Empowerment in Mainstream Psychology:Legitimacy, Obstacles, and Possibilities

ISAAC PRIIXELTENSK.Y

Wilfrid Laurier University

AbstractHitherto, the concept of empowerment hasbeen largely denied a place of prominence inboth mainstream academic and applied psy-chology. It is argued that if this concept is toexpand beyond the field of community psy-chology into more traditional areas of psychol-ogy, such as social, personality, clinical andschool psychology, its moral and psychologicalfoundations should be more clearly articu-lated. In order to advance this proposition, anintegrativc conceptual model of empower-ment is presented. Within this framework, theethical and therapeutic legitimacy ofempowering practices, obstacles for theirinclusion in mainstream psychology, andpossibilities for their future development areexplored. Some of the benefits to be derivedfrom the adoption of the concept ofempowerment in academic and applied psy-chology are outlined.

If research on empowerment and policiesdesigned to empower individuals are to reachbeyond community psychology and have animpact in other, more traditional areas suchas clinical, school, personality, and socialpsychology, then it is incumbent upon com-munity psychologists to assert die legitimacyof these endeavours. I will argue that theethical, psychological and therapeutic foun-dations of empowerment provide amplelegitimacy for its vigorous pursuit in thediscipline.

Empowerment is generally understood asinterventions and policies intended to

Canadian Psychology/Psychologic canadiennc, 35:4

enhance the degree of control vulnerableindividuals exercise over their lives(Rappaport, 1981,1987). Hitherto, this con-cept has been largely denied a respectableplace in mainstream academic and appliedpsychology (Joffe & Albee, 1988; Sarason1982, 1988). With the notable exception ofcommunity psychologists (Florin & Wanders-man, 1990; Wolff, 1987; Zimmerman 8cRappaport, 1988) and some primary prevent-ionists (Albec, Joffe, & Dusenbury, 1988),psychologists have neglected to viewempowerment research and/or practice aslegitimate activities. In die most recent edi-tion of'the Journal ofSocial Issues (Spacapan& Thompson, 1991), entided "Perceivedcontrol in vulnerable populations," no refer-ences could be found to die concept ofempowerment. Similarly, no specific mentionof this concept could be seen in the newbook The psychology of human control(Friedman & Lackey, 1991). These are onlytwo examples of missed opportunities by con-trol researchers to take advantage of studieson empowerment (e.g., Rappaport, Swift &Hess, 1984; Zimmerman, 1990). This paperis designed to enhance the cross-fertilizationbetween research on empowerment andsome mainstream psychological theories andpractices. The concept of explanatory styleadvanced by Seligman (1990), and the fourmodels of helping and coping identified byBrickman et al. (1982) will be instrumentalin demonstrating the connections betweenempowerment, theories of control, andcounseling approaches.

The article is divided into four parts. Thefirst section presents a conceptual model ofempowerment. This is necessary in order to(a) clarify the various meanings of die term,and (h) provide a framework for researchand action. The second section elaborates onthe legitimate ethical and psychologicalfoundations of empowerment. While the

Empowerment in Mainstream Psychology 359

Figure 1. A descriptive and prescriptive model of empowerment.

third part deals with obstacles to be encoun-tered in promoting empowerment in main-stream psychology, the last portion offerssome directions to facilitate this integration.

Empowerment: A Descriptive and Prescrip-tive ModelThe purpose of the model to be presentedis twofold: (a) to understand the concept ofempowerment by delineating its mullifacetednature, and (b) to provide a framework forthe advancement of research and action inthis area. In other words, the model willdescribe the constitutive elements of empow-erment and serve as a basis for its prescrip-tion in psychology.

The circular representation of the modelfound in Figure 1 highlights the main threeelements of empowerment as discussed inthe literature. These arc values, processesand agents/stakeholders. Each third of themodel is subdivided into three sections. Theouter circle denotes the main componentsof empowerment at their most abstract level.The middle circle specifies the question/s to

be asked of values, processes and agents/stakeholders. The inner circle details inconcrete form the meaning of the key consti-tutive elements. The values of empowerment,that is, selfdetermination, distributive justice,and collaborative and democratic participa-tion, inform and guide the process as wellthe agents/stakeholders of empowerment.This influence is represented in Figure 1 bythe arrows pointing from values to the othertwo sections. These values are incorporatedby researchers as well as by human servicesproviders. The arrows pointing from pro-cesses to agents/stakeholders and vice versarepresent the dynamic relationship betweenthe people who conduct research and inter-ventions and the processes involved. 1 willdiscuss now each section of the model inmore detail.

VALUESValues play a central role in empowermentresearch and actions. Empowerment studiesand empowering interventions arc explicitlyconcerned with, and guided by, three princi-

360 Prilleltensky

pal moral values: self-determination, distribu-tive justice, and collaborative and democraticparticipation. The ethical foundations ofthese values will be articulated in the nextsection of this paper. My intention at thisjuncture is to show that these values havebeen central in the development of theconcept of empowerment.

Against a background of paternalisticattitudes in social and psychological interven-tions (Swift, 1984), Rappaport (1981, 1986,1987) advanced the concept and practice ofempowerment in psychology as means towardthe achievement of self-determination ofindividuals in need of changes in their lives.The inherent value of persons choosing acourse of action on their own is indeed aconstitutive part of what Riessman (1986)called the empowerment ethos. Self-determi-nation, as a fundamental principle in humanservices, has been recognized not only inpsychology, but also in social work (Breton,1989; McDermott, 1975; Moreau, 1990), socialpolicy (Boyte, 1990, McKnight, 1989;Wineman, 1984), education (Freire, 1971,1985), and even agriculture and engineering(Ovitt, 1989), among other professions.

The second value, distributive justice,promotes fair and equitable distribution ofresources and burdens in society (Miller,1978). This value derives from the realizationthat misery and happiness are largely dic-tated by the way material goods and accessto services are allocated in society. Contraryto the enduring belief in North America thatequality of opportunity exists, the promotersof empowerment assert that the unequaldistribution of wealth and power in societyseverely restricts access to services, educationand employment (Albee, 1986; Boyte &Riessman, 1986; Rappaport, 1984). Conse-quently, empowerment calls for interventionsdesigned to rectify this imbalance of oppor-tunities wherever it exists. Distributive justiceapplies at the micro-social level, wherepeople and small groups negotiate the fairallocation of resources, as well as at themacro-social sphere, where advocacy, socialand political action are called for.

The third fundamental value underpin-ning the notion of empowerment is collabo-rative and democratic participation. Thisvalue reflects best the ideal that personsaffected by individual and social interven-tions should be part of the decision-makingprocess. This principle, also identified byRiessman (1986) as a key element of theempowerment ethos, is a defining character-istic of empowering scientific and socio-politi-cal processes (Rappaport, 1990).

These three constitutive moral valuesinform the actions of researchers, therapistsand social interventionists identified with thetenets of empowerment. In the next twosections we shall see how these principlespermeate the people and processes involvedin empowerment.

AGENTS/STAKEHOLDERSThe process of empowerment may take placeeither as a result of the natural actions ofpersons desirous of attaining higher degreesof control over their affairs, or as a conse-quence of social interventions coming fromoutside the setting. Agents are the peoplewhose actions empower themselves and/orothers. Stakeholders are persons or groupsinvited to participate in the process. Theideal is for the stakeholders to becomeagents of empowerment themselves as soonas possible. As Lerner (1991) recently showedin his work with individuals, families andentire communities, empowerment mayoccur at any of these levels. Briefly stated,this third of the model describes the peopleinvolved and affected by empowering inter-ventions. Their actions are expected touphold the values described in the previoussection. Whereas Serrano-Garcia (1984),Wolff (1987), and Chavis and Wandersman(1990) demonstrate how these values areincorporated into research and interventionswith entire communities, Dunst, Trivette andDeal (1988) illustrate the fusion of empower-ment values with clinical practice.

PROCESSESThis section of the model represents the

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variety of actions and processes taking placein studying and promoting empowerment.These may be best understood by posing thefollowing questions: how, when, and wheredocs empowerment occur, and what are thenecessary and sufficient conditions for it todevelop. The inner circle of Figure 1 showsthe two main processes of empowerment: re-search and action. Actions take many forms.They may be the result of powerless individ-uals initiating social action, or they may comefrom professionals involved in communityorganizing, or from therapists empoweringwomen to leave abusive relationships.

What defines an intervention as empower-ing is not its specific content but rather itsadherence to the values of empowerment. Inone case political action may be called for inorder to improve the housing conditions ofa community. In another case empowermentmay take die form of helping a persondeflect blame for problems from internalsources to external oppressive conditions. Asnoted earlier, self-determination, distributivejustice, and collaborative and democraticparticipation should predominate at all levelsof human co-existence. Therefore, depend-ing upon die situation, empowering pro-cesses may be necessary to advance die inter-ests and rights of vulnerable persons in thecontext of relationships, families, occupa-tional settings, educational institutions, socialand political structures, and practically everyrealm of human endeavour (Lemer, 1991).

The complex nature of social settingswhere empowerment is called for necessitatesdiat psychologists be more versatile andcreative in their interventions. Greaterdegrees of control for vulnerable peoplecannot always be attained by counseling anddierapy. Social policy recommendations andpolitical actions may have to be incorporatedinto the psychologist's repertoire.

The analysis of empowerment along diedimensions of values, agents/stakeholders,and processes furnishes a systematic under-standing of die field at die same time diat itserves to guide research and action. Al-diough odler models of empowerment have

been proposed before (e.g., Wolff, 1987), Ibelieve die present one to be unique in itsexplicit emphasis on moral principles. Inaddition, die model advanced here mayprove to be (a) of heuristic value in inter-preting and organizing die field of empower-ment, and (b) useful in disseminating thisconcept in mainstream psychology.

LegitimacyThe model of empowerment described aboverests on philosophical as well as psychologicalfoundations. Both aspects are necessary toattain an integralive and holistic understand-ing of empowerment. Moreover, they aremutually complementary. While die moralphilosophical basis provides the justificationfor pursuing empowerment, die psychologi-cal ground facilitates its promotion.

THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF EMPOWERMENT

Although the prevailing discourse on empow-erment is marked by ethical connotations(Rappaport, 1990), its moral foundationshave not yet been fully explicated. In thepresent atmosphere of so-called pluralismand ethical relativism, the risk exists of misin-terpreting moral imperatives as moral predi-lections (Lemer, 1991; Wolfe, 1989). As aresult, mainstream psychologists may con-tinue to regard advocacy and empowermentas activities which arc largely dictated, not byethics, but by personal world-views and pref-erences. I contend that a compelling argu-ment for empowerment can, and should bemade, on die basis of the ethical obligationsof psychologists toward society in general andvulnerable populations in particular (secSteininger, Newell, &: Garcia, 1984; O'Neill,1989). Odierwise, mainstream psychologistswill continue to regard empowerment as amatter of personal choice and not as a mat-ter of moral duty. Following a discussion ofthe ethical principles of empowerment, I willattempt to show how these values resonatein die professional ethics literature.

Ethical principles. The direc fundamentalpillars of empowerment arc sclf-determina-

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tion, distributive justice and collaborative anddemocratic participation. As noted earlier inthe model, these principles are widely prom-ulgated by empowerment practitioners. Eachof diese values has a respectable tradition inmoral philosophy.

Following Olson's (1978) analysis of free-dom, self-determination may be thought ofas "the individual's ability to pursue chosengoals without excessive frustration" (p. 45).The capacity to carry out one's objectives inlife is, according to Rawls, "perhaps the mostimportant primary good" (1972, p. 440). Thisconstituent element of self-respect, Rawlsclaims, "implies a confidence in one's ability... to fulfill one's intentions" (1972, p. 440).Ortega y Gassct (1983), who wrote extensive-ly about self-determination (Ramos Mattci,1987), captured die human essence of thisvalue in die expression that 'To live is toconstantly decide what we are to become"(1983, p. 190, author's translation).

The primary good inherent in a sense ofautonomy, personal freedom and self-deter-mination may be threatened by at least twosources: (a) a restrictive psychosocial environ-ment, and (b) paternalism. Concerning theformer, Aboulafia (1986) states diat "it isclear that die other(s) and die social-econ-omic system can inhibit and prevent dierealization of such a self... The obstacle Ispeak of is the relationship of dominanceversus subordinancc" (Aboulafia, 1986, p.104). The interpersonal and societal barriersto self-determination identified by Aboulafiahave also been widely recognized by dieproponents of empowerment (I.erncr, 1991;Serrano Garcia, 1984).

The second obstacle to self-determinationhas to do with paternalistic attitudes towardpeople in need of assistance. Many so-called"benevolent" interventions to help the disad-vantaged have infringed upon their sense ofself-respect and effectively curtailed tiieiraspirations for self-determination (Gaylin,Glasser, Marcus, 8c Rothman, 1981). Amongapplied ethicists, Young (1982) contends that"opposition to paternalistic interference withadults, whether it involves the intervention

of the state (legal paternalism) or anodicradult individual, has usually been based ona concern to preserve human autonomy orself-determination" (1982, p. 47). The manyconverging critiques on paternalism co-alesced to create alternate, empoweringstrategies (Boytc & Riessman, 1986; Rappa-port, 1981, 1987; Swift, 1984).

The needs and rights of individuals pro-moted and protected by self-determinationshould be complemented with values design-ed to preserve the needs and rights of fellowcommunity members. This ensures a balance-between personal fulfillment and communalwell-being. Distributive justice is die valueinvoked to guide the fair and equitableallocation of burdens and resources insociety (Facione, Scherer & Attig, 1978;Miller, 1978; Olson, 1978; Rawls, 1972). InSidwick's words, diis value puts forth "prin-ciples from which we may work out an ideallyjust distribution of rights and privileges,burdens and pains, among human beings assuch" (1922, p. 274). Similarly, according toMiller (1978), distributive justice may bedefined as "suum cuique, to each his(/her)due" (p. 20). Justice, Miller explains,

concerns the distribution of benefits andburdens throughout a society, as it resultsfrom the major social institutions — propertysystems, public organizations, etc. It deals withsuch matters as the regulation of wages and(where they exist) profits, the protection ofpersons' rights through the legal system, theallocation of housing, medicine, welfare bene-fits, etc. (Miller, 1978, p. 22)

Proponents of empowerment in psychologyand social services have asserted die need toredistribute resources in a more equitablefashion (Albee, Joffe, & Dusenbury, 1988;Rappaport, 1984; McKnight, 1989). Legal,political, ideological and social interventionshave been launched in an effort to reallocatewealth and power in accordance with theprecepts of distributive justice.

The intrinsic beneficial qualities of self-determination and distributive justice are

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brought forth by the collaborative and demo-cratic process. The belief in the inherentcapacity of individuals to select their goalsand defend their interests is recognized inthe value of democracy. As Swift noted(1984), "the concept of democracy and itsembodiment in our political institutions arebased on the principle of empowering citi-zens to participate in decisions affecting theirwelfare" (p. xiii). A commitment to treatingpersons fairly, equitably, and with respectdemands that a collaborative approach beused. This is in opposition to paternalisticmodels of intervention which have tradi-tionally operated from an expert-knows-bestpoint of view.

While the importance of collaboration anddemocracy may be publicly upheld by psy-chologists, an in-depth examination of psy-chological theories and practices reveals thatthese values are not always at the forefrontof their priorities (Sampson, 1991; Walsh,1988). Proponents of empowerment in psy-chology endeavour to make collaborationand democratic participation one of the firstitems of their scientific and social agenda(Rappaport, 1986, 1990). As we shall seenext, applied moral philosophers attempt toincorporate primary values into the modus-ope randi of the professions.

Professional ethics and empowerment. Moral-ity, Frankena (1963) claims, "is not to be aminister merely to one's own good life butto that of others as well" (p. 77). This reason-ing, widely endorsed by other moral philos-ophers (Facione, Scherer & Attig, 1978;Olson, 1978) implies that ethical behaviourshould encompass actions designed toenhance the welfare of fellow communitymembers. By extension, professional ethicalbehaviour calls for efforts to promote thewelfare of the community as a whole(Kultgen, 1988). Reeck (1982) said it wellwhen he claimed that the moral guide of theprofessional should be the "devotion of pro-fessional skills to meeting the needs of clientgroups and, ultimately, to the common good"(italics in the original, p. 38). Reflecting on

the same topic, I^ebacqz (1985) commented:"If the professional's relationship to societyis seen as a matter of entrusting of power,then the professional will be bound by obli-gations to society... It is really a matter ofjustice of repaying a debt" (p. 85).

Reeck (1982) argues for the legitimacy ofempowerment in the professions. He con-tends that "an ideal that seems common tothe moral heritage of the professions is thatof enablement" (p. 38), which is understoodas the empowering of individuals for thepurpose of helping themselves. Consistentwith the philosophy of empowerment,Lebacqz claims that meaningful improvementin the life of many citizens cannot beattained without fundamental social changes— changes which require a more equitabledistribution of political power (Albee, Joffe& Duscnbury, 1988; Edwards, Reich & Weiss-kopf, 1986; Ryan, 1981; Schwartz, 1987;Weisband, 1989).

Kultgen (1988), Lebacqz (1985), andReeck (1982) explicitly advance the preceptsof empowerment in the professions. Theysupport the process by which individualsacquire control over their lives and thepower to enhance their personal and com-munal welfare. Professions can accelerate thisprocess. However, in establishing their moralduties, professions have traditionally soughtto secure only the welfare of their immediateclients and neglected (a) to consider thewelfare of the community at large, and (b)the need to change damaging societal struc-tures (Lebacqz, 1985; Reeck, 1982; Wilding,1982). Psychology has not escaped this pro-clivity (Prilleltensky, 1990a, 1990b, 1991). Theobstacles section of this paper will outline insome detail why psychology has been reluc-tant to embrace empowering paradigms andsocial change propositions.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF

EMPOWERMENT

Psychology has much to offer, as well as togain from, the Held of empowerment. Thepotential of this mutually beneficial relation-ship will be explored in this section. The

364 Prilleltcnsky

psychology of personal control can definitelyinform empowerment research (Friedman &lackey, 1991; Langer & Rodin, 1976;Seligman, 1990; Spacapan & Thompson,1991; Zimmerman, 1990; Zimmerman &Rappaport, 1988). Control investigators, inturn, can learn a great deal from observingthe experience of empowerment in real-lifesettings (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990;Dobyns, Doughty, & Laswell, 1971; Lcrner,1991). 1 will review next a number of studiesthat bear directly on the relationship betweenissues of personal control, coping, helping,and empowerment. These will show some ofthe mainstream psychology foundations ofempowerment, as well as the therapeutic andprotective aspects of empowering processes.

Research. Studies concerning issues of con-trol and empowerment at die individual levelof analysis will be reviewed first, followed byresearch dealing with communities. Therearc long-term beneficial repercussions for theearly experiences of task mastery and control(Chess & Thomas, 1984; Rolf, Masten,Cicchetti, Neuchterlein, & Weintraub, 1990).Indeed, as Cowen (1991) recendy noted, "therooting of relevant life competencies may bethe single most important precondition forthe young child's development of an earlyphenomenological sense of empowermentand having control over one's fate" (p. 406).Moreover, important positive effects can bederived from die perception of control, notthe least of which is physical health (Lord &Farlow, 1990). In dieir review of the litera-ture, Thompson and Spacapan (1991) men-tion improved (a) emotional well-being, (b)ability to cope with stress, (c) health, (d)motor and intellectual performance, and (e)capacity to make desired behaviouralchanges, as resulting from perceptions ofcontrol.

A sense of personal control contributesalso to the development of psychosocialresilience (Garmczy, 1984; Rutter, 1987;Scligman, 1990; Zimmerman, 1990). That isto say, experiences of control act as buffersagainst future adversities. The opposite is

also true. Experiences of helplessness acrossthe life-span render people vulnerable to arange of emotional problems (Seligman,1990).

It has been well documented tiiat theexperience of helplessness is mediated bycognitive style. Seligman (1990) contendsthat individuals who explain bad events interms of external, specific and temporarycauses, what he calls optimistic explanatorystyle, will show greater attempts at controlwhen they encounter adversities in thefuture. Those who attribute failure to per-sonal, permanent and pervasive factors willlikely not assume control when faced withthe next setback. Although the degree ofhelplessness people manifest is moderated bytheir attributions, an optimistic explanatorystyle can go only so far in protecting peoplefacing severe or chronic stressors. Recurringor acute life-stressors may teach dieir victimsthat no matter what they do, their lot in lifedoes not improve. If the adverse effects ofthese experiences subside, children "willdevelop the theory that bad events can bechanged and conquered. But if they are, infact, permanent and pervasive, the seeds ofhopelessness have been deeply planted"(Seligman, 1990, p. 135).

To overcome the deeply planted seeds ofhopelessness, individuals growing up inpermanent and pervasive depriving condi-tions need more than a change in attribu-tions and perceptions to cope with misfor-tune. They need real experiences of controlto change real-life stressors. Research onempowerment can show how this can beattained (Zimmerman & Rappaport, 1988;Zimmerman, 1990). The present dominantfocus on attributions and perceptions ofcontrol should be complemented by researchon the increase of actual power in real-lifesettings. This is the main potential contribu-tion of empowerment research in this area.

Research on the empowerment of com-munities shows the gains derived from asense of group cohesion and collective actionaround specific goals and problems. Florinand Wandersman (1990) describe the em-

Empowerment in Mainstream Psychology 365

powering effects of citizen participation,voluntary organizations and communitydevelopment. Chaws and Wandcrsman(1990), for example, illustrated how a senseof community may generate social action andenhance the participants' perception andactual control over their environment. Giventhe action research nature of communityempowerment, more will be said about it inthe next section.

Action/Intervention. As in the research sec-tion, I will examine empowering interven-tions at the individual and community levelsseparately. A useful theoretical framework forunderstanding and appreciating die need forempowerment at the personal level is pro-vided by Brickman and his associates (1982).They made a comparative analysis of fourmodels of helping and coping and theireffects on clients. The techniques theyexplored were examined in terms of twodimensions: (a) Attribution to self of respon-sibility for the problem, and (b) Attributionto self of responsibility for the solution. Eachvariable was divided into high or low. Thisresulted into four models of helping: (a)medical (People are not held responsible forproblems or solutions), (b) compensatory(People are not held responsible for prob-lems but responsible for solutions), (c) moral(People are held responsible for problemsand solutions), and (d) enlightenment (Peopleare not held responsible for solutions butresponsible for problem). Their comparisonof helping methodologies falling into thefour categories led them to the conclusionthat die compensatory model, the one whichadvocates empowerment, is generally thepreferred one, particularly with disadvan-taged populations. In this approach peopleare not held responsible for their problemsbut are expected to be active in the sol-utions, a philosophy which is congruent withthe tenets of empowerment. Brickman et al.(1982) prefer die compensatory modelbecause it avoids blaming-the-victim at thesame time diat it benefits from the advan-tages associated with holding individuals

responsible for improving dicir lives. Know-ing that change is within their ability andcontrol provides suffering people with anempowering feeling.

Lord and Farlow (1990) discuss the impli-cations of die compensatory paradigm forhealth promotion. According to diem die"individuals who achieved die greatest degreeof control in their lives" (p. 3) were thosewho resisted blaming themselves and adopt-ed an active stance with respect to dieirfuture aspirations. An application of thecompensatory model by Rose and Black(1985) helped discharged psychiatric patientsadjust to the community. They found diatdirough the externalization of blame, anddirough "seizing command of some aspect(however minute) of their lives" (p. 90),individuals attained a degree of dignity andself-respect that could not have been obtain-ed otherwise.

Finally, empirical evidence for die positiveresults associated widi the compensatorymode of helping comes from the work ofLerner (1991). Based on die assumption thatoccupational stress derives primarily fromself-blaming, Lerner launched interventionsdesigned to (a) reduce personal blame, and(b) modify oppressive working conditions,l ie found that

with a decrease in self-blaming comes anincrease in ability to cope with stress at homeand at work. This is partly explained by theincreased sense of personal power that comesfrom being able to focus anger at oppressivework conditions. But it is also explained bythe fact that once people are no longer totallydisempowcred by self-blaming, they arc in abetter position to formulate plans for how toengage in concrete struggles to change theirenvironments. (Lerner, 1991, p. 44)

The therapeutic aspects of the compensatorymodel can also be seen at the communitylevel. A prime example of its powerful impactis furnished by die women's movement. Inelucidating systemic (as opposed to personal)conditions of oppression and facilitating con-

366 Frilleltensky

trol over their own affairs, Kravetz noted thai"consciousness-raising groups have served asan important mental health resource forwomen" (1987, p. 55). Grass-roots associ-ations (Boyle, 1990; Burgess, 1990), students'and seniors' groups (Wolff, 1987), native(O'Sullivan, Waugh, & Espeland, 1984) andpoor rural communities (Serrano-Garcia,1984), among others, have been helped bythe tools of social action advocated byempowerment theory.

To summarize, this section dealt with themoral and psychological foundations ofempowerment in mainstream psychology.Next, I will examine some of the barriers tobe encountered in promoting a wider accept-ance for the concept of empowerment.

ObstaclesIn spite of the fact that professional ethicscall for the enablement and empowermentof vulnerable populations (Kultgcn, 1988;Lebacqz, 1985; Reeck, 1982), most pro-fessions, in actuality, have eidier rejectedthese endeavours as illegitimate or paid littleattention to them. What follows is an analysisof the main obstacles and arguments obstruc-ting the introduction of empowering prac-tices in psychology.

PROFESSIONAL CREDIBILITYSocial action, a key empowerment strategy,has been historically perceived as undermin-ing the credibility of the social sciences. Inthe social sciences, the conflict betweenso-called "academics" and "reformers" datesback to 1865, when the American SocialScience Association was formed. This conflictis very well documented in Furncr's (1975)book Advocacy and objectivity. According toher, the "academics" had no trouble winningthe struggle for recognition as "pro-fessionals." Unfortunately, the monopoly overprofessionalism exerted by die academics hadrather adverse consequences. As Furner(1975) noted: "as professionalization pro-ceeded, most social scientists stopped askingethical questions" (p. 8).

The fear of reformers is associated with

the intrusion of values in what is supposedto be a value-free enterprise (Wilding, 1982).The claim is made that social action, and itsconcomitant values, derogate the scientificstatus of psychology (Robinson, 1984). Thisargument neglects to consider two points.First, nonepistemic values, that is, social andpolitical values, are an inherent part ofpsychology, whether we like it or not(Howard, 1985). And second, claiming to bevalue-neutral is in itself a value-laden posi-tion, one that upholds die societal statusquo. Failure or neglect to challenge predomi-nant values translates into indirect supportfor them (Prilleltensky, 1989).

Empowerment, advocacy, and social actionare not presented here for die pursuit of thenarrow private interests of professionals, inwhich case the credibility of the professionmay be jeopardized. On die contrary, em-powerment is advanced as a means to fulfillour ethical commitment to the vulnerable(Hillerbrand, 1987).

SOCIAL ETHICSThe study of social ediics in the socialsciences in general and in psychology inparticular has not received as much attentionas it probably should (O'Neill, 1989;Tymchuk, 1989; Warwick, 1980). This errorof omission led to a narrow preoccupationwith individual, as opposed to social ethics(For examples of this proclivity see APA,1987; Cabot, 1926; Carroll, Schneider &Wesley, 1985; Clarke & Lawry, 1988). As aresult, die ethical dimensions of social action,power structures, domination and oppressiondo not receive the attention they merit.

A commitment toward the individualclient, or what may be termed individualethics (Prilleltensky, 1990a, 1991) dominatesthe professional and psychological ediicsliterature. Few references are made in diatliterature to the need to promote a socialethics mentality — an ediics that is directedtoward enhancing die quality of life for largeand vulnerable segments of society.

The negative effects of diis neglect arestrongly felt in the helping professions.

Empowerment in Mainstream Psychology 367

Human services in general (McKnight, 1989),and medicine (Wailzkin, 1989), social work(Carniol, 1990; Gil, 1990), and psychology inparticular (PrilleUensky, 1989; 1990b; Walsh,1988) provide examples of professionalpractices where, paradoxically, preoccupationwith the single "case" may ultimately hur t the"case." This is simply because in searchingfor solutions to a client, attention is divertedfrom pervasive social forces that may havecaused, contr ibuted to, or perpetuated thenature of the problem.

This is well illustrated in a program report-ed by Halpern in 1988. Attempts to minimizeinfants' d iarrhea by psychoeducational mea-sures were severely h indered by an overbear-ing environmental condition: lack of accessto uncontaminated water. This is an incidentwhere medical or psychological interventionsshould be accompanied by social and eco-logical change. In the context of psycho-therapy, L c m e r (1991) also shows the debili-tating effects of focussing exclusively on theindividual. "Lacking a sense of social causal-ity, most therapists interpret the frustrationsof family and personal life as individualfailings ... therapists implicitly suggest thatthe problems arc individual in scope" (p.323). In spite of the ill-effects of this implicitmessage, therapies and therapists continueto reinforce die notion that it is only theclient who needs to be changed, not thesocial conditions (Halleck, 1971, Jacoby,1976; Lerner, 1991; Nahem, 1981; Prillel-tensky, 1989, 1990b, 1990c). Such bias isprevalent in most social and medical services(McKnight, 1989; Waitzkin, 1989).

If professionals are entrusted by society toenhance the quality of life for the populationat large, then social ethics is as important asindividual ethics. Yet, the former continue tobe overshadowed by die latter. This bias isreflected in die Canadian code of ediics(CPA, 1991), whereby responsibilities towardthe individual client come before responsibil-ities toward society at large.

MERITOCRACYAnother reason why professionals have not

regarded collective empowerment as vital isbecause of their fundamental belief diat dieanswer to social problems lies in individualmerit (Bledstein, 1976; Hall, 1983; Kultgen,1988; Pcrkin, 1990; Reiff, 1974; Wilding,1982). By embracing die ideology of meritoc-racy, whereby success and failure are explain-ed in person-centered terms, professionalsproceed to change individuals and no t socialstructures. Professionals project onto societytheir own experience of success due toso-called talent and merit, thereby expectingtheir clients to improve dieir fortune no t bysocial action but by personal effort.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Empowerment calls for equitable distributionof power between professionals and citizens(I^ebacqz, 1985; Rappaport , 1981, 1987;Riessman, 1986), a depar ture from the cus-tomary practice of treating professionals widideference and ascribing them moral andintellectual superiority. Empowerment willnot occur unless professionals concede toshare power widi the recipients of dieirservices (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990), adevelopment which many observers considerunlikely unde r die dominant hierarchicalprofessional edios (Illich, 1977; Kultgen,1988; Liebcrman, 1970; Perkin, 1990; Reiff,1974; Wilding, 1982).

SCIENTIFIC TRAININGPsychologists are mosdy trained and social-ized into a professional problem-solvingmentality diat glorifies neat, sterile, lab-typemethods and procedures, die kind that is no treadily — if at all — applicable to socialcomplexities (Sarason, 1978). Psychology'sadoption of die natural science's experimen-tal approach as its preeminent paradigm hadunpropitious repercussions for the usefulnessand applicability of psychological knowledgeto human and social problems (cf. Kline,1988). As Sarason (1981) put it, since its earlydays

psychology committed itself to the cull ofstandardization, i.e., to contrive situations that

368 Prilleltcnsky

would be standard for all people. This seemedto meet the scientific requirements of objec-tivity, reliability, and validity but at the expen-se of recognizing or pursuing the followingquestion: how docs behavior in standardizedsituations relate to and illuminate behavior innaturally occurring situations, (p. 183).

Similarly, DeBocr (1983) wrote that "innomothctic psychology ... the human beingis methodically stripped of his(/her)historicity. The test-person is ahistorical" (p.6). This ahistorical stance has largely pre-vented a full and rich understanding of thedynamics involved in life in the community.

The empowerment of individuals and com-munities requires the management of unpre-dictable variables, political complications,and uncontrollable social events. Traditionaltraining does not prepare applied psychol-ogists for this kind of work. The few attemptsby mental health specialists to launchcommunity-wide interventions that we haveseen in the last decade or so have beenconducted almost exclusively by communitypsychologists (Albee, Joffe, & Dusenbury,1988; Rappaport, Swift, & Hess, 1984), aprofessional group trained in a scientificapproach that seeks to merge methodologi-cal rigour with real-life vicissitudes.

PossibilitiesI have argued for the legitimacy of the con-cept of empowerment in mainstream psychol-ogy and outlined some of the obstacles forits inclusion in our profession. In this sectionI wish to discuss two areas of psychology dialmight particularly benefit from the valuesand theory of empowerment. The first has todo with ethics. The second, with issues ofcontrol, power, and well-being.

QUOTIDIAN ETHICS

Empowerment brings to the forefront ofscientific and professional endeavours threevalues: self-determination, distributive justice,and collaborative and democratic participa-tion. In fact, it may be argued that the maindirust of empowerment theory is the dissemi-

nation and permeation of ethical values intoeveryday activities. The term quotidian ethicsrefers to the recurrent application and pro-motion of moral values in the various servicesprofessionals provide. I offer this term tosuggest that ethics arc to be of prime con-cern in performing daily routines. Ethicsbecome a matter of constant observance, andto a large degree determine the contents andprocedures of the occupational realm. Thisis to be contrasted widi the current attitudetoward ethics. In the present atmosphere,professional ethics are essentially equatedwith rules and regulations to be upheld andcalled upon to discipline misconduct. Quo-tidian ethics proactively procure theenhancement of certain moral values in everyaspect of the professional's life.

Moral philosophy should be easily accessedand debated by professionals and consumersalike. Ethics should not remain exclusively inthe hands of ethical boards or applied moralphilosophers. For as long as die public feelsexcluded from the ethical decision-makingprocess affecting professions, professionalsand citizens, die risk of nurturing an elitistkind of ethics is perpetuated.

The concept quotidian ethics is evocativeof Cohen's (1988) discourse ethics, "with itsemphasis on die equal participation of allconcerned in public discussions on contestednorms" (p. 315). According to Cohen (1988),social policies and professional activities areto be regarded as legitimate only if all thosepossibly affected by diem would have anequal opportunity to voice dieir concerns,and a vote on the final decision. The termdiscourse ethics, like quotidian ethics, isdrawn from "die principles of democracy"(Cohen, 1988, p. 315):

Quotidian ethics attempt to incorporatemoral values into the occupational realm anddisseminate them among all individualsconcerned, service providers as well as citi-zens/consumers. Proponents of empower-ment have made a great deal of progress intranslating these principles into action. As itwas pointed out in this paper, the values ofempowerment are congruent widi the values

Empowerment in Mainstream Psychology 369

of professional ethics in general. Theempowerment paradigm affords professionalsan opportunity to actively pursue the ful-fillment of their moral duties; primarily thoseconcerned with the social welfare of thepopulation at large, an area largely neglectedin professional circles.

Quotidian ethics may be practiced at theuniversity as well as at the community.Courses dealing with the social ethics andthe values of psychology may be introducedat both the undergraduate and graduatelevels. The degree of congruity betweenempowerment values and the contents andprocesses of psychology curricula could bethe subject of discussions among students,staff, and faculty. In the community, psychol-ogists can engage the public in debatingservice priorities. With limited resources,service providers struggle between givingimmediate help to individuals in need andplanning long-term interventions and preven-tion programmes to enhance the welfare ofthe community at large. The ethical andsocial repercussions of each course of actionneed to be carefully examined, and inputfrom consumers is vital in this process. Anexcellent illustration of how the ethicalvalues of empowerment can be incorporatedinto counseling with individuals and familiesis provided by Dunst, Trivette, and Deal(1988). Their clinical work reaches a rarelyattained integration of client participation,self-determination, and sensitivity to restrict-ive social circumstances and life events.These values are similarly reflected in thetherapeutic work of Lerner (1991) withindividuals and occupational stress groups.These authors attempt to operate from aclinical framework that would seem to becongruent with the philosophy of quotidianethics.

In summary, the language of empower-ment fosters public debate on moral issues.It vitalizes individual and social ethics. Inapplying the values of empowerment to theirteaching, research, and interventions, psy-chologists would be advancing die practiceof quotidian ethics.

CONTROL, POWER, AND WELL-BEING

It has been argued that psychological well-being is generally enhanced by control overone's life events and circumstances (Langer& Rodin, 1976; Lerner, 1991; Thompson &Spacapan, 1991). However, an importantdistinction is to be made between the percep-tion of control and real experiences of controland power. Research and interventions deal-ing exclusively with the perceptions of con-trol have serious limitations. Attempts toincrease perceptions of control will havedifferent effects depending on whether theindividuals live under relatively empoweringor disempowering conditions. Whereas in theformer situation people may benefit fromthese efforts, in the latter people still have tocontend with depriving living circumstances.At this point more than purely psychologicalhelp is needed. Individuals and groups facingdisempowering life events and circumstancesrequire assistance in changing not only theirperceptions of power, but also, and moreimportantly, the real constellations of socialpower that deprive them of rights, goods andservices (e.g., Kallcn, 1989). The latter is therealm of empowerment.

Since certain injurious systemic conditionsremain present even after we adjust ourcognitions, an optimistic explanatory style(Seligman, 1990) may be considered only thefirst step in propelling people into changingdemeaning and oppressive societal structures.Following a process of cognitive liberationequivalent to saying: "It is not my fault,"oppressed individuals need to be empoweredto oppose structural configurations of powerthat precluded them from experiencingcontrol in the past and perpetuate theirmisfortune in the present.

Furthermore, interventions designed toenhance the level of control people exerciseover their affairs provide an insight into thereal-life dynamics of power that can be rarelyattained by the somewhat removed,laboratory-type of research on perceptions ofcontrol and attributional style. Hence, wemight conclude that when dealing withdepriving psychosocial environments, empow-

370 Prilleltensky

crment research and action arc needed tocomplement psychological interventionsdealing primarily widi perceptions and cogni-tions. This is solid ground for the construc-tion of bridges between the fields of empow-erment and control theory in particular, andbetween community psychology and main-stream psychology in general.

ConclusionThe concept of empowerment brings to dieforefront of research and action the unequaldistribution of power among citizens and itsconcomitant personal and societal reper-cussions. Problems deriving from excessiveand unjustified use of power are endemic infamilies, classrooms, industry, business, relig-ious settings, and governments. Practically inalmost every sphere of our lives there is thepotential for psychological damage caused bysome people oppressively controlling odiers.The model of empowerment presented intiiis article offers mainstream psychology avalue-based argument for exploring andintervening in situations of power inequality.

This article is partly based on a paper given atthe Annual Convention of the Canadian Psy-chological Association, June 1991, Calgary,Alberta. I wish to thank Paul Davock, Ceofl"Nelson, and Richard Walsh-Bowers for theirstimulating suggestions and for their helpwith various aspects of this paper. 1 would alsolike to thank the editor Pat O'Neill and twoanonymous reviewers for their helpful com-ments. Address all correspondence to IsaacPrillekensky, Department of Psychology,Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario,Canada, N2L 3C5.

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ResumeL'appropriaiion du pouvoir: lcgitimite,obstacles el perspectives

Le terme appropriation du pouvoir («em-powerment» en anglais) est generalementutilise pour designer toute intervention oupolitique dont lc but est de rehausser ledegre de controle que les individus vulnera-bles excrccnt sur leur propre vie. Jusqu'apresent, les psychologues des milieux uni-versitaires ct de la psychologic appliquce sercfuscnt a accorder a ce concept une im-portance predominante. On y soulicnt quesi l'on veul elargir la theoric dc I'appropria-tion du pouvoir au-dela du domaine de lapsychologie communautairc vers des do-maines plus traditionncls de la psychologie,comine la psychologic sociale, la psycholo-gie de la personnalitc, la psychologie clini-que et scolairc, on devra tnieux expliqucrses assiscs morales et psychologiques. Afind'illustrcr cette affirmation, l'autcur nousprcsente un modele conccptuel integre deI'appropriation du pouvoir.

Lc modele possede un objectif double:(a) comprendre le concept dc l'appropria-tion du pouvoir en specifiant scs multiplesfacettes, et (b) offrir un cadre d'analysepour 1'avanccmcrii de la recherche dans ledomaine. IJZ modele met 1'accent sur lestrois principaux elements de l'appropria-iion du pouvoir donl on a deja traite dansde nombrcuscs etudes sur le sujct. Ce sontles valeurs, les proccssus et les agents/de-positaires d'enjeux. I es valeurs de l'appro-

priation du pouvoir, a savoir la determina-tion de soi, la justice distributive, ainsi quela participation collaborative et democrati-que deierminent et guident les mecanismeset les agents/depositaires d'enjeux de l'ap-propriation du pouvoir. Ces valeurs sontintegrees par les cherchcurs aussi bien quepar les agents dc services sociaux. 1-csagents sont des personnes qui posent desactions qui leur donnent un plus grandcontrole de leur propre vie et/ou aident lesautres a prendre controle de leur vie. Lesdepositaires d'enjeux sont des personnesou des groupes qu'on invite a participer auprocessus. L'ideal est que les depositairesd'enjeux deviennent aussi vite que possibleles agents de l'appropriation du pouvoireux-memes. Dans la troisiemc section, l'au-tcur s'attardc a la variete d'aciions et demecanismes qui sc produisent lorsqu'onctudic ct fait la promotion de l'appropria-tion du pouvoir. Les questions suivantesaident a mieux comprendre les actions etles mecanismes qui menent a l'appropria-iion du pouvoir: ou, comment et pourquoil'appropriation du pouvoir se produit-cllc,et quelles sont les conditions neccssaircs etsuirisantes pour qu'cllc sc dcveloppe? I*eprocessus de ('appropriation du pouvoirpeut se presenter comine le resultat desactions naturcllcs des personnes qui cher-chent a obtcnir plus de conirole sur leschoscs qui les concernent, ou comme laconsequence des interventions socialesvenant de 1'exterieur. Pour ce qui est desactions, elles ont plusicurs formes. Ellcspeuvent etrc lc rcsullat d'aciions socialesiniticcs par des individus impuissants, ouencore etre posccs par des organisaieurscommunautaircs et des iherapeutes quiencourageraicnt, par exemple, des femmesa quitter unc situation de couple ou ellessont victime d'abus. Ce qui definit uneintervention comme de l'appropriation dupouvoir n'est done pas son contcnu specifi-que mais plutot son adhesion aux valeursde l'appropriation du pouvoir.

Afin de justifier la pertinence du modelequ'il propose, l'auteur en cxplique les bases

Resume 375

philosophiqucs ct psychologiques. II sou-tient que les deux aspects sonl necessairessi on veut arriver a une comprehensionintcgree et holistique de l'appropriation dupouvoir. La base philosophique morale jus-lifie la poursuitc dc l'appropriation dupouvoir, tandis quc la base psychologiqucen facilite la promotion. La psychologic abeaucoup a ofTrir et a gagner dans ce do-maine. I-a psychologie du controle de soipent enrichir la recherche sur l'appropria-tion du pouvoir; ceux qui font des recher-ches sur le controle peuvent beaucoup ap-prendre a observer l'experience de l'ap-propriation du pouvoir vecue dans desmilieux reels.

Malgre le fait que la dcontologic profes-sionnelle clame l'importancc de l'habilita-tion et de l'appropriation du pouvoir despopulations vulnerablcs, la plupart desprofessions, en fait, ont, ou bien rejete detcllcs tentatives comme illegilimes, ou bienne leur oni reserve que tres peu d'attcntion.En definissant leurs devoirs moraux, les pro-fessions n'ont traditionncllcmcnt chcrchcqu'a assurer le bien-etre de leurs clients im-mediats et ont neglige de prendre en consi-deration (a) le bien-etre de la communautcen general, et (b) la necessite de changerles structures sociales nuisibles. La psycholo-gie n'a pas echappc a ccttc tendance. L'au-teur dc cct article offre une analyse desprincipaux obstacles et arguments empe-chant l'introduction en psychologie despratiques de l'appropriation du pouvoir.

Dans la dernicrc section de cet article,l'auteur traite des deux domaincs dc la psy-chologie qui peuvent bencficicr des valcurset de la theorie de l'appropriation du pou-voir. Le premier touchc la dcontologie et Icsecond, les questions dc controle, de pou-voir ct dc bicn-ctre. Quant au premier, onpcut maintcnir que la poussee principale dela theorie de l'appropriation du pouvoir cstla dissemination et l'infiltration des valcursdeontologiques dans des activites quotidien-nes. L'auteur introduit le tcrmc deontologiequotidienne afin de mcttrc l'accent sur lanecessite d'appliquer ct dc promouvoir de

facon continue les valcurs morales dans lesdivers services fournis par les profcssionncls.II utilise cc terme afin de suggerer que ladeonlologic doit ctrc d'une importanceprimordiale dans I'accomplissement destaches routinieres. Dans ce coiilcxtc, lesprincipes deontologiques ineritent d'etrerigourcusement observes, et, en grande par-lie, dctcrmincnt le contenu et les procedesdu domainc occupationnel. Ceci vient encontradiction avee 1'attitude actuelle face ala dcontologie. Dc nos jours, la dcontologieprofessionnelle est generalemcnt misc sur lcmeme pied que les regies et reglcments arespecter et auxquels on fait appel dans descas d'inconduite. La deontologie quoti-dienne aide a rehausser de facon proactivecertaines valeurs morales dans tous les as-pects de la vie d'un professionnel.

En ce qui concerne le deuxieme do-inainc d'intcret, on soutient quc Ic bien-etre psychologique est generalement re-hausse en prenant controle des evenementsct des circonstances de sa vie. Toutefois, onctablit une distinction importantc cntrc laperception de controle et I'experience reellede controle et de pouvoir. Les rechercheset les interventions qui s'interessent exclusi-vement aux perceptions de controle sontseverement li mi tees. Des tentatives d'amc-liorcr les perceptions dc controle aurontdes effets differents si les individus viventdans des conditions relativement favorablesou defavorables a l'appropriation du pou-voir. Tandis que dans la premiere situation,les gens peuvent beaucoup retirer de cestcnlativcs, dans la deuxieme, les gens au-ront toujours a fairc face a des circonstan-ces de vie de privation. En lcqucl cas, nousavons besoin dc plus que d'une aide pure-inent psychologique. Les individus et lesgroupes qui doivent faire face a des evene-ments et a des circonstances de vie defavo-rables a l'appropriation du pouvoir ontbesoin d'aidc pour changer, non seulementlcur perception du pouvoir, mais egale-ment, ct plus encore, cette veritableconstellation du pouvoir social qui lesprivent de droits, de biens et de services.