Emergence of the 5th Generation of Leadership: Periscoping the 17th CPC Congress by Navigating within a Series of

Dialectical Models

W. Emily CHOW and Peter Kien-hong YU(Emails: w.emily.chow@post.harvard.edu and

pyu8@hotmail.com)

Graduate School of International AffairsMing Chuan University

Taoyuan Campus, Taiwan, R.O.C.September 24, 2007

Emergence of the 5th Generation of Leadership: Periscoping the 17th CPC Congress by Navigating within a Series of Dialectical Models

W. Emily CHOW and Peter Kien-hong YUGraduate School of International Affairs

Ming Chuan UniversityTaoyuan Campus, Taiwan, R.O.C.

September 28, 2007

Abstract This paper is an attempt to decode and decipher the Chinese Communist words and deeds. The HU Jintao regime is likely to remain in power until the 18 th

National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, it has to continue to pick or groom a suitable elite or the next cohorts of leaders to succeed HU. Arguably, the successor, keeping the pace of time, must learn to navigate within the safe zones of a series of dialectical models, because the mainstream Market Economy line is suppose to continue for a long period of time.

Key words HU Jintao, Communist Party of China congress, successors, models and theories, dialectics

In John M. H. Lindbeck’s Understanding China: An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources, we learned that, in 1958-1959, the study of both Taiwan and mainland China was in its developmental decade.1 In David L. Shambaugh’s American Studies of Contemporary China, we were told that the new generation of (Communist) China studies in the 1990s has acquired a better “feel” for China.2

Years later, WU Yu-shan of the Republic of China (ROC) attempted to theorize relations across the Taiwan Strait in terms of nine contending approaches, such as the divided-nation model, the power asymmetry model, the strategic triangle model, and cognitive psychological model.3 SHU Keng argued that we should move beyond those dyadic models as examined by WU. As an alternative, he proposed the linkage communities analytical framework, which can allow more serious, in-depth, and comprehensive assessments of the impacts of socio-economic contacts or interactions, political pressures, and policy outputs across both sides of the Taiwan Strait.4

1 See John M. H. Linbeck, Understanding China: An Assessment of American Scholarly Resources (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971). 2 See David L. Shambaugh, ed., American Studies of Contemporary China (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). See also, Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, and Seiichiro Takagi, China’s Watching: Perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States (London: Routledge, 2006). 3 See Wu Yu-shan, “Theorizing on Relations across the Taiwan Strait: Nine Contending Approaches,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.9, No.25 (November 2000), pp.407-428.

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Arguably, if we want to have a closer and fuller understanding of Chinese (Communist) politics, we should first apply the dialectical approach. There is ample evidence to show that the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Nationalist Party of China or Kuomintang (KMT), the Democratic Progressive party (DPP), etc. apply dialectics of one kind or another, not the models or theories mentioned in the last paragraph.

To be sure, a typical Chinese mind works in the following way: First, he or she would first think of a dot,5 be it a symbol, a concept, a sentence, a house, the Earth, the solar system, or even the universe. Second, the dialectician would find its opposite or extreme. For example, one would think of house, and its opposite or extreme would be non-house and vice versa. Third, he or she would make side-ways moves like a crab. Fourth, if this House versus Non-house model cannot describe and explain, if not infer or predict, certain phenomena, the dialectician would right away construct another dialectical model. Hence, we would see a series of dialectical frameworks at work. In other words, the dialectician would play a role of a frog, leaping from this model to another model.6

One of the authors’ models is as follows. It was first constructed in September 1994 and later somewhat modified four times:

1 2 3 4 5 A B C D Etime/space sequence (1)time/space sequence (2)………………………..time/space sequence (n)

1 (or 100% of the concept or whatever); 3 (or 50% of the concept or whatever);5 (or 1% of the concept or whatever).

E (or 100% of the concept or whatever);

4 Shu Keng, ”Making Sense of the Impacts of Socioeconomic Contacts across the Taiwan Strait,” paper presented at Taiwan Thinktank, dated December 1, 2003, 26 pages. See http://www.peaceforum.org.tw/onweb.jsp?webno=3333333322&webitem_no=626. 5 See Peter Kien-hong YU, “The Study of Politics Should Begin with One Dot,” The One-dot Center Occasional Working Papers Series, No.1 (January 2008), 20 pages and “The Study of China Should Begin with One Dot,” The One-dot Center Occasional Working Papers Series, No.2 (March 2008), 24 pages. 6 See Peter Kien-hong Yu, The Crab and Frog Motion Paradigm Shift: Decoding and Deciphering Taipei and Beijing’s Dialectical Politics (Lanham, MD.: University Press of America, 2002).

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C (or 50% of the concept or whatever);A (or 1% of the concept or whatever).

The 1 2 3 4 5 spectrum is equivalent to what I call the safe zone, and the A B C D E spectrum, danger zone. 5 is the middle way/road/path/line/track in the safe zone and A, the middle way/road/path/line/track in the danger zone.7

When one makes a move at any time/space sequence, he or she is thinking of only one Number or Letter, and, therefore, there is no contradiction whatsoever. In the course of making moves, the negation of negation, the affirmation of negation, the affirmation of affirmation, and the negation of affirmation may also appear before time/space sequence (n) is reached. This process is known as the sub-dialectical game. It should be pointed out that there are three basic stages (or nodal points) of development (or for each concept or whatever): nascent, ascendant, and mature for the Numbers and mature, descendant, and moribund for the Letters. In other words, 5 is nascent; 3, ascendant; and 1, mature. On the other hand, E is mature: C, descendant; and A, moribund. Last but not least, a series of other dialectical, theoretical models must be applied, in order to describe, explain, and infer (or predict) more phenomena.

7 The “zone” and time/space sequence concepts are very Chinese cultural-bound. China and some other Chinese-influenced societies are categorized by Edward T. Hall as the “high context culture,” where message is part of the context. Therefore, it is the context, not the exact word, which is important. High context cultures rely on relatively more “implicit” way of communication as opposed to “low context” cultures which rely on explicit words. Therefore, a yes is a yes in most of the Western (low context) countries, but in Chinese culture, a “yes” may have a range of meanings from “yes” to “I heard it” or even just a functional word (sound) to fill in the blanks. People from high context cultures also discuss issues from a “holistic” viewpoint with a cyclical thinking pattern rather than a linear order. “Past,” “present” and “future” are believed to be highly connected and intertwined. “Whole” (oneness) is important and is usually taken into account when making plans. But within the “oneness,” according to the great Chinese book, I Ching (Classic of Changes), has two sides, namely, Yin and Yang. More importantly, the two sides are, depending on the model, “not mutually exclusive.” In other words; there are some Yang molecules in Yin and some Yin molecules in Yang, just a matter of degree (in our words, 100%, 50%, 1% of a concept.) An analogy will be the evolution of day and night, or seasons, as shown

in the following picture. I Ching is still a book which is frequently consulted by the Chinese people, especially elites who are making strategies today. It contains 64 gua(hexagrams), each gua is a figure composed of 6 stacked horizontal lines called yao. Each yao means different positions (degrees) of the gua. If we see the gua as one spectrum, yao represents the degree of the spectrum. The two big themes of I Ching are “timing” and “position.” At different times, one must adopt different strategies, or same strategy, but different positions/ degrees (yao.) The best position is “middle.” Therefore, yao 1 is usually the beginning of a concept/strategy; while 6 is the other extreme. Both are usually considered to be too little or too much of a concept. However, yao 3 is not always the best position. Most of the time, yao 2 and yao 5 are considered to have the most potential and good positions depending on the strategy. Every strategy has an opposite strategy, to simplify this concept, we have a qian gua, which represents the heaven; we also have the opposite kun gua representing the other extreme -- the earth. When we make strategies, we must take a holistic view of the strategy, look at the two extreme sides as well as pay attention to the degrees of the strategy and change the degrees/positions at the right timing. This way of thinking has influenced the Chinese people for thousands of years. The dialectical model can be seen as a more succinct version to describe the Chinese way of thinking.

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At this juncture, a caveat should be added, that is, whenever we use the word, versus, it means that the concept or whatever on the left extreme, say Yes, or 1 will eventually defeat, coopt, absorb, etc. the concept or whatever on the right extreme, say No, at time/space sequence (n). However, in the process, the following arrangement may be necessary, such as flexibly positioning Yes at 1 and No at 5. In other words, a contradictory or even adversary relationship between Yes and No has been transformed into a non-contradictory, non-adversary relationship, meaning that whoever chose Yes or whoever opted No should learn to tolerate the existence of each other, because they are in the safe zone spectrum.

The following series of models, which were first conceived in late 2000 and put in print in early 2005,8 can help us to have a closer and fuller understanding of what should the fifth generation leaders of the CPC should understand, if they want to climb the power ladder or to have better, if not higher, positions. Needless to say, they have to comply with the Centralism versus Democracy model and to ask the party members to do it as well. Otherwise, all the models could crumble, like a domino effect.

In the first section of this paper, we will first spell out the structures of Marxism, Leninism, MAO Zedong Thought, the DENG Xiaoping Theory, the JIANG Zemin Important Theory or Sangedaibiao (Three Represents). We will also outline HU Jintao’s credo or theoretical proposition (lunshu) of Scientific Development Perspective in All Aspects of Economic Work (kexuefazhanguan) or the outlook of scientific development in an all-round way, and another of HU’s vital theoretical innovations, named harmony in the society.9 Then, the authors will remind the fifth generation leaders about the mainstream economic lines/paths/tracks/ways/roads since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the next section, we will discuss the first superstructure, namely, country, which includes the national title, national song, national anthem, etc. In the third section, the authors will talk about the ideology, which is the second superstructure. In the fourth section, we will analyze the third superstructure, politics. Finally, the authors will talk about military affairs, which follow politics. In each section, we will discuss mainland China’s relationship with Taiwan. 8 See Peter Kien-hong Yu, Hu Jintao and the Ascendancy of China (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International Academic Publishing, 2005). In January 2001, JIANG Zemin put forward the concept, yidezhiguo, and, on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in July 2001, he mentioned the term, yushijujin. 9 On religion and its role in social harmony, which is the intrinsic quality of Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics, see http://english.people.com.cn//200611/28/eng20061128_326018.html, dated November 28, 2006.

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Why Dialectical Politics?

MAO is the first generation or echelon leader. This is because it was he who led the Chinese Communist Party since January 1935 to eventually overthrow the CHIANG Kai-shek Government. When he was over 40 years, he said he became well versed in dialectics. For him, there were two dots/points/extremes (liangdianlun) at present. In future, there will still be two points. He also said that, in ancient China, the two points were called Yin and Yang, respectively. MAO certainly relied on dialectics to play politics and engage in military affairs. Once, he said he would like to convert the 600 million Chinese into dialecticians. In this respect, what he did has influenced the second generation leaders like ZHOU Enlai and DENG Xiaoping, who were also Long Marchers. In short, their political language is definitely couched in terms of dialectics.

One of the best examples of the dialectical model as constructed by DENG is: One Center, Two Points. One Center refers to the Economic Construction. It is like a roof, housetop, or eaves. Under the roof, there are two points. The first point is the Four Insistences (sigejianchi), such as adhering to Marxism, Leninism, and MAO Zedong Thought; and the other point, Reform and Opening to the Outside World (gaigekaifang), because he knows that, once opened to the outside world, the Chinese mainland (neidi) will be bound to have corruptions. This is also true in capitalist countries. So, in order to reconcile the two points or extremes, he instructed his subordinates to, serving as a dynamic, operational concept or what the Chinese Communists called fangzhen, conduct anti-corruption campaigns (fanfubaiyundong), so as to bring about the disappearance of the right extreme by elimination, cooptation, absorption, etc. To be sure, HU, to this day, is carrying out the campaigns. In March 2007, a National Corruption Prevention Bureau (NCPB) (Guojiayufangfubaiju) was approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) for the first time, to, among other things, to meet commitments to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). Certainly, HU’s successors will do the same, so as to enable the party to stay in power. Otherwise, the CPC may become an opposition party.

JIANG is a third generation leader of the core, who, as an underground Communist member in Shanghai Municipality, sided with the Chinese Communist Party on the eve of the creation of the PRC. He was confirmed as the core leader in September 1994 at the 4th Plenum of the 14th CPC Congress. He practices dialectics. From July 1995 to March 1996, it was he who ordered seven waves of military exercises of one

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kind or another against the ROC. The dialectical model he chose was Not to Attack versus To Attack. In terms of the 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E model mentioned above, military exercises were being positioned at 5, because, while, for example, unarmed ballistic missiles were launched, no one was hurt or injured during this period. In September 1997, it was JIANG who announced the Market Economy line.10 Later, he added the Three Represents, which should be understood in terms of the whole picture. We will show this in the next section. JIANG’s Shanghai gang gradually lost its power, especially after October 2006.11 With the death of HUANG Ju in June 2007, who was JIANG’s protégé, the Shanghai gang could be said as being symbolically lost its power. WANG Weigong, who had headed the office in Beijing of HUANG Ju, was detained in a widening probe over misuse of Shanghai Municipality's pension funds in August 2007. Vice President ZENG Qinghong, also the right hand man of JIANG, has expressed his intention to step down from the party’s Political Bureau Standing Committee in a letter to HU in April 2007.12 CHEN Liangyu, the former Shanghai Municipality party secretary, was also arrested, and expelled from both his administrative post and the party (called double expulsion, shuangkai) for corruption.13 Moreover, JIANG Mianheng, son of JIANG Zemin, and YOU Xigui, Head of Central Police Bureau (CPB) and JIANG Zemin’s body guard, both failed to be elected as representatives to the 17th CPC Congress.14 All these further indicated the collapse of the gang.

HU, who is a fourth generation leader,15 is also well versed in dialectics. In September 2004, JIANG handed HU the chairman position in the Central Military Commission (CMC), completing the first bloodless leadership succession in the party’s turbulent history. Again, HU’s Scientific Development Perspective in All Aspects of Economic Work, and harmony in the society are part of the whole picture, which will be elaborated in later sections.

10 By the end of 2006, 66 countries in the world recognized the mainland’s Market Economy status. Jiefangjunbao (hereinafter JFJB)(Beijing), January 15, 2007, p.7.11 Taipei Times (hereinafter TT)(Taipei), October 9, 2006, p.1.12 http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/281364/1/.html, dated June 10, 2007.13 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ft/20070803/bs_ft/fto080320071317477653, dated August 3, 2007. & http://www.atchinese.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=37695&Itemid=110, dated August 6, 2007.14 China Times (hereinafter CT)(Taipei), http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Print/0,4634,110505x112007072500096,00.html, dated July 25, 2007. & http://www5.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/SinoNews/Mainland/2007_8_13_20_11_19_518.html, dated August 14, 2007.15 See, for example, BO Zhiyue, China’s Elite Politics (Singapore: World Scientific, 2007) and Andy ZHANG, Hu Jintao: Facing China’s Challenges Ahead (San Jose, CA.: Writer’s Club Press, 2002) and LI Mingjiang, “China’s Issue of Succession,” Straits Times (hereinafter ST)(Singapore), as cited in http://twiasecurity.org/ST/2007/ST-170407.htm, dated April 17, 2007. LI pointed out that there is some urgency which has to do with four major factors for HU Jintao to prepare for a transition now.

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The fifth generation leaders are being defined as those who were born in the 1950s. They consist of many “sent-down youth,” who are often referred to as members of “the lost generation” of the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR).16 Some potential candidates have been surfaced in the press, such as LI Keqiang, YU Zhengsheng, ZHOU Yonggang LI Yuanchao, XI Jinpping, BO Xilai, WANG Qishan, MA Kai, WANG Yang, and LIU Yandong,17 many of them are the so-called princelings (taizidang) or the children of incumbent, retired, or late Chinese Communist high-ranking leaders. Although the two LIs are widely believed to be HU’s possible successors, it is still too early to predict as today’s political stars may not become the leader tomorrow, especially in a rapidly changing society. We must remember the “Who is HU?” days when HU was first elected into the Political Bureau Standing Committee in October 1992.18 He afterwards still carefully took a low profile, made steady progress, and gradually lined up support for 11 years while waiting for his day to come.

But in general, this generation differs profoundly from preceding generations in terms of their formative experiences, educational credentials, political socialization, administrative backgrounds, foreign contacts and world views. For example, both LI Keqiang and LI Yuanchao hold doctoral degrees.19 The latter has studied at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University in June 2002.20 And both of them tend to be market-friendly and popular with the foreign business community.21

The collective characteristics and intra-generational diversity of this new generation of leaders will likely have a strong impact on the Chinese mainland's political trajectory and socio-economic policies in the years to come.22

16 See Cheng Li, “China's 'Fifth Generation' Leaders Come of Age,” Asia Times (Hongkong) http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/IC29Ad01.html, dated March 29, 2007.17 China Post (hereinafter CP) (Taipei), May 12, 2007, p.2.18 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-07/10/content_5424602.htm & http://english.people.com.cn/leaders/vpresident.html, dated August 21, 2007

19 Xinxinwen (New News)(hereinafter XXW)(Taipei), No. 1063, July 19-25, 2007, pp.58-59 and http://www.6park.com/news/messages/44704.html, dated December 19, 2006.20 In his interview with American Planning Association in November 2003 (web version published in 2004), LI mentioned that he has participated in a training program titled "Leadership in Development" at JFK School of Government in Harvard University in June 2002, which has “…broadened my perspective of regional development and urban planning. During the program, I was able to communicate and exchange thoughts with my foreign colleagues and learn more about advanced subjects of world economic, scientific and urban development, especially urban development.” http://www.planning.org/APAinChina/news/liyuanchaointerview.htm, and http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/nov03/textonly.asp?id=224 dated August 21, 200721 Jonathan Ansfield and Melinda Liu, “Beijing Battle: the Ouster of Shanghai’s Powerful party chief may be the first salvo in the battle for supremacy among the next generation of Chinese leaders,” Newsweek International, October 9, 2006, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-152372172.html, viewed August 21, 200722 LI (note 15).

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In sum, the fifth generation leaders will certainly not rely on game theory, system theory, or rational (choice) theory, which were developed in the West, when they hold Political Bureau meetings. Imagine if they did apply those Western theories, they would still have to change the thinking of, for example, the 2.3 million military officers and soldiers in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Would the 72.3-million-member Chinese Communist Party have the time to do it? The resounding answer is: Of course not, because it simply means a waste of time, energy, budget, etc.

Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought

The massive spread of Marxism in China began after the October Revolution in Czarist Russia.23 MAO often mentions Karl Marx and Vladimir I. Lenin during his era. This is because he understands that whenever Marx studies the human development, he takes the following phases of development or spectrum into consideration, namely, primitive Communism, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and Communist. As to Lenin, his framework is smaller, that is, Feudalism versus Communism.

What about MAO himself? He focuses on the Communism versus Capitalism model. In other words, his dialectical model is even smaller than Lenin’s and much smaller than Marx’s. In other words, he was playing a sub-dialectical game.

Why is it called the DENG Theory? DENG, lacking other options, especially in view of the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, adopted the Socialism with Chinese Characteristics (as opposed to Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics after the adoption of the Market Economy line/path/track/way/road) versus Capitalism framework. This is a breakthrough in Marxism, because Marx did not talk about the Market Economy line. Because he knew that, playing another sub-dialectical game, his model is part of MAO’s, if not Lenin’s and Marx’s, he could not abandon Maoism after MAO’s death in September 1976. He can only describe MAO’s record as being 70% good or correct and 30% bad or wrong.

JIANG’s Three Represents can be seen in the safe zone in the Socialism versus Capitalism model. The Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics and Market Economy constitute the safe zone. The first Represent constitutes the subject (zhuti)

23 JFJB, June 5, 2006, p.4.

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[as opposed to object (keti)] and it refers to the workers, peasants, and the Chinese PLA who are standing under or positioned at the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics. The intellectuals are placed at 3. And the three million businessmen (siyingqiyezhu) and entrepreneurs, who are organized in about 180,000 party cells and who would keep Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics in mind and at heart, stand at 5, which refers to the Market Economy line. They are welcome to join the party since July 2001.24 In October 2006, the CPC for the first time mentioned the term, xindejingjihanshehuizhuzhi or shuangxinzhuzhi for short. That is to say, delegates to the 17th Party Congress should include them. Zhejiang Province, for example, will have one delegate who represent the businessmen and entreprenuers. Besides, the counter-revolutionary crime has been revised into the crime of jeopardizing state security. Of course, the former crime still applies to those who are in the danger zone, practicing 1%, 50%, or 100% of capitalism.

After taking over the General Secretary position and at the same time becoming the PRC President in November 2002 in addition to become the CMC Chairman of both the party and the PRC in September 2004, HU, in December 2004, mentioned the concept, Scientific Development Perspective in All Aspects of Economic Work. What is meant by this? HU actually wants to remind the CPC members that someday the Market Economy line will again be replaced by the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics as the mainstream economic line. As in one of his most important speeches since he became mainland China’s President in November 2002, at the CPC Central Party School in Beijing on June 25 2007, HU emphasized that the nation must advance the self-perfection in the development of the socialist political system, while preserving the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power.25 Most importantly, “…to insist on and develop the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics” said HU.26 When the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics becomes the mainstream economic line again, the CPC will be applying or returning to the Communism versus Capitalism model. To him, this is the inevitable, scientific development. To remind the party members that they are superior to the capitalists who are positioned at A, B, C, D, and E, the CPC from January 2005 to June 2006 was engaged in the Baoxian movement, which literally refers to “The Preservation of the Advanced Characteristics of the CPC.”

24 As of September 2007, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) said the Chinese mainland’s enterprises employed 120 million people, up 9.5% from the same month in 2006. 25 New York Times (hereinafter NYT), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/27/world/asia/27china.html?ex=1183608000&en=9853c33ac096a0b4&ei=5070, date June 27, 2007.26 http://big5.cctv.com/gate/big5/news.cctv.com/china/20070702/100155.shtml, dated July 2, 2007 & http://www.ettoday.com/2007/07/05/162-2121544.htm, dated July 5, 2007.

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Later in October 2006, marking an end to the JIANG era, the concept, social harmony or the building of a harmonious socialist society, was emphasized, which reflects a departure from DENG’s edict, namely, to let some regions and people get rich first. What HU is trying to emphasize is that there should be harmony among the Three Represents, the main forces in the society. For example, the businessmen after making money would donate money to the needy and poor in the society. The intellectuals would write things harmonizing the relationship among the three forces. And the workers, peasants, and military officers and soldiers, who do not possess a mode of production, would still be socialist in what they do and say. In addition, they must tolerate the existence of those private enterprise businessmen who are also or can be party members since July 2001. Thus, so long as the mainstream economic line is Market Economy, we would not see intellectuals, for example, being tortured or put to death. On May 16, 1966, which marked the first day of the GPCR, a 13-year old junior high school student, QIAN Gang, who was asked to struggle against the editor of Reminribao (People’s Daily), DENG Tuo, who committed suicide one day later, thereby becoming the first victim of the GPCR.27

It is true that the fifth generation leaders differ profoundly and their collective characteristics and intra-generational diversity of them will be likely to have a strong impact on the PRC’s political trajectory and socio-economic policies in the years to come. However, it should be noted that the collective leadership will also occasionally mention the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought worldview, because they still have the obligation to help their successors to go back to the mainstream Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics line someday.

Moreover, most of the potential 5th generation leaders mentioned above still belong to the category of the “politically correct (in Chinese terms, genzhengmiaohong, meaning square root and red sprout)” people, especially the princelings. In other words, their base of legitimacy is still the CPC and its doctrine, which is very different from the oppositions in areas like Taiwan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), who based their legitimacy on the bottom-up social movements (of course, also foreign support) and therefore will definitely divert from the doctrine of the old rulers. Among the representatives of the 17th CPC Congress, although we see more people from the business, most of the delegates are still CPC officials who will not abandon the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought.

27 United Daily News (hereinafter UDN)(Taipei), May 14, 2007, p.A13. Qian Gang teaches at the University of Hong Kong. In May 2006, it was reported that recently the Communist Party of China (CPC) for the first time compensated for the loss of Mrs TANG Deying’s son during the June 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. See CT, May 1, 2006, p.A13.

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Another concern is the conservative sector in the party and military in particular as well as the society in general. Although HU constantly reiterate the importance of the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought in various of his speeches; launched projects to boost the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought, by providing funding for scholars and party theorists to update textbooks, popular readings, and monographs on the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought, HU still faced the pressure from the conservative faction questioning his economic policies of diverting form the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought.28 The conservative faction will remain at least for the next decade. Similar situation will confront HU’s successor, who will become the General Secretary and/or PRC’s President.

After all, the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought and anything with “Chinese Characteristics” are “Chinese.” To develop as a strong world power, it is highly unlikely for the Chinese Communist leaders to abandon something Chinese for anything Western, not to mention that the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought is still a very important subject at school and a key theory that contributes to the political socialization of the mainland Chinese people today. Like DENG, JIANG and HU, the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought doctrine can be used flexibly by the 5th generation leaders along with the then current domestic and international environment. More daring changes may happen with the 6th generation leaders who come from single-child families and who are raised up in the market economy society.

In sum, the CPC has never abandoned Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought for one second. However, if one’s thinking were linear, it is possible that he or she may concur with Francis Fukuyama’s argument in his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, in which he argued that the progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy or political and economic liberalism after the end of the Cold War and the fall of Berlin Wall in late 1989.

Mainstream Economic Line

28 Seventeen retired CPC officials (most of them retired ministers) wrote a letter to HU suggesting HU to “go back” to the Marxism-Leninism-MAO Zedong Thought at the 17th Congress before the nation goes too far on the “deviate road” of reform. See http://www5.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Opinion/2007_7_16_10_17_56_608.html, dated July 16, 2007.

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Chinese Communists repeatedly say that luxianjuedingyiqie (line determines everything). Here, the line refers to the mainstream economic line at a particular time/space sequence. The fifth generation leaders certainly know that the PRC has gone through the Socialism line (or develop the mainland according to what Marx and Lenin instructed) from October 1949 to the first half of 1957; the Communism line from the second half of 1957 to the late 1970s when the Third Plenum of the 11 th CPC Congress was held; the Socialism line (or develop the mainland according to the Chinese Characteristics plus what Marx and Lenin had instructed); and Market Economy line unofficially from January 1992 and officially from September 1997 at the 15th Party Congress.

Each fifth generation leader must maintain and sustain the Market Economy line. This is because at the 15th Party Congress, JIANG in his political report said it will take a few generations, several generations, and even more than 10 generations to gradually guide the Market Economy line back to the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics Line. In February 2007, PRC Premier, WEN Jiabao, in an article published in Renminribao (People’s Daily), commented that democracy will emerge once a mature socialist system develops, adding that it might not happen for up to 100 years. What he said implied that the Market Economy line will last for that period of time, so as to enable the mainland to advance out of the primary state of Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics.29 For this reason, none of them will be a second LIN Biao, for example. From October 1983 to late 1986, the Chinese PLA tried to sort out three types of unwanted officers and soldiers. They were during the GPCR: 1) followers of LIN Biao and JIANG Qing, who was MAO’s wife; 2) under the heavy influence of bangpai (faction); and 3) engaged in da (beat), za (smash), or qiang (plunder). In other words, those military officers and soldiers would never be promoted, since the mainland has been implementing the mainstream Market Economy line after September 1997.

With the passage of the Property Law for the very first time since the founding of the PRC in March 2007, the socialist-style Market Economy line is still able to be maintained. This is because no one can buy and sell land in the Chinese mainland, which still belongs to the state. It must be pointed out that the case of the famous “nail house (dingzihu)” that clung to a mound of dirt in a huge construction pit located in Chongqing Municipality in southwest China that stood against developers for three years until April 200730 has nothing to do with the land. Thus, we can regard the law

29 CP, February 28, 2007, p.2.30 Ibid., April 4, 2007, p.9.

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as in between 5 and A, despite the fact that many conservatives like LI Peng fear that the Chinese mainland will further slide toward E or Capitalism. Will it be so?

Ever since mainland China has opened up itself to the outside world (gaigekaifang), it has submitted a splendid record by the Western standard. But the Market Economy line also lead to new problems, awaiting for the 5th generation leaders to confront.

The mainland enjoys an average economic growth rate of 9.5% for three decades and made it to the fourth-largest economy in the world31 with U.S.$ 1.2 trillion in foreign reserves in April 2007.32 From 2002 to 2007, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of Chinese mainland people has risen from U.S.$1,200 to U.S.$2,500. Mainland China’s export sold nearly U.S.$1 trillion worth of goods overseas in 2006.33 Although most of the goods belong to the category of the so-called “Wal-Mark Economy,”34 they have already become the products exist in every household in the United States, Europe, and most of the Asian countries, if not every where in the world.

However, the promising economic growth has met severe international pressure especially in recent years and reached its peak in July & August 2007. The problem is the quality of the Chinese mainland products. Deadly chemicals were found in the cough syrup made in the mainland and has cost several death incidents in Panama; tainted pet food imported from it was found in the United States; toys contains lead paint has caused uneasiness among parents; poisonous toothpastes were seized in Spain and Italy.35 Many of these incidents has led the consumers to believe that the Chinese exports are unsafe and possibly been contaminated.

Those substandard products pose a even more serious problem in the domestic market; vermicelli noodles carrying cancer-causing agent, ill-processed chickens, cheap infant milk formula that lack protein which caused the death of 50 infants,36

31 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/04/content_632199.htm dated August 21, 200732 Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/12/AR2007041200373.html?nav=hcmodule & http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043001.htm, dated July 23, 2007 and http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070717/sc_afp/oecdenvironmentchina_070717030922, dated July 17, 2007.33 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/08/news/beijing.php, dated July 8, 2007.34 The economic race to the bottom with cheap prices, produced with low wages and sold with low returns.35 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/business/worldbusiness/10forbriefs-SUSPECTTOOTH_BRF.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, dated July 10, 2007.36 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/08/news/beijing.php, dated July 8, 2007.

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fake medicine killed at least 13 patients,37 to name a few. Chinese mainland people are buying and eating immoral products in their daily market. The state-run media has once been given the freedom to expose and report the shoddy, in Chinese, the “black-hearted” goods, a measure to raise the public demand for better-quality. But, the measurement finally reached the bottleneck when a story about phony Chinese bums (baozi) caught the attention of the international media like Cable Network News (CNN) and backlashed to further tarnish the country’s already bad reputation of its production in July 2007. It ended up with the reporter confessed of forging the story. Lacking a vivid civil society and consumer awareness, the current Chinese Communist government will not face any consumer movement or pressure domestically.

But, the government cannot dodge the problem internationally. How is the HU government tackling the problem internationally? On one hand, the government stressed that there are as many as 17 organizations in charge of food and drug safety in the mainland,38 and most of the Chinese mainland products are overwhelmingly safe, therefore calls on foreign media not to hype the problem. On the other, it executed its ex-food and drug chief ZHENG Xiaoyu, who has approved untested medicine, received graft, and forged documents in July 2007. It also started dialogues and cooperation efforts with its trading partners39 in the hope to calm down the international pressure with foreign endorsement and further utilize this pressure to push its domestic producers to improve the quality of their products. And it blacklisted 400 exporters and cancelled the licenses of six medicine manufacturers in August 2007.40 All these effort was to show the determination of the government to overcome the predicament and refurbish its global image.

But, punish individual criminals/companies does not solve the problem. The real problem is not at the individual level. It is embedded in the whole system, to list a few. First, too many responsible organizations might just lead to the blurred responsibility of all of them. Second, laws are not respected or complied with, especially in business, and connections prevail. Third, most of the companies enjoyed good connection with local governments, which were empowered by the central government after its “opening-up” in DENG’s era, to produce higher GDP in local

37 http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070809/hl_afp/healthchinamedicine_070809191951&printer=1;_ylt=AlUVDd6r.sKK9bBQPdXHw0aKOrgF, dated August 9, 2007.38 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/07/08/news/beijing.php, dated July 8, 2007.39 http://asia.news.yahoo.com/070805/3/35vuu.html, dated August 5, 2007.40 http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/04/news/international/chinaexportban/index.htm?section=money_latest, dated August 4, 2007

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areas.41 In other words, their interests are all intertwined. Local officials became middlemen for and/or took kickbacks from the business. The Shanghai party secretary, CHEN Liangyu, believed to be JAING’s Shanghai clique, was fired in September 2006 after being accused of plowing USD400 million in pension funds into real-estate projects and toll roads was only one of the examples.42 For the past twenty years, there were 33 crimes associated to delegates of the National People’s Congress (NPC).43 Fourth, even if the effort of the government works, the next question is for how long, if rule of law is not the common practice in this country and if interests are still intertwined between the business and local governments. One may argue that it took some years before “made-in-Japan” or “made-in-Taiwan,” or even “made-in-the U.S.A.” to win the trust of the consumers of its quality. However, the market does not give new comers the privilege and time to develop, and it is a very practical game.

Product quality is not the only serious problem after the Chinese mainland adopted the Market Economy line and joined the Western game. Rapid economic development has brought rapid damage to the environment, and subsequently, damage to human health and depletion of natural resources.44 China Mainland has become the world’s second-largest producer of greenhouse gases and the largest producer and consumer of ozone-depleting substances, accordingly to a report done by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in July 2007.45

Again, although China’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) employs about 300 people in its headquarters in Beijing and 60,000 workers across the country,46 they report directly to the local governments whose priority have always been making quick economic development than other issues.

Urban-rural inequality also creates a huge problem of HU’s credo of building a harmonious society. The Gini coefficient of the Chinese mainland has risen from 40.7 in 1993 to 47.3 in 2004,47 a figure which denotes the potential for civil unrest 41 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043001.htm, dated July 23, 200742 Therefore, this accusation was also believed to be a gesture of HU to remove JIANG’s influence. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5376858.stm & http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043001.htm, dated July 23, 200743 CT, August 5, 2007, p.A13.44 For example, a factory in Anhui which dumped ink-black waste into the river might have caused a sudden increase in cancer and other illness of the people lived in the same village, reported by Xinhua News Agency. http://us.f339.mail.yahoo.com/dc/launch?action=welcome&YY=1274382346&.rand=8396br9eaoofi, dated July 30, 2007.45 http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070717/sc_afp/oecdenvironmentchina_070717030922, dated July 17, 2007.46 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043001.htm, dated July 23, 200747 Report from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2007/pdf/Inequality-in-Asia-Highlights.pdf, and http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2007/12084-chinese-economics-growths/default.asp, dated August

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according to the Western standard and twice the growth rate fast than India— somewhat sarcastic for the world’s biggest “socialist” country. Forbes called this situation the “dangerous rich.”48 Premier WEN Jiabao also labeled the Chinese mainland economy “unstable, unbalanced, uncoordinated, and unsustainable” in March 2007.49 The economic growth in the Chinese mainland, unlike what happened in other East Asian areas like Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, did not create a big middle class beneficial to social stability, but some very rich and some very poor people in the society, an “M” shape income distribution.

The expansion of production which brought about the high growth rate in the Chinese mainland has met a critical point: quality control, environmental concern, urban-rural inequality, lack of social welfare, over-dependency on exports and so on. All these, named by Pieter Bottelier as the “second economic transition,”50 demand the Chinese mainland to confront and solve. The crisis management ability of the Chinese Communist government, when dealing with the West in business issues has being heavily challenged. The auspice of the summer 2008 Olympic game so far does not pressurize mainland China to improve its problems such as human rights, press freedom, environment, and so on as expected by the West. It, on the contrary, has offered the CPC a great stage to flex its muscles, brought about tourists and business and consolidated the national identity of the Chinese people. This is to say that the problems mentioned above will remain in the foreseeable future.

In sum, to sustain the socialist-style Market Economy line is not simply a domestic issue. If the Chinese mainland cannot preempt its trading partners in economic policies, it will fall into a “crisis-management-action-reaction” cycle. The 5 th

generation leaders must continue to overcome the aforementioned problems, promote the quality of the people, as well as their own crisis management ability.

Moreover, whether the Market Economy line will lean toward capitalism, lead to the expansion of the civil society, which combined with the increasing Western pressure on cyber freedom, press freedom and human rights, and consequently causes a

9, 2007.48 http://www.forbes.com/business/2007/08/08/china-wealth-inequality-opinions-cx_pm_0808gini.html?feed=rss_business, dated August 8, 2007.49 http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_30/b4043001.htm, dated July 23, 2007.50 Bottelier argues that China went through its first transition from 1978 to 2003. The aim in that period included adopting market principles, creating market institutions, and maximizing growth both to gain national strength and to facilitate a massive reallocation of labor from agriculture and inefficient SOEs to the non-state urban economy. Pieter Bottelier, “China’s Economy in 2020: The Challenge of a Second Transition,” Asia Policy, Number 4 (July 2007): pp.31-40.

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democratic transition also poses as a tremendous challenge facing the leadership of the 5th generation leaders.

If so, the runaway Market Economy line may eventually interfere with the political socialist line and cause a possible shake-up in the new leadership. A split of the new leadership and a “frog-leap” of the political line are then foreseeable. HU’s idea of a “harmonious society” (or 5 in the middle, as spelled out in the December 2005 white paper, China’s Peaceful Development Road) will be abortive. Since economy is believed to be the base structure of a society, it will be difficult for the 5 th generation leaders to keep a “socialist democratic system,” while its market been extensively capitalized.

Beijing chose to join a market game designed by the West and tied itself into the world market. Can it not play with the Western rules of the game and keep its “socialist-style,” which means, to pull over before entering the dangerous zone of the spectrum is in question and needs further observation.

Country

Today, mainland China is relatively stable, as compared to the early days of the PRC when the remnant forces of CHIANG Kai-shek were still strong, the turbulent 10-year GPCR, when the Red Guards were defying the laws (wufawutian), and the period when the Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union collapsed one after another in the late 1980s and early 1990s, respectively. In April 2007, Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader, again said that he accepts the Chinese sovereignty over his homeland, Xizang/Tibet, including the handling of foreign and defense affairs.51

However, the Taiwan issue remains sensitive and thorny. In November 2003, Beijing promised that it would “rise peacefully.”52 In saying this, it has limited its options in reunifying both the mainland and Taiwan by using alternative, if not bloody, ways and means. Before DENG’s death in February 1997, he proposed a change of the national title from the PRC to Zhonghuagongheguo. The Chinese characters can equally be translated as the ROC in English, which is the exactly same as Zhonghuaminguo in English. Of course, Zhonghuaminguo was introduced by Dr. SUN Yat-sen in January 1912, and it is used by CHIANG Kai-shek and other ROC presidents, including CHEN Shui-bian. However, DENG dropped the idea, when the

51 Ibid., April 8, 2007, p.11.52 The term was initially interpreted by the international community as an evidence of the possible “China threat.” The Chinese government later modified the wording to “peaceful development.”

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then Vice Premier of the State Council, WU Xueqian, told him that the English version of Zhonghuaminguo is also ROC.

Why did DENG do that? It is very simple and straightforward. That is to say, DENG perceived that someday the mainstream economic line will be changed to Market Economy from Socialism with (Distinct) Chinese Characteristics. Therefore, the superstructure of Market Economy line could be changed or different. In November 1997, that is, several weeks after the official adoption of the Market Economy line, WANG Daohan, who was the president of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), proposed the new national title of China to a visiting delegation of New Party members from Taipei led by General XU Linong.

When the DPP replaced the KMT as the ruling party in the Taiwan area, other new national titles as proposed by PRC academics and experts, such as the United Republics of China (UROC) surfaced in October 2004.

Beijing leaders have said many times that they are willing to discuss any issues that concerns Taipei leaders at the negotiating table. In September 2004, ROC citizens began to use ROC (Taiwan) passports as opposed to ROC passports. To be sure, as early as Ocotber 1, 1954, Taipei used the national title of ROC (Taiwan, to participate in the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).53 The fifth generation leaders, under the One China Principle, which first appeared before the end of 1954 when Beijing leaders learned about the drafting of the December 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the ROC, could immediately change their national title from the PRC to simply read ROC (Mainland), if urgency for the Chinese reunification arises.

In any case, since the 15th CPC Congress, CPC members are taught to ideologically tolerate the existence of the ROC. In the January 26, 2007 edition of Jiefangjunbao (Liberation Army Daily) on page 7, ROC was mentioned, although in parenthesis. And, in the January 18, 2007 edition of the same newspaper on page 11, a certificate of merit, which was awarded to a Second Detachment (zhidui) member of the Chinese PLA Railway Army Corps (bintuan) and which was hidden during the GPCR, was shown. What is significant about this is that the certificate was dated the July 12, 38 th

year of Zhonghuaminguo (ROC). In other words, at that time, the Chinese PLA politically accepted the ROC.

53 UDN, May 3, 2007, p.A19.

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The remaining, crucial question is, of course, political. That is to say, how many PRC citizens can accept the national title of ROC at this point in time? Before that, the relationship can be characterized as the contradiction between the enemy and ourselves (diwomaodun). After September 1997, the relationship between both sides of the Taiwan Strait has become that of the contradiction among the people (renminneibumaodun), meaning that those who stand at 1 should learn to tolerate, if not accept, those people who are positioned at 5. Because Beijing leaders realized that most people in the Taiwan area are still reluctant to reunify with the people on the mainland and, therefore, HU shifted the One China principle qua the Roof to the bottom of both the PRC and the ROC, meaning that One China will come about in the future. However, HU also added the March 2005 Anti-Secession Law, reminding his counterpart in the Taiwan area not to change the national title from the ROC to something else, such as Diergongheguo (the Second ROC)54 or Republic of Taiwan (ROT) or simply Taiwan Guo (state). Anyway, if Beijing is in a hurry, the fifth generation leaders can consider ROC (Mainland), because, to a third party like the United States and Japan, China has been at least symbolically and, more importantly, peacefully reunified.

In early 2005, President CHEN may have asked James C. SOONG, who is the party chairman of People’s First Party (PFP), to propose to the Beijing leaders his idea for the Chinese reunification, since the superstructure of the Market Economy line is the ROC. That is to say, as a first step, under a symbolically reunified China, the Taiwan area would call itself ROC (Taiwan) and the mainland, ROC (Mainland). In other words, should Beijing refuse to change its national title from the PRC to ROC (Mainland), CHEN cannot be blamed for calling the Taiwan area, ROC (Taiwan). The fifth generation leaders should realize this.

Aa a matter of fact, at the current stage, it will be wise for leaders on both sides to start real cooperation via a joint effort to build, maintain, and sustain a series of Bicoastal Chinese (lianganzhongguo) and/or international regimes. Dialogues can begin from non-political issues such as enviornment, counter-terrorism, drug-trafficking, and human-trafficking, which contribute to the common good of the region and human kind. Taipei cannot deny such invitations since joining international dialougues is always seen as a diplomatic breakthrough in the country; and Beijing will accordingly gain international reputation and support as a “peacefully developing” country. These meaningful cooperation efforts moreover will develop a

54 It was reported that Beijing would use the Anti-Secession Law if the CHEN Shui-bian regime adopted the Second Republic. See CT, May 5, 2007, p.A6.

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good pattern of cooperation and coordination in other issue-areas such as arms control, disarmament, and non-prolfieration in the future. Ideology

Having an ideology is important, because it refers to a theoretical vision. Without it, there is no direction nor meaning. When there is no direction, a lot of tangible and intangible resources can be wasted. In this connection, when the party members can do anything they want, they cannot really be united at time of need. For this reason, the Chinese Communist Party conducted the 1.5-year long Baoxian movement, so that the CPC could rationalize everything and its members could understand what is going on.

Because HU is expected to have another five years, he will enrich the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics and Market Economy spectrum. As such, it would be more difficult for the fifth generation leaders to come up with new breakthroughs in coining new terms, to be later implemented on. What they and even their successors can do is to implement all relevant policies.

Politics

Once ideology can be put into practice, it is part of politics. Needless to say, the fifth generation leaders will also play politics within a series of dialectical, ideological frameworks. Some of the important issues include democracy, whether or not new political parties can be formed, and what to do with the pro-Taiwan’s de jure independence activists in the Taiwan area.

HU met George W. Bush, Junior at the White House in April 2006. The latter urged the former to practice democracy, and the former replied to the latter and a journalist’s question about when will the Chinese mainland practice democracy, saying the Chinese mainland is practicing Democracy with Chinese Characteristics (DCC).55 What does DCC refer to? To the Chinese Communists, they always believe that, under E or Capitalism, you will see a multi-party political system. In this system, it is usually the capitalists who first got benefited, because they have representatives in, for example, the U.S. Congress.

55 http://www.teco.org.au/whatnew/2006april/hu-Jintao-visit-us.htm.

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A word must be added here, regarding the December 2005 white paper, China’s Peaceful Development Road. For the first time, the CPC has completely and systematically clarified the PRC Government’s and people’s theory and practice. The following crucial words were mentioned: “… the Chinese people are working hard to build China into a prosperous, powerful, democratic, civilized and harmonious modern country, and continually making new contributions to human progress with China’s own development.” It is very clear that HU began by stressing harmonious society (or 5 in the model). The next phase is stressing civilization (or 4). Democracy then will come (or 3). And the next two phases are making China a powerful and prosperous country (or 2 and 1, respectively). In other words, Chinese Communist-style of democracy will not come about at least for a few decades. This is means that, if the Chinese mainland cannot be harmonious, making it a civilized place will have to be delayed.

To be sure, the superstructure of Socialism or Socialism with (Distinct) Chinese Characteristics is the multi-party cooperation system (duodanghezuozhi). Since the 15th Party Congress, the name for the superstructure of the Socialism with Distinct Chinese Characteristics and Market Economy spectrum is Systems of Socialist Democracy (shehuizhuyiminzhuzhi) and Political Consultation. From the 16th CPC Congress, we see Systems of Socialist Democracy, combining with Distinct Chinese Characteristics and following the pattern of zhiduhua (systemization), guifanhua (standardization), and chengshihua (formulization).56

In October 2006, an article written by YU Keping, who is the Deputy Director General of Central Compilation and Translation Bureau (CCTB) and who is the “literary guts” of the Beijing leadership, was published. Beijing Daily reprinted YU’s article, Democracy is a Good Thing. In February 2007, WEN, as mentioned earlier, wrote the following words: “[S]cience, democracy, rule of law, freedom, and human rights are by no means sole property of capitalism, but rather are the values commonly pursued and the fruits of civilization commonly forged by humanity over the slow course of history.” He added that there is no uniform model and the mainland must travel its own road.57 In April 2007, YU, in an article published in the Central Party School (CPS) newspaper, discussed the rise of civil society and mentioned the number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the Chinese

56 http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1003/6/9/7/100369733.html?coluid=45&kindid=0&docid=100369733, dated May 17, 2007. This important article was first published in Qiushi.57 http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2007/04/phoenix_weekly_on_gao_qinrongs_jail_blues_kims_successo.php. See also, http://www.zaobao.com/yl/tx070421_502.html, dated April 21, 2007.

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mainland, which is more than 320,000.58 More importantly, he urged the government to withdraw from many areas of governance. In sum, paraphrasing what DENG said about Market Economy, just as there is democracy in capitalism, there is democracy under the Systems of Socialist Democracy (SSD). In a word, the CPC can practice 50% of Western-style democracy.

Under the SSD, the Three Represents will be the first ones to get benefits. In other words, the fifth generation leaders will not allow new opposition parties to be created. However, if one runs on an independent ticket, it is another matter. To foster Chinese reunification, Beijing will continue to welcome politicians from the Taiwan area to serve in, for example, the NPC. In this connection, in March 2006, the State Council of the PRC for the first time at the NPC said it plans to develop Fujian Province into a haixiaxianjingjiqu/ “Peaceful Cooperation Experimental District on the West Coast of the Taiwan Strait,”59 which is aimed at attracting more businesses and industries from the Taiwan area to relocate their operations to Fujian Province. For the record, in October 2005, the Chinese mainland for the first time became the Taiwan area’s biggest export market.60 In this connection, from August 2005 to April 2007, it bought US$99.5 million of fruits from the Taiwan area, the latter of which did not have to pay more than one million U.S. dollars in tax.61 It also means that politicians from the Taiwan area can serve in certain government positions and play politics in Fujian Province. In December 2005, eight pilots with the PRC license from the Taiwan area began to work in a Sichuan Province airline company. In January 2006, HU in Xiamen City, Fujian Province, speaking to representatives of the Taiwan area businessmen, praised the Haicang Taiwan Businessmen-Investment Zone (HBBIZ). In April 2007, some ROC medical doctors for the first time went to the Chinese mainland to take examination tests so as to get their license to practice over there.

The fifth generation leaders will face the urgent task of curbing Taiwan’s de jure independence. The March 2008 presidential election will be crucial, because if the pan-blue camp cannot win back the presidency, the DPP will be able to shatter the mainland’s plan to eventually reunify with the Taiwan area in the next few decades, if not forever. In May 2000, at his inaugural presidential speech, CHEN, under the pressure from the United States, pledged the Four Nos plus One No/One Without. It refers to not declaring Taiwan’s de jure independence, not changing the ROC’s national title, not pushing for the inclusion of the “state-to-state” description into the

58 Some academics estimated the number to be three million.59 CT, March 6, 2006, p.A13.60 http://www.zaobao.com/special/realtime/2005/11/051122_34.html, dated November 11, 2005.61 http://realtime/zaobao.com/2007/05/070530_14.html, dated May 30, 2007.

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ROC Constitution, not promoting a referendum to change the status quo in the regard to the question of independence or unification, and not abolishing the National Unification Council (NUC) and its National Unification Guidelines (NUG). However, in March 2007, CHEN put forward the following statements or the Four Yeses and One No: Taiwan will say yes to independence; Taiwan will be correctly named, Taiwan will have a new constitution, and Taiwan will develop plus that there will be no left-right political axis in the Taiwan area, just the question of independence or assimilation. In July 2007, CHEN moreover said that he would press ahead with the referendum on whether the island should apply for UN membership under the name Taiwan in his interview with Washington Post,62 an on the other hand, CHEN kept on applying to the UN membership although as expected, with no positive response.63

Applying the 1 2 3 4 5 A B C D E model, what CHEN did constituted the setting up of another dialectical model, namely, Four Nos + One No versus Four Yeses + One No. In other words, he only very briefly crossed the red line, so to speak by entering into the danger zone. In early May 2007, he again mentioned the Four Yeses + One No. However, Beijing understood the dialectical logic and, therefore, we did not see military exercises conducted by the Chinese PLA, because CHEN was understood to be in the safe zone most of the time. Alternatively, CHEN could have been treating the Four Nos + One No as 1 and the Four Yeses + One No as 5, because he has not been punished by HU or others.64 It should be noted that, since May 2000, CHEN has been using the following dialectical model: Republic of Taiwan (ROT) as 1; Taiwan (Guo/State) as 2; ROC (Taiwan) as 3; and ROC as 5. His supporters will think of him as someone who is for Taiwan’s de jure independence, because 1 carries the most weight, while the pro-reunification or the pan-blue camp can still cling to the hope that it can re-seize state power, because CHEN has not abandoned the ROC.

The fifth generation leaders will make sure that “enemy forces” or a Western-inspired “color revolution” of the kind that brought political change in Central Asia, Central

62 Washington Post, July 8, 2007; Page A17. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/07/AR2007070700714_2.html, & http://news.yahoo.com/s/afp/20070710/pl_afp/ustaiwanchinapoliticsdiplomacy_070710074845, dated July 10, 2007.63

On July 19 CHEN wrote Mr. Ban, Secretary-General of the United Nations, a letter applying for membership. Mr. Ban returned the letter. He said, through his spokeswoman, that it "could not be received." CHEN followed up on July 31 with a second letter, that letter was also returned. The Wall Street Journal, dated August 13, 2007; Page A14. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118696621693795613.html?mod=googlenews_wsj.64 There could be other models, such as The Four Yeses + One No as 1 and The Four Nos + One No as 5.

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Europe, and elsewhere, will not be able to use the Chinese mainland’s legal system to Westernize and divide the country. In other words, they will make sure that the CPC can maintain its dominance over lawyers, judges, and prosecutors.65 As a matter of fact, the 2008 Olympics, 2010 Shanghai World Expo and the possible 2018 the International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) World Cup in mainland China will grant chances for the CPC to further consolidate its domestic leadership.66

The fifth generation leaders will also promote the Chinese mainland’s ideas on the concept of a harmonious society and a harmonious world, which is couched in terms of Tao Te Ching (The Classic of the Way and Virtue), a book consisting of only 5,000 Chinese characters. In April 2007, the Chinese Taoism Association (CTA) and China Religious Culture Communication Association (CRCCA) held a first international forum of its kind that the Chinese mainland has organized for the last 50 years. Many government officials believe that “Harmonious World” can rebut the fear of the so-called “China Threat,”67 which has spread around the world to this day since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in late 1989. As mentioned earlier, through economic, cultural, educational, and other non-political forms of international exchange and cooperation, mainland China may develop as a strong “soft power” in Asia and in the world. Military affairs are, needless to say, related to politics. So long as the new CPC leadership, who do have guns, can control and command the Chinese PLA, they can handle the Taiwan question.

Military Affairs

The fifth generation leaders are very aware that it is not an easy task for any one of them to control and guide the armed forces. The latter, armed with lethal weapons of one kind or another, can conduct a coup d’etat, rebel, revolt, mutiny, etc. at any time. LIN Biao, who in August 1966 was officially identified as MAO’s “closest comrade-in-arms,” thereby replacing LIU Shaoqi as holder of that designation, tried to assassinate the CPC chairman in September 1971.

Would the new generation leaders rely on MAO Zedong Thought, and DENG Xiaoping theory, plus their respective charisma, influence, and so on and so forth?

65 http://taiwansecurity.org/NYT/2007/NYT-030307.htm, dated February 3, 2007.66 Cheng Li, “China in the Year 2020: Three Political Scenarios,” Asia Policy (Seattle, Washington), Number 4 (July 2007), p.28.67 http://english.people.com.cn//200603/20/eng20060320_251861.html, dated March 20, 2006 and http://english.people.com.cn//200608/24/eng20060824_296498.html, dated August 24, 2006.

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Would they, as in the West, comply with various military laws especially the March 1997 National Defense Law (NDL)? Or would they first and foremost stick to the principle or the dialectical model of The Party Commands the Gun versus the Gun Commands the Party to control and guide the Chinese PLA, which had been reduced to 2.3 million by December 31, 2005?

The first theory could describe and explain the Chinese Communist politico-military phenomena only up to February 1997, because Mao passed away in September 1976 and DENG, February 1997.

In this connection, there are some weaknesses in this theory. First, it is not possible for MAO or DENG to be immortal. Even though the Chinese PLA constantly and consistently brainwashes its officers and soldiers, new comers may have different feelings toward the two Chinese Communist leaders. Many of them and their relatives and friends may still remember that some of MAO’s erroneous or grave policies had led to the death of many people, especially during the disastrous 10-year GPCR. Although DENG was credited for opening up mainland China to the outside world, it was he who made the final decision to use the Chinese PLA to crack down on the student and civilian demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, resulting in heavy bloodshed. Many countries in the West conducted sanctions against the mainland regime thereafter. Second, MAO or DENG can personally reward those military officers and soldiers, if and when they see fit. There are many ways of going about it. If one performs well, he or she would be able to serve in CMC. One can also get a senior, prestigious command post in the military regions, provincial military regions, National People’s Congress (NPC), etc. Arguably, the latter figures who had been benefited from the promotions would be personally loyal to the two Chinese Communist leaders. But, would the same officers and soldiers and, for that matter, their subordinates, be personally loyal to HUA Guofeng, JIANG, and HU? There might possibly be some, but, due to passage of time, the number could be zero by now.

Realizing this, JIANG and HU tried to secure their leadership in the military via offering salary raise and promotion. JIANG, during his CMC days, has promoted 79 generals; and HU, from 2004 to 2007, has promoted 15.68 To further his personal control, HU in the summer of 2007 has promoted many young officers who were born in the 1950s to high positions, simultaneously gradually replaced JIANG’s men in

68 http://www5.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Opinion/2007_8_1_21_12_57_624.html, dated August, 1 2007.

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some important posts.69 The average age of the 296 Chinese PLA officers who were elected to attend the 17th CPC Congress in Fall 2007 is 52.70 HU moreover approved 350 billion yuan (U.S.$41,791,044) to increase the salary, offer better training programs and signed the measures to “attract and retain high-level specialist technical talent” for military modernization on August 3, 2007.71 The salary of the Chinese PLA was already doubled in 2006.72

Although JIANG and HU have put much effort to foster their leadership and control over the Chinese PLA, they would not enjoy the level of loyalty which MAO and DENG have enjoyed, mainly due to the fact that JIANG and HU are both civilian leaders who had never fought any combat before. For example, most of the generals HU promoted enjoyed good connections with CMC Vice-Chairmen, and few of them have close relationship with HU himself.73 In other word, they have to seek other ways to facilitate their control. One of them is the NDL.

Although military laws, which are structured dialectically, existed before the enactment of the NDL, such laws did not weigh heavily when MAO was around, because he was playing what we called Dialectical Politics, which is a mixture of both Rule of Man (or personality) Politics and Rule of Law (as opposed to rule by law) Politics. To be sure, MAO once said that he would like to convert all the 600 million Chinese people as dialecticians. DENG, on the other hand, after consolidating his political power in the late 1970s, equally enjoyed high respect among the senior and junior professional soldiers, and he was very popular among the common people. DENG could rule the Chinese PLA by brushing aside the military laws. But he knew that, after his death, not a single military figure would be as powerful, charismatic, and influential as MAO, if not himself as well, in the decades to come. Therefore, he must play safe. It follows that, soon after JIANG became the CMC Chairman of both the Party in late 1989 and the PRC President in later months, he was instructed by DENG to draft and pass many laws related to military affairs. Such laws are publicized in JFJB and other publications to this day. 69 For example, YOU Xigui, aged 68, JIANG’s Director of the Central Police Bureau, failed to represent the PLA for the 17th Congress. http://www.sinchew.com.my/content.phtml?sec=4&artid=200707060825, dated July 6, 2007.70 http://news.chinatimes.com/2007Cti/2007Cti-News/2007Cti-News-Content/0,4521,110505+112007070600096,00.html, dated July 6, 2007.71 http://www5.chinesenewsnet.com/MainNews/Military/2007_8_6_16_22_7_994.html, dated August 8, 2007, & http://www.sinchew.com.my/content.phtml?sec=4&artid=200708042015, dated August 4, 2007 & http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Now_high-tech_talent_for_China_military/articleshow/2252466.cms, dated August 3, 2007.72 http://china.donga.com/big/srv/service.php3?bicode=060000&biid=2007071198048#top, dated July 11, 200773 http://www.chinesenewsweek.com/MainNews/Opinion/2007_7_31_20_57_23_473.html, dated July, 31 2007.

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We must remember that, in March 1997, the Party Commands the Gun was included in the NDL for the very first time. This inclusion has far reaching implications. On the one hand, it definitely means that the Chinese PLA will not be nationalized.74 On the other hand, non-Party members can serve in the Chinese PLA and be promoted, so long as they observe the CPC Commands the Gun clause. Under the organizational principle (zhuzhiyuanzhe) of minzhujizhongzhi (democratic centralism or Centralism versus Democracy, to be more precise), they will not be allowed to have cells, etc., within the troops.75 Today, one of the authors has heard of at least two retired ROC professional soldiers who are serving in the Chinese PLA.76 Although the NDL can be modified, the CPC Commands the Gun clause will remain intact, even when the NDL becomes non-existent. In a word, the third theory still weighs heavier than the military laws or it is closer to reality, for the simple fact that not all the military officers can remember all the laws at all times.

At least on three occasions, MAO and DENG were not around. These facts simply tell us that it is the dialectical framework, which is at work, ensuring that the Party can still control and guide the Chinese PLA. First, right after the death of MAO in September 1976, no one was the chairman of the CMC of both the CPC and the PRC. To be sure, HUA did not take over the Party and the PRC’s CMC chairmanship until later in October of the same year, and YE Jianying’s position in the CPC was lower than DENG’s; 2) when DENG passed away, the NDL was yet to be passed by the NPC. Out of respect for DENG, the Chinese Communist Party under JIANG did not ask the NPC to pass the NDL, although it had been already drafted; and 3) there was a gap between the time when Chairman HU of the Party’s CMC could legally take over the PRC’s CMC chairmanship in March 2004 and when Jiang still held on to the same, last post at the national (as opposed to the party) level for several months when the NPC passed HU’s appointment.

From the above discussion, arguably, it is the dialectical framework of The CPC Commands the Gun versus the Gun Commands the CPC, which has helped the Party to control and guide the PRC armed forces, since the founding of the PRC, if not the Red Army as well. Although the CMC members may have heard of game theory, system theory, rational choice theory, and so on and so forth, their political language will remain dialectical.

74 CT, April 20, 2007, p.A13.75 http://www.chinareviewnews.com, dated December 17, 2006.76 During the eight-year-long Anti-Japanese War, there were native Taiwanese serving in the Red Army of the party. See JFJB, July 1, 2005, p.8.

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To this day, military officers still have to learn Maoist military dialectics. In other words, MAO and DENG also had to observe the model, although many, if not most, academics and experts in the West had thought that the model was of secondary importance. JIANG and HU in addition to the fifth generation leaders have to rely on the NDL and other military laws to shore up or to make sure that the dialectical model can work well. Speaking on the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese PLA before a gathering of past and present party leaders, HU presented his “three wars” ideology, namely, prepare for the war, caution with the war and dare for the war, another sub-dialect system under the “CPC Commands the Gun” spectrum.

Needless to say, in the last few decades more military officers and soldiers have failed to observe the model as compared to the first few decades after the creation of the PRC. In the mid-1990s, a major-lieutenant, LIU Liankun, began to work for the ROC, providing the latter with valuable secret intelligence that the ballistic missiles lobbed into the waters off Goaxiong Port and Jilong Port, Taiwan Province, in March 1996 were unarmed. The most recent example is the removal from office of Lieutenant General WANG Shouye, who was arrested in late 2005. He had been involved in scandals and had mistresses.77 In December 2006, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.78 The Lieutenant General and other military offenders, being regarded as part of The Gun Commands the CPC spectrum, were trialed by the military court, jailed, and sometimes executed. Of course, some of them were guided to enter or re-enter The Party Commands the Gun spectrum. In January 2006, XU Caihou, a member of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee and also Vice-Chairman of the CMC asked the military to step up their anti-corruption efforts at all levels. In the same month, Xinhuashe reported that Beijing planned to audit more than 4,000 military officers. These would include more than 100 will be army commanders or above, especially those who were in charge of expenses and officers about whom people had complained about, etc. In the 10th Five-Year (2001-2005) Plan, the mainland audited 77,000 military institutions and projects and 7,890 military officers, reaping economic benefits valued at 6.8 billion yuan (850 million American dollars). And, in October 2006, a division of the Chinese PLA was criticized for its poor performance during the Quenshan-2006.79 The division’s faults were listed. For example, the attacking troops shot five missiles but only two hit their intended targets. As another example, the commander of the attacking division postponed the attack three times, resulting in it being left in a vulnerable position for fifty minutes in front

77 CT, April 8, 2006, p.A13.78 See Hua Daily News (hereinafter SHDN) (Sarawak, Malaysia), February 6, 2007, p.A31.79 http://english.people.com.cn//200610/19/eng20061019_313205.html, dated October 19, 2006.

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of the enemy lines. A third example was a division, which requested firepower support but did not give the precise timing and location.

In sum, since March 1997, it is still the military laws--not JIANG, HU, and their CMC successors--which are enabling the CPC to apply the paramount dialectical model as mentioned in this section to control and guide the Chinese Communist armed forces. Needless to say, this model plus other related ones can be used to train foreign military forces, because there are still Communists in Kingdom of Nepal (KON) and the Philippines, for instance. So far, the most popular course offered by the Chinese PLA National Defense University (NDU) to foreign military officers is Sunzi Bingfa (The Art of War by Master Sun), 80 a course focusing on a very Chinese way of militant logic, which sees military generals as the bulwark of the country and, therefore, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.81 The sovereign, in the PRC, is still the CPC. As stated clearly in the missions of the Chinese PLA General Political Department (GPD), “to lead the army to implement the line, direction and the policy of the CPC; constitution and law of the state; and the decision, order, rules of the CMC…,” the CPC still goes before the state.82 HU, in the same talk at the celebration ceremony of the 80 th anniversary of the Chinese PLA in summer 2007, again stressed that the Chinese PLA must insist on its tradition of accepting the “absolute leadership of the party,”83 follow the Marxist-Leninist-MAOIST, DENGIST, and JIANG’s “three representatives” as the ideological guideline, implement HU’s scientific development theory, foster social harmony, and open a new road for the Socialism with Distinct Chinese characteristics.84 “To follow the CPC's command is the overriding political requirement that the Party and Chinese people have placed on the PLA and is the unshakable and fundamental principle for the PLA,” said Hu.85 According to the Associated Press, HU has emphasized the concept of “Party commands the Gun” at least 15 times in this speech.86 The Chinese PLA remains people’s army under the CPC.

80 The University started its training course to foreign military officers in the late 1950s. Many of them later became presidents of their own countries such as the president of Zimbabwe. It now offers courses mainly to military officers in the developing countries such as Al Salvador, Sri Lanka, Senegal etc. In 2008, the University plans to train 449 military officers from 112 different countries. http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2007-08/02/content_6463909.htm, dated August 2, 2007.81 The Art of War by Master Sun, Chapter 3 & 7, http://www.chinapage.com/sunzi.html#SZ02, dated August 5, 2007.82 http://bjds.bjdj.gov.cn/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=5586, dated August 5, 2007.83 http://www.hkheadline.com/news/instant_news_content/200708/01/20070801e105517.asp, dated August 1, 2007 http://www.sinchew.com.my/content.phtml?sec=4&artid=200708010987, dated August 1, 2007.84 http://www.hkheadline.com/news/instant_news_content/200708/01/20070801e111852.asp, dated August 1, 2007.85 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-08/01/content_6460273.htm, dated August 1, 2007.86 http://www.zaobao.com/zg/zg070802_501.html, dated August 2, 2007.

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In sum, the fifth generation leaders will still rely on The CPC Commands the Gun versus the Gun Commands the CPC model, as first constructed by MAO in September 1927 at Sanwan Village, Yongxin County, Jiangxi Province. To be sure, in April 2007, while inspecting the Chinese PLA in Ningxia, HU reminded the officers and soldiers to adhere to the dialectical model in preparation for the 17 th National Congress of the Party.87 His message at the 80th Chinese PLA anniversary ceremony manifested the same thing. In other words, HU must reassure the “Party Commands the Gun” clause, otherwise his target of “harmonious society” will just fall in vain. All these clearly explained that HU is still maneuvering within the dialectic model and his chosen successors will have to follow the model to hold real control over the military.

Major Observations

Several major observations can be made. First, the Chinese (Communist) mind differs from the typical Western mind. The latter would rely on a train of thought, figuring out the cause and effect in a linear fashion. To them, a rose is a rose is a rose. People in the Middle East would first find out the whole picture or the boundary. Then, they would proceed to find out the details. The Lindbeck, Shambaugh, WU, and SHU’s approaches plus the Western and Middle Eastern approaches are all non-dialectical. Therefore, none of them can describe and explain the following simple, basic concept in Chinese politics, the middle way. By applying one of the authors’ model, we can say that the middle way could be 5 in the safe zone and/or A in the danger zone at a particular time/space sequence.

What we are trying to drive at is that it is not possible to have a closer or fuller understanding of Chinese (Communist) politics, if one’s approach is non-dialectical, just as some physicists dismiss the string theory, which seeks to outline the entire structure of the universe in a few brief equations, as intellectual dead end or cul-de-sac.88 Thus, to a person in the West, the middle way is the middle way is the middle way, whereas, to a person in the Middle East, it is rather difficult to locate it, if the shape of the whole picture is irregular. As we explained in the very beginning of this paper, Chinese middle way must be understand in relative terms. Different time requires different position and, therefore, a different middle way. If one extends or narrows the spectrum, the middle point changes accordingly.89 As explained, we can change to different positions/ degrees (Yao) of a strategy/spectrum (Gua) to obtain

87 http://www.zaobao.com.sg/zg/zg070418_507.html, dated April 18, 2007.88 http://english.people.com.cn//200610/09/eng20061009_310079.html, dated October 9, 2006.

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different result without deserting our goal/ basic strategy. Therefore, the credos raised by DENG, JIANG and HU are all included in MAO’s Communism vs. Capitalism model, just with degree/scope differences. Consequently, 50%, 30% and 1% of Western democracy can also all be included in the SSD.

Another good example is that, in October 2006, the CPC began to build a harmonious socialist society. A member of the Standing Committee of the NPC and Vice-chairman of the Committee on Environment and Resources Protection of the NPC reminded us, saying “[c]ulture is interwoven with human existence, the basis of which is the relationship between humans and nature, between people, and between oneself and others. The three fields are the ideological basis of a harmonious socialist society. In China it is impossible to ignore the inheritance of the harmonious notion that was such a big part of traditional Chinese culture.”90 However, the question is: How to slot in the following three fields into a non-dialectical model or theory, such as game theory in order to achieve harmony between man and nature, to foster harmony between people, and to achieve harmony between oneself and others by first finding harmony between body, mind and the spirit? It is difficult. However, it is not difficult, if we regard the first field as 1; the second one, 3, and the third, 5 in our model. In other words, at each time/space sequence, we can choose anyone of them to suit our need. The Chinese people are more interested in anything with “Chinese characteristics” today than no other time in the Communist history. According to Fenggang Yang, a strong social movement has begun to revive Confucianism as a religion in mainland China.91 In the year of 2006, two traditional writers became extremely popular especially on television. For example, YU Dan, called by the Chinese mainland media as the “academic superwomen,” who is a female professor at

89 For example, Chinese medicine believes that illness is caused by two parts: weakness and the virus/ illness itself. If we extend the treatment strategy spectrum to the inner weakness part, the middle point changes from one side to another. Therefore, a Chinese doctor may treat the weakness part (which is believed to be caused mainly by the imbalance of our Chi and blood within and ourselves and the environment) first and then or simultaneously treat the illness part. The treatment itself is a gradual process; different medicine is used at different time. It does not believe in treating the illness with quick and extreme methods such as operation.90 http://english.people.com.cn//200609/01/eng20060901_298842.html, dated September 1, 2006. Taoist people believe that the balance not only exists between man and nature, but also between the inner part and the outer environment, and between the body, mind and the spirit. This view is categorized by Trompenaars as “externalistic people” who have a more organic view of nature. Mankind is one of nature's forces, so should operate in harmony with the environment.91 Evidences of the movement include the elaborateness of government-sponsored public celebrations of Confucius’ birthday, the erection of Confucius statues on university and school campuses, the restoration of temples devoted to Confucius, the spreading of Confucian scripture-reading classes and institutes devoted to the study of traditional Chinese readings, the emergence of traditional-style Sishu (four great ancient Chinese books) schools, the promotion of Han dress (Han fu), and the abundance of Confucian BBS blogs, websites, and in September 2006 the Ministry of Culture released the “Outline of Cultural Development in the 11th Five-Year Plan” with one chapter devoted to the “protection of national culture,” etc. Fenggang Yang, “Cultural Dynamics in China: Today and in 2020,” Asia Policy, Number 4 (July 2007), pp.1-52

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Beijing Normal University (BNU), became extremely popular through her lectures on the Lunyu (The Analects of Confucius) on China Central Television (CCTV). Her book sold 600,000 copies within four days of the first print. If one counts her TV audience, YU will have more than 10 million fans. Another male writer, YI Zhongtian, who wrote a book on Sanguo (a period in Chinese history where existed three countries), also published millions of books which made the publisher make a profit of more than 100 million yen.92

In sum, it should be noted that a dialectical remark is just the opposite of a non-dialectical remark, or, at best, they must meet half-way.

Second, in the next few decades, mainland China will continue to rise economically. Will the economic forces crush the series of the dialectical models, including the Centralism versus Democracy framework? In other words, will the Political Bureau be the only organ, which can uphold all of the dialectical models, as mentioned in this article? This possibility cannot be ruled out, because time is money, when it comes to doing business. However, one thing is still clear, that is, up to this day, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and their immediate subordinates plus those who have benefited from the economic reforms over the last few decades can still stick to the models. However, the CPC must reform with great care. Examples from other Asian countries such as the ROC and the ROK show that economic growth usually brought about the expansion of the civil society, leading to the demand for political reforms from the people/ opposition, which will damage if not topple the ruling power. Consequently, it is still the degree of the relaxations of market rules that remains on the agenda of the 5th generations. It is unlikely that they, as the chosen successors of the CPC leaders, will choose a different spectrum/strategy. But, they certainly have a lot of challenges ahead. Yet, they will increasingly become the minority in the years ahead. As a last resort, unless the General Secretary can effectively command the gun, the successors to the fifth generation leaders will not be able to shift the Market Economy line/path/track/way/road to the Socialism With Chinese Characteristics line as shown in the Communism versus Capitalism model in the figure.

Third, forces clamoring for democracy and forces against corruption may also deal heavy blows to the fifth generation leaders. Assuming that HU can finish his second term, it will mean that the new General Secretary of the CPC can serve 10 years. In this connection, Premier WEN Jiabao in March 2007 said the Market Economy

92 CT, August 5, 2007, p.A13.

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mainstream line will continue for another 100 years. If so, it is safe to say that leaders of the fifth generation will have a tougher time in dealing with those hostile forces. However, the September 2007 establishment of the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (NBCP), a deterrent to corruption activities, could help the Chinese Communist regime’s lease on life.

Fourth, MAO liked to choose his successor one by one. So, LIU Shaoqi, LIN Biao, and HUA Guofeng were among the candidates. DENG preferred to groom two figures at one time. HU Yaobang and ZHAO Ziyang were familiar names. JIANG had no choice, because HU was designated by DENG. Needless to say, should something go wrong, JIANG would immediately pull out a name from his Shanghai Gang pocket, such as ZENG Qinghong, who is a princeling. For this reason, HU was placed as the first among equals in the fourth generation in line to succeed JIANG.93 It is not clear how many candidates may HU and others have in mind. LI said: “… it seems necessary for the Chinese political establishment to identify HU’s successor during this upcoming congress. With an adequate ‘reserve’ period near the center of power, this heir apparent will be able to take over the top leadership when HU completes his second term at the 18th Party Congress in 2012.”94 LI’s educated-guess is that there will be a new face or the “core” leader of the fifth generation in the 2007 Political Bureau.95 Again, one should not forget the “Heir-in-waiting” years of HU, who also carefully not to expose too much before obtaining real power. We think, to play safe, there could be more than one designated successor, because, in a rapidly changing world, anything could happen in five years. Those possible successors will check-and-balance each other, and HU will be able to practice tight control and hold absolute power until his heir becomes clear at the 18th CPC Congress.

Besides, the party under HU has increasingly become unable to exercise overall leadership as in the past, in view of the fact that many non-CPC members can gradually serve in the government since the late 1970s. It follows that there could be, as LI said, two to four “rising stars” who have been monitored by the party’s Organization Department for 15-20 years and who are waiting in line to fill up the top posts in the CPC and the state.96 If it so happened that the successor-designate is from the Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), it does not mean that HU is biased, favoring his own tuanpai protégés. In a word, the successor must be politically correct by being able to maintain the Market Economy line. He or she would fully

93 Ibid.94 Ibid.95 Ibid.96 Ibid.

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realize that he or she is just a cog in a giant wheel, the wheel being the Socialism versus Capitalism model.

Fifth, by navigating within a series of dialectical models, would the fifth generation have a tunnel vision? The answer is no, because dialectics is something that can help the practitioners to rationalize everything. Yes, everything, if one has understood its dynamics, keeping in mind Marx’s model, which is Communism versus primitive Communism.

Sixth, jockeying for power among the factions should be expected, because none of them think that the others are better qualified than them. Once becoming the hopeful, we can say that the successor-designate will be very humble in doing everything, fearful that, if not, he or she will not become the real successor.

Seventh, to counter the so-called China Threat, using HU’s credo, Harmonious World, the world will understand what the Chinese Communists are trying to accomplish. It is suggested that new Beijing leaders should now get a fuller understanding of international regimes. The incumbent Chinese Communist leaders including HU do not fully understand international regimes. This is because after reading more than 50 white papers, the first one of which was published in November 1991, it is doubtful that HU and others fully understand what are meant by norms, rules, community-centered cooperation, one for all and all for one, etc. Only regimes can foster harmony in the international community or mitigate anarchy, tension, (scientific) uncertainty, and mistrust among countries, political entities, economic entities, and human beings like you and me, because power struggle and other things like sovereignty are not involved at all. If Beijing really wants to re-rise as a big power,97 it is wise of it to initiate various international regimes establishment movements including working with Taipei.

Eighth, more and more non-CPC members will be able to hold central government posts. In April 2007, WAN Gang was appointed as the Science and Technology Minister. The last non-CPC member who held an important post in the central government was FU Zuoyi. He was a defected KMT general, and he resigned from his post as the Minister of Water Resources in October 1972. In June 2007, the second non-Communist cabinet member, French educated CHEN Zhu, was appointed as the Minister of Health (MOH).98 In other words, from October 1972 to April 2007, the

97 China's first rise covered over 1,000 years before 1800 A.D. See Andre Gunder Frank, Re-Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1998).98 http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSSP251042, dated June 29, 2007.

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CPC was using the Party Member versus Non-Party Member, and since April 2007, it is using Party Member (as 1) and Non-Party Member (as 5) versus Non-1 2 3 4 5. In any case, WAN, CHEN, and other non-CPC central government officials must support the mainstream line and have a socialist heart. Concluding Remarks

There is no doubt that the fifth generation leaders will continue to apply dialectics when they play politics and conduct military affairs. What this means is that it is inappropriate to apply non-dialectical models and theories to describe and explain Chinese Communist politics, if not to infer or predict their words and deeds in the future.

However, there is no guarantee that the fifth generation leaders can keep the CPC afloat as the ruling party, because civil society is getting more powerful in the mainland. As more citizens on the mainland learn to protect their own rights and challenge the Chinese Communist Party, the party will be increasingly on the defensive.

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