The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 2 | Issue 3 | Article ID 1869 | Mar 01, 2004

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Ending the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Task Force on U.S. Korea Policy

Ending the North Korean NuclearCrisis

A Proposal by the Task Force on U.S. KoreaPolicy, Selig S. Harrison, Chairman

Cosponsored by The Center for InternationalPolicyThe Center for East Asian Studies, University ofChicagoThis report represents the consensus of theTask Force members. All members do notnecessarily endorse all aspects of this report.Members participated in their personalcapacities, not as representatives of theirorganizations.

ForewordOn March 1, 2003, the Task Force on U.S.Korea Policy published a detailed, 32-pagereport that analyzed recent developments inboth North Korea and South Korea anddiscussed U.S. policy options in the Koreanpeninsula against the background of broaderU.S. regional interests in Northeast Asia. Thereport presented recommendations embracinga wide range of key issues, including theresolution of the nuclear crisis with NorthKorea, the resumption of negotiations to limitor end North Korean missile development andthe replacement of the 1953 Korean WarArmistice with a peace treaty.

This second report focuses solely on thenuclear issue, updating and enlarging upon theearlierrecommendations made by the Task Force.

The Task Force met three times in connection

with the formulation of the first report(November 20 and December 5, 2002, andJanuary 9, 2003) and reconvened in a day-longmeeting on May 28, 2004, initiating a processof consultation and debate that continued untila final consensus was reached on November10, 2004.

The Task Force is co-sponsored by the Centerfor International Policy and the Center for EastAsian Studies of the University of Chicago.Funding for the second report was provided bytheFord Foundation and the Center for East AsianStudies of the University of Chicago.

Task Force on U.S. Korea PolicySelig S. Harrison, ChairmanDavid AlbrightEdward J. BakerTed Galen CarpenterAdm. William J. Crowe, Jr.Ellsworth CulverBruce CumingsCol. John EndicottCarter J. EckertAmb. James E. GoodbyBrig. Gen. James F. GrantAmb. Donald P. GreggPeter HayesAmb. James T. LaneyKatharine H.S. MoonDon OberdorferHan S. ParkClyde V. Prestowitz, Jr.Amb. Charles L. PritchardC. Kenneth QuinonesLeon V. SigalDavid I. SteinbergJohn D. Steinbruner

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Joel S. WitDavid WolffMeredith Woo-Cumings

Key Findings and Recommendations

The Greater Urgency of the Plutonium Threat"The central issue that has emerged in thenegotiations to date is whether to focus initiallyon what is, demonstrably, an already-existentplutonium program that is actively producingfissile material or to address at the outset boththe known plutonium program and a suspectedprogram for enriching uranium about whichlittle is known."

"The Task Force recommends that the UnitedStates should give priority to dealing with theclear and present threat posed by theplutonium program." (p. 8)

Does a Weapons-Grade Uranium EnrichmentProgram Exist?"No evidence has yet been presented publiclyto justify the conclusion that facilities capableof producing high-enriched, weapons-gradeuranium exist in North Korea. No suchevidence has been made available to the U.S.Congress or to other states participating in thesixnation negotiations. At the same time, theTask Force finds that the evidence so faravailable does suggest the existence of a pilotor experimental program..."

"Given the greater urgency of the threat posedby the plutonium program, the start of thenegotiation process should no longer bedelayed by the continuation of the stalematethat has resulted from attempting to compelNorth Korean acknowledgement of a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program...Whethera weapons-grade program exists...would bedifficult to determine without North Koreanc o o p e r a t i o n a s p a r t o f a n a g r e e ddenuclearization process with intrusiveinspections. The Task Force recommends,therefore, that the United States should give

priority to dealing with the clear and presentthreat posed by the plutonium program andconfront the uranium issue in the final stages ofthe process after greater trust has beendeveloped through step-by-step mutualconcessions." (p.8)

Getting the Plutonium Out of North Korea

The Task Force recommends a four-stepproposal designed to achieve the complete,verifiableand irreversible denuclearization of NorthKorea, starting with a freeze of its plutoniumprogram accompanied by additional measuresthat reflect a "recognition of the urgency ofthe threat posed by its possession of significantquantities of weapons-usable plutonium thatcould be transferred to third parties."

Calling for "the complete removal of all of thisplutonium from North Korea in the first phaseof denuclearization," the Task Force declared,"In order to get North Korea to take theextraordinary step of giving up its plutoniumthe United States, Japan, South Korea, China,and Russia should be prepared to offersignificant economic and political incentives,"including, "substantial bi lateral andmultilateral programs of assistance...valuedcollectively in accordance with an agreed priceper kilogram" of plutonium. The Task Forcepointed out that the 1994 nuclear freezeagreement with North Korea, known as theAgreed Framework, deferred the completeremoval of the plutonium until the final phaseof the denuclearization process. (p. 13)

THE FOUR-STEP DENUCLEARIZATIONPROCESS

Preparatory PhaseDeclaration of DenuclearizationNorth Korea would commit itself to thecomplete elimination of its "nuclear weaponsprograms," without the specific reference to itsuranium enrichment facilities required in

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the June 24, 2004 U.S. denuclearizationproposal.The United States would pledge to respectNorth Korean sovereignty and commit itselfto the goal of normalized relations and atripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War(theUnited States, South Korea and North Korea.)Conditional Security AssurancesNorth Korea would pledge not to initiate amilitary attack against the United States andwould reaffirm its 1991 commitment not toattack South Korea...The United States would pledge not to initiate amilitary attack against North Korea orto seek to undermine its government...Step One: Eliminating the Post-1994 NorthKorean Plutonium InventoryNorth Korea would permit the inspectionaccess necessary for the International AtomicEnergy Agency to determine how muchplutonium has been reprocessed since theexpulsionof the inspectors following the breakdown ofthe Agreed Framework in December,2002; the sequestering of this plutonium andany spent fuel under international controls,and the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor andreprocessing plant under internationalcontrols.

If North Korea agrees to surrender all of theplutonium found through the inspectionprocessfor shipment out of the country, the UnitedStates, South Korea, China, Japan and Russiawould reciprocate with:The resumption of shipments of the 500,000tons of oil per year delivered under theAgreed Framework, which were cut off inDecember, 2002.The exchange of liaison offices with NorthKorea by the United States and Japan as thefirst step toward fully normalized relations.Bilateral and multilateral programs ofassistance for the economic and socialdevelopment

of North Korea valued collectively inaccordance with an agreed price per kilogramof the plutonium surrendered.The Task Force does not specify how muchshould be offered in payment per kilogram.However, for illustrative purposes, it points outthat if the plutonium inventory totals 40kilograms, and if a price of $25 million perkilogram were agreed upon, the funds availablefor these assistance programs would total $1billion. The Task Force also notes that SouthKorea and Japan had agreed to provide $4billion and $1 billion respectively to constructlight water reactors under the AgreedFramework, and that the United States spent$405,106,000 from 1995 through 2003 for oilshipments and for administrativesupport of thelight water reactor project.

Upon conclusion of the proposed aidagreement, North Korea would initiate steps torejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty andpermit the resumption of the IAEA inspectionaccess cut off in December, 2002.

Step Two: Plutonium Cleanout

North Korea would agree to surrender theremainder of its plutonium inventory, includingpre-1994 plutonium reprocessed prior to theAgreed Framework.The United States would end the remainingU.S. economic sanctions against Pyongyangand would encourage the World Bank and theAsian Development Bank to move towardNorth Korean membership in these institutions.This would require the removal of NorthKorea from the U.S. List of State Sponsors ofTerrorism.

Step Three: Eliminating the PlutoniumWeapons InfrastructureNorth Korea would open previously-barredwaste and storage sites and other plutonium-related facilities to a level of inspectionacceptable to the IAEA.The United States would initiate talks with

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North Korea to set the stage for the elevationof their liaison offices in Pyongyang andWashington to the status of embassies.The United States would declare its readinessto keep open the option of completing oneor both of the two light water reactorspromised under the Agreed Framework, asSouthKorea and Japan have urged.

Step Four: Elimination of Weapons-GradeUranium Enrichment

If North Korea permits the unimpededinspection access necessary to determine what,if any,weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilitiesexist, and takes the comprehensive measuresnecessary to eliminate any such facilities, theUnited States would:Establish full diplomatic relations, upgradingits liaison office in Pyongyang to anEmbassy.Authorize Exxon-Mobil to pursue a natural gaspipeline to South Korea that wouldcross North Korea.Open negotiations on a tripartite peace treatyending the Korean War.

ContentsPageI. Foreword 2II. The Nuclear Crisis 7III. The U.S. Proposal 9IV. The North Korean Proposal 11V. The South Korean Proposal 12VI. Recommendations 13Step One: Eliminating the Post-1994 NorthKorean Plutonium InventoryStep Two: Plutonium CleanoutStep Three: Eliminating the Plutonium NuclearWeapons InfrastructureStep Four: Elimination of Weapons-GradeUranium EnrichmentVII. The South Korean Nuclear Program 18VIII. Beyond the Nuclear Issue 18IX. Notes of Dissent 19

X. Members of the Task Force 21XI. Notes 23

The nuclear crisis with North Korea hasbecome progressively more serious since theTask Force on U.S. Korea Policy published itsfirst report in March, 2003.1 Six-partynegotiations in Beijing (the United States,South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China andRussia) have so far failed to stop North Koreafrom moving ahead with its effort to developnuclear weapons. The Task Force has decided,therefore, to assess the key issues that haveemerged in the negotiations and to presentdetailed recommendations for a comprehensivesettlement with North Korea designed toend its nuclear weapons program completely,verifiably and irreversibly.

The Task Force commends the BushAdministration for taking a constructive firststep toward a settlement with its June 24,2004, denuclearization proposal to North Koreaand urges the Administration to build on thisbeginning by taking the initiative to shape theterms of a workable settlement. While adheringto the goals defined in the proposal, theAdministration should review its strategy forreaching agreement with North Korea afterconsidering the suggestions that have sincebeen made by its negotiating partners, notablySouth Korea, together with the new proposalsembodied in the Task Force recommendations.

Discussing the nuclear crisis in its initialreport, the Task Force delivered a grimwarning:that the breakdown of the 1994 AgreedFramework in December, 2002, followed bythe expulsion of International Atomic EnergyAgency inspectors from the Yongbyon nuclearcomplex, had left North Korea free to reprocessplutonium from the 8,000 fuel rodsat the Yongbyon reactor. There is "a dangerthat North Korea could produce sufficientplutoniumfor four to six nuclear weapons within six to

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eight months from the fuel rods thathave been in storage under the 1994accord,"the report declared. "Getting them outof thecountry, as envisaged in the accord, andgetting inspectors and monitoring equipmentback in, should be the top U.S. priority,"especially given "the possibility of transfers offissilematerial to third parties."

This warning has been vindicated duringsubsequent months by mounting evidence thatNorth Korea has succeeded in reprocessingsome or all of the fuel rods. North Korea hasstated that in 2003 it reprocessed all 8,000rods and used the extracted plutonium to"strengthen its deterrent." During a visit by aprivate U.S. delegation to the Yongbyonnuclear center on January 8, 2004, Dr.Siegfried Hecker, former Director of the LosAlamos National Laboratory, found that the8,000 rods were, indeed, no longer in thestorage pool where they had been kept underinternational Atomic Energy Agency controlssince 1994.

The delegation was then permitted to inspectthe operations of the Yongbyon reprocessingfacility—the first time it had been shown inoperation to any Americans, official orunofficial.North Korean scientists also showed Heckerwhat they asserted to be 200 grams ofplutonium metal. Hecker, who participated inthe Task Force discussions, did not have thetechnical means at hand to verify theauthenticity of the plutonium metal. He was notableto ascertain whether or not North Korea hadreprocessed all of the fuel rods and hadactuallybuilt nuclear devices. However, he concludedthat North Korea did possess the necessarytechnical skills, facilities and capacity to havereprocessed all the spent fuel rods and tohave produced weapons-usable plutonium

metal.2

The Hecker visit underlined the central issuethat has emerged in the negotiations to date:whether to focus init ial ly on what is ,demonstrably, an already-existent plutoniumprogramthat is actively producing fissile material or toaddress at the outset both the knownNorth Korean plutonium program and asuspected program for enriching uraniumaboutwhich little is known.

Despite its denials that such a program exists,there is clear evidence that North Korea hasattempted to purchase key components neededfor uranium enrichment to weapons-grade.However, it is unclear in most cases whetherthese purchases have materialized and, if so,in what quantities.3 No evidence has yet beenpresented publicly to justify the conclusionthat fac i l i t ies capable of producinghighenriched, weapons-grade uranium exist inNorth Korea. No such evidence has been madeavailable to the U.S. Congress or to otherstates participating in the six-nationnegotiations.

At the same time, the Task Force finds that theevidence so far available does suggest theexistence of a pilot or experimental enrichmentprogram and strong North Korean interestin obtaining enrichment technology.

The assumption that North Korea does have asecret program to develop uranium-basednuclear weapons rests primarily on intelligencefindings pointing to possible Pakistan- NorthKorean nuclear cooperation. Recent revelationsof the nuclear black market activities of theousted director of Pakistan's nuclear program,Dr. A.Q. Khan, have reinforced suspicions ofsuch cooperation. However, how muchtechnology and equipment, if any, has beensupplied, and the level of sophisticationinvolved, remain unclear. Dr. Khan has not

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discussed the facts publicly, and no foreignaccess to Dr. Khan has been permitted. China,which has been briefed by Pakistani officialsand has its own information sources, haspublicly expressed skepticism that aweaponsgradeenrichment program exists.

Whether a weapons-grade enrichment programdoes exist—and if so, how close it is toproducing weapons-grade fissile material insignificant quantities—would be difficult todetermine without North Korean cooperationas part of an agreed denuclearization processwith intrusive inspections. The Task Forcerecommends, therefore, that the United Statesshould give priority to dealing with the cleara n d p r e s e n t t h r e a t p o s e d b y t h eplutoniumprogram and confront the uraniumissue in the final stages of the process aftergreater trust has been developed through step-by-step mutual concessions.

The denuclearization process should bestructured to establish definitively whether aweapons-grade uranium enrichment programexists and, if so, to eliminate it. The declaredgoals of the process should be formulated atthe outset in a way that implicitly embraces theuranium issue and leaves adequate scope fordealing with it effectively. Given the greaterurgency of the threat posed by the plutoniumprogram, however, the start of the processshould no longer be delayed by a continuationof the stalemate that has resulted fromattempting to compel North Koreanacknowledgment of a weapons-grade uraniumenrichment program.

In a formal proposal presented to North Koreaon June 24, 2004, in Beijing, the United Statesoutlined a six-stage denuclearization process.North Korea would be required at the outset toacknowledge that a weapons-grade uraniumenrichment program exists and to makespecific commitments providing for itselimination in a denuclearization agreement.

Following is an abridged version of theproposal drawn from Congress ionaltestimony4:

1.The DPRK would make a uni lateraldeclaration pledging to "dismantle all of itsnuclear programs"

2."Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration,the parties would:a. provide provisional multilateral securityassurances, which would become moreenduring as theprocess proceededb. begin a study to determine the energyrequirements of the DPRK and how to meetthemby non-nuclear energy programsc. begin a discussion of steps necessary to liftremaining economic sanctions on the DPRK,andon the steps necessary for the removal of theDPRK from the List of State Sponsors ofTerrorism."

3. Based on the DPRK declaration, "the partieswould then conclude a detailed implementationagreement providing for the superviseddisabling, dismantling, and elimination" of allDPRKnuclear programs, the removal of all nuclearweapons and weapons components, centrifugeandother nuclear parts, fissile material and fuelrods; and a long-term monitoring program.

"To be credible, and for the programs to getunderway," the declaration and the agreementwouldhave to include "the uranium enrichmentprogram, and existing weapons, as well as theplutoniumprogram."

4. Upon conclusion of this agreement, "non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to theDPRK."

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5. Implementation of the agreement wouldbegin with a three-month preparatory period inwhich the DPRK would:d. provide a complete listing of all nuclearactivitiese. cease operations of these activitiesf. "permit the securing of all fissile material andthe monitoring of fuel rods"g. "permit the publicly disclosed andobservabledisablement of all nuclear weapons/weaponscomponentsand key centrifuge parts"

These steps would be subject to "internationalverification."

6. After the dismantlement is completed,"lasting benefits to the DPRK" would resultfrom the energy survey and the discussions onending sanctions and the removal of the DPRKfrom the terrorist list.

Even after dismantlement, however, a "whollytransformed relationship with the UnitedStates"would follow only if the DPRK "changes itsbehavior on human rights," addresses the"issues underlying" its inclusion on the terroristlist, eliminates chemical and biologicalweapons programs, "puts an end to theproliferation of missiles and missilerelatedtechnology, and adopts a less provocativeconventional force disposition."

The Task Force welcomes the June 24 initiativeas a starting point for negotiations but feelsthat the U.S. proposal in its present form doesnot provide a realistic basis for successfulnegotiations. The proposal fails to take intoaccount the deep distrust existing between theUnited States and North Korea and thus theneed for simultaneous steps in which the twosides, in tandem, each make concessions ofsufficient importance to the other to reducedistrust and facilitate compromise. In itspresent form, the proposal places the

burden on North Korea to make majorconcessions first without a correspondingassuranceof reciprocity by the United States.

The U.S. Proposal

For example, Stage One envisages a unilateralNorth Korean declaration, pledging completedenuclearization, that would set the stage forconclusion of a detailed agreement in StageThree providing for the "supervised disabling,dismantling, and elimination of all nuclearprograms," including the suspected uraniumenrichment program.

To get North Korea to make a denuclearizationpledge, the Task Force believes, the declarationshould be more symmetrical, coupling a pledgeby North Korea to eliminate nuclearweapons programs and fissile material with asimultaneous pledge by the other powersconcernedthat affirms respect for North Korea'ssovereignty and explicitly rules out a militaryfirst strike or an economic embargo. The TaskForce agrees that an acceptable settlementwith North Korea must eventually bring aboutall of the detailed denuclearizationmeasures spelled out in Stage Three, includingthe elimination of weapons-gradeuranium enrichment capabilities if they exist.

However, given the existing level of distrustbetween Washington and Pyongyang, NorthKorea is unlikely to commit itself to thesemeasures in advance without reciprocalcommitmentsby the other parties to the settlement. It mustbe induced to take them in thestep-by-step fashion outlined in this report,with quid pro quos along the way. Moreover,in contrast to the precision and magnitude ofthe North Korean concessions detailed in theproposed agreement, the rewards offered inreturn would be minimal: an undefinedprovisional

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security assurance; "discussions" on long-termenergy assistance and removal fromthe terrorist list, with no hint of possible action;and short-term oil shipments ofunspecified size, primarily from South Koreaand other "non-U.S. parties."

The fact that the United States would notparticipate in the oil shipments offered in StageFour signals to North Korea that a nuclearsettlement would not in itself lead tonormalizedrelations. Yet it is the promise of normalizationand of an end to a perceived U.S. threat toits survival that make a settlement attractive toNorth Korea. North Korea is not likely tomove toward complete denuclearization, theTask Force believes, unless the United States isprepared to match North Korean concessionswith reciprocal steps toward the normalizationof political and economic relations and towarda tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War(the United States, North Korea and SouthKorea). The June 24 U.S. proposalholds out the hope for a "wholly transformedrelationship" with the United States only ifNorth Korea "changes its behavior on humanrights," eliminates chemical and biologicalweapons programs, puts an end to theproliferation of "missiles and missile-relatedtechnology,"and adopts a "less provocative conventionalforce disposition."

The Task Force agrees that human rights,chemical and biological weapons, missiles andconventional arms control are all issues thatshould be on the negotiating agenda withNorth Korea. But progress on these issuesshould not be a precondition for normalization.On the contrary, they are more likely to beresolved in a climate of improved relationsthan in one dominated by mutual suspicion.South Korea accepted this view in a proposalof its own spelled out most fully on June 24, inwhich the normalization of U.S. and Japaneserelations with North Korea would take place

once the nuclear issue is resolved.

To integrate the negotiations on a nuclearsettlement with broader movement towardimproved relations, the Task Force urges thatseparate bilateral negotiations between theUnited States and North Korea should bebroadened and further developed inconjunctionwith the existing multilateral negotiatingformat. Beijing, Tokyo, Moscow and Seoulhave all made clear that they would welcome abilateral U.S.-North Korean dialogue andthat they favor a step-by-step approach to asettlement addressed initially to plutonium.

The U.S. proposal contrasted sharply with themore limited and loosely-defined NorthKorean offer to freeze its plutonium program,made behind closed doors in the August, 2003,and June, 2004 rounds of six-party negotiationsand spelled out publicly most fully indiscussions with the Task Force Chairman5 andwith Task Force member Donald P. Greggduringtheir visits to Pyongyang in April and July,2004, respectively.

In its opening offer at the six-party talks, NorthKorea defined a freeze as limited to theshutdown of the five-megawatt reactor andreprocessing plant at Yongbyon underinternationalinspection. However, depending on what theUnited States is prepared to do in return, ViceForeign Minister Kim Gye Gwan told the TaskForce Chairman that North Korea might alsopermit the inspections necessary to determinehow much plutonium has been reprocessedfrom the 8,000 fuel rods removed from storagein December, 2002 and the sequestering of thisp lutonium and any spent fue l underinternational controls, in addition to theshutdown of the Yongbyon reactor andreprocessing plant under internationalinspection. This would be the "first step" in acontinuing process that would lead to

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denuclearization in stages, keyed to progresstoward improved relations with the UnitedStates. The period of the freeze, and the natureand timing of these subsequent stages, havenot been specified.

Among the U.S. quid pro quos suggested byNorth Korea for the shutdown of the reactorand reprocessing plant are the resumption ofoil shipments and energy aid sufficient tocompensate for the 2000 megawatts of electricpower capacity promised in the AgreedFramework.

The North Korean Proposal

The U.S. and North Korean proposals both callfor a freeze of the production of newweaponsusable plutonium during the initialpreparatory phase of the denuclearizationprocess. But the U.S. proposal goes beyond afreeze during a three-month preparatoryperiod. It providesnot only for the sequestering of existingplutonium under international controls but,moreimportant, for the "supervised disablement" ofall North Korean nuclear weapons andweapons components, including any centrifugefacilities related to the suspectedweapons-grade enrichment program.

By contrast, the South Korean proposal allowsa preparatory period of six months, not threemonths, that would be limited to a freeze,without the additional "disablement" proviso.Like the U.S. proposal, it calls for a NorthKorean pledge, prior to the start of the freeze,to dismantle "all" nuclear weapons-relatedprograms, and for unspecified measures tobegin dismantlement within the preparatoryperiod. But it would not require North Koreato acknowledge or reveal its suspectedweapons-grade uranium capabilities duringthe preparatory phase.

Significantly, the South Korean proposal would

not restrict energy aid to non-nuclearenergy programs, as the U.S. proposal does,thus leaving the door open for a continuationof the suspended Korean Energy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO) program to build the twocivilian light water reactors envisaged in theAgreed Framework. A more fundamentaldifference between the South Korean and U.S.proposals is that the South Korean proposalwould reward North Korea for denuclearizationby s tepping up progress toward thenormalization of U.S. and Japanese relationswith Pyongyang, while the U.S. proposal wouldspecifically condition normalization on furtherNorth Korean concessions unrelated todenuclearization.

Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo Hyuckoutlined six steps in an unpublished "ConceptPaper" presented at the start of negotiations onJune 24:

1. North Korea would make a declarationpledging to "dismantle all nuclear programs ina thorough and transparent manner subject tointernational verification."2. As the first step toward dismantlement,North Korea and the other parties in theBeijingNegotiations would negotiate an agreementproviding for a six month freeze of its nuclearprograms. During this six month period, itwould "declare all of its nuclear programs,cease operation of these programs, seal nuclearmaterials and facilities and put them underinternational verification." The dismantlementwould begin "within the six months of thefreeze."3. At the beginning of the freeze, the otherparties would give North Korea securityassurances,affirming that they "have no intention to attack,invade or seek regime change," and that theywould provide "more enduring" assurancesonce the dismantlement is completed.4. During the freeze period, the other partieswould provide heavy fuel oil and increased

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humanitarian assistance to North Korea andwould "launch a study project to determine itsenergy requirements."5. The United States and North Korea wouldbegin a dialogue "soon" on terrorism andeconomic sanctions "for the purpose ofeventually lifting the sanctions."6. The parties would agree to "make efforts toremove obstacles on the way towardnormalizationof diplomatic relations and significantlyimprove the environment for economiccooperation betweenNorth Korea and the international community."

The South Korean Proposal

The Task Force believes that the South Koreanproposal offers a realistic basis for successfullypursuing renewed negotiations with NorthKorea. As a minimum objective, the newAdministration should seek to initiate adenuclearization process based on the SouthKorean proposal that would start with a freeze.

At the same time, the group believes thatgreater recognition should be given to theurgency of the threat posed by North Korea'spossession of significant quantities of weapons-usable plutonium that could be transferred tothird parties. The group urges the adoption of amore ambitious, sharply-focused strategydesigned to achieve the complete removal of allof this plutonium from North Korea in the firstphase of denuclearization. The achievement ofthis goal, which would greatly enhance U.S.security, was deferred in the AgreedFramework until the final phase of the process.

In order to get North Korea to take theextraordinary step of giving up its plutonium,the United States, Japan, South Korea, Chinaand Russia should be prepared to offersignificant economic and political incentivesgoing beyond the unspecified amount of heavyfuel oi l and "increased humanitarianassistance" that would be provided under the

South Korean freeze proposal.

The group proposes a phased, four-stepprocess, detailed below, that would lead tocomplete denuclearization, including thedismantlement of any weapons-grade uraniumenrichment facilities.Preparatory Phase

The four-step proposal would be presented infull at the outset of negotiations. However, thesteps would be negotiated one at a time. Beforenegotiating on Step One, the United States andNorth Korea would join in a Declaration ofDenuclearization.

North Korea would commit itself to the goal ofthe complete elimination of its "nuclearweapons programs," including all fissilematerial in whatever form. If North Korea isunwilling to accept more explicit language thatspecif ical ly refers to weapons-gradeenrichment facilities, the United States, alongwith the others in the six-party talks, wouldmake publicly clear their understanding thatsuch facilities are covered.

The United States would declare its respect forNorth Korean sovereignty and commit itself inthe Declaration to the goal of normalizedrelations and a tripartite peace treaty endingthe Korean War (the United States, SouthKorea and North Korea.)

Each side would provide the other with anexplicit conditional security assurance. TheUnited States would pledge not to initiate amilitary attack against North Korea or to seekto undermine its government. This pledgewould remain e f fect ive both dur ingnegotiations on the four steps and thereafter,provided that North Korea abides by the termsof the agreements negotiated.

North Korea would pledge not to initiate amilitary attack against the United States. Thispledge would remain effective both during

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negotiations on the four steps and thereafter,provided that the United States abides by theterms of the agreements negotiated. Inaddition, North Korea would reaffirm its 1991commitment not to attack South Korea, andwould pledge not to transfer fissile material tothird parties under any circumstances, withimmediate effect during the period of transitionto complete denuclearization proposed in StepsTwo, Three and Four.

Following the exchange of conditional securityassurances, negotiations would begin on StepOne.Recommendations

Step One:

Eliminating the Post-1994 North KoreanPlutonium Inventory

The extent of the plutonium alreadyreprocessed by North Korea both before theconclusion of the Agreed Framework in 1994and subsequent to its breakdown in 2002 is asubject of dispute among nuclear scientists andintelligence agencies. However, there is ageneral consensus that the total amount ofweapons-usable plutonium in North Korea'spossession does not exceed 40 kilograms, i.e.enough for five, or at most, six fission -type (asdistinct from fusion) nuclear weapons,depending on the grade of plutonium, theweapon design and the desired explosive yield.

Step One would deal with what is by far thelargest portion of this accumulation, theplutoniumreprocessed since the breakdown of the AgreedFramework in December, 2002.North Korea would be required to permit theinspection access necessary for the IAEA todetermine how much plutonium has beenreprocessed from the 8,000 fuel rods; thesequestering of this plutonium and any spentfuel under international controls, and theshutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and

reprocessing plant under internationalcontrols.Based upon the quantum of the post-1994plutonium stockpile, the United States, Japan,South Korea, China and Russia would providesubstantial economic and political incentivesto North Korea if it is willing to surrender all ofthis plutonium for disposal out of the country:

First, the resumption of shipments of the500,000 tons of oil per year promised in theAgreed Framework, which were cut off inDecember, 2002.

Second, the establishment of liaison offices inPyongyang and Washington, and Pyongyangand Tokyo, as the first step toward fullynormalized relations.

Third, based on the quantum of the stockpilesurrendered, the five parties would compensateNorth Korea with substantial bilateral andmultilateral programs of assistance for itseconomic and social development valuedcollectively in accordance with an agreed priceper kilogram. For example, assuming 40kilograms at $25 million per kilogram, thefundsavailable for these programs would be $1billion. No direct cash payments to North Koreawould be involved.

(The Task Force does not specify how muchwould be offered in payment per kilogram.However, it notes that South Korea and Japanhad agreed to provide $4 billion and $1 billionrespectively to construct light water reactorsunder the 1994 Agreed Framework, and thatthe United States did spend $405,106,000 from1995 through 2003 for oil shipments andadministrative support of KEDO in return forthe freeze.)

North Korea would decide on the priorities inthis assistance package. As examples of theassistance programs envisaged by the TaskForce, such aid could relate to:

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Long-term food securityIrrigation and agricultural modernizationShort-term energy security, includingcontinued heavy oil shipments and theintegrationof the North Korean electricity grid with SouthKorean and/or Chinese andRussian electricity networksLong-term energy security, including oil andgas prospecting and natural gas pipeline linkswith RussiaRehabilitation of hospitals, clinics, and otherpublic health facilitiesModernization of the economic infrastructure,including harbors, ports, railroads and theelectrical grid

An agreement fixing the valuation of the aidpackage, the timetable for resumption of theoil shipments and their duration, and theestablishment of liaison offices would beestablished prior to the surrender of theplutonium by North Korea.

North Korea would make a formal pledge inthis agreement not to transfer any fissilematerialout of North Korea pending the implementationof Steps One, Two, Three and Four,and would initiate steps to rejoin the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and permit theresumption of International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) inspection access.

The specific content of the aid package, thevaluation of specific programs and how theywould be administered would be negotiatedsubsequently with North Korea. In the case ofenergy aid, the Korean Energy DevelopmentOrganization (KEDO) would be a possiblecondu i t f o r ex te rna l funds and theadministrator of agreed programs. No fundswould bemade available directly to North Korea to avoidpossible diversion to military purposes.The destination of the plutonium for storage ordestruction would be decided by the five

parties. Russia would be a possibility, given theU.S. involvement in monitoring Russiannuclear facilities as part of the Nunn-Lugarprogram.

* * * * *

If the incentives are sufficient and areresponsive to North Korea's priorities as itdefinesthem, the Task Force believes that Pyongyangmay prove willing to surrender all of the post-1994 plutonium in Step One. However, theUnited States should consider a fallbackpositionin the event that North Korea should balk atgiving up all of it.

A significant proposal considered seriously butnot adopted by the Task Force would be tooffer cash payment for the plutoniumsurrendered on a sliding scale, with thecompensationper kilogram increasing in accordance with theamount surrendered, as an incentiveto North Korea to offer as much up front aspossible. Supporters of this proposal cited aprecedent in the 1994 deal with Russia inwhich the United States agreed to pay Moscow$10 billion to convert 500 tons of high-enricheduranium to low-enriched uranium for use inU.S. light water reactors. Many membersobjected that cash payments could be divertedto military purposes. In another version of thisproposal, the funds generated would be usedfor aid programs on the same basis as in theStep One proposal above that the Task Forcedid adopt. Although the group did not reach aconsensus in support of either version of the"buyout" approach , the Task Forcerecommends that it be given consideration inthe event of an impasse with Pyongyang.

Step Two:

Plutonium Cleanout

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North Korea would agree to eliminate theremainder of its plutonium inventory notcoveredin Step One. This would include plutoniumreprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework;add i t i ona l p lu ton ium conta ined inunreprocessed fuel rods that has accumulatedin the five megawatt reactor at Yongbyon sincethe breakdown of the Agreed Framework; anyother plutonium in unreprocessed fuel rodsfrom previous reactor operations, andplutonium that exists in any other potentiallyweapons-usable form.

For safety reasons, it would be desirable tohave North Korea reprocess the fuel rods underinternational inspection and surrender theplutonium for shipment by the United States,rather than have the fuel rods themselvesshipped. Compensation would be provided forthis plutonium on the same basis as in StepOne and the five parties to the accord wouldshare the cost of reprocessing.

In tandem with North Korea's verifiablefulfillment of its obligations under Step Two,theUnited States would reciprocate in two ways.First, it would end remaining economicsanctionsagainst Pyongyang. Second, it would encouragethe World Bank and the Asian DevelopmentBank to move toward Nor th Koreanmembership in these institutions. This wouldrequire the removal of North Korea from theU.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

North Korea would provide the United Statesand/or the International Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) with all necessary records andaccess to its plutonium facilities—includingpreviously-barred waste and storage sites—toverify that all plutonium is eliminated andthat all facilities have been identified so theycan be decommissioned and decontaminated.

Step Three:

Eliminating the Plutonium Nuclear WeaponsInfrastructure

This step requires very stringent and intrusivemonitoring and on-site inspection and,therefore,must have full cooperation from North Korea.The five parties would jointly fund the safe,secure, and environmentally acceptableeliminationof the North Korean plutonium infrastructure.The elimination of the infrastructure would beconducted under IAEA inspection and beopen to future on-site international monitoring.David Albright, president of the Institute ofScience and International Security and aTask Force member, has made detailedproposals for appropriate verification that theT a s k F o r c e e n d o r s e d(http://www.isisonline.org/dprkverification.html).

To reciprocate for North Korea's cooperation inStep Three, especially for opening previously-barred waste and storage sites to a level ofinspection acceptable to the IAEA, the UnitedStates would take two steps. First, it wouldinitiate talks with North Korea to set the stageforthe elevation of its liaison office in Pyongyangto the status of an Embassy. Second, it woulddeclare its readiness to keep open the option ofcompleting one or both of the two lightwater reactors promised under the AgreedFramework, by supporting action in KEDOthat would continue the suspension of thereactor project, in place of the previous U.S.efforts to cancel it.

Upon the completion of Step Three, NorthKorea would have fulfilled many of the sameobligations it accepted under the AgreedFramework, which provided for dismantlementof its plutonium infrastructure. The UnitedStates, South Korea and Japan, however,would not have completed the construction ofthe two light water reactors for North

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Korea, which had been envisaged in return forfreezing its nuclear plutonium program.South Korea has spent $800 million onpreparing the site for the two reactors atKumho, andSouth Korean companies have been awarded$2.3 billion in contracts for completion of theproject. Japan has spent $400 million.Construction work was suspended by KEDOuntil December 1, 2004, when the future of theproject was scheduled to be reveiwed.

The Task Force recommends that KEDO shouldcontinue to suspend, not discontinue,the reactor project , so that i t can beperiodically reassessed in the context ofprogress in thedenuclearization process and of changes inNorth Korea-U.S. and North Korea-SouthKorea relations. Meanwhile, to make use of theinfrastructure already developed at theKumho site, a non-nuclear thermal power plantcould be built there. When and if a lightwater reactor is built, external assistanceshould be provided only if North Korea agreesto conditions that would preclude its use fornuclear weapons. These conditions wouldinclude a commitment to lease its nuclear fuelfrom commercial nuclear suppliers and to ruleout capabilities for plutonium reprocessing anduranium enrichment to weapons-grade.

For Pyongyang, getting at least one of thereactors up and running is a political priority, ifonly because the Agreed Framework bore thepersonal imprint of Kim Il Sung and Kim JongIl. Equally important, since Japan and SouthKorea both have large civilian nuclearprograms,North Korea regards nuclear power as atechnological status symbol. Like Tokyo andSeoul, Pyongyang wants nuclear power in itsenergy mix to reduce dependence onpetroleum.Still another factor is that North Korea has aforce of 7,500 nuclear personnel, many ofthem trained in Russia, who have been in a

state of limbo since the 1994 accord and areawaiting new jobs when the KEDO nuclearcomplex at Kumho is completed.

Step Four:

Elimination of Weapons-Grade UraniumEnrichment

If North Korea does possess weapons-gradeuranium enrichment facilities, they will not begiven up lightly. The United States should beprepared to make its own most importantconcessions in return for definitive NorthKorean action to resolve this issue. If NorthKorea permits the full, unimpeded inspectionaccess necessary to determine what, if any,weaponsgrade enrichment facilities exist, andtakes the comprehensive measures necessaryto eliminate any such facilities, the UnitedStates would take these steps:

First, the liaison offices established under StepOne would be replaced by an Embassyand the establishment of full diplomaticrelations.Second, the United States would authorizeExxon-Mobil to explore with NorthKorea, South Korea, Russia and internationalaid institutions the development of a naturalgas pipeline that would originate in the Exxon-Mobil Sakhalin-I concession in Russia andwould cross through Russia andNorth Koreaenroute to its principal market in South Korea.The Sakhalin pipelinewould have a profoundeconomic impact on North Korea, sincePyongyang wouldreceive substantial annualtransit fees and could rely on regular gassupplies from thepipeline for power plants andfertilizer plants.

Finally, the United States would opennegotiations with North Korea and South Koreaon a tripartite peace treaty ending the KoreanWar, which Pyongyang regards as aninseparable accompaniment to a meaningfulnormalization of relations.

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These steps would be taken side by side withNorth Korean actions to share its records andopen up any related facilities not yet inspectedfor intrusive inspection. Together, NorthKorea, the United States and the IAEA woulddesign a long-term monitoring/verificationregime designed to provide the transparencyand cooperation required to verify the absenceof undeclared nuclear materials and weaponsactivities of any kind. This step would requirethe full application of the IAEA AdditionalProtocol.6 It would require trust and fullcooperationfrom the host country. Such trust will exist atthis stage, most members of the TaskForce agree, if all of the U.S. compensatorymeasures recommended in Steps One throughFour have been taken.

Given greater trust, the Task Force points out,the United States would find it easier than inearlier years to negotiate an agreement withNorth Korea that would end its developmentof long-range missiles capable of deliveringnuclear, chemical or biological weapons toU.S. territory. Similarly, Japan and South Koreawould find it easier to negotiate agreementswith Pyongyang that would head off theescalating competitive development ofshort-range and medium-range missiles. TheClinton Administration made significantprogress toward negotiating an agreement toend missile exports and long-range missiledevelopment. These negotiations should beresumed on the basis of the recommendationsin the initial Task Force report.

The South Korean Nuclear Program

The importance of the Additional Protocol, withits newly-stringent inspection requirements,was graphically demonstrated by therevelations in September, 2004, that SouthKorea had conducted secret experimentsrelating to uranium enrichment and plutoniumreprocessing, some as recently as four yearsago. It was South Korea's decision to become

one of the first states to accept the AdditionalProtocol that led to these revelations.The fact that Seoul had conducted a shortlivedcovert plutonium-based nuclearweapons program during the Park Chung Heemilitary regime has long been known. Sincethe termination of this program under U.S.pressure in 1975, South Korea has been atrustedadherent of the global non-proliferation regime.The recent revelations of secret experiments,in violation of the 1991 North-South Agreementand of IAEA commitments, suggestthat latent support for a nuclear weaponsoption persists within the South Koreannuclear establishment. However limited theseexperiments were, they have vitiatedconfidencein South Korea's non-proliferation bona fidesboth in North Korea and in the broaderinternat iona l communi ty , and haveunderscored the inseparability of non-proliferationenforcement efforts embracing North Koreaand South Korea alike.

South Korea is to be commended for itsdecision to make a clean breast of its failure toliveup to all of its IAEA obligations and for itscontinuing cooperation with enforcement of theAddit ional Protocol . The Task Forceemphasizes that North Korea, too, will have tobebrought under the discipline of the AdditionalProtocol, but not until the final stages of thedenuclearization process.

South Korea accepts full transparency as partofa broader pattern of normal relations withthe international community. North Korea canbe held to the same standard only when itsrelations with the international community arenormal ized in con junct ion wi th thedenuclearizationprocess.

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Beyond the Nuclear Issue While focusing onthe nuclear crisis, the Task Force notes thatsignificant economic reforms have beeninitiated in North Korea since its last report.The group emphasized that the continuation ofthe reform process would gradually loosen upNorth Korea's rigid, totalitarian system, settingin motion a long-term process of politicalliberalization in which human rights abuseswould be reduced.

Against this background, economic assistanceand the normalization of relations betweenWashington and Pyongyang, including a peacetreaty, would not only be critical to a resolutionof the nuclear crisis but would also promotepeaceful, evolutionary progress toward a moreopen society in North Korea. Policies designedto pressure and isolate the Kim Jong Il regimewould, conversely, strengthen hard-lineelements opposed to reform and wouldreinforce repression.

James E. Goodby

I support the main thrust of the Task Forcereport. However, a better approach thanseeking a formal agreement at the outset wouldbe to agree on a statement of common goalsand to adopt the model the Bush administrationrelied on to eliminate Libya's nuclearprograms. The administration has favorablycited this model as a basis for makingdiplomatic progress in North Korea.

The essence of the Libya model is to proceedthrough "reciprocal unilateral measures"-independentactions taken by parties to the negotiations toreach their shared objectives. A formalagreementis not a requirement. This process leaves toeach participant some discretion in what itactuallydoes. It is the model the Bush administrationpreferred in the case of Russia, as well asLibya. North Korea's nuclear programs are

more advanced than Libya's and piecemealdismantlement may be the only practical way toproceed.

What reciprocal unilateral measures might beinvolved? The discussions in the six-party talkssuggest the following steps, over time:

North Korea would:

1) dismantle all its nuclear facilities and placeconstraints on its missile programs, agreeing tomonitoring measures;2) acknowledge and end all technical programsthat could be used to enrich uranium; 3)withdrawtroops from the Demilitarized Zone and reduceits forces.

The United States would:

1) reduce its deployment of troops on theKorean Peninsula, as it is now doing;2) providesecurity assurances;3) eliminate remaining trade barriers;normalize diplomatic relations with NorthKorea; 4) provide energy and economic aid.

South Korea would: 1) implement the economicassistance it has promised to North Korea forending its nuclear programs; 2) initiateconfidence- building measures to lowertensions onthe peninsula.

Japan would: 1) provide North Korea withpromised reparations; 2) take actions to fostereconomic development in North Korea. Chinaand Russia could undertake additionalmeasures in response to North Korea's decisionto dismantle its nuclear facilities.

If a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is acceptedas a common strategic objective, Kim Jong Ilshould be able to begin the process by takingsome significant action, while reciprocalunilateral actions by other participants would

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keep the ball rolling toward achievement of thegoal. By forming a permanent oversight groupat the earliest possible date, the parties wouldmaintain pressure and help build momentumfor the negotiations.

James F. Grant

I support the Task Force's recommendationsfor negotiations as a way to further probe andtestPyongyang's intentions. However, this paperand its proposed negotiating strategy are basedon theassumption, which I question, that North Koreacan be convinced to negotiate in earnestconcerning its nuclear weapons capability atthis time if we approach them in a reassuringmanner, and provide them with sufficientmaterial incentives and security pledges.

I do not believe that Pyongyang presently iswilling to negotiate away a nuclear "posture"(declaratory or real) that has given them theironly real leverage in dealing with the outsideworld and provides them with the possibility ofa "poison pill" that in their minds might wardoff invasion by the US and others. Myassessment is that North Korean leaders willcontinue to present us with a "neither confirmnor deny stance" concerning their nuclearposture.

They may make some small tactical moves togain some material benefits and split the forcesarrayed against them. However, ultimately Ibelieve they will frustrate our efforts and avoidclear resolution of this issue any time in theforeseeable future.

Notes of Dissent

We need to continue to search for ways toengage North Korea in serious negotiations,while maintaining a strong military posture inNorth East Asia as well. While we mightconceivably make progress in getting North

Korea to agree to conditions related to non-proliferation/non-export of weapons of massdestruction, I think we need to be prepared foran extended period withoutclear resolution of the fundamental issue ofNorth Korean possession of a nuclear weaponscapability.

Katharine H.S. Moon

Regarding Step One, I firmly agree that theUnited States and the four other parties to thesix-party process must be ready and willing tooffer significant economic and humanitarianassistance in recognition of and response toNorth Korea's steps to relinquish its post-1994stockpile of plutonium. However, I object to theprice per/kilogram of plutonium scheme thatwould match assistance funds for the plutoniumsurrendered for the following reasons:1. It could be construed by North Korea as anopportunity to haggle, stretch out thebargainingprocess, and engage in tit-for-tat tactics.2. It would set an undesirable precedent forother states with active nuclear ambitions.3. It would be subject to severe criticism withinthe U.S. public that North Korea's violation ofthe Agreed Framework is being rewardedsystematically, and therefore would not bepoliticallyviable.4. It would conflate and confuse payment forillicit goods with economic assistance thatmeetsreal human needs, such as those mentioned onpage 15. For the same reasons, I object to theexplicit buyout suggestions.

Ambassador Donald P. Gregg and Joel S. Witendorsed this statement.

Amb. Charles L. Pritchard

I join with Katharine Moon's Note of Dissent inobjecting to an explicit monetary buy out ofNorth Korea's post-1994 stockpile of plutonium.

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The Task Force on U.S.-Korea Policy Members

SELIG S. HARRISON, Chairman of the TaskForce, is Director of the Asia Program at theCenter for International Policy and a SeniorScholar of the Woodrow Wilson InternationalCenter for Scholars. He is author of KoreanEndgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S.Disengagement and has visited North Koreaeight times. He served as a Senior Associate ofthe Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace for 22 years.

DAVID ALBRIGHT, President of the Institutefor Science and International Security, is theauthor of Solving the North Korean NuclearPuzzle. As a consultant to the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency Action Team from 1992to 1997 , he served as the f i r s t non -governmental inspector of the Iraqi nuclearprogram.

EDWARD J. BAKER, Associate Director of theHarvard Yenching Institute, has been amember of the board of directors of Asia Watchsince its founding in 1985 and a leading U.S.supporter of South Korean human rightsorganizations. He served with the Peace Corpsin South Korea for five years and has visitedNorth Korea.

TED GALEN CARPENTER is Vice President forDefense and Foreign Policy Studies of the CatoInstitute. He is author of Peace and Freedom: AForeign Policy for A Constitutional Republic; ASearch for Enemies: America's Alliances Afterthe Cold War, and co-author with Doug Bandowof The U.S.-South Korean Alliance: Time for aChange.

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR. (USN, Ret.),former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffunder President Ronald Reagan, has served asCommander, U.S. Pacific Command, Chairmanof the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board andAmbassador to the United Kingdom.

ELLSWORTH CULVER is Co-Founder andSenior Vice President of Mercy CorpsInternational, one of the most active U.S.-basedhumanitarian aid organizations operating inNorth Korea and in adjacent border areas ofChina. He has made 17 trips to North Koreaand chaired the U.S. Private VoluntaryOrganizations Consortium that monitored over305,000 tons of U.S. government food aid toNorth Korea.

BRUCE CUMINGS is the Norma and EdnaFreehling Professor of History and Director ofthe Korea Program, Center for East AsianStudies, University of Chicago. He is author ofThe Origins of the Korean War (2 vols.), Korea'sPlace in the Sun: A Modern History andParallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations.

CARTER J. ECKERT is Professor of KoreanHistory and Director of the Korea Institute atHarvard University. He is the author of KoreaOld and New: A History, and Offspring ofEmpire: The Colonial Origins of KoreanCapitalism, which won the John K. FairbankPrize in East Asian History of the AmericanHistorical Association. He is former Chairmanof the Committee on Korean Studies of theAssociation for Asian Studies.

COL. JOHN ENDICOTT (USAF Ret.) is theDirector of the Center for InternationalStrategy, Technology and Policy at the SamNunn School, Georgia Institute of Technology.He formerly served as Director of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies at the NationalDefense University and as Director of TargetPlanning for the Fifth Air Force. He is theauthor of Japan's Nuclear Option.

AMBASSADOR JAMES E. GOODBY served in avariety of senior arms control positions during37 years in the Foreign Service, including ViceChairman of the U.S. delegation to theStrategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). AsChief U.S. Negotiator for the Safe and Secure

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Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, henegotiated 30 agreements with former Sovietrepublics. He is the author of several studies ofconventional arms control issues in Korea.

BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES F. GRANT(USAF, Ret.), Executive Vice-President of ZelTechnologies, served as Assistant Chief of Stafffor Intelligence (J-2), U.S. Forces, South Korea,Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (C-2) ofthe US-ROK Combined Forces Command andAssistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, PacificAir Forces.

AMBASSADOR DONALD P. GREGG, Presidentof the Korea Society, served as Ambassador totheRepublic of Korea from 1989 to 1993. Heserved in the Central Intelligence Agency from1951 to 1982 and subsequently in the WhiteHouse as National Security Adviser to GeorgeH.W. Bush during his tenure as Vice-President.

PETER HAYES, Executive Director of theNautilus Institute for Security and SustainableDevelopment, is a consultant to the U.N.Environment Program and the AsianDevelopment Bank. He has visited North Koreasix times in connection with environmental andenergy assistance projects. He is the author ofPacific Powderkeg: American NuclearDilemmas in Korea.

AMBASSADOR JAMES T. LANEY served asAmbassador to the Republic of Korea from1993 to1997. He was President of Emory University for16 years and currently serves as Co-Chairmanon the Council on Foreign Relations Task Forceof Korea.

KATHARINE H.S. MOON is the Jane BishopProfessor of Political Science and Chairpersonof thePolitical Science Department at WellesleyCollege. She is a non-resident Fellow at theSigur Center for East Asian Studies, George

Washington University, and is the author of SexAmong Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations.

DON OBERDORFER, Journalist-in-Residence atthe School of Advanced International Studies,JohnsHopkins University, is the author of The TwoKoreas: A Contemporary History. A formerDiplomatic Correspondent and Northeast AsiaBureau Chief of The Washington Post, he hasvisited North Korea three times.

HAN S. PARK, is University Professor ofInternational Affairs and director of the Centerfor Global Issues at University of Georgia. Hehas visited North Korea 40 times and hasorganized numerous high level "track two"exchanges, bringing together North Koreanofficials with retired U.S. officials and membersof Congress.

CLYDE V. PRESTOWITZ JR. is President of theEconomic Strategy Institute and formerCounselor to the Secretary of Commerce. He isthe author of Trading Places: How We AllowedJapan to Take the Lead and Rogue Nation(Basic Books, May, 2003).

AMBASSADOR CHARLES L. PRITCHARD, aVisiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, hasserved as U.S. Ambassador and Special Envoyfor Negotiations with North Korea and asSeniorDirector for Asian Affairs in the NationalSecurity Council. He is the author of The NorthKoreanNuclear Crisis and Beyond.

C . KENNETH QUINONES, author o fUnderstanding North Korea, served for 18years in a variety of U.S. Foreign Serviceassignments relating to Northeast Asia,including Desk Officer for North Korea in theState Department. He lived and worked at theYongbyon Nuclear Research Center in NorthKorea for eight months between 1995 and 1998

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as a member of the U.S. Nuclear Spent FuelTeam that monitored the 1994 nuclear freezewith North Korea.

LEON V. SIGAL is Director of the NortheastAsia Cooperative Security Project of the SocialScience Research Council. His book, DisarmingStrangers: Nuclear Diplomacy With NorthKorea, won the 1998 book award of theAmerican Academy of Diplomacy. He served onthe editorial board of The New York Times andwas a professor of government at WesleyanUniversity.

JOHN D. STEINBRUNER is Professor of PublicPol icy and Director of the Center forInternational and Security Studies at theUniversity of Maryland. He is Chairman of theBoard of the Arms Control Association andserved as Director of Foreign Policy Studies atthe Brookings Institution for 18 years. He is theauthor of Principles of Global Security and co-author with William J. Perry and Ashton B.Carter of A New Concept of CooperativeSecurity.

DAVID I. STEINBERG is a DistinguishedProfessor and Director of Asian Studies at theSchool of Foreign Service, GeorgetownUniversity. He served as Representative of theAsia Foundation in South Korea from 1963 to1968 and 1994 to 1997. his 12 books includeStone Mirror: Reflections on ContemporaryKorea; The Republic of Korea: EconomicTransformation and Social Change and KoreanAttitudes Toward the United States: ChangingDynamics.

JOEL S. WIT, a Senior Fellow at the Center forStrategic and International Studies, is co-author with Robert L. Gallucci and DanielPoneman of Going Critical: The First NorthKorean Nuclear Crisis. During 15 years in theState Department he served in a variety ofarms contro l and non-pro l i ferat ionassignments, including Senior Advisor toAmbassador Gallucci during negotiations on

the 1994 Agreed Framework and subsequentlyas Coordinator for implementation of theagreement.

DAVID WOLFF, a Senior Scholar of the ColdWar International History Project of theWoodrow Wilson International Center forScholars, has specialized in Russian relationswith Northeast Asia. A former AssistantProfessor of Sociology at Princeton, he is theauthor of To the Harbin Station: The LiberalAlternative in Russian Manchuria, 1898-1914and co-editor with Stephen Kotkin ofRediscovering Russia in Asia.

MEREDITH WOO-CUMINGS is Professor ofPolitical Science at the University of Michigan.Her works include Race to the Swift: The Stateand Finance in Korean Development and TheDevelopmental State. She is a consultant to theAsian Development Bank Institute and servedon the White House Commission on U.S.-AsiaPacific Trade.

Siegfried Hecker, former Director of the LosAlamos National Laboratory, participated in theTask Force discussions as a consultant

Notes1. Turning Point in Korea: New Dangers andNew Opportunities for the United States,published by the Center for International Policyand the Center for East Asian Studies,University of Chicago, 35 pp.2. Siegfried S. Hecker, testimony before theSenate Foreign Relations Committee, January21, 20043. For the most authoritative publicly availablediscussions of the intelligence findings relatedto North Korea's suspected weapons-gradeuranium enrichment facility, see North Korea'sWeapons Programmes: A Net Assessment,International Institute for Strategic Studies,London, January, 2004, and Jonathan Pollack,"The United States, North Korea and the End ofthe Agreed Framework," Naval War CollegeReview, Summer, 2003

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4. "Dealing with North Korea's NuclearPrograms," Statement by James A. Kelly,Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian andPacific Affairs, Senate Foreign RelationsCommittee, July 15, 20045. The Financial Times, May 4, 2004, pp. 1 and3.6. South Korea signed the Additional Protocolon June 21, 1999.The major provisions of the Protocol weresummarized by the U.S. State Department asfollows:

"The Model Additional Protocol requires statesto declare to the IAEA a number of nuclear andnuclear-related materials, and activities that,while they could be part of a peaceful nuclearprogram, would be required for a covertnuclear weapons program.

Specifically, the Protocol requires states toreport exports of nuclear-related itemscontrolled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group,confirm imports of such items, and reportdomestic manufacturing of key items. It alsorequires states to report exports, imports, andstockpiles of raw uranium and thorium that

could be used as feed material for a covertnuclear program, and also report informationrelated to uranium mines, uranium and thoriumconcentration camps, uses of buildings on thesites of safeguarded nuclear facilities,construction of new nuclear facilities, andcertain nuclear-related research anddevelopment work not involving nuclearmaterial..."

(U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, Susan F. Burk,Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation,Acting, Testimony Before the Senate ForeignRelations Committee, Washington D.C., January29, 2004)

Center for International PolicyRobert E. White, President1717 Massachusetts Ave. NW., Suite 801Washington, DC 20036Tel. 202.232.3317Center for East Asian StudiesUniversity of ChicagoJames E. Ketelaar, Director5835 S. Kimbark Ave.Chicago, IL 60637Tel. 773.702.8647