Empedocles' Cosmic CycleAuthor(s): Denis O'BrienSource: The Classical Quarterly, New Series, Vol. 17, No. 1 (May, 1967), pp. 29-40Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637758 .Accessed: 18/12/2010 22:08

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EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE

HITHERTO reconstructions of Empedocles' cosmic cycle have usually been offered as part of a larger work, a complete history of Presocratic thought, or a complete study of Empedocles. Consequently there has perhaps been a lack of thoroughness in collecting and sifting evidence that relates exclusively to the main features of the cosmic cycle. There is in fact probably more evidence for Empedocles' main views than for those of any other Presocratic except Parmenides in his Way of Truth. From a close examination of the fragments and of the secondary sources, principally Aristotle, Plutarch, and Simplicius, there can be formed a reasonably complete picture of the main temporal and spatial features of Empedocles' cosmic cycle.'

I In fr. 17 Empedocles describes how the world grows to be one from many

and then again grows apart to be many from one. This allows us to distinguish initially two processes of unification and separation and two states of com- pleted unity and completed separation. But we must keep an open mind on the relative duration of these times and on the condition of the world particularly at the two terminal states of complete unity and complete separation.

In the Physics Aristotle tells us that Empedocles' world moved and was at rest in turn.z That there is movement when the elements are becoming one or becoming many is clear both in itself and from what Aristotle tells us: KLVELUOL /1EV a t av O7X

' EK 7TOAAW-V 7TOL77L TO EV 7 TOVELKOS 7ToAAa E EVOs, ?7PEJ1EtV

E' EV 0oS JLETaf XpdvOLV.3 But it is not clear whether the world is at rest for both in between times, complete unity and complete separation, or for only one. Aristotle's use of singular and plural, T•v pe-aeT Xpdvov4 and dv -0ot-' ET-aV Xpdvos,5 is no indication either way. Therefore the sense of Aristotle's remarks has to be determined from passages elsewhere in his works. In the De generatione et corruptione Aristotle says that the elements arose from the Sphere uta 77/1v

KLV•7wa .6 This most naturally implies that separation and movement

began together. It would be possible but less simple to suppose that before the elements were separated the Sphere was moving in some less genetic fashion. In the De caelo Aristotle twice implies that at the other terminal point, com- plete separation, the elements were moving. He is arguing for the priority of natural movement.7 Without a world or before the world began there could not be, as Plato and the Atomists supposed, disordered movement existing on its own. There could not be any movement, only rest. Thus Anaxagoras is right in principle to start his cosmogony from a unity that was at rest. Aristotle continues: EK E8tEr07'jV 8E Kac KWVov1EvCOV OVK

E,?AoyOV •TOLEFV 77V YE'VEUTV. to' Ka'

This article summarizes the results of a longer work prepared under the supervision of Professor W. K. C. Guthrie, who has very kindly made one or two corrections to the present essay. I should perhaps remark that this article was completed before the ap- pearance of U. H61lscher, 'Weltzeiten und Lebenszyklus, eine Nachpriifung der Em-

pedokles-Doxographie', Hermes xciii (1965), 7-33. H61scher's denial of any cyclic repeti- tion in Empedocles seems to me very mis- guided.

2 250ob26-251a5 and 252a5-32. 3 250a27-29. 4 252a9.

s 250b29. 6 315a22. 7

3ooa20 ff

30 D. O'BRIEN

'ETESOKfj&-9 7TcpaAELVtEL -qv 1 E -= -rq~Po'-ryrogS oi yap v 7)&va-ro vacr-aat '-rv

olpavov EK KEXOWPCtLVV /OV1,EV KaTaCrKE•vd•OV, vYKPLCTLV ~E rOLWV W&L 77V 7V a. The context clearly implies that Empedocles was committed to starting the

generation of increasing Love from elements that were separate and moving. Given the context, there would be no point in the criticism if the elements had been separate and at rest. A little earlier in the same discussion Aristotle criticizes the birth of animal parts under increasing Love immediately after criticizing the random precosmic movement of the Timaeus: E' 8~ Erouoi3Tov

Er7TawEpOLT av rL&, tOTEpov vvarv o ooX

vOlTV 7 V K7LVOjva aEtL aKtCl 0 Kal cotlyvvuOat otLavlls aiELs AgEVtai, te CrOv oCfAritoratle ra Kark S wouLV inVVthLisECL

xa4cli7a, AE' ' 8 olov orrd at U' apKas, KauarEp 'EpkT4TE8oKA JS br77f L y•tE•aOa

tT t

7j9S ObtAo'7-rog- AE'YEL ya% p w" g"roAAct' LE'V KOPcYEL G vavXEvEs g fAacrr?7aav". Aristotle's remark fairly clearly presupposes that before Empedocles' elements are made into flesh and bone they are already moving. Their movement is

dTaKT••9 because at the beginning of Love's world movement is still largely

controlled by Strife.3 Again the point of Aristotle's remark would in this context be largely lost if the movement of the elements at the beginning of increasing Love had been initiated from a time of rest. These two passages from the De caelo confirm the interpretation of the De generatione et corruptione. If the elements under complete Strife were moving, there is no time when they can have been at rest except in the Sphere.

Simplicius speaks of two rest periods in each cycle, rest under complete movement and rest at the time of complete separation.4 Simplicius' extensive quotations,s and his ability to illustrate topics such as the role of Love6 or the admission of chance7 with quotations of his own choosing, make it very likely that he had access to the whole of the physical poem. But the alternation in time between the one and the many does not seriously engage Simplicius' attention: for Empedocles' alternation Simplicius sees as describing in mythical terms the difference between the intelligible and the sensible world.8 Em-

pedocles never really intended there to be a time when Strife would be in

complete control of the world and the elements would be fully separated.9 Consequently it is not unnatural for Simplicius to let himself be guided on the details of alternate rest and movement by what he supposes Aristotle is saying. But we have seen that Aristotle in the Physics is ambiguous. He does not make it clear whether he is thinking of one rest period in each cycle or of two. It is

easy to see why Simplicius chooses the interpretation that he does, the wrong interpretation as it happens. For on Aristotelian principles, between opposed movements rest must

intervene;o? and becoming one from many and many

from one are opposed movements par excellence." Later Simplicius shows clearly I 30

a

i4-i8. 2 300b25-31* 3 Cf. De gen. et corr. 333bi6-2o and b22-33.

The point of this passage is that initially Aristotle expects Love to be the cause of natural movement and Strife the cause of unnatural movement. He argues that in fact the reverse turns out to be the case, for his purpose is to indicate a lack of con- sistency in Empedocles' system.

4 Phys. I 125- 15-22. 5 Simplicius quotes over a hundred and

fifty verses or part verses of the physical

poem. This would account for from seven to eight per cent. of the whole work, if we accept the figure in the Suda, s.v. 'E1rrE0o- KAS9, of 2,000 verses for the physical poem.

6 De caelo 528. 29-530. I-. 7 Phys. 330. 31-331. I6. 8 Sample passages are Phys. 31. 18-34. 17,

16o. 22-161. 13, 1123. 25--1124. 18, I186. 30-35; De caelo I40. 25-141. I I, 294. 10-13, 530. 12-16, 590. 19-591. 6.

9 De caelo 530. 22-26, cf. Phys. I 12 I. 17-2 1. 10 Phys. 26I a3I--b26. "I Phys. 229a7-b22.

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 31

that he has been influenced by this line of thought. He writes: ... KaL To

?pE/ELjV v -r j /LETacv' X)pov Tov -rjV yp EVaV7wVo KLVwtUEC•WV

l7pEl/a LETaV E•rTLV.1. When after a long digression Simplicius turns to Aristotle's second set of

remarks on alternate movement and rest in Empedocles' world he records the opinion of Eudemus that there was only one rest period in each cycle: E~Grlqtog SE%7V- cLKLqrIUlaCV El, I7a L T?)T S 9tAlcLS ETLKpcTElcLL KdClT C 7K W abC pov E'K8XEaTaL.2 Eudemus' opinion is left to stand without comment. Simplicius' view of the cycle leaves him without the interest to retrace his steps and to discover for himself whether there was one rest period or two. But Eudemus does not, as has been supposed,3 contradict Aristotle. For Simplicius' point in introduc- ing Eudemus is that Eudemus made it clear that he thought of the Sphere alone as at rest. And that, as we have seen, was the view of Aristotle. Eudemus is opposed not to Aristotle, but to Simplicius' false interpretation of Aristotle.

Plutarch knew Empedocles well. He often quotes from Empedocles or refers to him,4 and Lamprias' catalogue records a work in ten books on Empedocles,s to which Hippolytus once refers.6 In the De facie Plutarch introduces a de-

scription of Empedocles' world under total Strife as a warning against too strict an interpretation of the Aristotelian and Stoic doctrine of a natural place for each element, a doctrine which would prevent the moon being made of earth. In the course of this description Empedocles' elements are clearly said to be moving: fEvyovaaL Ka L

urHro•TpEodptEvaL Ka0L 1EpdfEvaL bopds /a Kal

a'cOsE•s.7 It is true that very soon afterwards there is a reminiscence of the

random movement of the Timaeus. But there is no reason to suppose8 that Plutarch's anticipation of Plato will have falsified his reference to Empedocles. We have already seen in Aristotle a comparison of Empedocles' state of total Strife with the random movement of the receptacle in Plato's Timaeus.

There is perhaps a difficulty in the way of our accepting Aristotle's evidence that the Sphere was at rest. In the passage of the Physics which we have made use of Aristotle introduces the following verses to confirm or to illustrate alternate movement and rest in Empedocles:

ogTWS oiL ~qEV E• V EiK rTAEodWV IEuCtewdO'elqKE h VEtata )&7TaALV ArtvCbvtosV EVs• 7TAEA ov' E'TEAEOovcfl,

7C7L /EV )1yVOVTcL TE Kcl ov UcLULv E/wLTTE3OS alcu/ 3t 8E ra•' 8 a"J' aovra 8tajLr7EpE o3atqa A-yEL,

raUv'Tlq 8' at'Ev E-aortv JK KcLc KVKAoV.9

Following von Arnim"o it is now quite widely held" that Aristotle has

SI 183. -26-28. 2 1183. 28-1184. 4. 3 Karsten, Empedoclis Agrigentini ...frag-

menta, Amsterdam, 1838, p. 367. Solmsen, Aristotle's system of the physical world, a com- parison with his predecessors, Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1960, p. 223 n. 4. Cf. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentar, Heft 8, Basel, 1955, Eudemos von Rhodos fr. iio, and p. 1o9.

4 Plutarch quotes some hundred verses or part verses.

s No. 43 corrected by Treu, Der sogenannte Lampriascatalog der Plutarchschriften, Walden- burg in Schlesien, 1873, ad loc.

6 Ref. 5. 20o. 6.

7 926D-927A. 8 As does Cherniss, Loeb edition of the De

facie (957) ad loc. 9 Fr. 26. 8-12 = fr. 17. 9-13- 0o 'Die Weltperioden bei Empedokles',

Festschrift Th. Gomperz dargebracht, Wien, 1902, pp. 17-18. The view is derived from Alexander and Simplicius, Plys. 1123-5.

" Bignone, Empedocle, studio critico, Torino, 1916, p. 562 n. 3, P. 592 n. i, s.v. fr. 17. 10. Cornford, Loeb edition of the Physics 1952 ad loc. Cherniss, Aristotle's criticism of Pre- socratic philosophy, Baltimore, 1935, P. 175 n. 130. Apparently Ross, edition of the Plhysics, Oxford, 1955, ad loc. Munding, 'Zur Beweisfiihrung des Empedokles', Hermes

32 D. O'BRIEN

misunderstood dK'v~TroL to mean literally motionless, whereas the sense of the piece makes it clear that Empedocles intends the elements to be dKV77To70 in so far as they are fixed forever in a cycle of change. It might possibly be argued that Aristotle has founded his interpretation of alternate periods of rest on his misunderstanding of this verse. But it is unlikely that Aristotle has in fact misunderstood aKV7To70o. For he adds in a note to the quotation that we must understand the last verse but one to mean 'in so far as the elements changefrom here' or 'from here to there'.' 'Here' may mean the world last mentioned, the world of becoming many from one, or it may mean the world of immediate experience.z Now the present world Aristotle knew was the world of increasing Strife: he complains of Empedocles' failure to provide a cause for the world 'being the same now under increasing Strife as it was before under increasing Love'.3 Thus in either case 'here' should be the world of increasing Strife. But Aristotle cannot have supposed that as the world moved on from here, i.e. from increasing Strife, the elements came to be at rest: for, as we have seen, Aristotle knows that under total Strife the elements are moving. Thus Aristotle cannot have misunderstood the verses in the way that has been suggested, though he may have misunderstood them in a less obvious way.4

In that case we may wonder how Aristotle saw these verses as a suitable illustration of the alternation of rest and movement. An answer may be that Aristotle sees the alternation between rest and movement as underlying the alternation between one and many. For rest and unity, movement and plurality were regularly associated by the Presocratics: by Xenophanes,s by the Pytha- goreans,6 by Parmenides,7 by Anaxagoras,8 and in their own way by the Atomists, who probably gave no 'moving cause' because they saw plurality as ultimate,9 as well as by Plato in the Timaeus.Io It is likely that Empedocles also saw rest and movement as dependent in some way upon unity and plurality,

lxxxii (I954), I35. Solmsen, H.S.C.P. lxiii (1958), 277, and op. cit., p. 223 n. 4. Kahn, Anaximander and the origins of Greek cosmology, New York, 1960, p. 23.

I The reading EvOdv6E has better textual support, E K and Simplicius, though it is not adopted by Ross. vOGvE'E E'KELFE, F H I J, is probably an attempt to explain a puzzling phrase. The process of expansion can be seen at work in Simplicius, cf. I

I25. 5 and 17-18, from whom the fuller reading has possibly arisen. vOvE8E is all that is needed for the interpretation of Aristotle's note suggested below.

2 This latter sense would be like the use of

EvOdvS, and eKE'caT as a pair or separately to describe the contrast between this world and the world of forms or the world beyond the grave, e.g. Plato, Phaedo i o7e, 117 c, Theaet. 176 a, and see L.S.J., s.v.

3 De gen. et corr. 334a5-9. 4 Aristotle's note suggests perhaps that he

has taken the first three lines and the last two lines to describe not the same cycle from different points ofview, which is Empedocles' intention, but different phases of the cycle. The first three lines could be taken to de-

scribe the elements passing into and out of the Sphere, 'in so far as they grow to be one from many and tIhen many from one'. This involves discontinuity of change from move- ment to rest and rest to movement, which Aristotle would agree was not E'IrrEboS al'dV. The last two lines, if they describe movement from here, i.e. from increasing Strife, would describe a period of movement with no rest, and this Aristotle would be inclined to agree is being 'fixed in a cycle'.

s Frr. 23, 24, 25, 26. 6 Arist. Met. 986a22-26. Porph. Vit. Pyth.

38. Plut. De Is. et Os. 370D-E. 7 Fr. 8 especially lines 4, 26, 29-30, 36-41. 8 Anaxagoras' mixture, in some sense a

unity, was at rest and the effect of movement was to separate out its parts.

9 Cf. Guthrie, J.H.S. lxxvii (1957), 40-41. Simplicius was probably wrong to think of the atoms as bai Je dKtvp-ra, Phys. 42. 10-I I.

10 57 e, cf. 52 e, 57 c, 58 d-e, 62 b I. The association of rest and unity may be seen at Phaedrus 245 d 6-eI (preferably reading yyv), where there may be a reminiscence of the return of Empedocles' world to the Sphere. Cf. Phaedo 72 b-d.

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 33

Love being in some sense cause of rest, while Strife is cause of movement.' But whereas rest and movement were of primary importance for Aristotle and his school, what interested Empedocles more was unity and plurality. Thus Em- pedocles describes explicitly the alternation of unity and plurality in fr. 17. The accompanying alternation of rest and movement was probably included more or less incidentally in the account of the different phases of unity and plurality. If so, Aristotle's alternative to quoting the lines he does would have been to quote snippets like those Eudemus has chosen:2 and these would have obscured what for Aristotle was of leading interest, namely the regular succession of periods of rest and movement. Aristotle was aware of the tra- ditional association of rest with unity and of movement with plurality.3 Quite likely he has accepted the alternation between unity and plurality as a good enough reminder of the parallel alternation between rest and movement.

II At the end of his second discussion of rest and movement in Empedocles

Aristotle writes: T 8 Kat &' V' owv Xpo'vwv E~LTa Ao'yov TLvdo.4 At first sight it might be thought that this sentence was a mere appendage, a footnote in- cidental to what has preceded. In that case the place of Aristotle's 'equal times' in Empedocles' cycle would perhaps have to be left an open question. But an examination of the passage makes it reasonably clear that the sentence is an organic part of Aristotle's argument and that these are equal times of rest and movement. Aristotle complains that Empedocles has not provided a cause of alternation. Love and Strife cause only their own activity, not their alternation in power: av Td v& ydp o0iK at•a 7•

d •7TroTEOV7a, 0;8 70Ou7 To V T7 ~LodorT7rL q VEILKEL Elvat, dA A T7S

Z•EV T ToavvayELV, T OU 7 T•oLaKptVELV. Et E

7TpoLoptE•-Ta 1-o

EoV fvLcPEL, W , WoIrTEr OTt EaTtLV TL 0 c vvayEL TOVS o VOaWITOV% 77 SLAla, Kal

EV'yo••oTL O o'XOpot oAX•A-9ovsg

TOvT yap VTOTOE-TaL Ka0 E'V 6T ,Awt Etvat- qat'vcrat yap Eln TLVWV 01TW5. To% Kal SLV Lawv Xpovwv ELTat Ao'dyov TLVoS.5

Here Aristotle allows that in a sense Empedocles has argued correctly to the existence of Love and Strife on a cosmic scale from the observation of par- ticular events. But this limited praise of Empedocles loses its point unless Aristotle reiterates that the alternation of Love and Strife should have been given a similar explanation. Thus TO o& Ka SV' 'L"Uwv Xpdvwv, etc., picks up and repeats El 7T3 poaoptErat To E v ipEt. This in turn looks back to the two earlier definitions: E'v E'pEd rTO rdrv 7PELELV Kat LVEeaOaL rTdcAv6 and TO KpaTELV Kat KLVELV EV -LEPEL T77jV cptav KLt To VELKOSQ 9VTapxE ToLS' 7 i paypaortc v E6 a'vcyKrjS',

7pEfCLEL 8 T7v ~LEraev Xpdvov.7 Aristotle's references to alternation have become increasingly abbreviated. But almost certainly it remains the same alternation which he has primarily in mind throughout the passage, the alternation of rest and movement. We have seen that Aristotle knew that the Sphere alone was at rest. Thus Aristotle's remark will mean that the Sphere lasted for as long

The notion of Love as primarily cause of rest is the more likely if, as we shall argue, Love's time of rest in the Sphere lasts for as long as the world of movement and plurality that in a sense 'belongs' to Strife.

2 Frr. 27. I, 3-4, 31, ap. Simpl. Phys. 1183. 28-1184. 4.

3 Met. oo04b27-29, cf. Phys. 20Ibi6-21,

4599.1

De caelo 30Ia,1i-14,

and Simplicius' com- ments, Phys. 22. 16-18 and 42. 8-io on Arist. Phys. I84bi5-I8.

4 252A31-32. s 252a25-32. 6 252a20-21.

7 252a7_-O.

D

34 D. O'BRIEN

as the whole period of separation and movement, i.e. the period which includes increasing Strife, total Strife, and increasing Love.

This is quite likely the implication of fr. 30:

avdap EITEl pLya NEFKOS' EVC LEAE'EUUW E Ep'OP7) ETLCS 73 7 a vopovaUE 'EAEtCOLEVOtO XpoVoo., 03 uq0w tCv /atos' lr AarE'os' Trap' EA77Aa-rat bKOV ...

(The limbs in the first line will be Strife's limbs, not as is commonly supposed the limbs of the Sphere.) Aristotle quotes this fragment in a passage of the Metaphysics which reproduces exactly, though in a somewhat shorter form, the argument of the passage in the Physics.' dpotflatos, though singular in form, should imply two times, a time that is given and a time that is received. The simplest rate of exchange would be for Love and Strife to have equal times. Quite likely therefore the fragment implies that Love now cedes to Strife a time equal in length to the time that Love has herself enjoyed during the Sphere. The second time it will be simplest to suppose lasts for as long as there is movement and separation in the world, i.e. until the rebirth of the Sphere.

There remains the question: for how long were the elements separated under total Strife ? The answer to this question we must defer for a moment.

III

In fr. 35. io we hear that when Love is prevailing Strife is driven increasingly ITd'

gUaxra pLcLpta7a KUvKAov. Where does Love go when Strife is prevailing?

The answer is not, as has usually been supposed,z that Love in her turn is driven outside the world. That idea has been accepted simply for the sake of its symmetry. The opening lines of the fragment tell us that Love was confined to the centre of the world when Strife's power was at its height:

EITEL NEKOS t V EVEpracLrOV LKETO /#OSg

8&v7 S, v U tdU1•U

ntOAo-r-. uarpoqAyy~ y7E'V77aaL, EV 77tL 87 nra&E lTav-a aVVEpXE'Tat E LVOV ELVaL,

OvK aq3ap, caAAd OEAr/Ld UVaV•

arLEV" &"AAoOEv AAa.

Empedocles does not here describe the position of Love and Strife during the

Sphere and then go back to recount the events which have led to their being in that position. It is true, things are said to come together: and then we are

told, 'not all at once'. But that does not mean that ovK acoap, J AAd OeA9prL qualifies 'KETco and yy-qra~ as well as

vvEpXEra•. "KETo describes an action com-

pleted before aVVEPXEcrac and completed it should remain, no matter for how long the events described in

uVVE'pXE'at are then said to continue. Equally,

'vE'p'ra-ov Pdv8os is not likely to mean the Sphere's outermost circumference, the same as EaXara -rEppiaTa KvKAov. Like the Latin imus or infimus used of the centre of

SAlet. Iooob12-17. 2 e.g. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 4th edition, London, 1930, pp. 234, 236, 242. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, London, 1912, p. 239. Bignone, pp. 223, 576, 585. Frenkian, J8tudes de philosophie prisocratique, ii, Paris, 1937, PP- 53-55. Freeman, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd edition, Oxford, 1949, P. i86. Skemp, Plato's Statesman, Lon-

don, 1952, p. 90. Mugler, 'Deux themes de la cosmologie grecque, devenir cyclique et pluralit6 des mondes', JLtudes et Commentaires xvii (1953), 42-43. Zafiropulo, Empidocle d'Agrigente, Paris, 1953, P- 151. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge, 1957, p. 346. Santillana, The Origins of Scientific Thought, London, 1961, pp. 112-13.

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 35

a sphere,' &V'p-a-os

will more naturally describe the centre of the whirl, not its circumference: and Strife therefore will have been at the centre of the whirl before it is driven rr' &arXa aTa

T•'p ,a7 KvKAov. The tense and mood of

Cvy-reat are

probably correct, as generalizing the events described. The change of mood from fKETO to

y7dr&'Tat,2 from particular to general, is like the change of mood

from general to particular in some of Homer's similes.3 'When Strife reached the innermost depth of the whirl, and whenever Love has come4 to be in the centre of the whirl, (then) there (in the centre) do all things (begin to) come together to be one only, not at once but gradually drawing together from different directions.' Thus Love is driven to the centre of the world when Strife prevails. When Love prevails she expands from the centre and drives Strife to the circumference.

Fragment 35 completes our understanding of the temporal structure of the cycle. There is obviously not meant to be any very long delay between the action of 'KETO or y vv-aa and of rvv'pXErat. Increasing Love follows more or less at once upon Strife's reaching the innermost centre at the height of its power. Now the time of increasing Love will presumably, for reasons of sym- metry, be equal to the time of increasing Strife. Thus we have two alternations in the life of the world. There is first the major alternation between one and many or rest and movement. Then there is the minor alternation within the period of movement and separation between becoming many and becoming one, with only a short while when the elements are fully separated. Each alternation is composed of equal parts, of halves. This is probably in part the answer, in so far as there was an answer, to Aristotle's demand for a cause of alternation. 'Equal times' probably seemed to Empedocles the obvious and natural result of the broad oath of fr. 30 and of the broad oaths and necessity of fr. I 15. In this way equality, equal times, will in Empedocles' eyes probably have helped to explain how the world alternates between being one and being many, the major alterna- tion, and between becoming one and becoming many, the minor alternation.s

IV How were the elements arranged under total Strife? Tannery writes:6 'On

ne doit pas... supposer que le Neikos arrive "a produire une separation com-

plete des 616ments, de fagon "a conduire chacun d'eux ' une place d6termin6e de l'univers; son action n'ira pas plus loin qu'une dissociation complete de

l'homogene, et dans cet 6tat de dissociation, le repos originaire aura fait place a un tohu-bohu o i s'agitent, en mouvements d6sordonnes, les masses 616men- taires, indistinctes et confuses.' Tannery's description is in part bound up with

I Cicero, De nat. deorum 1. 103, 2. 84, 2. I16, Tusc. Disp. 5. 69. Manilius, 1. 170. Macrobius, in Somnium Scipionis I. 22. 4.

2 This change of mood Wilamowitz finds 'undenkbar', Hermes lxv (1930), 248-9, and Groningen 'impossible', 'La composition litteraire archaique grecque', Verhandelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Afdelung Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks lxv. 2 (1958), 216 n. 2.

3 Il. 4. 141 ff, 16. 297 ff., 21. 522 ff., quoted by Goodwin, Moods and Tenses, sect. 547-9. The change of mood between opta- tive and indicative in parallel subordinate

clauses, sect. 467 and 534, should be ex- plained in the same way.

4 The aorist subjunctive when followed in this way by a present indicative regularly has the sense of the English perfect, see Goodwin, sect. 90.

s For the importance of equality in Em- pedocles and among the Presocratics generally see Vlastos, 'Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies', Classical Philology xlii (1947), 156-78.

6 Pour l'histoire de la science helline, 2nd edition by Dies, Paris, 1930, p. 319-

36 D. O'BRIEN

his belief that there is only one world from Sphere to Sphere, with 'increasing Strife' a mere preliminary sorting out of the elements. But as if to refute Tannery's very words that none of the separated elements had 'une place determinee de l'univers', Plutarch in the passage already quoted from the De .facie introduces Empedocles' state of total Strife to indicate precisely what would happen if each element were restricted to its 'natural' place in the universe. That is also the implication of Aristotle's criticism in the De caelo that Empedocles omitted to describe the origin of the universe under increas- ing Love. Aristotle's point presupposes that the elements have been arranged by Strife in essentially the positions which they already occupy in Aristotle's world. Thus Empedocles' elements, when fully separated by Strife, will have been arranged in concentric spheres.

V

There is evidence that, at least for some part of the cycle, Love and Strife were perhaps also thought of as arranged in roughly concentric spheres, fr. 17. 17-20:

ror~ ' a' &tqev 7rAE'ov' E'e vo% EvatL,

l7ip Kat VSWp Kati ya~a Kac? q'pos a1TAEro v os!,

NEtKO'S r' ov1Ao'-Evov 8iXa "rwv, ""d'Aavov a7-aacrw7t,

Kal f_&Adt 'r-' TOLU-W, "

7[ L[ 'KIS TE 7E TAcoS 7E.

It is difficult to suppose that Love is equal in length and breadth to each of the elements.' For this would make the elements equal to each other in volume, which in a world roughly like our own would make the radius of the earth three times as large as the distance from earth to heaven.z Further, when Aristotle considers what Empedocles meant by the equality of his elements, he does not consider the possibility that they could have been strictly equal in

volume.3 Itis also difficult to suppose that Love is equal in length and breadth to all the elements taken together.4 For this would suggest that

dT-dAavrov describes Strife as in some way equal to the elements. But if the reference of

&7-dravTrov is external, Strife compared to the elements, it would be simpler to read

CKd&-TW or orTavT7,5

which would again make Strife, and so by implication Love, equal to each of the elements.6 More probably the verse means that Love is equal to herself in length and breadth, i.e. stretched out in the shape of a sphere. For a sphere is the only three-dimensional figure in which from any direction, passing through the centre, length is equal to breadth. (In a cube

That is the view of among others Tan-

nery, pp. 314-15, and evidently Burnet,

pp. 208, 232, 236. z The formula for the volume of a sphere

is Arr3. If, in order to approximate to the condition of the present world, we include water with earth and fire with air, then the ratio of the radius of the inner to the outer sphere is I: 1.3. The suggestion is not that

Empedocles would have wanted, or been able, to work out the mathematics precisely. The result of equal volumes can easily be visualized by someone who is not a mathe- matician.

3 De gen. et corr. 333ai6-34, cf. Meteor. 34oa8-18.

4 This is apparently the view of Bignone, s.v. fr. 17, but cf. p. 541 and Studi sul pensiero antico, Naples, 1939, P. 338.

s Sextus, Adv. Math. 9. 10, IO. 317, and Hippolytus, Ref. 10. 7. 5, have

•vr177TiL or

addvr7q. Simplicius, Phys. 26. 3 and 158. 18, has CKaa-rov. Panzerbieter reads iKadaTwr and suggests iTravrt for Sextus, Beitrdge zur Kritik und Erkldrung des Empedokles, Meinin- gen, 1844, ad loc.

6 We cannot perhaps entirely exclude the possibility that with the reading idnrsrdqt Strife is said to be 'everywhere equal (sc. to all the elements taken together)', and so too that Love is 'equal in length and breadth (sc. to all the elements taken together)'.

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 37

for example there are different dimensions from the centre to different parts of the circumference.)

Similarly, drdAavrov cirdavr-q probably describes the position of Strife. aTdAavros in Homer regularly means no more than 'equivalent to' or 'like' (L.S.J., s.v.). For Empedocles' phrase we may therefore compare rdwviocr' tcrqv used of a shield in Homer, II. 12. 294, and Laov o rdrCavrgt used to describe

Prometheus' liver growing again at night after the eagle's daily attack on it, Hesiod, Theog. 524. In either expression 7TdvroTE and drrcr'77T serve to prevent the comparison being external: the shield and Prometheus' liver are not com- pared to anything else, they are 'every way equal (sc. to themselves)'. So too, Strife, we suggest, is 'everywhere equal (sc. to itself)'.

Now further, similar expressions are used of a sphere: ot. . . 7cdvroOEvy Cov,

Parmenides fr. 8. 49 ; KaWrrwdoOEv ) L'cor oavrgEcLo Empedocles fr. 29. 3 ;2 rrdcVTOOEV ttoso (QotL fr. 28. I;3 and probably luovo

daEravrt Timon fr. 6o. 2.4 JT4Aavo70

drc7dvriq occurs again in Aratus, Phaen. 22-23,5 to describe the earth suspended in the centre of the world. The notion of weight or balance present in Aratus, and easily suggested by -rdAcavrov, is found also in the description of Par- menides' Sphere, fr. 8. 44,

Lad•oEv taorrahE rrTdv7rLs. Strife too, we suggest, is

arranged in the form of a sphere, 'equal on every side (sc. to itself)' or perhaps 'equally balanced on every side'. The difference will be that, since Love, as we have seen, moves to and from the centre of the world, therefore Strife will form not a solid but a hollow sphere. That is, Strife will form an even spherical layer surrounding Love.

This description of the positions of Love and Strife may perhaps be true only during the Sphere, when in the most obvious sense Strife is 'apart' from the elements and Love is 'in' them.6 But the description quite likely applies to Love and Strife at any time. Love we have seen is never outside the elements. She expands and contracts to and from the centre. And the 'battle' between Love and Strife seems to have been envisaged not as a chaotic toing and froing, 'rather after the analogy of the battlefield, wherein one point after another is lost for a considerable time to the enemy, and then regained, perhaps only to be lost again',7 but as essentially a regular process, with Love in the period of her increasing power constantly pressing on the heels of Strife, and not abandoning positions once attained, fr. 35. 12-13:

oaaov S' a'Ev VrmEK7rrTOEoL (Strife), rdocov aEev ErTrLEL 'ij7rnLfPWV (PtAr-q77770-S CL(L(EOSa aL/P070oo o

Sof Diels, for od Simpl. Phys. 146. 22. 2 Schneidewin, Philologus vi (1851), 161,

for LadE dartv ai'rct Hipp. Ref. 7. 29. 13. 3 This verse is quoted anonymously by

Stob. Ecl. I. 15. 2 = I. 144. 2o Wachsmuth, but followed by a verse, fr. 28. 2 = fr. 27. 4, attributed by several authors to Empedocles. Eo00 add. Maas, E'yv Grotius, Env Diels, doto or d Fc> Wachsmuth.

4 Timon is describing Xenophanes' god, probably with the thought of it being abatpoEL~6, cf. [Arist.] De MXG 977bl.

s This is probably imitated in Ovid's description of the earth, Met. I. 3 3pon- deribus librata suis, cf. 34-35 aequalis ab omni parte.

6 This may also be the implication of the juxtaposition of fire and water in line '*8: these two contrasting elements are united by the power of Love.

' Millerd, On the interpretation of Empedocles, dissertation, Chicago, 1908, p. 46. Millerd's description is apparently taken from Sim- plicius, Phys. I 124. 7-9, where, however, the temporary advances and withdrawals of Love and Strife take place within a single and eternal sensible realm and are an attempt to explain the 'mythical' alternation of Love and Strife within this framework in a way that would mitigate the extreme neo- Platonic view whereby Strife alone is active in the sublunary world.

38 D. O'BRIEN

It is possible therefore that all the time Love is roughly 'equal (to herself) in length and breadth', and Strife 'equal (or equally balanced) on every side (of Love)'.

VI The last feature of the cosmic cycle which we have to consider is the sequence

of stages in the zoogony. Aetius 5. 19- 5 names four stages which can be con- firmed singly from the fragments: separate limbs, fr. 57, monsters, frr. 60o and 61, whole-natured forms, fr. 62, and men and women. The question is how we should place these stages in the cosmic cycle.

Separate limbs we are told by Aristotle and Simplicius were born Erl T-t

tA~7rpqrog, i.e. under increasing Love.' They were formed inside the earthz and were therefore, as we should expect, and as Simplicius tells us,3 the first creatures to be born. These separate creatures were joined together by Love.4 The result will have been monsters.s Monsters were still among the first creatures of Love's world: Aristotle refers to them as 'v 'rags E) pXqg tpa

Whole-natured creatures were formed when fire was KptVdo,.EVOV and OEAov 7rp03 dIorov lKEUc0a, fr. 62. 2 and 6. They belong therefore to the world of in- creasing Strife. They were described later in the poem than separate limbs.7 They sprang from the earth, xOov~a VE'avrEAAov, fr. 62. 4, and so were again the first creatures to be born.

The whole-natured creatures have no sex, ov"7E . . . E)alvov7as . . . o~ov 7~

dTrXwptov av8pdu't yvi^ov, fr. 62. 7-8, or are more probably bisexual, since they have shares, the implication is probably equal shares, of fire and water,

.c.LOTErpwV vLardO TE KcU E8 EO aLtav EXOVT7E, fr. 62. 5, and these are the male

and female element respectively.8 They were described rrpa -r1 -c6v '-

v pdwV KaU ytVaLKELwC aoWtXroWv 6apOpwEaows.9 Simplicius later speaks of them being split apart.' Men and women are now each a avploAov of the other." The implication is obvious, though it has been denied,Iz that the whole-natured creatures are split apart into men and women.

Thus so far we have clearly established two evolutionary sequences with no doubt about the opening stages of each. In Love's world separate limbs arise and join together to form monsters. In Strife's world there arise whole-natured forms which are later split apart into men and women.

Do men and women also arise in Love's world? Simplicius says they do, though a faint suspicion may be felt that he has himself produced men and

I Arist. De caelo 300b25-3I. De gen. anim.

722b17-20 and b26. Simpl. De caelo 587. 8-26. Kara-

r•7v -rf•7 LOas &pX9*v Phys. 371.

33-35- 2 Arist. De gen. anim. 722b24-26. Aet.

5. 22. I as corrected by Diels. Cf. fr. 96. I. 3 Phys. 371-. 34. 4 Arist. De anima 430a30. Cf. De gen. anim.

722b20-28. Simpl. Phys. 371- 35, 381. 22-25. De caelo 587. 18-19.

s Aristotle in the passage quoted from the De anima may be thinking of separate limbs joining to form men and women.

6 Phys. I99b5- 7 The formation of bones, one of the

animal parts that arose at the beginning of Love's world, Arist. De caelo 300b29, was described in the first book, Simpl. Phys. 300. 20 quoting fr. 96. Whole-natured creatures were described in the second book, Simpl. Phys. 38?. 29 quoting fr. 62.

8 Arist. De gen. anim. 765a8-IO. De part.

anitm. 648a28-31. Frr. 65 and 67. Aet. 5. 7. I,

cf. 5. 26. 4- 9 Simpl. Phys. 381. 29-30. 0o Phys. 382. 20. " Arist. De gen. anim. 722bi1, cf. Plato,

Symp. 19' d. 12 Rudberg, 'Empedokles und Evolution',

Eranos 1 (1952), 23-30, esp. p. 28.

EMPEDOCLES' COSMIC CYCLE 39

women from separate limbs in order to illustrate a passage of Aristotle.I But fr. 26 also implies that men and women arise as the elements are drawn to- gether by Love:

avra yap Eurtv rawra, &t' AAr9AoWv

S '0OVra yivovr' ivOpwo7rot TE Kal dAAowv EOwa OqLpctv LAAorE dtEv ptAo'•rrvt UvVEpXotLEV E'S Eva KOatLov, iAAor-E 8' a; 81X'

KOKaara bopElVLEva NEIKEO• EXOEL, ELUOKE EV UCvvTra rp 7T wV

V 7TEvEE YEV77raL.

It is true that this fragment is a mosaic of repetitions from earlier in the poem, probably a summary of the first part of the poem on the cosmic cycle and the elements. But the literal meaning of the lines is plainly that men and women are born both as the elements come together under increasing Love and as they are drawn apart by Strife.

Were men and women the final stage in either sequence? Fr. 20 indicates that in Strife's world men and women are later to be torn apart into separate limbs:

roro tILEV av fpoTrEWV taLEAEWV OLpL~EtKEToV ~OKOV" IAAor-E /IEV (6PAo-7r•T aUvvEPXo'LE

E13 Egv aravra yvta, 7-a u

tfa AEAOYXE •lov 08aA•8ovrog 3Ev a'K/tL't

AAo•-E 8 ' a1~TE KaKqLtuL

8Lat-/170t9vr 'ZEpE•8Cau

,17AElaE7t CVOLX EKaaua 1TEptpp9YI~v/Lt

fltoto. CLs 8' aviowg Ocalvoa L Kat 1X' V va " po1LLEAaOpotSg 0-)pcl i'' PELAEXEEcTcTLV IE' 7TTEPoJ3agtLort Kv(1LFatLS

This fragment has usually been taken as a description of the power of Love and Strife in the life cycle of each individual. But diAAoTE i Cv tA

dr'r'-rt and

AAOTE 8' cav••E

KaK'7LaL .. 'EplG'8aa indicate fairly clearly that we are still

dealing with alternate worlds of Love and Strife. 'The limbs that have found a body in the peak of blooming life' will be separate limbs that become monsters and then men and women in the world of increasing Love. 'At another time' will be the world of Strife increasing. 'Limbs', the subject is still yvta, 'are torn apart again by wicked spirits of dissension and wander2 each of them apart along the breakers of life's shore.' This is not a plausible description of death. Nor does it easily describe, as Diels wishes,3 the formation of monsters from separate limbs. Empedocles' limbs have already found a body and are now torn apart: just the opposite process. The point must be that under increasing Strife men and women will be torn apart into separate limbs. They are torn apart 'again' because they become separate limbs under increasing Strife as before under increasing Love.

We may recall Aristophanes' speech in the Symposium, where the connexion with Empedocles has often been noted.4 There too men and women arise from bisexual creatures and are threatened with a further separation: dlflog oiv EUTtV, E~aV AL4 KOULtL~o WaEot v 1 rpo TgTOvg OEOV"g, &ro0 tW5l Kal avutg

LaUaXItu7uo- fIE~a, Kat ITEpltIEv E"XOvTEs WIT7~Ep Ot tE

' TatS aT7)A*aLa Ka-aypav~ E'KTETlfTWfIEVtOt

' Phys. 371. 33-372. II on Arist. Phys.

g198bio-34. 2 Cf. idAcovro and Ed'Aavaro used of

separate limbs in fr. 57 and Simplicius, De caelo 587. 19.

3 Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta, ad loc.

4 At greatest length by Ziegler, 'Men- schen- und Weltenwerden, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Mikrokosmosidee', Neue Jahrbiicher xxxi (I913), 529-73, who, how- ever, supposes that there is only one zoo- gonical sequence.

40 D. O'BRIEN

LcTEITrptL(LEVOL KaEr/ TRaS pVcLrs, YEYOVOTECS WUTEp AlU7TrL.' In the Symposium we are also promised the possibility of being fused together again with our other half. 2

Thus Aristophanes' speech contains in effect the whole of Empedocles' cycle: from double creatures to men and women, to quarter creatures, back to double creatures.3

It is true, there is no direct mention of whole-natured creatures in Love's world: but we are quite likely intended to assume their existence, so as to

complete the symmetry with Strife's world:

Increasing Love Increasing Strife

separate limbs and monsters whole-natured creatures men and women men and women whole-natured creatures (monsters and) separate limbs

Aetius may have taken only Love's sequence, which we have seen was de- scribed earlier in the poem, and rearranged the stages so as to end with men and women. Perhaps more likely, Theophrastus recorded only those stages of either

cycle that were described in detail, and wrote, starting with increasing Love:4 separate limbs and monsters and men and women under increasing Love, and whole-natured creatures and men and women under increasing Strife. In that case Aetius or his source has not surprisingly produced a single sequence by suppressing the first mention of men and women.

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge DENIS O'BRIEN

' 193 a. This is explained as one of Plato's jokes by Ziegler, p. 547 cf. p. 557-

2 192 d-e, 193 c-d. 3 Thus Aristophanes alone among the

earlier speakers shares with Diotima the attitude to Love as not simply an immediate delight, but a yearning that can find com- plete fulfilment only beyond the immediate world. Diotima in effect acknowledges the similarity at 205 d Io-e, cf. perhaps 212 c 4-6.

4 The reason for this would again have been that Love's zoogony was described first. Empedocles regularly speaks of in- creasing Love before increasing Strife, frr. 17. 1-17, 20. 1-4, 26. 5-12; there is the same order in the passage quoted above

from Aristotle's Physics, 250b27-29. Fr. 21. 7-8 is an exception in putting increasing Strife before increasing Love, probably be- cause there Empedocles is appealing to our experience of the present world. Aristotle, De gen. et corr. 334a5-7, and Theophrastus, De sens. 20, speak of increasing Love as in the past (Aristotle's 7rpd?'epov shows that Theophrastus' -'dre does not refer to the future). The priority of Love's zoogony is probably the reason for the tense of

d7Tro-AETo, Aristotle Phys. 198b31, describing monsters in Love's world, and t4LerEv, Theophrastus, De caus. pl. I. 22. 2, describing fish which are fiery creatures and so in Love's world took up their habitat in a cool element, water, cf. I. 21. 5-