.8 16.7Denmark 2.1 2.1 £700m - £2bn 10.5 -3.1 Consumer 12.2 3.1France 3.6 -1.3 £200m - £700m 47.9 19.7 Energy 4.0 -1.3Germany 33.4 21.9 <£200m 51.2 41.2 Financial 3.6 0.9Ireland 4.1 4.1 Food 2.0 -0.3Isle Of Man 1.0 1.0 Industrials 14.2 6.2Italy 8.4 7.0 Leisure 4.2 -2.6Jersey 4.7 2.9 Materials 1.7 0.1Netherlands 3.0 3.0 Media 17.4 13.3Spain 2.0 -2.0 Property 6.8 6.8Sweden 1.5 -0.1 Services 8.4 4.1Switzerland 4.4 0.2 Technology 20.0 9.2UK 39.6 18.0 Telecoms 4.5 -2.6US 6.8 -2.0 Transport 1.9 1.9Other 1.8 1.8 Other 0.4 0.4

Longs % Shorts % Gross Exposure % Net Exposure %87.0 31.1 118.1 55.9

Gross and Net Exposures as % NAV

Company Country Sector % of NAV1 Sto Germany Construction 9.32 Xing Germany Technology 5.73 Buzzi Unicem Italy Construction 3.74 Kentz Corp United Kingdom Industrials 3.15 LSL Property Services United Kingdom Property 2.9

24.7

Top Five Long Holdings as at 31 December 2010

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE (GBP)

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ENNISMORE EUROPEAN SMALLER COMPANIES FUNDAnnual performance from inception to 31 December 2010 (GBP)

Fund NAV% Change

HSBC Index% Change

Fund Relative to HSBC Index

MSCI Index% Change

Fund Relative to MSCI Index

Micropal Ranking Large & Small Cap

Micropal Ranking Small Cap Only

Annualised 16.0 9.8 6.3 2.4 13.7

1999 to date 489.9 203.9 286.0 32.6 457.4 2/441 1/71

2010 18.4 21.9 -3.4 6.8 11.6 418/2871 257/369

2009 -1.6 47.7 -49.4 27.7 -29.3 2365/2394 417/419

2008 -5.7 -36.8 31.1 -38.9 33.3 47/2078 3/323

2007 9.1 3.1 6.0 6.0 3.1 614/1177 63/240

2006 8.4 30.5 -22.1 19.1 -10.7 1630/1695 299/307

2005 30.4 32.6 -2.2 24.9 5.5 106/1244 105/278

2004 23.5 24.6 -1.1 12.2 11.3 66/1310 69/260

2003 29.3 48.8 -19.5 19.8 9.5 254/1168 206/235

2002 6.2 -19.8 26.0 -29.4 35.6 11/1258 2/211

2001 1.5 -18.3 19.8 -16.4 17.9 10/1130 1/164

2000 35.7 -3.2 38.9 -2.2 37.8 4/885 1/124

1999 49.0 27.2 21.8 29.8 19.2 52/687 40/87

TRACK RECORD AND EXPOSURE LEVELS (GBP)

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change

MSCI Index % Change % Longs % Shorts

% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

1999 to date 57.90 489.9 203.9 32.6 72 21 93 512010 57.90 18.4 21.9 6.8 83 32 115 512009 48.89 (1.6) 47.7 27.7 64 38 102 262008 49.69 (5.7) (36.8) (38.9) 76 48 124 282007 52.67 9.1 3.1 6.0 83 45 128 392006 48.28 8.4 30.5 19.1 74 24 98 512005 44.54 30.4 32.6 24.9 84 15 99 702004 34.15 23.5 24.6 12.2 88 13 101 752003 27.65 29.3 48.8 19.8 59 7 67 522002 21.49 6.2 (19.8) (29.4) 52 8 59 442001 20.52 1.5 (18.3) (16.4) 60 11 72 492000 20.21 35.7 (3.2) (2.2) 76 5 80 711999 14.90 49.0 27.2 29.8 68 1 70 67

December 2010 57.90 6.0 12.7 5.5 87 31 118 56November 2010 54.64 (0.4) (4.7) (3.3) 91 35 126 56

October 2010 54.87 2.3 3.6 3.0 90 35 124 55September 2010 53.63 3.4 10.4 5.3 85 37 122 47

August 2010 51.85 (1.5) (2.0) (2.2) 82 31 113 51July 2010 52.63 2.4 6.7 5.9 83 31 115 52June 2010 51.39 (0.3) (3.6) (2.5) 81 29 109 52May 2010 51.52 (1.6) (9.4) (5.8) 79 27 106 52

April 2010 52.36 1.0 (0.4) (1.8) 78 32 109 46March 2010 51.84 2.0 7.9 6.9 79 34 114 45

February 2010 50.82 3.0 1.2 0.7 80 31 110 49January 2010 49.32 0.9 (0.1) (3.8) 80 29 110 51

December 2009 48.89 (0.9) 2.3 4.9 83 30 112 53November 2009 49.31 2.0 1.4 1.9 80 29 109 51

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change


% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

October 2009 48.33 (1.1) (4.5) (2.7) 80 30 110 49September 2009 48.89 7.0 8.3 3.3 69 30 99 39

August 2009 45.69 4.5 14.2 6.5 67 30 98 37July 2009 43.74 0.3 6.9 9.2 66 34 100 31June 2009 43.63 (2.5) (2.6) (1.9) 58 40 98 18May 2009 44.77 4.0 4.5 4.4 56 41 97 15

April 2009 43.06 (6.5) 19.1 12.8 59 57 117 2March 2009 46.06 (2.1) 7.3 3.7 51 48 99 3

February 2009 47.07 (1.6) (7.2) (9.1) 50 42 93 8January 2009 47.85 (3.7) (6.5) (6.1) 52 44 96 7

December 2008 49.69 7.5 12.7 0.7 55 44 99 12November 2008 46.24 2.1 (4.1) (4.7) 57 45 101 12

October 2008 45.29 (7.6) (20.1) (13.5) 60 49 110 11September 2008 49.00 (8.5) (17.4) (11.8) 69 40 109 28

August 2008 53.53 1.5 6.1 2.5 80 50 130 30July 2008 52.76 (0.2) (4.6) (1.9) 76 43 120 33June 2008 52.84 (2.9) (9.6) (9.8) 76 47 124 29May 2008 54.44 (0.5) 1.3 0.6 83 52 135 30

April 2008 54.71 1.8 1.3 6.2 85 52 137 33March 2008 53.74 0.1 1.3 (2.5) 85 50 134 35

February 2008 53.70 3.4 4.7 (0.3) 82 46 128 36January 2008 51.93 (1.4) (11.0) (11.4) 89 50 139 39

December 2007 52.67 3.4 0.4 (0.5) 91 50 141 41November 2007 50.96 (0.9) (6.9) (3.8) 87 49 136 38

October 2007 51.43 (0.3) 3.8 2.9 89 55 144 33September 2007 51.61 1.4 (0.2) 1.7 89 52 141 37

August 2007 50.89 (1.5) (3.0) (0.5) 86 50 136 37

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change


% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

July 2007 51.66 0.5 (1.6) (3.5) 82 39 121 43June 2007 51.39 1.5 (3.3) (0.7) 84 40 125 44May 2007 50.64 0.5 2.5 3.2 78 36 114 42

April 2007 50.41 2.9 4.2 4.1 80 40 120 40March 2007 48.99 2.4 5.2 3.2 80 41 122 39

February 2007 47.85 1.3 0.7 (1.4) 80 43 123 37January 2007 47.23 (2.2) 2.0 1.6 77 42 119 35

December 2006 48.28 1.7 5.7 3.9 77 41 118 36November 2006 47.49 1.0 3.0 (0.1) 73 41 114 32

October 2006 47.01 1.4 3.4 3.0 66 37 103 29September 2006 46.35 (0.8) 3.6 2.3 62 38 99 24

August 2006 46.72 (1.4) 1.3 2.4 60 32 91 28July 2006 47.40 (0.7) (1.3) 1.3 58 14 72 43June 2006 47.72 (4.0) (0.1) 1.1 65 16 81 50May 2006 49.73 (3.9) (6.6) (5.0) 80 13 93 67

April 2006 51.73 4.2 1.7 0.6 80 12 93 68March 2006 49.66 4.8 6.4 3.3 91 14 105 78

February 2006 47.40 2.3 4.4 1.9 85 15 100 70January 2006 46.34 4.0 6.1 3.2 85 16 101 69

December 2005 44.54 4.9 5.1 3.8 84 18 102 66November 2005 42.48 2.5 5.0 3.6 76 18 94 58

October 2005 41.43 (5.2) (5.4) (2.8) 77 17 94 60September 2005 43.70 3.3 5.1 4.4 87 13 99 74

August 2005 42.29 3.2 0.4 (0.2) 86 13 99 73July 2005 40.98 6.6 7.4 4.1 85 13 97 72June 2005 38.43 4.7 3.9 3.5 83 13 96 70May 2005 36.71 2.1 6.0 5.0 85 15 100 71

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change


% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

April 2005 35.97 (2.4) (4.1) (2.6) 85 15 99 70March 2005 36.86 0.4 (1.4) (0.4) 85 15 100 70



October 2004 31.84 1.9 2.6 1.4 87 15 102 73September 2004 31.25 1.7 4.3 2.4 95 13 109 82

August 2004 30.74 1.5 0.8 (0.2) 87 13 100 74July 2004 30.28 (0.9) (3.4) (2.1) 84 13 97 71June 2004 30.56 4.6 4.5 2.0 88 14 102 74May 2004 29.22 (1.5) (2.4) (1.0) 87 14 101 73

April 2004 29.66 2.1 2.3 2.0 93 14 108 79March 2004 29.06 (0.5) (1.7) (2.3) 93 11 105 82



October 2003 26.08 0.9 5.3 6.1 78 18 95 60September 2003 25.84 2.2 (0.8) (3.5) 73 18 91 55

August 2003 25.30 1.5 5.5 1.9 71 19 89 52July 2003 24.93 3.3 7.4 4.3 61 15 76 46June 2003 24.14 0.0 1.9 2.4 55 0 55 55May 2003 24.13 4.7 9.1 2.3 50 0 50 50

April 2003 23.05 4.9 13.2 11.7 49 0 49 49March 2003 21.98 1.4 (0.9) (2.2) 46 0 46 46

February 2003 21.67 2.8 0.8 (2.0) 41 0 41 41

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change


% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

January 2003 21.18 (1.5) (4.7) (6.6) 40 0 40 40December 2002 21.49 (0.5) (4.3) (8.1) 41 0 41 41November 2002 21.61 2.5 6.7 4.9 43 5 48 39

October 2002 21.08 3.3 4.6 9.8 48 5 53 44September 2002 20.41 (4.1) (13.5) (14.2) 45 7 52 38

August 2002 21.28 0.6 (1.0) 0.5 47 8 55 40July 2002 21.16 (5.3) (11.0) (11.6) 50 10 59 40June 2002 22.34 (1.0) (8.4) (8.1) 55 8 63 46May 2002 22.56 2.7 1.3 (2.8) 57 10 67 46

April 2002 21.96 1.5 0.4 (3.6) 58 11 69 47March 2002 21.63 3.2 5.7 4.5 56 12 68 44

February 2002 20.95 2.2 (1.5) (0.4) 55 9 64 46January 2002 20.78 1.3 1.5 (2.2) 57 10 67 47

December 2001 20.52 2.8 (0.7) 2.2 59 8 67 51November 2001 19.96 2.7 11.0 5.1 57 8 65 49

October 2001 19.44 0.9 8.2 4.3 53 12 65 41September 2001 19.27 (4.6) (17.6) (10.7) 46 19 65 27

August 2001 20.20 1.8 (2.2) (5.5) 54 16 70 38July 2001 19.83 0.4 (2.3) (2.4) 54 12 66 42June 2001 19.76 (0.7) (6.5) (3.4) 57 12 69 45May 2001 19.90 1.4 (1.9) (1.8) 61 14 75 47

April 2001 19.63 2.2 4.1 6.8 61 12 73 49March 2001 19.21 (7.8) (8.8) (4.5) 64 11 74 53

February 2001 20.84 0.7 (4.4) (7.6) 72 10 82 61January 2001 20.69 2.4 4.7 1.4 73 8 81 64

December 2000 20.21 3.2 1.5 (0.1) 75 7 82 68November 2000 19.58 2.6 (4.3) (5.0) 75 7 82 68

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Fund NAV GBP

Fund NAV % Change

HSBC Index % Change


% Gross Exposure

% Net Exposure

October 2000 19.09 (3.0) (4.0) 2.5 77 6 83 71September 2000 19.68 (2.5) (5.7) (4.8) 76 7 83 69

August 2000 20.19 0.1 4.0 2.6 75 7 82 68July 2000 20.18 1.0 (0.1) 1.1 74 6 80 68June 2000 19.98 1.8 1.5 (0.6) 73 6 79 67May 2000 19.62 2.5 2.1 (0.4) 72 3 75 69

April 2000 19.15 (4.6) (4.6) (0.6) 75 3 78 72March 2000 20.06 (0.3) (1.9) 2.4 78 2 80 76

February 2000 20.11 20.7 8.7 7.1 74 2 76 72January 2000 16.66 11.8 0.4 (5.7) 81 3 84 78


October 1999 12.10 2.6 (0.3) 4.6 73 4 77 69September 1999 11.79 (1.8) (2.4) (2.2) 72 4 76 68

August 1999 12.01 1.4 4.5 2.2 80 2 82 78July 1999 11.85 4.6 1.3 (2.5) 80 1 81 79June 1999 11.33 3.3 2.4 3.1 80 1 81 79May 1999 10.97 1.4 (0.9) (3.6) 81 0 81 81

April 1999 10.82 6.6 5.0 4.6 68 0 68 68March 1999 10.15 0.8 0.2 2.1 50 0 50 50

February 1999 10.07 1.0 3.2 0.4 24 0 24 24January 1999 9.97 (0.3) 0.0 1.6 0 0 0 0

ANNUAL PERFORMANCE (EUR)

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ENNISMORE EUROPEAN SMALLER COMPANIES FUNDAnnual performance from inception to 31 December 2010 (EUR)

Fund Nav % Change

HSBC Index% Change

Fund Relative to HSBC Index

MSCI Index% Change

Fund Relative to MSCI Index

Micropal Ranking Large & Small Cap

Micropal Ranking Small Cap Only

Annualised 14.1 7.8 6.2 2.4 11.7

1999 to date 379.8 146.2 233.6 32.6 347.2 2/441 1/71

2010 22.8 25.9 -3.1 6.8 16.0 418/2871 257/369

2009 7.1 59.7 -52.7 27.7 -20.6 2365/2394 417/419

2008 -28.3 -51.5 23.1 -38.9 10.6 47/2078 3/323

2007 0.1 -5.5 5.6 6.0 -6.0 614/1177 63/240

2006 10.6 33.2 -22.7 19.1 -8.5 1630/1695 299/307

2005 34.4 36.3 -1.9 24.9 9.4 106/1244 105/278

2004 22.9 24.4 -1.5 12.2 10.7 66/1310 69/260

2003 19.6 37.5 -17.9 19.8 -0.2 254/1168 206/235

2002 -0.3 -24.7 24.4 -29.4 29.0 11/1258 2/211

2001 5.3 -15.6 20.9 -16.4 21.7 10/1130 1/164

2000 34.3 -4.7 39.0 -2.2 36.5 4/885 1/124

1999 65.2 42.1 23.1 29.8 35.4 52/687 40/87

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Geoff Oldfield, as CIO, retains veto on all investments

ConcentrationNo individual long position > 5% NAV at purchase or > 10% at value, No short > 3% NAV at sale or > 4% NAV at value

ExposureFund manager exposure limits:

Gross exposure maximum of 150%

Net exposure maximum of 75%, minimum of 0%

Historic fund exposure:Average gross exposure of 90%

Average net exposure of 52%

LiquidityFund manager liquidity limits:

75% of NAV to be convertible to cash within 3 months

PORTFOLIO RISK MANAGEMENT

Experienced support team – separate from investment management decision making (e.g. centralised dealing desk), managing UCITS fund since 1999

Compliance – Compliance Officer (“CO”) with over 13 years’ experience as a CO in UK regulated financial services firms

Robust internal controls & procedures – no complex instruments traded

Portfolio pricing – performed independently by external Administrator

Service providers – all top tier firms

Corporate governance – the Fund has a highly experienced, independent Board of Directors including Chairman Nick Durlacher, ex SFA Chairman and UK Takeover Panellist

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

30

Support Team

Chief Operating Officer:Andrew Blair

Operations Manager:Eleanor Scott

Fund Administrator:Danielle Etkin

IT / Dealer:Stewart Lim

PA / Reception:Dalia Nasser

Geoff Oldfield

CEO / CIOFund Manager

Christian Fiesser

Fund Manager

Leo Perry

Fund Manager

Simon Reid

Fund Manager

Tom Hearn

Fund Manager

Investment Team

COMPANY STRUCTURE

31

32

Geoff Oldfield

Fund Manager – London

Investment Experience – 20 years

Geoff is a founder director ofEnnismore. He joined BaringAsset Management in 1995 wherehe was responsible for Europeansmaller companies. Prior to thishe worked at Enskilda Securitiesin Frankfurt researching andmarketing German smallercompanies and as a Europeaninvestment manager at Gartmoreand Midland Montagu.

Geoff graduated fromLoughborough University with adegree in Banking & Finance. Heis a CFA charterholder and anAssociate of the CharteredInstitute of Bankers.

FUND MANAGER BIOGRAPHIES

Tom Hearn



Tom joined Ennismore inSeptember 2003. He hadpreviously worked as an analyston the European equities team atBaring Asset Management, whichhe joined as a graduate trainee in1998, focusing on small caps andthe banking sector.

Tom graduated from theUniversity of Manchester with adegree in Economics and SocialStudies. He is a CFAcharterholder.

Leo Perry



Leo joined Ennismore in October2001. He holds an MA inContemporary History andPolitics and a PostgraduateCertificate in Economics fromBirkbeck College, University ofLondon.

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Simon Reid



Simon joined Ennismore in January2003. He holds an MSc inMathematical Physics from theUniversity of Nottingham. He is aCFA charterholder.

FUND MANAGER BIOGRAPHIES (cont’d)

Christian Fiesser

Fund Manager – Frankfurt


Christian joined Ennismore in May2007. He started his investmentcareer in 2001 at Weisenhorn &Partner in Frankfurt where he wasresponsible for covering smallercompanies.

Christian holds a Diploma inInternational Studies of Financeand Law from Frankfurt Universityof Applied Science.

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Andrew Blair

Chief Operating Officer – London

Andrew joined Ennismore FundManagement in May 2004 as ChiefOperating Officer. Andrew startedhis career with Price Waterhouse in1985 where he qualified as aChartered Accountant. After 7years he moved to Cal Futures Ltd,a derivatives broker fund manager.The business was acquired byUnion PLC where he becameGroup Finance Director.Subsequently Andrew worked fortapX as COO. He holds a BA inAccountancy Studies from ExeterUniversity.

SUPPORT TEAM BIOGRAPHIES

Eleanor Scott

Operations Manager – London

Ellie joined Ennismore in October2003 and worked in the supportoffice before progressing onto thedealing desk in May 2005. Shegraduated from the University ofBristol in June 2003 with a BA inFrench & Spanish and speaks bothlanguages fluently. Ellie is a CFAcharterholder

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SUPPORT TEAM BIOGRAPHIES (cont’d)

Stewart Lim

Dealer / IT – London

Stewart joined Ennismore inOctober 2007 having graduatedwith an MSc in FinancialEconomics from the University ofOxford Said Business School.

Stewart also holds a BSc inBiochemistry from the Universityof the Philippines College of Artsand Sciences. He has passed theCFA Level III examination.

Danielle Etkin

Fund Administrator – London

Danielle joined Ennismore inJune 2005 as a FundAdministrator. Prior to this shehad gained 7 years experience insupport office work including themanagement of back officeoperations for a Private WealthManagement company. Danielleholds a Bachelor of CommerceDegree from University ofWitwatersrand, South Africa anda Post Graduate Degree inBusiness Management from theUniversity of South Africa.

Dalia Nasser

PA / Reception – London

Dalia joined Ennismore inOctober 2010.

Prior to this she spent 6 years as aPA at a property developmentcompany and 2 years as arecruitment consultant workingacross a number of sectors. Daliastudied Business Management atthe American University ofBeirut and speaks fluent Arabic.

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Ennismore was founded in 1998 by Geoff Oldfield and Gerhard Schöningh who having previously managed European equity funds together at Barings

The two funds (the Ennismore European Smaller Companies Fund and Ennismore European Smaller Companies Hedge Fund) were launched on 27th January 1999, raising EUR 14m and EUR 3m respectively. No managed segregated accounts were accepted

In 2000 the funds were closed to new investment (the maximum number of shares in issue was capped) with EUR 96m and EUR 64m under management respectively

In 2003 the funds reopened for EUR 12m and EUR 18m of new investment respectively and were immediately closed again

In 2006 Geoff bought Gerhard’s stake in the investment management company, becoming the sole owner

In 2008 a five year LTIP was launched for senior personnel

COMPANY HISTORY

37

BARRIERS TO ENTRY

Economies of Scale Absolute cost advantagesProprietary product differences - Proprietary learning curveBrand identity - Access to necessary inputsSwitching costs - Proprietary low-cost product designCapital requirements Access to distributionGovernment Policy Expected retaliation

SUPPLIERS

Differentiation of inputsSwitching costsSubstitute inputsSupplier concentration vs Industry ConcentrationImportance to supplierCost relative to total industry purchasesImpact of inputs on cost or differentiationThreat of forward integration vs backward integration

INDUSTRY COMPETITION

Industry growth Fixed (or storage) costs/value addedIntermittent overcapacity Product differencesBrand identity Switching costsConcentration and balance Informational complexityDiversity of competitors Corporate stakes / prideExit barriers

CUSTOMERS

Level of substitute products Price/total value of purchasesBuyer volume Brand identitySwitching costs Impact on quality / performanceBuyer information Buyer profitsAbility to backward integrate Decisions makers incentivesProduct differencesCustomer Concentration vs Industry Concentration

SUBSTITUTES

Suitability / availability of substitutesRelative price performance of substitutesSwitching costsBuyer propensity to switch

COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS: PORTER’S FIVE FORCES

Threat ofnew entrants

BargainingPower

BargainingPower

Risk ofSubstitutes

Date initiated: August 2004 Price initiated: €15 Price at Dec 31: €94.66 Weighting: 9.4% Mkt Cap: EUR 610m Net Cash: EUR 43m

Source of Idea: Followed company since the late 1990s, investment triggered by change in CFO and subsequent meetings

Sto is a leading manufacturer and distributor of façade insulation systems based in Germany

Strong competitive position reflected in its ability to generate superior profits even in a recessionary environment:High brand awareness built over many decades; hard to duplicate. Most trusted brand in insulation systems among decision makersEarly focus on its core competence façade insulation systems – a growing market supported by strong long term drivers: higher energy costs, reduction of CO2 emissionsDirect distribution secures access to a fragmented customer baseSuppliers sell commodity-like products with little differentiation and low switching costsSubstitutes – high emphasis on R&D secures position of innovation leader

Operational risk:Cost base is largely fixed with high value addedStrong record of growing business organically across many markets. Acquisitions only an option if priced very reasonablyMajority owned by the founding family – high risk awareness built-in

Financial riskFocus on free cash generation and strong ability to finance future growthWe expect a net cash balance of more than EUR 100m at year end, giving independence from external financingTradition of very conservative accounting and guidance

Valuation risk:Undemanding valuation of just 6x EV/EBIT and unlevered free cash flow yield of 10% based on 2010.Ability to show superior margins even in the recession year of 2009No brokerage coverage is keeping valuation lowDividend yield of 2.5% is covered more than 3x net income

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is low, c. 197 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excluding non-notified trading, which is material in some marketsImproving due to increasing awareness amongst investors

RESEARCH IN ACTION – LONG: STO

38

Date initiated: May 2009 Price initiated: €4.25 Price at Dec 31: €11.06 Weighting: 1.0% Mkt Cap: EUR 590m Net Debt: EUR 113m

Source of Idea: Followed the stock from IPO in 2007. Investment triggered by meeting with new CFO when hype had died down

Compugroup Medical is a leading e-health company in Europe providing workflow software solutions to healthcare providers

Strong competitive position reflected by its consistent strong cash flow generationHigh entry barrier in core market of ambulant information systems. In most EU markets Compugroup has at least 50% market shareThe customer base is very fragmented consisting of dentists and doctors with little bargaining power and no purchasing organisationsHigh switching costs reflected by very low churn rate. Compugroup tends to only lose customers when they retire or close their practiceDue to the direct access to doctors and dentists Compugroup can use their network to market to pharma and generic companies, and to healthcare insurance companies – the bigger Compugroup’s share in a market the more attractive it is for marketingNo key suppliers or obvious substitutes but Compugroup is dependent on the healthcare structure of local markets. Major structural shifts initiated by governments could impact their business

Operational risk:Cost base is largely fixed and the demand is highly predictable due to the significant monthly maintenance revenuesCapitalisation of R&D could be used for short term earnings manipulation, monitored closely by Ennismore for any warning signsGrowth is driven both organically and through acquisitions of mostly privately held small software vendors – Compugroup have beenprepared to pay up to 10x EV/EBITDA to build dominant market positionMajority owned by the founder – driving force for future development

Financial riskFocus of free cash generation – strong ability to finance future growthCapitalisation of R&D can be used for short term earnings manipulation, monitored closely by Ennismore for any warning signsNet debt of 113m well covered by cash earnings of €50m

Valuation risk:Valuation is very reasonable at c. 9x 2011 EV/EBITA when compared to growth prospects in the e-healthcare market. Governmentsrealise that they can save on healthcare spending when implementing software solutionsDividend yield of 2.4% is covered more than 3x by cash earnings

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is moderate, c. 28 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excludingnon-notified trading, which is material in some markets

RESEARCH IN ACTION – LONG: COMPUGROUP MEDICAL

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Date initiated: April 2009 Price initiated: £2.00 Price at Dec 31: £5.85 Weighting: 2.4% Mkt Cap: GBP 250m Net Debt: GBP 30m

Source of Idea: Meetings with other participants in the broadcast industry

Vitec is an equipment supplier for the global broadcast and photography markets

Strong competitive position driven by scale and brand strength:Entry barriers – high due to dominant position (40-80% share) in niche markets and internal distribution networkCompetition – limited competition due to small size of markets, particularly at the high end where Vitec is typically the de-facto solutionSuppliers – no material external suppliers; key inputs are labour and raw materials / componentsCustomers – product is typically mission-critical for customers, giving limited price pressure and a reluctance to switch to new brandsSubstitutes – no risk of substitute for core products – camera tripods, bags, etc

Operational risk:Cost base is relatively fixed with 40% gross margins bringing substantial operating leveragePrompt management action in 2009 allowed the business to report a profit despite a 30% plus decline in the broadcast marketsNew management team are refocusing the business on its core abilities, improving R&D efficiency with no cost increase. All our research backs up the idea that this is an exceptional business and we expect it to show in improved financials over timeHistorically built by acquisition but activity has been limited in recent years and management have divested some non-core operations

Financial riskBalance sheet has limited net debt of c. 1x EBITDACashflow generation is strong with net debt falling in 2009 and H1 10 despite weak broadcast markets and dividend paymentsManagement focus on cost efficiency and disposing of under-performing assets should bring further benefits going forwards

Valuation risk:Currently trading on approximately 10x 2010 EV/EBIT, with profit still depressed by the weak broadcast marketsFuture earnings growth driven by entry into adjacent product markets, ongoing market recovery and renewed focus on core activitiesEntry into Military and Government markets has been a tremendous success with Vitec’s products having won a majority of tenders, including a major FBI contract that is likely to drive significant future salesStock is starting to come to the attention of brokers and the markets, giving potential for re-rating

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is moderate, c. 40 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excluding non-notified trading, which is material in some marketsImproving due to increasing awareness amongst investors

RESEARCH IN ACTION – LONG: VITEC

40

Date initiated: April 2010 Price initiated: £4.75 Price at Dec 31: £6.78 Weighting: -2.7% Mkt Cap: GBP 575m Net Debt: GBP 20m

Source of Idea: Private call with key competitor

Avanti Communications is a startup telco network planning to wholesale broadband via satellite in Europe

High risk strategy as new entrant in market with large, well-financed incumbents:Entry barriers – high as requires access to limited supply of orbital slotsCompetition – incumbent European operator launching at the same time with much larger, more efficient capacitySuppliers – required US / French trade body financing for second satelliteCustomers – unproven demand, 3.6 Mbps offer already offered by competitor with limited take upSubstitutes – fixed line and mobile broadband networks are likely to increase coverage gradually reducing the size of the target market for satellite broadband

Operational risk:Cost base is largely upfront capex, demand is unprovenFirst satellite launched in late November 2010, almost 2 years after date planned at IPOLarge competitor has more efficient capacity and will therefore be the price setter in Europe

Financial riskSatellite construction requires heavy debt burden prior to product launchAvanti has required additional equity funding 4 times since IPO in 2007, most recently to pay down debt with restrictive covenants

Valuation risk:Current market cap of GBP 575m, net debt at launch of first two satellites (2010, 2012) likely to be >GBP 150mFuture earnings are highly uncertain, contracts signed to date imply revenue levels significantly below broker forecastsSignificant recent insider sellingUS peer WildBlue acquired for EV of USD 500m in 2009; WildBlue’s 2 satellites have only about 80% as much capacity as Avanti’s 2satellites currently under construction but they are already in orbit with c.400,000 paying customers (of which about 40% are their ownretail customers)

Liquidity risk:Liquidity is good, c. 10 trading days to liquidate position assuming Ennismore funds trade one-third of daily volume and excluding non-notified trading, which is material in some markets

RESEARCH IN ACTION – SHORT:AVANTI COMMUNICATIONS

41

42

BASIS OF PRESENTATIONPERFORMANCEPerformance for 1999 is stated from inception on 27.01.1999.All performance statistics are based on month end data and are net of fees.All figures are for the Ennismore European Smaller Companies Fund. NAV is provided by the Administrator.NAV is stated excluding Fund dividends paid in 2002 and 2003. For performance purposes it’s assumed the dividend is reinvested.All references to the HSBC index relate to the HSBC Smaller European Total Return index (pan EU smallcap), and are converted to GBP.All references to the MSCI Europe index relate to the MSCI Europe 15 index and are based on total return.All index data is sourced from Bloomberg.Micropal rankings are from Standard & Poors, Pan European Funds to 31.12.2010.

KEY STATISTICSPeak AUM is the total NAV of the fund as reported by the Administrator.Standard deviation figures are annualised using month-end data points and exclude the period from 27th Jan – 31st Jan 1999.Sharpe ratio excludes the period from 27th Jan – 31st Jan 1999.Average return in negative index quarters refers to the average return in the Fund during those quarters where the HSBC index declined.Correlation refers to the correlation of monthly Fund returns with monthly returns in the HSBC index.Correlation in down markets refers to the correlation of quarterly Fund returns with quarterly returns in the HSBC index during those quarterswhere the HSBC index declined.Beta is calculated as: (annualised std dev of monthly Fund returns / annualised std dev of monthly HSBC index returns) * correlation to index.Alpha is calculated as: fund return – (fund beta * HSBC index return).Turnover for the long book is calculated as: the lower of long purchases or long sales / average Fund NAV.Stock Betas for calculating Beta adjusted exposure are taken from Bloomberg. Where Bloomberg data doesn’t exist, a Beta of 1 is used.Implied return for long and short books is calculated by taking the attribution and dividing by the average weighting of the book as a % of the fund. As such, the figure relates to the return from a long investment in the underlying stocks.

LIQUIDITY DATASourced from Ennismore Fund Management and calculated using trading volume data from Bloomberg.Stated % NAV convertible to cash includes current net cash balance and relates to liquidation of the long book.Assumes all funds managed by Ennismore Fund Management trade simultaneously at one third of average daily volume in prior 6 months.

EXPOSURE DATAGeographic exposure analysis related to country of incorporation or listing and may not represent the underlying economic exposure.All references to short exposure are based on total exposure to the underlying security.Historic fund exposure data is sourced from Ennismore Fund Management.

43

The content of this document is subject to copyright owned by Ennismore Fund Management Limited (“EFML”). You may print or downloadthis document for your personal use and information only but this document may not (in part or in whole) be reproduced or transmitted forany other purpose. This document is for information purposes only and is not an offer to buy or sell shares in Ennismore European SmallerCompanies Fund. Past performance of a fund is no guarantee as to its future performance. The value of investments can decrease as well asincrease. This presentation should be read in conjunction with the full text and definitions section of the Prospectus dated 4 January 2011 asamended.

Although EFML makes reasonable efforts to obtain reliable content from the companies in which we invest and from third parties, we do notguarantee the accuracy of the information provided to us or of our opinions. The factual information contained in this document may becomeinaccurate as a result of the passage of time and should therefore be read for historical information only. Future expectations are the opinionsof EFML only, based on information provided to us. No guarantee can be given as to the accuracy of the data and information we have usedand on which we have undertaken our investment analysis. Content in this document is not an invitation or inducement to engage ininvestment activity and is not appropriate for the purposes of making a decision to carry out a transaction or trade in any of the companiesmentioned in this document. We hereby disclose that we may hold positions in the companies discussed in this report and we are thus subjectto conflicts of interest in respect of these companies. The analysis presented on these companies has not been prepared in accordance withlegal requirements regarding the independence of investment research.

This document is issued by Ennismore Fund Management Limited which is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.

Issued: 19 January 2011

DISCLOSURES

Ennismore Fund Management Limited, Kensington Cloisters, 5 Kensington Church Street, London, W8 4LDRegistered in England and Wales No. 3598371 Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority

ennismore european smaller companies fund

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