Elite Configuration and Regime Change in North Africa: The Tunisian and Egyptian Case -Ian Kelly, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University

Introduction

The literature on authoritarian resilience has come under criticisms for its

inability to explain the occurrence of the Arab uprisings (Gause, 2011). These

criticisms have prompted calls within the scholarly community to re-think the

literature (Pace and Cavatorta, 2012), and, with that in mind this paper seeks to offer a

different explanation for why some regimes succumbed to popular uprisings in 2011

by analysing incumbent elites. The paper attempts to explain the immediate outcomes

of the Arab uprisings, ‘the initial regime change’ (Volpi, 2013: 970), by linking the

interests of elite actors to the process of regime change.

Initial work in the uprisings has pointed to the importance of regime elites in

this regard (Goldstone, 2011) and the record of the uprisings suggests elites were vital

in shaping the outcome. The loss of elite support contributes to Saleh’s ouster in

Yemen, and, the Assad regime holds on in Syria where there have been no defections

from the regime’s inner core, despite serious internal fracturing (ICG, 2013a).

Dalacoura (2011: 69) writes that regime change ‘depended on whether regimes

managed to retain the loyalty of their key allies, most crucially the army and the

security services, and important sections of the citizenry’. Accounting for why elites

chose to withdraw their support provides an opportunity to test the efficacy of those

strategies designed to secure elite loyalty throughout the region.

Incorporating the Elite Dimension

The Literature

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It is well established that dictators ‘do not rule alone’ (Gandhi, 2008: 34). In

order to rule incumbent leaders rely on coalitions of elites. The importance of

retaining elite support has not been lost on the incumbent autocrats of the MENA who

have worked to establish systems designed to both support the incumbent and

neutralise the threat of internal elite challenge (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003;

Svolik, 2013). Contemporary approaches to securing elite support in the region took

an array of analytical perspectives into account. These included geostrategic

perspectives (Entelis, 2008), rent-based approaches (Beblawi and Luciani),

institutional approaches (Brownlee, 2007; Droz-Vincent, 2007; Sassoon, 2012), and,

the demobilisation of the opposition (Wegner, 2007; Cavatorta and Durac, 2011).

In the aftermath of the uprising these approaches, like the broader literature,

require a re-thinking when the following is taken into account. First, there has been a

tendency to analyse those measures employed by the incumbent without accounting

for their relative importance and efficacy. This is a consequence of research design

employed in the MENA that selects cases on the positive observation of the

dependent variable, authoritarian persistence, which prevents us from making an

informed judgement as to which strategies of elite management are particularly

efficient in retaining elite support (Albrecht, 2015: 40).

Second a lack of attention has been paid to the institutional makeup of the

region’s elite cadres that prevents us from making an informed judgement as to what

strategies of elite management aid in our understanding of regime change.

Categorisations of the region’s autocracies have tended to be overly detailed (Perthes,

2004) or too abstract (Lust, 2011), both of which make comparison impractical. What

is required is an analytical framework that utilises sound theoretical concepts while

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acknowledging the observed differences between the various authoritarian

governments in the MENA.

The Analytical Framework

This paper seeks to explain authoritarian transitions where there are popular

uprisings and seeks to explain their immediate outcomes: the initial regime change.

The focus is on the process of change within authoritarian systems, specifically the

presidential republics of the MENA, which experienced a moment of ‘systemic crisis’

in 2011 (Albrecht, 2012: 257). The paper argues that the initial regime is the

consequence of divergent interests within the ruling elite. There are two distinct

observations that can be made with regard to the initial regime change. First, it may

constitute authoritarian breakdown, ‘a sharp, clean break with the past’ (Huntington,

1991: 147), representing a change in the who and the how of governance. Second, the

initial regime change may constitute authoritarian transformation, a partial dissolution

of the incumbent regime representing a transition away from one particular form of

authoritarianism to another (Shehata, 2011: 31), thus representing a transformation of

the who and offering a de facto continuity between the previous authoritarian regime

and the one that emerged with the initial regime change. The paper is choosing not to

utilise a control case, authoritarian maintenance in the face of a popular uprisings, as

the research question has been designed to explain the occurrence of an initial regime

change in the MENA.

There is an established link between the withdrawal of elite support for the

incumbent leader and regime change within authoritarian systems (Gandhi and

Przeworski, 2006). In order to guard against the withdrawal of support incumbents

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must realise the interests of their supporters and do this through granting material

goods and policy concessions (Ibid: 2). To articulate elite interests the MENA’s elite

cadres must be analysed in such a way that allows for comparison. Roger Owen

(2012: 38-39) writes that incumbent presidents of the MENA are surrounded by an

array of elites drawn from their family, the military, the security services and well-

organised ruling parties.

While specifics vary across the region there are recognisable similarities in the

actors drawn upon to comprise the elite with regards to the career paths and qualities

needed to enter the elite stratum (Perthes, 2004). To facilitate the analysis of these

differences the paper will apply Geddes’ (1999; 2003) established typology of

authoritarian systems to the elite cadres under examination as it the dynamics

underpinning these cadres that determine their interests. Geddes classifies

authoritarian regimes as military, single-party, personalist or amalgams of these types

and argues that the composition of authoritarian regimes reflects the manner in which

it breaks down. This paper applies the established interests and attitudes of elite

cadres towards regime change to the study of the Arab uprisings and argues, per

Owen’s work, that all three elite cadres are drawn upon to staff the presidential

republics. As such, the elite under examination will be categorised as either military,

single-party or personalist. This application of Geddes’ typology enhances our

understanding of regime change in the MENA as it allows us to observe which

methods of elite management are effective.

Military elites are drawn form active members of the senior officer corps.

Their interests are centred on the efficacy and survival of the military as an institution.

These interests imply a concern with the maintenance of internal cohesion, territorial

integrity, autonomy from civilian intervention, the procurement of ultramodern

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equipment, and, the recruitment of high-quality recruits (Stepan, 1971, Nordlinger,

1977), interests the military is not capable of realising unless it is sufficiently

provided for. Such interests indicate the military will favour regime change if there is

a belief that civilian governments prevent the realisation of these interests. As an

institution the military would prefer to remain autonomous. The interests of the

military in the MENA are typically safeguarded through the appointment of a senior

general as Defence Minister (Owen, 2012: 46).

Single-party elites are members of the ruling party’s leadership body (Ezrow

and Frantz, 2011: 21). Like democratic politicians they want to stay in power. Some

value controlling policy, others the perks of office and some the illicit gains that

comes with their position (Geddes, 1999: 129). Factions form around a range of issues

in ruling parties but there is a realisation that everyone is better off remaining united.

As such, single-party elites prioritise co-optation over exclusion as the realisation of

interests can be done over a long-term time horizon.

Membership in personalist cadres is more fluid. These cadres are often formed

form the network of family and friends surrounding the incumbent. Within the MENA

these cadres also include the forces of the security services (the various police,

paramilitaries and intelligence services housed in the Interior Ministry). The mission

of the security services differs from that of the military’s: theirs is the defence of the

regime not the nation (Droz-Vincent, 2014: 183). Recruited on material inducements

personalist elites have strong reason to support the leader as they are thoroughly

enmeshed in the regime’s corruption and lack an independent political base from

which to realise their interests (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 86).

The above interests determine whether the elite rivalries that exist in all

governments lead to regime change. Military elites favour regime change if the

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military institution is threatened. During the occurrence of internal crisis single-party

elites keep their heads down and wait to see who emerges victorious. It is only when

their own interests are threatened that they will favour regime change (Geddes, 2004:

15). What compels single-party elites to favour regime change is exogenous rather

than endogenous factors, in contrast to their military counterparts (Geddes, 1999:

134). Personalist elites are less vulnerable than military elites but more so than single-

party elites as they are entirely dependent on the leader and the narrowness of their

support bases makes them more likely to be challenged (Ibid: 132-134). Furthermore,

they are vulnerable to economic crisis. While their individual interests may not be

threatened per se, personalist elites are vulnerable to the impact that an economic

crisis may have on wider society and the dynamics it might unleash.

Thus, when faced with a popular uprising different elites react in different

ways. If the military as institution is threatened military elites will favour regime

change. After all there is life after regime change as the military can return to the

barracks. Single-party elites prioritise co-optation of their critics but where exogenous

factors compel them to favour regime change they will do so. Like their military

counterparts there is life after regime change. The ruling party and its networks can be

reconfigured to operate in the post-regime change political arena. Personalist cadres

will circle the wagons however. Thus, exogenous factors remove personalist elites

from power with the modal ending in this regard being a coup, and, insurgency,

popular uprisings or invasion important in more than half of their demises.

Analysing elite dynamics during the occurrence of a popular uprising is

problematic as it gives rise to tautological elite dynamics (Levitsky and Way, 2010:

61). To mitigate this problem the paper will first focus on interest realisation

endogenous to the regime elite and the map the changes that have occurred

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throughout the regime’s time in power. The authoritarian leaders of the MENA are

old hands in this regard using divide-and-rule strategies to keep their supporters

acquiescent (Brownlee, 2002). Through ensuring their supporter’s interests are

realised incumbents can guard against the emergence of a group of individual who

can challenge their authority. However, the use of these tactics ferments competition

within the regime as favoured elites emerge under the incumbent’s patronage (Lee,

2009: 645). Divide-and-rule may safeguard authoritarian regimes in the short term but

in the long term create conditions in which parts of the regime elite may be more

focused on improving their position than supporting the regime.

Second, paper will trace factors endogenous to the elite up to and including

the occurrence of popular uprisings as these factors provide an opportunity for

marginalised elite to move against the regime and their rivals within it. The

occurrence of a popular uprising is an opportunity to do just that as those protesting

can appeal to marginalised elites within the regime (Schmitter, 1985). The disgruntled

regime elite thus become the ‘swingmen’ whose support can hasten the transition

process within authoritarian regimes (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986/2013). Whether

marginalised elites favour regime change depends on conditions exogenous to regime

dynamics that affect their decisionmaking in the midst of a popular uprising.

Keeping the above in mind, it is possible to have a typology of the specific

variables at play. The first two outlined are endogenous to the elite while the second

two are exogenous. The first variable to take into account is patrimonial ties. This

refers to the non-material ties binding the elite to the incumbent (Perthes, 2004: 15-

18, 24-28). These ties consist of the educational, social and generational backgrounds

of elite actors, which contribute to forming their worldview, and their political

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agendas. Where these ties contribute to the realisation of elite interests elite actors

will not be amenable to regime change (Bellin, 2004: 145-146).

The second variable is resource distribution. Incumbents retain the support of

elites through ensuring their material interests are looked after. In order to analyse

material distribution this variable follows Richter’s (2007) work on fiscal sociology

and analyses the targeted expenditure towards members of the elite. This expenditure

takes the form of direct material transfers (budgetary allocations), the provision of

jobs, and, preferential access to trade and business opportunities granted via economic

liberalisation. This variable also functions as a signifier of elite status in that it

represents a commoditification of power into material resources that can be displayed

throughout society (Nitzan and Bichler, 2002: 36-38).

The next variable is popular legitimation and speaks to the relationship

between the people and the regime, and how this affects elite interests. The leaders of

the MENA’s presidential systems sought popular legitimacy through ideology and

state-led development (Schlumberger, 2010: 243-246). Where the regime was deemed

legitimate in the people’s eyes the elite did not countenance regime change, as the

costs were too high. Where the regime was deemed illegitimate however, if the

relationship between the regime and the people was ‘typically expressed as a

suspiciousness of the motives or abilities of politicians, and denial that governmental

institutions work to assure the responsive of constituents’ (Weatherford, 1991: 255),

elites favoured regime change as they would not be ruined by reform (Bellin, 2004:

146).

The final variable is that of international support. Members of the elite are

likely to favour regime change when critical international support is lost.

Authoritarian regimes are especially vulnerable to the vagaries of international

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politics as they have long reaped the benefits of leveraging Western concerns over

energy, migration and terrorism, reaping large quantities of foreign aid form both the

United States and the European Union (Bellin, 2004: 148-149). Furthermore,

international support has endowed authoritarian regimes with a sense of legitimacy

(Sedgwick, 2010: 255). Where international support is withdrawn it triggers both an

existential and financial crisis amongst authoritarian elites (Janos, 2000).

All of these variables may not necessarily act at the same time or have a

constant degree of intensity or duration. Some are in clear conflict with others and

some mutually reinforce each other but they all influence the interest realisation of

elites, who in turn have their own proffered objectives and outcomes.

Tunisia: The Erosion of the Regime from Within

The Ben Ali Regime

The Tunisian Regime under Ben Ali was built on an elite alliance between the

single-party elites of the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), the

military elites of the Tunisian armed forces, and the personalist elites of the Tunisian

Interior Ministry. As the regime moved into the 1990s it subsequently evolved to

include another personalist cadre centred on Ben Ali’s extended family.

Erosion from Within

The Tunisian military refused orders from Ben Ali to repress protestors during

the uprising. Taking the military’s relationship with Ben Ali into account these

actions are unsurprising despite senior members of the military being placed into

leading state and party positions (Murphy, 1999: 171; Camau and Geiser, 2003: 208).

Ben Ali’s attitude to the military, despite his military background, mirrored that of

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Bourguiba’s and he kept it small and marginalised in order to limit its political

ambitions while concurrently sponsoring a growth and professionalization of the

Interior Ministry’s forces (Goldstone, 2011: 13; Brooks, 2013: 6). As a consequence

of its marginalisation the military developed its own distinct corporate identity,

becoming loyal to the Tunisian republic rather than Ben Ali personally (Ayachi,

2011). For his personal protection and political support Ben Ali relied on his domestic

security apparatus quartered in the Interior Ministry – the police, the National guard

and the Presidential Guard. Numbering between 130,000 and 150,000 altogether, the

Interior Ministry dwarfed the 35,000-man army, of who perhaps only 15,000-18,000

could be mobilised as soldiers, as the rest were administrators (ICG, 2011: 11). The

Interior Ministry’s strength lay not only in the physical force it could bring to bear

against threats to the regime but in the pervasive influence it exercised across

Tunisian society (Hibou, 2011: 82-83). Amongst other actions, it controlled who

entered the civil service and employed a vast range of surveillance tools, including the

co-optation of taxi drivers, to monitor Tunisian society.

That the Interior Ministry was privileged over the military can also be seen in

the resources both had access to. The military’s budget was approximately 1.4 percent

of GDP on the eve of the uprising, such that Tunisia ranked 109th globally in terms of

resources devoted to defence expenditure (IISS, 2012: 351-352). This paled in

comparison to military expenditure throughout the region and the military was further

forced to rely forced to rely on French and American equipment that was out of date,

if not already obsolete, and foreign military financing from the United States (Brooks,

2013: 6). In contrast the forces of the Interior Ministry were well resourced,

particularly the Presidential Guard, who enjoyed excellent salaries in comparison to

their peers and access to ultramodern equipment (ICG, 2011: 11). Furthermore, as

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Amine Ghali makes clear, the Interior Ministry’s forces were able to extract bribes

from the Tunisian public in order to supplement their income and in turn received

impunity from the regime with regard to these activities.1

It was not only the military with which Ben Ali had strained relations; there

was also the matter of the RCD. Upon coming to power Ben Ali undertook a

recruitment drive and expanded the RCD’s membership to include previously

neglected parts of society: the young, women, businessmen and professionals (Willis,

2012: 132). Upon coming to power Ben Ali began the process of setting Tunisia on a

long-term path to prosperity through undertaking a structural adjustment process

designed to liberalise the Tunisian economy. However, the anticipated benefits of this

programme proved elusive to the membership of the RCD. The party primarily

accessed its material resources through opportunity redistribution, simply put party

members would use their access to the state to secure business licences and permits

on favourable terms owing to their party membership (Hibou, 2011:89). The party

effectively functioned as a facilitator between its members and the state.2 The

anticipated benefits of economic reform proved elusive to members of the RCD over

time as it was well-connected individuals that were part of Ben Ali or his wife Leila

Trabelsi’s family who preyed on the newly liberalised Tunisian economy, gaining

disproportionately relative to RCD members. ‘The Family’ used their access to Ben

Ali to acquire state land, state businesses and import licences that allowed them to

dominate whole economic geographies. The Trabelsi family dominated the economy

of Greater Tunis, while Ben Ali’s family established an economic empire along the

southern coast (Murphy, 2013: 49). The Family’s domination of the economy was

such that many feared to challenge their economic hegemony because as Achraf

1 Interview with Amine Ghali 2 Interview with Selim Ben Yedder

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Aouadi put it, ‘Ben Ali was not only the President of Tunisia, he was also the

employer of Tunisia’.3

The rise of The Family also saw the political foundations of the regime begin

to narrow as the RCD became increasingly depoliticised. At the outset of his rule Ben

Ali relied heavily on the party as he consolidated power. However, after consolidating

power Ben Ali increasingly staffed his cabinets with technocrats with technocracts

who had no political bases of their own (Alexander, 2010: 66). As Youssef Cherif

makes clear the appointment of technocrats to cabinet was solely intended to support

the president in implementing his economic agenda and looking after The Family’s

interests.4 The depoliticised top of the party’s leadership was mirrored at the local

level. At the local level the party was tasked with mobilising in support of Ben Ali

when needed and managing the political affairs of local members (Hibou, 2011: 87)

but the reality of local party membership was quite different. Many registered party

members were not active members, it was rather the case they were state employees

who were automatically registered as party members.5 While not actively mandated to

support the regime these individuals were reminded that there were consequences to

actively withdrawing their support.

The political base of the regime gradually shifted away from formal

governmental institutions to a range of informal structures that orbited the President

(Erdle, 2004: 214). The most prominent actor in orbit of the president was Leila

Trabelsi who began to assert control over the presidential office as Ben Ali’s health

began to deteriorate throughout the 2000s.6 It was Leila who decided who decided

upon access to the president and what matters would be brought before him (Beau and

3 Interview with Achraf Aouadi 4 Interview with Youssef Cherif 5 Interview with Anis Samali 6 Interview with Amna Guallali

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Graciet, 2009: 30-31). She also worked to secure the future of the regime through

arranging marriages between her relatives and prominent members of Tunisian

society and through having Ben Ali appoint family members to leadership positions

within the RCD.

The regime’s support base was also eroded by its loss of legitimacy. Economic

reform did not deliver the anticipated benefits. It instead brought an increase in

poverty, regional inequalities and youth unemployment. The World Food Programme

estimated that 11.5 percent of the Tunisian population lived below the poverty line

(Labidi and Sacco, 2011: 7), a consequence of removing subsidies on food and fuel

(Murphy, 2013: 42). Unemployment was recognised as officially standing at 14.2

percent in 2008 with youth unemployment stood at 41 percent, the result of an

education system that failed to prepare university graduates for work in Tunisia’s

liberalised economy (Schraeder and Redissi, 2011: 7; Mabrouk, 2011: 628). Further

exacerbating the crisis was a regional disparity in unemployment. While

unemployment persistently at 14 percent nationally it was at least twice that in Gafsa,

the southwest’s capital. In Moualrès, Mdhilla and Erdayf, the main towns in the Gafsa

Mining Basin Area, unemployment in 2007 officially stood at 38.5 percent, 28.4

percent and 26.7 percent respectively (Gobe, 2011: 5). This unemployment was in

large part due to the contraction of the Gafsa Phosphate Company workforce as it

underwent modernisation and restructuring. What new jobs were created tended to be

heavily concentrated in the coastal cities leaving Tunisia’s rural and inland regions

lagging behind in the distribution of benefits.

The journalist Kamel Labidi makes the point that these factors, coupled with

the economic activities of The Family, created a constituency amongst the Tunisian

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people that saw the regime as illegitimate.7 The ‘fundamental unfairness’8 of the

regime’s policies led many to take action against it during the Tunisian uprising and

contributed to the narrowing of the regime’s support base at the time. The military

refused orders to engage the protestors as military elites were made aware that

individual officers refused to actively engage citizens as many were deployed to areas

where they had familial and social ties.9 The regime’s loss of legitimacy also

contributed to the erosion of RCD support for the regime because the party’s rank-

and-file were also protesting against the regime, having been denied opportunities at

the expense of The Family (ICG, 2011: 9).

While the story of the regime’s narrowing support base is primarily a domestic

one, the international support afforded to Ben Ali merits acknowledgement.

Consistent with its historical inclination towards Francophone Africa, France was one

of Tunisia’s largest trading partners and international advocates (Kallander, 2013:

103). The relationship established between Ben Ali and successive French

governments privileged security and economic concerns over political reform and

human rights. Indeed Ben Ali established successful relations with many in the

French elite who looked after his interests. French authorities placed Tunisian

dissident sunder house arrest in order that they not cause trouble for the Ben Ali

regime and permitted the RCD to place France-based Tunisians under surveillance

from a party office that masqueraded as a cultural centre (Beau and Tuquoi, 1999;

Ryan, 2011). Indeed during Ben Ali’s hour of need the French Foreign Minister

7 Interview with Kamel Labidi 8 Interview with Youssef Cherif 9 Interview with Achraf Aouadi

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Michèle Alliot-Marie offered the assistance of French police to quell the protests

engulfing Tunisia.10

The United States relationship with Tunisia was less friendly however. While

Ben Ali was viewed as a valuable ally in the fight against terrorism (Murphy, 2014:

244), the United States posture was less friendly towards the Ben Ali regime as under

George W. Bush the United States sought democratisation in the MENA and was not

above voicing these concerns publicly (Associated Press, 2004). During the final

years of the Bush administration the zeal for democratisation cooled somewhat but

were revived under the Obama administration (Angrist, 2013: 554). Despite an

awareness of the corruption at work inside the regime, particularly amongst The

Family, the United States did not advocate cutting ties with the Tunisian regime but

there was a growing awareness in American diplomatic circles that the regime was on

the verge of a crisis.11 During the uprising the United States did not publicly call on

Ben Ali instead maintaining a silence and only sided with those protesting against

Ben the regime after Ben Ali’s departure. The Congressional Research Service

admitted to this delayed reaction while attempting to gloss over it: US criticism of the

[Tunisian] government’s response to the December-January demonstrations, although

initially muted, mounted as the protests grew’ (Arieff, 2011: 6). It also emerged in the

uprisings aftermath that the United States view of Ben Ali during the uprising was

less favourable than that of France’s. According to Schraeder and Redissi (2011: 14)

10 See the full text of Alliot-Marie’s statement under the heading ‘Violences en Tunisie et en Algérie. Réponses du Ministre d’Etat, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et Européennes, Michèle Alliot-Marie, a des Questions d’actualités a l’Assemblée Nationale’, Paris January 11 2011. Available at http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr [Accessed March 11 2015] 11 Cable, Embassy Tunis to Secretary of State, ‘Corruption in Tunisia: What’s Yours is Mine’, June 23 2008, 08TUNIS679. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TUNIS679.html [Accessed March 2 2015]; Cable Embassy Tunis to Secretary of State, ‘Tunisia: What Should We Do?’, July 17 2009, 09TUNIS492. Available at: https://wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/07/09TUNIS492.html [Accessed March 2 2015]

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the US ambassador Gordon Gray told Ben Ali that he had to step down and ‘could not

count on exile in the U.S’.

Thus, as Angrist writes (2013: 554), on the eve of the uprising the ‘Ben Ali

regime had eroded considerably’, the product of the president alienating multiple key

elite constituencies, the military and the RCD, at the expense of the growing influence

of The Family. When the Tunisian population significantly challenged the regime, a

challenge borne of the regime’s growing illegitimacy, neither mobilised to defend the

president. It was rather the case that both performed the role of swingmen and

allowed the protest movement to force Ben Ali into exile.

The outcome of the Tunisian uprising resulted in the occurrence of

authoritarian breakdown. In the immediate aftermath of the uprising elements of the

RCD leadership sought to capture the political system. However, sustained protests in

the public saw members of the previously outlawed opposition appointed to positions

in cabinet and RCD stalwarts retired as Tunisia began the process of embarking upon

an uncertain democratic transition (Brownlee et al., 2015: 126-127; Murphy, 2011).

The Egyptian Uprising: Authoritarian Transformation

The Mubarak Regime

The Egyptian Regime under Mubarak was built on an elite alliance between

the single-party elites of the National Democratic Party (NDP), the military elites of

the Egyptian armed forces, and the personalist elites of the Egyptian Interior Ministry.

The regime evolved in the 2000s to include a further personalist cadre centred on

Mubarak’s younger son, Gamal.

A Divided Regime

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February 11th saw Hosni Mubarak resign from the Egyptian presidency and

invest the power of the state in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF),

the military’s ruling body, and bring to an end eighteen days of protest against his

rule. The military’s decision to remove Mubarak was a momentous, if not entirely

unsurprising event, given the relationship between the two. Despite his history with

the military Mubarak had become distant from the officer corps following his

decision to remove the popular Defence Minister General Abu Ghazzala from power

because of his popularity both within the military and throughout Egypt.12 Despite his

distance from the institution Mubarak moved to assert his control over the institution.

All promotions over the rank of corporal were decided by him, popular officers were

rotated and removed lest they build up a support base in the military, and, strategic

doctrine was controlled in such a manner that prevented officers from gaining

meaningful combat experience (Droz-Vincent, 1999: 18; Kandil, 2012a: 185-187).

Ghazzala’s replacement as Defence Minister, Hussein Tantawi, was perfectly placed

to manage the military’s isolation. The officer corps frequently derided Tantawi as

‘Mubarak’s poodle’ and a man who was doing his best to run the military into the

ground.13 The distance between Mubarak and Tantawi on the one hand and the rest of

the officer corps on the other is perhaps generational. Mubarak and Tantawi were

both products of Soviet military training and the October War while those who

derided them were the beneficiaries of US training and peacetime service (Albrecht,

2015: 44). Class divisions may also have contributed to the military’s political

isolation. The officer corps was primarily drawn from the lower-middle classes while

the regime’s new political elite, embodied by Gamal Mubarak, was drawn from the

12 Cable, Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State, ‘Academics See the Military in Decline, But Retaining Strong Influence’, September 23 2008, 03CAIRO2091. Available at: https://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08CAIRO2091.html [Accessed November 24 2014] 13 Ibid.

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upper classes (Ibid: 44-45). Compounding the military’s loss of status was the

secondary role it played in regime maintenance to the security forces of the Interior

Ministry (Kandil, 2012b: 199).

Financially, the military were also in a declining position. Despite privileged

access to US military aid, officer’s privileges and a military-economic complex that

had rapidly matured since the 1970s (Richter, 2007: 184) the military, as an

institution, was unable to provide for its rank-and-file. First, Egypt’s generals had

made it clear since the 1980s that the privileges its men received were not enough

against skyrocketing inflation (Baz, 2007: 64-70). Second, the military leadership was

‘largely hostile to economic liberalization and private-sector growth’ and were

opposed to being ruled by Egypt’s embodiment of neoliberal economics, Gamal

Mubarak (Anderson, 2011: 4). Third, its military economic-complex was not a

lucrative source of revenue; the middle classes looked down its products upon and it

was the president who gave the final say on the singing of arms contracts (Frisch,

2001: 6; Sirrs, 2010: 130-131). And finally, while defence expenditure remained

somewhat constant it gradually delinked as a proportion of regime expenditure

(Kandil, 2012a: 184). In contrast to this the forces of the Interior Ministry had seen

their budgets grow, as a consequence of the Islamist insurgency in the 1990s, from 3.5

percent of GDP in 1988 to six percent in 2002, which was almost twice that of the

military’s at the time (Soliman, 2011: 63; Kandil, 2012b: 195). The real increase in

resources for the Interior Ministry came from the rent seeking its members took up in

order to supplement their incomes, an option not available to the military. Bribes were

expected from members of the public in order to get identification cards or routine

documents and police officers also took a cut off the money touts made from tourists

visiting Egypt’s historical sites (Bradley, 2012: p.150)

18

Underscoring the division between the military and the regime’s political

apparatus was Mubarak’s decision to devote his time to foreign and security policy

while allowing Gamal to oversee domestic policymaking (Kazziha, 2013). Gamal’s

rise was borne of the regime’s decision to undertake a structural adjustment

programme in the 1990s under the auspices of the World Bank and IMF (Soliman,

2012). The programme was ostensibly undertaken to liberalise the Egyptian economy

through privatising a number of state businesses and services (Denis, 2006: 58; El-

Naggar, 2009; 38; Marfleet, 2009: 17). In actual fact the programme was soon co-

opted by regime elites so that they could pursue personal enrichment and put in place

domestic patronage networks (Henry and Springborg, 2010). These elites were either

friends or business associates of Mubarak’s younger son Gamal (Al-Din Araft, 2011:

34) who, as Mona El-Ghobashy (2005) makes clear, shared similar interests in

reorienting the Egyptian state along market lines. In order to realise their goals they

co-opted the ruling structures of the NDP and remade the party in their image and

removed party stalwarts opposed to them. The most important outcome of this party

restructuring was the creation of the Policies Secretariat (PS), a vehicle designed to

advance the interests of Gamal and those around him (Cook, 2012: 171). Brownlee

(2008: 46-47) further makes the point that these actions were also intended to position

Gamal as successor to his president. Hatem Zayed agrees with this point, noting that

throughout the 2000s the NDP evolved from being a party that supported the regime

to one that supported the interests of Gamal and his entourage.14

Gamal also remade the party’s parliamentary representation in order to bolster

his political base. Traditionally NDP MPs were drawn from former military officers

or bureaucrats who used their position in parliament to enrich themselves. Through

14 Interview with Hatem Zayed

19

distributing state patronage to their constituents they were able to ensure their

consistent re-election (Blaydes, 2011: 56). Structural adjustment changed this as the

state’s retreat from the economy limited the ability of MPs to distribute patronage to

their constituents. This provided an opportunity for Gamal to remake the party in his

image and businessmen were encouraged to run for parliament. They were able to

finance patronage in their constituencies personally and a seat in parliament

represented an opportunity to pursue lucrative business opportunities and immunity

from corruption (Al-Din Arafat, 2011: 70-72).

Entering the political arena proved to be a financial boon for Gamal and his

entourage. The cabinet reshuffle of 2004 saw a number of PS members given

command of economic portfolios. These appointees commanded obsequiousness, as

they knew they owed to their positions to their ties with the Mubarak family, and it

was these ties that allowed them to act with impunity (Al-Aswany, 2011: 13-14).

These appointments allowed for corruption on a grand scale as many ministers were

responsible for sectors in which they had personal interests and many worked to

enrich themselves and the Mubarak family (Lesch, 2012: 20-21, 27-30) while

establishing patronage networks of their own.15 Furthermore, the ‘bourgeoisification’

of the NDP’s parliamentary representation allowed for these activities to continue, as

MPs were reliant on the support of Gamal Mubarak and the PS for continued political

advancement (Muslim, 2012).

The divisions underpinning were further exposed during the uprising when its

loss of legitimacy was taken into account. Mubarak had built his legitimacy on

providing some semblance of social protection to the Egyptian people. However

rhetoric did not match reality for those outside of the regime elite. While the middle

15 Interview with Wael Nawara

20

class heard celebratory statements about increased GDP and rises in economic growth

the standard of living for all Egyptian was progressively worsening (Abd al-Aziz,

2011: 89). On the eve of the uprising unemployment reached 26.3 percent and an

estimated 3 million people were forced to join the underground economy (Shatz,

2010: 6). The economy had become divided into two spheres: one that serviced the

conspicuous consumption of the top 10 percent, and the other throwing what

breadcrumbs it could at the surviving masses (Kandil, 2012b: 210). The Egyptian

people not only saw their aspirations crushed but were forced to watch powerlessly as

Egypt’s upper class sent its children to private international schools, received

treatment in highly equipped hospitals and resided in lavish compounds that were cut

off from the rest of the population (Amin, 2011: 73-77).

The division of the Egyptian economy led to those outside the bubble of the

regime psychologically breaking with the regime. Economic policies designed to

favour the rich led many to disassociate with a regime they did not believe had their

interests at heart. As Hatem Zayed makes clear the gated communities of the rich,

where many of Egypt’s poor worked, reinforced this break as the poor saw a world

that was not for them.16 The regime’s complicity in this division led to a growing

sense of anger directed at Gamal Mubarak and those around him as they took no

action to relieve Egypt’s socioeconomic crisis but actually reinforce through

promoting consumption-led lifestyles in the national press.17

The anger the people felt towards the regime, and Gamal in particular,

contributed to the military withdrawing its support for the regime during the uprising.

As Wael Nawara points out the SCAF saw Mubarak as a legitimate leader who did

16 Interview with Hatem Zayed 17 Interview with Nateem Yasser

21

have a mandate to govern.18 However, as Nawara subsequently points out the

Egyptian people did not view Gamal as a legitimate leader nor did they have any

respect for him, finding his displays of ostentatious wealth distasteful. It was this

crisis of legitimacy that led the SCAF to remove Mubarak as they would have to go to

the street to protect the regime, something the SCAF did not want to do.

The regime’s divisions were also the product of the international support

afforded to Mubarak by the United States. Since the signing of the 1978 Camp David

accords Egypt has worked to realise US strategic interests in the region (Gerges,

2012), for which it has been handsomely rewarded. Since 1978 Egypt has on average

received $2 billion annually in aid from the United States, of which $1.3 billion is

military aid (Sharp, 2010: 4; Sharp, 2014: 11). US support for Egypt was predicated

on the latter remaining a relevant strategic actor capable of realising US interests.

Realising US interests had different affects for different parts of the regime. While the

US was nominally supportive of a Gamal Mubarak succession there were

acknowledgements that the younger Mubarak may not have been as capable as his

father.19 To this end many in the US establishment looked to Intelligence Director

Omar Suleiman as likely candidate to succeed Mubarak,20 while Brownlee (2012: 96)

also argues that the United States undertook democracy promotion efforts in Egypt in

order to support the emergence of a candidate who was amenable to US interests and

lacking connections to the Mubarak regime. Despite these limitations there was

recognition within the Egyptian military that US aid was a necessary evil. As Adel

18 Interview with Wael Nawara 19 Cable, Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State, ‘Presidential Succession in Egypt’, May 14 2007, 07CAIRO1417. Available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07CAIRO1417.html [Accessed November 24 2014] 20 Cable, Embassy Cairo to Secretary of State, ‘Actions Louder Than Words: Gamal Mubarak and the Presidency, April 3 2006, 06CAIRO2010. Available at: http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/04/06CAIRO2010.html [Accessed November 24 2014]

22

Soliman, a retired general, noted the United States had the ability to make or break the

Egyptian army as it had been built on weapons provided by the US.21

Strategic calculations affected the actions of the United States during the

uprising. As Hatem Zayed makes clear the United Stares initially supported Mubarak

but having seen him lose control of the situation called on him to go.22 As Zayed

further points out the military’s decision to come out against Mubarak provided the

United States with an opportunity to bring about regime change and still see their

interests realised given the military’s reliance on the United States.

Thus, on the even of the Egyptian uprising the Mubarak regime was divided,

the result of tensions between the military and Gamal Mubarak’s personalist bloc that

could not be resolved until Mubarak exited the presidency (Kemou and Azaola, 2013:

144). It was the case that the Egyptian uprising represented such an opportunity.

While the uprising began as an act of popular anger directed at the Mubarak regime

its dénouement was brought about by the SCAF. It was a duality that brought about

Mubarak’s undoing, a juxtaposition of popular uprising and military coup. The

outcome of this duality was authoritarian transformation. Mubarak had exited the

presidency and Gamal and the NDP’s leadership had been displaced but other pillars

of the regime remained in place, particularly the military and the security services

(ICG, 2013b: 9). Gehad Auda, a former NDP member, argues that Mubarak’s vesting

power in the military was deliberate.23 Auda argues that Mubarak feared that the

political situation in Egypt might unravel if power was to be vested in a newly

established civilian authority, hence Mubarak’s decision to invest power in the

military. Adel Soliamn concurs with his point arguing that the military’s ouster of

Mubarak was designed not to ensure the Egyptian uprising’s success but its death by

21 Interview with Adel Soliman 22 Interview with Hatem Zayed 23 Interview with Gehad Auda

23

placing in power an institution that could keep the Mubarak regime alive and allow it

to continue.24

Conclusion

Other explanations have been advanced to explain the immediate outcomes of

the Arab uprisings. Some have argued that regime change was the product of popular

mobilisation facilitated by social media platforms while others have looked to

socioeconomic explanations (Axford, 2011; Herrera, 2012; Springborg, 2011; Kandil,

2012c). While there may be elements of truth to these arguments (Achcar, 2013),

given that mono-causal explanations do not usually stand up this paper hopes to have

proffered an explanations where elite variables play a central role.

An analysis of the Tunisian and Egyptian cases revealed some of the key

causal mechanisms in the regime change process. First, the elite interests argument

explains how and why splits occurred within both regimes. The privileging of the

political and material interests of each regime’s personalist cadre to the detriment of

military and single-party elites gave rise to competition in both Tunisia and Egypt.

The privileging of personalist interests was the result of shared patrimonial ties

between the incumbent and their respective personalist cadres on the one hand and the

gradual erosion of these ties between the incumbent and military and single-party

elites on the other. This was a pattern mirrored in the distribution of material

resources. Second, the increased privileging of personalist cadres was detrimental to

both regimes’ persistence. As mentioned this created tensions within both regimes but

also contributed to their declining legitimacy in public. This loss of legitimacy was

borne of two distinct causes. One, the depoliticised of ruling patties affected the

24 Interview with Adel Soliman

24

ability of party elites to mobilise support for the regime. And two, the preferential

access personalist elites were granted to the economy mobilised a constituency that

viewed the incumbent regime as illegitimate. The third point to consider is that the

affects of international support did not hold constant in both cases. Where

authoritarian breakdown occurred in Tunisia there was international support for the

Ben Ali regime. In Egypt international support for the Mubarak regime was

withdrawn and authoritarian transformation occurred. The United Stares exercised

leverage over the Egyptian military to bring about a regime change that was amenable

to its strategic interests. This indicates the importance of geopolitics in shaping

outcomes in the region, as external actors will seek to shape the outcome of the

regime change process in those countries where they have significant interests.

The findings also have implications for the literature. First, the findings

confirm that personalist elites will not favour regime change. It was the juxtaposition

of popular mobilisation and military intervention that saw their removal from power.

Second, the findings also confirm that single-party elites will favour regime change

when exogenous circumstances compel them to do so. Despite seeing their relevance

decline it was only the strength of popular mobilisation that compelled single-party

elites in Tunisia and Egypt to withdraw their support for the incumbent. Third, the

findings also confirm that military elites favour regime change if their institutional

interests are not realised. However, both cases diverged in that while the Tunisian

military acted in accordance with the literature’s assumptions the Egyptian military

did not. Rather than relinquish power to a civilian authority the Egyptian military

worked to establish a political order amenable to its interests. This finding indicates

that the Egyptian military acted in a manner that was not in accordance with the

literature’s assumptions. Analysing the divergent outcomes between the Tunisian and

25

Egyptian contexts indicates the primacy of international support in explaining this

divergence. It is likely then that the provision of international support from the United

States prompted the Egyptian military to take the course it did, contributing to the

realisation of US strategic interests in return for support that would allow it to realise

its own corporate interests.

There are a number of limitations in the paper that must be acknowledged.

First, the paper examines only authoritarian transitions during periods of popular

uprising and their immediate outcome. It is plausible that the elite interests argument

may not apply to other forms of regime change. Further research is necessary to

assess the scope of this argument. Second, as this is an intraregional small-n analysis

there is awareness that the article lacks sufficient insight into cases in other parts of

the world. However, while external validity may be weaker compared to cases using

large-n cross-case studies this paper makes up for this weakness with its strength in

internal validity - it is easier to establish the veracity of the causal relationship in the

two cases under examination. Be that as it may be one could also reasonably argue

that the unique political ecology of the MENA and its attendant sub-literature

preclude detailed cross-case analysis. Despite these limitations it seems that analysing

the elite dimension of the region’s presidential systems offers insights into the process

of regime change during the occurrence of popular uprisings by highlighting the

relevance of elite interests to this process.

26

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Interviews: Personal Interview with General Adel Soliman, (Ret.), Director of the Strategic Dialogue Forum,

Cairo, February 10, 2014.

Personal Interview with Wael Nawara, Journalist at Al-Monitor and Co-founder of the Al-Dostour

Party and National Association for Change. Cairo, February 10, 2014.

Personal Interview with Hateem Zayed, Researcher at the Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social

Rights, Cairo, February 11 2014.

Personal Interview with Nateem Yasser, Researcher at The Arabic Network for Human Rights

Information, Cairo, February 11 2014.

Personal Interview with Professor Gehad Auda, Professor of Political Science at the British University

in Egypt and former NDP member, Cairo, February 11 2014.

Personal Interview with Achraf Aouadi, Chair and Founder of I Watch, Tunisian Transparency and

Anti-Corruption NGO, Tunis, January 7, 2015.

Personal Interview with Anis Samali, Project Chief Mourakiboun, Tunisian Election Monitoring NGO,

Tunis, January 7, 2015.

Personal Interview with Selim Ben Yedder, CEO of Cynapsys Tunisia, Tunis, January 7, 2015.

Personal Interview with Youssef Cherif, Political Analyst, The Cherif Consultancy Company, Tunis,

January 7, 2015.

Personal Interview with Amine Ghali, Program Director, The Kawabiki Transition Centre, Tunis,

January 8, 2015.

Personal Interview with Amna Guallali, Human Rights Watch Tunisia, Tunis, January 8, 2015.

36

Personal Interview with Kamel Labidi, Journalist and Chairman of the Commission for Information

and Communication Reform, Tunis, January 8, 2015.

37