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PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000) 25

The End of Tolerance _____________________________________________

J o h n He n le y

Abstract: Tolerance has received less critical scrutiny than most liberalvalues. This article traces the history of tolerance from the time of Locke,through Mill, to the present day. It critically reviews the approaches of Dworkin, Walzer and Rorty, all of which it finds wanting. It notes thatWalzer’s “enthusiasm” for diversity represents a shift from liberalismtowards pluralism. Theologians such as Biggar and Markham shareWalzer’s “enthusiasm” but fail to link it to the distinctive commitment of Christian communities. Hauerwas contends that such commitment offersthe prospect of genuine peace. The paper concludes that a true ap-preciation of the Christian virtue of patience supports this contention.

MICHAEL WALZER HAS STATED quite categorically that the “freedom”to choose for one’s future, together with “toleration” of one’s fellowsand their freedom to do the same, “constitute what we can callAmerican liberalism”. 1 Following a period of thorough research, SusanMendus was prepared to extend the context beyond America.“Liberals”, she wrote,

are frequently defined as people who value liberty and the tolerationnecessary for the promotion of liberty…. Although other politicalideologies may find a place for the value of toleration, it is inliberalism that that place is most exalted. 2

In view of the widespread criticism that philosophers andtheologians have levelled at liberalism in recent decades, it is surprisingto discover how little attention has been paid to the supposed value of

toleration, especially by theologians. Much has been written on all sidesabout the inadequacy of other key elements in liberal thought andpractice. These elements, which are not easily reconciled with oneanother and so make liberalism “a protean phenomenon” that is hard topin down, 3 include the following four candidates for over-riding

1. Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven and London: Yale University, 1997) 74.2. Susan Mendus, Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism (London: Macmillan, 1989) 3.3. Stanley Hauerwas, Against The Nations: War and Survival in a Liberal Society

(Minneapolis, Chicago, New York: Winston, 1985) 17.



26 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)commitment: rights, justice, equality, and freedom. 4 Rights are calledinto question for being interminably conflictual, 5 justice too procedural, 6

equality unduly abstract 7 and liberty, which many would regard as thekey value, 8 open to a range of rival interpretations. 9

Behind these values, of course, lies a liberal commitment to theindividual and his or her rational self-determination or autonomy whichmany writers now dismiss as unreal in its depiction of a being whotranscends both history and society. So feminists especially decry thismodel of the human person for its inattention to the ties that bind andits covert maleness, 10 while Stanley Hauerwas points out that his“critique of liberalism” does not amount to “moralistic judgments about‘enlightened interest’, ‘selfishness’, or ‘individualism’.... Rather, myconcern has always been what liberalism does to remembering as apolitical task.” 11

Hauerwas has made some brief, disparaging remarks abouttoleration when dealing with other issues 12 and this could well beinterpreted by liberals and others as further indication, if any wereneeded, of a religious, including a Christian, propensity to intolerance. 13

On the other hand, a few theologians have begun to follow aphilosophical lead given by Robert Wolff more than thirty years ago, 14 if not earlier, by suggesting that modern society will only prosper bymoving “beyond tolerance”. 15 What they have in mind is somethingthat is not less or other than tolerance but that builds and improves

upon it. It would appear, then, that we have here the makings of asignificant dispute but, before we can begin to assess the prospects, weneed to seek some clarification about the matter under dispute. Justwhat is toleration or tolerance?

4. John Kekes, The Morality of Pluralism (Princeton: Princeton University, 1993) 201-202.5. Susan F. Parsons, Feminism and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge

University, 1996) 2-3.6. Kekes, Morality of Pluralism , 204-11; see Parsons, Feminism, 53.7 . Parsons, Feminism, 42, 61, 186-7.8. Richard Rorty, “Truth And Freedom: A Reply To Thomas McCarthy”, in Gene

Outka and John P. Reeder (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity, 1993) 279.

9. Mendus, Toleration, 72.10. Parsons, Feminism, chapter 2 and pp. 184-8.11. Stanley M. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings (Boulder, CO and Oxford, UK:

Westview, 1997) 230.12. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings 116-20.13. Walzer, On Toleration, 46; see G. G. Stroumsa, “Postscript: the future of intolerance”,

in G. N. Stanton and G. G. Stroumsa (eds.), Tolerance And Intolerance In Early Judaism AndChristianity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 356-1.

14. R. P. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, in Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr.,Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston: Beacon, 1965) 52.

15. For example, Ian S. Markham, Plurality and Christian Ethics (Cambridge, UK:Cambridge University Press, 1994) chapter 11; Nigel Biggar, Good Life: Reflections On WhatWe Value Today (London: SPCK, 1997) chapter 7.



HENLEY: TOLERANCE 27

THE MARKS OF TOLERANC E : L OC KE AND M ILL

Walzer proposes a neat distinction between toleration and tolerance.The former term, he suggests, refers to a practice, whereas the latterindicates the attitude which lies behind the observable pattern of behaviour. 16 Since the focus of Walzer’s book is “regimes” of tolerationand the practical problems of liberal regimes in particular, hisdistinction serves a heuristic purpose and is to that extent acceptable.Beyond this, however, it cannot be pressed because it would then givethe misleading impression of a clarity and, indeed, a precision which isin fact lacking.

The seeds of ambiguity were sown quite early in the debates of thesixteenth and seventeenth centuries concerning religious persecution,with the Latin tolerantia being rendered as “toleration” in English and astolerance in French. 17 What was originally little more than a linguisticdifference would in the course of history become more complex so thatthe meaning of toleration or tolerance is as difficult to define as that of liberalism. For this reason it is preferable to trace the development of the idea, or set of ideas, from those early discussions until the present inorder to identify some of the main characteristics, or “marks”, of asomewhat slippery subject.

In the writings of John Locke, especially the “Letter on Toleration”whose authorship he sought to keep anonymous because of the political

pressures of the time,18

the main focus of attention is the power of civilauthority 19 and there are two mutually reinforcing grounds for the con-tention that this power should not extend to persecution of those whodissent from the official religion. These are, quite simply, that genuine belief cannot be coerced by force, or the threat of force, and that thecompetence of such authority does not extend to the religious sphere butis limited to the temporal order. 20 Within the latter a major aim of policy is the maintenance of civil peace and this is certainly the purposeof religious toleration. 21 Any hope that Locke might have entertained of keeping church separate from state was, however, nullified by hisrecognition that certain beliefs could disturb the peace, on the one hand,and that legitimate reasons for state action could impinge on religious

16. Walzer, On Toleration, p. xi.17. R. Klibansky, Preface to John Locke, Epistola de Tolerantia: A Letter on Toleration

(Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) pp. x-xiv.18. Klibansky, Preface, pp. xx-xxvi.19. He did not overlook the problem of persecution by ordinary people, however:

Locke, Epistola, 79, 81, 147.20. Mendus emphasises the argument from the nature of belief ( Toleration, 26, see 41),

whereas that relating to the extent of political authority is considered to be moredeterminative by Richard Vernon in The Career of Toleration: John Locke, Jonas Proast andAfter (Montreal and Kingston: McGill and Queen’s University, 1997).

21. Epistola, 65.



28 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)practice, on the other. So Roman Catholics with their loyalty to thePope, could not be tolerated, 22 while an economic measure to cope withscarcity was justified even if it should prove costly (economically orotherwise) to a religious group. 23

The toleration advocated by Locke, then, only requires the state and, by implication, the citizenry to make room for certain kinds of religiousnon-conformity for the sake of “peaceful coexistence”. 24 Howeverminimal this accommodation might now appear, it is noteworthy thatthe rationale for it includes, in the first place, the recognition that afundamental dimension of life is not a matter of straight-forward choicethat might be coerced; then there is the claim that the competence of thestate is limited. Although the case made by Locke for such tolerationdid not go uncontested by conservative contemporaries, it is fair to saythat a conservative could accept it, albeit grudgingly. According toWalzer, this would suffice for him or her to exhibit “the virtue of toleration”, albeit in the minimal sense of “resignation”. 25

The classic exposition of a liberal understanding of toleration was notto appear until 1859, more than 150 years after the publication of Locke’sletter. By this time the term tolerance had entered the English languagein the relevant sense and pressures to extend the level of participation indemocratic government had increased. John Stuart Mill was as much anadvocate of more representative government as he was of liberty and of the tolerance that he considered requisite for the exercise of true

liberty.26

Mill concludes the outline of his essay “On Liberty” with thetriumphant words “the individual is sovereign”, but he has alreadymade it clear that he thinks too many individuals have yet to realise thisand act accordingly. Hence “the normal coercion of public opinion” istaken to inhibit an individual’s “liberty of action” at least as much as“physical force in the form of legal penalties”. The only justification foreither form of “compulsion and control”, he claims, is the prevention of “harm to others”. 27

22. Epistola, 131, 133. Atheists, too, he considered intolerable.23. Epistola, 109, 111. Locke saw no problem in the state upholding sabbath observance,

but Mendus doubts whether the principle of state neutrality with regard to religion,whether in its Lockean, rationalist form or in a consequentialist guise, can be helpfullyapplied to an issue such as Sunday trading; see Toleration, 84.

24. This is the end or main purpose of toleration according to Walzer; see On Toleration,2.

25. Walzer, On Toleration, 12.26. Mill’s essays “On Liberty” and “Considerations on Representative Government”

appear together with his “Utilitarianism” in successive editions of Everyman’s Library.My references to the work on liberty are, however, taken from Stefan Collini (ed.), OnLiberty, with The Subjection of Women and Chapters on Socialism(Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989). In this work Mill makes no distinction between toleration andtolerance and is content to use either term; see, for example, pp. 68, 99.

27. Mill,On Liberty, 78.




The tolerance implicit in what Mill calls a “very simple principle” of liberty is markedly different from that found in Locke. It is to bepractised by individuals as much as or perhaps more than bygovernments. It is to be extended to individuals as such and not just asmembers of groups or of what the United States’ founding father, JamesMadison, referred to as “factions”. 28 It relates to matters of moral andnot just religious importance and thus further limits the competence of the state.

Mill justifies the extension of liberty by appeal to an optimisticunderstanding of human nature which emphasises the diversity of individuals. Provided this diversity is allowed to express itself, thesociety in which it does so will flourish, just as a tree may be expected todevelop new shoots which will grow into branches, stems and leaves if it is not cropped severely. 29 This analogy may be taken further, for justas a healthy tree can benefit by attention which includes a little pruningso, for Mill, diversity is not enhanced by a tolerance which amounts toindifference and simply leaves others alone. 30 On the contrary, whenpeople think that an individual is heading in a direction which is notgood for him they have “good reasons for remonstrating with him, orreasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not forcompelling him or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise”. 31

There is a further reason for refraining from compulsion and this isMill’s conviction that a mature individual is entitled to decide forhimself “his own mode” of living. 32 While some compulsion may benecessary to lead people to maturity, once they “have attained thecapacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction orpersuasion”, they should be free to pursue their own course. 33 With hisoptimistic view of human nature, Mill was confident that such self-

28. James Madison, “Federalist 51”, in William T. Hutchinson, William M. E. Rachal, et

al (eds.), The Papers of James Madison vol. 10 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1977)476ff.

29. Mill,On Liberty, 60-62.30. Walzer regards this as the second stage which the virtue of toleration may reach

along a “continuum” that begins with “resignation” but can proceed to the further stagesof “stoical acceptance, curiosity, and enthusiasm” ( On Toleration, 12).

31. Mill,On Liberty, 78. These words form part of Mill’s initial outline of the principle.32. Mill,On Liberty, 135.33. Mill,On Liberty, 78.



30 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)determination, or autonomy, 34 would express itself in preference for“higher” pleasures and more refined ways of life. 35

To the marks of tolerance we have already identified in the thoughtof Mill, then, we may now add an appreciation of human diversity andindividual self-determination, together with the suggestion that societyas a whole should not seek to impose one version of the good life on itsmembers, although the latter were expected to be vigorous in champion-ing their own versions. 36

There is something initially captivating about the liberty soenthusiastically endorsed by Mill. On inspection, however, his accountraises more questions than it answers and some of these are of directrelevance to the issue of toleration. In the first place, we may ask hownarrowly or widely the principle of harm is to be interpreted, noting thatthe answer to this question will help determine the extent of tolerationin a liberal society. If the outrage that some women and men feel overpornography is considered a relevant kind of harm, then a case can bemade for limiting the freedom with which it is produced and distributedor even for not tolerating it at all. 37

A further question relates to the supposed neutrality of society withrespect to the different versions of a good life espoused by its members.Mill’s understanding of human nature inclined him to be confident thatthe experience of freedom would be self-authenticating. But, in retro-spect, it has become quite clear that men and women are not so willing

to yield on their deeper beliefs and commitments, including those whichare religious, and these in turn incline them to be less than tolerant inthe eyes of liberals. Given the over-riding value that most liberalsascribe to freedom, they here confront an ideological dilemma betweenpractising tolerance and risking its subversion. 38

In Mill’s terms, of course, those who hold fast to religious and otherdeep commitments exhibit an immaturity which indicates that they are

34. Strictly speaking, this term summarises the teaching of Kant according to which an

agent should decide what to do in conformity to a rule or principle ( nomos). By contrast,Mill invites us to choose a path that will lead to happiness for all who are affected by thechoice. Kant therefore saw no value in diversity or pluralism, whereas Mill not onlyappreciated these features of social life but, as Mendus points out, regarded them asessential because their absence would deprive agents of “an adequate range of options” forthe exercise of choice ( Toleration , 54-5).

35. Mill, On Liberty, 130-31; see 144. More frequently cited is his discussion of thismatter in chapter 2 of the essay on utilitarianism where he states that it is “better to be ahuman being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a foolsatisfied”.

36. By contrast with Locke, then, Mill takes religion to be a private matter, albeit animportant one. It was not until the twentieth century that liberalism succeeded inconvincing many people in a few parts of the world “that religion is merely a privatematter” (in Catherine Pickstock’s words and my italics).

37. See Mendus, Toleration, 137-9.38. Mill, for example, refuses to allow the extreme case of selling oneself into a state of

slavery ( On Liberty, 172).




not yet ready for the exercise of liberty. 39 Bearing in mind his expec-tation of increasing levels of refinement among the mature, however, wemay ask whether the required maturity can ever be achieved by manymembers of society and so doubt whether tolerance can legitimatelyextend beyond a kind of upper class. 40

BEYOND LOC KE AND M ILL

These and other matters relating to tolerance have continued to besubjects of debate among liberals throughout the twentieth century. Animportant, although further complicating, factor in some of thesedebates has been something that Mill might perhaps have foreseen byreflecting further on his analogy of the tree. It is certainly now widelyrecognised that human beings are socially and biologically groundedand inter-dependent in so many ways and to such an extent that Mill’saspiration for individual independence is rendered most problematic, if not altogether implausible. With James M. Gustafson we now findourselves enmeshed in “patterns and processes of inter-dependence” 41

and, it should be noted, of time past and time future, some of which findmore settled spatial and temporal expression in institutions and all of which set us at various points on a continuum between dependence andindependence. If we are to enjoy much of the latter, therefore, it willhave to be facilitated by instruments of the former, of which the most

basic is language, and this of course means there will be structuralconstraints upon our freedom behind and beneath any limitations thatare imposed by the actions of others. Even in a notably liberal society,then, the kind of family in which one is reared and the kind of educationwith which one is provided will have a marked effect on one’sinclinations concerning the ways freedom is to be expressed and therange of people and practices to be tolerated.

Another social factor which has impinged upon twentieth centurydiscussions of freedom and toleration has been the emergence of technological mass society. This process began with urban and sub-urban conglomerations supplanting the kinds of city in which, bycontrast with a small town, Mill’s kind of liberty could well be

39. In chapter 2 of the essay on utilitarianism, especially, Mill professes admiration forthe teachings of Jesus Christ and even claims that his philosophy accords with theseteachings. In the essay on liberty, however, he is with some justification critical of laterChristian teaching ( On Liberty, 116-118) and practice (108-110) and, as he states in theopening chapter, he clearly thought that “intolerance in what they really care about” is “sonatural to mankind” that “almost all religious persons” can be expected to be deficient inobserving “the duty of toleration” (76-77, 81-82).

40. Mendus thinks it extends to “the ‘cultured’ middle classes” ( Toleration, 139) whoregard themselves as “a kind of upper class”, that is, “more highly than [they] ought tothink” (Rom 12:3).

41. James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Volume 2, Ethics andTheology (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984) 6-8.



32 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)appropriated 42 and, more recently, it has produced a “globalisation” of centres of human population, whatever their location, shape or size,which takes a variety of forms ranging from the multi-cultural societythrough communication in cyber-space to virtual reality.

Confronted with factors such as these, liberals have found itnecessary to abandon Mill’s view of human nature and to seek a basisfor freedom and tolerance elsewhere. Some, such as Ronald Dworkin,have followed a “turn to the subject”, albeit a subject stripped of muchsubstance. Despite this, Dworkin has sought to assure his audience, it isa subject invested with dignity and therefore with rights to exercisechoice and follow certain preferences in life provided these do notimpinge unfairly on the lives of others. 43 Such a self amounts to littlemore than an arbitrary will and so it is hardly surprising to findDworkin arguing for policies that are difficult to reconcile with oneanother. So he recommends that pornography be tolerated even if itlowers the tone of society 44 but also contends that the state shouldsubsidise the fine arts so as to maintain a rich cultural heritage. 45 AsMendus has pointed out, this is hardly “a state which is neutral” inrespect of rival versions of the good, although it appears to be one“which is comfortable for the ‘cultured’ middle classes”. 46

This chance remark about social class may serve as another reminderabout the ideological character of liberalism. If its political philosophymasks an ambivalence about any who do not share the values to which

it is committed, its economic theory masks the impotence of any wholack the resources required for the exercise of effective choice. 47

This judgement may seem premature because we have yet toconsider the views of those liberals who present their case for toleration by reference to a reality that transcends the self. Such a “turn from thesubject” might lead to an account of freedom which is more realistic andso less arbitrary than any we have considered so far. Two eminent

42. Mill recognised that the process had begun by the time he was writing; see On

Liberty, 82-3 and especially 134-5 and 141-2 with the references to “individuals...lost in thecrowd”, the power of the “masses” and “the ascendancy of numbers” among other factors,including education, making for uniformity. Mill failed to notice, of course, that anindividual is at least partly a numerical concept.

43. Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and Euthanasia(London: HarperCollins, 1993) 239.

44. Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,1985) 352-8.

45. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle , 233.46. Mendus, Toleration, 139.47. Locke regarded property as a basic value which, together with life and liberty,

required the protection of “the magistrate” ( Epistola, 103), while Mill referred to “the so-called doctrine of Free Trade, which rests on grounds different from, though equally solidwith, the principle of individual liberty” set forth in his essay ( On Liberty, 164). Parsonsnotes the importance of property as one of the “forms of power” presupposed in the liberalparadigm ( Feminism, 56).




representatives of this movement in liberal theory are Michael Walzerand Richard Rorty.

M ICHAEL W ALZER AND R ICHARD R ORTY

In a tone reminiscent of Mill’s statement concerning the sovereigntyof the individual, Walzer prefaces his recent work On Toleration with thepronouncement: “Toleration makes difference possible; differencemakes toleration necessary.” 48 This is not just a reiteration, with a newemphasis, of Mill’s predilection for diversity. On the contrary, the focusis now not on individuals but “on groups of people with differenthistories, cultures, and identities”. 49 As Wolff has noted, this identi-fication of people with the groups to which they give their loyalty tendsto make people less tolerant of eccentric individuals. 50 Walzer wouldseem to regard this as a price worth paying, however, because heapplauds the extension of tolerance to individuals belonging to minoritygroups that has occurred during the twentieth century. “Democraticinclusiveness”, he writes, “is the first modernist project” and it has beenfollowed by a second which he characterises as “a struggle for boundaries” and whose slogan is “self-determination”. 51

An even greater emphasis on the political dimension is advocated byRorty, for whom a pragmatic commitment to a democratic preferencefor liberty is sufficient to sustain the practice of tolerance. Drawing

upon the idea of “reflective equilibrium” that is central to the accountthat John Rawls gives of justice, 52 Rorty argues that we have nowentered a phase of history in which philosophical issues can be relegatedto a private sphere just as religious matters were in the past. 53 Thus wemay “forget about truth and rationality” as “regulative ideals” 54 andleave “questions about the point of human existence or the meaning of human life” to philosophers and others who want to spend timediscussing them. 55 Rorty happens to think that the “light-minded

48. Walzer, On Toleration, p. xii. Like Stanley Hauerwas, I find it hard to believe thatWalzer, when he wrote this, was unaware of Reinhold Niebuhr’s famous dictum about justice: “Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination toinjustice makes democracy necessary” (Foreword to the first edition of The Children of Lightand the Children of Darkness [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944, repr. 1960] p. xiii).

49. Walzer, On Toleration, 2.50. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 38.51. Walzer, On Toleration, 85.52. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, in Outka and Reeder, Prospects

for a Common Morality, 266-8.53. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy”, 260. It should be noted,

however, that Mill anticipated this move: see On Liberty, 119, where he refers to “the evilsof religious or philosophical sectarianism”. He considered Comte to be an advocate of thelatter (p. 82) and thought it narrow-minded to confine one’s knowledge of philosophy toone school (see p. 177).

54. Rorty, “Truth And Freedom”, 279.55. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy”, 260.



34 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)aestheticism” of the post-modern self is peculiarly well adapted to thepragmatic requirements of a liberal democracy, including that of tolerance, 56 but he emphasises that such an understanding of selfhood isnot required as “a basis ” for a social order whose only regulative ideal is“freedom”. 57

Walzer is more worried about the “divided selves of post-modernity” 58 and, in particular, about the way in which individuals are becoming “increasingly dissociated” from the forces which shapecontemporary culture. 59 He not only suggests that post-modern selvesare “parasitic” on the groups which furnish the cultural material of “their self-fashioning”, 60 but also argues that governments will have todevelop programmes of support for “cultural associations” 61 with theaim of encouraging the emergence of “engaged men and women”whose advocacy and even “stridency” in support of particular socialaspirations will help promote “the social equality promised (and, inpart, delivered) by our regime of toleration”. 62 Reflecting an earliercomment on the way intolerance is exacerbated “when differences of culture, ethnicity, or race coincide with class differences”, 63 however, hetempers his optimism about the possible effects of such political actionwith the further observation that our “regime of toleration” is “steadily being undercut by economic inequality”. 64

Just as this call for a kind of social democratic programme 65 invitescivil authority to go beyond the neutrality traditionally associated with a

policy of toleration, so Walzer thinks that “the virtue of toleration” nowrequires more of individuals than the “resignation, indifference, stoicalacceptance” or “curiosity” in respect of others that formerly wereenough for it to be effective. What is needed in these days of distur- bance for moderni ty is nothing less than an “enthusiasm” fordiversity. 66

With such proposals Walzer would appear to stretch the idea of toleration beyond breaking point. To put up with people and practicesthat differ from one’s own is one thing; actually to promote them issurely quite another. Walzer has missed a subtle, yet important,distinction suggested by Wolff, who noted that a shift had occurred inthe implications of pluralism. In an earlier phase of “industrial

56. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy”, 268.57. Rorty, “The Priority of Democracy”, 266 and “Truth And Freedom”, 279.58. Walzer, On Toleration, 91.59. Walzer, On Toleration, 102-03.60. Walzer, On Toleration, 91.61. Walzer, On Toleration, 105.62 Walzer, On Toleration, 107-08.63. Walzer, On Toleration, 56.64. Walzer, On Toleration, 108.65. Walzer, On Toleration, 111-12.66. Walzer, On Toleration, 12.




democracy” 67 tolerance amounted to “the live-and-let-live of the marketplace”68 and allowed “the interest groups which make up the socialorder” to pursue these ends by “morally neutral means”. 69 Suchtolerance is “instrumental” and still dependent upon the “liberalphilosophy from which it derives” 70 but, in the conditions of “a pluralistdemocracy” that now obtain, tolerance has become the virtue parexcellence because it is “the state of mind which enables [a pluralistdemocracy] to perform its function well”. 71 Beyond this however, Wolf has little to say about the substance of the new tolerance. Neither does aphilosopher of pluralism and critic of liberalism, John Kekes who goesfurther than Walzer by calling for state intervention “to guarantee theconditions in which its citizens could make a good life for themselves”and includes among these conditions something “which wouldprobably be quite informal, like an ethos or a prevailing sensibility, thatwould maintain the spirit of tolerance and encouragement of individuality without which the plurality of values would hardly bepossible”. 72 These suggestions may not stretch the meaning of tolerancein the way that Walzer attempts but they leave the unfortunateimpression that, in a post-liberal, pluralist era, tolerance will involvelittle more than acquiescence on the part of citizens in such diversity asgovernments choose to foster.

Wolff looked forward to a time when “a new philosophy of community” would emerge “beyond pluralism and beyond tolerance” 73

but, however the “tale of tolerance” is to end, it has come a long way notonly from its beginnings around the time of Locke but also from whatmany would regard as its heyday in and after the time of Mill. The mostobvious indication of this has been the displacement of the individual asthe focus of attention. Diversity remains to the fore but at the expense of neutrality and calls for the state to promote group diversity are under-standably alarming not just to some groups but also to manyindividuals. The latter are unlikely to be pacified by suggestions thatthey either become enthusiastic about diversity or acquiescent in it,although they may well agree that the former hardly qualifies astoleration, which becomes an issue “only where there is diversitycoupled with disapproval, dislike or disgust”, together with a capacity,

however minimal, to do something about it.74

67. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 6.68. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 20.69. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 15-16.70. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 23-24.71. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 23.72. Kekes, Morality of Pluralism, 214-15.73. Wolff, “Beyond Tolerance”, 52.74. Mendus, Toleration, 15, 20.



36 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)ENG AG EMENT WITH D IVERSITY : THE THEOLOG IANS

Having gained some idea of what is involved in the practice of tolerance and, in particular, of its changeability in the course of recenthistory, the reasons why theologians have had so little to say about it areworthy of brief consideration. Ian Markham has pointed out that a“Christendom” mentality continued to prevail until recently in Britainand Europe and so tolerance was only conceded as a necessary evil in aliberal social order that had lost its focus. 75 The same might also betruer of the United States than Markham is prepared to admit becauseliberals, such as the philosopher, Michael Walzer, continue to harbour

doubts about the tolerance to be extended to the bodies to which mosttheologians belong. “Internally intolerant and illiberal groups”, hewrites, “( like most churches, say) can be tolerated in a liberal societyinsofar as they take the form of voluntary associations. But can they betolerated as autonomous communities with coercive authority over theirmembers?” 76

Reinhold Niebuhr was an American theologian who now standsaccused by some of accommodating Christian teaching too closely to thevalues of a liberalism that can raise such questions about churches. 77 Inthe circumstances of his time, however, it is understandable that he andmany other Christians should have considered the justice delivered by aliberal regime to be a better approximation of Christian love than that ondisplay in totalitarian societies. Even more enthusiastic about theirsocial context were some theologians who, taking their inspiration fromDietrich Bonhoeffer and his idea of a “world come of age”, 78 welcomedthe advent of “the new man” 79 and “the secular city”. 80 For them thevalues of a liberal society represented the secular expression and, in asense, the culmination of centuries of Christian influence on Westernculture. Such post World War II optimism was not, however, to lastlong.

75. Markham, Plurality, 124-5.76. Walzer, On Toleration, 46 (my italics). The prototypes of the “voluntary as-

sociations” were, of course, some of the anabaptist churches formed around the time of theReformation. How ironical, then, that a Mill could scarcely conceive of a free decision tosubmit oneself to their kind of discipline and that a Walzer and a Rorty doubt whethertheir successors can be tolerated or allowed to participate in public disputation.

77. See for example John Milbank, “The Poverty of Niebuhrianism”, in The Word MadeStrange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997) chapter 10, esp. 239-41;Hauerwas (with Michael Broadway), “The Irony of Reinhold Niebuhr: The IdeologicalCharacter of ‘Christian Realism’” in Wilderness Wanderings, 48-61.

78. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison (London: SCM, 1967) 178-82, 188-9, 192-3, 195-7.

79. See Ronald Gregor Smith, The New Man: Christianity and Man’s Coming of Age(London: SCM, 1956).

80. See Harvey G. Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in TheologicalPerspective (London: SCM, 1966).




Indeed, behind this optimism one may suspect there was lurking afear of the Gospel being rendered irrelevant in and to modern culture. Itis just such a fear that comes to expression in Markham’s work, Pluralityand Christian Ethics, as he tries to demonstrate “that the contemporarythreats to plurality do not come from religion, but from secularism” because the latter, with its nihilism, “is the greater danger totolerance”. 81 Reading this, one is reminded of arguments by Tertullianand other Fathers of the early church for the legitimacy of Christianparticipation in the “religious market-place”, now often referred to as“the public square”. As Guy Stroumsa has wryly noted, their “cogentand impressive arguments for religious toleration” were soon forgottenfollowing the conversion of Constantine. 82

Fear of a more liberal kind clearly animates the concern that NigelBiggar expresses about the future of tolerance. Unless this liberal valueis defended, he suggests, the field will be left to “the unchecked tide of moral nihilism” and eventually, when it tires of being challenged, “thepseudo-tolerance of private convenience will reveal itself, in all itsnatural ruthlessness”. 83

How “liberal” a concept of tolerance Biggar has to offer us is,however, open to question. For he contends that a tolerance whichmerely leaves others alone “is actually demeaning” and often resented by those who are its recipients. 84 This is precisely one of the reasonswhy Mendus thinks a liberal conception of toleration is inadequate,although she makes the point in relation to the need to “promote a senseof belonging” on the part of different groups “to society as a whole”. 85

The tolerance recommended by Biggar has something of the socialistinclusivism sought by Mendus but is based on the “enthusiasm” which,as we have seen, takes Walzer beyond the bounds of liberalism. It is a“kind of tolerance” that “engages with what it lets be” and it does so “indialogue” which seeks to be “co-operative” and so “creates com-munity”. 86

The manner in which Biggar proceeds to describe this process of en-gagement is intensely personal. He refers to care for other persons andwhat they believe and to exercise of patience when confronted bysomebody reluctant to enter into dialogue so that we may “gently coax

him” in.87

If this is all there is to it, we may happily leave it to those of

81. Markham, Plurality, 194.82. G. Stroumsa, “Tertullian on Idolatry and the Limits of Tolerance” and “Postscript”

in Stanton and Stroumsa, Tolerance and Intolerance , 174-75 and 360. Stroumsa makes it clearthat the tolerance in question is that favoured by pluralists whose concern is that it beextended to groups rather than individuals.

83. Biggar, Good Life,92.84. Biggar, Good Life, 87.85. Mendus, Toleration, 158-60.86. Biggar, Good Life, 89-90.87. Biggar, Good Life, 90.




people and called to be a light to the nations, bearing witness to the onewho is believed to be the way, the truth and the life. The humility that belongs to this mission is subtly, but importantly, different from thatenjoined by Markham. It certainly involves a recognition of mylimitations and so keeps open the possibility of learning something from“the perspectives of others” but this is not the point of the exercise. Thisconsists rather in the knowledge that earthen vessels cannot perfectlyconvey the light of the world. The inadequacy of our witness to thislight is certain whereas learning from others is much less sure.

The humility which Markham recommends to us, then, is merelyepistemological and this serves to reinforce the impression that hispolicy is really intended to drive members of communities into engage-ment with others who are different. Apart from the possibility of learning something from this engagement, however, there is no sug-gestion of a historical point to it. On the contrary, its intelligibility isreferred beyond history, to the creator god who serves as its “guaran-tee”. That will not serve as much comfort for any who fail to learnsomething of value through their engagement with diversity.

Markham admits that engagement may give rise to disagreement andhe even notes that the latter can be protracted and frustrating, as overthe issue of abortion. 92 What he omits to mention is that it can also beviolent, especially in the land he credits with making “a culturaldiscovery”, the United States. 93 He may have had such a risk in mind,however, because on the penultimate page of his book he stops talkingabout engagement and falls back on the idea of tolerance. Well may weask, in the absence of “the spirit of tolerance” to which Kekes also refersnear the end of his book on pluralism, who or what will keep the peacewhen some groups menace others as parts of the process of on-goingand open-ended engagement with diversity?

Markham has something to say about this too. Given the politicalnature of his proposal, this is not surprising, although the direction inwhich he points us is hardly reassuring. He finds “encouraging signs”in a “new ecumenism” that James Hunter has outlined in his book,Culture Wars . This involves “distinct and separate religions and moraltraditions” setting out to “share resources and work together toward

common objectives” on a range of issues and forming “alliances” onsome of them. Markham even entertains the hope that such “cross-community alliances” might produce “a new moral consensus” 94 andthus gives the game away entirely. For this is a hope that looks for a

92. Markham, Plurality, 192.93. Markham, Plurality, 194. By contrast, Stroumsa observes the increase in violence

that accompanied the new emphasis on religious identity in “the first Christian centuriesand late antiquity” (“Postscript” 357).

94. Markham, Plurality, 193 (referring to James D. Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle toDefine America [New York: Basic Books, 1991]).



40 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)“trickle down” effect from the work undertaken by the managers of theprocess, the official representatives of the groups. Thus, as AlasdairMacintyre might say, are we to be consigned again to the bureaucraticfate of late liberal society 95 or, as Wolff observed many years ago, to asituation in which, there seems no rhyme or reason why some groups“count” or make it “inside” the process, while others are left “outside”it?96 Writing at the same time as Wolff, Herbert Marcuse detected some-thing even worse in all this, namely, a “passive” tolerance whereby, inexchange for prosperity, the governed are prepared to put up with thedeterminations of those who govern a supposedly democratic society. 97

We may now ask whether theological critics of tolerance can match sucha damning judgement as this!

C OMMITMENT TO P EACE

Stanley Hauerwas has been a persistent theological critic of liberalismand he has stated his objections to the liberal practice of tolerance quitesuccinctly. “Tolerance”, he writes, which may be regarded as “theprimary cardinal virtue of the morality of mutual respect, cannot help but kill.” 98 This judgement is to be understood, first of all, “quiteliterally” and it echoes something of the concern expressed by Marcuse,who matches the “passive toleration of entrenched and establishedattitudes and ideas even if their damaging effect on man and nature isevident” with an “active, official toleration granted to the Right as wellas to the Left”. 99 Whereas Marcuse, with his utopian vision of a“democratic educational dictatorship of free men”, is prepared to coun-tenance left-wing violence as a means to the end of liberation, 100

however, Hauerwas condemns violence from any source as a betrayal of the kingdom of peace that God has inaugurated in Christ. 101 ForChristians, then, resort to violence would be a denial of their commit-ment and false witness.

Tolerance is lethal in another respect according to Hauerwas. It “killsthe soul”.102 The poet, W. B. Yeats, had something similar in mindwhen he wrote:

I did not foresee, not having the courage of my own thought:

95. Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981)

24-27.96. Wolff, “Beyond Toleration”, 40-44.97. Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance”, in A Critique of Pure Tolerance, 83-85.98. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 120.99. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance”, 85.100. Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance”, 106, 116-17.101. Many of Hauerwas’ works revolve around this theme. A central work focussing

on the theme is The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer In Christian Ethics (Notre Dame, IN:University of Notre Dame, 1983).

102. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 120.




The growing murderousness of the world....The best lack all conviction while the worstAre full of passionate intensity. 103

A more prosaic account of the limitations of the “best” is provided byRorty, who admits “that even if the typical character types of liberaldemocracies are bland, calculating, petty, and unheroic, the prevalenceof such people may be a reasonable price to pay for politicalfreedom”. 104 In more Christian, if not more positive, terms we may notewith Linda Woodhead and others the modern tendency to define love as“regard” or “respect” and thus to reduce it to “an attitude of minimum

beneficence, more like basic tolerance or acceptance than anything morepositive”. As Woodhead observes, such a “cool, emotionally detachedattitude” may well be appropriate for the exercise of “one-way love”. 105

When dealing with strangers it is probably all that is required, initiallyat least, but it hardly represents the passion of the two-way love which bears one another’s burdens and so fulfils the law of Christ (Gal 6:2),and which enters into each other’s joys so that apostolic joy may becomplete (Phil 2:2).

The crowning virtue of the Christian life which enables two to walk together is itself enabled by the all-embracing love of God in Christ.Such love is also all-demanding. So we may conclude with Hauerwasthat Christians

have no use for tolerance. We are not going to validate a publicpolytheism even if it buys us a ‘peace’ (which, when translated, is just another way of saying ‘we are not being physically killed at themoment’). The God we worship as Christians wants it all. ‘Renderunto God the things that are God’s and unto Caesar the things thatare Caesar’s’ is not what Caesar wants to hear. Caesar also wants itall – particularly when Caesar has become ‘democratic’. 106

To the liberal protestation that such a commitment to a peace that is“not of this world” will disturb the peace that is a prime object of tolerance, Hauerwas replies that “the confrontation between theologyand ‘the secular’ cannot be other than conflictual, as hegemonic nar-ratives, when confronted by their hegemony, always attempt to claimthat ‘peace’ is being threatened”. 107

103. Cited in Barrington Moore Jr., “Tolerance and the Scientific Outlook” in A Critique

of Pure Tolerance, 53.104. Hauerwas, “The Priority of Democracy”, 265.105. Linda Woodhead, “Love And Justice”, Studies in Christian Ethics 5 (1992) 44-61, see

p. 47.106. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 116.107. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 194. Both Locke (Epistola, 89, 93) and Mill (On

Liberty, 151) expressed concern about “fanatics”. The latter, however, was more concernedabout the “bigotry” he observed in bodies such as churches and in the English middle class



42 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)Confrontation such as this may not be welcome in the market-place,

still less in the more managed public square, but it seems a more ap-propriate method for dealing with liberals than the general policy of engagement recommended by Markham. For liberals think they candictate the terms of what will occur in the square. Thus Walzer, as wehave already seen, condescends only to admit those who behave in amanner that befits the members of “voluntary associations”, whileRorty, in terms reminiscent of Locke and, to a lesser extent, of Mill,applauds the way Rawls dismisses a religious commitment to God asthe “dominant good” because it “strikes us...as mad” and himself insiststhat “tolerance must stop short of a willingness to work within anyvocabulary that one’s interlocutor wishes to use”. 108

Markham is under no illusions about views such as these. On thecontrary, he thinks they indicate how secularism poses a greater threatto tolerance than does religion. His invitation to engagement istherefore directed principally to “faith communities” 109 but, in thisconnection too, we must surely beware of those with “hegemonicnarratives”, including many who call upon the name of Christ. Theviolence to which some of the latter have been and still are prone, notonly lends credence to the views of Rorty and other liberals, but alsoleads Hauerwas to argue that Christians must temper their zeal whendealing with Jews and American Indians who have suffered so muchfrom it in the past. 110 Commitment to a God of truth, then, does not

entail a general policy of confrontation.A deeper challenge to this kind of religious commitment has beenissued by Jacob Neusner who, while he shares something of Hauerwas’dissatisfaction with tolerance, suggests that the trajectory of humanhistory now requires that religions come to terms with each other inways that are unprecedented. In particular, they will have to think,“within their own theological framework and religious system, aboutthe place within the structure of the other outside of it...something noreligion has ever accomplished up to this time”. In other words, the eraof toleration, with what Neusner describes as its “meretriciousrelativism” which allows something to be “right for the other but not forme”, is over. 111 The day of the welcome outsider has dawned, but doesany religion have the resources with which to accommodate such astranger? (see On Liberty, 76, 98-9). He advocated tolerance of those whom church or society branded as heretics or lunatics (31-6, 136-7).

108. Hauerwas, “The Priority of Democracy”, 271, n. 7 (referring to John Rawls, ATheory of Justice[Cambridge, MA: The Belknap of Harvard University, 1971] 553-5) and 265.

109. Markham, Plurality, 191-92.110. Hauerwas, Against the Nations, 74-8, and Wilderness Wanderings, 194-5.111. See Stephen C. Barton, “Paul and the Limits of Tolerance” in Stanton and

Stroumsa, Tolerance and Intolerance , 133, n. 24, citing Neusner’s “Shalom: Complementarity”in his Jews and Christians: The Myth of a Common Tradition (London: SCM, 1991) 107.




P ATIENC E : AN ESC HATOLOG ICAL VIRTUE

It remains to be seen whether pressures for a global extension of civicpeace, reflecting what Hans-Georg Gadamer has identified as an“intensified need for security” in a scientific age, 112 will lead not just toan engagement between major religions but to the kind of rapproche-ment that Neusner considers desirable. Suffice to note that at this pointin time religions such as Judaism and Christianity, while not lacking inresources for sympathetic treatment of outsiders, 113 continue to en-courage the kind of total commitment identified by Hauerwas and thusto render some degree of competition inevitable, even if this is tempered by a growing appreciation of the possibilities of cooperation. Instead of waiting to see whether the market-place or public square will prove to be the site from which a new consensus emerges, secularists especiallywill be tempted to look for ways of strengthening international or evenimperial bodies so that culture wars might be nipped in the bud, if notaverted. 114

Whatever the future holds in store, Christians can practise a way of meeting it which has much in common with tolerance but also has alonger and better pedigree and therefore avoids many of the drawbacksthat have become evident as the story of the liberal virtue has unfolded.I refer, of course, to the practice of patience which has been commended

to those who would follow the way of the Lord from the outset. In thisconnection a rather curious article on the subject of tolerance by DaveLeal is most revealing. Towards the end of his article the authorsuggests that Christians “will find resources for a logic of toleration inmany facets of the tradition” among which he includes the discussion of provisionality and hope in the letter of Paul to the Romans. 115 As anyreader of the Pauline or other scriptural passages referred to by Lealshould realise, however, the early Christians did not lack terms fordescribing the practice that was closely connected to their hope. Theyhad them and among them were two Greek terms, hypomone andmakrothymia, which have been commonly rendered in English as

112. Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age

(Cambridge: Polity, 1996) 159.113. See, for example, the biblical prescriptions in Exod 22: 21 and Lev 24:22 on the

treatment of aliens and in Matt 25:35 and Heb 13:2 on entertaining strangers; also Luke:14:16-24 (the parable of the wedding feast).

114. It is noteworthy that the first two of the “five regimes of toleration” that Walzerdiscusses in the second chapter of his book are multinational empires, which focus on thegroups to which people belong, and international society, in which the state treats “all itscitizens as individuals rather than as members of groups” ( On Toleration, 31).

115. Dave Leal, “Tolerance”, Studies in Christian Ethics 9 (1996) 36-51, see p. 50.



44 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)patience (see Rom 5:3-4; 2 Cor 1:6; 6:6; Gal 5:22; Eph 4:2; Col 1:11;compare Rom 12:12).116

Leal also suggests, mistakenly but again revealingly, that the conceptof tolerance has its “primary focus” on relations between individualsand not on those among groups. 117 Much of what he then proceeds todescribe as the rationale for tolerance, in the sense of an individual re-fraining from intervention when others act in defiance of his or hermoral commitments, would be acceptable to a man or woman of patience. Such persons would also think twice about intervening incases where they lacked the capacity to do so or the others the capacityto act differently, as well as in cases of uncertainty about one’s own judgement or in situations where a higher good, such as the develop-ment of the other towards maturity, seemed to justify a suspension of one’s own judgement. 118 Such overlap between a Christian and a liberalpractice may be taken to indicate that the presence of the former in thelives of the individuals on whom Leal focuses his attention providedfertile ground in which the latter could take root and flourish. In otherwords, the development of tolerance can be seen in relation to patienceas an example of what Hauerwas describes as “the subtle co-option of the Christian narratives” by “those of the Enlightenment”. 119

This judgement is strengthened by consideration of the extent towhich patience can endorse the marks of tolerance exhibited on the broader scale of public affairs. In particular, there seems no reason to

think that Christians should be other than appreciative of attempts toachieve civic peace, even though they are under no illusions about thedifficulties involved, especially for democracies, or that they should lack respect for groups that differ from themselves, especially when thesedifferences are based on deep commitments like their own. Beyond this,the memory if not the direct experience of their own periods of non-conformity should alert them to the point of Mill’s concerns about thetyranny of public opinion and its tendency to stifle genius and banisheccentricity. This, in turn, suggests that patience can make room evenfor the enthusiasm with which some wish to engage with diversity,although the risk that this entails of being led in trendy but falsedirections will not be overlooked, and so the “patients” can be reliedupon to hold the enthusiasts to account. For there is one thing thatChristians are specially charged to give an account of and it is intimately

116. Hypomone denotes “the quality of endurance under trials” and makrothymia “anattitude [of long suffering] with respect to people” (see J. D. Douglas and Merrill C. Tenney(eds.), The New International Dictionary of the Bible [Grand Rapids MI: Zondervan, 1987] 755-6). The argument for the priority of patience over tolerance (toleration) finds some supportin the fact that the former appears in written English more than a century before either of the latter; see The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1975) Vol. 2, 1528).

117. Leal, “Tolerance”, 36.118. Leal, “Tolerance”, 42-43.119. Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 194.



46 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)While patience may sometimes express itself in ways similar to those

of tolerance, in practice it will also differ significantly. For one thing itwill be marked by a hope that renders it historically dynamic in copingwith change and seeking reconciliation through attention to the noveldemands of human relationship. Tolerance, by contrast, involves amore temporal practice in the sense of being content with the currentstate of affairs. It is less demanding of its practitioners; in particular, itmakes little or no sense of forgiveness.

In this connection, too, the article by Leal is quite revealing. Notingthat forgiveness is an alternative to tolerance as a way of resolving “thetension between that which I permit and that which I desire”, he goes onto identify the former with “a position of moral superiority andapparent strength” and to suggest that, unless a person who offersforgiveness fully appreciates “the cost of penitence to the other”, he orshe may be branded “an intolerable prig”. 122 This judgement is in stark contrast with those of Mendus and Biggar concerning the capacity of tolerance to alienate its recipients and provoke their resentment. Itmistakenly equates the practice of forgiveness with the kind of condescension that leads Walzer and Rorty to limit the contribution thatreligious representatives may make in the public arena. The reason forthe mistake is plain. It consists in construing the practice of forgivenessaccording to a model not of community life but of economic exchangeamong individuals who might as well be strangers to one another.

Recognition of the cost of penitence is therefore conceived to be the onlymeans of redeeming an otherwise inegalitarian practice.Leal is, of course, right to find fault with any who assume a position

of moral superiority in relation to their fellows. But the solution to thisproblem does not lie in the abstract equality of individuals loath topractise forgiveness. Rather is it to be found in the memory of historical beings who know themselves to be forgiven. Their dealings with oneanother therefore display a humility which matches the modesty withwhich they disagree with those who differ from them. This modestymay be regarded as an expression of the patience, and this humility anexpression of the kindness which, according to the great “hymn” of 1Corinthians 13, are the first fruits of love. Together, these virtues orientChristians towards the practice of hospitality which, as Hauerwas hassuggested, “means we cannot as a matter of fact act violently toward ourneighbor”. 123

If those who practise patience think it is better, where possible, toforgive than to tolerate, they should also be more sceptical than liberalsand pluralists about talk of human equality, whether this be based on asupposed dignity and autonomy of individuals or on a conception of

122. Leal, “Tolerance” 45.123. Personal communication.




justice that involves equal rights for groups. Although some theologianstry to move Christians into a modernist or post-modernist camp byappealing to a doctrine of creation and the imago dei in all human beings,the complacency with which they pass over the death of the “newAdam” who is the true imago dei and ignore the eschatological promiseof his resurrection betrays the true nature of their cause. For it is onlywhen hope is fulfilled and God is all in all that human equality will become something to celebrate rather than to argue about, and thenthere will no longer be any need for appeals to rights.

Until then such appeals will be treated with caution by men andwomen of true patience – not only because of their lack of substantialgrounds but also because of some of their practical implications. For, atthe subjective level, the bearers of purported rights and their supportersare intolerably inclined to impatience, thinking of their rights as“trumps” which should be promptly conceded. In the public arena,meanwhile, the bearers of different rights are in constant tension andsometimes open conflict with one another. A body politic in such a stateof multiple fracture is incapable of being at peace with itself. A betterprospect for peace is offered by the practice of patience which is moreconcerned about redressing wrongs than about conceding rights.

With the body politic in such an unhealthy state, any suggestion thatthe state should practise toleration by observing a strict neutrality con-cerning human values is revealed as a sham because it would simplypermit the stronger to increase their advantages over the weaker. Thesame risk seems also to attend the pluralist recommendation that somegroups be encouraged by government as a means of promoting thegeneral welfare of society because the reluctance to concede strongleadership to government makes it unlikely that weaker groups wouldhave much success in pressing their claims. Patience of a Christian kindwould prefer to see a state more committed to the inclusion of themarginalised, a general policy which, ironically, has commended itself to Christian consciousness in recent years as a result, largely, of theteachings of a most impatient form of Christian theology advocatingliberation for the poor and oppressed. The validity of this basic insightmust, however, be balanced by a recognition, born of patience and to be

borne with it, that systems of worldly power cannot deliver lastingpeace. Some do better than others and this justifies a preference forthose which promote a more inclusive social order but even in the bestsome people will be called to bear witness to a better hope by enduringtheir lot of suffering and these will not only be those whom liberationtheology categorises as “poor”. 124

124. The policies of justice advocated by liberation theology are more “corrective” than

“substantive” and, as such, run the risk of “over-correction” if they are ever implemented,



48 PACIFICA 13 (FEBRUARY 2000)As this way of referring to suffering is meant to imply, it is hardly

something which is to be sought, as though it had meaning or value initself. On the contrary, for Christians it only has any point in referenceto a cross and resurrection which offer hope that the reality of death willnot be reality’s last word. They offer hope because they are the ex-pression of God’s patient love for a world that still refuses toacknowledge the things that make for genuine peace and good will(Luke 19:42).

As mentioned earlier, patience is the first of the fruits of love iden-tified in the “hymn” of 1 Corinthians 13. Unlike the values of liberalismand pluralism, those born of love are worth singing about and so Chris-tianity has its music. This helps us to rejoice even in our suffering and itindicates that, even in its darkest hour, patience retains its dynamismand sheds its light of hope. For it is a true expression of the love which“casts out fear” (1 John 4:18), whereas tolerance, like its opposite, isdoomed to remain forever fearful about how much room to make forthose who are different in a world where it is wrongly believed thatthere is not enough room for all. 125

just as the implementation of medical policies in a scientific age almost always do; seeGadamer, The Enigma, 113-14.

125. Milbank, “The Name of Jesus”, 154-6.

end of tolerance

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