eli franco (ed)-yogic perception, meditation and altered states of consciouness

YOGIC PERCEPTION, MEDITATION AND ALTERED STATESOF CONSCIOUSNESS

EDITED BY ELI FRANCOIn collaboration with Dagmar Eigner

ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTENPHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE

SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 794. BAND

BEITRÄGE ZUR KULTUR- UND GEISTESGESCHICHTE ASIENS

NR. 65

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ÖSTERREICHISCHE AKADEMIE DER WISSENSCHAFTENPHILOSOPHISCH-HISTORISCHE KLASSE

SITZUNGSBERICHTE, 794. BAND

Yogic Perception, Meditation and AlteredStates of Consciouness

Edited by Eli FrancoIn collaboration with Dagmar Eigner

Vorgelegt von w. M. ERNST STEINKELLNERin der Sitzung am 13. März 2009

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data.A Catalogue record of this book is available from the British Library.

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Contents

Eli FrancoIntroduction ................................................................................ 1

Part I: Yogic Perception in the South Asianand Tibetan Traditions

Larry McCrea�Just Like Us, Just Like Now�: The Tactical Implicationsof the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception ...................... 55

John TaberYoga and our Epistemic Predicament ...................................... 71

Eli FrancoMeditation and Metaphysics: On their Mutual Relationshipin South Asian Buddhism ........................................................ 93

Anne MacDonaldKnowing Nothing: Candrakīrti and Yogic Perception .......... 133

Vincent EltschingerOn the Career and the Cognition of Yogins ........................... 169

Dorji WangchukA Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validityof Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism ............................... 215

Orna AlmogiThe Materiality and Immanence of Gnosisin Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources ..................................... 241

Philipp André MaasThe So-called Yoga of Suppressionin the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra ................................................... 263

vi

Marcus SchmückerYogic Perception According to the LaterTradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta .................................. 283

Marion RastelliPerceiving God and Becoming Like Him:Yogic Perception and Its Implicationsin the Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra ................................. 299

Part II: Meditation and Altered States of Consciousnessfrom an Interdisciplinary Perspective

Karl BaierMeditation and Contemplationin High to Late Medieval Europe .......................................... 321

Diana RiboliShamans and Transformationin Nepal and Peninsular Malaysia ......................................... 347

Dagmar EignerTransformation of Consciousnessthrough Suffering, Devotion, and Meditation ........................ 369

John R. BakerPsychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness:Insights from the Biocultural Perspective .............................. 389

Shulamith KreitlerAltered States of Consciousnessas Structural Variations of the Cognitive System .................. 407

Renaud van QuekelbergheMindfulness and Psychotherapy:The Revival of Indian Meditative Traditions withinModern Psychology, Psychotherapy, and Medicine .............. 435

ONTENTSC

vii

Michael DelMonteEmpty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses:A De-constructive Path to Inner Peace .................................. 449

Contributors ................................................................................... 481

O N T E N T SC

Dieses eBook wurde von der Plattform libreka! für Gregory Zwahlen mit der Transaktion-ID 1072965 erstellt.

E L I F R A N C O

Introduction1

The present volume has its origin in a research project funded by theAustrian Science Fund (FWF) from 2002 to 2004 (Project Nr. P14861)on the concept of para- and supra-normal perception in the Buddhistepistemological tradition. The project was conceived as part of the vastproject �The epistemological-logical tradition in India and Tibet,� initi-ated by Ernst Steinkellner and directed by him for more than twentyyears. The topic of para- and supra-normal perception, or extrasensoryperception, constitutes a hitherto neglected theme in the study of Bud-dhist philosophy of religion, despite its considerable importance inas-much as it concerns the very basis and foundation of the Buddhist reli-gious tradition, namely, the core insights of the historical Buddha.2 Inthe classical period of Buddhist philosophy, these insights were classi-fied and interpreted by the Buddhist tradition as examples of yogic per-ception. It is this notion of yogic perception, its theoretical conceptionsand presuppositions, the arguments for and against it, its cultural andreligious varieties, and its epistemological implications that form thecentral topic of the ongoing project and, to a large extent, of this vol-ume.

1 I would like to thank Prof. Dagmar Eigner for co-organizing the conference that wasthe starting point for this volume, especially for helping shape its interdisciplinarycharacter, as seen in the chapters on psychology and shamanism in this volume'ssecond half. I am also indebted to Anne MacDonald and Philipp Maas, who kindlyread the introduction and made pertinent and very helpful remarks.

2 This statement is not meant to express a position in the ongoing debate about thehistoricity of the Buddha and information about him found in the Buddhist texts.Paradoxical as it may sound, the more we know about the Buddhist canons, the lesswe know about the Buddha as a historical person. Rather the statement concerns theway the Buddha was (and still is) perceived by the Buddhist tradition and how theBuddhist tradition argued for the reliability of the teachings that are attributed to theBuddha.

2 ELI FRANCO

The belief in meditation3 as a source for extrasensory percep-tion seems to have always been present in South Asian civilization.Some scholars trace the ideals of asceticism and the practice of yoga allthe way back to the Indus Valley Civilization. Needless to say, in viewof the absence of probative evidence, this must remain a matter of opin-ion and speculation.4 However, clear references to meditation can al-ready be found in the late Vedic literature, for instance, in the MuṇḍakaUpaniṣad, which states that the Self, or soul, cannot be apprehended byordinary sensory means. Muṇḍaka 3.1.8 declares that the Self can beperceived neither by means of the eye (or better, by the faculty of sight),nor by speech, nor by other sense faculties (deva), nor by austerities(tapas), nor by ritual action (karman). Rather, the partless Self is seenby the meditating man5 when he (or his mind) has become pure throughthe lucidity of his knowledge.6

While in the initial historical stages the practice of meditationmay have developed within the context of ritual and world-affirmingvalues, it increasingly came to be associated with the śramaṇa milieu.The word śramaṇa is derived from the root śram, meaning �to strive, tomake an effort,� or more specifically �to perform austerities.� Accord-ingly, the word śramaṇa refers to an ascetic or religious mendicant ingeneral. The expression �śramaṇa milieu� or �śramaṇa movement�

3 The term �meditation� is used in a wide variety of ways. I follow David Fontana,who suggests that the common features among the various forms and traditions ofmeditation may be reduced to three: concentration, tranquility and insight; seeDavid Fontana, �Meditation.� In: Max Velmans and Susan Schneider (eds.), TheBlackwell Companion to Consciousness. Oxford 2007: 154-162, at p. 154. AntoineLutz et al., however, explicitly reject any attempt to define meditation in general asinvolving unverifiable hypotheses and trivializing diverse practices; see AntoineLutz et al., �Meditation and the Neuroscience of Consciousness: an Introduction.�In: Philip David Zelazo et al. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness.Cambridge 2007: 499-551, on p. 500.

4 It is notable that unlike the case of the practice of austerities (tapas and similarterms) there are no clear correspondences to yoga and meditative practice in otherancient Indo-European cultures. However, even if the practice of yoga and medita-tion are genuine South Asian developments, it is not necessarily the case that theyare related to the Indus Valley Civilization.

5 The masculine form is used here; it is clear that the Upaniṣadic authors were notthinking, as a rule, of women gaining access to this privileged knowledge.

6 See Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upaniṣads. New York 1998: 450: na cakṣuṣā gṛhya-te, nāpi vācā, nānyair devais tapasā karmaṇā vā / jñānaprasādena viśuddhasattvaṃtatas tu taṃ paśyate niṣkalaṃ dhyāyamānaḥ //.

INTRODUCTION 3

refers to ascetics living, mostly celibately, on the fringes of or com-pletely outside society, some of them loosely associated in smallgroups, others more tightly organized into religious orders. Many reli-gious movements emerged from the śramaṇa milieu, not the least Bud-dhism and Jainism, as well as innumerable religio-philosophical move-ments and sects that did not survive to the present day or did not assumea dominant role.

The śramaṇa milieu had a profound influence on South Asiancivilization as a whole, spreading its characteristic values of world ne-gation, world renunciation and liberation from rebirth far beyond theascetic circles and into the mainstream of society, especially its brah-manic elite. The most typical and fundamental concepts of Indian reli-gious philosophy originated in this ascetic milieu or were propagated byit: the view that the world is governed by a process of rebirth (saṃsāra)and is fundamentally frustrating and painful; the tenet that moral actions(karman) determine the form of rebirth; the idea that escape or libera-tion (nirvāṇa, mokṣa and similar expressions) from rebirth is the ulti-mate ideal and highest good for living beings; the tenet that liberation isattainable by cognitive means, namely, by means of a special insight;the belief that such insight is only possible when one renounces allworldly ties (wealth or material possessions, family, etc.); the practiceof �non-violence� (ahiṃsā) and various forms of austerities (tapas) asthe means for gaining control over the sense faculties and desires (kāmaand similar expressions), to mention the most conspicuous notions. Ofcourse, these tenets and ideals are blended in various manners. Bud-dhism, for instance, emphasizes the elimination of desires at the ex-pense of the obliteration of karma.7 In Jainism it is the other wayaround.8 With the notable exceptions of Mīmāṃsā orthodoxy9 and mate-rialistic-skeptic heterodoxy,10 Indian religious philosophy has been writ-

7 Note that karma is not mentioned in the four noble truths of Buddhism; it is also notincluded in the twelve members of dependent origination, although later Buddhistinterpreters claim that it is included in saṃskāra (�volitional impulses�).

8 Next to these two dominating models of liberation, namely through the eradicationof desires or of karma, one can add for the later period, with its spread of theisticmovements, the notion of liberation through devotion to God and by divine grace.On yogic perception in the Vaiṣṇava tradition, see the papers by Marcus Schmückerand Marion Rastelli in this volume.

9 See the contributions by Lawrence McCrea and John Taber in this volume.10 See Eli Franco, Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. Repr. Delhi 1994.

4 ELI FRANCO

ten for the most part from the point of view of the renouncer or in ac-ceptance of the values of the renouncer, even though the authors of phi-losophical works themselves were not always renouncers. Religio-philosophical works, such as the Bhagavadgītā, that repudiate renuncia-tion and propagate the life of action within society are the exceptionrather than the rule.

What is common to most of the ascetic movements is the be-lief that liberation can be attained through knowledge, through a fun-damental extrasensory insight into the ultimate nature of reality, whichis sometimes even equated with omniscience (sarvajñatva).11 Theoreti-cally one can discern two models regarding the attainment of this in-sight. Either the capacity for such extrasensory perception is innate tothe soul or the mind, and can be automatically attained by removal ofthe obstacles (impurities, karma) that prevent the soul or the mind fromexercising its innate cognitive capacity, or this capacity for the liberat-ing insight, or even omniscience, is not inherent in the soul or mind, butcan be attained by means of spiritual cultivation and refinement. In gen-eral, the former model seems to be predominant in South Asian relig-ions. A typical example is the Jaina theory that knowledge or cognition(jñāna) is the innate nature (svabhāva) of the soul and that the soul will,under the proper conditions, cognize everything that is knowable(sarvaṃ jñeyam).12 As Jaini puts it, �[t]he amount of karma destroyedcorrelates directly with the gain in purity of the soul and increase in therange of knowledge. Therefore, a total destruction of the forces ofkarma, together with the causes of their accumulation, must inevitablyresult in perfect purity, which would automatically usher in the state of

11 The logical outcome of this belief is that the ultimate cause of bondage to this worldis ignorance or error. This is especially emphasized in Sāṃkhya�Yoga, Vedānta andBuddhism.

12 Everything that is knowable means the infinite number of souls (jīva), the infinitelyinfinite (anantānanta) amount of matter (pudgala), the principle of motion (dharma)and rest (adharma), space (ākāśa), time (kāla) and the infinite number of transfor-mations (paryāya) through which they all pass. See Padmanabh Jaini, �On Sarva-jñatva (Omniscience) of Mahāvīra and the Buddha.� In: Collected Papers on Bud-dhist Studies. Ed. Padmanabh Jaini. Repr. Delhi 2001: 97-123, on p. 101.


INTRODUCTION 5

�omniscience.��13 Consequently, according to the Jainas every liberatedsoul is omniscient.14

A similar belief can be encountered in Canonical Buddhism.Here we find the simile of gold ore and the mind. Gold ore is defiledwith iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver, but when it is purified it shineswith its natural luster. Similarly, �when the mind is emancipated fromthe five defilements, it becomes supple, pliant, lustrous, firm, and be-comes rightly concentrated for the destruction of the defiling im-pulses.�15 Another simile compares cognition to a pure crystal whichtakes on the color of an object touching it; in the same manner cognitionis defiled by desire, etc. Thus, the defilements are considered to be onlyadventitious to cognition, while its true nature is luminous.

However, this view was rejected by some of the major schoolsof Conservative Buddhism, notably the Theravāda and the Sarvāsti-vāda.16 According to them, cognition is not naturally or originally pure,for it is defiled by passion and karma. If an originally pure and lumi-nous cognition could be tainted by adventitious defilements, one mightalso assume that defilements could become pure by the association withpure cognition. Thus, in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda it is assumed thatwhen the connection with desires has been severed, an impure cognitionceases and gives rise to a new cognition that is free from obstacles.17

Even if the mind is not luminous and pure by nature, it neverthe-less has been considered to have a latent capacity for paranormal per-ception. This capacity is cultivated in a negative way, not directly byincreasing the faculty of perceiving, but by eliminating the obstacles to

13 See Jaini, ibid., p. 102.14 Buddhists, on the other hand, often distinguished between the perfect enlightenment

of the Buddha, which was also equated with omniscience, and the lesser enlighten-ment of the Arhat, the disciple who differs from the Buddha inasmuch as he/she canreach enlightenment only with the help of the Buddha or the Buddha�s teachings. Ofcourse, this lesser enlightenment also consists in an extrasensory perception.

15 Aṅguttara Nikāya III 16-17, quoted in K.N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowledge. London 1963: 423.

16 See Étienne Lamotte, L'Enseignement de Vimalakīrti : Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. Louvain1962: 53; André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule. Paris 1955: 67-68, no. 44.

17 See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, L�Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Paris/Louvain1923-1931. Vol. 6: 288.

6 ELI FRANCO

paranormal perception.18 The five obstacles (pañca-nivaraṇa) are cov-etousness (abhijjhā), ill-will (vyāpāda), sloth and torpor (thina-middha),restlessness and worry (uddhacca-kukkucca), and skeptical doubt(vicikicchā). A mind that has become free from these obstacles developsfurther by means of practice of tranquility (śamatha-bhāvanā) and con-centration.

The attainment of extrasensory perception is usually associatedwith dhyāna (Pali: jhāna) meditation.19 While dwelling in the state ofthe fourth dhyāna one attains what is usually termed abhiññā (Sanskrit:abhijñā), an early and common Pali term that is the closest equivalent to�extrasensory perception.� Abhiññā is usually said to have six compo-nents:20 (1) the knowledge of magical powers (such as making the earthshake, multiplying oneself, passing through walls, flying, diving intothe earth as if it were water, walking on water, touching the sun and themoon with one�s hand, etc.), (2) clairaudience (�divine sense of hear-ing�), (3) telepathy or the knowledge of other minds, (4) recollection ofprevious lives, (5) clairvoyance (�divine sense of sight�), and (6)knowledge of the destruction of the defilements.21

These six capacities have close equivalents in the PātañjalaYoga tradition.22 A substantial number of aphorisms in the Yogasūtra

18 An analogy to this type of indirect approach may be found in the Buddhist path; inthis context it is not required that one knows what the Self is, but rather that the em-pirical constituents of a person are not the Self.

19 For a brief description, see my contribution to this volume.20 For a classical study on this topic, based mainly on the Pali canon, see Sigurd

Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhiññā. Eine Studie über die klassischen Wunder des Yoga.Uppsala 1935. For a useful general survey, see Étienne Lamotte, Le traité de lagrande vertu de sagesse de Nāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) avec une étudesur la Vacuité. Vol. IV. Louvain 1976: 1813-1817. See also the first section of AnneMacDonald�s paper in this volume.

21 To these six, Jayatilleke (ibid. 439-441) adds another four: another type of telepathicknowledge and the threefold knowledge (tisso vijjā) attained in enlightenment. Thehistorical relation between the abhiññās and the threefold knowledge is not entirelyclear. It seems that the latter are included in or elaborated into the former. However,the first five abhiññās are considered to be mundane, that is, attainable also by non-Buddhist yogis.

22 I distinguish here between yoga and Yoga: yoga is a technique of gaining controlover the body, senses and mind in order to attain a liberating insight. It is a tech-nique or a method and as such is not connected to any philosophy or religion in par-ticular; thus we have Buddhist yoga, Jaina yoga, Vedānta yoga, and so on; Yoga(capitalized), on the other hand, is used here as the name of a particular philosophi-

INTRODUCTION 7

(hereafter YS) deal with the supranormal attainments or perfections(siddhi) of the yogi who has reached an advanced state of meditation.Among these attainments�which have been a cause of great embar-rassment to Yoga scholars and practitioners alike23�one also finds spe-cial forms of knowledge, such as the recollection of past lives, by con-centrating on traces left by past experience in these lives (YS 3.18),knowledge of other minds (YS 3.19), knowledge of the time of one�sown death and that of others (YS 3.22), knowledge of subtle and con-cealed objects (YS 3.25), knowledge of remote cosmic regions, such asthe world of Brahma and Prajāpati, by meditating on the sun, andknowledge of the arrangement and movement of the stars by meditatingon the moon and the pole star, respectively (YS 3.26-27), knowledge ofone�s body by concentrating on the navel (YS 3.29), as well as super-natural sight, hearing, smelling, etc. (YS 3.36). However, yogis do notonly attain such extraordinary forms of knowledge, but also miraculouspowers such as the ability to become invisible (YS 3.21) or strong likean elephant (YS 3.24), to fly through the air (YS 3.42), to become assmall as an atom, to levitate, to become as large as a mountain or a city,to stretch one�s body to the point of being able to touch the moon withone�s finger tips, to dive into the earth as if it were water, to controlmaterial things by causing them to be produced and destroyed, or byrearranging their parts, and to fulfill one�s wishes (YS 3.45 and com-mentaries thereon).

The similarity between the siddhis of Yoga and the iddhis andabhiññās of Conservative Buddhism is not the only point of resem-

cal tradition, closely affiliated with Sāṃkhya, whose foundational text is the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali; thus one also refers to it as Pātañjala Yoga. On this tradition,though not specifically on the siddhis, see Philipp Maas� contribution to this vol-ume.

23 On the embarrassed reactions to the descriptions of the siddhis by modern scholars,see Yohanan Grinshpon, Silence Unheard: Deathly Otherness in Pātañjala-yoga.Albany 2002: 32-35. It is indeed surprising how often the siddhis are only cursorilymentioned and neither enumerated nor described (not even by Grinshpon himself orby Mircea Eliade in his voluminous Yoga, Immortality and Freedom); for an excep-tion, see Alain Danielou, Yoga. The Method of Re-Integration. Repr. London 1973:149-157. Danielou lists and describes forty-six attainments: eight physical attain-ments, thirty subsidiary attainments and eight spiritual attainments. Critical andskeptical responses to claims of yogic attainments, especially to claims of extraordi-nary knowledge, were also voiced from within the South Asian tradition. The twocontributions by McCrea and Taber in this volume reproduce these voices well.

8 ELI FRANCO

blance between the two traditions. It is probably not generally wellknown to what extent Buddhist scholasticism, especially of the Sarvās-tivāda School, had a decisive influence on the author(s) of the Yogasū-tra. A long list of similarities between the sūtras and various Buddhistdoctrines was compiled by Louis de La Vallée Poussin.24 It suffices tomention a few of them: the four types of concentration (samādhi),which correspond to the four levels of dhyāna (see YS 1.17); the defini-tion of God (īśvara) in YS 1.25 as the one in which the seed of omnis-cience reaches the highest degree (niratiśayaṃ sarvajñabījam), a defini-tion that can only be understood in light of Buddhist Mahāyāna teach-ings (of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha); the four brahmavihāras in YS1.33; the threefold division of knowledge/wisdom (prajñā) into knowl-edge that �holds the truth� in contradistinction to knowledge whicharises from study (śruta) or reasoning (anumāna) in YS 1.48-49; theinterpretation of the doctrine of karma (YS 2.12-13, 31, 34, 4.7); thedivision of suffering into three kinds in YS 2.15 (pariṇāma-tāpa-saṃskāra-duḥkha), which is clearly of Buddhist origin; the theory of theexistence of three times (past, present and future) in YS 3.13 and 4.12,which is a reflection of the corresponding Sarvāstivāda theory; the doc-trine of knowledge of other minds (paracittajñāna) as knowing onlywhether the cognition of another person is good or bad, but withoutknowing the object of the cognition (YS 3.20-21); the four perfectionsof the body (kāyasampad YS 3.46); and, of course, the five types ofsiddhi (YS 4.1), which are either innate, produced by the use of herbs,by uttering magical syllables (mantra), from the practice of austerities(tapas), or through the practice of meditation/concentration (samādhi).

Such claims of extraordinary knowledge and supernatural bodilycapacities were presumably not made, at least for the most part, by thepersons to whom they are attributed, the Buddha,25 the Jina or other

24 See Louis de La Vallée Poussin, �Le Bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali.� Mé-langes chinois et bouddhiques 5 (1936�1937): 223-242. The direction of the influ-ence is not always clear, but for the most part one can assume a Buddhist influenceon Yoga; Maas dates the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra, which includes the sūtras as well asthe earliest commentary, to a time span reaching from 325 to 425 CE (see p. 268 be-low), a period in which Buddhism was philosophically dominant in South Asia. In-dividual sūtras, however, may be of considerably earlier date.

25 In canonical Buddhism the stance towards omniscience is ambiguous. The Buddhais reported to have said that actual omniscience, that is, knowing all things at once,is impossible; thus other religions, notably Jainism, are criticized on this account.

INTRODUCTION 9

accomplished yogis, but by their pious followers.26 They are primarilydue, I assume, to the natural propensity to aggrandize one�s teachers,and even more so, the mythical founder of one�s tradition. Yet the cru-cial question remains: Is meditation a suitable means for gaining knowl-edge, especially knowledge that is not attainable otherwise? Some areof the opinion that in India all philosophical theories arose directly orindirectly from meditative experiences. Sweeping formulations such as�In India philosophy is the rational interpretation of mystical experi-ence� (Constantin Regamey) are plainly absurd, but even more carefulformulations are highly problematic, as I argue in my paper in the pre-sent volume. One has to distinguish here between theory and practice:In theory, the Buddha, the Jina and many others, although certainly notall founders of traditions,27 gained their deep insights into the nature ofreality while absorbed in meditation, but in practice we see that also inIndia metaphysical theories were conceived and developed�is thisreally surprising?�by philosophers philosophizing. The same is true inthe case of the Tibetan tradition. As Dorji Wangchuk points out in hispaper in this volume, new philosophical theories in Tibet were mainlycreated in an attempt to resolve contradictions and inconsistenciesfound in the heterogeneous Buddhist scriptures.

For the traditional practicing yogis, such as the followers of theBuddha and the Jina, the question of gaining new knowledge throughmeditation usually does not arise, at least not theoretically. For themthere is nothing new to discover in the course of their meditation; theobjective of meditation is to gain deeper understanding of the truthshanded down by the tradition. The threefold sequence of study, reflec-tion and meditation that is prescribed for Buddhist practitioners, brieflydescribed by Vincent Eltschinger in this volume, means that one studies

However, potential omniscience, i.e., that there is no part of reality that one cannotgrasp, is admitted. See Jayatilleke [as in n. 15]: 203-204. After the second centuryCE, omniscience came to be regarded as an essential property of being a Buddha.On the various terms used to designate the omniscience of the Buddha with specialreference to the Yogācāra tradition, see Paul Griffiths, Omniscience in theMahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and its Commentaries. Indo-Iranian Journal 33 (1990): 85-120, especially pp. 88-89.

26 Grinshpon, ibid.: 60, however, suggests that the doctrine of siddhis may be based onnear-death experiences.

27 Notable exceptions are traditions like the Sāṃkhya, Yoga or Nyāya, which attributetheir beginnings to the original visions of certain Rishis.


10 ELI FRANCO

the teachings of the Buddha, reflects on them with rational means, andthen meditates on these same teachings. Similar procedures are wellknown in the Hindu traditions and are closely associated with Yoga andVedānta. Although it is assumed that the knowledge attained in medita-tion is deeper and more certain than the knowledge attained by rationalmeans, it is not really a different knowledge. Moreover, the teachingsprovide the structure and/or the basis for the interpretation of experi-ences in meditation. Accordingly, there is not much room for �new�experiences. Indeed, it would have been presumptuous for a traditionalyogi to claim that s/he had attained new knowledge. And in addition, ifa yogi would have claimed that he had discovered something new that isat odds with what was discovered by the founder of his tradition (theBuddha, etc.), he would have risked being ostracized as a heretic by hiscommunity.28

In other words, the traditional view about the results of medita-tion can be summarized with the phrase: You should not get out whatyou did not put in. What one gets out should conform, at least in itsbroad outlines, to previously established teachings. And this conceptionis hardly surprising in the context of a traditional society that believesthat perfect knowledge was already attained in the past and may onlyhave diminished in the present.

The perspective changes, of course, when one considers thegreat founders of traditions like Buddhism. By definition, a Buddha issomeone who reaches enlightenment by himself; unlike the later Bud-dhist disciples, a Buddha does not have another Buddha to guide him. Inhis case, meditation must impart new knowledge, be it only newly dis-covered long forgotten knowledge.29 Consequently, the Buddha�s claimto knowledge cannot be grounded in any tradition. Therefore, the ques-tion arises: Can the original insights of the meditating Buddha be veri-fied by independent means? We may be caught here in the Mīmāṃsādilemma, ably represented by McCrea and Taber in their contributionsbelow: If these insights cannot be verified, why should they be ac-

28 Accordingly, when defining yogic perception, the Buddhist philosophers limit thescope of such perception to the teachings of the Buddha; on this point, see my paperbelow p. 122.

29 According to the Buddhist tradition, there were an infinite number of Buddhas in thepast, each discovering the Buddhist teachings anew. Similar notions are found in theHindu tradition, for knowledge disappears partly or completely during cosmic disso-lution and has to be regained after each new creation.

INTRODUCTION 11

cepted? If they can be verified, we do not need them; whatever they tellus can be known from other sources.

From a modern perspective, most of us, I assume, would adoptthe position of the Mīmāṃsakas: Theories about the world gained frommeditative practice are either uncertain or superfluous. For most of us,the external world is whatever the natural sciences say it is.30 And if atheory realized in the course of meditation happens to agree with whatthey say, this is interesting and all the better, and if it does not, all theworse�for the theory, not for the natural sciences.

Incredulity towards the veracity of meditative visions was alsofelt within the Buddhist tradition. To repeat an example given byWangchuk in his contribution, how is one to make sense of statementsthat in just a single atom there exist Buddha fields corresponding innumber to the total number of atoms in the universe? The most elabo-rate attempt to establish the validity of the teaching of the Buddha wasundertaken by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660?) andhis followers. According to them, the teachings of the Buddha can bedivided into a main part and secondary parts; the main part, which isidentified as the four noble truths and the doctrine of Non-Self (anāt-man), is independently verifiable, in principle by anybody, by means ofperception and inference.31 Visions of the Buddha fields and other mira-cles32 would presumably have to be relegated to the secondary and non-essential parts of the Buddha�s teachings, be interpreted as only didacti-cally useful, or not be accepted at all as being a genuine part of theteaching. The fact that certain teachings are secondary does not implythat they are false, but only that they need not be independently estab-lished and defended against external criticism. Dharmakīrti did believein the possibility of extrasensory perception, but such perception, he

30 Or, in fact, after Popper and Kuhn not even that; physical theories are no longerconsidered to be �true,� but only �approximations� (that lead periodically to para-digmatic changes) to a reality, which can never be known.

31 There are an increasing number of studies on this topic; for a relatively recent dis-cussion, see John Dunne, Foundation of Dharmakīrti�s Philosophy. Somerville2004: 223-252.

32 On the complex and ambivalent stance towards miracles in Buddhism, see PhyllisGranoff, �The Ambiguity of Miracles. Buddhist Understandings of SupernaturalPower.� East and West 46 (1996): 79-96. For a remarkable study of miracles em-ployed by the Buddha to convert various beings, which combines Buddhist philol-ogy with art history, see Monika Zin, Mitleid und Wunderkraft. Wiesbaden 2006.

12 ELI FRANCO

thought, could only be utilized towards relatively minor aims such asthe neutralization of the poison of snakes, not towards soteriologicalaims.33 Although Dharmakīrti was arguably the most important Bud-dhist philosopher of South Asia, it is hard to say whether this opinionwas widely accepted in Buddhist circles. It was obviously formulated ina period when Buddhism was under pressure from powerful philosophi-cal criticism and suffering from dwindling political support.

Due to the encounter of Tibetan Buddhism with Western civili-zation in the second half of the 20th century, this Buddhist traditionseems to be slowly undergoing the process of coming to terms withnatural sciences that the Catholic Church has been going through duringthe last centuries.34 Certain statements of the Dalai Lama, at least whenaddressing a Western audience,35 indicate remarkable openness andreadiness to accept the world view of modern physics36 at the expenseof Buddhist cosmology.37 Similar processes are occurring in Theravāda

33 See Eltschinger, Dharmakīrti sur les mantra et la perception du supra-sensible.Vienna 2001: 109-114.

34 That this process is far from being completed is clear from recent debates on intelli-gent design.

35 See Thupten Jinpa, Science as an Ally or a Rival Philosophy? Tibetan BuddhistThinkers� Engagement with Modern Science. In: B. Allan Wallace (ed.), Buddhismand Science. New York 2003: 71-85, p. 79: �Unfortunately, so far no written workin Tibetan from the Dalai Lama has been published that articulates his views on thepotential areas of engagement between Buddhist thought and science.�

36 One of the main purposes of the �Mind and Life� conferences is to provide a �high-level tutorial for the Dalai Lama� in quantum mechanics. We are told, for instance,that (http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/news/3186) the �Dalai Lama did not havea problem with photons having both particle and wave-like properties, but was re-luctant to accept that individual quantum events are random. For example, he re-fused to accept that we cannot know which path a photon takes in a two-path quan-tum interference experiment.� It is also remarkable that the Dalai Lama is now re-portedly supporting the study of physics being part of the instruction at all Buddhistmonasteries. See also Arthur Zajonc (ed.), The New Physics and Cosmology. Dia-logues with the Dalai Lama. Oxford 2004.

37 See http://www.dalailama.com/page.163.htm: �I [viz., the Dalai Lama] have oftenremarked to my Buddhist colleagues that the empirically verified insights of moderncosmology and astronomy must compel us now to modify, or in some cases reject,many aspects of traditional cosmology as found in ancient Buddhist texts.� Further-more (ibid): �[I]n the Buddhist investigation of reality, at least in principle, empiri-cal evidence should triumph over scriptural authority, no matter how deeply vener-ated a scripture may be.� See also The Dalai Lama, The Way to Freedom. San Fran-cisco 1994: 73, quoted in Donald S. Lopez Jr., Prisoners of Shangri-La. Chicago

INTRODUCTION 13

Buddhism and in Japanese Buddhism, though in a less conspicuousmanner, for other Buddhist traditions lack a central authoritative figurelike the Dalai Lama. It is not difficult to notice that Buddhism (espe-cially, but not only Tibetan Buddhism) is repositioning itself as a ra-tional and empirical cognitive science, a science of the mind based onintrospection and meditation, supplemented by altruistic ethics. Cos-mology, if mentioned at all, is relegated to the background, and just asin Dharmakīrti�s argument, presented as unessential. Typical for thistrend is Matthieu Ricard, who has become one of the most prominentfigures representing Tibetan Buddhism in intercultural and interdisci-plinary dialogues. According to Ricard, Buddhism is different from allother religions because it does not require an act of faith, and it couldbetter be designated a science of the mind than a religion.38

A most extreme, almost belligerent form of this discourse, pe-culiar and displaying a surprising ignorance of the Buddhist tradition,

1999: 186: �The purpose of the Buddha coming to this world was not to measure thecircumference of the world and the distance between the earth and the moon, butrather to teach the Dharma, to liberate sentient beings, to relieve sentient beings oftheir sufferings.� Dharmakīrti�s statement (Pramāṇavārttika 2.33) that the Buddha�sabsolute knowledge of the number of insects on the earth is of no use to us has notlost its relevance.

38 See Wolf Singer, Matthieu Ricard, and Susanne Wasmuth, Hirnforschung undMeditation. Ein Dialog. Frankfurt am Main 2008:10: �[Buddhismus] � erfordertkeine Glaubensakte. Man könnte den Buddhismus vielmehr als eine Wissenschaftdes Geistes und einen Weg zur Transformation bezeichnen.� The rational and em-pirical image of Buddhism is clearly belied by studies of traditional Buddhist socie-ties; for just one example among many, see B.J. Terwiel, Monks and Magic. Bang-kok 1994.For a recent insightful and informative study (with an incongruously Maimonidiansubtitle) of the relationship between Buddhism and Western science in the last hun-dred and fifty years, see Donald S. Lopez Jr., Buddhism and Science. A Guide for thePerplexed. Chicago/London 2008. Lopez notes that in order to spread across Asia,Buddhism assimilated the Vedic gods, the Tibetan �protectors of the snowy peaks,�and the Japanese kami; he then raises the question: �In order for Buddhism to estab-lish itself in Europe and America, must the God of the West, the God of Science,also find its place in the Buddhist pantheon?� I believe that this is unlikely. Despitethe political correctness and mutual respect that accompany the numerous attemptsat rapprochement between Buddhism and science, defensive and apologetic under-tones are clearly discernable throughout, even in the eloquent discourses of someonelike Ricard. A more appropriate metaphor than the assimilation of the God of Sci-ence might be that of seamen caught in a shipwreck throwing overboard what is dis-pensable in order to safeguard the essential.

14 ELI FRANCO

has been propounded by B. Allan Wallace. Wallace, who attempts toapply the vocabulary of philosophy of science to Buddhism, claims thatBuddhism �posits testable hypotheses� about the nature of the mind andits relation to the physical environment, and that Buddhist theories�have allegedly been tested and experientially confirmed numeroustimes over the past twenty-five hundred years, by means of duplicativemeditative techniques.�39 Further, �Buddhist insights into the nature ofthe mind and consciousness are presented as genuine discoveries in thescientific sense of the term: they can be replicated by any competentresearcher with sufficient prior training.�40

The distinctions and characterizations put forward by Ricard,Wallace and others are historically doubtful, for Buddhism had neither ascientific character�certainly not in the sense of �science� when ap-plied to modern physics�nor was its scope limited to the mind. Bud-dhism had its own theories of matter in order to account for all elementsof existence (dharmas). Nevertheless such new interpretations of Bud-

39 See Wallace 2003 [as in n. 35]: 7. The alleged experiential confirmation of Buddhisttheories would be, in my opinion, closer to the experiential confirmation of witch-craft and divination (described in many ethnological studies such as of the Azandeby Edward Evans-Pritchard) than to a confirmation of an experiment in modernphysics or the cognitive sciences. In a similar vein, Wallace claims that �many Bud-dhist theories are obviously the expression of rational public discourse� (p. 5), buthis idea of rationality remains a mystery to me. Wallace is hostile to the academicstudy of Buddhism, whose scholars he describes as �scholars who spent their timereading other people�s books and writing their own books about other people�sbooks.� He considers their lack of contemplative experiences as introducing �a glar-ing bias into modern academic Buddhist scholarship� (p. 7). Most scholars of Bud-dhism, he says, take �an Orientalist approach� and the study of Buddhism in West-ern academia is labeled �commonly unscientific� (p. 7). With such a cavalier ap-proach, it is not entirely surprising that Wallace occasionally commits serious blun-ders such as mistaking �the attainment of cessation� (nirodhasamāpatti) for �a pri-mary goal of Buddhist meditation� (p. 7). In fact, this meditation is not a part of theBuddhist path to salvation and may be considered a meditative luxury.Wallace quotes approvingly (p. 4) from Richard King�s Orientalism and Religionand seems to subscribe to the tenet that �pure� and �authentic� Buddhism is locatedin the experiences, lives and actions of living Buddhists in Asia and not in Buddhisttexts, or as King calls them, �the edited manuscripts and translations carried out un-der the aegis of Western Orientalists.� Given that the vast majority of Buddhist tra-ditions have not survived to the present day (Bareau discusses more than thirty�sects� for Conservative Buddhism alone), this approach, if followed, would se-verely limit and impoverish the scope of Buddhist studies.

40 See Wallace 2003 [as in n. 35]: 8-9.


INTRODUCTION 15

dhism can be useful. Even though most scholars, myself included, arenot looking at meditation as a source of knowledge of the externalworld, it may certainly be a source of knowledge in areas where theenhancement of concentration and memory may tell us something newand significant about ourselves. If rebirth is possible, and there is a con-siderable body of evidence in favor of this hypothesis41�but then thesame can be said of miracles�meditation may perhaps be the means ofawakening recollections from past lives. The study of meditation itselfis not only crucial to the understanding of South Asian and Buddhistculture, but can also be employed in areas where introspection is calledfor, for instance in the study of the mind (as mind, and not as brain). Itis not surprising, therefore, that the academic fields where meditativetechniques have been studied and used best are psychology and psycho-therapy. This is demonstrated by the papers in this volume by MichaelM. DelMonte, Renaud van Quekelberghe and Shulamith Kreitler.

It became clear already in early stages of the project that yogicperception is an ideal topic for interdisciplinary study. The present vol-ume is the outcome of an attempt to initiate such a study, a study thatcenters on consciousness, body, mind and health, and that binds to-gether such disparate disciplines as Buddhist and Tibetan studies, reli-gious studies, philosophy and the history of philosophy, anthropologyand psychology.

One of the best available means of promoting cross-disciplinarystudies are interdisciplinary symposia. They offer the participants theoccasion to present the results of their research to a sympathetic andinterested audience of scholars who work on similar topics in other dis-ciplines; it creates a general framework for dialogue, and not of lesserimportance, lets scholars and scientists experience their limitations.After the initial difficulty of getting accustomed to new terminology,new sets of questions, and new approaches, which initially makes com-munication seem impossible, one slowly comes to the realization thatwhat other disciplines have to say is not only relevant, but greatly moti-

41 See Ian Stevenson, Cases of Reincarnation Type. 4 Vols. Charlottesville 1975-1983;European Cases of Reincarnation Type. Jefferson 2003; Satwant Pasricha, Claims ofReincarnation: An Empirical Study of Cases in India. Delhi 1990; Jim Tucker, LifeBefore Life: A Scientific Investigation of Children's Memories of Previous Lives.New York 2005.

16 ELI FRANCO

vating and inspiring. This, we hope, will also be the experience of thereader.

In the following, we present the program of a conference of thistype that was organized by Dagmar Eigner, Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek andmyself at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asiaof the Austrian Academy of Sciences in June 2006, and summarizethose papers given at this conference that constitute the body of thisvolume. Some of them are of course significantly longer, modified ver-sions of the talks that were presented.

PROGRAM

Tuesday, 27 June 2006

9:00 WelcomeErnst Steinkellner, Director, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual

History of Asia, Austrian Academy of Sciences

Opening addressEli Franco, Director, Institute for Indology and Central Asian Stud-

ies, University of Leipzig; Dagmar Eigner, Institute for the History ofMedicine, Medical University of Vienna

9:30 John Taber, University of New MexicoInfinity in All Directions

10:15 Lawrence McCrea, Harvard University�Just Like Us, Just Like Now�: The Tactical Implications of the

Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception

11:30 Orna Almogi, University of HamburgThe Physicality and Immanence of Gnosis in rDzogs-chen

12:15 Dorji Wangchuk, University of HamburgA Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity of Perception in Indo-

Tibetan Buddhism

INTRODUCTION 17

15:00 Vincent Eltschinger, Institute for the Cultural and IntellectualHistory of Asia

Dharmakīrti on the Career and Cognition of Yogins

15:45 Eli Franco, University of LeipzigMeditation and Metaphysics: On Their Correspondence and Mutual

Interaction in South Asian Buddhism

17:00 Anne MacDonald, University of ViennaSeeing in Not Seeing: The Madhyamaka Experience

Wednesday, 28 June 2006

9:30 Karl Baier, University of ViennaMeditation and Contemplation: Late Medieval to Early Modern

Europe

10:15 Marion Rastelli, Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual His-tory of Asia

Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him: Yogic Perception and ItsImplications in the Tradition of Pāñcarātra

11:30 Yohanan Grinshpon, The Hebrew University of JerusalemThe Serpent and the Void: Kundalini and Empty Consciousness in

Tantric Yoga

12:15 Elizabeth De Michelis, University of CambridgeWhat do Haṭhayogins Perceive? Dhyāna (meditation), samādhi (en-

stasy) and the Manipulation of Mind, Senses and Sense-organs (manas,citta, indriya) in Selected Classical and Modern haṭhayoga Texts

15:00 Philipp A. Maas, Institute for the Cultural and IntellectualHistory of Asia

Mental Processes, Direct Perception, and [Meditative] Concentration(samādhi / māpatti) in Classical Sāṃkhya Yoga

18 ELI FRANCO

15:45 Marcus Schmücker, Institute for the Cultural and IntellectualHistory of Asia

Between God�s Cognition and Normal Perception: Yogic PerceptionAccording to the Later Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta

17:00 Oded Maimon, Tel Aviv UniversityConsciousness Phases According to Experience with Eastern Phi-

losophies

Thursday, 29 June 2006

9:30 Dietrich Ebert, University of Düsseldorf and Universityof Leipzig

Physiological Correlatives of Dharana and Their Meaning

10:15 John Baker, Moorpark College, CaliforniaPsychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness: Some Biocultural Con-

siderations

11:30 Diana Riboli, Panteio University, AthensShamans and Transformation

14:00 Dagmar Eigner, Medical University of ViennaTransformation of Consciousness through Suffering, Devotion, and

Meditation

14:45 Shulamith Kreitler, Tel Aviv UniversityAltered States of Consciousness as Structural and Functional Varia-

tions of the Cognitive System

Friday, 30 June, 2006

9:30 Renaud van Quekelberghe, University of Koblenz-LandauMindfulness and Psychotherapy: The Revival of Indian Meditative

Traditions within Modern Psychology, Psychotherapy and Medicine

10:15 Urs Rüegg, University of Vienna

INTRODUCTION 19

Psychotherapy and Altered States of Consciousness: Which Scien-tific Concept is Helpful?

11:00 Günther Fleck, University of ViennaThe Consciousness Disciplines and Knowledge Production: An Epis-

temological Account

12:15 Michael M. DelMonte, St. Patrick�s Hospital, DublinEmpty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses: A De-constructive Path

to Inner Peace

15:00 Discussion

SUMMARIES

Part I: Yogic Perception in the South Asian and Tibetan Traditions

Of the above twenty-three lectures, seventeen could be collected in thepresent volume. The following brief summaries of the papers accompa-nied by short comments are designed to help the reader to navigatethrough the presented terrain. In Indian philosophical texts, there areoften two protagonists, an opponent and a proponent, with the opponentalways speaking first (so that the proponent can have the last word). Wewill follow this fine procedure here and begin with two papers that pre-sent some of the most powerful objections to and criticism of yogicperception that were articulated in the Indian tradition. The Mīmāṃsātradition is often labeled as the most orthodox of all Indian philosophi-cal traditions. Yet this tradition rejects with vehemence some of themost distinctive tenets that one associates with Hinduism, notably, theexistence of God,42 the cyclical dissolution and re-emergence of the

42 While the Mīmāṃsā does not reject the existence of deities who might play the roleof recipients in sacrifices, the existence of an omnipotent or omniscient God, likeŚiva or Viṣṇu, to whom the creation of the world, the composition of the Veda or adecisive influence on the human lot may be attributed, is vigorously rejected.


20 ELI FRANCO

cosmos, the ideal of liberation (mokṣa, nirvāṇa and similar expres-sions)43 and�what concerns us here�yogic perception.

In ��Just Like Us, Just Like Now�: The Tactical Implicationsof the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic Perception,� Larry McCrea showswhy the Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumārila (7th c. CE) considered thevery possibility of yogic perception a serious threat to the validity of theVedic tradition. He presents Kumārila�s arguments succinctly andclearly and explains the context in which they were raised. The mainconcern of the Mīmāṃsā is to demonstrate that the Vedas (�the oldestsacred texts of Hinduism�) are the only source for knowing dharma.44

Thus, it is not yogic perception as such, but its potential as a source forknowing the dharma that makes the Mīmāṃsakas fervently oppose it.

To begin with, even if a yogi such as the Buddha could indeedperceive truths that are beyond the range of perception of ordinary peo-ple, this would be useless for them. There is, as McCrea puts it, �anunbridgeable epistemic divide� (p. 58) between yogis and ordinary peo-ple. Thus an ordinary person can never know who is a genuine yogi andwho is a quack or a swindler. �It takes one to know one.� On the otherhand, if the statements of a yogi could be confirmed by ordinary means,they would be superfluous.45

At any given time, people as a rule lie. One cannot trust themtoday, and in the past they were equally unreliable. The constancy ofbehavior between past and present individuals, past and present socie-ties, is one of the most characteristic assumptions of Kumārila. Thesame consistency or uniformity in the perceptual capacity of ordinarypeople is assumed to have existed throughout the ages. It is clear thatpeople�s capacities can have quantitative differences: some people maybe able to see objects that are far away or very small, objects that an-

43 This human aim is absent in the early Mīmāṃsā texts, but was introduced in thosewritten after the 6th century CE.

44 Dharma is narrowly interpreted by the Mīmāṃsā as characterized by an injunctionto perform a sacrifice. It is a far cry from dharma referring to moral or meritoriousaction; see Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection. Albany 1991, especiallychapter 4: Vedic Apologetics, Ritual Killing, and the Foundation of Ethics.

45 This criticism is reminiscent of a famous argument against the validity of infer-ences: inferences are either not established or they prove what has already beenproved: sāmānye siddhasādhyatā, viśeṣe �nugamabhāvaḥ.

INTRODUCTION 21

other person cannot see, but there is no radical or qualitative differencebetween what all people see: colors are seen and not heard.46

A common move to substantiate the reliability of a person, beit a yogi like the Buddha or a God like Śiva, relies on his self-identity. Ifthe Buddha�s statements about matters that can be examined by ordi-nary people (say, about medicine and healing) are invariably confirmedto be true, one may trust his statements about other matters as well (forinstance, about karma and past lives). If the mantras revealed by Śivathat are applicable to everyday life function well (for instance, bringwealth to their user), one may assume that his other mantras functionequally well.

As Kumārila makes clear, an argument in this form is patentlyfalse. The fact that someone is reliable in area A does not imply that heis reliable in area B, especially when area B is beyond the reach of ordi-nary people. Would we accept metaphysical speculations about Godbecause they are put forth by a physicist who has been proven reliablein physics?

Kumārila also emphasizes the plurality of yogic visions andthe ensuing contradictions. If the cognition of our yogis contradicts thatof your yogis, whom shall we trust? In fact, no yogi can be trusted.Unless one possesses such knowledge oneself, one is unable to judgewhether another person knows things beyond the reach of the senses.Any other standard opens the way to frauds or even honest but delu-sional people claiming knowledge about extrasensory objects they donot possess.47

Probably in response to Kumārila, later Buddhist and Hinduwriters who attempted to establish religious authority put a strong em-phasis on the speaker�s motivation. It is not enough that one knows thetruth; one also has to have a positive motivation to communicate thattruth (this motivation is usually identified with compassion towardsliving beings and the ensuing wish to help them) and a lack of motiva-

46 Actually there are people who do hear colors, as anyone with synaesthesia (appar-ently one out of every thousand people) or anyone who has had a psychedelic ex-perience would know.

47 In the last part of McCrea�s paper, which I do not summarize here, he briefly pre-sents Kumārila�s positive arguments for the reliability and eternity of the Veda. Itwould be an interesting exercise to check whether the arguments about the impossi-bility of knowing whether a person is omniscient might not be applied to the impos-sibility of knowing that the Veda is eternal.

22 ELI FRANCO

tion to lie. Unlike Kumārila, who states that people usually lie, the Bud-dhist philosopher Dharmakīrti maintains that people tell the truth unlessthey have a motive for lying, and he further argues that the Buddha hasno such motive because he has nothing to gain from lying to us.48 Al-though the aspect of motivation and compassion of the speaker can befound prior to Kumārila in discussions about religious authority andreliability (e.g., in the Nyāyabhāṣya), this aspect does not seem to havebeen emphasized before his time.

However, even if one can be sure that the Buddha had no mo-tivation for lying to his disciples, it is possible that he was deludinghimself. Dharmakīrti counters this objection by maintaining that themajor part of the Buddha�s teaching is not about objects beyond thereach of the ordinary perception and inference, but is about objects thatare independently verifiable. So even if the Buddha were wrong aboutnon-empirical matters such as karma,49 this would hardly matter as longas he is verifiably right about the phenomenon of suffering, its cause,and the way to remove this cause. Similarly, he may or may not be liter-ally omniscient, but even if he isn�t, this hardly matters as long as heknows everything there is to know about how to stop suffering. AsDharmakīrti somewhat sarcastically puts it: we don�t care whether theBuddha knows the number of worms in the world.

John Taber�s paper, �Yoga and our Epistemic Predicament,�covers partly the same ground as McCrea�s, but it is wider in scope. Itbegins with the question whether yogic experience is at all possible andinvestigates the epistemic conditions that would allow one to answer thequestion affirmatively. What matters to Taber is not whether such ex-periences are subjectively possible, but whether they are true. In otherwords, whether there can be a means for new knowledge, especially of

48 See Pramāṇavārttika 2.145b: vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam. �He [The Buddha] does nottell a lie because [this would] be fruitless.� This verse is edited and translated inTilmann Vetter, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika. Vi-enna 1990: 52.

49 Although karma is one of the causes of rebirth, Dharmakīrti explicitly rejects thepossibility of eradicating karma in order to stop rebirth. As long as one lives, onecontinuously produces new karma and thus, the complete elimination of karma isnever possible. The only way to stop rebirth is to eliminate desire, as is stated in thefour noble truths.

INTRODUCTION 23

objects that are traditionally associated with yogic perception, such aspast and future objects,50 or indeed of all objects.

Historians of Buddhism and Indian philosophy, as well asscholars of religion, usually disregard the question of truth in manyfacets of their studies, not only with regard to yogic perception.51 Yogicperceptions, however, are important because the belief in them playedsuch an important role in various societies and cultures. It is for thisreason that Taber is not content with leaving the question of truth aside(p. 72):

�Surely it is of the utmost significance if a particular society orculture attributes value to, and invests considerable cultural energy andresources in, something that is, at basis, an illusion�just as it would beif a particular person were to build his life around a belief that is pat-ently false, say, a belief in the existence of some imaginary being. Wewould immediately suspect that some pathology is at work, distortingthat society�s collective perception of reality.�

Taber approaches the question of truth by examining a ques-tion that was debated over centuries in Classical India, the famous de-bate between the Mīmāṃsakas and the Buddhists (beginning in the 7th

century and lasting until Buddhism had practically disappeared from theSubcontinent around the 12th century).52 Interestingly, for the most partthe debate was not whether a particular person (such as the Buddha orthe Jina) had acquired the right knowledge about what ultimately mustbe done and avoided, but about the very possibility of a human beingacquiring such knowledge. A presupposition shared by all parties in thedebate was that if such knowledge is at all possible, it would be ac-quired by yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa), for that is the only type ofperception whose scope can go beyond the present. So who won thisdebate? Taber concentrates on the Proof of an Omniscient Person by the

50 Seeing past and future objects is counted by the Yogasūtra as one of the accom-plishments (siddhi), i.e. the supernatural powers that the true yogi possesses; seeYogasūtra 3.16.

51 The factoring out of the question of truth is not specific to Buddhist or Hindu stud-ies, but is typical for religious studies in general. See Johann Figl, �Wahrheit derReligionen. Ein Problem der neueren Religionswissenschaft und der Religionsphä-nomenologie.� In: Gerhard Oberhammer and Marcus Schmücker (eds.), Glaubens-gewissheit und Wahrheit in religiöser Tradition. Vienna 2008: 81-99.

52 The debate began in earnest with Kumārila in the 7th century and continued till the11th century in the writings of Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.

24 ELI FRANCO

Buddhist philosopher Ratnakīrti (ca. 990-1050), who represents the lastphase of Buddhist philosophy in South Asia.

Taber compares the attribution of yogic perception to the Bud-dha to the attribution of miracles to Jesus. In both cases the credibilityof the testimony must be weighed against that which speaks against it,e.g., witnesses being few, of doubtful character or having a vested inter-est in what they affirm. However, above all the credibility of the testi-mony has to be weighed against the improbability of the fact to which ittestifies (p. 77-78).

Can one show that yogic perception is not a miracle, that itdoes not violate the laws of nature? Yogic perception qua perceptionhas to have two qualities: it has to be free of conceptual construction (orbe vivid) and has to be non-erroneous. Concerning the first characteris-tic, it seems impossible to transform conceptual teachings like the fournoble truths into a vivid visual image, no matter how long one meditateson them. In establishing the first characteristic, Ratnakīrti explains thatone should not consider perception, as has been traditionally done, to bean awareness that is somehow related to the senses. Rather perception isnothing but an immediate awareness, and such awareness is not limitedto sense data.53

Yet even if we grant that long, intense and uninterrupted medi-tation causes objects of cognition to appear with such clarity or vivid-ness as if they stood before one�s eyes, the question of their veracityremains open. However, as far as I can see, Ratnakīrti does not elabo-rate on this issue, probably because he follows Dharmakīrti�s assump-tion that the Buddha�s main teaching and his reliability are provable byordinary means of knowledge. Only towards the very end of his treatisedoes he attempt to prove genuine omniscience, without, I suspect, beingentirely convinced of his own proof.

Taber concludes his investigation with the failure of the Bud-dhists to prove the possibility of omniscience. Of course, the impossibil-ity of omniscience remains equally improvable. This, however, is hardly

53 In this, Ratnakīrti follows his teacher Jñānaśrīmitra, who follows in turn an originaldevelopment by Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810). The latter identified perception withimmediate awareness (sākṣātkaraṇa) and consequently claimed that even inferencecan be perception; see Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana (ed.), Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam orVārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti�s Pra-māṇavārtikam). Patna, 1953: 111.20: tasmād anumānam api sarvākārasākṣātkara-ṇapravṛttaṃ pratyakṣam eva.


INTRODUCTION 25

surprising, for practically no philosophical tenet can be proved. Thequestion Taber raises next is crucial, namely, how to deal with the factthat yogic perceptions are widely, even cross-culturally, reported.Should one simply investigate such phenomena and put aside the ques-tion of their veracity? This is, in fact, the common practice in religiousstudies (as an academic discipline), no matter which culture or whichreligion forms the object of investigation. One may attempt to deter-mine what is actually being said, what impact it has on a given culture,what function it fulfils in society, and so on without asking whether it istrue, or even assuming it is untrue. But this is not the path Taber pro-poses to take. If societies and traditions are inherently healthy and ra-tional, they cannot be based on falsehoods or on the thin theoreticalpossibility that that yogic perception is not impossible. Yet we mustcontinue to collect data and keep our minds open, and we must be will-ing to consider yogic perception at its face value. For the time being,however, as long as our theory of nature cannot accommodate yogicperception, it will remain deeply problematic.

Eli Franco�s paper, �Meditation and Metaphysics,� has a dif-ferent concern altogether, but it may still belong to the pūrvapakṣa ofthis volume inasmuch as it challenges the role attributed to yogic per-ception in shaping Buddhist philosophy. The notion that Buddhist phi-losophy arose from meditation has been widespread among scholars ofIndian philosophy. Sweeping formulations of this idea, such as by Con-stantin Regamey or Edward Conze, are clearly wrong and need not befurther examined. However, even more careful and qualified formula-tions, such as that by Lambert Schmithausen, remain in the final analy-sis improvable and questionable. Schmithausen is, to the best of ourknowledge, the only scholar who has not just pronounced this idea, butwho has seriously attempted to prove it on the basis of rigorous philol-ogical analysis. Thus, his work deservedly forms the focus of the atten-tion here. Franco examines this hypothesis in some detail and providesthereby a bird�s-eye view of most if not all the important philosophicaltheories in South Asian Buddhism. He argues that the relation betweenmeditation and metaphysics in Buddhism cannot be reduced to a singlemodel. In the final analysis, one cannot avoid the conclusion that certainphilosophical theories (which are described in the paper) arose frommeditative experiences and certain others did not, and that the origin ofstill others cannot be determined, in which case it seems preferable to

26 ELI FRANCO

suspend judgment. This conclusion may seem trivial and obvious, but itgoes against the mainstream in Buddhist studies.

Anne MacDonald�s contribution, �Knowing Nothing: Can-drakīrti and Yogic Perception,� deals with the topic of yogic perceptionin the Madhyamaka tradition, one of the major schools of MahāyānaBuddhism that had a profound influence both on Indian and ChineseBuddhism and is alive in the Tibetan tradition until the present day.While focusing on the objectless meditation on emptiness (śūnyatā), shealso provides a succinct introduction to Madhyamaka philosophy ingeneral. Nāgārjuna (2nd-3rd c. CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka tra-dition, said practically nothing on meditation or yogic perception in hisMūlamadhyamakakārikās. His main concern there was to disprove theexistence of the elements of existence (dharma) as postulated in variousmetaphysical theories of Conservative Buddhism. To understand theMadhyamaka stance on yogic perception and related issues it is infor-mative to turn to other works by Nāgārjuna and to his influential com-mentator Candrakīrti (600-650 CE). MacDonald notes that the super-natural capacities of knowledge (abhijñā)54 are barely mentioned inCandrakīrti�s writings owing to their negligible soteriological role.Candrakīrti�s interest in supramundane knowledge lies in an insight intothe nature of reality that facilitates the break out of the �jail ofsaṃsāra.� This he equates not with an insight into the four noble truths,but into the emptiness or unreality of all things.

Thus, the questions arise: How can one escape from somethingthat is not real? And is nirvāṇa as unreal and as non-existent assaṃsāra? The Mādhyamikas reject the four possible views: that nirvāṇaexists, that it does not exist, that it both exists and does not exist, orneither. The thorough knowing (parijñā) of the non-existence of bothexistence and non-existence is, according to the Mādhyamikas, power-ful enough to release one from the bonds of saṃsāra. Candrakīrtiequates this knowing with non-perception of existence and non-existence: When the yogi remains without an apprehension of any of thethings accepted by others as existing or non-existing, the object of histhorough knowledge is different from and excludes all phenomenal enti-ties. The true nature of dependently originated phenomena, MacDonaldcontends (p. 145), should be understood as the �Mādhyamika�s onto-

54 See p. 6 above.

INTRODUCTION 27

logical nirvāṇa.� The knowing of this nature, sometimes referred to asknowing the �thusness� (tattva) of things, is the knowing without objectthat the yogi cultivates in the meditative state. Later Mādhyamikas suchas Kamalaśīla (740-795), who was heavily influenced by Dharmakīrtiand the epistemological tradition (discussed in Eltschinger�s paper inthis volume), interpreted this knowledge as cognition apprehendingnothing but itself (svasaṃvedana). However, this interpretation wouldnot have been acceptable to Candrakīrti.

In the course of a debate with a Realist opponent who claimsthat the object confers its form to consciousness, Candrakīrti points outthat consciousness of a non-existent object, such as the son of a barrenwoman, would have to conform to the non-existent form and be itselfnon-existent.55 When consciousness does not apprehend the image of anobject, it simply cannot arise. Equally impossible is the epistemologists�account of liberating insight being the culmination of meditation on thefour noble truths. According to them, at the beginning of meditation itsobject is conceptual, i.e., a universal, but in the course of meditation itgains in vividness till it becomes a particular.56 This assumption, Can-drakīrti maintains, is simply impossible, for a conceptual object cannever become a particular.57 Indeed, the epistemologists themselvesassume that the particular and the universal are mutually exclusive. Fur-ther, even if such a process were possible, cessation (nirodha) could notbe perceived because consciousness cannot arise without an objectivesupport (ālambana).

55 Candrakīrti seems to play here on two meanings of the word �form� (ākāra), whichcan be understood as an image or as the own nature of a thing. The same ambiguityis present in other terms meaning �form,� notably the term rūpa.

56 This process is compared in later times to someone so besotted with his lover that heperceives her in his mind with such vividness that it is as if she would be standing infront of his eyes. See also Franco, �Perceptions of Yogis. Some Epistemological andMetaphysical Considerations.� In: Proceedings of the 4th International DharmakīrtiConference (forthcoming).

57 It is indeed difficult to understand how an abstract and necessarily conceptualstatement such as �everything is impermanent� can become a particular object, nomatter how long and how intensely one meditates on it. This point was debated be-tween Buddhists and Naiyāyikas for centuries (as long as Buddhism remained aliveon the Subcontinent); on the last phase of this debate, see Taber�s paper in this vol-ume.

28 ELI FRANCO

But what are the implications of this stance? Does it mean thatultimate reality is pure nothingness and the ultimate realization that onecannot know anything? MacDonald contends that Candrakīrti�s view ismore sophisticated. For him the actual realization of the true nature ofall things is performed by an altogether different type of awarenesstermed �gnosis� (jñāna).58 Unlike normal awareness (vijñāna), gnosisdoes not have an object and perceives the inconceivable reality that wasalways there; it has a form (or nature) that transcends all manifoldness(sarvaprapañcātītarūpa). Candrakirti also states that the Buddhas abidein this objectless gnosis. In advancing this interpretation, MacDonaldgoes against the construal of Madhyamaka by North American scholarssuch as C.W. Huntington and Dan Arnold.

Vincent Eltschinger�s paper, �On the Career and the Cogni-tion of Yogins,� is a remarkable contribution towards the reconstructionof the religious philosophy of Dharmakīrti. It consists of two parts. Thefirst part sketches a systematic development of the meditating Buddhistmonk from the stage in which he is still an ordinary person, beset by afalse view of Self and Mine giving rise to desire, to the moment ofenlightenment and the ensuing liberation. Dharmakīrti follows the tradi-tional Buddhist scheme of three successive stages in understanding theBuddha�s teaching as epitomized by the four noble truths, these threestages being studying, reasoning and meditating.59 As soon as one at-tains a meditative vision of the four noble truths for the first time (dar-śanamārga), the yogi stops being �an ordinary person� and becomes anoble person (ārya). However, this vision can only remove the concep-tual error about the existence of a Self; the deeply-rooted, innate con-ception of the Self (sahajasatkāyadṛṣṭi) is far more difficult to eradicateand one has to repeat the meditative vision of the four noble truths invarious aspects again and again until this innate or instinctive concep-tion of Self, which is present even in lower animals that are unable toconceptualize, is uprooted.

According to the Yogācāra tradition, with which Dharmakīrtiis affiliated, living beings are divided into various �families� (gotra)

58 On various aspects of gnosis in the Tantric tradition, see Orna Almogi�s paper inthis volume.

59 A similar three-stage process of understanding can be found in Hinduism, and it isstill practiced, especially in the Vedānta tradition: studying (śravaṇa), reflecting(manana), and meditating (nididhyāsana). See also YS 1.48-49 referred to above.

INTRODUCTION 29

that determine the mode of liberation either as Hearers (i.e., disciples ofthe Buddha who reach enlightenment with the help of the Buddha), oras Buddhas-for-themselves (pratyeka-buddha, who reach enlightenmentby themselves, but do not help other living beings), or as Buddhas (whoreach enlightenment by themselves and help others to reach it). Whilethe path of the Hearers and the Pratyeka-Buddhas is relatively short, theBodhisattva, the person who has resolved to become a Buddha, has toprolong his stay in saṃsāra in order to acquire additional skills thatenable him to become a �teacher� for all living beings; he must elimi-nate imperfections of body, speech and mind, and become practicallyomniscient. The practice of the path ends in the so-called transformationof the basis (āśrayaparivṛtti), an expression that was first used for thechange of sex (from woman to man), but which came to designate theirreversible elimination of all defilements and their latent causes(�seeds�), this elimination characterizing the state of being Buddha.60

The second part of Eltschinger�s paper deals with the cognitionof a yogi in its epistemological dimension. Yoga is characterized as achariot pulled by two horses, tranquility of mind (śamatha) and dis-cernment (vipaśyanā).61 It carries one to an insight (prajñā) of the truenature of reality. Yogic perception, as every perception, must be reliableand free of conceptualization. The first characteristic does not seem tobe problematic for Dharmakīrti; the reliability of yogic perception isgrounded in the Buddhist scriptures, which are also established by inde-pendent means such as perception and inference. For instance, onemeditates on the four noble truths that are already known to be true be-fore the meditation begins.62 One may also meditate of course on a non-existent object such as an imaginary disintegrating corpse. In this casethe yogic cognition is simply not true (and therefore not perception�pratyakṣa) for the simple reason that its object has no correspondence in

60 See also Hidenori Sakuma, Die Āśrayaparivṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi.Stuttgart 1998.

61 See Louis de La Vallée Poussin: L�Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu. Vol. 8. Repr.Brussels, 1980: 131, n. 2.

62 This perspective changes radically from the 8th century onwards, due to the debateswith the Mīmāṃsā. From this point in time it is not an ordinary yogi, but the Bud-dha himself, the yogi par excellence, who is the focal point, and it is not the reliabil-ity of the Buddhist yogi who follows the Buddha�s teachings which is at stake, butthat of the Buddha, who cannot rely on a further Buddha to establish the truthfulnessof the Buddhist teachings.


30 ELI FRANCO

reality. Dharmakīrti�s main concern, however, is how a conceptual cog-nition can become non-conceptual. His criterion for the absence of con-ceptualization is the vividness of a cognition�when one sees an objectas if it were standing before one�s eyes. Dharmakīrti�s solution to thisproblem was not completely satisfactory, and later Buddhist philoso-phers (Kamalaśīla, Prajñākaragupta, Jñānaśrīmitra, Ratnakīrti) contin-ued to deal with it and suggest still other solutions.63

However, if yogic perception apprehends an object that was al-ready established by a means of knowledge (pramāṇa), how could it beitself a means of knowledge, for a means of knowledge must apprehenda new object, an object that was not perceived earlier? Dharmakīrti�sanswer would probably be that although the object was previously es-tablished by scripture and reasoning, it was not established as a non-conceptual object. Thus, the process of meditation is the reverse of theprocess of perceiving in everyday life. In everyday life, the cognitiveprocess begins with a non-conceptual perception of an object whichgives rise to a conceptual cognition. In meditation one begins with aconceptual object, and the meditation culminates in the conceptual con-struction being cast away. This cognitive process consists in destroyingignorance and other defilements of consciousness so that the cognitionmay shine again in its intrinsic luminous nature, with which it can ap-prehend reality as it truly is.64

Dorji Wangchuk�s contribution, �A Relativity Theory of thePurity and Validity of Perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism,� extendsour field of vision to Tibetan Buddhism, or better, Indo-Tibetan Bud-dhism, for the philosophical developments of the Tibetan scholars can-not be understood without their Indian background. Wangchuk notesthat one occasionally comes across philosophical theories and interpre-tations that are of purely Tibetan origin and most of the purely Tibetan

63 See also Taber�s paper in this volume.64 Or one could say that although the inferential cognition of the four noble truths

(attained at the second stage, between studying and meditation) is true, it does notmake one obtain its object, and thus it cannot be said to be non-belying (avisaṃ-vādin) in the usual sense of the term. A similar case might take place with inference.What happens when one infers fire and then goes to the place of the fire and sees it?Both cognitions are valid, both are connected to the same object, yet each cognitionis said have a new object. In fact they only cognize the same object from differentaspects and cannot have different efficient actions (arthakriyā), which is character-ized as attaining an object, for the same object cannot be obtained twice.

INTRODUCTION 31

philosophical theories seem to be the product of an endeavor to resolveand systematize conflicting ideas found in heterogeneous Indian Bud-dhist systems. This thus tallies well with my observation that meditativevisions have not played a crucial role in the development of philosophi-cal theories in South Asian Buddhism.

Wangchuk examines an intriguing tenet in the Buddhist theoryof knowledge, namely, that various types of living beings perceive oneand the same entity in different modes. For instance, what appears toordinary humans as clean water is perceived by so-called hungry ghosts(preta) as dirty and disgusting (sullied with blood and pus, etc.),65 by thegods as nectar, and by yogis as a goddess or a woman who is capable ofarousing samādhic ecstasy in them. The epistemological problem thatarises from this tenet is clear: If the same object is perceived differentlyby different living beings, whose perception is true? How can one thendistinguish between valid and invalid cognitions? Further, how can onesubstantiate yogic visions that seem downright impossible, as for in-stance the perception of innumerable Buddha fields in a single atom?Wouldn�t the acceptance of such visions lead to �ontological nihilism�?

The renowned rNying-ma scholar Mi-pham (1846�1912) sug-gested making a distinction between various kinds of means of knowl-edge, most importantly between pure and impure worldly means (kun tutha snyad pa�i tshad ma = sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa). The degree of thepurity of perception determines the degree of its correctness.66 The pu-rity of perception can be enhanced by meditation, but there is also adifference in the degree of purity of perception of those who do notmeditate at all. For instance, a human being perceives water as water,which is regarded as purer than the preta�s perception of it as pus, re-gardless of whether that human being and preta meditate or not. Mi-

65 This example first entered the philosophical discourse in Vasubandhu�s Viṃśatikā. Itis used by Vasubandhu to show that living beings (notably the pretas) can sufferfrom what may be called collective illusions due to similar karmic fruition. Vasu-bandhu, however, does not doubt the identity of water as an object in this example,but only attempts to prove that it does not exist outside the mind. As far as I know,the example is not further discussed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition fromthe perspective it obtained in Tibetan Buddhism, namely, that the identity of the ob-ject is doubtful.

66 According to this theory, the cognition of water by ordinary people would have tobe considered less true than the vision of the yogi who perceives the same substanceas a goddess.

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pham�s theory was inspired by Rong-zom-pa, a rNying-ma scholar ofthe 11th century, who suggested that reality is �mere appearance� (snangba tsam), behind which there is nothing. He also adduced a distinctionin validity between human and non-human and between yogic and non-yogic perceptions. Thus, the validity of perception depends on the pu-rity of perception, i.e., the purer the perception is, the more it agreeswith ultimate reality, which is the absolute purity. Wangchuk also dis-cusses briefly the Indian antecedents, especially in Madhyamakasources, of this theory, which he calls �the relativity theory of the purityand validity of perception.�

Meditation and yogic perception culminate in gnosis (jñāna,prajñā and similar expressions). The quasi-material aspects of this gno-sis form the subject matter of Orna Almogi�s paper, �The Materialityand Immanence of Gnosis in Some rNying-ma Tantric Sources.� Ac-cording to these sources, gnosis is immanent in the human body, moreprecisely, in the center of the heart. Before describing the �meta-physiological� aspects of gnosis, Almogi looks into the conception ofthe human body in Buddhism in general. As is well known, Buddhistsources, including already the Pali Canon, consider the human body tobe a collection of impure and revolting substances such as hair, nails,flesh, bones, bladder, liver, pus, blood, excrement, and the like. Yet thebody is also recognized as the basis for the human experience that en-ables one to tread the path of salvation.

The Tantric attitude to the body is generally more positive.The Tantric practitioners conceive the body as a microcosm, and it ismeditatively envisioned as the pure body of a deity; most importantly itis the abode of gnosis, the ultimate aim for all Buddhists. Although gno-sis is to be acquired by practice, it is often conceived of as inherent,latent and changeless. It abides in the body like a lamp in a pot that canshine only if the pot is broken. The Buddha-Embryo theory�the theorythat all living beings are potentially Buddhas and will eventually be-come Buddhas�is used as a foundation to substantiate the immanenceof gnosis in one�s body. The resemblance of this notion of gnosis to theBrahmanic concept of a permanent soul (ātman) is obvious,67 and therNying-ma scholars make a conscious effort to distinguish gnosis fromsuch a soul.

67 In fact, the Ratnagotravibhāga, the foundational text of the Tathāgatagarbha tradi-tion uses the terms ātman and paramātman in the exposition of the Buddha nature.

INTRODUCTION 33

The �meta-physiology� of gnosis involves channels, cakras,vital winds and seminal drops. Their divergent descriptions have beenconveniently juxtaposed by Almogi in the form of tables. Each channelhas its own color, a type of pure essence, and an essence-syllable thatcauses purification, phonic seeds that cause pollution, and birth causedby the pertinent phonic seeds and type of mind. For instance, the chan-nel of gnosis has a blue light, which is square in shape, the pure essenceof breath, the essence syllable hūṃ, and is inhabited by mental percep-tion. It is clear that although gnosis is not a material entity, one doesfind statements describing it in terms of light, color, shape and sound.However, these are merely meant as aids to confused living beings, whohave not recognized the permanent immanent gnosis within themselves.Nevertheless, it appears that these descriptions were sometimes takenliterally.

Almogi�s paper concludes the Buddhological section in thisvolume. Three contributions deal with yogic perception in the Hindutradition. Philipp André Maas discusses the so-called Yoga of suppres-sion as it appears in the first chapter of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra, i.e., theYogasūtra of Patañjali with its oldest commentary, the so-calledYogabhāṣya,68 a text that Maas has edited in an exemplary manner onthe basis of twenty-one printed editions and twenty-five manuscripts.His starting point is Oberhammer�s pioneering yet largely ignored studyStrukturen yogischer Meditation (Vienna 1977), which shows beyonddoubt that the Pātañjalayoga teaches four different kinds of medita-tions�not two, as is commonly assumed�which differ from each otherwith regard to their objects, structure and content. Maas� paper, how-ever, limits itself to the first two of these meditation types, for which hesuggests a new terminology. The common term for these types of medi-tations, which seems to have been coined by Frauwallner, is �Unter-drückungsyoga� or �Yoga of suppression.� This term, however, can bemisleading inasmuch as it evokes the common psychological meaningof �complete deletion of a reaction,� in contradistinction to �inhibition,�which refers to an inner impediment to activity that can be removed.�Suppression� is also used to refer to a voluntary suppression of an im-pulse for action. Obviously, none of these meanings is applicable toyogic meditation, nor is �suppression� as used by Indologists meant to

68 Yoga in this section is short for Pātañjala Yoga.

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convey these meanings, but rather to refer to the definition of yoga asthe elimination or stopping (�the shutdown� as Maas calls it) of all men-tal processes. Further, it is often said that the purpose of yoga is toeliminate cognition, but this statement has to be qualified insofar asyoga does not eliminate the Self (puruṣa), which is defined as pure con-sciousness. What yoga aims at is the elimination of all objects of con-sciousness.

Maas also notes that the �Yoga of suppression� consists, in fact,of two different types of meditation; he suggests calling the first type�non-theistic yogic concentration� and the second �theistic yogic con-centration.� In the former type, the path leading to the cessation of men-tal activities is the practice of gradual withdrawal or detachment, in afirst stage from everyday material objects, in a second stage from matteras such, and it culminates in self-perception of the Self, which leads toliberation from the cycle of rebirths. The theistic concentration is simi-lar to the non-theistic in many respects�most importantly it also cul-minates in self-perception of the Self�but differs from it inasmuch asin the initial stages it has God (īśvara) as its object.

It is remarkable that in Yoga the concept of God lacks any sec-tarian or mythological elements. Moreover, there is no qualitative dif-ference between God and any other liberated soul, except that the latterbecame liberated at a certain point in time, whereas God has alwaysbeen liberated. Nor does God really intervene in the realm of matter,and his effectiveness within the world is rather limited. At the begin-ning of every re-creation of the world he �assumes� a mental capacity�doesn�t this imply that he must leave his state of liberation?�in order toteach a seer and thus start a succession of teachers and disciples. Hispresumed motivation to do this, just as in the case of the Buddha, iscompassion.

The concept of God being intrinsically identical to all othersouls (or selves) can also be found in the tradition of Viśiṣṭādvaita Ve-dānta, a Vedānta school that is strongly affiliated with the Vaiṣṇavadevotional movement, examined here by Marcus Schmücker in �YogicPerception According to the Later Tradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Ve-dānta.� This tradition is particularly interesting in its contrast to theBuddhist tradition. To begin with, yogic perception is hardly discussedin the writings of Rāmānuja (traditionally dated 1017�1137), the found-ing father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita. He accepts the possibility of its exis-tence, but does not consider it capable of perceiving absolute reality


INTRODUCTION 35

(brahman) (see n. 3 in the paper). However, Rāmānuja�s follower,Meghanādārisūri (13th century), deals with this topic in a more extensivemanner. Unlike the Buddhists, who go to a great deal of trouble toprove that yogic perception is free of any conceptual construction (seethe papers by Taber, Franco and Eltschinger in this volume),69 Megha-nādārisūri assumes that all yogic perceptions are conceptual for thesimple reason that they do not depend on the senses. This aspect ofyogic perception puts it on par with the cognition of God (identifiedwith Viṣṇu), or the highest Self (paramātman), as well as of the liber-ated souls�both those that have always been liberated (nityamukta) andthose that became liberated at a certain point in time. The differencebetween the cognition of a yogi, who is still bound to saṃsāra, and thecognition of the liberated souls (God included) is that the latter haveonly conceptual cognitions. Of course the cognition of God is far largerin scope�it includes everything�than that of the yogi, but inasmuch asboth are independent of the senses, both are conceptually constructed(savikalpaka). Furthermore, while the Buddhists consider every concep-tualization to be false and claim that only non-conceptual cognitions area true reflection of reality, Meghanādārisūri argues that an absolute cor-respondence between perception and reality is only possible in a con-ceptual perception. A non-conceptual perception, which depends on thesenses and has only a momentary existence, is unable to perceive allproperties of a given object. Especially the recurrent properties, the so-called common properties or universals (jāti), which are identified withthe structure (saṃsthāna) of things, cannot be perceived as such whenan object is seen for the first time. It is only in the second and subse-quent cognitions that the recurrence of a universal can be perceived. Yetthe common point between the Buddhist and the Viśiṣṭādvaita traditionsis that the highest cognition, be it the omniscience of God or of theBuddha, is a subspecies of yogic perception.

69 An exception, however, should be noted for the Buddhist Tantric work Tattvasiddhiattributed to Śāntarakṣita; see Ernst Steinkellner, �Is the Ultimate Cognition of theYogin Conceptual or Non-conceptual? Part 2: Introducing the Problem in the FinalSection of the Tantristic Tattvasiddhi with Analysis and Translation.� In: EsotericBuddhist Studies: Identity in Diversity. Proceedings of the International Conferenceon Esoteric Buddhist Studies, Koyasan University, 5 Sept.�8 Sept. 2006. Ed. by theExecutive Committee, ICEBS. Koyasan 2008: 291-306. The possibility of Vedānticinfluence on the doctrine of the Tattvasiddhi still needs to be explored.

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The role of yogic perception in another Vaiṣṇava devotionaltradition, the Pañcarātra, is examined in Marion Rastelli�s contribution,�Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him: Yogic Perception and ItsImplications in the Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra.� The earliest evi-dence of this tradition dates back to the pre-Christian era, and it is stillpresent today in the Vaiṣṇava tradition in South India. Unlike the otherBuddhist and Hindu traditions presented so far, the Pañcarātra offers itsfollowers not only a means of pursuing liberation from rebirth, but alsoallows the pursuit of worldly pleasures such as wealth, offspring, thefulfillment of sexual desires, death of enemies and a great number ofsupernatural powers. For the most part, these aims are to be achieved byritual means into which yogic practices are integrated, but yoga is alsopracticed independently. There are two kinds of yogic practices: theYoga of Eight Members (aṣṭāṅgayoga), which is practically identical tothe practice described in Pātañjala Yoga bearing the same name (brieflyreferred to by Maas p. 6), and the Laya Yoga or the �Yoga of reabsorp-tion.� Some elements are common to both practices, as for instance,sitting in a particular posture, controlling one�s breathing, and the with-drawal of the mind from the object of the senses. However, the twopractices differ in their object; while the object of the yoga of EightMembers is static, the object of the Laya Yoga is dynamic. The termlaya evokes the cosmic dissolution of the material elements, these beingreabsorbed, each into the respectively preceding one, in the reverse or-der that they were created or emanated until they are all absorbed intothe primordial matter, which is itself a manifestation of God.70 The LayaYoga imitates this process of destruction. The yogi visualizes objectafter object in the order of their destruction until he reaches a particulardeity, this deity being an emanation of still another deity, and so onuntil one reaches the Supreme God. The Lakṣmītantra describes severaldeities that are to be meditated upon, and similar to the Buddhist Tantricmeditation described by Almogi, each is associated with a special stateof consciousness and with a specific sound (the various elements areconveniently presented by Rastelli in a table on p. 306).

70 These cycles of cosmic emanation and dissolution are well known from ClassicalSāṃkhya (see also Maas� paper in this volume, pp. 269-270) and Purāṇic literature.However, in the Pāñcarātra tradition the material elements are considered a manifes-tation of the God Vāsudeva.

INTRODUCTION 37

In the Laya Yoga, the meditating yogi visualizes a deity andcontinuously recites a mantra until the deity appears to him; by concen-trating on the deity the yogi becomes one with it and reaches a statecalled �Consisting of Him/Her� (tanmayatā), depending upon whetherthe object of meditation is a God or a Goddess. In other words, the sub-ject and object of meditation become identical. What this identity meansexactly is not entirely clear, however. Rastelli suggests that the identitycannot be complete or numerical; rather �consisting of Vishnu� isanalogous to saying �consisting of wood�: consisting of somethingwould thus mean having all the properties of that thing. Thus, the resultof meditation varies according to the object one meditates on. If onemeditates on brahman (absolute reality) one attains the state of brah-man, which means liberation from rebirth; if one meditates on Sudar-śana, one attains the supernatural powers of Sudarśana, and so on.

In the Pañcarātra tradition, it is also possible to become �con-sisting of God� by ritual means, above all through a mental identifica-tion with the deity. This identification can be induced verbally bymeans of mantras, or by assuming the outward appearance of a deity,for instance, by wearing garments that are usually associated with thedeity or certain adornments that are typical for it. A still easier way toattain the same goals, provided one has the financial means, is to offerfire oblations (homa) to the deity. It is interesting to note that all ofthese rituals, if performed well over a period of time, leave the deity nofreedom of choice. It must appear before the yogi or the devotee.71

Part II: Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness from anInterdisciplinary Perspective

The second part of this volume examines broader aspects of alteredstates of consciousness beyond those occurring in yogic perception. Inthe first four papers, Karl Baier deals with meditation and contempla-tion in the Christian tradition, Dagmar Eigner and Diana Riboli focus onshamanic trance in Nepal and Malaysia, while John Baker clearly showsthat drug-induced altered states of consciousness are an element present

71 In this respect the Pāñcarātra tradition follows an older Vedic and Mīmāṃsā tradi-tion which claims that the gods who are the recipients of certain sacrifices are in factpassive players inasmuch as they are obliged bring about the result for which a sac-rifice is prescribed.

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in all traditional and modern societies. Thus, altered states of con-sciousness are by no means limited to meditative traditions.

Karl Baier�s contribution, �Meditation and Contemplation inHigh to Late Medieval Europe,� is a useful reminder that Europe had itsown rich tradition of meditation which has fallen into disuse, a traditionthat, in an odd twist of fate, shows signs of revival under the growinginfluence of Indian meditative traditions.

Baier examines the period between the 12th and 15th century, aperiod that differs significantly from the preceding and subsequent cen-turies. He deals primarily with four trends that became prominent dur-ing this period: the development of elaborate philosophical and theo-logical theories dealing systematically with meditation and contempla-tion; the democratization of meditation and contemplation; the emer-gence of new imaginative forms of meditation; and a differentiationbetween meditation and contemplation. Baier considers these trends andrelated developments by examining three texts: Benjamin minor (alsocalled The Twelve Patriarchs) of Richard of St. Victor (?-1173), theScala Claustralium of Guigo II (1174-1180) and the anonymous Clowdeof Unknowyng.

In Benjamin minor, Richard of St. Victor develops a hierarchi-cal system of different modes of cognition, correlating them to fourbasic cognitive faculties: sensus, imaginatio, ratio and intelligentia(sense-perception, imagination, discriminative rationality, intuitive in-sight). The lowest mode of awareness is termed cogitatio. It is �thecareless looking around of the mind,� motivated by curiosity and otherpassions. Meditation is a more focused way of thinking; it emergeswhen the cogitatio becomes seriously interested in an object it has un-covered. Its dominant mental faculty is ratio, discursive thinking, and itinvestigates the cause (causa), mode (modus), effect (effectus), purpose(utilitas) and inner structure (ratio) of its objects. Meditation culminatesin contemplation, the fulfilled insight. Cogitatio is like crawling on thefloor, meditatio like walking and sometimes running, but contemplatiois comparable to free flight (liber volatus) and beholding from above,this allowing the whole landscape be viewed at once.

Richard discriminates between different levels of ecstasy: astate in which the activity of the corporeal senses is only suspended, onein which imagination has come to a standstill, and a final absorption in

INTRODUCTION 39

which even intelligentia is no longer active. All forms of ecstasy areaccompanied by exaltation and intense joy.72

Guigo�s Scala Claustralium (ladder for monastics), also knownas Scala paradisi (the ladder to paradise) and Epistola de vita contem-plativa (letter on the contemplative life) contains one of the most con-cise analyses of spirituale exercitium (spiritual exercise) written in theHigh Middle Ages. His intent was to integrate meditation and contem-plation into the reading and interpretation of the Bible. In the early me-dieval period reading the Bible chiefly meant memorizing the text forliturgical purposes. In the 11th century the tradition of the Desert Fatherswas revived, and the new order of the Carthusians integrated the life-style of the hermit with monastic community life. This led to an interi-orization of religious reading, as is reflected in Guigo�s text. The prac-tice contained three stages, which, again, are strongly reminiscent ofBuddhist, Yoga and Vedānta practices: lectio, the monk reading theBible in his cell and following the literal sense of the text as attentivelyas possible, which led to meditation and the monk beginning to repeat apassage that touches his heart again and again;73 oratio, the monk ask-ing God to open his soul to His presence; and contemplatio, the monkgaining the deepest level of understanding of the biblical texts and ex-periencing their mystical sense (anagogia, sensus mysticus), which, as adirect encounter with God, can only be fully realized in contemplation.The basic distinction between meditation and contemplation is that inmeditation the different faculties of the soul are still at work, whilst incontemplation their activities have calmed down and the ineffable cen-ter of the soul awakens.

In the centuries after Guigo, the link between reading the Bibleand meditation lost its importance. The imaginative techniques had theeffect of the Bible being replaced by manuals of meditation, such asVita Christi, which were better suited for visualization and easier tograsp. Meditation and contemplation ceased to be a monastic privilegethat could be practiced only in the solitude of monasteries; they could

72 One is immediately reminded of the Buddhist descriptions of dhyāna and āyatanameditations, briefly described in Franco�s paper, as well as of saṃprajñāta samādhias discussed in Maas� contribution, but the differences are strong enough to rea-sonably exclude the assumption of borrowing or influence of one tradition on theother.

73 This practice is traditionally called ruminatio, rumination on the text.


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also be practiced in the flourishing towns. Book production developedenough to create a market of religious texts; these were usually compi-lations of monastic mystical theology, simplified schemes for the ascentto God, edifying stories about saints and miracles, and prayers. Thesebooks were not written in Latin, but in the vernacular languages. Thus,from the Late Medieval Period onwards, meditative and contemplativepractices became increasingly popular among all strata of the literateEuropean Christian society. Older forms of mysticism, based on with-drawal from the world and programs of asceticism and contemplativeprayer, did not die out, but they were challenged by new lifestyles en-couraging more democratic types of mysticism that were open to all(and therefore also communicated in the vernacular) and that did notdemand retreat from the world.74

The Clowde of Unknowyng, written between 1375 and 1400and today one of the most famous of all late medieval mystical texts, isa good example of the developments outlined above. The text followsthe traditional distinction between vita activa (actyve liif) and vita con-templativa (contemplatyve liif). The first stage of active life consists ofworks of mercy and charity, the second, which is concurrently the firststage of contemplative life, is goostly meditacion, the third and finalstage is specyal preier. The latter is described as blynde thoucht or na-kyd feeling and culminates in ecstasy (excesse of the mynde, overpas-syng of thiself), in which one is to leave behind distinct considerationsof the self, sins, creation and God and enter a �cloude of forgetyng.�

In the 15th century, the methodical structuring of thoughtwithin meditation became extremely elaborated. However, the moremeditation became formalized, the more its limitations and dangersbecame obvious; the practice of contemplation began to decline. AsBaier concludes, �only with the growing influence of Eastern religionsand the revival of Western mysticism from the end of the 19th centuryonwards did the popularization of contemplative practices start all overagain. The 20th century became the Age of the decline of the Baroqueform of European meditation and gave birth to a second contemplationmovement within Western Christianity.�

Diana Riboli�s contribution, �Shamans and Transformation inNepal and Peninsular Malaysia,� is an introduction to the different be-

74 Here, too, the emergence of the Mahāyāna bears striking if superficial similarities.

INTRODUCTION 41

liefs related to shamanic transformation into animal and plant forms, inparticular in the ethnic groups of the Chepang in south-central Nepaland the Jahai and Batek of peninsular Malaysia. Despite the necessaryadaptations of shamanic cultures to changes in social, economic andpolitical conditions, the figure of the shaman generally remains that of a�hunter of souls,� even in societies no longer based on hunting andgathering.

Riboli describes the rain forest as a closed universe from theBatek and Jahai point of view, divine and perfect, a sort of maternaluterus that satisfies all the basic requirements of its inhabitants andwhich is the beginning and end of everything.75 In what is clearly animplicit critique of Lévi-Strauss and his followers, she claims that forthe societies she has studied, a conceptual distinction between �nature�and �culture� has little or no significance.

Quite often the shamans� faculty of transforming themselvesinto animal or vegetal forms, of communicating with animals and dei-ties, or flying between cosmic zones is seen as a relic from a mythical�Golden Age,� a time when all human beings had these abilities. How-ever, in some shamanic societies ecstatic journeys and altered states ofconsciousness are almost completely absent, although considered byEliade and others to be an essential and defining element of shamanism.

Riboli points out that what scholars call �altered states of con-sciousness� or simply �trance� is a complex phenomenon, and that theChepang language has no single term corresponding to it.76 In spite oftrances often having a similar physical appearance�the shaman�s bodyjerking, trembling and sweating profusely, as well as appearing to un-dergo sensorial detachment�there are different types, and they are notexperienced as the same by shamans or their audience. Riboli distin-guishes between �incorporatory trances,� in which shamans embodysupernatural beings, and �trances of movement,� in which shamanstravel to other cosmic zones. In her earlier studies she included thecategory �initiatory trances,� and noted that there are certainly stillother types of altered states of consciousness, these being, however,

75 The most friendly inhabitants of the rainforest are the cenoi, poetic creatures some-what like our fairies, described as perfect little men and women living inside flowerswho offer help to humans in distress.

76 The same is true, of course, of what one calls �meditation,� a rather vague term thathas no exact correspondence in any South Asian language (see also n. 3 above).

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difficult to document. Similarly, �shaman� itself is not a consistentcategory; the Chepang distinguish between pande,77 who are allowed totravel to all cosmic zones, and gurau, who can transform themselvesinto animal forms.78 The Jahai use halak and jampi to refer respectivelyto shamans of greater and lesser powers.

Though Riboli has noted a decline in many of the shamanicpractices described by Endicott in the 1970s, she nevertheless confirms,contrary to observations by certain scholars, that despite the strongpressures and tensions they are continually subjected to, both Batek andJahai forms of shamanism are still very much alive today. In fact, afterthe recent passing away of one of the oldest and most venerable sha-mans, many young men have been receiving dreams in which the oldshaman is teaching them about the shamanic vocation. A new genera-tion of young shamans seems to be emerging.

Dagmar Eigner�s contribution, �Transformation of Conscious-ness through Suffering, Devotion, and Meditation,� investigates thespiritual and personal development of shamans and mediums in CentralNepal. It is based on Eigner�s study of traditional healers in CentralNepal undertaken for a total of thirty-six months between 1984 and2005. Her research has focussed on Tamang shamans living in the mid-dle hills east of Kathmandu Valley. The Tamang constitute the largestethnic minority in Nepal and there are many shamans among them.These shamans mostly treat a multi-ethnic, socially disadvantaged cli-entele, who seek cures for a wide variety of ailments. Some shamanshave moved away from traditional healing methods, partly because oftheir lack of the needed knowledge and partly in order to accommodatethe multi-ethnic environment. In this context, Eigner has investigatedthe similarities between the healing methods of different healers and therole of ethnic-specific knowledge of myths in the shamanic procedures.

Contact with a deity is considered a basic component of a sha-man�s power. Shamans and mediums usually experience a vocationalcalling, in which they are chosen by a spiritual power to become ahealer. Often this is not immediately recognized and the unusual behav-

77 It seems that about ten percent of pande are women; Riboli investigated thirtypande, three of whom were women.

78 This second category seems to be mythical or defunct; in eight years of extensivefield work, Riboli has not encountered a single shaman who claimed to possess thisability.

INTRODUCTION 43

iour of the chosen person is interpreted as a disturbance of her/his wellbeing. The period of crisis is attended by physical and psychic sufferingthat is not alleviated by standard medical treatment. On the contrary, insome cases attempts to force the so-called evil spirits to depart causesthe suffering to intensify. Sometimes several years pass before deities orancestor spirits reveal themselves through the persons they have chosen.

After the initial crisis, such a person forms a strong relationshipwith the spiritual world. They then begin a process of granting the dei-ties and tutelary spirits increasing space within their psyche, and of di-minishing the desires and expression of their own ego. Devotional exer-cises slowly alter the mind of a shaman so that with growing experi-ence, the chosen person remains continuously in a state of transformedconsciousness. Having attained this altered level of consciousness, theyare able to carry out whatever is needed during healing sessions withouteffort and without a conscious decision on their part. Their change inpersonality is primarily realized during treatments, in which their pa-tients experience the power of the deities, this being the core of thehealing process.

Eigner�s paper presents a number of narratives of shamans andmediums from Central Nepal describing this process of transformation.Briefly presented are various healers� perceptions of the spiritual world,their own connection to it, and their understanding of the cures theyachieve. These narratives show that the strong connection with the spiri-tual world changes these healers for the rest of their lives; their status inthe community, their relationships with the people around them, andtheir sense of identity have become irreversibly altered.

In �Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness: Insights fromthe Biocultural Perspective,� John Baker suggests that the use of psy-chedelic substances to alter consciousness is more ancient than all of theother techniques discussed in this volume. He also argues that studies ofpsychedelic experiences can be very useful for discerning the roles thatcultural expectations and individual characteristics play in shaping andunderstanding altered states of consciousness. Baker�s interactionistposition assumes that consciousness is affected by both �top down� and�bottom up� phenomena. Consequently, the study of consciousnessstates requires a comprehensive framework that incorporates biologicaland psychological insights into the study of socio-cultural phenomena.

The number of plants, fungi, minerals, and even animals capa-ble of inducing altered states of consciousness is large, and the use of

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these substances has been documented throughout the world since an-cient times. The use of such substances reflects both the basic humanpredilection to enter altered states and the fact that almost any psy-choactive substance can be utilized for personally integrative and cul-turally constructive purposes when used appropriately.

In contrast to the traditional use of psychedelic substances innon-Western cultures, many Westerners have a �hallucinophobic� atti-tude about psychedelics. This attitude has its roots in the proscriptionsagainst pagan religions issued by the Emperor Theodosius in 380 CE,when he adopted Christianity as the official religion of the empire andsuppressed the ancient mystery cults. During the next sixteen hundredyears, most European knowledge about the proper ways to use thesesubstances and exploit their effects for constructive purposes was lost.Consequently, few were prepared for the renaissance in psychedelic usethat began in the 19th century and accelerated in the 20th, especially afterthe discovery of LSD.

With the spread of LSD and other psychedelic substances, mil-lions of individuals were able to experience and explore highly unusualstates of consciousness. Lacking traditional frameworks for using thesesubstances or understanding their effects, some people experienced�bad trips� or suffered physical injury because they were temporarilyunable to react appropriately to external events. Laws were quicklypassed that prohibited the manufacturing, distribution, use, or posses-sion of psychedelic substances. By the mid-1960s, all psychedelic re-search on human subjects had been curtailed. As a result, many peoplein the West continue to view psychedelics in a highly negative light.

Baker uses the terms �sacrament� and �sacramental� to distin-guish between psychedelic use in societies that embrace such use and inthose that condemn it. In the former, a person�s first use of a psyche-delic substance often has an initiatory quality and occurs after a periodof training in which the individual has been taught to anticipate and�correctly� interpret such experiences. Here, psychedelics often serveculturally integrative purposes. In the second type of society, psychedel-ics are typically used clandestinely and without proper guidance. Insuch contexts, psychedelic experiences may lead an individual to ques-tion his or her society�s values and world view. In spite of this, suchexperiences are often interpreted in near-mystical terms and can haveprofoundly positive effects upon the user.


INTRODUCTION 45

The �sacrament/sacramental� distinction recognizes that cul-tural attitudes play a profound role in shaping states of consciousness.At the same time, the biological underpinnings of modern anthropologyremind us that the uniqueness of each person begins at the genetic level,and is expressed in differences in the make-up of our individual nervoussystems as well as our life histories. Consequently, every experience ofan altered state of consciousness is unique, and is open to multiple in-terpretations.

Baker concludes that psychedelic agents do not only representimportant tools for studying consciousness, but also have the potentialto �democratize� consciousness by making it possible for large numbersof people to explore domains previously accessible to only a few. Hesuggests that the near-universal desire to experience an altered state ofconsciousness can�and should�be channeled in a way that minimizesthe possibility of problems and maximizes the potential for personal andsocial gain.

Shulamith Kreitler�s contribution, �Altered States of Con-sciousness as Structural Variations of the Cognitive System,� presents anew approach to defining consciousness in terms of an innovative the-ory of meaning. Most approaches to consciousness have been based onthe assumption that differences in consciousness consist primarily indegrees of awareness, so that it may seem superfluous to dwell on thecharacterization of various so-called altered states of consciousness.However, an analysis of different states of consciousness reveals severalmajor dimensions in which they indeed do differ, e.g., salience and thestatus of the �I,� the sense of control and the ability to control, clarity ofthought, precision of perception with regard to external reality and envi-ronment, emotional involvement, as well as the arousal, accessibilityand inhibition of certain kinds of information. These specified dimen-sions allow the common states of consciousness to be characterizedaccording to their differences in terms of major cognitive, emotionaland behavioral features. The differences between the states of con-sciousness imply that a new approach is necessary. The new suggestedapproach is cognitive and based on a theory of meaning dealing with thecontents and processes underlying cognitive functioning. Meaning isdefined as a referent-centered pattern of meaning values. A referent isthe input, the carrier of meaning, whereas meaning values are cognitivecontents assigned to the referent in order to express or communicate itsmeaning. Together, the referent and the meaning value form a meaning

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unit. Five sets of variables are used for characterizing the meaning unit:meaning dimensions, which characterize the contents of the meaningvalues; types of relation, which characterize the immediacy of the rela-tion between the referent and the cognitive contents; forms of relation,which characterize the formal regulation of the relation between thereferent and the cognitive contents; referent shifts, which characterizethe relation between the referent and the presented input; and forms ofexpression, which characterize the forms of expression of the meaningunits. Each individual person functions cognitively in terms of a spe-cific meaning profile (i.e., a set of meaning variables habitual for thatperson) that determines his or her range of cognitive potentialities andalso affects manifestations at the level of emotions and personality.Cognition is a function of the structure and activation of the meaningsystem.

Kreitler�s main thesis is that states of consciousness are a func-tion of comprehensive changes in the cognitive system brought about byspecific organizational transformations in the meaning system. Onemajor kind of reorganization consists in changing the dominant types ofrelation that regulate the functioning of the cognitive system in ordinarywakeful states, namely the attributive and comparative, to the exempli-fying-illustrative and metaphoric-symbolic that regulate the functioningof the cognitive system in certain states of consciousness. Structuralchanges of this kind may be attained by either psychological or physio-logical means. When they occur, cognitive functioning, personalitymanifestations, mood and affect, as well as physiological processes maybe affected. Kreitler describes the changes in consciousness attained bymeans of experimentally-induced changes in meaning, as well as theresulting changes in cognitive and emotional functioning. The new ap-proach may enable the matching of cognitive tasks to suitable states ofconsciousness, the production of states of consciousness by self-controlled cognitive means, and even the definition of new states ofconsciousness.

The two final papers, by Michael M. DelMonte and Renaudvan Quekelberghe, consider the use and integration of meditation inpsychotherapy. Van Quekelberghe begins with a brief discussion of�mindfulness� (Pali: sattipaṭṭhāna, Sanskrit: smṛtyupasthāna) in thecontext of Theravāda Buddhism. The purpose of mindfulness is to in-crease the powers of concentration as a preparatory stage to meditationproperly speaking (samādhi). It consists in the conscious awareness of

INTRODUCTION 47

everyday activities such as breathing, thinking, feeling, moving, eatingand even defecating. In the last decade or so, cognitive behavior therapyand psychoanalysis has begun to focus on mindfulness as a constructivemethod for overcoming clinical symptoms and suffering. Quekelberghenotes that the recent shift in cognitive therapy from symptoms as the�content� to symptoms as the �context� offers an analogy to the tradi-tional Eastern (Buddhist and other) distinction of consciousness directedtowards an object and consciousness without an object. �Context�would correspond to emptiness, peace of mind, pure silence, crystal-liketransparency and an empty mirror; while �content� would correspond toego-related passions, mirages, thoughts and feelings. This dichotomyindicates the need to step back from the many to the one, from thechanging to the changeless, from bondage to freedom.

In the second part of his paper Quekelberghe offers a very use-ful survey of the relationship between psychotherapy and Buddhismfrom the 1930s to the present day. He begins with the well-known study�Buddhist training as an artificial catatonia� by Franz Alexander (alsosummarized by DelMonte), which has inspired many leading psychia-trists to focus on the parallels between schizophrenic regression andmeditation. However, there were also exceptions to this general trendand some psychiatrists, such as Johannes Schulz and Arthur Deikman,considered yogic traditions positively, fighting against the �naïve arro-gance� of psychiatry and psychoanalysis towards the Eastern meditativepractice.

Jung rejected the psychoanalytic view of Asian or Buddhistmeditation as infantile regression, autistic defense formation or narcis-sistic neurosis. Yet he too believed that an integration of Western psy-chotherapy and Eastern meditation was�if at all possible�not desir-able. On the other hand, the so-called Neo-Freudians, including KarenHorney, Erich Fromm and Harold Kelman, involved themselves withZen-Buddhism in the 1950s and emphasized points of convergence oftheir discipline with it. Kelman, for instance, considered psychoanalysisto be a meditative training in mindfulness and the development oftherapist-client relationship as analogous to the guru-devotee relation-ship. In the 1980s, Jeffrey Rubin tried to integrate Buddhist ideas into aso-called contemplative psychoanalysis, although oddly enough hesomehow confused the Buddhist conception of egoless-ness (Pali:anatta, Sanskrit: anātman) with the psychoanalytic narcissism theory.The dialogue between Buddhism and psychotherapy has continued un-

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interruptedly until the present day, with Barry Magid currently its mostprominent proponent.

W.L. Mikulas was the first behavior therapist who integratedBuddhist meditation into behavior therapy. He emphasized self-controlskills and few theoretical constructs, focused on the concrete content ofconscious experience, and made a clear distinction between observablebehavior and problematic concepts such as person, ego, identity and theworld. Quekelberghe summarizes the work of a number of behaviorpsychotherapists who found correspondence between the Buddhistteachings and techniques of behavior therapy, namely, stress reductionprograms based on mindlessness. These include Da Silva, Kabatt-Zinn,Grossman, Linhan, Perls, Hayes, and last but not least, Quekelberghehimself.

Another important area of dialogue between Asian meditativetraditions and psychotherapy is transpersonal psychology and ther-apy79�a school of psychology that studies and encourages spiritualself-development, peak experiences, mystical experiences, systemictrance and other metaphysical experiences of living. In an earlierwork,80 Quekelberghe described the main fields of this spiritually ori-ented psychotherapy. Quekelberghe ends his article with a plea to estab-lish modern �wisdom research centers� after the model of the famousBuddhist monastery Nālandā.

Michael DelMonte�s paper, �Empty Thy Mind and Come toThy Senses: A De-constructive Path to Inner Peace,� studies the benefi-cial effects of Yoga practices, Qi-gong, and modern Gestalt therapy onpsychological growth (Eros). In an age when our minds and our sensesare over-stimulated and our emotions over-aroused, meditation may bepositively used as an antidote to mental over-drive. Paradoxically deep�mindfulness,� when competently practiced, may lead to peaceful�mindlessness,�81 a state of �no thought.�82 Such techniques are particu-

79 The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology describes transpersonal psychology as�the study of humanity�s highest potential, and with the recognition, understanding,and realization of unitive, spiritual, and transcendent states of consciousness.�

80 Transpersonale Psychologie und Psychotherapie, Ed. Dietmar Klotz. Eschborn beiFrankfurt/M. 2005.

81 In this respect, meditative therapy is the opposite of the �talking cure� typically usedin Freudian and other therapies.

82 DelMonte�s view of the relationship between thought and consciousness strikes meas being potentially anti-Darwinist (§4): �Although consciousness without thought

INTRODUCTION 49

larly effective in cases of unhealthy attachments, be they attachment tovictimhood and self-righteous misery, obsessive attachment to people orobjects, or fear of loss as linked to separation anxiety. These attach-ments lead to defensive detachment which DelMonte calls �schizoiddefense�; in extreme versions this defense is found in the affective non-attachment of borderline personalities, defensive isolation, extreme ego-tism, or solipsism.

However, DelMonte also warns us of the risks of using medita-tive techniques inappropriately; their use may become detrimental tosocial engagement and emotional attachment, foster �narcissistic empti-ness,� pathological de-realization and de-personalization as well aspathological regression�fixated on Thanatos, i.e, the wish to return toan undemanding pre-incarnate state. Meditation is not suitable for eve-rybody nor is everyone ready for it.

The challenge for all self-conscious and reflective beings ishow to build up an internal sense of self while being and living in animpermanent world. We all have a quest for knowledge as well as twotypical orientations: introversion and extroversion, which need to be inequilibrium. Successful meditation helps one find the right balance be-tween, on one hand, introspection and self awareness and on the other,social adaptation. Not surprisingly, introspection tends to become moreimportant as we age.

A final point is what DelMonte calls �the obsessive Westernfocus on individualism� that leads to a strong individual identity beingforged at the risk of this over-valued �mask� or �false self� being takentoo seriously. The traditional Eastern society, says DelMonte, does notoverly focus on individualism83 and may facilitate attempts to dis-

is a possibility, its opposite, thought without some consciousness is not (excludingthe Freudian repressed unconscious). Consciousness thus appears to be primary, andfrom it emerges thought as a secondary epi-phenomenon: An epi-phenomenon thatcan become �parasitic,� in the sense that consciousness can play the role of a reluc-tant host to our unbidden thinking.�

83 DelMonte touches here on a set of problems that are especially associated with thework of Louis Dumont (see especially his Homo Hierarchicus. Le système des casteset ses implications. Repr. Paris 1979). However, Dumont�s inspiring work also metwith strong criticism. The issues involved are too complex and multifaceted to bedealt with here, but to risk a generalization about Indian civilization (for I have nooverall competence in �Eastern� civilization), I would say that the tensions and in-ner conflict between �Homo Hierarchicus� and �Homo Equalis� are present alsowithin Indian society.


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identify from over-invested individualism. It is interesting that the aimof yoga as a psychotherapy is not to become �atomized emotional is-lands,� although this is precisely the purpose of traditional yoga (see forinstance Maas� paper in this volume): Liberation consists in the aware-ness that one is an isolated �island,� albeit not an emotional one.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The above papers fall into two broad categories, those dealing with his-torical-philological aspects of yogic perception and meditation, andothers broadly falling into the social sciences of anthropology and psy-chology. The need for an interdisciplinary approach between textual andsociological disciplines is so obvious that it hardly needs to be men-tioned. But at the risk of stating the obvious: The benefits of an interdis-ciplinary approach as practiced here should go in at least two directions.On one hand, after taking a walk in the modern social sciences, the tex-tual scholars should be able to go back to their sources and gain a betterunderstanding of them. The social scientists, on the other hand, whostudy meditative experiences as a cultural phenomenon, would certainlybenefit from the historical depth that can be gained from the study oftexts. As Richard Gombrich once said�I paraphrase from memory�Buddhism has been around for 2500 years: who in his right mind wouldwant to restrict one�s study of it to the last century? The same is true ofcourse for Hinduism and the European civilization.

To conclude, I should mention perhaps what was under-represented at the conference and is completely lacking in the presentvolume: the natural sciences. This reflects the approach and interests ofthe organizers. Collingwood once chastised someone who thought themind is what proves recalcitrant to an explanation by the natural sci-ences: �In the natural sciences, mind is not that which is left over whenexplaining has broken down; it is what does the explaining. If an expla-nation of mind is what you want, you have come to the wrong shop; youought to have gone to the sciences of the mind.�84

Our intention is not to question the relationship between themind and the brain, or their possible ontological identity. At present,however, we do not yet seem to gain much when quantum physicists

84 R.G. Collingwood, The New Leviathan. Oxford 1942 (Repr. 1944), p. 11, § 2.48.

INTRODUCTION 51

tell us that consciousness is related to the collapse of a wave functionwhich is used to describe the probability of distribution of all possiblestates of an observed system. Nor do we wish to dwell on the concept ofrelativity in Madhyamaka Buddhism as a precursor of modern physicsor on the resonance of emptiness and quantum mechanics. We also con-sider of little relevance to our studies whether gamma or alpha raysincrease or decrease in deep meditation. It may be fascinating to ob-serve the physical changes that occur in meditation, which includemetabolic, autonomic, endocrine, neurological, encephalographic anddigestive effects, galvanic skin responses, hormone levels in blood, aswell as limbic arousal in the brain. We deny neither the merit nor inter-est nor importance of these studies, but have deemed them of peripheralrelevance to the studies undertaken in this volume.

Part I

Yogic Perception in the South Asianand Tibetan Traditions

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�Just Like Us, Just Like Now�: The TacticalImplications of the Mīmāṃsā Rejection of Yogic

Perception

The practitioners of traditional Indian hermeneutics, or �Mīmāṃsā�, areoften described as the most �orthodox� upholders of the Vedic tradition,but even a cursory survey of the central works of the Mīmāṃsā traditionis sufficient to reveal that their positions were often quite radical,placing them at odds with most or all rival philosophical systems, eventhose within the �Hindu� fold. They were by and large skeptical about,or outright deniers of, many of the stock elements of Hinducosmology�for example, the existence of gods, the cyclical dissolutionand reemergence of the cosmos, the possibility of liberation from thecycle of death and rebirth. Similarly, the Mīmāṃsā position on yogicperception is decidedly at odds with what we might describe as�mainstream opinion� among Sanskrit philosophers. In opposition tovirtually all other schools of thought in pre-modern India, theMīmāṃsakas totally reject the possibility of yogic or supernaturalperception. The only other group of philosophers who made thisabsolute denial were the materialist Cārvākas (with whom theMīmāṃsakas otherwise have very little in common). In this paper Iwant to briefly consider some of the principal arguments theMīmāṃsakas raised against yogic perception, in the hope of sheddingsome light on what made this skeptical stance so appealing to them or,perhaps more to the point, what made the admission of supernormalperception, even on the part of upholders of the Vedic tradition, seem sothreatening to them. I will focus primarily on the arguments of theseventh century Mīmāṃsaka Kumārilabhaṭṭa, as he proved to be themost articulate and influential critic of yogic perception.

In interpreting Kumārila�s arguments against yogic perceptionand attempting to understand their motivation, it is crucial to attend tothe context in which they are made. Kumārila�s most importantdiscussions of yogic perception are found in the Codanāsūtra and

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Pratyakṣapariccheda sections of his Ślokavārttika.1 The central questionof the Ślokavārttika, and of the section of the Mīmāṃsāsūtra on which itcomments, is to demonstrate that it is only from scripture, specificallyfrom the Vedas, that people can gain knowledge of dharma andadharma�that is to say, of the beneficial or adverse karmic results thatwill follow from present actions, including but not limited tootherworldly results such as the obtainment of heaven or spiritualliberation. The primary purpose of raising the question of yogicperception in both of the passages mentioned above is to rule it out as arival means of knowing dharma, leaving scripture as the only possiblemeans of acquiring such knowledge.

Now, the Mīmāṃsakas are not of course alone in wishing toground their beliefs about the nature of the soul or the afterlife inpurportedly reliable scriptural texts. Most of the rival philosophical/-religious traditions they confronted accepted one or another set ofscriptures as a reliable guide to otherworldly matters. What sets theMīmāṃsakas apart from nearly all of their rivals is their understandingof how it is that scriptures can contain reliable information on suchmatters. Rival accounts of scriptural validity�both those of extra-Vedicrivals such as the Buddhists and Jains, and of those who upheld thevalidity of the Vedas, such as the Naiyāyikas�take the reliability oftheir scriptures to derive from the knowledgeability of their authors.Intuitively enough, they take the position that scriptures should beunderstood to be reliable insofar as it can be determined that those whocomposed them knew whereof they spoke. The remembered andrecorded words of �seers� such as the Buddha and the Jina are seen asvaluable insofar as they give us access to truths which they couldperceive, but we cannot. It is, above all, against such claims of personalauthority in matters of dharma that the Mīmāṃsakas direct their fire. Itis therefore not primarily the existence of yogic perception, but itsusefulness as a means for validating scriptural claims, that they wish todeny. They do offer arguments against the very possibility that anyperson could have the sort of extraordinary perceptual powers claimedfor the Buddha and the like; but, crucially, they argue further that evenif this were possible�even if certain individuals really did have thepower to perceive dharma, for instance�this would be of no help to

1 For a brief overview of Kumārila�s position, see Bhatt 1962, pp. 160-163.

JUST LIKE US, JUST LIKE NOW 57

ordinary people�to people like ourselves who are not yogis�ingaining knowledge of dharma for themselves.

This concern to demonstrate the epistemic uselessness of yogicperception can be clearly seen in Kumārila�s seminal discussion in theCodanāsūtra section of the Ślokavārttika. The codanāsūtra itself (thesecond of the aphorisms of Jaimini, which form the basis of theMīmāṃsā system) indicates that the commands of the Veda (codanā),which the Mīmāṃsakas take to be eternal and authorless, are the onlymeans through which one can come to know dharma.2 In the course ofdefending this claim, Kumārila�s predecessor Śabara remarks that thestatements of human beings cannot be considered reliable when theyconcern matters �beyond the range of the senses� (anindriyaviṣayam),for such things, as he says, �could not be known by a person, exceptthrough a verbal statement�.3 Yet if this verbal statement is made byanother person, this only pushes back the epistemological problem onemore step: how could the speaker of this statement have any knowledgeof supersensory matters to impart? �In matters of this sort,� says Śabara,�human statements have no authority, just like the statements ofcongenitally blind people regarding particular colors.�4 Śabara�s briefcomments, without offering any detailed arguments to this effect,presuppose a general uniformity of sensory capacities among people:what is �beyond the range of the senses� for one person will be so foranother (barring sensory impairments such as blindness). Yet this isprecisely what the advocate of yogic perception denies. The yogi ispresumed to have sensory capacities that exceed those of ordinarypersons, such that his statements would have the capacity to impart tothose ordinary persons information about supernatural matters whichthey could not acquire for themselves.

Obviously, if claims for this sort of extraordinary perception areallowed to stand, Śabara�s argument, and the central Mīmāṃsā claim itupholds, will collapse. Hence Kumārila, in commenting on anddefending this passage of Śabara�s work, seeks to rule out the possibili-ty that the statements of yogis could serve as a reliable source of

2 SeeMīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.2 (MD, Vol. 1, p. 13): codanālakṣaṇo �rtho dharmaḥ.3 Śābarabhāṣya ad 1.1.2 (MD, Vol. 1, p. 17): aśakyaṃ hi tat puruṣeṇa jñātum r ̥tevacanāt.

4 MD Vol.1, p. 18: naivaṃjātīyakeṣv artheṣu puruṣavacanaṃ prāmāṇyam upaiti, jāty-andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣeṣu.

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knowledge for ordinary, non-yogically-endowed people such as us. Dueto this focus on the statements of yogis and their putative validity, theissue he confronts is not so much an ontological question�Do yogisactually exist?�but an epistemological one�How, if at all, could onereliably determine whether the statements of any self-proclaimed yogiare reliable or not? The upholders of yogic perception, and of theauthorial model of scriptural authority, need to argue that their yogis,and specifically the authors of their scriptures, have direct andprivileged access to certain truths�about the nature of the universe, thesoul or its absence, our fate after death, and so on�that are totallybeyond the range of what ordinary people can know by their owndevices. The value of scriptures lies precisely in their capacity totransmit to us the knowledge of those who can perceive what wecannot. But, one of the key strategies of Kumārila�s argument in theCodanāsūtra is to show that�even if we were to admit the existence ofyogis�the privileged access to truth that is claimed for them, far frommaking their words a valuable source of knowledge for ordinarypersons, actually renders them entirely useless to us. He attempts toshow that the perceptually privileged status ascribed to yogis wouldcreate an unbridgeable epistemic divide between us and them, such thattheir own knowledge, however accurate it might be, would necessarilyremain inaccessible to us. I will examine his arguments in more detailbelow, but briefly his position is that �it takes one to know one��thatthere is simply no way one can satisfactorily evaluate the knowledge-claims of purported seers or yogis, unless one can confirmindependently that they really do know truly what they claim to. Yetone cannot do this unless one has the same extraordinary perceptualcapacities that they do. Hence, the statements of those who claimextraordinary perceptual powers can be held valid only insofar as theyare redundant�we can only know them to be true when they tell uswhat we are able to find out for ourselves. So, even if it could beestablished that such extraordinary perceptual powers exist in someindividuals, their epistemic value for ordinary people would be nil. Onecould never tell the difference between a genuine yogi and a fraudwithout being a yogi oneself.

Kumārila�s argument against the epistemic usefulness of yogic-perception claims is grounded in a pervasive skepticism regarding thereliability of human beings and their utterances, summed up in hisbracingly cynical dictum that:


At all times, people are, for the most part, liars.Just as there can be no confidence in them now, in the same way there is noconfidence in statements of things past.5

We know�from abundant experience, alas�that people nowadays areoften less than entirely truthful in what they say. And just as people arenowadays frequently seen to make unreliable statements, we mayreasonably suppose that people in the past were similarly undependable.We have, then, strong prima facie reasons to doubt the veracity ofhuman statements past or present. In ordinary situations, this presentsonly a minor practical problem; if one doubts the accuracy of statementspeople make about everyday matters, it is easy enough to to confirm ordisconfirm them through direct observation. Yet, in the case ofstatements made by the Buddha, the Jina, or others who claim topossess extraordinary perceptual powers (and, in fact, claim to beliterally omniscient), we are asked to place our trust in claims we areabsolutely incapable of verifying for ourselves. We are asked,moreover, to accept that those who made these claims gained their ownknowledge through a kind of �perception� wholly unlike any perceptionwe have ever experienced ourselves, or witnessed in others.

Here Kumārila resorts to one of his most characteristic moves:what we might call an �inference from the ordinary.� He argues that, inthe absence of strong counterevidence, we may legitimately infer thatthe perceptual capacities of other persons�past, present and future�are basically similar to our own. Since people, in our own experience,have no ability to perceive�for example�objects existing in the pastor future, we can legitimately extrapolate from this experience andconclude that people in the past were similarly limited in theirperceptual capacities.6 As he says:

People can apprehend objects of a certain sort by certain means of knowledgenow. It was the same even in other times.Even where a heightened ability [in some sense faculty] is seen, it occurswithout overstepping the natural object [of that sense faculty], as, for example,

5 ŚV, Codanā 144: sarvadā cāpi puruṣāḥ prāyeṇānr̥tavādinaḥ | yathādyatve na vis-rambhas tathātītārthakīrtane ||

6 For an argument that awareness of past or future objects must be excluded, by defi-nition, from the scope of perception, see ŚV, Pratyakṣa 26-36, and (for a translationand explanation of the passage) Taber 2005, pp. 54-57.


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when someone sees objects which are far away or very small. But one�shearing cannot apprehend color.And one never sees, even in the smallest degree, a capacity to perceive afuture object ...7

In our own experience, we observe that there are variations in people�sperceptual capacities. Some people are better than others at seeingdistant or minute objects, and, extrapolating from this experiential base,we could plausibly enough imagine people who can see farther orsmaller objects than any we have known. But we could not plausiblyimagine people who could �see� sounds or smells; it seems to beinextricably part of the nature of �seeing� that what we see are colorsand shapes, nothing else. As Kumārila sees it, supposing, incontradiction our own present-day experience, that people such as theBuddha could �see� the future involves a similar category error. Tosuppose that anyone could perceive future objects would fly in the faceof our own experience in the same way as supposing that one could hearcolors.

This sort of argument�that, in general, things or people in thepast may legitimately inferred to be �like nowadays� (adyavat, idānīmiva) or �like people nowadays� (adyatanavat), and that people outsidethe range of our own experience may be inferred to be �like personssuch as ourselves� (asmadādivat)�is pervasive in Kumārila�s work,and underlies many of the key arguments of the Ślokavārttika (not onlyarguments against supernormal perception, but arguments in support ofthe eternality of Sanskrit, and of the Vedas, and against the occurrenceof cosmic dissolution).8 It may seem a rather cheap argument�notmuch more than a reflexively conservative attitude�but it does appearto generate formally valid inferences, and is not without a certain basicplausibility. If we do not base our understanding of the nature of

7 ŚV, Codanā 113-115: yajjātīyaiḥ pramāṇais tu yajjātīyārthadarśanam | bhavedidānīṃ lokasya tathā kālāntare �py abhūt || yatrāpy atiśayo dr̥ṣṭaḥ sa svārthānati-laṅghanāt | dūrasūkṣmādidṛṣṭau syān na rūpe śrotravr̥ttitā || bhaviṣyati na dr̥ṣṭaṃ capratyakṣasya manāg api | sāmārthyaṃ... || Similar statements from Kumārila�s (lost)Br ̥ḥāṭṭīkā are quoted in Ratnakīrti�s Sarvajñasiddhi (RNĀ, p. 8) and Śāntirakṣita�sTattvasaṃgraha (TS, vss. 3160-3163, 3170-3171).

8 See for example ŚV, Codanā 99, 117, 144, 151; ŚV.Pratyakṣa.35; ŚV, Nirālambana-vāda.85, 127; ŚV, Saṃbandhākṣepaparihāra 67, 77, 97, 113, 116; ŚV, Ātma-vāda.137; Tantravārttika ad 1.3.1 (MD, Vol. 2, pp. 71, 75).


perception on our own experience of it, then what, after all, are we tobase it on?

The key question then is this: since neither we ourselves noranyone in our own experience possesses the kind of perceptualcapacities claimed for persons like the Buddha, what sort of evidencemight there be that would lead us to lay aside the evidence ofexperience and accept these claims at face value? Ex hypothesi, we haveno perceptual evidence that would support such claims. On the otherhand, if one were to rely upon scripture itself to support the knowledgeclaims, problems of regress would arise. To conclude that a purportedseer possesses extraordinary knowledge because he himself claims to doso in a text he himself has authored is plainly circular. But if one relieson a claim made in a text composed by another author, one simplypresses the problem back one level: How can one know that this secondauthor himself possesses the relevant knowledge to support his claim?9

It might seem that the most promising avenue to pursue inattempting to validate omniscience claims in the eyes of non-omniscientpersons would be inference. If we see that a person such as the Buddhainvariably speaks accurately about matters that are confirmable throughperception or other ordinary means of knowledge, may we not infer thathis statements about supersensory matters are similarly accurate? Tothis Kumārila responds as follows:

If, having seen that [an author] makes true statements in matters where aconnection between the object and the sense organ is [possible] (i.e. in mattersaccessible to ordinary perception), one were to conclude that he also makestrue statements about matters that must be taken on faith, because they are hisstatements [121]; then one will have demonstrated that the authority [of his

9 See ŚV, Codanā 117-118. Somewhat different problems would arise if one at-tempted to support the knowledge claims of a human scripture-author with claimsmade in a purportedly eternal scripture such as the Veda: an eternal text could notcontain information about a historically limited author (as it would have to have ex-isted before he did). Eternal texts, the Mīmāṃsakas argue, cannot refer to particularhistorical persons or events. Those passages in eternal texts which appear to refer tosuch persons and events must be understood as figuratively praising or otherwise re-ferring to elements of the (eternally recurrent) Vedic sacrifice�what theMîmāṃsakas call arthavāda. Hence, any apparent reference in a purportedly eternaltext to the omniscience of a particular scripture-author would either have to be anarthavāda passage (and accordingly be interpreted figuratively), or, as a historicalreference, would show that the text is not in fact eternal�see ŚV, Codanā 119-120.

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statements] is dependent [on perceptual confirmation]. If they are authoritativein and of themselves, then what dependence would there be on sense-organsand the like? [122] Just as, in this case, the authority [of his statements] is dueto being determined by sense-organs and the like, it would be the same even inmatters which must be taken on faith. [Their] authority is not establishedindependently. [123]10

The inference does not establish what it is intended to establish. If theonly testably valid knowledge claims an author makes are thoseconcerning matters accessible to ordinary means of knowledge such assense perception, then this can establish the authority of the author'sclaims only in so far as they depend on these ordinary means ofknowledge. It can in no way establish that this pattern of accuracyextends to supersensory matters as well.

Kumārila does not himself offer any example of the sort oftestable knowledge claims which might be advanced as evidence for theaccuracy of their speakers, but his commentators all mention theBuddhist doctrine of momentariness in this connection.11 If theBuddha�s claim that all things are momentary could be shown to be trueon grounds other than his own assertion, would this not confirm hisreliability? But Kumārila�s argument is well-suited to get around thissort of example. If the momentariness of all things really weredemonstrable on grounds other than the Buddha�s assertion, then itwould in fact be a truth accessible through ordinary means ofknowledge, and hence could not serve as evidence for his accuracy inmatters beyond the scope of these ordinary means of knowledge. Thesame would be true of any claim of a purported yogi which could beverified through ordinary means of knowledge.

In addition, Kumārila challenges the inferential argument foryogic reliability with the following counterinference:

Furthermore, when [human statements] concern objects beyond the range ofthe senses, they are false, because they are human statements. [In this

10 ŚV, Codanā 121-123 (=ŚV(U), pp. 75-76, ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p. 127): yo �pīndriyārtha-saṃbandhaviṣaye satyavāditām | dr ̥ṣṭvā tadvacanatvena śraddheyārthe �pi kalpayet ||tenāpi pāratantryeṇa sādhitā syāt pramāṇatā | prāmāṇyaṃ cet svayaṃ tasyakāpekṣānyendriyādiṣu || yathaivātrendriyādibhyaḥ paricchedāt pramāṇatā | śrad-dheye �pi tathaiva syān na svātantryeṇa labhyate ||

11 See Umbeka, Sucaritamiśra, and Pārthasārathi ad ŚV, Codanā 121, ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p.127, and ŚV, p. 83.


inference] each of the extra-Vedic schools will serve as an example (lit.:similar case, sapakṣa) for the others.12

Because there are multiple and conflicting claims about what exactlyyogic perception reveals about the ultimate nature of things�the Jainassaying one thing, and the Buddhists another, for instance�each of theseschools must argue that the others are wrong, and that their claims ofsupersensory knowledge are false. But this allows the Mīmāṃsaka touse each case as an example in constructing an inference to counter theother. The Buddhists must admit that the Jainas claim accuracy for theirscriptures based on the demonstrable accuracy of the Jina�s testabletruth claims, and yet are wrong. And the Jainas must admit the sameregarding the Buddhists. Thus each can be used to demonstrate to theother the insufficiency of the inference from accuracy about ordinarymatters to accuracy about supersensory ones.

This line of argument suggests another basic problem withaccepting the claims of yogic perception. The non-yogi attempting tojudge for himself whether yogic claims should be taken seriously or notis confronted, not with one person�s claim to accuracy in supersensorymatters, but with a whole host of mutually conflicting claims�fromBuddhists, Jainas, Sāṃkhyas, and others. Even if one were to admityogic perception as a general possibility, how, lacking any means forjudging among this welter of conflicting claims, could one hope todetermine which claims one should believe? Once the door has beenopened to claims of extraordinary perception, a free-for-all ensues. Itseems that almost anyone can make any claim based on such privilegedperceptual knowledge with more or less equal plausibility. Yet, becauseany number of these conflicting and untestable knowledge-claims canbe (and are) made, no one such claim can convince. Kumārila touchesbriefly on this issue in the Nirālambanavāda section of the Ślokavārttika(88-94). The (Buddhist-Idealist) opponent claims that all ourawarenesses exist without any extra-mental object, like dream-awarenesses. Kumārila, challenging the parallel between waking and

12 ŚV, Codanā 126:api cālaukikārthatve sati puṃvākyahetukam |mithyātvaṃ vedabāhyānāṃ syād anyonyaṃ sapakṣatā ||The printed edition of ŚV reads vedavākyānāṃ, as does ŚV(S), but it�s clear fromhis comments (ŚV(S), Vol. 1, p. 129) that Sucaritamiśra read -bāhyānāṃ; ŚV(U)prints the text correctly as vedabāhyānāṃ (p. 76).

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dream awareness, notes that in the case of dreams we conclude that ourawareness lacked an extramental object only after we wake up. Ourexperience of waking serves as a blocking awareness (bādhikā buddhiḥ)which invalidates the dream. But in the case of our waking awareness,there is no such blocking awareness, and therefore no reason toconclude that the objects that appear to us in waking life are unreal. TheBuddhist counters that the awareness of yogis does indeed reveal theunreality of everyday objects, and therefore stands in contradiction toour waking awareness. But, Kumārila retorts, �[the awareness] of ouryogis [yogināṃ cāsmadīyānām] stands in contradiction to what youhave said.�13 Kumārila�s reference to �our yogis� seems rather tongue incheek. Since the Mīmāṃsakas themselves absolutely deny yogicperception, the �us� in question must demarcate some broaderaffiliation of �āstikas� or �followers of the Vedas� (what we would nowcall Hindus). The point, of course, is not to claim that �our� yogis arebetter and more trustworthy than those of the Buddhists, but to showthat anyone can play the �yogi�-card in any debate, and that such claimsare consequently useless in settling philosophical disputes.

Along the same lines, and still more facetiously, Kumārilamocks the opponent�s inference for the reliability of yogic perception(in the Codanāsūtra section) as follows:

[I say:] �The Buddha and other such people are not omniscient.� Thisstatement of mine is true, because it is my statement, just as [when I say],�Fire is hot and bright.�And one can perceive that I have made this statement; you have to prove that[those statements] were made by the that person [i.e. the Buddha or whoever].Therefore, mine is a sound inferential reason; yours is open to the suspicionthat is not established [in the desired locus].14

If the ability to make true statements about ordinary things is all that isrequired to speak with authority on supersensory matters, then anyonecan claim such authority�even Kumārila himself. Again, the real pointis not to reveal the untenability of the Buddhist claim in particular, oreven the general impossibility of yogic perception, but to expose theindeterminacy and consequent irresolvability of arguments based on

13 ŚV, Nirālambana 94cd (=ŚV(S) 2.60): yogināṃ cāsmadīyānāṃ tvaduktapratiyoginī ||14 ŚV, Codanā 130-131: buddhādīnām asārvajñyam iti satyaṃ vaco mama | madukta-

tvād yathaivāgnir uṣṇo bhāsvara ity api || pratyakṣaṃ ca maduktatvaṃ tvayā sādhyātaduktatā | tena hetur madīyaḥ syāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā tava ||



claims of privileged perception. Since there is simply no way to testsuch claims, or to sort out good ones from bad ones, there is nothing toprevent anyone from claiming the authority of yogic perception for anyconclusion he wishes to advance.

All claims to privileged or supernormal perceptual knowledgeare suspect precisely because of their privileged status. Statementsbased on such knowledge, if they are to be at all useful, must betransmitted at some point from persons who have this privilegedperceptual knowledge to those who do not. Yet the recipients of thisknowledge, because they have no access to the perceptual awarenessfrom which it is derived, are in no position to evaluate its accuracy.Thus the �revelatory moment�, when the yogi or the omniscient personimparts his knowledge to those who lack his perceptual ability, isdoomed to fail epistemically. To quote Kumārila again: How couldpeople at that time who wish to know whether that person is omniscientunderstand this, if they have no awareness of his knowledge and itsobjects?

And you would need to postulate many omniscient persons�anyone who isnot himself omniscient cannot know an omniscient person.And, if a person does not know him to be omniscient, then his statementswould have no authority for that person, since he would not know their source,just as with the statements of any other person.15

Even actual omniscience is not sufficient to make one�s statementstrustworthy from the perspective of ordinary people. One�s omnisciencecould underwrite the authority of one�s statements only if it were knownto one�s hearers that one is omniscient. But they cannot truly know thisunless they already know what you know�unless they too areomniscient. It takes one to know one. Hence, even the utterances of agenuinely omniscient person would be, for epistemic purposes,absolutely worthless. One could be confident of their accuracy only ifone already had independent knowledge of the information they convey.

To adopt any less rigorous standard than this in judging thevalidity of a person�s statements regarding supersensory matters is toleave oneself no defense against charlatans or delusional people

15 ŚV, Codanā 135-136: kalpanīyāś ca sarvajñā bhaveyur bahavas tava | ya eva syādasarvajñaḥ sa sarvajñaṃ na budhyate || sarvajño �navabuddhaś ca yenaiva syān nataṃ prati | tadvākyānāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ mūlājñāne �nyavākyavat ||

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claiming knowledge they do not possess, and opens one up to amultitude of irresolvable and contradictory claims, as discussed above.Kumārila�s hermeneutic of suspicion is absolute and uncompromising.Even God himself (were such a being to exist) could not be seen as areliable informant in supersensory matters. In the Sambandhākṣepapari-hāra section of the Ślokavārttika, Kumārila, having already set fortharguments against the existence of a creator God, goes on to show that,even if He did exist, no one could ever trust His claim that he createdthe world. As he says:

He could not be known by anybody, at any time.Even if he were perceived with his own form, the fact of his being the Creatorwould not be known. How could even the first beings in creation know this?They would not know how they were born here, or what the prior state of theworld was, or that Prajāpati is the creator.Nor could they have certain knowledge of this due to His own statement; for,even if he hadn�t created the world, He might say it, in order to promulgateHis own lordship.16

So no person, human or even divine, could be taken as a reliableinformant on matters beyond the scope of ordinary means ofknowledge. You can�t be too careful.

Yet, despite their thoroughgoing suspicion regarding thereliability of any person�s utterances, the Mīmāṃsakas are not skeptics.They believe in a soul, they believe in an afterlife, and they believe it ispossible for us to acquire reliable knowledge about such things. Buthow, in the light of the preceding arguments, can they believe anythingof the kind? Famously (or infamously) they do so by pushing aside theissue of personal authority altogether, by arguing that their ownscriptures are not they product of any authors at all�human or divine,yogically perceptive or otherwise�but are instead eternal and uncreatedtexts, passed down orally from teacher to student in a beginningless andunbroken chain of transmission. As we have seen from Kumārila�sarguments above, it is the �moment of revelation�, when the knowingauthor transmits his knowledge verbally to his perceptually limited

16 ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 57cd-60: na ca kaiścid asau jñātuṃ kadācid apiśakyate || svarūpeṇopalabdhe �pi sraṣṭr̥tvaṃ nāvagamyate | srṣ̥ṭyādyāḥ prāṇino ye cabudhyantām kiṃ nu te tadā || kuto vayam ihotpannā iti tāvan na jānate | prāgava-sthāṃ ca jagataḥ sraṣṭr̥tvaṃ ca prajāpateḥ || na ca tadvacanenaiṣāṃ pratipattiḥsuniścitā | asrṣ̥ṭvāpi hy asau brūyād ātmaiśvaryaprakāśanāt ||


hearers, that lies at the heart of the epistemic problem he finds withauthored scriptures. But in the case of the Veda, at least for theMīmāṃsakas, there is no moment of revelation. The text, and theknowledge it contains, are always already the property of many. Andone need postulate no extraordinary perceptual or cognitive abilities onthe part of the receivers and transmitters of the tradition in order toaccount for its epistemic effectiveness. As Kumārila explains:

Because it exists in many people, and because it is learned and rememberedwithin a single lifetime, there is nothing to impair independent authority in thecase of the Veda. And, if there were any alteration [of the Vedic text], it wouldbe prevented by many people. Whereas if [the text] were revealed to oneperson, it would be no different from one created [by that person].So, in this tradition, no one person is required.Many people can be dependent [on it]; for they are all men, just likenowadays.17

Knowledge of the Veda is thus always embedded in a community.There is no time, and has never been any time, when its hearers werefaced with the dilemma that confronted the Buddha�s first audience:Faced with a person who claims to �see� the ultimate nature of reality,how is one to judge his trustworthiness, or the accuracy of hisknowledge? Is one simply to accept his claims on faith? In the case ofthe Veda, there is not, and never has been any one person in whom oneneeds to place this kind of trust.

The key features of Kumārila's argument are thrown into reliefif we compare them with his discussion of the authority of smr̥ti texts inhis other major work, the Tantravārttika (TV), commenting on MS1.3.1-2. These texts are held to be the work of human authors (such asthe Mānavadharmaśāstra, held to be the work of the human sageManu), but are nevertheless held to be authoritative in matters ofdharma, since they are thought to contain a restatement of matterderived from lost or otherwise inaccessible Vedic texts (which aretherefore said to be �remembered� [smr ̥ta], rather than �heard� [śruta]).The hypothetical opponent (pūrvapakṣin) who presents the case againstthe Mīmāṃsā position here employs arguments strikingly similar to

17 ŚV, Codanā 149-151: anekapuruṣasthatvād ekatraiva ca janmani | grahaṇasmara-ṇād vede na svātantryaṃ vihanyate || anyathākaraṇe cāsya bahubhiḥ syān nivāraṇam| ekasya pratibhānaṃ tu krt̥akān na viśiṣyate || ataś ca saṃpradāye ca naikaḥ puruṣaiṣyate | bahavaḥ paratantrāḥ syuḥ sarve hy adyatvavan narāḥ ||

68 LAWRENCE MCCREA

those deployed by Kumārila himself in rejecting the authority ofscriptures composed by self-proclaimed �omniscient persons� such asthe Buddha or the Jina. We see the same invidious comparison withdeceptive �present day persons� (�Even nowadays some people are seento declaim things with no scriptural basis by passing them off asscripture�18), and the same problem of indeterminacy (�And, as in alegal proceeding in which the witness is dead, if one may postulate alost Vedic recension as the basis [for claims made in smr ̥ti texts], onecan take as authoritative anything that one pleases� 19), leading to thesame difficulty that even the scriptural claims of rival traditions couldbe validated on the same basis (�If [smr ̥ti texts] are supposed to bebased on lost Vedic recensions, then, by this means, it would follow thatall smr ̥tis�even those of Buddhists and the like�would be valid.� 20).The key distinction, for Kumārila, between the Mīmāṃsā defense ofauthored texts and that given by rival traditions such as Buddhism isthat the Mīmāṃsakas claim for smr ̥ti-authors such as Manu no specialinsight or sensory power beyond those observed in ordinary peoplenowadays�people �just like us�. 21 As Manu's text is universally held tobe valid among those who uphold the Vedic tradition, one mayreasonably infer that the claims he makes are themselves grounded inthat tradition, even if the specific Vedic texts which serve as the sourceof these claims are not presently accessible to us. There is nothingcontrary to our experience in supposing that Manu learned the truthsimparted in his work in the ordinary manner, by memorizing a Vedictext taught to him by an ordinary human teacher.22 The process by

18 dr̥śyante hy anāgamikān apy arthān āgamikatvādhyāropeṇa kecid adyatve 'pyabhidadhānāḥ (MD, Vol. 2, p. 71).

19 mr ̥tasākṣikavyavahāravac ca pralīnaśākhāmūlatvakalpanāyāṃ yasmai yad rocate satat pramāṇīkuryāt (MD, Vol. 2, p. 71).

20 yadi tu pralīnaśākhāmūlatā kalpyeta tataḥ sarvāsāṃ buddhādismr ̥tīnām apitaddvāraṃ prāmāṇyaṃ prasajyate (MD, Vol. 2, p. 74).

21 Kumārila specifically rejects the suggestion that Manu had any �capacity contrary tothose of the general class of all persons nowadays� (idānīṃtanasarvapuruṣajāti-viparītasāmarthya) which would allow him to directly experience the truths con-tained in his work; �this has been rejected,� he says, �in the discussion of omni-science� (etat sarvajñavāde nirākrt̥am)�seemingly referring back to his own dis-cussion in the Codanāsūtra section of his Ślokavārttika (MD, Vol. 2, p. 75).

22 As the scriptures of extra-Vedic traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism contradict,and indeed directly attack, the Vedas, and explicitly seek to ground their authority


which these Vedic texts may have been lost is likewise a part of oureveryday experience: �For even nowadays one sees that texts are lost,while their meanings are remembered.�23 Even when ascribing authorityto texts of human authorship, the Mīmāṃsakas retain the basicprinciples of the textual epistemology developed above: that no faithcan or should be put in statements which depend on claims ofsupernormal perception or insight, and that knowledge of otherworldlymatters, in order to be reliable, must always already belong to a(beginningless) community of knowers�ordinary persons likeourselves�and can never be made to depend on such claims ofepistemic privilege.

The Mīmāṃsakas� attempt to ground the reliability of Vedicscriptures on their eternality, and on the absence of any person whoeither composed or revealed them, whatever one may make of itsintrinsic philosophical merits, is a brilliant tactical move in theMīmāṃsā polemic against the their principle rivals, the Buddhists andthe Jainas. Because both traditions look back to historical founders,neither can claim, or would want to claim, authority for their scriptureson the only basis Kumārila�s argument allows for. It is an inescapablefeature of both traditions that their emergence into our world (at least inthe present time) is due to the teachings of their founders, and that thetrustworthiness of their central claims rests on the personal authority ofthese founders� own words. By calling the whole notion of personalauthority into question, the Mīmāṃsaka is able to avoid theinterminable and rather sterile �Our sages are better than your sages�sort of arguments that those (such as the Naiyāyikas) who defend thereliability of the Vedas by claiming omniscience for their authors, seemalways to be drawn into. They capitalize on the one feature that plainlysets the Vedic tradition apart from that of the Buddhists or the Jainas�its immemoriality.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhatt 1962 Govardhan P. Bhatt, The Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa School ofPūrva Mīmāṃsā. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies XVII, Varanasi

on the supernormal perceptual capacities of their founders, they cannot be plausiblysupposed to derive in this way from lost Vedic texts.

23 dr̥śyate hy adyatve 'py arthasmaraṇaṃ garnthanāśaś ca (MD, Vol. 2, p. 77).

1962.


70 LAWRENCE MCCREA

MD Mīmāṃsādarśana, ed. Vāsudeva Śāstrī Abhyaṅkar and Gaṇeśa-śāstrī Jośī, Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 97 [7 vols.], 2nd ed.,Poona 1970-1977.

RNĀ Ratnakīrti, Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali, ed. Anant Lal Thakur, TibetanSanskrit Works Series 3, Patna 1957.

ŚV Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika, ed. Rāma Śāstrī Tailaṅ-ga, Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 11, Benares 1898.

ŚV(S) The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Su-caritamiśra, ed. K. Sāmbaśiva Śāstrī, Trivandrum Sanskrit SeriesNos. 23, 29, and 31, Trivandrum 1927-1943.

ŚV(U) Umbeka, Ślokavārttikatātparyaṭīkā [2nd. ed.], ed. S.K. Rama-natha Sastri, revised by K. Kunjunni Raja and R. Thangaswamy,University of Madras, Madras 1971.

Taber 2005 John Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology, Rout-ledge Curzon, London/New York 2005.

TS Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṃgraha, ed. Embar Krishnamacharya,Gaekwad�s Oriental Series 31 [2 vols.], Baroda 1926.

J O H N T A B E R

Yoga and our Epistemic Predicament

In this paper I would like to consider the question, Is yogic ex-perience possible? It may seem odd, even inappropriate, that such aquestion would be asked at a conference on yogic perception, medita-tion, and altered states of consciousness. Surely, one would think, oneought to be able to assume the existence of the topic of the conference! Iraise this question, however, in order to draw attention to the somewhatawkward methodological predicament in which the participants of thisconference must find themselves. I suspect that most of us set ourselvesapart from our colleagues in our respective disciplines � and a widerange of fields are represented here � by our interest in yoga, yogic per-ception, and altered states of consciousness. I know that philosophers, atleast, tend to steer clear of these topics, which they lump together withparanormal phenomena, just as they avoid the topic of mysticism. Thereason is that the status of these states of consciousness, in the modernworld, is very much in doubt. By that I mean whether what people whohave such experiences report experiencing when they have them, reallyoccurs: whether a yogin or yoginī really sees past lives (where some-one�s �seeing� a certain state of affairs implies the existence of thatstate of affairs in same the way in which it visually appears to that per-son); whether he or she really sees events that will take place in the fu-ture, or really sees everything at once; and even whether he or she everreally sinks into a completely thoughtless state, a state of �pure con-sciousness� (i.e., samādhi or nirodhasamāpatti). In short, are thesestates of consciousness more than mere hallucinations? If not, whyshould they merit our attention?

Many, I believe, would respond that, regardless whether theyare hallucinations or not, they merit our attention because the belief inthem has played an important role in various societies and cultures. Thebelief in the supernormal cognition, even omniscience of the Buddha,for instance, played a central role in Buddhist apologetics in India in thefirst millennium C.E., as the basis for maintaining the authority of theBuddhist scriptures against the skepticism of outsiders. Altered states of

72 JOHN TABER

consciousness, whether they are authentic encounters with a transcen-dent reality, a spirit world, or just hallucinatory experiences, are as-signed a value and serve a variety of social functions in many othersocieties. Perhaps in our research we can focus on these aspects of thesephenomena, which can be observed empirically or documented textu-ally, and suspend judgement about their nature as experiences, i.e.,whether they belong to the category of veracious cognitions or to some-thing else?

This, however, will not do. Surely it is of the utmost signifi-cance if a particular society or culture attributes value to, and investsconsiderable cultural energy and resources in, something that is, at ba-sis, an illusion � just as it would be if a particular person were to buildhis life around a belief that is patently false, say, a belief in the exis-tence of some imaginary being. We would immediately suspect thatsome pathology is at work, distorting that society�s collective percep-tion of reality; and that would be a notable characteristic of that society,which a complete social-scientific or historical account of it could notvery well leave out. Indeed, this is precisely what Freud suggested is thecase for European society � a certain collective pathology supports ourbelief in a Supreme Being and sustains all the practices of religionwhich accompany it, which of course from a purely sociological or an-thropological perspective serve many useful social and cultural func-tions.1

Therefore, I raise at the outset of this conference the questionthat no one really wants to answer, and that is whether it is possible forus to accept reports of yogic experience and altered states of conscious-ness at face value, as veracious supernormal cognitive acts, e.g., actualperceptions of things which normally lie beyond the range of our sensefaculties (states of affairs in the past or the future, for instance), or, inthe case of samādhi in particular, as the removal of all objects altogetherfrom consciousness, without the extinguishing of consciousness itself.2

What conditions, specifically, would have to be met in order for us totake such claims seriously? I shall approach the question by examininga debate that actually took place in classical Indian philosophy, betweencertain highly orthodox representatives of the Brahmanical tradition on

1 See Freud 1961.2 Even in India in classical times doubts were raised about the possibility of samādhi.

See, e.g., Nyāyasūtra and Bhāṣya 4.2.38-40 (NBh 1090, 5 � 1092, 3).

YOGA AND OUR EPISTEMIC PREDICAMENT 73

the one hand, and defenders of the so-called heterodox traditions ofBuddhism and Jainism on the other, about the possibility of yogic per-ception.3 In this way we will not only become aware that we are not thefirst to consider this problem; we will also get a sense of how oneschool of thinkers, at least, went about solving it � by presuming to beable to prove that yogic perception is possible! An examination of theirproposed solution to this problem, I believe, will at least indicate, by itsstrengths and weaknesses, the basic elements that any affirmative an-swer to the question of whether yogic experience is possible shouldpossess.

Other scholars at this conference will also be referencing thisdebate, but my purpose will be rather different. They, for the most part,will be concerned with assessing it as historians, to determine the mean-ing and importance of the doctrine of yogic perception in classical In-dian thought. I, on the other hand, shall be assessing it as a philosopher,to determine who wins. For since we ourselves are interested, or shouldbe interested, in the question of whether yogic experience is possible, itis of particular interest to us to see whether a particular school of phi-losophers who thought they could prove that it is possible actually suc-ceeded in doing so.

In order to orient ourselves toward the problem of yogic percep-tion in Indian philosophy I shall rely on Eli Franco�s important study,Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth.4 One of Franco�s most sig-nificant achievements in that book was to work out a convincing ac-count of the �proof strategy� of the first chapter of Dharmakīrti�sPramāṇavārttika, a much discussed problem in Dharmakīrti scholar-ship. Dharmakīrti, who probably lived in the first half of the seventhcentury, was, together with his predecessor Dignāga (early to mid-sixthcentury), co-founder of the important logico-epistemological school ofBuddhist philosophy. One of the principal concerns of that school wasto place the authority of the Buddhist scriptures on a firm footing,which in Dignāga�s and Dharmakīrti�s period was being increasinglyeffectively challenged by Brahmanical thinkers. Franco shows thatDharmakīrti attempts to do this by actually employing a strategy origi-nally devised, perhaps, by one of the Brahmanical schools of philoso-

3 A remarkably similar debate took place in fourth-century China between Confuciansand Taoists about the existence of the Taoist immortal (hsien). See Ware 1967.

4 See Franco 1997.

74 JOHN TABER

phy, the Nyāya, in establishing the validity of their own scripture, theVeda.5 Nyāya philosophers believed the Veda to be true because it is avalid form of �testimony� (śabda), that is to say, it has an author or au-thors who are āpta, �reliable witnesses.�6 This was in marked contrastto the approach of another leading Brahmanical philosophical school ofthe classical period, the Mīmāṃsā, which held that the Veda should beconsidered true precisely because it is eternal and authorless � theMīmāṃsakas denied that the Veda was composed by human beings, oreven by God � for error in a statement or text can only derive from anauthor. According to the Nyāyabhāṣya, the earliest commentary on theNyāyasūtra to have come down to us, someone is an āpta if he or shepossesses the qualities of having (1) direct knowledge of things, (2)compassion toward living beings, and (3) a desire to teach things asthey are. Thus, one is able to determine that someone is an āpta, in gen-eral, by confirming his or her statements in regard to things one is ableto verify for oneself. One is able to determine that the �seers and teach-ers� of the Veda are āpta, in particular, by verifying the truth of theprescriptions of the Āyur and Atharva Vedas, which contain medicalremedies and magical formulas for curing diseases and averting otherevils. One assumes that all portions of the Veda have the same seers andteachers. By confirming the truth of certain parts of the Veda one can beconfident that the seers and teachers of the Veda are trustworthy in gen-eral, i.e., have the qualities required of those who are āpta, therefore,that all parts of the Veda are true.

Dharmakīrti appears to follow this strategy, Franco argues, byattempting to demonstrate in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter of his magnumopus, the Pramāṇavārttika, the validity of the Four Noble Truths, thecentral part of the Buddha�s teaching! Having confirmed for ourselves,through reasoning (with Dharmakīrti�s help), this, the most importantand profound doctrine expounded by the Buddha, we may be confidentthat the Buddha is an āpta (for Dharmakīrti the term āptavacana isequivalent for āgama, scripture), that he possesses all the qualities ex-pressed by the epithets of the famous dedicatory verse of Dignāga�sPramāṇasamuccaya, which Franco convincingly shows parallel the

5 Franco 1997, chap. 1, pp. 28 ff.6 The Nyāyabhāṣya refers to �the seers and teachers� (draṣṭāraḥ prayoktāraś ca) of

the Veda (NBh 568, 3-5), who were probably considered its composers. By the timeof Vācaspatimiśra the Veda is believed to have a single, divine author.



qualities of an āpta as presented in the Nyāyabhāṣya. Thus, one may beconfident that all the Buddha�s teachings are true, including in particu-lar his statements about the results of good and bad actions, which im-ply recommendations about how one should live � what should be doneand not done. In other words, we may be confident that the way of lifethe Buddha prescribed for his disciples � his �Dharma,� which deviatesin significant respects from the Dharma of the Brahmins as well as theway of life of the Jainas � will indeed lead to salvation, liberation fromthe cycle of rebirth, if not also well-being and prosperity on earth and inheaven.

Criticisms of the Buddhist attempt to demonstrate the authorityof the Buddha by other schools, in particular, the Mīmāṃsā, indicatethat they understood the Buddhist argument along these same lines. TheMīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila (also first half of the 7th c. C.E.) pointsout that expertise in one area does not necessarily transfer to another;just because someone is smart in grammar doesn�t means he knowsastronomy; and certainly, the fact that one knows a lot about the sorts ofthings we can know through perception and reasoning hardly impliesthat he is able to know anything about transcendent matters.7 Besides, ifwe have to verify the Four Noble Truths in order to be confident ofthem, it makes sense for us to verify other statements of the Buddha.Why, indeed, accept anyone�s word about anything?8 But the debatequickly came to focus on one particular implication of the claim that theBuddha had knowledge of Dharma, and that is that he was possessed ofsome kind of supernormal cognitive ability. Dharma pertains to thegood and bad results of actions. One ought to do X because doing Xwill yield a good result � pleasure or happiness; one ought to avoid Y

7 See TS, 3163-66, which cites Kumārila�s lost work the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.8 I am rather freely paraphrasing some of Kumārila�s points. See ŚV, Codanā 121 ff.;

for a more detailed account of Kumārila�s position see the contribution by LawrenceMcCrea in this volume. It should be kept in mind that in the first chapter of thePramāṇavārttika Dharmakīrti indicates that the reliability of someone�s statementsin regard to things we are able to confirm does not strictly establish the truth of hisstatements regarding other, supersensible things; for there is always the possibilityof a �deviation� (PVSV 167,23-168,3). Dignāga stated that the notion of the reliabil-ity of the statements of an āpta is an �inference� only �because there is no otherway� of being guided in acting in regard to supersensible matters, according toDharmakīrti (PV 1.216; PVSV 108, 1-6; 109, 19-22). Strictly speaking, Dharmakīrtisays, scripture is not a pramāṇa (PVSV 168, 2-3)!

76 JOHN TABER

because doing Y will yield a bad result � pain or suffering. But one isable to know such things only insofar as one is able to see that a certainaction committed in the past yielded a certain result and a certain actioncommitted in the present will yield a certain result. Knowledge ofDharma entails the ability to perceive states of affairs in the past and thefuture, which ability is beyond the scope of ordinary human beings � orso, at least, the Mīmāṃsaka insists. Or else, Dharma is simply �thatwhich ought to be done and avoided.� But that, too, most Indian phi-losophers believed, is something ordinary mortals are unable to knowindependently of scripture.9 The truth of the Buddha�s recommendationsabout how one should live, about what should and should not be done,believed to have originated from him and not some other scripturalsource, are thus called into question. In short, his statements about suchmatters cannot be trusted, because he had no way of knowing them.

Thus the debate about the possibility of supernormal cognition,synonymous in most texts with yogic perception, yogipratyakṣa, beginsin earnest across a broad range of texts in Indian philosophy. I do notintend to survey the history of this debate here. Rather, I will be con-cerned with what came to be the main Buddhist argument for the possi-bility of the Buddha�s omniscience, including especially his ability toknow the results of good and bad actions, which presupposes the powerto see the past and the future.10 I shall ask, what are we, in this day andage, to make of this argument? Is it at all persuasive? Does it really es-tablish that the perception of the past and the future, of things far away,very small (atoms), or concealed (beneath the earth), is possible? I shallconsider this argument in its mature form, as presented by Ratnakīrti inhis Sarvajñasiddhi, �Proof of an Omniscient Person.� This text, whichrepresents the culmination of a long development, was translated intoGerman by Gudrun Bühnemann in her doctoral dissertation, written

9 See Taber 2005: 51-56.10 The Buddhist argument under consideration here is actually presented as proving

only that the Buddha knew all things relevant to salvation, that is, as Dharmakīrtiputs it, �the reality of what is to be accepted and rejected and the means [thereto]�(PV 2.34), not absolutely every thing in every way. See SS 1, 9-19. Dharmakīrtisuggests that proving omniscience in the latter sense would be otiose, though someBuddhists clearly accepted it (see Jaini 1974); and it is not clear that the argumentfor the omniscience of the Buddha just in regard to all things relevant to Dharmadoesn�t actually imply total omniscience.


under the supervision of Prof. Ernst Steinkellner and published in1980.11

Before I turn to Ratnakīrti�s argument, however, I would like todraw attention to certain considerations that have shaped the attitudetoward the supernatural among philosophers in our culture and thereforedefine the context in which we think about it today. The category ofsupernatural or supernormal phenomena with which Western philoso-phers have traditionally been concerned has been, not yogic experience,of course, nor even extrasensory perception, but miracles, especiallybiblical miracles, which have been frequently cited by Christians asproof of the divinity of Jesus and of the authenticity of the Bible. Theclassic statement on this matter is that of David Hume in his An InquiryConcerning Human Understanding. It has provoked an extensive litera-ture, which continues to grow to this day.12

Hume�s concern was whether there can ever be a valid reason tobelieve that a miracle has occurred. He assumes that few of us ever wit-ness miracles ourselves, therefore the question becomes whether thetestimony of others can ever suffice to establish the occurrence of amiracle. Now trust in testimony, Hume observes, is founded on experi-ence. Normally, we notice, the statements of people conform to thefacts. Humans generally have decent memories, an inclination to tell thetruth, and a sense of probity accompanied by a sense of shame whendetected in a falsehood.13 Thus, we are inclined to believe what theysay. Yet, Hume says, �a wise man proportions his belief to the evi-dence,� 14 and we should take all the evidence into account. What speaksin favor of the credibility of testimony must be balanced against whatspeaks against it. We become suspicious of testimony, for example,when witnesses contradict each other; when they are few, or of doubtfulcharacter; when they have an interest in what they affirm, and so on. Inparticular, we become suspicious of testimony when it reports some-thing highly unusual. The improbability of the event testified to canindeed neutralize the authority of the person or persons testifying to it.Here Hume cites the Roman saying, �I would not believe such a story

11 See Bühnemann 1980.12 For a recent bibliography see Levine 1996. One of the most important recent contri-

butions is Coady 1992.13 Hume 1955: 119.14 Ibid., p. 118.

78 JOHN TABER

were it told to me by Cato.�15 Transposing this into Indian terms, theāptatva of a witness, based on considerations about the witness�s char-acter, his compassion and so forth, and even a solid track-record of cor-rect statements in the past, is not sufficient by itself to guarantee thetruth of what he says. It must still be weighed against the improbabilityof the fact to which he testifies.

From this Hume concludes that no testimony can ever be suffi-cient to establish a miracle, which by definition is a violation of thelaws of nature, hence contrary to all experience. Or else,

no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony can be ofsuch a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which itendeavors to establish; and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of ar-guments, so that the superior gives us an assurance suitable to that degree offorce which remains ... When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored tolife, I immediately consider with myself whether it be more probable that thisperson should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact, which he relates,should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and ac-cording to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and alwaysreject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more mi-raculous than the event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend tocommand my belief or opinion.16

One might think that while this analysis of testimony might pose aproblem for Christians, it doesn�t for Buddhists, since the Buddha wasnot given to reporting miracles. But he did make statements about theconsequences of actions, which have implications about right andwrong, about how one should conduct one�s life. For Indians in classi-cal times, as discussed above, that suggests that he had an ability toknow things that ordinary mortals are unable to know, specifically, thepast and the future. Such an ability is prima facie miraculous by Hume�sdefinition: it is contrary to common experience. Therefore, the Bud-dha�s statements, despite his authority established on the basis of ouralleged confirmation of the most important and profound part of histeachings, the Four Noble Truths, are called into question by the miracleor miracles that would have had to occur in order for them to be expres-sions of a valid state of knowledge on his part.

15 Ibid., p. 121.16 Ibid., pp. 123-4.


One can see from Hume�s discussion that the key to affirmingthe Buddha�s authority is to show how yogic experience is possible, andthat would seem to entail showing how it is not a violation of the laws ofnature, i.e., not really a miracle at all. In other words, one must suggesta plausible natural mechanism that can explain it. That is precisely whatRatnakīrti tries to do in his Sarvajñasiddhi.

Ratnakīrti�s central argument � unfortunately I do not havespace to treat his views comprehensively � goes roughly like this. If onethinks long enough and intensely enough about something, then theobject of one�s reflection will eventually present itself in propria per-sona: one will have a vivid, intuitive experience of the object as if itwere actually present. A lovesick man, obsessed with a beautifulmaiden, for example, and constantly thinking of her, will eventuallyexperience a vivid apparition of her, as if she were bodily present. Nowthe Buddha reflected on the Four Noble Truths uninterruptedly over along period of time; we may expect that this reflection eventually cul-minated in a vivid intuitive experience of the Four Noble Truths. Sincethe Four Noble Truths are universal in scope � they state that everythingis duḥkha, the cause of all duḥkha is desire, and so forth � his intuitionof those truths encompassed everything in the past, present, and future.And so, when the Four Noble Truths became vividly evident to him, theproperties of all things past, present, and future became evident to himas well.

I have of course taken liberties in paraphrasing the argument. Rat-nakīrti�s own formulation is closer to the following.

Any property or quality of the mind (cetoguṇa) which is accompanied by atten-tive, continuous, and sustained practice (abhyāsa) is capable of becoming vivid(sphuṭībhāvayogya), like the mental representation (ākāra) of a maiden of alovesick man. The mental representations of the Four Noble Truths of the Bud-dha are like that � they are mental qualities that were cultivated by attentive,continuous, and sustained practice. Hence they were capable of becoming vivid(SS 1, 20-25).

Ratnakīrti is aware of course that this does not directly prove the omnis-cience of the Buddha but just the possibility of a mental state achieving,through continuous repetition, a kind of intuitive quality (SS 4, 24 ff.).Vividness is the hallmark of perception for Ratnakīrti, as we shall see;hence, for any vivid, intuitive awareness there is a presumption in favorof its truth. It is only by further implication that the person who hasachieved a vivid intuition of the Four Noble Truths through this kind of


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practice can have a vivid intuition of all things in the past, present, andfuture, which comprise the subject of the propositions which are theFour Noble Truths (except perhaps the fourth) (SS 10, 18-21).17 It issufficient to establish merely this possibility, says Ratnakīrti, in order torefute those who deny there could be any cause of omniscience (i.e., theMīmāṃsakas and Cārvākas [materialist philosophers]) (SS 5, 12-13). Infact, if one maintained that a vivid intuition will arise from the constantrepetition of a particular mental state, then one would be inferring aneffect from its cause, which is illegitimate (SS 5, 4-5). That specificallythe Buddha had such a (veracious) intuition is then indicated by thecorrectness of his teachings of the momentariness and selflessness of allentities, which are established by other pramāṇas but which other sagesalleged to be omniscient reject (SS 6, 10-21) � that is to say, in effect,by his āptatva, his compassion and wisdom as established by our ownconfirmation of the truth of his main teachings. It would be impossibleto prove directly that a particular person such as the Buddha is omnis-cient, because there is no class of omniscient persons with which tocompare him and in which he would be included if he possessed a cer-tain characteristic mark.

Thus, the crux of Ratnakīrti�s proof is the attempt to establishthe possibility of bringing a cognition to complete vividness, in effectraising it to the status of a perception, through constant and intenserepetition.

The first thing that strikes the modern reader about the proof isthe example, which is supposed to ground the generalization that mentalstates that are practiced attentively, constantly, and over a long periodof time indeed yield vivid intuitions. What is Ratnakīrti talking aboutwhen he says that the lovesick man, obsessed with the maiden, eventu-ally sees her (as if) before his very eyes? This is not the sort of thingthat is often reported in our culture. Nor, for that matter, does it seem to

17 This, however, is from the Buddhist pūrvapakṣa of Vācaspatimiśra�s Nyāyakaṇikāwhich Ratnakīrti quotes (see below) � and the point is made in regard to knowledgeof the selflessnessness of all entities, not the Four Noble Truths. Ratnakīrti does notmake the point explicitly himself. Cf., however, TS 3440-42. McClintock 2000 of-fers an analysis of how Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla thought a cognition of all thingscould follow from the cognition of one general object, such as emptiness or selfless-ness. It should be noted, however, that the notion of omniscience as the ability toknow all objects at once is rejected in the Pali Canon. See Jaini 1974, 80-82.


have been a staple of Indian literature. Kuntidevī in the Mahābhārata isable to call into her presence the various gods, but she was given a man-tra to do that. Visualization practices are known throughout Tantric andsectarian Hindu literature, and of course bhāvanā has a lengthy historyin Buddhism prior to Ratnakīrti, but those are precisely the sorts oftechniques the efficacy of which is in question here. To cite them asexamples for establishing the connection of the logical reason of thisinference with the property-to-be-proved would be an obvious petitioprincipii. I shall return to this point presently. Vācaspatimiśra, however,the Brahmanical writer, in his discussion of this argument in hisNyāyakaṇikā, has the Buddhist maintaining that this is something wecan actually observe, if only indirectly. We know from the speech andgestures of a lovesick man that he finds himself in the presence of thewoman he is obsessed with, for he says, �Come, you enchanting crea-ture with the jug-like breasts, eyes of a deer, and slender, golden body �embrace me like the vine of the Kandalī plant. I fall down at yourfeet!�18 But if this is what Ratnakīrti is talking about, his example, at thesame time that it establishes the possibility of a very vivid intuitivecognition arising from constant and sustained reflection, also suggestsits falsehood. The lovesick man may indeed be seeing a beautifulwoman, but if we can�t see her, too, then she is not real!

Vācaspati raises essentially this objection in his discussion of anearlier version of the Buddhist argument in his Nyāyakaṇikā, whichRatnakīrti quotes at length in the Sarvajñasiddhi and attempts to refute(SS 10, 15 � 11, 25).19 (Vācaspati, by the way, is a somewhat puzzlingfigure in that he wrote, besides the Nyāyakaṇikā, in which he attacks thevery possibility of yogic perception, also a commentary on theYogasūtrabhāṣya, in which he takes all kinds of yogic experience veryseriously.) We will grant, Vācaspati says, that someone might produce avivid intuitive cognition of an object through constant reflection or con-templation (bhāvanā) on it, but that cognition will not be a pramāṇa, avalid means of knowledge; for, neither identical with nor arising fromthat object, it can deviate from it, that is, it can turn out that the object isquite different from how it is represented in the cognition. The Bud-

18 Adapted from Vidhivivekaḥ, 1218,10-1220,3. Dharmakīrti also suggests that thefact that a person is experiencing the object as if it is bodily present can be inferredfrom his behavior; see the contribution by Vincent Eltschinger in this volume.

19 In the Nyāyakaṇikā the discussion extends from 1214,8-1224,9.

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dha�s vivid intuitive cognition of all entities as duḥkha and so forth, as aresult of his meditation on the Four Noble Truths, which are proposi-tional in nature and which he arrived at presumably through some proc-ess of reasoning, did not actually arise from all the entities in the uni-verse, the ultimately real particulars themselves, but from his thoughtabout them. The Four Noble Truths refer to �everything� only in a gen-eral way; they do not specifically mention that entity A is duḥkha, entityB is duḥkha, and so forth. If one were to maintain that the Buddha�sintuitive cognition of all entities nevertheless arose indirectly from allultimately real particulars (svalakṣaṇas), in the same way that an infer-ential cognition of fire from the observation of smoke arises indirectlyfrom the svalakṣaṇa of fire that produces the svalakṣaṇa of smoke thatone observes, and in the same way that a vivid intuitive cognition of fireresulting from continuous and sustained contemplation on that inferredfire might be said to arise indirectly from the particular fire and thus becaused by its object � if one were to take this view, one must still ac-knowledge that the intuitive cognition of fire resulting from the medita-tion on the fire we inferred to exist from the heavy smoke rising from,say, the top of the ridge, is usually quite different from the searing blazewe are confronted with when we finally get to the top of the ridge! Ingeneral, says Vācaspati, the intuitive cognition resulting from bhāvanāis produced not by its object but by the bhāvanā � as if to say, it is astate of subjective effervescence or intensity engendered just by themental activity of contemplation. It can have an unreal object just aseasily as a real one, as we see indeed in the case of the lovesick man. Ifwe were ever to encounter such a person in our day we would tend todismiss him, saying something like, �He�s really worked himself into astate!�20

20 Dharmakīrti tries to escape this problem by stipulating that yogic perception must bereliable, saṃvādin (PV 3.286) � or else �consistent with a pramāṇa� (pramāṇa-saṃvādin), if one reads the verse according to Franco�s recommendation (seeFranco forthcoming). He recognizes that some of the meditational exercises thatform part of the preliminary path for the Buddhist adept achieve vivid, non-conceptual cognitions of unreal (abhūta), imagined objects, such as a corpse in vari-ous stages of decay (PV 3.284). For a yogic cognition to count as an instance of thepramāṇa perception its object must be established by other pramāṇas, in particular,reasoning. Thus, the chief, if not indeed the sole, object of (valid) yogic perceptionfor Dharmakīrti is the Four Noble Truths, which he establishes by means of reason-ing in the second chapter of his Pramāṇavārttika. See, again, the contribution by


Ratnakīrti�s response to this, which I take to be the main criti-cism of his argument as I have reconstructed it, is not unsophisticated;in the end, however, it does not seem completely satisfactory. Hestresses at the outset, partially in reply to objections raised by other au-thors, that the essence of perception does not consist in its being pro-duced by an external sense faculty, but in its involving the immediatepresentation of its object (sākṣātkāra) (SS 16, 32-33). The vivid intui-tive cognition of all things produced by bhāvanā on the Four NobleTruths is a mental cognition that immediately reveals its object andtherefore qualifies as a perception. �Just as the visual sense, withoutviolating its [normal] capacity, functions to produce its specific [visual]cognition dependent on an object located in an appropriate place, so themind, which is also a sense faculty, joined with bhāvanā on an existingobject, which opposes all ignorance, and reaching (prāpya!) an objectlocated in an appropriate place, will function to produce its specificcognition (svavijñānajanana)� (SS 17, 2-4). Just as visual perception ispossible without coming directly in contact with its object, so is mentalcognition � of objects in the past and the future � possible � but not foreveryone! The key here is the practice of a kind of bhāvanā that de-stroys the defilements that normally restrict the capacity of perceptionto objects proximate in time and space, in particular, bhāvanā on theFour Noble Truths or on the momentariness and selflessness of all enti-ties (SS 17, 4-14). Once one fully comprehends these things, ignoranceis destroyed, which uproots the other defilements (kleśas). This kind ofbhāvanā, which reveals the object as it truly is even though the mind isnot in immediate contact with it � in the same way, for the Buddhist, thesenses of vision and hearing apprehend their objects without being di-rectly in contact with them � must be said to arise from the object itself,and not just from the bhāvanā, and so it is a pramāṇa.

Vācaspati�s example of an intuitive cognition produced fromcontemplation on an inferred fire, which is seen not always to corre-spond to its object, is therefore a sheer fantasy and cannot be taken aschallenging the generalization the Buddhist really wants to establish,namely, that bhāvanā on an object yields a veracious intuitive cogni-

Vincent Eltschinger in this volume. The unfortunate consequence of this kind of ap-proach, as we shall see, is that it leaves no other example of yogic perception topoint to in proving the possibility of the Buddha�s perception of the Four NobleTruths.

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tion. No one would practice bhāvanā on a fire (SS 19, 21-25)!21 And itwould seem that the main point Ratnakīrti is emphasizing, that the kindof bhāvanā he is talking about is the kind that destroys ignorance, de-sire, and other defilements, thereby releasing perception from its usualconstraints (of proximity to its object in time and space, and so forth),could be used to turn aside the objection Vācaspati (and I) raised earlieragainst the example of the lovesick man, namely, that this is a case ofhallucination, not a valid cognition; for Ratnakīrti could say that in thiscase, too, we are not dealing with the right kind of bhāvanā, the kindthat really destroys the defilements and has the power immediately topresent its object as it really is. In fact, if there ever were a case of thewrong kind of bhāvanā, the type that would reinforce avidyā and theother defilements, not remove them, surely this is it!

Now, however, Ratnakīrti � the Buddhist � is faced with a newand equally serious problem, which in the end seems fatal to me. Hehas, in effect, in responding to Vacaspati's objections, revised his infer-ence so that it might be stated as follows:

The proper kind of bhāvanā focused on the right kind of object will yield a vera-cious, intuitive experience of that object. The Buddha�s contemplation of theFour Noble Truths was precisely that � the proper kind of bhāvanā focused onthe right kind of object. Therefore, the Buddha achieved a veracious, intuitiveexperience of the Four Noble Truths.

His problem now is that he is still in need of an example for his infer-ence, one that will support the generalization that the right kind of bhā-vanā on the right kind of object will lead to a veracious, intuitive ex-perience of the object. He needs an example, moreover, that is drawnfrom everyday experience; for the positive example of an inference mustbe siddha, not taken from the class of things to be proved but alreadyaccepted by both opponent and proponent. Obviously, Ratnakīrti can-not, in grounding the generalization on which his inference is based,appeal to the alleged fact that yogis have veracious, intuitive experi-ences as a result of the destruction of defilements by means of bhāvanāall the time! No such example from everyday experience, however, ap-pears to be forthcoming. This is hardly surprising; for it is of the es-sence of ordinary perception that it is restricted to objects that exist here

21 Someone who is cold will simply move toward a fire he has inferred, not contem-plate it.



and now, are of a certain magnitude, and directly affect the sense facul-ties. It�s beginning to look as if �you can�t get there from here,� youcan�t base an argument for the possibility of supernomal perception onobservations about everyday experience. Everyday experience speaksagainst the possibility of supernormal experience at every turn.

Ratnakīrti is also faced with a problem concerning the vyatirekaof his inference. The logical reason or hetu of an inference has to satisfynot only the requirement of anvaya, being found together with the prop-erty-to-be-proved, which is documented by the positive example, butalso the requirement of vyatireka, not being found to occur in the ab-sence of the property-to-be-proved, which is documented by a negativeexample. Is it the case, however, that no mental state that is practicedassiduously over a long period of time ever fails to yield a veracious,vivid intuitive cognition? Well, we certainly hear plenty of reports fromdisappointed meditators practicing all kinds of techniques, includingvisualization techniques, to the effect that the promised result nevercomes about: the object of meditation does not materialize even aftersustained and arduous practice. The only question is how long and harddoes one have to keep practicing without results before one deems thatthe generalization that such practice will eventually yield a vivid, vera-cious intuition is disconfirmed? In short, the relation between logicalreason and property-to-be-proved in this inference seems rather tenu-ous.

I think we can begin to see from this very brief treatment ofRatnakīrti�s main argument that, when it comes to the attempt to provethe possibility of supernormal, yogic experience by means of some kindof inference, anumāna, the skeptic � the Humean or the Mīmāṃsaka �will always have the advantage. The Mīmāṃsakas understood this verywell. For every proof, sādhana, of the omniscience of the Buddha thatthe Buddhist puts forward, they said, there will be a counterproof, apratisādhana. Whatever characteristics the Buddha might have thatspeak in favor of his possession of supernormal abilities � his longmeditation on momentariness and selflessness, which would seem todestroy ignorance along with all the other kleśas, his compassion andaccuracy concerning things we are able to verify for ourselves � will beoffset by all his other ordinary human characteristics, which indicate hereally wasn�t any different from the rest of us. (As a modern skepticmight put it: he had to put his pants on one leg at a time, just like us!)The Mīmāṃsaka lists among these mundane characteristics: his being

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an object of cognition, being an object of a valid means of knowledge,being a living being, a human being, a speaker, and possessed of sensefaculties.22

It seems, then, that the Buddhist cannot win at the anumāna (in-ference) game when it comes to debating about the existence of super-normal powers or beings with supernormal abilities. He cannot provethe possibility of supernormal perception by means of some inference.Inference, by its very nature, appeals to experience. It is therefore diffi-cult to see how it can ever reveal to us anything, even the possibility ofanything, beyond experience. This is what two of the greatest Indianthinkers outside the epistemological tradition, Bhartṛhari and Śaṅkara,pointed out. Reasoning cannot tell us about what lies beyond the senses,only scripture can. But this is hardly a satisfactory solution to the prob-lem of evidence for yoga and yogic experience that confronts the mod-ern yoga researcher!

It would seem that the Buddhist failure to prove the possibilityof yogic perception has implications for the question of whether yogicexperience is possible in general. The Buddhist case suggests that anyattempt to prove that yogic experience is possible is bound to fail. Forany proof � unless of course it is an a priori proof, which seems hardlyto come into question here � must somehow extrapolate from commonexperience; and our common experience of human cognition is that it isopposite in nature to yogic experience: it is characterized by intentional-ity (directedness toward objects) 23 and dependent on the stimulation ofthe nervous system by internal and external stimuli. More specifically,in order to show that yogic experience is possible, one must be able tosuggest a causal mechanism that could account for it. Any such mecha-nism, however, would have to be consistent with our scientific under-standing of nature, to which humans of course also belong � which un-derstanding must ultimately be based on common experience, includingobservations we make about normal human perception and other cogni-tive processes. Thus, it seems one could never prove yogic experienceto be possible. Indeed, the whole enterprise of attempting to devise

22 See SS p. 23, 11-14: sugato �sarvajñaḥ jñeyatvāt prameyatvāt sattvāt puruṣatvādvaktṛtvād indriyādimattvād ityādi rathyāpuruṣavat; cf. ŚV, Codanā 132; TS, 3156.

23 Samādhi, on the other hand, is depicted as a state of pure consciousness, awarenesswithout an object.


some kind of proof of the possibility of yogic experience seems funda-mentally misguided.

At the same time, however, it becomes apparent that one cannotprove that yogic experience is impossible, either. The fact that some-thing �violates the laws of nature� � i.e., the principles that underly ourscientific understanding of nature � does not establish its impossibility,as Hume seems to think, unless we are confident that those �laws� cap-ture the way things really are.24 We are sophisticated enough nowadays� we have obtained sufficient distance from the great discoveries thatrevolutionized Hume�s world � to know that that is unlikely. We knowthat the foundations of our scientific picture of the world are periodi-cally called into question and revised, and that we can, at any momentin the history of science, only be confident that we are progressingcloser toward a correct, comprehensive understanding of nature, butnever that we have finally arrived there. Moreover, we have becomeaware that science advances only by posing questions to which preciseand definite answers can be provided, which restricts its focus to a cer-tain range of phenomena; we are painfully aware that, for all the amaz-ing progress of the physical and social sciences, there is still much wedo not know. Under these circumstances, to consider compatibility with�the laws of nature� as science currently understands them the criterionof possibility would be rather arbitrary.

Nevertheless, this offers little if any succor to those who wouldlike to believe in yogic experiences. That something is not impossible ofcourse implies that it is possible, but mere theoretic possibility is hardlythe same as plausibility. The fact that something is incompatible withour scientific understanding of nature makes it, if not impossible, thencertainly extremely unlikely. Indeed, that may have been all that Humemeant when he referred to something as a �miracle.�

Let us now return to the situation of the yoga researcher and seeif these considerations somehow give us a new purchase on the problemof whether yogic experience is possible. The yoga researcher is faced

24 See Hume 1955: 122: �A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firmand unalterable experience has established those laws, the proof against a miracle,from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience canpossibly be imagined.� This passage suggests that �the laws of nature� Hume has inmind are ones to which we have epistemic access, hence the laws of nature as de-fined by contemporary science.

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with the following predicament: Over against the �impossibility� ofyogic experiences and altered states of consciousness stands the factthat they are widely, even cross-culturally, reported. Committed to ascientific view of the world, convinced that everything will eventuallyyield itself to a scientific � and that means a physical � explanation, onemay be inclined to adopt the position that there simply are no validclairvoyant or clairaudient experiences � no one ever really sees thingsin the past or the future, let alone all things at once � or genuine statesof objectless trance, and that reports of such experiences and the preoc-cupation with them in certain cultures or traditions have to be under-stood in terms of the role the idea of such experiences plays in them.Yet I believe that a yoga researcher may also reasonably resist this con-clusion, because it just presents us with another disturbing incongruity,namely, that certain cultures and traditions should attach so much im-portance to experiences that are essentially erroneous or hallucinatory.

Yet the latter researcher must also have a response to theHumean challenge: Shouldn�t reports of yogic experiences simply bedismissed on the grounds that they are violations of the so-called lawsof nature and therefore ipso facto undermine the credibility of anyonewho would report them? For, otherwise, on what basis could one everbelieve that such experiences actually occur? Here it must be noted,however, that Hume�s attitude � quite reminiscent, in fact, of theMīmāṃsā attitude that people and the world have always been, andpresumably will continue to be, more or less as they are today25 � whentaken to an extreme, becomes unreasonable and unscientific. If �thelaws of nature,� determined just by what we have experienced thus far,rigidly dictated what counts as valid experience, we would never learnanything really new. Columbus�s �discovery� of the New World wouldnever have been taken seriously � the �miracle of the fact� would havecancelled out the credibility of the witnesses � nor any other major geo-graphical, archaeological, and astronomical discovery of history. Wewould have dismissed out of hand reports of magnetism produced by anelectric current, x-rays, black holes, static electricity, vacuums, cloudchambers, and many, many other phenomena. In general, the Humeanprinciple that science immediately overrules reports of experiences in-consistent with it is insensitive to the fact that science and experience

25 Cf. ŚV, Codanā 113; cf. also McCrea�s paper in this volume.


exist in a kind of tension with each other. Our current scientific pictureof reality may tell us what is �possible,� but experience can call scien-tific theory into question and sometimes even overrule it � indeed, if itcouldn�t, science would not be empirical. Of course, that happens onlyin certain circumstances, which modern history of science has helped usto understand; in particular, it happens when the resources are availableto construct a new theory that not only accounts for the problematicphenomenon but also has greater overall predictive power and fecunditythan the old one. Moreover, the kind of experience to which science isattuned is, ideally, repeatable and intersubjectively verifiable, and yogicexperience is typically not like that. Nevertheless, in light of our mod-ern understanding of the dynamic relationship between scientific theoryand empirical observation, Hume�s attitude that an established scientifictheory should automatically overrule reports of experiences of phenom-ena that are inconsistent with it (because the �miracle of the fact� willalways be greater than the �miracle� that the testimony is false) seemstoo strong and even dogmatic.26

26 I have not attempted here to do justice to all of the subtleties of Hume�s position, letalone consider all the interpretations, revisions, and refinements of it that haveemerged in two-and-a-half centuries of discussion of it. Suffice it here to point outthat while Hume may have thought that testimony about the occurrence of a miracle,which by definition is a violation of the laws of nature, is a priori incredible, testi-mony about other extraordinary events, which are �analogous� to other eventsknown from experience, may be acceptable under certain circumstances. He consid-ers the case of �all authors, in all languages� agreeing that on January 1, 1600, theentire earth was plunged into darkness for eight days. �... Suppose that the traditionof this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people: that all travel-ers, who return from foreign countries, bring us accounts of the same tradition,without the least variation or contradiction: it is evident, that our present philoso-phers, instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain, and ought searchfor causes whence it might be derived� (Hume 1955: 137-8). One could argue thatyogic experience is more like this; it is less of a prodigy than an outright miracle �think of Moses turning the Nile into blood (Exodus 7:14-24), for example � andbears certain analogies to common experience. (Another Buddhist author,Śāntarakṣita, suggested, in attempting to prove the possibility of yogic perception,that it is analogous to the ability of certain animals to see in the dark or see greatdistances [see TS, 3404-6]. Moreover, he argued, directly contradicting theMīmāṃsaka, that just as one might increase one�s capacity to jump through constantpractice, so one can increase, proportionately to one�s practice, one�s mental powers[TS, 3424-30]. For that matter, the argument for the possibility of yogic perceptionfrom the observation that one may bring about a vivid, �intuitive� experience of an


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In summary, unable to prove either that yogic experience is pos-sible or that it is impossible, it would seem that one ought to suspendjudgement about the matter. But of course that leaves open the possibil-ity that yogic experience is possible, and that means, by application of awell-known rule of modal logic, that it is possible. But the mere theo-retic possibility of yogic experience is too thin a basis for taking reportsof yogic experience seriously, i.e., at face value. Those historians andsocial scientists who are inclined to do so require an additional, fairlypowerful reason. Such a reason, I believe, would be the conviction thatthe societies and traditions they study are inherently healthy and ra-tional. That they would attribute great value and importance to certainexperiences � even to the point of considering them the most importantexperiences one can have � that misrepresent reality and are rarely, ifever, confirmed, simply does not make sense. The urge simply to over-rule reports of experiences that are incompatible with our current scien-tific picture of reality, to which Hume has forcefully given expression,can reasonably be resisted by noting that, in the end � even taking intoaccount all the considerations brought to bear on this matter by propo-nents of scientific holism � our scientific picture of reality is built upfrom and justified by experience, not vice versa. Until we are confidentthat we have worked out a complete theory of nature, including humannature, we must continue to collect data with open minds, and thatmeans, we must willing to consider it at face value. Nevertheless, aslong as yogic experience remains incompatible with the picture of na-ture presented to us by the physical and biological sciences, it will con-tinue to be deeply problematic. The only thing that could eventually

object by constant meditation can be seen as pursuing this same strategy; it rendersit less incongruous by showing it to be continuous with other known phenomena.) Inlight of this, one might well argue that testimony about yogic experience should beaccepted because it actually meets Hume�s standard for acceptability, namely, itsfalsehood would be more improbable than the phenomenon it reports; for, as I havesuggested, given the importance vested in yogic experience and altered states ofconsciousness in so many cultures, the imaginary or illusory status of these experi-ences would be would be highly problematic. That, however, is ultimately a com-plex methodological question in the social sciences which also cannot be adequatelydealt with here. For a trenchant presentation of the dominant attitude toward reli-gious experience within the academic discipline of religious studies in North Amer-ica � with which this paper is of course completely at odds � one may consultMcCutcheon 2001.


dispel the air of mystery around yoga and yogic experience would be a(radically) revised theory of nature that can accommodate it � which,however, at this time is not on the horizon.

ABBREVATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bühnemann 1980 Gudrun Bühnemann, Der Allwissende Buddha. Ein Beweis undseine Probleme. Ratnakīrti�s Sarvajñasiddhi. Wiener Studien zurTibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 4. Wien 1980.

Coady 1992 C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: a Philosophical Study. Oxford 1992.Franco 1997 Eli Franco, Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth. Wiener

Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 38. Wien 1997.Franco forthcoming Eli Franco, �Perceptions of Yogis - Some Epistemological and

Metaphysical Considerations.� Proceedings of the 4th Interna-tional Dharmakīrti Conference. Wien, forthcoming

Freud 1961 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion. New York 1961.Levine 1996 Michael Levine, �Miracles.� Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-

phy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/miracles 1996.Hume 1955 David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed.

Charles W. Hendel, Indianapolis 1955.Jaini 1974 P. S. Jaini, �On the Sarvajñatva of Mahāvīra and the Buddha.� In:

Buddhist Studies in Honor of I. B. Horner. Dordrecht 1974McClintock 2000 Sara McClintock, �Knowing All through Knowing One: Mystical

Communion or Logical Trick in the Tattvasaṃgraha andTattvasaṃgrahapañjikā.� Journal of the International Associationof Buddhist Studies 23/2 2000.

McCutcheon 2001 Russell T. McCutcheon, Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing thePublic Study of Religion. Albany 2001.

Nyāyakaṇikā Vācaspatimiśra, Nyāyakaṇikā. In: Vidhiviveka.NBh Vātsyāyana, Nyāyabhāṣya. In: Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana�s

Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara�s Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra�s Tātparyaṭīkā& Viśvanātha�s Vṛtti, ed. Taranatha Nyayatarkatirtha andAmarendramohan Tarkatirtha. Calcutta 1983

PV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmkirtti with theCommentary �Vrtti� of Acharya Manorathanandin, ed. SwamiDwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Series 3. Varanasi 1968.

PVSV Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti. In: The Pramāṇavārttikamof Dharmakīrti: the First Chapter with the Autocommentary, ed.Raniero Gnoli, Serie Orientale Roma 23. Rome 1960.

ŚV Kumārilabhaṭṭa, Ślokavārttika. In: Ślokavārttika of Śrī KumārilaBhaṭṭa, with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasāra-thimiśra, ed. Svāmī Dvārikadāsa Śāstrī, Prāchyabhārati Series 10.Varanasi 1978.

SS Ratnakīrti, Sarvajñasiddhi. In: Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī, ed. Anan-talal Thakur, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 3. Patna 1975.

92 JOHN TABER

Taber 2005 John Taber, A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology. London2005.

TS Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha. In: Tattvasaṅgraha of ĀcāryaShāntarakṣita, with the Commentary �Pañjikā� of Shri Ka-malashīla, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati Se-ries 1-2. Varanasi 1981.

Vidhiviveka Maṇḍanamiśra, Vidhivivekaḥ with Commentary Nyāyakaṇikā ofVācaspatimiśraḥ and Supercommentaries Juṣadhvaṅkaraṇī andSvaditaṅkaraṅī of Parameśvaraḥ: the Pūrvapakṣa, ed. Elliot M.Stern, 4 vols., unpublished disser., University of Pennsylvania(Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1989).

Ware 1967 James R. Ware (trans.), Alchemy, Medicine, and Religion in theChina of A.D. 320: The Nei pien of Ko Hung (Pao-p�u tzu). Cam-bridge, Mass. 1967.

E L I F R A N C O

Meditation and MetaphysicsOn their Mutual Relationship in South Asian

Buddhism1

It is well known that Buddhism developed and prescribed a large num-ber of meditative exercises. It is equally well known that Buddhismdeveloped some highly original metaphysical doctrines, such as theanātman-doctrine, i.e., the doctrine that there is no soul and no sub-stance, the doctrine of momentariness, i.e., the doctrine that all things,even those that seem permanent such as stones and mountains, last foronly a moment, the doctrine of Emptiness of the Madhyamaka accord-ing to which nothing really exists and all things are but an illusion, orthe idealism of the Yogācāra which professes that the external world ismerely an image in our consciousness. However, it may be less wellknown that all metaphysical doctrines of Buddhism have their corre-spondence in meditative practice, and some of them may even havearisen from such practice.

There are at least two main reasons for this state of affairs. Firstthe general tendency in Indian thought to presuppose a correspondencetheory of truth. In other words, if the objects visualized by the yogi dur-ing meditation are to be considered true, they must have a correspon-dence in reality. In this respect, the perception or awareness of yogis isnot different from any other perception. The second reason is that in themajority of Buddhist traditions, Enlightenment, or liberating insight,

1 I would like to thank Lambert Schmithausen very warmly for personal and writtencomments on a previous draft of this paper and I regret that he was unable to com-ment on this final draft. I am also indebted to Karin Preisendanz who read severalversions of the paper and made highly perspicacious comments and suggestions atall stages. Further thanks go to Nobuyoshi Yamabe who kindly shared his thoughtswith me about the nature of meditation and its relation to philosophical theories.

94 ELI FRANCO

consists in a right insight into the true nature of reality.2 And this pro-found insight into the absolute truth, it is generally assumed, cannot beachieved only by way of rational thinking which is connected to con-cepts and language, but has to be deepened in meditation. One shouldnot only learn and think about the teachings of the Buddha, but alsomeditate upon them repeatedly. Thus, because Enlightenment is usuallyan insight into the true nature of the world, the metaphysical teachingswere being taught as subjects of meditation, and their content was pos-tulated as part of liberating insight. It goes without saying that this con-tent differs from tradition to tradition. In a realistic tradition the liberat-ing insight is an insight into the true nature of the final elements of exis-tence (dharma); in an illusionistic tradition it consists in the insight thatprecisely these elements are unreal.3

It is undisputed that there are close relationships between medi-tation and metaphysics in Buddhism. However, some scholars of Bud-dhism go as far as to claim that all metaphysical doctrines in Buddhismhave arisen from meditative practice, and indeed this opinion seems tobe widely spread. I will mention here only three of its most influentialvariants. Constantin Regamey claims that not only Buddhist philosophy,but Indian philosophy in general is the rational interpretation of mysti-cal experience (Regamey 1951: 251):

Notre philosophie est née de la curiosité et du besoin de savoir, d�expliquer lemonde d�une façon cohérente. En Inde la philosophie est l�interprétation ration-nelle de l�expérience mystique.

This is the most sweeping generalisation on the subject that I have comeacross so far. According to Regamey one would have to assume thatevery Indian philosophical theory, from the atomism and ontologicalcategories of the Vaiśeṣika to the logical developments of NavyaNyāya, is a rational interpretation of mystical experience. In a less

2 This in contradistinction to Jainism, where the means of liberation consists in theelimination of karma, or certain theistic systems, where liberation depends on thegrace of God, etc.

3 In addition to these two reasons, one may mention the subjective feeling of themeditating person, who sometimes feels transposed to another space (cf. for instancethe case of the dhyāna meditation below). The journey of the spirit is a phenomenonwell known from many cultures, even though the modalities of such journeys are notoften theorized.


MEDITATION AND METAPHYSICS 95

sweeping but similar manner Edward Conze, one of the most influentialBuddhist scholars in the second half of the twentieth century, states(Conze 1967: 213):

The cornerstone of my interpretation of Buddhism is the conviction, shared bynearly everyone, that it is essentially a doctrine of salvation, and that all its phi-losophical statements are subordinate to its soteriological purpose. This implies,not only that many philosophical problems are dismissed as idle speculations,but that each and every [philosophical] proposition must be considered in refer-ence to its spiritual intention and as a formulation of meditative experiences ... Icannot imagine any scholar wishing to challenge this methodological postulate�

However, the most influential formulation of this hypothesis was putforward by Lambert Schmithausen in his renowned paper �SpirituellePraxis und philosophische Theorie im Buddhismus� (Schmithausen1973: 1854):

Es scheint sich somit bei dieser Entwicklung von philosophischen Theorien ausspirituell-praktischen Ursprüngen um einen Vorgang zu handeln, der für diebuddhistische Geistesgeschichte geradezu t y p i s c h ist. ... Für die zentralen,das Ganze bestimmenden philosophischen Theorien gilt, dass sie, zum minde-sten zum größten Teil, unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsensein dürften.5

4 A shorter English version of this paper was published as �On the Problem of theRelation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism,� cf.Schmithausen 1976a. This shorter version was reprinted in Williams 2005: 242-254.

5 �It seems, therefore, that philosophical theories developing out of meditative exer-cises is a process that is really t y p i c a l for Buddhist intellectual history.It is valid to say that the central philosophical theories, which define the whole, mayhave directly arisen, at least for the most part, from spiritual practice (=meditativepractice).�The expression �spirituelle Praxis� can be understood, of course, in a very broadmanner. Indeed, any mental activity can be so described. However, if this term is todescribe something that is typical for Buddhism and to stand in contradistinction tophilosophical theory, its scope has to be narrowed down. Schmithausen defines �spi-rituelle Praxis� (p. 162) as �die geistige Seite religiöser Übungen, d.h. solcher Ü-bungen oder Handlungen, die direkt oder indirekt auf das Heil ausgerichtet sind. ImFalle des Buddhismus handelt es sich dabei vor allem um moralisch-ethische Übun-gen sowie um Versenkungspraktiken.� Since moral-ethical exercises are not furtherdiscussed in Schmithausen 1973 and 2005, and do not seem to be directly relevant tothe arising of metaphysical theories, I will confine my remarks to �Versenkungs-

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Unlike Regamey, Conze and others, Schmithausen does not only claimthat philosophical theories in Buddhism arose from meditative practice,but actually attempts to prove that this is the case. I will, therefore, con-fine my remarks to his paper.6

Schmithausen�s thesis is seductive because if it could be con-firmed, it would capture an essential and special characteristic of Bud-dhism that would distinguish it not only from Western philosophies andreligions, but also from other Indian traditions. However, the relation-ship between meditation and metaphysics is in my opinion more com-plex and heterogeneous, and I shall argue that its varieties cannot bereduced to a single homogeneous model.

Let me begin with two cases that fit Schmithausen�s hypothesiswell. The close relationship between meditation and metaphysics can beclearly seen in the case of dhyāna-meditation. This type of meditation isgenerally considered to belong to the earliest strata of the Buddhistcanon (see, for instance, Vetter 1988: 3ff.), and it already appearswithin the framework of the four noble truths. The fourth truth laconi-

praktiken� which I translate as �meditative practice,� �meditative state� or simply as�meditation.� Regamey uses the term �expérience mystique� to refer, presumably,to the same meditative experiences. Cf. also Schmithausen 1973: 165 where he re-fers to Conze�s thesis (Conze 1962: 251ff. cf. also May 1971) that the roots ofYogācāra are to be looked for above all (in erster Linie) in meditative practice, inopposition to Masuda�s hypothesis that the Yogācāra developed as a reaction to theabsolute Negativism of the Madhyamaka. In Schmithausen 2005: 247, Schmit-hausen also uses the expression �transphenomenal state� to refer to the Buddhistspiritual practice.

6 As I understand it, Schmithausen�s thesis clearly implies that all the important orcentral philosophical theories in Buddhism arose mainly from meditative practice.However, in what follows I will examine a number of philosophical theories that arenot discussed in his paper. In this respect, I may be going beyond his original inten-tion. Ideally, one would have to determine first what Schmithausen considers centraland what philosophy, but these are issues that I hope Schmithausen himself willclarify on a different occasion. In my opinion, all the philosophical doctrines dis-cussed below are central to Buddhism, but it goes without saying that others may beof a different opinion. On the use of the term �philosophical� here, cf. n. 55 below.I am however not the first to criticize Schmithausen�s thesis. An extensive criticismwas formulated in Robert Sharf�s impressive paper (Sharf 1995). A more limitedcriticism that concerns only the Yogācāra portion of Schmithausen�s paper wasvoiced in Bronkhorst 2000: 77-93. But my approach here is different and, I hope,has not been made redundant by these previous criticisms.


cally describes the path of a person from the moment he meets the Bud-dha and comes to realize that life is fundamentally frustrating, painfuland hopeless till the moment he reaches Enlightenment through medita-tion.

Right meditation, which is the culmination of the path, is di-vided into four stages. The first stage is characterized by bodily well-being (kāyasukha) and mental joy (prīti). This joy arises from the factthat one has succeeded in ridding oneself of one�s desires. Conceptualthinking, that is, thinking connected with language, continues at thisstage. When concentration further increases, one reaches the secondstage, at which conceptual thinking ceases. Bodily well-being and joycontinue, but they now arise directly from the power of meditation.When concentration increases even further, one reaches the third stage,at which joy is replaced by equanimity. Finally, at the fourth stage, evenbodily well-being disappears and absolute equanimity and lack of sen-sation are reached. In this fourth dhyāna the mind becomes absolutelyclear. One can remember one�s own previous lives and see how certaindeeds lead to certain results�good deeds to pleasant births, bad deedsto painful ones. Then, with the so-called divine eye one can observe thesame phenomena for countless other living beings. Finally, after oneperceives in this manner the entire saṃsāra both in time and in space,one reaches the certainty that the present life is one�s final life, that onewill not be born again.

It is interesting to note that this dhyāna meditation has (or better,has obtained in the late or post-canonical period) a cosmological corre-spondence. According to the Ābhidharmikas of the Conservative Bud-dhism, the world consists of three layers. The first, the layer of desire(kāma-dhātu), is the one we live in. On the top of it there is a secondlayer, the layer of desireless corporeality (rūpa-dhātu), and it corre-sponds precisely to the four stages of the dhyāna meditation (cf. AKBh3.2). The sixteen, seventeen or eighteen subdivisions of this cosmiclayer7 are divided into four groups that are also called dhyāna. More-over, the first three dhyānas are further divided each into three layerswhich correspond to weak (mṛdu), middle (madhya) and intense (adhi-

7 On the different opinions concerning the number of layers, cf. La Vallée Poussin,chapter 3: 2-3.

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mātra) concentrations. The fourth cosmic layer contains further layers,primarily those in which the Buddhist saints who no longer return to thelayer of desire (anāgāmin) stay till their definitive disappearance intonirvāṇa.8

The highest cosmic layer, the ārūpya-dhātu, the layer that lackscorporeality, corresponds in its fourfold division to a division of stagesof another type of meditation. In the ārūpya meditation, the yogi turnshis mind to a succession of objects, each subtler than the preceding one.The starting point of this meditation is the so-called kasina exercise.The yogi concentrates on an object, such as a piece of earth or a patchof color, until he no longer observes a difference between the innermental image and the immediately perceived image. In other words, theyogi sees the object just as clearly and vividly with closed as with openeyes. The yogi can then stand up and go elsewhere taking the imagewith him. Now he has to concentrate on this image until a second imageis produced; i.e., the first image functions as the immediate image of theexternal object and it gives rise to a second mental reflex. When theyogi observes this secondary image for a long time, it disintegrates andfades away slowly, and in its place the incorporeal presentation of theinfinity of space appears. Herewith the first stage of the ārūpya medita-tion is attained.

After meditating on the infinity of space (ākāśānantya), the yoginaturally moves on to meditate on the infinity of the mind or conscious-

8 Unfortunately I was unable to find a visual description of the three layers in Indianor Tibetan art. As a rule, only the lowest layer, the layer of desire, is depicted. Thisis understandable, for the abstract content of the layer of desireless corporeality(rūpa-dhātu) and of lack of corporeality (ārūpya-dhātu) cannot be easily illustrated.Martin Brauen, in his book The Mandala: Sacred Circle in Tibetan Buddhism, hasgenerated a computer model according to the ancient descriptions. This model is ba-sically the same as the one in the Abhidharmakośa, but differs in some detail be-cause Brauen follows the Kālacakra cosmology. For instance, Mount Meru is roundand not quadrangular. A reproduction of a modern painting of the three dhātus canbe found in the catalogue of �The Tibet Exhibition in Japan 1983� (Tokyo: MainichiCommunications, 1983) plate nr. Tsu 77. According to the catalogue it is oftenplaced at the entrance of Tibetan temples, paired with a saṃsāracakra. For sketchesillustrating Buddhist cosmology according to the Pāli tradition, cf. Adolf Bastian1894.


ness (vijñānānantya);9 next the stage of nothingness (ākiñcanya) isreached, i.e., the meditation has no object whatsoever. Finally, withoutan object consciousness becomes so weak that it hardly deserves itsname. Accordingly, this stage of meditation is called �neither con-sciousness nor non-consciousness� (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā).10 When thismeditation is further intensified, consciousness disappears altogether.The meditation now has neither subject nor object. This stage is calledsaṃjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti, i.e., the meditation which consists inthe suppression of consciousness and feelings. Because at this stage allconsciousness and feelings disappear, this state of meditation has nocosmological correspondence. At this stage the yogi is almost dead; hisbody is unconscious and numb like a corpse. Only by his bodily heatcan one may know that he is still alive.11

We thus see that the psychological aspects of the dhyāna medi-tation have a cosmological correspondence, whereas in the case of theārūpya meditation there is cosmological correspondence to the object ofmeditation as well as to a special state of consciousness of the meditat-ing person. What does this mean? In the first case, one could understandthat the yogi or the yogi�s mind is transposed to the corresponding cos-mological region through the attainment of a special state of mind. Fur-ther, all living beings inhabiting this region experience this state ofmind or are somehow connected to it. In the second case, the content ofthe meditation in the first two stages corresponds to a cosmic realm andto cosmic (material, but not corporeal) elements; in the next two stages,by attaining a special state of consciousness, the yogi is transposed to aspecific cosmic realm in a manner comparable to the case of the dhyānameditation. The �suppression of consciousness and feeling,� where bothobject and subject are eliminated, has no cosmic or ontological corre-spondence because there is nothing left to be corresponded to.

9 Note that consciousness was considered to be a cosmic element which consists insubtle incorporeal matter, obviously even more subtle than space (or ether � ākāśa)which is also material but not corporeal. Cf. Langer 2001, esp. 43-50.

10 According to the Buddhist tradition, the Buddha practiced this meditation with histeachers Ārāḍa Kālāma and Rudraka Rāmaputra. It thus may be a pre-Buddhist formof meditation.

11 One more factor distinguishes the yogi from a corpse, namely, the power of life(āyus), but this factor is, of course, not observable.


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The case of dhyāna meditation and at least the last two stages ofthe ārūpya meditation seem to confirm Schmithausen thesis. However,these practices cannot be taken to represent all meditations in Bud-dhism. There are other meditative exercises that have their metaphysicalcorrespondences in the sense that they reflect the ultimate reality ac-cording to various ontological doctrines, for instance, the selflessness,the substancelessness and the momentariness of all existing things. Yetin the case of these exercises, Schmithausen�s thesis does not worksmoothly.

Schmithausen himself has retracted his thesis that the doctrineof momentariness of all things has arisen from spiritual practice(Schmithausen 1976b: 285f., and n. 5). But is this the exception thatconfirms the rule or is it the clear case that refutes it? I will argue for thelatter alternative by pointing out that momentariness is not a single treein the savannah. There are indeed other conspicuous doctrines that cer-tainly qualify as �central philosophical theories� and which are nottaken into consideration by Schmithausen in the above-mentioned pa-per. Two such doctrines that immediately come to mind are the doctrineof Dependent Origination (pratītyasamutpāda) and the Sarvāstivādatheory of existence of past and future objects. Concerning the former,there is hardly any need to argue that it did not directly arise from medi-tation or spiritual practice. Schmithausen himself has contributed a fun-damental study of this doctrine, where he argues that the list of twelvemembers as we know it today is the result of three different lists thatwere put together in the course of a development that is reflected in theheterogeneous materials of the Pāli canon (cf. Schmithausen 2000). Inthis case, I assume, Schmithausen himself would argue for systematiza-tions of earlier lists and redactional motives, rather than spiritual prac-tice, as decisive for the origin of the doctrine. As for the doctrine ofrebirth as such that is reflected in most if not all these lists, it is pre-Buddhist in origin and is presupposed and taken for granted in the earli-est strata of the Pāli canon. Thus, it too cannot have arisen from medita-tion, at least not from Buddhist meditation.12

12 Thus, it is excluded by Schmithausen from his investigation; cf. the beginning of hispaper (Schmithausen 2005: 243): �Thus, the philosophical theories whose relation tospiritual practice I am going to discuss in this article are those which are exclusivelyBuddhists and which are freshly developed by Buddhism.� Also uncertain would be


The Sarvāstivāda theory that all final elements of existence(dharma) exist in all three times (past, present and future) also presentsa clear case of a central philosophical theory that was not developedfrom meditative practice. The Abhidharmakośa provides four reasonsfor this counterintuitive doctrine. The first reason is simply that theBuddha himself said so. In a similar vein, the second reason is that thisdoctrine is implied by certain statements of the Buddha. The third rea-son has to do with the tenet that every moment of awareness is sup-posed to have an objective support. Thus, recollection too requires suchsupport, and that support must be a past object; similarly, certain cogni-tions have future objects and thus future objects must exist. Finally, pastobjects must be assumed in order to account for the functioning of thelaw of karma, more specifically, to account for the fact that a past actcan produce its result in the future, long after the act was committed.13

In connection with this tenet, four philosophical theories of timewere developed that aim to explain the difference between past, presentand future objects (cf. Stcherbatsky 1923: 78-80). None of these theo-ries seems to have arisen from spiritual practice. On the contrary, theyseem to be theoretical reflections meant to reduce the difference be-tween past, present and future objects to a bare minimum.

Similarly, the Sarvāstivāda theory that every element of exis-tence is accompanied by four characteristic entities (lakṣaṇas) responsi-ble for its arising, subsistence, decay and destruction and by four secon-dary characteristic entities (anulakṣaṇas) that play a part in the causa-tion of the first four entities is clearly due to theoretical reflectionsabout causality and the philosophical inclination to avoid infinite re-gress. They also reflect the rejection of the idea of a substance and aspecial hermeneutical approach towards the canonical writings, butthere is no evidence to connect their origin to meditative practice. 14

Furthermore, the postulation of the three eternal entities, space-ether (ākāśa), �suppression through careful consideration� (pratisaṃ-

the assumption that the various lists found in the Pāli canon are �exclusively Bud-dhist,� but even if they are, whether they are due to mystical experience, introspec-tion, rational investigation or other sources is anybody�s guess.

13 Cf. AKBh 5.24, p. 295, translated by de La Vallée Poussin, chapter 5 : 50-51.14 Cf. AKBh 2.45cd-46ab, p. 75.19ff., translated by de La Vallée Poussin, chapter 2:

222ff.

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khyānirodha) and �suppression without careful consideration� (aprati-saṃkhyānirodha), as well the factors dissociated from thought (citta-viprayuktasaṃskāra) could hardly be said to have arisen immediatelyfrom meditative experience. It seems rather that the Sarvāstivāda, likethe Ābhidharmikas of other schools, were analytically striving to iden-tify and systematize the final constituents of physical and mental realityin dependence on canonical materials.

This concern is also apparent in the so-called abhisamayavāda(�the doctrine of intuitive grasp�) of Dharmaśrī with its ten �propensi-ties� (anuśaya) and sixteen aspects of the four noble truths. Accordingto Frauwallner, who made a detailed study of the historical developmentof this theory,15 it did not arise from spiritual practice. In fact, it is ques-tionable whether the entire Abhidharma enterprise, from the early lists(mātṛkā)16 to the later developments by Vasubandhu and Saṅgha-bhadra,17 can be said to have arisen from meditation or spiritual prac-tice, rather than the collection, organization, systematization and theo-retical development of canonical materials.

The Conservative Buddhists developed a considerable numberof philosophical theories about matter, causation, space and time, andabout epistemological, ethical and soteriological issues. Practically noneof them were taken into consideration by Schmithausen (who probablydid not consider them to be central) or by any of the other scholars whogeneralized the origin of Buddhist philosophical theories. It is sufficientto leaf through a work such as Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu)18 tounderstand the extent of the disagreement among the various Buddhistschools, and to see how difficult, not to say impossible, would be the

15 Cf. Frauwallner 1971a; English translation in Frauwallner 1995: 149-184.16 On the mātṛkās and their relationship to meditation, cf. Gethin 1993. On the tradi-

tional account of the arising of mātṛkās, cf. DN 33, where the Buddha asks Śāriputrato prepare lists summarizing his (the Buddha�s) teachings in order to prevent strifeamong his disciples after his death, as was the case among the disciples of the Jina.Thus, at least according to the traditional account, the mātṛkās have not arisen frommeditative experience, but from the practical necessity to determine, secure andsummarize the Buddha�s teaching.

17 On Saṅghabhadra, cf. Cox 1995.18 Cf. Aung and Rhys Davids 1969. An extensive list of theses of controversy among

Conservative Buddhists was conveniently presented in Bareau 1955: 260-289. Note,however, that many of these points of controversy are not philosophical in nature.


task of anyone wishing to establish the origin of all philosophical theo-ries in Buddhism, even if one were to limit oneself to the most impor-tant ones. Interestingly, meditation does not seem to play a role in thephilosophical debates documented in the Kathāvatthu. (On the otherhand, it plays a decisive role in the doctrines that are rejected as harmfulin the Brahmajālasutta; cf. below.)

In what follows I shall mostly limit myself to those theoriestaken into consideration by Schmithausen. Perhaps the most importantand typical theory of Conservative Buddhism is the anātman theory, thetheory that there is no Self or Soul. This theory was indeed consideredby Schmithausen, but the evidence he adduces for the hypothesis that ithas its origin in meditative experience is rather meager. Schmithausen isone of the most learned scholars of Buddhism of our time, and yet forthe negation of the Soul (ātman) in meditation he could find no earliertestimony than Candrakīrti�s Madhyamakāvatāra,19 (sixth century CE),which was composed many centuries after the establishment of thisdoctrine. Furthermore, in recent times an alternative explanation of theorigin of the anātman doctrine has been proposed, namely, that it devel-oped not from spiritual practice, but as a reaction to the pudgala theoryof the Vātsīputrīyas.20 This hypothesis, however, was suggested afterSchmithausen�s paper was written and thus he could not take it intoaccount while formulating his thesis. In any case, it is a reasonable al-ternative hypothesis that casts serious doubts on Schmithausen�s as-sumption that the anātman theory was developed from meditative prac-tice.

19 Cf. Schmithausen 1973, note 55 which quotes Madhyamakāvatāra VI 120.20 Cf. Steinkellner 2002: 183: �Die theoretische Lehre von �Nicht-Selbst� (anātmavā-

da) als eines philosophischen Dogmas verdankt ihre Entstehung offenbar nicht demBedürfnis, diese Praxis ontologisch abzustützen, sondern der Notwendigkeit, eineeinflussreiche Fehlentwicklung zurückzudrängen, nämlich die Lehre von der soge-nannten �Person� (pudgala), die ein Mönch Vātsīputra um 300 v.u.Z. vertreten hat.�Possibly the same opinion, though formulated more vaguely and in a less committedmanner, is expressed by Vetter 1988: 42-44. An earlier formulation�or at least byway of implication�of this opinion is to be found in Frauwallner 1971b: 121 (=[9]),where Vātsīputra�s doctrine of pudgala is said to have broken the ice: �Damit wargewissermaßen das Eis gebrochen. Nun begann man auch andere Probleme zu über-denken und, wenn es nötig schien, die überkommenen Lehren weiterzubilden oderumzuformen.� Cf. also the quotation in the next note.

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This inevitably leads us to the question about the origin of thepudgala theory. Is there any evidence to connect its origin to meditativeexperience or was it motivated, as Frauwallner and others assume, bythe need to fill a theoretical gap in the canonical materials?21 And whilewe are at it, is there any evidence to connect the origin of the doctrine ofthe five groups (pañcaskandha) of the empirical person to meditativepractice? This concept is ubiquitously present in the Pāli canon, but weknow nothing about its origin. For all we know, it may not even beBuddhist in origin.

The doctrine of anātman as we know it from the post-canonicalliterature must have meant at its first stage that human beings, or livingbeings in general, lack a permanent Self or Soul. However, sooner orlater it was reinterpreted in a more general way to mean that all thingslack substance. Could one maintain that the development of this moresweeping doctrine is due to meditation? Again, evidence is lacking andone could make up various scenarios all equally speculative.

To conclude the discussion on Conservative Buddhism, let usbriefly consider the four noble truths. Surely, one may think, if any phi-losophical theory originated from meditation in an immediate manner,this so-called original message of the Buddha would be it. However,such an assumption is highly unlikely. Bareau, who closely studied allextant versions of the text, concluded that it is �not only apocryphal, butrather late.�22 This in itself need not refute the thesis that the four nobletruths originated from meditation, but there are at least two reasonsagainst such an assumption and they both concern the fourth truth. First,there is some evidence to suggest that this truth was added to the firstthree at a later stage.23 But more importantly, the fourth truth presup-

21 Cf. Frauwallner1971b: 121: �Aber der Buddha ist ihr [der Frage nach dem Ich]ausgewichen, weil er wußte, daß sie zu endlosen theoretischen Streitigkeiten führenwürde � Dieses Vermeiden einer klaren Aussage hat sich im allgemeinen behauptetund auch bewährt. Aber es war nicht zu vermeiden, dass sich die Frage nach demIch schließlich doch wieder vordrängte.�

22 Cf. Bareau 1963 : 180: �[L]e texte de ce premier sermon, tel que nous le trouvonsdans les trois Vinaya, est non seulement apocryphe, mais assez tardif.�

23 The fourth truth is sometimes transmitted without the first three, notably in theDharmacakrapravartana-sūtra, and it is also formulated in a different style. It ispossible that the third truth was originally the truth of the path (i.e., the way to avoidsuffering is to eliminate its cause, desire) and that the function of representing the



poses the saṅgha (monastic order), and its content has as much to dowith monastic rules and the way of life befitting a monk (or a nun) aswith meditative practice. Its eight members summarize the career of amonk from the moment he meets the Buddha and arrives at the rightview that the Buddha�s way is the right way towards eliminating suffer-ing till the moment he reaches enlightenment by the right meditation.

Thus, it seems that in Conservative Buddhism most philosophi-cal doctrines did not originate directly from meditative practice. How-ever, can it be said that they originated indirectly from such practice?Before we can answer this question, we have to understand what couldbe meant by �originating indirectly.� If we understand this phrase asoriginating primarily from philosophical reflection on meditative prac-tice,24 one could still maintain that most philosophical theories wouldnot fulfill this requirement, or more precisely, that we lack decisiveevidence that they do. If, on the other hand, we were satisfied to waterdown the qualification of �indirectly originating� to �origination some-how connected,� the qualification may be true, but trivial. Everything isindirectly connected to everything, and nobody disputes that meditationis a central phenomenon in Buddhism.

Let us turn now to the fundamental metaphysical doctrines ofthe Mahāyāna. Shortly before or after the beginning of the Common Erasomething extraordinary happened in the history of Buddhism. A largenumber of apocrypha, the Mahāyānasūtras, were composed by Buddhistmonks, or perhaps even lay persons, in which radically new teachingswere attributed to the Buddha. These teachings stand in clear contradic-tion to what was known of the Buddha�s teachings until then. The basicfundamental teaching of the Mahāyāna is the so-called illusionism, thedoctrine that all elements of existence (dharma) are illusory, unreal, donot really exist. Even the Buddha himself was an illusion. Furthermore,

path was taken over by the fourth truth when it was appended to the first three.Needless to say, a thorough investigation would be required to prove such an as-sumption.

24 In contradistinction to, say, being developed in a different context and later appliedto spiritual practice (as could be the case of the five skandhas), or being due to sys-tematization of older materials (as could be the case of pratītyasamutpāda), or ageneralization of an already existing philosophical theory (as could be the case forthe doctrine of no-soul to the doctrine of no-substance).

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desire and suffering too are illusions, and this means that all living be-ings, who do not really exist, are also not really tormented by unrealsuffering, which cannot arise from an unreal illusion. Nirvāṇa as thelack of suffering has thus always been there. Therefore, one may saythat there is no difference between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra.

Of course, these new apocrypha caused protests and oppositionfrom the Conservative Buddhists. However, it was apparently not soeasy to prove that the new Sūtras were falsifications of the originalteachings of the Buddha. The protests of the Conservative Buddhists (orMainstream Buddhists, to use Paul Harrison�s expression) could notprevail; even worse: the Conservative Buddhists were presented asfools. Their canonical sermons and other teachings ascribed to the Bud-dha which they transmitted orally and later on in written form wereconsidered to be half-truths and thereby disparaged. Only the Mahā-yānasūtras contain the absolute truth. The Hīnayānasūtras are merelyaddressed at monks who are not mature enough to receive the ultimatetruth.

The Mahāyāna movement is undoubtedly one of the most suc-cessful religious movements ever. Nowadays it is still alive in Tibet, inMongolia and East Asia (China, Korea, Japan). One of the reasons whythe Mahāyāna apocrypha could be so successful is that the compositionof Buddhist apocrypha had begun much earlier.25 Next to the canonicalcollections, independent works (muktaka) were always circulating,some of which were designated as apocrypha, lit., �superimposed�(adhyāropita). This phenomenon is mentioned already in the Pāli canon.Lamotte (1974: 180) refers to two passages, in Samyuttanikāya (II, 267)and Aṅguttaranikāya (I, 72-73),26 in which the Buddha prophesizes thatthe authentic sūtras will disappear and that people will believe in apoc-rypha composed by poets (kavikata).

The oldest Mahāyānasūtra is considered to be the AṣṭasāhasrikāPrajñāpāramitā, The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand verses.27

25 The authenticity of treatises and sermons ascribed to the Buddha was a problem thatall schools of Buddhism (including Madhyamaka and Yogācāra) had to face, andseveral attempts were made to formulate criteria for the authenticity of Buddhist sū-tras; cf. Lamotte 1988, Skilling 2000 and Mathes forthcoming.

26 Both references are to the editions of the Pali Text Society.27 For an extensive summary, cf. Conze 1975.


It is a relatively extensive work; an English translation would probablyrun for more than a thousand pages. The Sūtra was translated into Chi-nese already in 179 CE by Lokakṣema. Now, what is the perfection ofwisdom that is repeatedly praised in this Sūtra? It is the insight that allfinal elements of existence (dharmas) are unreal, and this insight is real-ized during a meditation that causes the suppression of all conscious-ness and feelings. In other words, when the perfection of wisdom isattained, the world disappears; all dharmas vanish and nothing remains:neither objects, nor feelings, nor consciousness. This state is similar tothe one attained in the nirodhasamāpatti mentioned above, but there isone important difference: the content of this meditation corresponds toabsolute reality. When the yogi emerges from the meditative state, hegeneralizes his experience: Just as all final elements of existence do notexist during meditative state, they not exist outside of it. The wholeworld is but an illusion; it contains elements of existence that only ap-pear to be real, but in fact are empty and unreal. The correspondencebetween the content of the meditation and the metaphysical truth isclear: The absence of the final elements of existence during meditationreflects their inexistence in reality.

Can we conclude that this counterintuitive doctrine has arisenfrom meditative practice? I fail to see that there is evidence for such aconclusion. There are at least three possible hypotheses that may ac-count for the development of the Perfection of Wisdom. One based onphilosophical reflection: One may claim that qualities can only exist assomething supported by a substance, and if substances do not exist,qualities cannot exist either. And if there are neither substances norqualities, nothing exists. Alternatively, one may explain the origin ofthe Mahāyāna Illusionism as a generalization of the meditative �experi-ence� in the nirodhasamāpatti. A third hypothesis was proposed byFrauwallner, who assumed that the Mahāyāna philosophy is due to themystical experience of the highest Being (höchstes Sein) and the ten-dency to assume that only this Being is real (cf. Frauwallner 1994: 144).As far as I can see, the question whether philosophical reasoning orspiritual practice is responsible for the arising of the Mahāyāna illusion-ism cannot be answered because the relevant materials are lacking. The

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doctrine is absent in the old canonical literature,28 and it is already pre-supposed by the earliest Mahāyānasūtras. In other words, either theevidence that may have let us determine the origin of this doctrine is nolonger available, or the doctrine came into the world like the aupapādu-kas, or Athena from Zeus� forehead, in a fully developed form and thusprovides no clues for determining the context of its arising. Therefore, itseems preferable in this case to suspend judgment and refrain from put-ting forward hypotheses about its origin.

On the basis of the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras, Nāgārjuna (fl. 2nd-3rd c.CE) developed the Madhyamaka philosophy, especially in his Mūla-madhyamakakārikā, which is considered the foundational text of thisschool. Schmithausen is silent on the Madhyamaka philosophy. Primafacie, however, it would be rather difficult to prove that the argumenta-tive philosophy of Nāgārjuna is the result of meditative experience,especially after a series of studies by Claus Oetke that bear on this sub-ject (for instance, Oetke 1988).

However, Schmithausen�s pièce de résistance is no doubt theYogācāra system and the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā. It seems, in fact,that Schmithausen first developed his thesis in the context of his inves-tigations into the Yogācārabhūmi and then extended and generalized itas being typical for Buddhism as a whole. Schmithausen�s hypothesisabout the origin of vijñaptimātratā has already been criticized in somedetail by Johannes Bronkhorst in his monograph Karma and Teleology.A problem and its solution in Indian philosophy (cf. Bronkhorst 2000:77-93). Bronkhorst argues in some detail that the materials presented bySchmithausen can be better explained in relation to the karma theory. Itseems to me that Bronkhorst�s arguments are as inconclusive asSchmithausen�s, but I will not attempt to discuss the matter here.29 In-stead, I would like to take a closer look at the method employed bySchmithausen and examine how it could be applied to the Yogācāratexts.

28 The use of illusory terms in the Pāli canon (e.g., SN III 95 (3) Pheṇam, pp. 140ff.) inrespect to the final elements of existence cannot be taken by itself as pointing at theorigin of the Mahāyānistic notion of emptiness, for they are used there to express theworthlessness of dharmas, not their inexistence.

29 For a more thorough criticism, though from a different perspective, cf. RobertSharf�s paper (Sharf 1995).


Schmithausen states that he wants to prove his thesis by meansof a rigorous historic-philological method (�nach streng historisch-philologischer Methode� Schmithausen 1973: 163) and explains that�[f]or this purpose, the oldest sources for a given philosophical theoryhave to be made available and the context in which the theory appearsexamined� (�Hierzu müßten für eine gegebene philosophische Theoriedie älteste Quellen ausfindig gemacht und der Zusammenhang, in demdie Theorie dort erscheint, geprüft werden.�).

Similarly, in the English version of his paper (Schmithausen2005: 243) he says: �[T]here is still much work to be done from thepoint of view of a strictly historicophilological method. In order to ar-rive at reliable results, one has to find the oldest sources for each phi-losophical theory and to check the context in which the respective the-ory appears there.�

However, �the oldest sources� is a relative term. What if the ear-liest source for a given theory is centuries later than the theory itself? Inthe main part of his paper Schmithausen examines the Sandhinirmoca-nasūtra, which may be as late as the 4th century CE because it is laterthan the Daśabhūmikasūtra, which was translated into Chinese in thelast decade of the third century (cf. Schmithausen 1973: 172, Schmit-hausen 2005: 248). To what extant can one rely on this source, which isnot a historiographic source and which perhaps originated two centuriesafter the theory of vijñaptimātratā, in order to draw a conclusion aboutits origin? On the other hand, the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthi-tasāmadhisūtra, which is the oldest source for the vijñaptimātratā doc-trine, and was translated into Chinese as early as 179 C.E., receives lessattention from Schmithausen. In the following I will confine my re-marks to this work, as it is indeed our earliest source for the vijñaptimā-tratā doctrine. 30

30 In Schmithausen 1984: 438 (see also Schmithausen 2005: 245) it is stated that San-dhinirmocanasūra VIII.7 is �in all probability, the oldest extant passage announcing,by the very term, the doctrine of vijñaptimātra, i.e., the central doctrine ofYogācāra-Vijñānavāda.� It is actually quite possible that the Pratyutpannabuddha-sammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra uses only the term cittamātra and not vijñaptimātra(the original Sanskrit of both texts is now lost), but in any case both terms refer tothe idealistic doctrine and I fail to see why Schmithausen considers the later passageof the Sandhinirmocanasūtra to be the oldest occurrence of the doctrine. I use �vi-


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Like the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, this Sūtra too was alsotranslated by Lokakṣema and counts as one of the earliest Mahāyānasū-tras. While the Aṣṭasāhasrikā is considered to be a source for theMadhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna, the Pratyutpannabuddha-sammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra is assumed to be a foundation of theidealism of the Yogācāra. In the type of meditation described andpraised in this Sūtra, the yogi visualizes one, or even several presentBuddhas, foremost Amitābha, the Buddha of Immeasurable Light/-Luster. When he reaches the highest degree of concentration, he per-ceives the Buddha(s) face to face. Only after he emerges from the stateof meditation does he understand that he did not go to the Buddha, nordid the Buddha come to him. The whole encounter took place only in

jñaptimātratā doctrine� above to refer to the doctrine that the so-called external ob-jects are in reality images in one�s consciousness, no matter whether this doctrine isreferred to by cittamātra, vijñaptimātra, or by another term. Schmithausen seems todistinguish between Mahāyānasūtras and Yogācāra texts; thus, while recognizingthat the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra is considerably earlierthan the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, he still considers the latter to be the earliestYogācāra source. Even if the distinction is cogent, it raises difficulties for Schmit-hausen�s analysis of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra. Either the authors of this Sūtra al-ready knew the doctrine from the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhi-sūtra or from another source and borrowed it, or the doctrine has originated twice,each independently of the other. In the former case, the Sandhinirmocanasūtrawould hardly qualify as the earliest available source of the doctrine, and even if onewere to assume that in the Yogācāra texts/school the doctrine was borrowed in thecontext of spiritual practice, that would hardly imply that it originated in this con-text. If, on the other hand, the latter is assumed, one would have to face the chargeof kalpanāgaurva. Assuming, as Schmithausen seems to do (e.g., 1984: 455, 2005:250) that cittamātra is an older term than vijñaptimātra, what does the introductionor occurrence of a new term for an older doctrine tell us about origin of this doc-trine? According to my understanding, even if we accept all of Schmithausen�s con-jectures and assumptions, the change in terminology indicates an attempt to put anidea that is not new (that is, it may be new only in Yogācāra context, not new assuch) into an old garb. In that case, the Sandhinirmocanasūtra could tell us at mostwhen/where the doctrine was borrowed, not when/where it originated. YetSchmithausen (1984: 454) does not seem to assume that the doctrine has been bor-rowed, but that it has been newly incepted: �[The double entendre in Sandhinirmo-canasūtra VIII.7] can be appreciated as purposeful only in the context of the intro-duction of a new idea on which its discoverer wanted to confer as much of a tradi-tional garb as was available.�


his mind. And again the yogi generalizes: Just as during the meditationall objects were mere images in my mind or consciousness, so are allexternal objects: they are nothing but images in one�s mind. The exter-nal world, i.e., the world outside consciousness, does not exist.31

It is worthwhile noting that in this case there is no one-to-onecorrespondence between the content of the meditation and a metaphysi-cal doctrine. The yogi in meditation does not have an insight into thetrue nature of reality. On the contrary, the objects of his meditation, theBuddha(s) that he visualizes, are false. Epistemologically speaking, theyhave the same status as an illusion. Only after the state of meditation,from without, does the yogi reach the correct conclusion. As the textstates, he did not go to the Buddha, and the Buddha did not come tohim. (Nevertheless, the meditation is not entirely without foundation inreality because the mind of the Buddha indeed operates from a distancedirectly on the mind of the yogi.32)

Therefore, when Schmithausen states that the metaphysical doc-trines in Buddhism arose in an immediate manner from spiritual praxis(�unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsen sein dür-ften�), he uses the expression �arose in an immediate manner� in differ-ent meanings. In one case, the expression refers to the molding of medi-tative experience into a philosophical or religious doctrine, in the othercase to the molding of the experience into a doctrine that contradicts itbecause the experience in the state of meditation is declared to befalse.33

Next, let us consider the meaning of �checking the context.�According to the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtrathe yogi attains an understanding of a metaphysical doctrine after andon the basis of his experience during meditation. Can we rely on this

31 For an English translation, cf. Harrison 1990, esp. chapter 3.32 Three factors are necessary for the obtaining of the vision of the Buddhas (Harrison

1990: 41): �[t]he might (Skt. anubhāva) of the Buddha, the application of the forceof their [the Bodhisattvas�] own wholesome potentialities, and the power [which isthe result] of attaining samādhi.� Cf. also ibid., pp. 49 and 51 where it is stated thatthe Bodhisattvas are established in the samādhi while being supported by the Bud-dha.

33 In a personal communication Schmithausen informs me that he would now with-draw the adverb �unmittelbar� (�in an immediate manner�), but still maintains thatphilosophical theories arise in a mediate manner from meditation.

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presentation of the context and draw historical conclusions about theorigination of this metaphysical teaching from it? The Mahāyānasūtrasare obviously not historical narratives or reports in the sense that theyprovide information on the historical situation in which their teachingscame into being. In other words, if a Mahāyānasūtra narrates that a cer-tain yogi reached the right view about vijñaptimātratā in meditation,this would hardly allow us to infer that this was in fact the way the doc-trine came into being, even if the contextual connection in the Sūtraseems smooth. Besides, the Mahāyānasūtras in general and our Sūtra inparticular do not describe the meditating yogi as discovering anythingthat was not already taught by the Buddha. The yogi does not entermeditation as a tabula rasa, but only after studying (or �hearing�) whathas to be practiced during meditation. Thus, the Sūtra�s own accountdoes not leave any room for innovation. Rather, one could say that nomatter how a metaphysical doctrine arose, the Mahāyānasūtras presentit as the Buddha�s word and as an object of meditation. The mode ofpresentation has more to do with religious topology and literary conven-tions than with an actual historical situation. If we were to take the Ma-hāyānasūtras as historical accounts, we may just as well start lookingfor the origin of Mahāyāna theories on the Vulture Peak in Rājagṛha.

It would also not be advisable, as some scholars attempted onlya generation ago34 with respect to the Sūtras of Conservative Buddhism,to discard those parts of the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthita-sāmadhisūtra that are obviously mythical and assume that what remainscorresponds to a historical reality. Such a procedure was applied, forinstance, to the biography of the Buddha, with results that seem moreand more doubtful. Imagine subtracting the wolf from Little Red RidingHood and assuming that the rest of the story corresponds somehow tohistorical reality.

Moreover, even if one were to accept that the presentation in thisparticular Sūtra is a true and faithful mirror of its origin, this still doesnot lead to conclusive results in this case, or better, it leads to more thanone result. The crucial passage adduced as evidence for the thesis thatthe doctrine of vijñaptimātratā originated in meditative practice can alsobe adduced as evidence that the same doctrine was developed as a result

34 Indeed, not only a generation ago; cf. Schumann 2004.


of thoughts about the reflection of light in mirrors and similar shinyobjects. Let us have a look at the passage to understand how precariousthe textual material is (Harrison 1990: 41-42):

[3K] �For example, Bhadrapāla, there are certain women or men with a naturalbent for washing their hair and putting on jewelry, who might decide to look atthemselves in a vessel of clear oil, or a vessel of clear water, or a well-polishedround mirror, or a patch of ground smeared with azurite[?]. If they see thereintheir own form, Bhadrapāla, what do you think? Does that appearance of theform of the men or women in the vessel of clear oil, or the vessel of clear water,or well-polished round mirror, or patch of ground smeared with azurite meanthat there are men or women who have gone inside those things or enteredthem?�

Bhadrapāla said:�No Reverend Lord, it does not. Rather, Reverend Lord, because the oil and thewater are clear and undisturbed, or the mirror is highly polished, or the patch ofearth smeared with azurite is clean, the reflections stand forth; the bodies of themen or women have not arisen from the water, oil, mirror, or patch of earth, theyhave not come from anywhere nor gone anywhere, they have not been producedfrom anywhere, nor have they disappeared anywhere.�[3L] The Lord said:�Well done, well done, Bhadrapāla! You have done well, Bhadrapāla! So it is,Bhadrapāla. As you have said, because the forms are good and clear the reflec-tions appear. In the same manner, when those bodhisattvas have cultivated thissamādhi properly, those Tathāgatas are seen by the bodhisattvas with little diffi-culty. Having seen them they ask questions, and are delighted by the answeringof those questions. In thinking: �Did these Tathāgatas come from anywhere?Did I go anywhere? They understand that the Tathāgatas did not come fromanywhere. Having understood that their bodies did not go anywhere either, theythink: �Whatever belongs to this triple world is nothing but mind (~cittamātramidaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam). Why is that? Because however I imagine things,that is how they appear.�

I�m afraid that nothing decisive can be concluded from this or similarpassages. Furthermore, in the same chapter of the same Sūtra (chapter3) the doctrine that all final elements of existence are illusory is pre-sented in connection with the phenomenon of dreams. After a dream,one generalizes and comes to the conclusion that the experience in adream is the same as all everyday experience and the illusory characterof dreams is extended to the latter.35 This connection between dreams

35 Cf. Harrison 1990: 39: ��Bhadrapāla, formerly in the past, a certain man travelledinto deserted wilderness, and having become hungry and thirsty was overcome by

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and vijñaptimātratā is also contextually smooth and given the signifi-cance of dreams in Indian culture, apparent already in the Vedic period,one could even argue for certain plausibility in its favor. 36

However, here Schmithausen would object, as he kindly did in apersonal communication, that his method consists in examining theoldest source for a key term (�Schlüssel-Terminus�)37 in a specificmeaning (�in einer bestimmten Bedeutung�) and asking whether theoccurrence of the term in its context is plausible,38 i.e., whether the in-

torpor and lethargy; he fell asleep, and in a dream obtained a great quantity of foodand drink. On obtaining it he ate his fill, and his hunger and thirst vanished. Whenhe awoke, neither his body nor his belly had grown any larger, and so he thought:�There exist certain dharmas which are so, that is, like a dream;� understanding thatto be so he obtained the patient acceptance of the fact that dharmas are not produced(Skt. anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti); and he also became unable to regress from the su-preme and perfect awakening.�The text continues that in the same manner the Bodhisattvas who �concentrate theirthought on the Tathāgata in that quarter, they will obtain a vision of the Buddha.They should not entertain the apperception of an existing thing, but should entertainthe apperception of an empty space.�

36 The connection between the vijñaptimātratā doctrine and dreams in the context ofthis sūtra has already been pointed out by Sharf (Williams 2005:287-288, n. 10). Hequotes Schmithausen 1976: 246 who compares the Bodhisattva�s understanding thathe has not met the Buddha in his meditation to �a man, awaking from a dream,comprehends that all phenomena are illusory like dream visions.� He then adds:�Remarkably, Schmithausen cites this text in support of his claim that, �the thesis ofuniversal idealism originated from the generalisation of a situation observed in thecase of objects visualized in meditative concentration, i.e., in the context of spiritualpractice� (ibid.: 247). Yet this scripture suggests quite the opposite, in so far as itsucceeds in explicating a doctrinal point by drawing an analogy to dreaming.�

37 This emphasis on a key term does not yet appear in Schmithausen�s 1973 paper andin the English version of 1976, but is formulated in his Ālayavijñāna (Tokyo 1987) §1.4, pp. 9-10; cf. note 39 below.

38 Plausibility is, of course, a rather vague criterion. What is plausible for one observeris implausible for another. If one believes that philosophical theories in Buddhismarise from meditative experiences, it seems plausible that this is also the case in thePratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhisūtra; if, on the other hand, some-one, like Bronkhorst or Sharf, does not share this belief, this would seem implausi-ble. What seems plausible to us is bound to become implausible to the next genera-tion. Dumezil once gave a wonderful answer to the question whether he was rightabout the tripartite ideology: J�ai raison, mais j�aurai tort! (�I am right, but I will bewrong!�)



troduction of the term in the relevant meaning is reasonably motivated,as he has done with regard to the term ālayavijñāna.39

The emphasis on a key term raises the question whether a giventheory and the term that designates it coincide. In the case of the termsvijñaptimātra or cittamātra we know this not to be the case.Schmithausen himself pointed out that the term cittamātra was firstused to negate emotional and volitional factors beside the mind, not theexistence of real objects.40 The expression prajñaptimātra was used inthe Bodhisattvabhūmi and Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya in the sense of�mere denomination,� i.e., alluding to a nominalistic theory that deniesthe correspondence between human concepts and things in reality, butdoes not deny that things exist in reality. In another use of the sameterm, it refers to a theory which maintains that false conception reallyproduces things (outside the mind).41 The statement that the wholeworld is just mind (cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam) in theDaśabhūmikasūtra can be understood as denying the Self (ātman), notthe existence of real objects.42 So what can be concluded from the factthat vijñaptimātra or cittamātra occur in the Sūtra in a different (notnecessarily new) meaning? What can be inferred from the fact that theydenote here an idealistic doctrine? Do the terms tell us how this doctrinearose? The terms are after all descriptive of a certain tenet; they do notwear a tag saying how the tenet they refer to came about.43

39 �Aber ich gehe nicht von einer beliebigen Stelle aus, sondern vom ältesten erreich-baren Beleg eines Schlüssel-Terminus in einer bestimmten Bedeutung, und fragemich, ob dessen Auftreten dort im Kontext plausibel ist, d.h. die Einführung desverwendeten Terminus in der relevanten Bedeutung einleuchtend motiviert (vgl.Ālayavijñana § 1.4).� Does the word �Einführung� imply that the term was usedthere for the first time? Surely that would be an unlikely assumption. Consideringthe state of available materials, the assumption that such a source did not survive ismore plausible. Schmithausen clearly says �erreichbaren Beleg.� Note the (unin-tended?) switch from the neutral �Auftreten� to �Einführung,� which is not neutral.

40 Schmithausen 1976: 244.41 Schmithausen 1976: 245.42 Schmithausen 1976: 249.43 In the case of the term ālayavijñāna one may argue that its literal meaning reflects

its first function because the term was coined with that function in mind. However,such an inference is not possible in the case of cittamātra or vijñaptimātra; they donot disclose the context of their origin.

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Furthermore, couldn�t one assume that a doctrine existed beforea specific term was adopted to refer to it? And couldn�t it be that asource where a technical term does not yet appear indicates an earlierstage of development before the theory was crystallized and obtained aspecial designation? Consequently, is it not possible that a source wherea technical term does not yet appear gives us a better clue as to how thetheory in question originated? Imagining two passages proclaiming thesame idealistic theory, one using the key term vijñaptimātra, the othernot referring to it, do we have to conclude that the first passage gives usthe decisive clue as to how the theory arose and not the second?44

To conclude the examination of the issue of vijñaptimātratā, wemay say that although there is some evidence for the arising of this the-ory from meditative experience, though certainly not in an immediatemanner, the evidence is inconclusive and the methodology used bySchmithausen uncertain.

One should also recall that Schmithausen�s theory is not, so tospeak, the only one on the market. Following Paul Harrison, the idealis-tic teachings of the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasāmadhi-sūtra can be seen as an attempt to harmonize a certain meditative prac-tice with the Mahāyāna teachings which stand in contradiction to it,namely, the practice of the visualization of the Buddha with the doctrinethat everything, including the Buddha himself, is unreal. If this hy-pothesis were confirmed, the doctrine did not arise from meditativepractice, but from the need to harmonize contradictory theories: a pre-viously existing doctrine and/or practice of meditation being adjusted to

44 Consider for instance two passages that refer to the Sāṃkhyistic doctrine of thethree guṇas as constituent parts of all matter. I do not think that anyone would arguethat the passage where the technical term guṇa or the technical terms for the specificguṇas appear for the first time in the available sources is necessarily older and givesus a better clue about the origin of the doctrine. To take another example, the doc-trine of the Tathāgatagarbha referred to below appears in rudimentary form, andwithout association with a technical term, in the Lotus Sūtra in connection with theeccentric monk Sadāparibhūta. Should one, therefore, conclude from a methodologi-cal point of view that the passage where the key term occurs for the first time, ratherthan the one where it does not occur, gives us the key about the origin of the doc-trine?


a new philosophical theory.45 One may also speculate that the buddhā-nusmṛti-Meditation was first harmonized with a previously existingvijñaptimātratā doctrine, because the author of the Sūtra emphasizesthat the buddhānusmṛti functions within the frame of the vijñaptimātra-tā doctrine by assuming a mutual influence between the mind of themeditator and that of the Buddha. Then, in a second stage of develop-ment, the vijñaptimātratā doctrine was integrated into Mahāyāna Illu-sionism, according to which even the mind and its images are unreal.46

Furthermore, the vijñaptimātratā doctrine is the only Yogācāradoctrine that is examined by Schmithausen. However, there are otherphilosophical doctrines associated with this �school,�47 such as the doc-trine of the three natures (trisvabhāva), the transformation of the basis(āśrayaparivṛtti),48 a special theory of Buddhahood,49 Nirvāṇa (aprati-ṣṭhitanirvāṇa) and tathatā, and indeed of the general Mahāyāna ideal ofBodhisattva.50 It remains to be proved that all these theories�which donot seem less central than the vijñaptimātratā�arose from meditativeexperience or from spiritual practice. As far as I can see, it would evenbe hard to prove that theories about meditation arise from meditativepractice (cf. below).

My skepticism about the role of meditation in the formation ofphilosophical theories is not alleviated when I consider the most impor-

45 Cf. Harrison 1978. One could argue perhaps that even in this case the vijñaptimā-tratā doctrine arose indirectly from meditation, namely, from thinking about thecompatibility of buddhānusmṛti-meditation with Mahāyāna Illusionism. However, Ido not think that Schmithausen would argue for this hypothesis because what is de-cisive here is the philosophical desire for coherence, not the spiritual practice assuch.

46 As far as I know, the doctrine of vijñaptimātratā without connection to Mahāyānageneral illusionism or tathatā Monism appears only in later works such as theTriṃśikā of Vasubandhu. This does not mean, of course, that this doctrine (i.e., thatthe final elements of existence are mental dharmas that are not themselves illusory)originated with Vasubandhu.

47 The notion of school is rather problematic in the Indian philosophical context; I usethis term here merely for the sake of convenience, cf. also Franco 1997: 89-92.

48 Cf. Sakuma 1998.49 Cf. Griffiths 1995.50 Cf. Dayal 2004. How much of the Bodhisattva doctrine can be said to have arisen

from spiritual (moral-ethical or meditative) practice?

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tant individual Yogācāra philosophers, Maitreya51 and Asaṅga. Frau-wallner described Maitreya�s philosophy as follows (Frauwallner 1994:297-298): �Im großen gesehen ist die Lehre Maitreyanāthas einkunstvolles Gebäude, in dem die verschiedenen älteren Lehren mitwertvollen eigenen Gedanken zu einer Einheit verschmolzen sind.�Among the older teachings, Frauwallner mentions the theory of thehighest Being of Sāramati, earlier Yogācāra ideas (�Anschauungen�)and various elements from the Madhyamaka. These diverse elementswere systematized to form a philosophical system which may be termedidealistic monism. What I fail to see, however, is that the conception ofthis system is the result of meditative experience. To be sure, liberatinginsight is said to be attained only in a state of meditation, but one cannotshow that the philosophical or mystical doctrine realized in this stateactually arose from it or was conceived on its basis. The systematizationof older materials into a coherent and new philosophical system hardlyrequires or presupposes meditative experience. Similarly, when oneconsiders the writings attributed to Asaṅga, the assumption that theyarose from meditation becomes doubtful, for his basic work consists inpatient reorganization and reworking of older Hīnayāna Abhidharmamaterials within the new framework of Yogācāra idealism.52

The next Mahāyāna tradition I would like to consider is theTathāgatagarbha, the so-called Buddha-embryo school. According tothis school all living beings are potential Buddhas and, even though itwill certainly take much time, will eventually become Buddhas. In otherwords, all living beings are Buddha embryos that will grow to becomefully developed Buddhas or�according to another meaning of the wordgarbha which may mean not only �embryo� but also �womb��allliving beings represent wombs in which Buddhas will grow. The Tathā-gatagarbhasūtra is presumably the earliest source in which the Tathāga-tagarbha doctrine is expressed in association with this term itself.53 Mi-chael Zimmermann, to whom we owe the most extensive study of this

51 The historicity of Maitreya is dubious, but there is no need to discuss this issue herebecause it does not affect my argument.

52 Cf. Frauwallner 1994: 328: �Für sein System ist � vor allem die Übernahme derBegriffswelt der Hīnayāna-Dogmatik kennzeichnend.�

53 The Ekayāna doctrine, however, which is presupposed or implied by the Tathāgata-garbha philosophy, predates the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra. Cf. also note 44 above.


Sūtra, also investigated its origin and I cannot but fully agree with hisconclusion (Zimmermann 2002: 75):

Of course, we cannot know whether the idea of the Buddha-nature in living be-ings resulted from a novel meditative experience or because the authors felt theneed to assert its existence in order to improve an unsatisfactory worldly or phi-losophical state of affairs, or whether it is based on other experiences. All this ismere speculation.

The last philosophical tradition I would like to examine here isthe so-called Pramāṇa School. How much of the Buddhist philosophypresented in the pramāṇa works can be said to have arisen from medita-tive practice? We are relatively well informed about the origin of thistradition and its philosophical theories, and it seems that they do nothave anything to do with meditation. Rather, in the first stage (as re-flected in the *Tarkaśāstra, *Upāyahṛdaya, the final part of the SpitzerManuscript,54 and fragments from Vasubandhu�s lost works Vādavidhiand Vādavidhāna), the Buddhists borrow very heavily from Brahmini-cal manuals of debate, adding, modifying and developing here andthere. In the later period, from the sixth century onwards, Buddhist phi-losophy, focusing mainly but not exclusively on epistemology, logicand theory of language, is developed above all in response to and incontroversy with the Brahminical philosophers from the Nyāya andMīmāṃsā traditions. It is clear that when Schmithausen speaks aboutphilosophical theories, he thinks primarily of ontological theories andleaves aside epistemology, logic, theory of language and to large extenteven ethics.55 Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta,Śaṅkaranandana and Jñānaśrīmitra are generally considered the mostoutstanding Buddhist philosophers, but one cannot point at anything intheir writings as having originated from meditation. For all we know,

54 Cf. Tucci 1929 and Franco 2004.55 It is also clear that Schmithausen�s understanding of the term �philosophy� is not

restricted to philosophy in the technical sense, which is characterized by the use ofspecial reasons and arguments. It is only by following Schmithausen�s usage of theterm �philosophy� that I used here �philosophical theory,� �philosophical doctrine�and similar expressions while referring to Buddhist Sūtras and Abhidharma litera-ture.


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these Buddhist philosophers may not have practiced meditation at all,56

or if they did, perhaps only for short and insignificant periods of time.57

At this point it may be worthwhile to raise the question how the Bud-dhist tradition itself considered the relationship between meditation andmetaphysics. I mentioned above that meditation plays a decisive role inthe doctrines that are rejected as harmful in the Brahmajālasutta. ThisSūtra, which is placed first in the collection of sūtras in the Pāli canon,discusses some sixty-four58 erroneous views held by various asceticsand Brahmins. A large number of these false views arise directly frommeditative experiences. I will mention only two such views, one claim-ing that the world is finite, the other that it is infinite. It is clear that the

56 We have practically no biographical data about the Buddhist philosophers. Pra-jñākaragupta was probably a lay person (upāsaka) (cf. Taranātha 1997: 296) andŚaṅkaranandana was perhaps not even a Buddhist; cf. Krasser 2001 and Eltschingerforthcoming. A pertinent observation by Eltschinger is worth quoting in this connec-tion (2008: §16): �Le bouddhisme indien nous confronte donc à la situationsuivante. D�un côté, des sectes nombreuses dont les spécificités disciplinaires etdoctrinales nous sont plus ou moins bien documentées; de l�autre, des discours phi-losophiques plus ou moins bien connus eux aussi, mais dont l�ancrage institutionnelsectaire nous échappe. En d�autres termes, ces deux ordres de réalité, l�institutionnelet le philosophique, ne coïncident ou ne se superposent qu�en de très rares cas enl�état actuel de nos connaissances.� I would only want to add that even if we knewmore about the sectarian and institutional affiliation of the Buddhist philosophers,we would still not know if, and to what extent, an individual philosopher followedsuch disciplinary and doctrinal specifications in practice.

57 To these, one may add perhaps Vasubandhu, whose strength, so it seems, lies morein his ability to systematise and expound various theories than in conceiving originalphilosophical doctrines. There is a biography of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha, whichis, to be sure, partly legendary. Yet it is interesting that Paramārtha never depicts hishero meditating. Rather, Vasubandhu studies the Buddhist writings, summarizesthem, refutes them, argues by means of logical reasoning and on points of grammar,and engages in debates with teachers of rival schools, both Buddhists and non-Buddhists, on the whole not unlike modern philosophers. Cf. Takakusu, 1904: 269-296. One should add perhaps that Paramārtha also describes Asaṅga as encounteringMaitreya in Tuṣita-heaven. In any case, it is hardly possible to determine the originof philosophical doctrines from hagiographies.

58 Sixty-four is a number that designates a certain completeness (cf. the sixty-four artsand crafts [kalā]). While there are certainly more than sixty-four wrong views in theworld, the author nevertheless seems to be striving for an exhaustive enumeration ofall views concerning the world (loka) and the self (atta).


author(s) of this Sūtra distrust(s) meditative visions and trances as asource for philosophical theories (Anonymous 1987: 32):

He [a certain samaṇa or brāhmaṇa] says thus: �This world is finite. It is circum-scribed. Why can it be said so? It can be said so because having achieved utmostmental concentration by dint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindful-ness and right attentiveness, and having established my mind in highest concen-tration, I abide in the view that the world is finite. Based on this, I know that theworld is finite and that it is circumscribed.�

Exactly the same formulation is used to substantiate the contradictoryview that the world is infinite:59

He [a certain samaṇa or brāhmaṇa] says thus: �This world is infinite, with nolimit. Those samaṇas and brāhmaṇas who assert that the world is finite and thatit is circumcised are wrong. In fact, this world is infinite, with no limit. Why canit be said so? It can be said so because having achieved utmost mental concen-tration by dint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindfulness and rightattentiveness, and having established my mind in highest concentration, I abidein the view that the world is infinite. Based on this, I know that the world is infi-nite, with no limit.�

As mentioned above, both views are rejected by the Buddha (or moreprecisely, by the author of the Sūtra), however, not because he rejectsthat the meditating persons achieved �utmost mental concentration bydint of ardent, steadfast, persevering exertion, mindfulness and rightattentiveness,� that is, not because he questions the quality of theirmeditative practice, but because meditative visions, such as recollec-tions of numerous past lives, are not in themselves a sound basis for theformation of metaphysical doctrines.

The topic of the special perception of yogis is extensively dealtwith in the Buddhist epistemological tradition, where it is intimatelyrelated to the fundamental issues of the Buddhist religion, such as thereliability and omniscience of the Buddha. According to this tradition,as well as most, if not all Buddhist traditions, the Buddha already dis-covered everything one needs to know in order to achieve Enlighten-ment. Therefore, theoretically the yogi cannot innovate anything on thebasis of his meditative experiences, at least not anything soteriologi-cally true and useful, but has to meditate on the content of the Buddha�s

59 The same formula is adduced as a reason for the false claims that the world is per-manent, impermanent, partly permanent, etc. Cf. ibid., pp. 19, 21, 22, etc.

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words.60 The characterization of the special perception of yogis in thePramāṇasamuccaya, the foundational work of the Pramāṇa tradition,may seem surprising at first sight: �The yogin�s intuition which is notassociated (avyavakīrṇa) with any conceptual construction of the āgama(the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only athing in itself is also perception.�61 Read as such, this statement maycreate the impression that the perception of yogis has, by definition,nothing to do with the Buddhist authoritative writings (āgama), but infact the contrary is the case. What Dignāga means, and this is also howhis followers understood him, is that the yogi studies the Buddhistteachings, meditates on them and in the process of meditation castsaway all conceptual constructions, all cognitions related to language,and arrives at an immediate, non-conceptual understanding of thesevery teachings, perceiving them as vividly as one perceives an object infront of one�s eyes. Therefore, the characterization of Dignāga in factlimits the scope of perception of yogis to the content of the Buddhistworks which profess the Buddha�s word (or if Dignāga also had non-Buddhist yogis in mind, to the scope of the authoritative teachings ofthe respective traditions).62 In other words, it is theoretically impossiblethat the yogi will discover anything new and true in his visions that isnot already included in his authoritative tradition.

The literature of the Buddhist epistemological tradition is par-ticularly interesting because it also provides us with theories aboutmeditative trance. Here we can learn not only what the yogis perceive ina trance, but also about the nature of trance, how it arises, what its dis-tinctive qualities are and so on. Moreover, we possess the individualwritings of the most important philosophers of this tradition and canthus see how their theories were developed. The topic of meditation orperception of yogis (yogipratyakṣa), as it is usually called, became an

60 In this respect Robert Sharf is certainly right when he points out that the Buddhisttradition distrusted any new meditative experiences.

61 Cf. PS on I.6cd: yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanaṃpratyakṣam. The translation is taken from Hattori 1968: 27.

62 At least according to Dharmakīrti and later commentators, only the Buddha�s teach-ings, mainly the four noble truths, are an appropriate object of meditation. Non-Buddhist meditations do not count as yogic perceptions, but as mere delusions; cf.Franco forthcoming.


important issue of controversy in the epistemological tradition to theextent that Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980-1040), the last important Buddhistphilosopher in South Asia, devoted a special treatise to it.63 However,yogic perception and related issues were hotly debated for hundreds ofyears before that, especially with the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, who rec-ognized the potential danger yogic perception posed to the authority ofthe Veda.64 In addition, epistemological problems inherent in the notionof yogic perception were independently raised. Already Dharmakīrti(ca. 600-660) was faced with the problem how abstract statements, suchas those that constitute the four noble truths, could be perceived in animmediate manner, that is, without involving concepts (cf. Franco forth-coming). Later generations were particularly concerned with the prob-lems related to omniscience. Is it really possible for a yogi, such as theBuddha, to know everything? What is the object of an omniscient cog-nition? Can one really know all individual things in a single act ofawareness? Or is it only possible to know the essence of one thing andfrom that knowledge understand the essence of all things?65

Another problem concerns the veracity of yogic perception. Ifyogic perception is to be considered true, its object must exist, just likethe object of any other perception. However, yogis in the Indian (notjust Buddhist) tradition are believed to have direct perceptions of pastand future objects.66 Accordingly, Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750-810) arguesthat past and future objects must exist. This tenet, in its turn, leads to adevelopment in the theory of time, which must account for the differ-ence in the mode of existence of past, present and future objects. Pra-jñākaragupta maintains that time taken as an independent and perma-nent entity does not exist. He seems to conceive of time as a relationalproperty. Speaking of time as a separate entity, for instance, when onesays: �the time of this thing,� is similar to saying �the body of this

63 For a general introduction to the topic of yogic perception in the Pramāṇa literatureand a summary of the Yoginirṇaya, cf. Steinkellner 1978.

64 Cf. McCrea�s and Taber�s papers in this volume.65 Cf. McClintock 2000, Moriyama 2004, Moriyama forthcoming, Franco forthcom-

ing.66 The perception of past and future objects is already mentioned in the Yogasūtra as

one of the �accomplishments� or supernatural powers (siddhis) of yogis. Cf. YS3.16.

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torso.� Past or future objects are, therefore, objects that are not seen atpresent. And to say that yogis perceive the past or the future means thatthey perceive what is not being seen, that is, not being seen by otherordinary people. Therefore, being a past or future entity depends on itsnot seeing by ordinary people. The yogi himself perceives past and fu-ture objects as present; only after emerging from the state of meditationdoes he determine them as past or future.67

When one follows this discussion in detail, it is clear that the de-liberations are purely philosophical. It is in fact quite certain that Pra-jñākaragupta developed the theory of the existence of past and futureobjects in the context of his proof of life after death and merely adapteda ready-made theory to the context of yogic perception. It can also beobserved that the discussion of meditation in general in the Buddhistepistemological tradition is not related to actual experience in medita-tion.68 To what extant this was also the case in the earlier Abhidharmatradition cannot be determined because the mode of presentation in theAbhidharma texts is impersonal and does not provide a context for pos-sible personal innovations by individual philosophers. It is doubtfulwhether the authors of the Mahāyānasūtras, the Yogācārabhūmi ormanuals of meditation69 were themselves practicing yogis or whether

67 PVABh, 113,7�9: tasmād atītādi paśyatīti ko �rthaḥ? anyenādṛśyamānaṃ paśyatitad dṛśyamānatayā vartamānam eva tāvatā tad iti na doṣaḥ. anyāpekṣayā tasyātītā-ditvam. tasmād yat sākṣātkṛtaṃ tad evāstīti nātītād<āv> akṣavyāpāras tasya sākṣāt-kṛtatvenāst[h]itvāt.

68 It is symptomatic that the example of the infatuated lover who sees his beloved as ifshe were standing right before his eyes is based on Dharmakīrti�s exposition andthat it is repeated for hundreds of years. However, the poverty of examples, i.e., thefact that the same old examples are repeated again and again and hardly any newones are introduced into the philosophical discourse is typical for Indian philosophyin general.

69 For an example of a Buddhist manual of meditation, cf. Schlingloff 2006. Schlin-gloff points out that the purpose of the manual is not to teach the methods and tech-niques of meditative practice (their knowledge is presupposed), but to present theindividual visions systematically, and classify and underpin them dogmatically(Schlingloff 2006: 30): �Dieses [das Yogalehrbuch] hat die Aufgabe, die einzelneVisionen als systematische Übungen darzustellen, zu gliedern und dogmatisch zuuntermauern.� �The practical part� (der praktischer Teil) too is anchored in the tra-dition; just as Maudgalyāyana penetrates heaven and earth, the yogi too visualisesthem, etc. (ibid.). On the whole, the meditation manual leaves little or no room for



they were not rather systematizing the experiences of others. The latterstate of affairs would hardly be typical for Buddhism alone. For asGrinshpon repeatedly emphasizes, the author of the Yogasūtras was aSāṃkhya philosopher who certainly was not actively practicing yoga(cf. Grinshpon 2002 passim).

To conclude, I would like come back to Schmithausen�s thesis.In the above-mentioned paper, Schmithausen attributes the peculiaritythat all central theories in Buddhism arise immediately from spiritualpractice to the Buddha himself: �Der Grund für diesen Unterschied[zwischen Buddhismus auf der einen Seite und europäischer und hindu-istischer Philosophie auf der anderen Seite] liegt gewiss letztlich in derPerson des Buddha selbst, der mit einer wohl einmaligen Konsequenzund Radikalität alle für das Heil irrelevanten theoretischen Spekulatio-nen abgewiesen hatte.� [�The reason for this difference [between Bud-dhism on the one hand and European and Hindu philosophy on theother] certainly lies, in the final analysis, in the personality of the Bud-dha himself, who rejected once and for all, and with unique conse-quence and radicalness, all theoretical speculations that are irrelevant tosalvation.�]70

Schmithausen�s thesis could be crucial for Buddhist studies. If itcould be shown to be true, he would have discovered an essential driv-ing force that played a crucial role during the entire history of Bud-dhism. One could almost see the Hegelian spirit entering Buddhist phi-losophy and determining it in a decisive manner and to a surprisingdegree. Not being a Hegelian myself, I find it difficult to accept that inthe long and complex history of Buddhism in South Asia the causalrelationship between meditation and metaphysics was in all centralcases one-directional, spiritual practice always being the cause andmetaphysics always the effect. As I have tried to show above, this as-

personal innovations. The language is both descriptive and prescriptive; it not onlydescribes what the yogi supposedly sees, but also what he should see. The individualspontaneous visions are in fact modelled after the Buddha�s biography and other ca-nonical materials. The same hold good for other manuals and descriptions of medi-tations, cf. Yamabe 1999 and forthcoming, Bretfeld 2003.

70 The historicity of the Buddha and our ability to extract his original teachings fromthe canonical writings are clearly presupposed in this passage and need not bespelled out. Those were obviously more optimistic times.

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sumption involves a number of problems and there are considerationsclearly speaking against it. On the whole, it is simply not provable. In-deed, it would be difficult to prove that spiritual practice is the cause ofsomething when the spiritual practice itself is all but unknown to us.71

As far as I can see, the relation between meditation and meta-physics in Buddhism cannot be reduced to a single model. In the finalanalysis, one cannot avoid the conclusion that certain philosophicaltheories arose from meditative experiences and certain others did not,and that the origin of still others cannot be determined, in which case itseems preferable to suspend judgment. On the basis of the examplesmentioned above, I would say that the dhyāna meditation and the higherlevels of the ārūpya meditation (at least the last two levels), which inci-dentally are not mentioned by Schmithausen,72 seem to fit his modelvery well. The cosmic layers that bear the same name seem to havebeen conceived as cosmological parallels to the content as well as thepsychological characteristics of the corresponding visions. This is clearalready from the terminology. On the other hand, the theory of momen-tariness, as Schmithausen himself conceded, seems to have been devel-oped out of philosophical considerations. The same can be maintainedfor the doctrine of the pudgala and the anātman doctrine. The doctrineof pratītyasamutpāda seems to have arisen as a systematization of oldercanonical materials, and perhaps redactional reasons were the primarydriving force behind it. Reflection on the law of karma and the phe-nomenon of memory, as well as textual considerations, seem to have ledto the Sarvāstivāda assumption of past and future objects. The questionwhether meditation or philosophical reasoning caused the arising of theMahāyāna doctrine of emptiness cannot be answered because relevantunambiguous materials are lacking. The same holds true for the vijñap-

71 This difficulty is relevant not only for Schmithausen�s thesis, but also for recentattempts to use Pierre Hadot�s interpretation of Greek philosophy as a model forBuddhist philosophy; cf. McClintock 2002: 6-8 and Kapstein 2003: 3-16. The prob-lems and shortcomings of this approach are discussed in Eltschinger 2008. Eltschin-ger rightly concludes (§ 20): �� nos textes [i.e., les textes de la philosophie boudd-hique] ne se laissent pratiquement jamais reconduire à leurs conditions historiquesde production, ne quittant jamais le terrain de l�argumentation et du raisonnementpurs.�

72 The reason for this is not clear to me; perhaps he does not consider them to be Bud-dhist in origin.


timātratā doctrine. To be sure, there is some evidence that connects thisdoctrine to the visualizations of the Buddha(s), but I fail to see how onecould determine whether this doctrine arose from reflections on suchvisualizations or whether it originated independently and was applied tothe meditative context to show that visualizations of the Buddha(s) aremeaningful even within the Mahāyāna illusionistic context.

Furthermore, even if we were to assume for the sake of argu-ment that all central philosophical theories in Buddhism were developedindirectly by reflection on spiritual practice, one could still argue thatthe dichotomy between spiritual practice and philosophical theory assuch is not always tenable. For what happens when a philosopher thinksabout spiritual practice�quite possibly without first-hand experience ofthis practice�and develops a new theory? Could it be said that in thiscase the doctrine arose from spiritual praxis in contradistinction to phi-losophical and theoretical considerations?

Finally, it is worth repeating that the yogi, even if he were to ar-rive at a new metaphysical doctrine on the basis of meditation, does notenter meditative experience in the state of tabula rasa. It is highlyunlikely that a Buddhist yogi will meet God the Creator in his visions,nor that a Jewish mystic or a Sufi will experience the anātman-doctrine.Even the purest meditative experience is culturally and linguisticallybound, and is engrossed in a tradition.73


AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. Ed. P. Pradhan.Patna 1975.

Anonymous 1987 Ten suttas from Dīgha Nikāya. Rangoon 1984. Repr. Va-ranasi 1987.

73 In this connection one has to note especially the extensive work of Stephan Katz. Heargued convincingly and repeatedly that mystical experiences are determined to aconsiderable degree by language and culture, e.g. Katz 1992: 5: �[Mystical experi-ences] are inescapably shaped by prior linguistic influences such that the lived ex-perience conforms to a pre-existent pattern that has been learned, then intended, andthen actualized in the experiential reality of the mystic.� Cf. also Katz 1983: 3-60.

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Aung and Rhys Davids1969

Points of Controversy or Subjects of Discourse. Transl.Shwe Zan Aung and Rhys Davids. Repr. London 1969.

Bareau 1955 André Bareau, Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule.Saigon 1955.

Bareau 1963 André Bareau, Recherches sur la biographie du Bouddhadans les Sūtrapiṭaka et Vinayapiṭaka anciens : De la quêtede l�éveil à la conversion de Śāriputra et de Maudgalyāya-na. Paris 1963.

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Bretfeld 2003 Sven Bretfeld, Visuelle Repräsentation im sogenannten�buddhistischen Yogalehrbuch� aus Qïzïl. In: Sven Bret-feld und Jens Wilkens (eds.), Indien und Zentralasien.Sprach- und Kulturkontakt. Wiesbaden 2003, 167-205.

Bronkhorst 2000 Johannes Bronkhorst, Karma and Teleology. A problemand its solution in Indian philosophy. Tokyo 2000.

Conze 1962 Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India. London 1962.Conze 1967 Edward Conze, Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies. London

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A N N E M A C D O N A L D

Knowing Nothing: Candrakīrti and YogicPerception1

1. INTRODUCTION

Individuals who have reached advanced stages on the Buddhist path arerenowned for being able to apprehend things beyond the ken of ordinarypersons. A plethora of anecdotes, narratives and expository material inIndian Buddhist works, beginning with the earliest suttas and extendingthrough the compositions of the Conservative (the so-called Hīnayāna)schools to the Mahāyāna scriptures and śāstras, depict and describepractitioners who have gained perceptual and cognitive access to remoteobjects and otherwise inaccessible information, who know distant envi-ronments, the hidden or invisible in their immediate surroundings,and/or the fundamental nature of the world. The ability of these adeptsto experience distinct phenomena, states of affairs, dimensions and su-preme realities concealed to others is often attributed to their mastery ofconcentrative states and meditative techniques, and the acquisition ofrefined levels of consciousness generated on their basis. Given the spe-cifically Buddhist focus of these persons� striving, their efforts tend tobe ultimately aimed at the direct cognition of or immediate insight intotheir tradition�s conception of the final truth, this truth being presentedin early and Conservative Buddhism as, e.g., the four noble truths, andin the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism as emptiness.

Nāgārjuna (2nd/3rd c. CE), the founder of the Madhyamakaschool, although without doubt convinced of an ultimate state of affairs,has little specific to say about perception of the out-of-the-ordinary in

1 Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Foundation in thecontext of the FWF-Project S9805-G08. I am most grateful to Prof. Eli Franco, Dr.Dorji Wangchuk and Terry Chantler for carefully reading the present paper and foroffering insightful comments and suggestions. I also thank Dr. MudagamuweMaithrimurthi for sharing with me his knowledge of the abhijñās.

134 ANNE MACDONALD

his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (henceforth MMK), and focuses its 447verses primarily on refuting the existence of the phenomena known tothe world, or, more particularly, on disproving the entities, categoriesand concepts accepted and taught by the Conservative Buddhistschools.2 With the exception of the very general reference in MMK24.24 to the cultivation (bhāvanā) of the path (mārga),3 Nāgārjuna alsodoes not mention or discuss in the MMK the means, such as meditationtechniques, for arriving at apprehension of the parokṣa, the impercepti-ble, or, as described by later scholars, the atyāntaparokṣa, the radicallyinaccessible. This dearth of references to methods and processes and hislimited delineation of the result leave his stance on exactly what thosewho dare to appropriate and internalize his radical critique might in theend perceive, achieve or experience open to interpretation, and contrib-ute to it remaining a topic of debate among scholars. Although the com-plementary scrutiny of other writings attributed to him contributes to theillumination of his views, for more explicit and detailed statementsabout yogic perception and the objects of yogic perception in Madhya-maka it is necessary to examine the works of later authors and commen-tators. The present paper will mainly concentrate on statements by Can-drakīrti (600�650 CE) that address, and allude and relate to the topic ofyogic perception. These can be found scattered throughout his works; Irely here on his commentary on the MMK, i.e., the Prasannapadā, hiscommentaries on Nāgārjuna�s Yuktiṣaṣṭikā and Śūnyatāsaptati,4 and onhis independent work the Madhyamakāvatāra, together with its bhāṣya.

2 See Vetter 1982: 96, n. 21, where he considers MMK 7.4 to represent the view of aSarvāstivāda opponent; MMK 9.1-2 and 9.6 that of a Pudgalavādin, possibly aSāṃmitīya; MMK 17.1-11 to represent the view of an opponent who would at leastlater be termed a Sautrāntika; and MMK 17.12-20 to possibly be that of aSāṃmitīya. See also Kragh 2006, Chapter 3 for more detailed discussion concerningreferences to the opponents dealt with in MMK 17.1-20. Nāgārjuna�s approach inthe MMK is apophatic, but he does refer to and even characterize (primarily nega-tively) the ultimate state (see, e.g., MMK 18.9); important references to the highesttruth and nirvāṇa in the MMK have been noted and discussed in Vetter 1982.

3 MMK 24.24: svābhāvye sati mārgasya bhāvanā nopapadyate | athāsau bhāvyatemārgaḥ svābhāvyaṃ te na vidyate ||. The mārga is also referred to in MMK 24.25and 40, bhāvanā in 24.27.

4 Candrakīrti�s authorship of the Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti is not completely beyond doubt.The work is not mentioned in Indian literature, and only the colophon of the Tibetantranslation of the work (in all four Canonical editions of the Tanjur) and later Ti-


KNOWING NOTHING: CANDRAK ĪRTI AND YOGIC PERCEPTION 135

2. CANDRAKĪRTI ON EXTRASENSORY PERCEPTION

Before proceeding to a presentation of the Madhyamaka understandingof the ultimate and an investigation of Candrakīrti�s views on its per-ception, it might be noted that Candrakīrti also makes allowance formore general types of extrasensory knowledge. One interesting refer-ence to the wonder of yogic perception in its wider sense is encounteredat Madhyamakāvatāra 3.11, where Candrakīrti recites some of the at-tainments gained by the practitioner who has reached and dwells on thethird Bodhisattva level of awakening, the bhūmi called prabhākarī, the�Illuminating.� 5 He states that the Bodhisattva who abides on this level,in addition to completely destroying his craving and hatred and perfect-ing the dhyānas,6 attains supernormal knowledge, or, as it is sometimesinterpreted, �direct knowledge� (mngon shes, *abhijñā). In the commen-tary on his verse, it is made clear that with his mention of supernormalknowledge he intends a traditional five-fold group of abhijñās, four ofwhich might broadly be seen as types of clairvoyance.7 These five typesof supranormal capability are generally said to be produced on the basisof the practitioner having reached the fourth dhyāna, an intensified con-centrative state characterized by one-pointedness of mind and emotionalequanimity. The first of the five abhijñās referred to in Candrakīrti�scommentary consists in the ability to perform various types of paranor-

betan historians name him as its author. For internal criteria that nonetheless appearto support attribution of the work to him, see Erb 1997: 1-10.

5 MA 3.11 (MABhed 53.17-20): sa der rgyal sras bsam gtan mngon shes dang || �dodchags zhe sdang yongs su zad par �gyur || des kyang rtag tu �jig rten pa yi ni || �dodpa�i �dod chags �joms par nus par �gyur ||.

6 The word bsam gtan (*dhyāna) is explained in the bhāṣya as intending the fourdhyānas, the four samāpattis, and the four apramāṇas.

7 For references to the group of five abhijñās, cf. Lamotte 1976: 1814; on the sixabhijñās, cf. 1809ff. Lamotte notes (p. 1809) that the first five are usually given inthe order r ̥ddhividhijñāna (Pāli: iddhividha) / r ̥ddhiviṣayajñāna; divyaśrotra (Pāli:dibbasota); cetaḥparyāyajñāna (Pāli: cetopariyañāṇa) / paracittajñāna; pūrvanirvā-sānusmr̥tijñāna (Pāli: pubbe nivāsānussatiñāṇa); cyutyupapādajñāna (Pāli: sattānaṃcutūpapātañāṇa), also known as divyacakṣus (Pāli: dibbacakkhu). Cf. also de LaVallée Poussin 1931; Lindquist 1935; Ñāṇamoli 1995: 37 (with references toMajjhima Nikāya suttas 6, 73, 77 and 108); AK 7.42-56 and AKBh thereon; Dayal1932: 106ff.; Gethin 1998: 185f.; Gethin 2001: 84. On methods for developing theiddhis and the abhijñās, see Visuddhimagga chapters 12 and 13 (iddhividhāniddesoand abhiññāniddeso) and AKBh on 7.43d; see also Gethin 2001: 101f.

136 ANNE MACDONALD

mal feats (r ̥ddhi), such as being able to manifest mind-made bodies, topass through physical matter such as walls and mountains, to fly, towalk on water and dive into the earth, to blaze like fire and showerdown rain from oneself, and to touch the sun and the moon. The secondabhijñā mentioned is the divine ear (divyaśrotra), by way of which theyogin is able to hear any sounds, divine or human, that he wishes tolisten to. The third abhijñā enables him to know the state of mind ofother beings (paracittajñāna), the fourth, to recollect millions of hisprevious lives in great detail (pūrvanivāsānusmr̥tijñāna). With the fifthsupranormal achievement, that of the divine eye (divyacakṣus), he isable to see beings dying and being reborn, and knows the wholesome orunwholesome karma that takes them to their respective good or difficultdestinations. As astounding and fascinating as these powers and super-normal perceptions might be, Candrakīrti has nothing special to sayabout them himself, choosing instead to elaborate on them in his bhāṣyaby citing verbatim the Daśabhūmikasūtra�s brief but detailed account ofthe five abhijñās.8 His interest in them is exhausted in this account.

As is obvious from Candrakīrti�s reliance on a Mahāyāna sūtrafor their description, these five abhijñās are not unique to the Madhya-maka school; we are, in fact, familiar with presentations of them in Ca-nonical and Abhidharma works, and two of them, the recollection ofpast lives and the divine eye, figure in a number of Canonical portrayalsof the Buddha�s own awakening.9 Individual abhijñās, explained asresulting automatically upon attainment of the fourth dhyāna (as in thecase of the Buddha or persons who trained in them in previous lives) oras needing to be developed through effort by the yogin on the basis ofthis dhyāna,10 were viewed early on as extraordinary but mundane typesof knowledge because they did not on their own accomplish releasefrom saṃsāra for the practitioner, even though they might be conducive

8 De La Vallée Poussin presents the Sanskrit text of the Daśabhūmikasūtra citation inan appendix to his translation of MA chapter 3; see MABhtr 1907: 305-307. For thesection cited, see also Rahder 1926: 34-36 (= section M).

9 For suttas in which these two abhijñās do not appear, see Schmithausen 1981: 221,n. 75.

10 Cf. Gethin 2001: 102. Cp. AKBh on 7.44b. On the dissociation of liberation fromattainment of the dhyānas in some Canonical texts, see Schmithausen 1981: 219-222.


to it.11 Canonical descriptions of the abhijñās in the context of the lib-eration process therefore usually included a further item, termed�knowledge of the destruction of the taints� (Pāli: āsavakkhayañāṇa,Sanskrit: āsravakṣayajñāna), the �taints� being [craving for] sensualpleasures (kāma), [craving for] existence (bhava), and ignorance(avidyā).12 This abhijñā came to be known as the supramundane abhi-jñā, for it informed of one�s attainment of freedom from birth and death,of one�s nirvāṇa, and in the stereotypical account of the attainment ofliberation has as a main component the insight that effects liberation.13

It is probable that two of the abhijñās included in the Canonicalliberation accounts, viz., the recalling of former lifetimes and the wit-nessing of beings propelled by their earlier actions to new existences,were considered to provide experiential confirmation of soteriologicallyrelevant truths, especially the truths of suffering and the origin of suffer-ing, and in this way to contribute to the liberation process. Both Ca-nonical and post-Canonical authors also acknowledged the usefulness ofother abhijñās, such as the ability to read others� minds and the capacityto perform miracles, for benefitting ordinary persons, especially forconverting them to Buddhism.14 Transferred to the Mahāyānist Bodhi-sattva context, the first five abhijñās � the sixth either reserved forBuddhahood or revised inasmuch as the end of the taints would deliverthe Bodhisattva to a premature nirvāṇa and thus abruptly end his ca-reer15 � must have been interpreted as serving to deepen the adept�s

11 See Ñāṇamoli 1995: 37; cp. the discussion and classifications in AKBh chapter 7 adverse 42. See also Schmithausen 1981: 221f., where he suggests that the abhijñāsmay have been considered especially necessary in the case of the Buddha�s originaldiscovery of the Four Noble Truths.

12 De La Vallée Poussin (1931: 338) remarks: �À ces cinq savoirs, fut ajouté unsixième: la connaissance que prend le saint de sa sainteté. Le caractère scolastiquede cette invention n�est pas douteux.�

13 For the �stereotypical account,� see Schmithausen 1981: 203-205. On āsavakkhaya-ñāṇa in the context of the stereotypical account, see Schmithausen 1981: 204, n. 16.

14 On Canonical views regarding the performance of miraculous feats, see, e.g., Gethin2001: 97-101. Cf. AKBh on AK 7.47 regarding the value of miracles and mind-reading for conversion; note also Granoff 1996 for problems connected with the per-formance of miracles.

15 The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, for example, distinguishes between an incompleteand complete āsravakṣayajñāna in order to explain statements in Prajñāpāramitā lit-erature that connect Bodhisattvas with the sixth abhijñā. In the case of the incom-plete form, the kleśas are stopped, but the vāsanās are not; see Lamotte 1976:

138 ANNE MACDONALD

experience and strengthen his dedication to reach the final goal ofBuddhahood, and as being of use in augmenting both his desire andability to inspire and aid others. It is difficult to know whether Can-drakīrti�s single-word reference to the abhijñās in his Madhyamakāva-tāra verse and his uncommented citing of the Daśabhūmikasūtra indi-cate much more than a tipping of his hat to tradition; their mention maydemonstrate his acknowledgement of the view that the acquisition andemployment of miraculous powers serve the Bodhisattva�s programmeof helping other beings. However, his disinterest in further elaboratingthe five abhijñās signals that regardless of their value as useful side-effects of the Bodhisattva�s endeavour, for him they are of minor impor-tance owing to their negligible soteriological value, both individuallyand collectively having little, if anything, to contribute to the actualachievement of liberation. Yet like the early authors whose inclusion ofa sixth abhijñā was inspired by a primary concern with knowledge withsoteriological function, Candrakīrti�s main interest is in a type of know-ledge that can be classified as supramundane and that provides the in-sight which breaks one out of, as the texts have it, the �jail of saṃsāra.�Writing nearly a millennium after the Canonical authors composed theiraccounts of the Buddha�s and his disciples� liberation process, Can-drakīrti, however, does not assert that the escape from repeated birthand death is effected through meditative stabilization in the fourth dhy-āna and subsequent profound insight into the four noble truths accom-panied by vanquishment of the taints. He declares rather that it isbrought about by profound insight into the emptiness (śūnyatā) ofthings.

3. THE MĀDHYAMIKA�S NIRVĀṆA: AN ILLUSION?

In brief, Candrakīrti propounds the view that the world, including thesubject perceiving and experiencing the world, is of an illusionary na-

1816ff. Candrakīrti explicitly refers to āsravakṣayajñāna when he recites and com-ments on the ten powers (bala) of a buddha in MA 12.21 (cf. MABhed 369.13: zagrnam zad pa mkhyen stobs); in MA 12.31 he declares that it informs the newly ac-complished buddha of the destruction of the kleśas together with their vāsanās. In-cluded in the stock list of the ten powers in MA 12.21 is the ability to recall pastlives (sngon gnas dran pa mkhyen pa, *pūrvanivāsānusmr̥tijñāna) and the knowl-edge of the birth and death of beings (�chi �pho skye blo, *cyutyupapādajñāna).


ture; it may be appropriate to refer to his view in this respect as one ofmetaphysical illusionism.16 According to him, the phenomena of theworld, or universe, which appear and seem to be real, in actuality do notexist. He and others of the Madhyamaka tradition do admit that thethings of the world appear to ordinary, unawakened persons, but theydeny that these things truly are as they appear to be, i.e., real as opposedto unreal. The Mādhyamikas maintain that the things of the world areempty of a real nature that would support or justify any claim to theirbeing ontologically existent. Phenomena must be empty of a real nature,of an own-being (svabhāva), the Mādhyamika argues, because theyarise in dependence (pratītyasamutpāda) upon other things; whateverarises in dependence, in being reliant on something else and thus notcapable of existing without the other�s support, obviously does not existof its own accord, by its own nature. Would things exist on their own,i.e., be real, they could as a consequence neither arise nor perish, for areal thing, a thing with its �own� being (sva-bhāva), would on accountof this not require causes for it to come into being or to pass out of be-ing; it would not arise in dependence on something else nor decay orvanish due to the influence of some other factor. Such an entity wouldexist forever, and change would be impossible. That the phenomenaexperienced by the unawakened are indeed apprehended to arise in de-pendence, and to change, reveals that they are empty of an own-being,and thus bereft of true existence. Their arising in dependence translatesinto not truly existing, to not actually arising in dependence. The merelyapparent existence of the things of the world therefore inspires theMādhyamikas to compare them to, among other illusory phenomena,the objects apprehended in dreams and mirages, or conjured by a magi-cian. Even though such objects appear and seem to be real during thedream, on a hot day in the desert, or, in the case of a magical illusion,while one beholds the magic show, the elephants in the dream, the waterin the mirage and the beautiful damsel produced by the magician areempty of real existence and do not actually exist. Upon awakening fromthe dream, approaching the mirage for water, or seeing the magiciandissolve the damsel, one relinquishes − even though their reality hadbeen taken for granted until then − all ideas of the existence of theseobjects. Like these illusory objects, the dependently-arisen phenomena

16 On Nāgārjuna as a propounder of metaphysical illusionism, see Oetke 2007: 16ff.


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of the world that are unquestioningly believed to be genuine by the un-enlightened have only an apparent reality, a semblance of, a superficial,�fake� realness. The teaching of the emptiness of things thus disclosesthe deceptive nature of worldly phenomena: they are mere fictions, un-real appearances masquerading, so to speak, as real things. As fictionsthey are actually no things, ontologically nothing, and thus in the finalanalysis, inexistent. According to the Mādhyamikas, no thing has everreally existed and no thing will ever come into existence. The cyclingthrough repeated births and deaths that constitute the saṃsāric wander-ing − this too has never really occurred.

Thus the question arises: If, according to the Mādhyamikas,saṃsāra is actually a fiction, what, then, of nirvāṇa? Can one escapefrom something that never was? Does nirvāṇa, unlike saṃsāra, exist?Or is liberation also a fiction, and the counsel to strive for it, a Mahā-yānist joke? Aid for answering these questions can be found in MMKchapter 25, the �Examination of nirvāṇa,� and in Candrakīrti�s com-mentary on its individual kārikās. It should be mentioned that largecircles within early Buddhism and some of the Conservative schools didindeed maintain a positively characterized nirvāṇa. A number of pas-sages in early Buddhist works present nirvāṇa as an unconditioned andenduring state or sphere, and as such as similar to the higher spheres ofyogic concentration but radically transcending them; nirvāṇa appears inthese specific cases to have been conceived as a metaphysical, or rather,meta-physical, world-transcending dimension into which the liberatedmind/self would enter.17 The Theravādins, in spite of their dogmatic

17 For references, see Frauwallner 1953: 226f. [= Frauwallner 1984: 178f.]; Schmit-hausen 1969: 158f. Schmithausen (1969: 159) remarks that the occurrence of a fargreater number of passages negatively characterizing nirvāṇa as the process or stateof the termination of suffering derives from the fact that the positive nature of nir-vāṇa, as it is in itself, was beyond the reach of thought and speech and experience-able only in a meditative state; positive statements might indicate its not being noth-ing, but detailed speculation, given the nature of language, was dubious. He addsthat such speculation on the nature of nirvāṇa was superfluous for the goal of Bud-dhism: inasmuch as all of worldly existence, on account of its impermanence, wasconsidered to be suffering, liberation from this suffering sufficed as the goal, regard-less of whether it might be characterized as a positive state or as pure annihilation.The tradition thus recognized the existence of a positive though indescribable di-mension as the �place� of liberation, but particularly emphasized its negative func-tion as the ending of suffering.


denial of the existence of a self that might enter or experience nirvāṇa,postulated it as a positive, unconditioned, and enduring − and to thatextent joyful − entity. Nirvāṇa in the Sarvāstivāda school has the uniquecharacteristic of being a hypostatized elimination or stopping of thedefilements and suffering, an existing �non-being,� and was thus con-sidered a real, unconditioned and permanent entity.18 Nāgārjuna ad-dresses the issue of an existent nirvāṇa in the fourth, fifth and sixthkārikās of MMK 25,19 commencing by unhesitatingly rejecting the pos-sibility. He argues that if nirvāṇa would be an existent thing, it a) wouldhave to be characterized by aging and death (jarāmaraṇa), b) wouldhave to be conditioned (saṃskr ̥ta) and c) would have to be reliant onsomething else (upādāya), since all existent things have the characteris-tics of aging and death, are conditioned and are reliant. No Buddhistwould accept a nirvāṇa so characterized. Nāgārjuna likewise rejects theview that nirvāṇa is non-existence (abhāva).20 The equating of nirvāṇaand non-existence was, however, not completely foreign to Buddhism,for the Sautrāntika school did assert a nirvāṇa − at least an ontologicalnirvāṇa − that is mere non-existence. The Sautrāntika nirvāṇa is ex-hausted in its designation: it is solely the name for the fact that the emo-tional and intellectual defilements, and suffering, no longer arise, onto-

18 Even though the Sarvāstivādins� presuppositions that individual existence ends withthe death of the liberated person and that an ātman (which might continue) does notexist relegated the spiritual experience of nirvāṇa without remainder to mere annihi-lation, the school did make room for the liberative effects of nirvāṇa prior to death.These occurred in the form of a consecutive separation from the defilements broughtabout by religious praxis and by pratisaṃkhyānirodha (cessation resulting from con-sideration/insight, equated by the Sarvāstivādins with nirvāṇa), which of necessitywas viewed as a succession of real, existent pratisaṃkhyānirodhas, or �nirvāṇas,�equivalent in number to the number of defilements removed. See, e.g., Schmit-hausen 1969: 161f.; Cox 1994; Cox 1995: 87f., 90f., 323 n. 72.

19 MMK 25.4: bhāvas tāvan na nirvāṇaṃ jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam | prasajyetāsti bhāvo hina jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā ||. MMK 25.5: bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskr ̥taṃbhavet | nāsaṃskr ̥to vidyate hi bhāvaḥ kvacana kaścana || (pāda c emended follow-ing MacDonald 2007: 40f.). MMK 25.6: bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇam anupādāya tatkatham | nirvāṇaṃ nānupādāya kaścid bhāvo hi vidyate ||.

20 He rejects this possibility in MMK 25.7-8. 25.7: bhāvo yadi na nirvāṇam abhāvaḥkiṃ bhaviṣyati | nirvāṇaṃ yatra bhāvo na nābhāvas tatra vidyate ||. 25.8: yady abhā-vaś ca nirvāṇam anupādāya tat katham | nirvāṇaṃ na hy abhāvo �sti yo �nupādāyavidyate ||.

142 ANNE MACDONALD

logically nothing at all.21 Explicating Nāgārjuna�s rejection of nirvāṇaconceived as non-existence, Candrakīrti states that in the world a thingis termed non-existent when it gives up its own-being and becomesotherwise, i.e., becomes other than existent.22 But since nirvāṇa wasnever established as something that exists, it cannot relinquish its exis-tence and become otherwise; that is, not having obtained the necessaryprerequisite of having the state of a thing, it is not in a position to aban-don this state and become inexistent. Speaking to the Sautrāntika viewof nirvāṇa as the cessation and thus end of the defilements, as their�having become otherwise,� Candrakīrti declares that if the non-existence of the defilements23 is nirvāṇa, then the impermanence of thedefilements (to be understood as their momentary perishing in thesaṃsāric continuum) will have to be accepted as nirvāṇa. This is defi-nitely not accepted by the Sautrāntikas, asserts Candrakīrti, because itwould entail that liberation is automatically achieved, without any efforton the part of the practitioner.24

Yet even though the Mādhyamikas reject a nirvāṇa conceived andclassified either as an existent or as non-existence (as well as one char-acterized by both existence and non-existence, and by neither existencenor non-existence),25 they continue to speak of nirvāṇa. This is con-firmed, for instance, by Candrakīrti�s commentary on MMK 25.10. In

21 The Sautrāntika nirvāṇa as a spiritual event consists in liberation from the defile-ments and suffering existence; nirvāṇa without remainder thus expresses itself asthe complete destruction, i.e., the end, of the body-mind continuum.

22 Candrakīrti�s statement here relates to MMK 25.7. See de Jong 1978: 245, entry forp. 527.6 (the sentences are missing from PsPed 527): iha hi bhāvaḥ svabhāvaparityā-gād anyathā bhavann abhāva iti vyapadiśyate | yatra ca pakṣe nirvāṇaṃ bhāvo nabhavati vihitadoṣatvāt tatra pakṣe �bhāvo �pi nirvāṇaṃ na bhavati bhāvasvarūpeṇā-siddharūpasyābhāvarūpatānupapatter iti abhiprāyaḥ |.

23 Candrakīrti mentions birth (janman) along with the defilements (kleśa).24 In his commentary on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 4cd, Candrakīrti informs an opponent who holds

that saṃsāra, specified as the skandhas, i.e., the body-mind continuum, exists andthat its cessation is nirvāṇa understood as non-existence (abhāva), that such is in-deed taught, but it is merely a strategy. The teaching is necessary because the un-enlightened have been habituated since beginningless time to the belief that thingsreally exist, and are not able to turn away from attachment to them without beingtold, as an antidote, that nirvāṇa is the cessation of saṃsāra. In coming to believethat the attainment of nirvāṇa involves great happiness, they are able to turn awayfrom the pleasant things of saṃsāra, not to mention the disagreeable.

25 Cf. MMK 25.11-15 and 25.16-17 and Candrakīrti�s commentary thereon.


the kārikā, Nāgārjuna makes reference to a statement of the Buddha�s inwhich he has proclaimed that being (bhava) and non-being (vibhava)have to be abandoned, and from this Nāgārjuna concludes that nirvāṇais appropriate neither as existence (bhāva) nor as non-existence (abhā-va).26 Citing a sentence from a Canonical work which negates that re-lease from existence can be found by way of being or non-being,27 Can-drakīrti declares that even though existence and non-existence are to beabandoned, the Buddha did not state that nirvāṇa is to be abandoned; herather asserted that it is not to be abandoned.28 Following Candrakīrti�sinterpretation of the MMK on nirvāṇa thus far, this would mean that thepractitioner who has come to understand that the world and even whatwas thought to be the escape from it are neither existing nor not existing(nor both nor neither) � this practitioner is nevertheless to continue tostrive for liberation, for nirvāṇa.

One might be inclined to interpret this call to continued effortfrom a subjective point of view, as meaning that even though theMādhyamikas reject an ontologically existent nirvāṇa, and even thoughthey equally reject nirvāṇa as the cessation of an ontologically existentsaṃsāra, they do accept nirvāṇa as a spiritual event. As an event it willbelong to the conventional level, but as the paramount and decisivespiritual event it will effect the practitioner�s release from repeated birthand death, which are ultimately unreal but experienced as real until theevent occurs. It is, as stated earlier, a profound insight, sharpened, deep-ened and solidified by meditative concentration, which is said to effectthe release. In Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 4cd, Nāgārjuna declares that the thoroughknowledge (parijñā) of existence and non-existence is the liberatingfactor.29 In his commentary on this half-verse, Candrakīrti explains thatbecause existence and non-existence are mutually dependent, they arenot established by own-nature, i.e., they cannot exist in reality (for

26 MMK 25.10: prahāṇaṃ cābravīc chāstā bhavasya vibhavasya ca | tasmān na bhāvonābhāvo nirvāṇam iti yujyate ||.

27 PsPed 530.7: tatra sūtra uktam | ye kecid bhikṣavo bhavena bhavasya niḥsaraṇaṃparyeṣante vibhavena vā �parijñānaṃ tat teṣām iti |. De La Vallée Poussin (PsPed

530, n. 4) determines the text closest to the sūtra cited by Candrakīrti to be attestedin the Udāna (p. 33, iii.10).

28 PsPed 530.8-9: na caitan nirvāṇaṃ prahātavyam uktaṃ bhagavatā kiṃ tarhy apra-hātavyam |.

29 YṢ 4cd: dngos dang dngos med yongs shes pas || bdag nyid chen po rnam par grol ||.I rely in this paper on Scherrer-Schaub�s edition of the YṢ as contained in the YṢV.

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whatever is dependent cannot really exist), but the spiritually immaturedo not know this and, conceiving existence and non-existence andtherewith engendering desire and other defilements in regard to the two,they are bound and doomed to wander in saṃsāra.30 Awareness of thelack of real existence and non-existence, on the other hand, has thepower to ultimately terminate the continuum of desire and other defile-ments because it jettisons the objective basis onto which desire is pro-jected. Thorough knowledge of the non-existence of both existence andnon-existence is on account of this potent enough to break the bonds ofthe cycle of birth and death and deliver one from saṃsāra; it is thussuitable as a means of liberation.

That thought and conceptual activity have no part to play in thisthorough knowing is indicated in Candrakīrti�s commentary to Yukti-ṣaṣṭikā 4cd, where he describes it as having the nature of the non-imagining of an own-being of existence and non-existence. More epis-temologically, he equates it with the non-perception of existence andnon-existence.31 It thus appears that for him thorough knowledge is theresult of cultivation of the understanding that nothing exists, and in-volves, conceptually, the ceasing of all conceptualizing of and in regardto existence and its contingent opposite, and perceptually, the non-apprehension of these two, i.e., of any thing or any lack of existencepredicated upon a thing. When the yogin as �knower� is without theconcept of, or apprehension of any of the things accepted as existing ornot existing by the world or by the other Buddhist schools, the �object�of the thorough knowing must exclude all possible phenomenal entitiesand non-entities. The object, conventionally speaking, is the truth be-hind the veil; the yogin�s thorough knowing characterized as the non-apprehension of existence or non-existence bespeaks a penetration ofthe world of fictions to its true nature, a nature which is untouched byconceptuality and stripped of the manifoldness of the illusion. It is a

30 Related text and French translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.9-23 and 132-134(I rely on Scherrer-Schaub�s edition of the YṢV in this paper). See alternatively Lo-izzo 2007: 259.6-260.6 and 140f. (Loizzo�s YṢ and YṢV translation is often unreli-able).

31 � yongs su shes pa dngos po dang dngos po med pa�i rang gi ngo bo la sogs payongs su mi rtog pa�i rang bzhin � (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.12-14; Loizzo 2007:259.7-9); dngos po dang dngos po med pa mi dmigs pa ni ... (Scherrer-Schaub 1991:32.23-24; Loizzo 2007: 260.6-7).



nature described in Madhyamaka works as peaceful (śānta) and thepacification of all objective manifoldness and all manifold conceptualand verbal activity (praprañcopaśama),32 and is such because nothinghas ever arisen to disturb its calm: nothing has ever come into being,and nothing has ever ceased. Thus even though it is neither a �thing�nor a dependently conceived �non-thing,� the object of the thoroughknowledge, viz., the true nature of the dependently originated and thedependently designated, is appropriate to be understood as the Mādhya-mika�s ontological nirvāṇa. This true nature of the world coincides withnirvāṇa conceived as the removal of the defilements and the abandon-ing of all suffering existence because like all other things, the defile-ments and suffering, in never having arisen, have always been �aban-doned.� Similar to the traditionally described nirvāṇa,33 the Madhya-maka nirvāṇa is set forth as the pacification of all manifoldness, but incontradistinction to the previously mentioned interpretations of nirvāṇa,which envisioned it as an existent and enduring dimension or entityremoved from the world, as an existent non-existent, or as the stoppingof real defilements and a real personal continuum, the Madhyamakanirvāṇa is the world itself � in its innate and eternal state of peacefulnon-arising. As the true nature of the world and the phenomena consti-tuting it, it is not even, as the other schools� nirvāṇa is, something to beattained through escape from the world, for it is already ontologicallyanticipated in things themselves and merely requires insight into thisfact.34 The old opposition between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is replaced in

32 Cf. MMK 7.16, 18.9, 25.24.33 Cf. Aṅguttara Nikāya II.163 where nirvāṇa is characterized as papañcavūpasama.34 Cf. Vetter 1982: 92f.: �Ich weise hier nur darauf hin, dass das von Nāgārjuna als

Ziel genannte Nirvāṇa kein jenseitiger Ort ist, auch kein isolierter Zustand in derWelt, auch kein Nichtmehrsein von etwas Besonderem, sondern die Welt selbst, in-sofern sie ihrer Bestimmtheiten und damit Bedingtheiten entkleidet und darum nichtmehr als solche wahrnehmbar ist.� (�I will here only point out that the nirvāṇanamed by Nāgārjuna as the goal is not a place beyond, not an isolated state in theworld, also not the being no more of something particular; [it is] rather the world it-self insofar as it is stripped of its determinacies and with that its conditionalities andtherefore no longer perceptible as such.�). Cf. MMK 25.9: ya ājavaṃjavībhāvaupādāya pratītya vā | so �pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate ||. See also Vetter1982: 93, where he asserts that the Madhyamaka interpretation of nirvāṇa assures itsdefiniteness: �... diese Endgültigkeit kann nur dadurch garantiert werden, dass esschon immer nur das Nirvāṇa gibt und dass die Welt nur eine falsche Vorstellung

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Madhyamaka with an identification of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, or ratherwith an identification of nirvāṇa and the true nature of saṃsāra. nirvāṇaas a spiritual event involves seeing through the world, the manifoldnessof existence, such that its true nature is experienced.

It is against this larger background that the seemingly paradoxi-cal statements found in Madhyamaka texts as well as in Prajñāpāramitāand Mahāyāna literature in general which state that the yogin sees theultimate by not-seeing, or that �non-seeing is seeing� are to be under-stood.35 The knowing of the true nature of things, of the ultimate peace-fulness of existence that has always been at its heart, or as the textssometimes refer to it, of �thusness� (tattva), is a knowing that is withoutobjects or appearances, one in which the yogin does not apprehend anything. To dwell in a meditative state in which nothing appears is to seereality. In his commentary on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 6cd,36 Candrakīrti also de-fines nirvāṇa via the seeming paradox: he asserts that the thoroughknowing of the non-arising of a real nature of existence which occurs byway of non thorough-knowing, is said to be nirvāṇa.37

4. PERCEPTION OF EMPTINESS ACCORDING TO A POST-CANDRAKĪRTIMĀDHYAMIKA

As realization of the ultimate was deemed to be direct and unmediated,with the rise of the Buddhist epistemological-logical tradition Mādhya-

ist.� (�This definitiveness can only be guaranteed when there was always solelynirvāṇa and the world is only a wrong idea.�).

35 See, e.g., MABhed 229.18-20 (MABhtr 1911: 279): rnal �byor pa �phags pa�i lammngon du mdzad par gyur pas ma gzigs pa�i tshul gyis de kho na nyid gzigs pa daggis � . Cf. also PsPed 265.3-5. The author of the Tarkajvālā quotes the sentencemthong ba med pa ni de nyid mthong ba�o (similar to the oft-cited adarśanaṃ bha-gavan sarvadharmāṇāṃ darśanaṃ saṃyagdarśanam); see Heitmann 2004: 98f. and99, n. 3. On interpretations of such statements, see Keira 2004: 99, n. 151.

36 YṢ 6cd: parijñānaṃ bhavasyaiva nirvāṇam iti kathyate || (Sanskrit cited in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 144, n. 125). Tibetan text and translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991:37.21-22 and 146; Loizzo 2007: 268.1-2 and 147.

37 Text of the entire relevant passage and translation in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 37.23-38.2 and 146-147; Loizzo 2007: 268.3-6 and 147. See also Scherrer-Schaub p. 146,n. 129, where she remarks that the aparijñāna defined as nirvāṇa may be best inter-preted as a state of consciousness without subject or object. Note that Candrakīrtihas defined existence (bhava, srid pa) as the five appropriated skandhas in hiscommentary to Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 6ab.


mikas felt increasingly behooved to explain how the soteriologicallycritical non-seeing occurred, and in doing so to situate it in an epistemo-logically suitable context.38 Candrakīrti�s presentation of the direct per-ception of the non-existence of phenomena was, as we shall see, in parta response to the influence of the epistemologists. In order to highlightthe distinctiveness of his presentation, it may be instructive to brieflydescribe, as a point of contrast, the theory of ultimate perception setforth by Kamalaśīla (740�795), a later Mādhyamika who dealt with theissue by appropriating and revamping the ideas of the epistemologists.Heavily influenced by Dharmakīrti (c. 600�660), Kamalaśīla relied onhis theory of non-perception (anupalabdhi) for the theoretical elucida-tion and traditional grounding of the vision of emptiness. Slightly modi-fying Dharmakīrti�s theory, which determines that the non-perception ofa specific thing X implies a perception other than that of thing X (an-yopalabdhi) and indeed a perception of something other than X, viz., Y,(anyabhāva), Kamalaśīla maintains that the non-perception consistingin the non-seeing of any and all things is a perception other than that ofX (anyopalabdhi) because it is a perception that is different from theseeing of things, but rejects that the perception of something other thanX (anyabhāva), that is, of some other thing, plays a role because noother thing truly exists which might serve as the object of perception.39

38 R. Keira (2004: 47-49) explains: �Now, since ordinary beings cannot perceive theultimate nature of entities, it is also impossible that they would perceive the void-ness (śūnyatā) of entities, since that is what entities ultimately are. Here, however,the following problem arises: if nobody could understand the Mādhyamika thesis ofthe absence of real intrinsic nature by means of direct perception, the Mādhyamikaswould not have a method for obtaining the nonconceptual wisdom of thusness. Inthat case the religious project of Mādhyamika philosophy would not be fulfilled:bodhisattvas would not be able to progress spiritually on the path to buddhahood bydirectly realizing the ultimate thusness, i.e., the absence of real intrinsic nature. TheMādhyamika theory of meditation upon all dharmas as being without real intrinsicnature thus could not be established. Furthermore, if the Mādhyamikas could notprove the possibility of a direct perception which understands the absence of real in-trinsic nature, they also could not prove the existence of the Buddha�s wisdom di-rectly understanding selflessness (nairātmya). Therefore, since the Buddha wouldnot be established to be someone who can directly realize thusness, his authoritywould accordingly be lost, as it is an essential facet of the Buddha�s wisdom that itbe nonconceptual and direct.�

39 On Dharmakīrti�s theory of non-perception, see Keira 2004: 52-64; on Kamalaśīla�srevision of this theory for Mādhyamika consumption, see pp. 64-86.

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Put simply, knowing the ultimate involves a cognition which does nottake any thing as its support. Kamalaśīla admits that like all otherthings, this cognition does not ultimately exist, but he unambiguouslydeclares that it, like the yogin in possession of it, does exist convention-ally.40 Even though the conventionally existing cognition which knowsthe true nature of things is a cognition devoid of content, it is proper toconfer on it the status of valid direct perception because it is clear(spaṣṭa), that is, non-conceptual (kalpanāpoḍha), and non-belying(avisaṃvāda). Opponents who, in consideration of the fact that cogni-tion by definition requires an object, would argue that non-existingthings are incapable of generating cognition are countered by Kamal-aśīla�s assertion that the gnosis (ye shes) which arises from meditationclearly realizes the thusness (de kho na nyid) of the selflessness ofthings; by no means, he states, on occasions where this gnosis is said,e.g., in the Dharmasaṅgītisūtra,41 to involve �non-seeing� is a non-implicative negation, i.e., no cognition at all, intended.42 Even so, it ischallenging to imagine how yogic cognition, as a clear perception inwhich nothing appears, might have as its �object� the state without ap-pearances; as R. Keira has noted, Kamalaśīla could be criticized forassuming an anyopalabdhi which has non-existence (abhāva) as its ob-ject.43 Kamalaśīla deals with the problem by turning to reflexive cogni-tion (svasaṃvedana) − the aspect of cognition which knows the contentof cognition and makes memory possible. According to him, when theyogin reaches the stage in his meditation on the selflessness of phenom-ena in which nothing appears, the reflexive aspect of his cognition, herein the role of anyopalabdhi, takes the clear perception without appear-ances as its object, first recognizing that it lacks any appearances andsubsequently recognizing that the cognition itself does not truly exist.On the basis of this experience, the yogin is afterwards, upon emergingfrom the non-conceptual state, able to understand by way of a concep-tual subsequent [judging] cognition (phyis rjes su thob pa�i shes pa) that

40 See Keira 2004: 105-110. For the Madhyamakāloka text containing Kamalaśīla�saffirmation of the conventional existence of yogic cognition, see ibid., pp. 226-228.

41 Dharmasaṅgītisūtra (as cited in the Śīkṣāsamuccaya): adarśanaṃ bhagavan sarva-dharmāṇām darśanaṃ samyagdarśanam iti; see Keira 2004: 69-71 and 99.

42 See Keira 2004: 98-104; for the Madhyamakāloka Tibetan text, see ibid., p. 225f.43 See ibid., p. 83f.


the cognition lacked appearances and that it also lacks true existence,and, as the upshot of this, that all things are without a real nature.44

5. CANDRAKĪRTI ON PERCEIVING NOTHING

Candrakīrti, who is estimated to have been active approximately a cen-tury and a half before Kamalaśīla and who seems not to have knownDharmakīrti�s views on non-perception, would concur with Kamalaśīlathat the yogin�s perception of reality occurs in the form of a direct per-ception. In a section of his Yuktiṣaṣṭikā commentary, to which I shallreturn shortly, Candrakīrti explicitly asserts that there is direct percep-tion of reality. His understanding of the nature of the cognition thatdirectly perceives the final nature of things is, however, quite differentfrom Kamalaśīla�s.

A passage relevant to Candrakīrti�s views on cognition of the ul-timate, albeit occurring in another context, can be found in his commen-tary on the second kārikā of Nāgārjuna�s Śūnyatāsaptati.45 The discus-sion there, sparked by the kārikā�s reference to the self (bdag, *ātman),commences with Candrakīrti�s rebuttal of an opponent view that thewords �I� and �mine,� although without an objective support for theBuddhas who have relinquished the belief in a self (ngar �dzin pa,*ahaṃkāra) and the belief in �mine� (nga yir �dzin pa, *mamakāra), dohave an objective support when it comes to ordinary, unenlightenedpeople because they still maintain the belief in a self; Candrakīrti arguesthat this is not the case because the self simply does not exist. The op-ponent responds that even if the self does not exist, the belief in a selfnevertheless exists as a mind associate (sems las byung ba, *caitta) andtherefore cannot be just a word. Candrakīrti inquires what the objectivesupport (dmigs pa, *ālambana) for this mind associate might be, andwhen the opponent states that it is the self, Candrakīrti reiterates that theself does not exist, and points out that in the absence of an objectivesupport, consciousness and its associates cannot arise. He then moveson to address the Yogācāra objection that consciousness and its associ-

44 I rely on Keira for this explanation. Kamalaśīla�s assertions on this point from theMadhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā, etc., and R. Keira�s elucidation of them may be foundin Keira 2004: 77-81.

45 For the text and a German translation of the entire relevant passage, see Erb 1997:218.33-223.32 and 46-53.


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ates arise and exist without an external object, as they do in dreams,etc.,46 and chides the Yogācāra opponent for not adhering to the well-established worldly convention that consciousness occurs together withan object, arguing that consciousness and its associates, which are infact produced by an object, cannot exist when the object is missing. Anextended discussion with another opponent follows in which a favouritenon-existent of Indian philosophy is made topical, with the opponentcontending that not all consciousnesses have an (existent) object be-cause otherwise the consciousness which apprehends the son of a barrenwoman (mo gsham gyi bu, *vandyāputra) could not occur. Candrakīrtiasserts that the designation (ming, *nāman/*abhidhāna) �son of a barrenwoman� serves as the consciousness�s object, and asks the opponentwhy he would then say that this consciousness is objectless. The oppo-nent retorts that if the mere name would be the object when one hears�son of a barren woman,� then with the utterance of the sentence �Theson of a barren woman does not exist,� the designation should also notexist, but since this is not the case, the name cannot be the object ofconsciousness. The opponent goes on to argue that non-existence(dngos po med pa, *abhāva) would constitute the object-support (dmigspa, *ālambana), positioning himself in the well-known ākāra theory ofperception attributed to the Sautrāntika school and recognized by epis-temologists like Dignāga, according to which the object bestows itsimage to consciousness and is cognized by means of this image;47 forthose admitting external things consciousness knows the outer objectexclusively via the image of the object reflected in it. Consciousnessthus appears with an image that conforms to its object; for example,consciousness of the colour blue arises assuming the aspect of its object,namely, blue. Consciousness of a barren woman�s son, in the view ofCandrakīrti�s opponent, would therefore arise with non-existence as itsimage. Candrakīrti attacks this idea, likewise in reliance on the Sautrān-tika theory that consciousness assumes the image of the object, focusingfirst on the idea that the image is not in its nature different from con-sciousness. Given that the opponent presumes that the son of a barren

46 Cf. also Candrakīrti�s rebuttal of the dream example for the Yogācāra argument thatconsciousness arises without an object in MABhed on MA 6.48-53; see MABhed

140.5-145.9 and MABhtr 1910: 328-333.47 Cf. AKBh 62.6, 473.25-474.1; Cox 1988: 38-40; Hattori 1968: 98, 102; Erb 1997:

142, n. 400.


woman as object transfers its image of non-existence onto conscious-ness, the consciousness, Candrakīrti points out, in conforming to thesheer non-existence of the image, will not be able to be existent. It is notlogically possible, he asserts, for an existent consciousness to take onthe image of that which is bereft of existence, because existence andnon-existence are mutually exclusive and cannot occur simultaneouslyin a single phenomenon. If it would nevertheless be supposed that theconsciousness would become both existent (to accommodate its ownexistence) and non-existent (to accommodate the image of the son of abarren woman), then the opponent will be forced to accept a doubleconsciousness. When the opponent shifts the focus to the object andargues that the case of the apprehension of non-existence will exactlyparallel the case of the apprehension of blue, i.e., the appearing imagewill reflect the object, he is informed that the image concerned (and theconsciousness by implication), in conforming to the inexistence of theson of a barren woman, can only be non-existent, because otherwise theobject and its image, the former non-existent, the latter existent, wouldcontradict each other. In the same vein, Candrakīrti stresses a few lineslater that inasmuch as consciousness does not have a nature differentfrom the image, a consciousness that is produced through conforming tonon-existence will have to be non-existent, since non-existence and an(existent) image are incompatible. He adds that consciousness lacks anynature prior to its arising, and not apprehending the image of an object,it simply does not arise.48 The debate does not stop here, but the mainpoint has been made: for Candrakīrti, a consciousness of which the ob-jective support is non-existence is a non-existent one. The lack of anobject for consciousness precludes the arising of consciousness.

While the above discussion from the Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti dealswith the Sautrāntika ākāra theory in the context of a response to oppo-nents who rely on it to defend their own doctrinal theories, in other ofhis works Candrakīrti independently introduces it and adopts it for thesake of underpinning his own views; he appears to have accepted thisdoctrine on the conventional level.49 Perhaps his most interesting use ofthe ākāra theory occurs in the passages in which he describes and de-fends his interpretation of consciousness�s apprehension of ultimate

48 Cf. Erb 1997: 221.14-15 and 49.49 For references, see Erb 1997: 142, n. 400.

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reality, ontological nirvāṇa. An epistemologically focused discussion onthis topic can be found in his comments on Yuktiṣaṣṭikā kārikā 8,50

where he attacks fellow Buddhists for the sake of demonstrating that hisview regarding consciousness and the ultimate is the sole logically andepistemologically viable one. Proceeding from the kārikā�s characteri-zation of the Buddhist opponents� nirvāṇa as (a real) cessation (�gog,*nirodha),51 Candrakīrti commences by exposing the inadequacy of theVaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika nirvāṇa conceived as the ceasing of thedefilements and the psycho-physical continuum (in the case of theVaibhāṣikas the conclusion of a series of hypostatized �stops,� and inthe case of the Sautrāntikas nothing but the utter end of the continuum)when it comes to realization, i.e., direct perception, of this cessation.52

Among other arguments, he denies that cessation, and thus perceptionof it, could occur as long as the aggregates still exist and adverts to thefact that, as the kārikā has indicated, once the psycho-physical contin-uum has come to an end there is no subject left to apprehend the cessa-tion.53 Candrakīrti then turns to the views of the logical-epistemologicalschool on direct perception of the ultimate. Quoting from and para-phrasing Pramāṇasamuccaya I.6cd and its auto-commentary, he setsforth Dignāga�s definition of yogic perception, presenting it as the yog-ins� seeing of the mere thing (don tsam, *arthamātra), a seeing that is

50 YṢ 8: rnam par �jig pas �gog �gyur gyi || �dus byas shes pas ma yin na || de ni su lamngon sum �gyur || zhig ces pa de ji lta bu ||.

51 See also YṢ 7: dngos po skyes pa zhig pa la || ji ltar �gog pa brtag pa bzhin || debzhin sgyu ma byas pa ltar || mkhas pa dag gis �gog par dgongs ||.

52 As Scherrer-Schaub (1991: 149f. [n. 141]) has already indicated, Candrakīrti ex-ploits the traditional notion that nirvāṇa/nirodha must be �realized� (sākṣātkr ̥) tobring the discussion onto epistemological terrain. �La discussion qui s�ouvre avec lakār 8 et se poursuit jusqu�à la kār 12 et son commentaire � porte sur la nature del�arrêt (nirodha) et de la connaissance de l�arrêt (nirodha-jñāna). Les sources scrip-turaires et les traités parlent de cette dernière comme d�une connaissance directe, un�vue devant les yeux�: ainsi de l�opération sur la troisième vérité, où l�arrêt doit êtreperçu directement (nirodha-sākṣātkāra). � La synonymie des expressions sākṣāt-KR̥- et pratyakṣī-KR̥-, de leur dérivés et expressions apparentées, autorise Candra-kīrti à déplacer le centre de la discussion sur le terrain de l�épistémologie.� Cf., e.g.,Saṃyutta Nikāya V, 422.19-22: Taṃ kho panidaṃ dukkhanirodham ariyasaccaṃsacchikātabban ti me bhikkhave � āloko udapādi ||; further references in Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 150 (n. 141).

53 For text and translation of these and other arguments, see Scherrer-Schaub 1991:39.3-40.11 and 151-155; Loizzo 2007: 270.3-272.7 and 148-150.


without the superimposition of a unitary object and not mixed with con-ceptuality deriving from the guru�s teaching;54 he declares that such aview of yogic perception is not suitable when it is a question of directperception of cessation. The opponent epistemologist responds byspecifying that it is generally established (grags, *prasiddha) that whena real particular (rang gi mtshan nyid, *svalakṣaṇa) is meditated uponby way of its general characteristics (spyi�i mtshan nyid, *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), the gnosis arisen from meditation (bsgoms pa las byung ba�iye shes, *bhāvanāmayam jñānam) gradually arises. That which is ap-prehended by this non-conceptual gnosis (rnam par mi rtog pa�i ye shes,*avikalpajñāna), he adds, being free of any conceptual superimposition,is nothing but the particular. Thus, when one realizes, e.g., imperma-nence, one knows the mere thing (dngos po tsam).55 The opponent con-cludes his argument by stating that since the object apprehended bygnosis is the particular, this object, like the object in the case of con-sciousness perceiving mere blue, etc., is directly perceived. The non-conceptual gnosis is thereby situated at the culmination of the episte-mologist yogin�s meditation on, we may assume, the four Noble Truths,with the �mere thing� the real aspects such as impermanence, suffering,emptiness, selflessness, etc., connected with these Truths. The yoginenvisaged by the opponent would thus initially meditate on a conceptualimage or conceptual ascertainment of his object, such as impermanenceor emptiness, and his intense concentration and repeated effort wouldeffect a gradual refinement of the conceptualized object, with the endresult that the meditation would issue in a direct, i.e., exclusively non-conceptual, perception of the object.56 In the view of certain later

54 YṢV: rnal �byor pa rnams kyi bla mas bstan pa las skyes pa rnam par rtog pa dangma �dres pa gcig tu yul sgro btags pa med pa don tsam mthong ba gang yin pa deyang �gog pa la mi srid do || (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.12-14; Loizzo 2007: 272.7-9. Translation in Scherrer-Schaub p. 155f.; Loizzo p. 150). PramāṇasamuccayaI.6cd: yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyavakīrṇārthamātradr̥k; (see Steinkellner 2005: 3; thefragments presented in Hattori 1968: 94 read °āvyatibhinnā° for °āvyavakīrṇā°).Pramāṇasamuccayavr̥tti to I.6cd: yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇamarthamātradarśanaṃ pratyakṣam (Steinkellner 2005: 3; see also VincentEltschinger�s article in the present volume, n. 93, as well as Eli Franco�s article inthe present volume p. 122).

55 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.12-21; Loizzo 2007: 272.10-273.2.56 For a concise summary of the basic structure of the yogic path according to Dhar-

makīrti, see section 3.1 (under �The Path to Salvation�) of Vincent Eltschinger�s ar-

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Mādhyamikas like Kamalaśīla, who is known for having appropriated anumber of the logical-epistemological school�s doctrines, the yogininvolved in conceptual meditation on the emptiness of things would beable to evolve the meditation to the point that upon reaching the �ulti-mate limit of [conceptual] meditation� (bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta), anon-conceptual perception of emptiness would arise,57 which, as previ-ously explained, would take the form of a cognition without content andwould be recognized and registered by the self-knowing aspect of cog-nition.

The postulation of Dignāga�s,58 later elaborated by Dharmakīrtiand his commentators, and tailored to fit Madhyamaka requirements byKamalaśīla, that extended conceptual cultivation of an object wouldissue in direct perception of the object, is dismissed by Candrakīrti aspreposterous. He asserts that when the idea being maintained is exam-ined more closely, the epistemologists, given that they strictly maintainthe distinctiveness, i.e., the mutual exclusivity, of the particular and ofthe general characteristic, respectively the object of direct perceptionand conceptual cognition, will have to admit that it is logically unac-ceptable to hold that the object used for meditation on the general char-acteristic could be the particular, since this would involve over-extension (ha cang thal bar �gyur ba, *atiprasaṅga) � I assume becausethe scope of the particular is thereby extended to include general char-

ticle in the present volume. For Dharmakīrti�s description of the cognitions and themeditative process the yogic path involves, see section 4 (�Yogijñāna as an Episte-mological Topic�) of the same article.

57 Cf. Keira 2004: 50, 69ff.58 Though I here attribute to Dignāga the idea that extended conceptual cultivation of

an object issues in its direct perception, it should be noted that this theory is not re-corded in any of his works available to us and is usually associated with Dhar-makīrti. While it is of course possible that Dignāga set forth this view in one ormore of his non-extant works and our YṢV passage provides documentation for this,its absence in the extant materials brings up the question of whether Candrakīrtimight have known Dharmakīrti. Christian Lindtner, solely on the basis of text in theCatuḥśatakaṭīkā which appears to refer to the Pramāṇavārttika assertion pramāṇamavisaṃvādi jñānam, maintains that it �seems probable� that Candrakīrti did knowDharmakīrti (see Lindtner 1992: 57; the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā clause Lindtner cites, viz.,mi bslu ba�i shes pa ni �jig rten na tshad ma nyid du mthong na, can be found in Til-lemans 1990: 67.11-12 [vol. 2]). The evidence is still too slim for definitive conclu-sions. I am grateful to Dr. Helmut Krasser for discussions on the matter and for pro-viding me with valuable references.



acteristics. Candrakīrti�s rejection of the epistemologists� theory thusfocuses on the fact that if the particular free of all conceptual overlay isthe actual object of meditation and, on account of this, the final objectof yogic direct perception, then during the long and repeated course ofthe meditation, this particular cannot also be its opposite, the generalcharacteristic constituted purely by conceptuality. The epistemologists,in maintaining that a yet unrealized particular can be conceptually con-templated to the point that it finally escapes the superimposition of gen-eral characteristics, contradict their fundamental differentiation of theobjects of cognition with this, in his view, fogging of the distinctionbetween the two and overlapping of their definitions. The mutually ex-clusive nature of the two objects and their respective cognitions other-wise posited by the epistemologists automatically prohibits any coincid-ing, intersection or reconciliation.

As stated, Candrakīrti obviously intends to expose the faults ofthe views of his Buddhist colleagues in order to clear the way for hisown position on perception of the ultimate. In the discussion on kārikā 8preceding the altercation with the epistemologists, he is asked if directperception takes place at the moment of seeing, and responds that be-cause there is the making known (rnam par rig pa, *vijñapti) of the ob-ject by consciousness (rnam par shes pa, *vijñāna) even after seeing hasceased, this may be designated �direct perception.�59 He uses this as alead-in to reference to the Sautrāntika theory of direct perception, ac-cording to which it is the image in consciousness, which conforms tothe actual object, that is actually perceived, invoking here the theory�sstock example of the consciousness of blue. The discussion is taken inanother direction by a Vaibhāṣika objection, but subsequent to his refu-tation of the epistemologists� theory of yogic direct perception, there isanother allusion to the Sautrāntika theory. Candrakīrti initiates the pres-entation of his Madhyamaka view by rhetorically asking how, even ifthe meditative process posited by the epistemologists would be correct,there could be the direct perception of the consciousness of cessation(�gog pa, *nirodha) when in cessation there does not exist even a traceof an entity having the form of the cessation of suffering. Next, in reli-ance on scriptural testimony which states that awareness of the non-arising of suffering is direct perception, he argues that it would, in fact,

59 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 39.19-22; Loizzo 2007: 271.3-5.

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be impossible for consciousness to arise when its objective support(dmigs pa; *ālambana) has the form of non-arising; in such a case con-sciousness would definitely assume the mode of non-arising,60 that is, itwould not arise at all.

With this last brief statement Candrakīrti�s initially seeminglyunusual take on direct perception of the ultimate is disclosed. For him,at the time of perception of the ultimate, of the emptiness of things thatwere never really there in the first place, inasmuch as there is nothingwhatsoever to be perceived, that is, since an object for consciousnessdoes not exist, consciousness will simply not come into being; Candra-kīrti�s assertion that consciousness assumes the mode of non-arisingtranslates into no consciousness at all. Yet in this way consciousnessstill fulfills the Sautrāntika demand that the consciousness resemble,conform to, its object: like its object, the non-arisen true nature ofthings, consciousness �takes,� so to speak, a non-arisen and non-existent form. In Candrakīrti�s words: If consciousness, like its object,has the form of non-arising, it is proper to maintain that it has proceededby way of the object just as it is.61 And given its proceeding by way ofits object, its conforming to its object, it is proper to designate it directperception. In the everyday world, too, he avers, situations occur inwhich one speaks of �direct perception� in regard to non-existentthings. He provides the following example: A traveller sees an area offin the distance that appears to be abounding in clear water. He intendsto cross the water but feels incompetent and nervous to do so, and there-fore inquires of a local farmer just how much water might actually beout there. In response, the local, apparently taken aback by the question,asks where the water might be that the traveller claims to see, and thenexplains that what indeed looks like water off in the distance is actuallyonly a mirage. He adds that if the traveller doesn�t believe him, heshould go and look for himself; then he will directly perceive what hehas just been told. It is the same in regular life, Candrakīrti points out,where things that do not exist and are not perceived are conventionallydesignated as directly perceived; therefore, from the point of view ofworldly concealing truth, it is not contradictory to call a consciousnessof non-perception (mi dmigs pa�i shes pa) − which for Candrakīrti is no

60 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 40.28-41.3; Loizzo 2007: 273.7-11.61 Cf. Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 41.3-5; Loizzo 2007: 273.11-12.


consciousness at all � �direct perception.� He bolsters his position byreferring to a scriptural statement which asserts that the determination(yongs su gcod pa, *pariccheda) of an object, corresponding to the wayit is, by that which makes it known (shes pa byed pa, *jñāpaka) is directperception. Candrakīrti considers this statement applicable to the pre-sent case because the consciousness which does not arise on account ofthe fact that its object is non-arisen accurately reflects, makes known,the fact that the object is non-arisen, i.e., that the object does not exist;therefore, inasmuch as the exact state of the object is accurately re-flected through consciousness�s own inexistence, it is appropriate toterm it direct perception.

Candrakīrti had earlier presented basically the same view, al-though in another context, in the fourth verse and its commentary in thechapter on the level of a Buddha in the Madhyamakāvatāra.62 There heis replying to an opponent who contends that if the peaceful (zhi ba,*śānta), viz., the eternal calmedness of all non-arisen things, is reality(de nyid, *tattva), the mind will not proceed in regard to this, and whenthe mind does not proceed, it cannot thoroughly know its object; as aconsequence, statements to the effect that precisely the non-existence ofthorough knowledge (yong su shes pa med pa) constitutes thoroughknowledge of reality, or complete non-knowing is knowing, are inap-propriate. In his verse response, Candrakīrti admits that in this specificcase of the mind relying on the aspect (rnam pa, *ākāra) of reality, it isonly �as if� (lta bu, *iva) consciousness knows the ultimate, clarifyingin his commentary, after reciting the Sautrāntika main requisite for per-ception, namely, that the consciousness be in conformity with the aspectof the object, and illustrating this with the example of blue, that it ismetaphorically stated that the consciousness �arising� in conformitywith the aspect of reality knows reality. It is owing to conceptuality thatone establishes that this consciousness knows reality; in actuality thereis not any consciousness of anything because neither consciousness norits object come into being. Yet even with the qualification, Candrakīrtiintends for the idea of a merely metaphorical apprehension of the ulti-mate to be taken seriously, indicating in the course of his explanation

62 Cf. the discussion in MABhed 356.18-358.20. See also the analysis of MA 12.3-4 inDunne 1996: 546-548.

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that his reference to the Sautrāntika model of perception supplies a gen-erally established example for the argument.63

6. KNOWING THE ULTIMATE

So what exactly, we might ask, is the point of all this, besides the factthat Candrakīrti has displayed his agility in the performance of a verynice little pirouette with the Sautrāntika theory of perception? And whydoes he insist on describing the Mādhyamika yogin�s lack of conscious-ness as direct perception? One might initially conjecture that Nāgār-juna�s explicit mention of the realization of cessation, i.e., of nirvāṇa, inkārikā 8 of the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā inspired Candrakīrti, whose criticism of theother Buddhist schools demonstrates his awareness of the prevailingtheories regarding nirvāṇa and the perception of it, to come up with hisown specifically Madhyamaka view on the topic as he composed hiscommentary on the kārikā. But this is too simplistic, and we have justseen that he had already given a less developed explanation of theknowing of the ultimate in his earliest composition, the Madhya-makāvatāra. It is more probable that Candrakīrti took Nāgārjuna�s refer-ence to realization of cessation primarily as an opportunity to confrontDignāga�s school, with its developed epistemological theories his mainrival on the issue of direct perception of the ultimate, in order to bothdiscredit its explanation of it and to set forth, in an argumentative andscripturally backed form, his own ingenious but typically pragmaticversion. His intent, one assumes, would have been to enter the arena ofBuddhist theories of perception of the ultimate and defeat the episte-mologist on turf that was quite possibly already monopolized by him. Itwas certainly necessary that Candrakīrti find a way to acknowledgedirect perception of nirvāṇa, for not to have done so would have lefthim open to attack regarding the Mādhyamika�s and even the Buddha�sdirect realization of nirvāṇa, and as a consequence, easy prey when itcame to questions of the value of Madhyamaka doctrines and to theissue of the Buddha�s establishment as an authority. At the very least,by securing his own rather unusual portrayal of the consciousness that�directly perceives� nirvāṇa as the ultimate state of things by means ofscripture and a widely accepted theory of perception, Candrakīrti was

63 Cf. MABhed 358.13-14.


able to retain his faction�s standing within the general Buddhist tradi-tion on these issues of fundamental importance. His specifically uniquepresentation of the consciousness of the ultimate, on the other hand,spared him from having to compromise his integrity as a Mādhyamika.

But what are the implications of the stance that when the finalstate of things is realized there is no object to be known, and no con-sciousness to know this? Would it mean that the ultimate is a sheervoid, or a pure abstract nothing, and that the ultimate realization of thisis in the end impossible since one can�t know nothing? I would contendthat our author�s view is more sophisticated and suggestive than this.One of the main points, if not precisely the point that Candrakīrti in-tends to make in the above discussions is that consciousness (vijñāna)as conceived by his fellow philosophers and accepted by himself on theconventional level is fundamentally incapable of knowing the ultimate,because its functioning is restricted to occurring in relation to objects,and the ultimate is no object and has no objects in it. One can be quitecertain that Candrakīrti would have rejected Kamalaśīla�s version of thehighest awareness as clear perception not only because it is based on theepistemologist�s model but also because in this version the clear percep-tion does not escape being described in terms that relate it to and there-fore bind it to the conventional level; Kamalaśīla in fact allows thisconsciousness conventional existence. Candrakīrti�s non-acceptance ofreflexive awareness would further have led him to repudiate the ideathat non-existence is not the object of the consciousness and to chargethat the positing of consciousness devoid of content, i.e., bereft of anobject, would contradict the general Buddhist doctrine that conscious-ness occurs in tandem with an object. Candrakīrti�s underscoring thatconsciousness does not arise when the object is the ultimate is secondar-ily intended to point to the fact that for him all perceptual activity as weknow it − as well as all conceptual and linguistic activity − ceases in theexperience of the true nature of things, of ontological nirvāṇa.64 Towardthe end of the Śūnyatāsaptati�s earlier referenced discussion of the per-ception of the son of a barren woman, Candrakīrti declares that the

64 Cf., e.g., Candrakīrti�s commentary on MMK 5.8, where he states that the pacifica-tion of all visibles (draṣṭavyopaśama) that is free of the net of all conceptuality (sar-vakalpanājālarahita) has the nature of the ceasing of consciousness (here intendedin the sense of conventional consciousness) and the object of consciousness (jñāna-jñeyanivr ̥ttisvabhāva).


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Mādhyamikas accomplish the clearing away, the elimination, of thefactors of existence (chos, *dharma) in the sense that with the non-perception of any of these factors, all of which are of the nature of non-existence, consciousness stops.65 This statement is followed by twosupporting scriptural citations, one of which is Āryadeva�s famous versethat states that consciousness (rnam shes, *vijñāna) is the �seed of exis-tence.�66

For Candrakīrti, the actual realization of the true nature of thingsis performed by a completely different category of awareness, if I maycall it that, namely, by jñāna, �gnosis,� which does not belong or relateto the everyday level. I am aware that a number of Madhyamaka schol-ars construe the situation regarding ultimate knowledge and its objectquite differently, in large part because they interpret the fundamentalMadhyamaka stance on the possibility of existence � in my interpreta-tion that it is impossible � as espousing it. I digress with this, but let itbe noted that C.W. Huntington in his book �The Emptiness of Empti-ness� describes the consciousness which knows the ultimate, i.e., jñāna,as a non-dualistic knowledge that is coterminous with the bodhisattva�severyday experience �in both its conceptual and perceptual aspects.� Hewrites, �The Mādhyamika does not advocate any radically unconven-tional category of epistemic act, but rather a radically unconventionalform of life, in which one is constantly and profoundly in touch with theholistic, contextual nature of all experience�with �the suchness of de-pendent origination.��67 Huntington�s jñāna, albeit acknowledged to be

65 See Erb 1997: 221.40-222.2 and 50-51. It is to be noted that antecedent to this textpassage, in the extended debate concerning perception of the non-existent Can-drakīrti adverts to the absurd consequence entailed by acceptance of objectless con-sciousness in regard to nirvāṇa, namely, that (ordinary) consciousness would per-manently continue, taking nirvāṇa as its objective support. He also briefly weaves inhis view of the status of consciousness at the time of perception of the ultimate; seeibid., 221.31-222.12 and 50-51. Cf. also 223.7-16 and 52.

66 Cf. Catuḥśataka XIV.25 (Suzuki 1994: 360): srid pa�i sa bon rnam śes te || yul rnamsde yi spyod yul lo || yul la bdag med mthong na ni || srid pa�i sa bon �gag par �gyur ||.The verse as cited in the ŚSV reads: srid pa�i sa bon rnam par śes || yul ni de yispyod yul la || mthong ba�i yul rnams bdag med phyir || srid pa�i sa bon �gag par�gyur ||; see Erb 1997: 222.9-12 and p. 144, n. 421.

67 Huntington 1989: 119f. One notes also other comments in reference to jñāna:�Jñāna is the essential clarity and unerring sensibility of a mind that no longerclings to reified concepts of any kind. It is a direct and sustained awareness of thetruth, for a bodhisattva, that meaning and existence are found only in the interface


meditatively cultivated, is essentially a rational insight into a profoundinterconnectedness inherent in the truly existing world, and thus merelya worldly, lived awareness of a state of affairs, and one that is involvednot only with perception but with conceptual thought. Dan Arnold doesnot refer to jñāna per se in his book �Buddhists, Brahmins and Belief,�but he does speak of a realization, which he qualifies, at least paren-thetically, as �radically transformative.�68 He clarifies that the subject ofsuch a realization would be �a Buddha.� Arnold states that the object ofthe realization would be ultimate truth, but rejecting Madhyamaka ar-gumentation as world-denying, he contends �that, for Candrakīrti, theonly ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth�that the �ultimatetruth,� in other words, is the abstract state of affairs of there being no setof �ultimately existent� (paramārthasat) ontological primitives like thedharmas of Abhidharma.�69 ��[U]ltimate truth� (nirvāṇa),� he writes,attempting to explain MMK 25.19ab, �does not consist in somethingfundamentally different in kind from �conventional� reality (saṃsāra);rather, what is �ultimately true� is simply the fact that there is nothingfundamentally different from the world as conventionally described.�70

According to him, the content of a Buddha�s realization would thereforeconsist in knowing that there is not something more real than thedependently arisen, but truly existing, world;71 similar to Huntington�s,Arnold�s ultimate insight is a real rational insight into the way the de-

between the components of an unstable and constantly shifting web of relationships,which is everyday life� (ibid., p. 104), and in reference to prajñā (Huntington statesthat it is �difficult to draw a distinction� between prajñā and jñāna): �Perfect wis-dom graphically reveals the holistic, contextual nature of all forms of existence andknowledge and allows the bodhisattva to adjust his attitude so that it accords withthe �suchness� of all experience, with the self, and with the world, as they are in thecontext of the moment. In this way, he is invested with the ability to act effectivelyand in harmony with the demands of every situation as it presents itself in the webof interrelated events (ibid., p. 88).�

68 Arnold 2005: 204.69 Ibid., p. 184.70 Ibid., p. 172. Two sentences before the one quoted, he states, �Thus, the point of

insisting on the �emptiness of emptiness� is to throw us back into the world and tocompel the recognition that, although events are dependent, contingent, and conven-tional, they are, for all that, real.�

71 Arnold (2005: 204) writes, �That claim [= Candrakīrti�s] is that the �ultimate� con-sists not in some radically �other� state of affairs but in the realization (radicallytransformative, to be sure) that there is nothing more real than this.�

162 ANNE MACDONALD

pendent but real world, inclusive of its concepts, exists. Taking up JohnDunne�s claim (a claim based on the previously mentioned Madhya-makāvatāra verse which states that suchness is only metaphoricallyknown by the non-arisen consciousness) that a buddha would knowneither ultimate reality nor the ordinary world because nothing occurs inhis mind, Arnold contests that such a being would indeed perceivesomething, though certainly not an ultimate reality: �It seems that theordinary world is all that such a Buddha would see.�72 On my reading ofCandrakīrti�s works, however, neither Huntington nor Arnold comenear to capturing what our author intends to convey with his referencesand allusions to the knowing of reality or his more general pronounce-ments on the nature of things.

To return to my understanding of Candrakīrti�s perspective onthe ultimate and its awareness: The cessation of all consciousness in theface of no objects is pivotal for the realization of emptiness, the truenature of things; it does not, however, fully define it. The coming to restof consciousness merely serves as the necessary condition for the ex-perience of the ultimate. As stated, it is a completely different type ofawareness, viz., �gnosis� (jñāna), that knows it. Unlike ordinary con-sciousness, gnosis does not take a thing, or as Candrakīrti sometimesterms it, a mark (nimitta), as its object.73 The fact that its object-supportis conventionally described by Candrakīrti to be emptiness74 does not,however, necessarily mean that the ultimate realization is a realizationof nothing, or that it involves acquiescing to absolute nothingness, to asheer, abstract void. Emptiness elucidated as the pacification of allmanifoldness (prapañcopaśama) implies that no concept or linguisticdesignation applies to the true nature of the world; nothing can bepredicated of it, not even �non-existence.� The notion of emptiness hasin this context a spiritual function; as Lambert Schmithausen has stated,

72 Arnold 2005: 204. Arnold is referring to Dunne 1996: 548.73 Cf. Candrakīrti�s commentary on MMK 25.16 (PsPed 533.11-15), where he argues

that nirvāṇa, in this case conceived by the opponent as both �existent and non-existent,� cannot be ascertained by vijñāna because there is no nimitta in nirvāṇa:kenaitad itthaṃvidhaṃ nirvāṇam astīti paricchidyate | saṃsārāvasthitaḥ paricchin-attīti cet | yadi saṃsārāvasthitaḥ paricchinatti sa kiṃ vijñānena paricchinatti utajñānena | yadi vijñāneneti parikalpyate tan na yujyate | kiṃ kāraṇam | yasmānnimittālambanaṃ vijñānaṃ na ca nirvāṇe kiṃcin nimittam asti |.

74 See PsPed 533.16: yasmāj jñānena hi śūnyatālambanena bhavitavyam |.


�The concept �emptiness� is also not intended to make a positive state-ment about this reality; it is rather merely a call to thought to deliveritself to its negation, to think itself away, to shake off all manifold con-ceptuality and thereby enable the manifestation of the inconceivablereality that was always there.�75 The ceasing of all conceptual and per-ceptual activity in the Madhyamaka yogin would thus act as a catalystfor experience of the concept-, designation- and percept-transcendingultimate that is neither an existent entity nor pure nothingness. Con-sciousness� coming to rest would create, so to speak, a vacuum in whichemptiness as thusness (tattva), the true nature of the world free of anyappearances or conceptual content, could reveal itself. Inasmuch as thepacification of manifoldness coincides in meaning with the cessation ofall things worldly, to which belong karma and the defilements, empti-ness as the true nature of the world is equivalent to nirvāṇa;76 the ex-perience of emptiness, then, would translate into an experience ofnirvāṇa, and the gnosis that has, conventionally speaking, emptiness asits object-support (ālambana) would convey this experience of nirvāṇa.

But if gnosis is not a real consciousness that takes the non-existent as its object or a conventionally existing clear, contentless con-sciousness, just how does Candrakīrti envision it? Given the generalMadhyamaka focus on demonstrating the ontological impossibility ofknown or postulated phenomena, and Candrakīrti�s hesitancy to attemptto describe an ultimate that could mistakenly be construed as existent ornon-existent, details regarding the nature of gnosis are extremely rare inhis works. There is, however, one interesting passage in which he doesdare to sketch its features; it occurs in his commentary on MMK 25.16,

75 Schmithausen 1969: 166: �Auch der Begriff �Leerheit� soll keine positive Aussageüber diese Wirklichkeit machen; es ist vielmehr lediglich eine Aufforderung an dasDenken, sich zur Negation seiner selbst zu vermitteln, sich zu zerdenken, alle viel-fältige Vorstellung abzuschütteln und dadurch die Manifestation der immer schonvorhandenen unbegreiflichen Wirklichkeit zu ermöglichen.�

76 Schmithausen (1969: 166) describes the intersection of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra: �DasNirvāṇa (als metaphysische Größe) ist also im Madhyamaka kein Jenseits; es istnicht außerhalb der Welt, es ist vielmehr in ihr; ja, Nirvāṇa und Welt sind überhauptnicht verschieden, sofern man nur die Welt nicht in ihrer unwahren Endlichkeit,sondern in ihrem wahren Wesen nimmt.� (�Nirvāṇa (as a metaphysical dimension)is therefore in Madhyamaka not a �beyond�; it is not outside the world, it is rather init; indeed, nirvāṇa and the world are not at all different, as long as one takes theworld not in its unreal finitude, but in its true nature.�)

164 ANNE MACDONALD

in which he contrasts consciousness (vijñāna) and gnosis (jñāna) and, asalready noted, asserts that gnosis� object-support is emptiness. Immedi-ately after this reference to its object-support he qualifies gnosis by wayof two adjectives, namely, �having the form of non-arising� (anutpāda-rūpa) and �having a non-existing own-form� (avidyamānasvarūpa),both of which could be applied to the consciousness which in Can-drakīrti�s pirouette �directly perceives� the ultimate, and both of whichcould also be taken to support the idea that there is no experience ofreality, or that its non-experience is experience of it. It is the third adjec-tive given − although at first glance seemingly insignificant − that pro-vides perhaps one of the most telling references to his take on it. Themodifier is �having a form that transcends all manifoldness� (sarvapra-pañcātītarūpa), and in contrast to the previous two, it clearly does notintend a purely negative characterization. With it, there is allusion to anawareness that surmounts all manifold conceptualization and designa-tion, one which neither exists nor does not exist, and is as unfathomableas its so-called object, the thusness that is true reality, ontologicalnirvāṇa. Of course as an awareness that is diametrically opposed toordinary consciousness, it will not be configured in a subject-objectrelationship with emptiness, expressed as its focus for conventionalconvenience; its functioning would rather be non-dual. Intimated by thisand the third adjective is the idea that gnosis consists in a radical mysti-cal experience. Elsewhere, Candrakīrti states that the Buddhas abide inthe objectless gnosis, far beyond the spiritually immature.77 It will notbe irrelevant to mention, in this connection, that Nāgārjuna, in his chap-ter on the Tathāgata in the MMK, describes the Buddha, here under-stood not as a distinct person but as the true reality that is his nature, inthe same way that Candrakīrti describes gnosis, namely, as �transcend-ing all manifoldness� (prapañcātīta).78 Just as striking is Candrakīrti�scomment in the same chapter where he declares that the Mādhyamikasdo not teach that the Tathāgatas are inexistent inasmuch as they are

77 Cf. YṢV on YṢ 4cd: de�i phyir de dag skye bo byis pa rnams las shin tu �das padmigs pa med pa�i ye shes la gnas pas de dag nyid che ba�i phyir bdag nyid chen pozhes bya ste | (Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 32.16-18; Loizzo 2006: 260. 1-3).

78 MMK 22.15: prapañcayanti ye buddhaṃ prapañcātītam avyayam | te prapañcahatāḥsarve na paśyanti tathāgatam ||. Cf. also PsPed 446.5: sarvās tv etāḥ kalpanāniṣprapañce tathāgate na saṃbhavanti |.



�completely outside [the domain of] manifoldness.�79 These descrip-tions of the awakened beings and their gnosis, limited to being made byway of modifiers indicating indescribability and inconceivability,merely point to the unfathomable state beyond the nothingness ofworldly phenomena. It is probably not inappropriate to state that for theMādhyamika as yogin the final goal, and the final state, is not nothing-ness, but transcendence. Although he is more often occupied with andthus associated with rigorously arguing an uncompromising denial ofthe world, it is in passages such as the ones examined here that we en-counter Candrakīrti, as he moves on from this to allude to the outcomeand purpose of that denial, as a conveyer of spiritual, mystical experi-ence.


AK Abhidharmakośa. See AKBh.AKBh Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu. P. Pradhan, ed.

Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8. 2nd ed. Patna, 1975.Arnold 2005 Dan Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemol-

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Cox 1988 Collett Cox, �On the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object ofConsciousness: Sarvāstivādin and Dārṣṭāntika Theories.� InJournal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies11 (1988): 63-105.

Cox 1994 Collett Cox, �Attainment through Abandonment: The Sar-vāstivāda Path of Removing Defilements.� In Paths to Lib-eration. The Mārga and its Transformations in BuddhistThought. R.E. Buswell, Jr. & R.M. Gimello, ed. Delhi1994: 31-87.

Cox 1995 Collett Cox, Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theorieson Existence. Studia Philologica Buddhica: Monograph Se-ries, 11. Tokyo: The International Institute for BuddhistStudies, 1995.

79 PsPed 443.11: na ca vayaṃ sarvathaiva niṣprapañcānāṃ tathāgatānāṃ nāstitvaṃbrūmaḥ� |.

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Dayal 1932 Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist SanskritLiterature. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul Ltd., 1932.Reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.

Dunne 1996 John Dunne, �Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha.� InJournal of the American Academy of Religion LXIV/3(1996): 525-556.

Erb 1997 Felix Erb, Śūnyatāsaptativrt̥ti: Candrakīrtis Kommentar zuden �Siebzig Versen über die Leerheit� des Nāgārjuna[Kārikās 1-14]. Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 6, Insti-tute for the Culture and History of Indian and Tibet at theUniversity of Hamburg. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag,1997.

Frauwallner 1953 Erich Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I.Band. Salzburg: Otto Müller Verlag, 1953.

Frauwallner 1984 Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1.Bedekar, V.M., tr. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.

Gethin 1998 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1998.

Gethin 2001 Rupert Gethin, The Buddhist Path to Awakening. Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1992; 2nd edition Oxford: Oneworld, 2001.

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Heitmann 2004 Annette L. Heitmann, Nektar der Erkenntnis. BuddhistischePhilosophie des 6. Jh.: Bhavyas Tarkajvālā I-III.26.Aachen: Shaker Verlag, 2004.

Huntington 1989 C.W. Huntington, Jr., The Emptiness of Emptiness. AnIntroduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika. Honolulu: Uni-versity of Hawaii Press, 1989.

de Jong 1978 J.W. de Jong, �Textcritical Notes on the Prasannapadā.� InIndo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978): 25-59; 217-252.

Keira 2004 Ryusei Keira, Mādhyamika and Epistemology. A Study ofKamalaśīla's Method for Proving the Voidness of allDharmas. Introduction, Annotated Translations and TibetanTexts of Selected Sections of the Second Chapter of theMadhyamakāloka. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie undBuddhismuskunde 59. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetischeund Buddhistische Studien, 2004.

Kragh 2006 Ulrich Timme Kragh, Early Buddhist Theories of Actionand Result: A Study of Karmaphalasambandha. Candra-


kīrti's Prasannapadā, Verses 17.1�20. Wiener Studien zurTibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 64. Vienna: Arbeits-kreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 2006.

Lamotte, 1976 Étienne Lamotte, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse deNāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra) avec une étude surla Vacuité. Tome IV. Publications de l�Institut Orientalistede Louvain, 12. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, Universitéde Louvain, 1976.

La Vallée Poussin 1931 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, �Le Bouddha et les Abhijñā.�In Le Muséon (1931): 335-342.

Lindquist 1935 Sigurd Lindquist, Siddhi und Abhiññā. Eine Studie über dieKlassischen Wunder des Yoga. Uppsala 1935.

Lindtner 1992 Christian Lindtner, �On the Date of Dharmakīrti etc.� InThe Adyar Library Bulletin (1992): 56-62.

Loizzo 2007 Joseph Loizzo and the AIBS Translation Team, Nāgārju-na�s Reason Sixty with Candrakīrti�s Reason Sixty Com-mentary. New York: The American Institute of BuddhistStudies at Columbia University, 2007.

MA Madhyamakāvatāra. See MABhed.MABhed Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti. Traduction Tibétain.

Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica IX.St. Petersburg, 1907-1912. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsi-dass, 1992.

MABhtr �Madhyamakāvatāra, Introduction au Traité du Milieu del�Ācārya Candrakīrti, avec le commentaire de l�auteur, tra-duit d�aprés la version tibétaine.� Louis de La Vallée Pous-sin, tr. In Le Muséon VIII (1907): 249-317; XI (1910): 271-358; XII (1911): 235-328.

MacDonald 2007 Anne MacDonald, �Revisiting the Mūlamadhya-makakārikā: Text-Critical Proposals and Problems.� InStudies in Indian Philosophy and Buddhism 14 (2007): 25-55.

MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. See PsPed and de Jong 1978.Ñāṇamoli 1995 Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, tr., The Middle

Length Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of theMajjhima Nikāya. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995.

Oetke 2007 Claus Oetke, �On MMK 24.18.� In Journal of Indian Phi-losophy 35 (2007): 1-32.

PsPed Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyamikasūtras) de Nāgār-juna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed. Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St.

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Petersburg 1903-1913. Reprint Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag,1970.

Rahder 1926 Johannes Rahder, Daśabhūmikasūtra. Leuven, 1926.Saṃyutta Nikāya M. Leon Feer, ed. London: Pali Text Society, 1898. Reprint

1960.Scherrer-Schaub 1991 Christina Scherrer-Schaub, Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvrt̥ti. Commentaire

à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseigne-ment de la causalité par le Maître indien Candrakīrti.Bruxelles: Institut Belge Des Hautes Études Chinoises,1991.

Schmithausen 1969 Lambert Schmithausen, �Ich und Erlösung im Buddhis-mus.� In Zeitschrift für Missionswissenschaft und Religi-onswissenschaft 53 (1969): 157-170.

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Schmithausen 1981 Lambert Schmithausen, �On some Aspects of Descriptionsor Theories of �Liberating Insight� and �Enlightenment� inEarly Buddhism.� In Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhis-mus. Gedenkschrift für Ludwig Alsdorf. Klaus Bruhn andAlbrecht Wezler, ed. Wiesbaden 1981: 199-250.

ŚSV Śūnyatāsaptativr̥tti. See Erb 1997.Steinkellner 2005 Ernst Steinkellner, Dignāga�s Pramāṇasamuccaya, Chapter

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V I N C E N T E L T S C H I N G E R

On the Career and the Cognition of Yogins1

In the present paper, I shall first attempt to reconstruct Dharmakīrti�snotion of a yogin�s career on the basis of the statements one can findscattered throughout his very influential Pramāṇavārttika. I shall try todraw a coherent picture of both yoga and yogins, from the first insights(prajñā) that take place when still in the stage of an �ordinary person�(pṛthagjana), who is beset by a false view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), to theculmination of the yogic endeavour at emancipation (mukti) and/or enli-

1 The present paper is the fifth in a series of studies of Dharmakīrti�s religious phi-losophy, see Eltschinger 2005a and b, 2007 and forthcoming. Most sincere thanksare due to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Prof. John Taber and Dr. Helmut Krasser, whocarefully read through the present paper, and to Mrs Cynthia Peck-Kubacek, whovery kindly improved my English. Though I could not do justice to all his sugges-tions and remarks, I am much indebted to Prof. Eli Franco�s very insightful com-ments on this paper. Since the present study was written in 2005, it did not take intoconsideration John Dunne�s 2006 essay on the yogins� cognition. Dunne�s exegeti-cal hypothesis is, however, diametrically opposed to mine. To put it in a nutshell,Dunne argues that �Dharmakīrti does not choose to present yogic perception as amystical gnosis that encounters or uncovers real things in the world� (Dunne 2006:500), or, to put it in other words, that �Dharmakīrti deliberately chooses to down-play the notion that, through spiritual exercises, an adept gains extraordinary sen-sory abilities� (Dunne 2006: 504). As I shall try to argue in the second part of thispaper, I think that Dharmakīrti actually did hold the opinion that, at the completionof the path, the yogin has a direct perceptual encounter with reality itself. In myopinion, Dharmakīrti inherits from ideas that can be found, e.g., in the Śrāvaka-bhūmi, and which have been summarized recently by Lambert Schmithausen. Ac-cording to the latter (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79), �the contemplation process cul-minates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cognition or insight(pratyakṣaṃ jñānadarśanam) that transcends the mental image and directly appre-hends the respective object itself.� To be more precise, the path described in theŚrāvakabhūmi �culminates in a non-conceptualizing (nirvikalpa) perceptual cogni-tion (pratyakṣajñāna) of the four Noble Truths� (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79). Re-search for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund in the context ofthe FWF-Project P19862 (�Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhis-mus�).


170 VINCENT ELTSCHINGER

ghtenment (bodhi). The description aims at presenting the religiousconceptions that form the background of Dharmakīrti�s epistemologicalaccount of a yogin�s perception (yogipratyakṣa). In the second part ofthis paper, I shall adduce a new and somewhat provocative hypothesisconcerning the still rather unclear subject of the nature of the yogin�scognition. I shall try to show that the properties Dharmakīrti ascribes toa mystic�s perception (pratyakṣa), viz., vividness (spaṣṭābhatā), non-conceptuality (nirvikalpatā) and reliability (avisaṃvāditā), should betaken at face value. To put it in other words, I shall attempt to demon-strate why, though of an admittedly much higher type, the yogins� per-ception of the (Buddhist) truths does not differ from ordinary percep-tion.

THE CAREER OF A YOGIN

1. On Ordinary Persons (pṛthagjana) and Nescience (avidyā)

1.1. Pṛthagjanatva. The intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory condi-tion from which a yogin wishes to free himself is traditionally describedas the state of an ordinary/worldly person (pṛthagjanatva). Buddhistdefinitions of this state are of a mainly negative character: the ordinaryperson is one in whose psychic stream the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), the four noble truths (āryasatya) or, to be more precise, thesupramundane (lokottara) noble factors (āryadharma), have not yetarisen (see below §3.2). According to the Sautrāntikas, the state of anordinary person � which is denied any reality as a separate entity2 � is to

2 The Vaibhāṣikas, some of whom at least classify pṛthagjanatva as a factor dissoci-ated from the mind (cittaviprayuktadharma), define pṛthagjanatva as follows(AKBh 66,9�12 together with AK 2.40bc1): mārgasyāprāptir iṣyate | pṛthag-janatvam | pṛthagjanatvaṃ katamat | āryadharmāṇām alābha iti śāstrapāṭhaḥ | alā-bhaś ca nāma aprāptiḥ |. �[T]he non-possession of the noble path is held to be thenature of an ordinary person (pṛthagjanatva). As the śāstra states: �What is the na-ture of an ordinary person? It is the non-acquisition of the noble factors.� Non-acquisition is a synonym for non-possession.� Translation (of Saṅghabhadra�sNyāyānusāra 399a) in Cox 1995: 202. According to Cox (1995: 223n. 102), śāstrahere refers to Jñānaprasthāna 2, 298c5ff, and Mahāvibhāṣā 45, 232b9ff: �What isthe nature of an ordinary person? The nature of an ordinary person is the present,past, and future non-possession of noble factors, noble heat, noble views, noble pa-tience, noble inclination, and noble insight.� Translation in Cox 1995: 223n. 102.

CAREER AND THE COGNITION OF YO G I NS 171

be defined as follows3: �The state of an ordinary person is the stream inwhich the noble factors have not arisen.� Not surprisingly,Vasubandhu�s Sautrāntika definition coincides with the one put forth byYogācāras, who hold the state (gnas skabs = avasthā?) of an ordinaryperson to be one in which the supramundane (lokottara) noble dharmashave not arisen (ma bskyed pa = anutpanna?).4 Idealist sources more-over regard the state of an ordinary person, which they also considerbeing besieged with erroneous clinging to (the notion of) person(s) anddharmas (pudgaladharmābhiniveśasaṃmoha), as the obstacle (āvaraṇa)that prevents one from entering the first Bodhisattva stage (bhūmi).5

Provided the yogin has not, still as an ordinary person, gone through(parts of) the so-called mundane path of cultivation (laukika-bhāvanāmārga), his condition is characterized by entanglement in ne-science (avidyā, or ignorance, ajñāna, delusion, moha) and the depravi-ties, moral faults and defilements (āsrava, doṣa, [upa]kleśa, etc.) ne-science is responsible for, all of which make one subject to rebirth

See also Siddhi I.57�58. Note that, at least for the epistemologists, the category ofarvāgdarśin (�jemand, dessen Erkenntnis von unserer Art ist,� Steinkellner 1979:79n. 258) is wider than the category of pthagjana: whereas the second refers tothose who have not yet entered the path of vision/first Bodhisattva stage, the first isoften though not systematically used as an equivalent of asarvadarśin (�non-omniscient�), i.e., seems to refer to all persons who are not Buddhas.

3 AKBh 66,20: anutpannāryadharmasantatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam |. The Mahāvibhāṣā(45, 231b26�29) ascribes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the conception according to whichpṛthagjanatva is no real entity (Cox 1995: 224n. 109). See also AKVy 154,28�31 onAKBh 66,20: anutpannāryadharmā santatir iti. anutpannā āryadharmā asyām ityanutpannāryadharmā santatiḥ pṛthagjanatvam. anutpannāryamārgā skandhasantatirity arthaḥ. arthād utpannāryadharmā santatir āryatvam ity uktaṃ bhavaty āśraya-parāvṛtteḥ.

4 VinSg P77a8, as quoted by Kritzer (2005: 63): so so�i skye bo gnas skabs gaṅ lagdags | rnam pa du yod ce na | smras pa | �jig rten las �das pa �phags pa�i chos mabskyed pa�i gnas skabs la�o ||.

5 According to SNS 9.5.1 (see Lamotte 1935: 240), each stage or bhūmi opposes aspecific type of error (saṃmoha), the first opposing pudgaladharmābhiniveśa-saṃmoha (SNS 127,12�13: sa daṅ po la ni gaṅ zag daṅ chos la mṅon par źen pa kuntu rmoṅs pa). According to Vasubandhu�s commentary on MS 5.1 (see Lamotte1973: II.196 as well as II.39*, which contains numerous bibliographical referencesto pṛthagjanas), pṛthagjanatva opposes the first stage. Siddhi II.642 explicitly iden-tifies the SNS�s saṃmoha to Vasubandhu�s pṛthagjanatā, the latter being defined asthe (bījas of the) kleśa° and jñeyāvaraṇa of the speculative type (see Siddhi II.639�640 as well as II.590).


(punarjanman) and re-existence (punarbhava), i.e., to the intrinsicallypainful (duḥkha) cycle of transmigration (saṃsāra).6

1.2. Satkāyadṛṣṭi. Dharmakīrti identifies the traditional Buddhist con-cept of nescience with the equally traditional concept of false view ofself (satkāyadṛṣṭi, or °darśana),7 the latter being in turn equivalent tothe belief in a self (ātmagraha) or in a (personal) being (sattvagraha).8

What does the false view of self consist of? According to Śākyabuddhiand Karṇakagomin, satkāyadṛṣṭi is to be explained as clinging or adher-ence to the self and one�s own (ātmātmīyābhiniveśa),9 which is close tothe definitions of pṛthagjanatva provided earlier by the Sautrāntikas aswell as the Yogācāras. According to (the Sautrāntika) Vasubandhu,satkāyadṛṣṭi consists in the false view of the self and one�s own (ātmā-tmīyadṛṣṭi),10 and is to be explained as an �aberration relative to thethings which constitute the pseudoperson.�11 According to the YogācāraVinSg, which Vasubandhu most likely relied upon,12 satkāyadṛṣṭi it to

6 On pthagjanas in epistemological literature, see PVP D195a2�3/P227b6, PVṬ ÑeD205b2/P253b2�3 (ad PV 3.217b; for the context, see Eltschinger 2005b: 168�171); PVP D58a6/P66b1�2 (ad PV 2.140�141a; for the context, see Eltschinger2005a: 415�416).

7 See Vetter 1990: 22�26 and Schmithausen 1987: II.517�519 (= n. 1421). Onsatkāyadṛṣṭi in general, see Rahder 1932, Kośa 5.15�17 + nn. 2�3 (AKBh 281,17�282,3 on AK 5.7), TṛBh 23,12 and 29,21, Traité II.737n. 3. On the reasons for suchan identification (rejected by Vasubandhu, see AK 3.29c), see Eltschinger (2007a,Appendix D, §1).

8 According to PV 2.211 and PV 2.196. For a more complete list of conceptualequivalents, see Vetter 1990: 22�23.

9 PVṬ Je D252a6/P299b8�300a1 = PVSVṬ 401,23: satkāyadarśanād ātmātmīyā-bhiniveśāt |.

10 AKBh 281,20: ātmadṛṣṭir ātmīyadṛṣṭir vā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |, and AKBh 281,24:ātmātmīyadṛṣṭir eva satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |.

11 See AKBh 290,19�21: api cānayor dṛṣṭyoḥ svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād aparapīḍā-pravṛttatvāc ca | svargatṛṣṇāsmimānayor apy evaṃ prasaṅgaḥ | sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭiravyākṛtā | yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ |. Eng-lish translation of Kośa 5.41 in Pruden 1991: III.798. See also AKVy 463,8�10:svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād iti. svasantatipatitānām upādānaskandhānām ātmātmīya-tvena grahaṇāt svadravyasaṃmūḍhā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ |.

12 See Kritzer 2005: 292�293 (�Saṃghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of thesūtra-master [T. 1562: 618a17�19] and refutes it�). The first of the two passagesquoted by Kritzer (2005: 293) runs as follows (VinSg P112b6�113a1): de la �jigtshogs la lta ba gaṅ źe na | ñe bar len pa�i phuṅ po lṅa po dag la bdag gam bdag gir


be defined as �the false view of self and one�s own (ātmātmīyadṛṣṭi),clinging (abhiniveśa) and �mentalization� (sems la �jog pa) with regardto the five constituents-of-personality being clung to (upādāna-skandha).� According to all the schools mentioned � the Yogācāras, theSautrāntikas, and epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti � this false viewof self is twofold, viz. speculative (parikalpita VinSg, ASBh, LAV,PVP, PVṬ, vikalpita AKBh) and innate/spontaneous (sahaja).13 Thespeculative false view of self characterizes heretics (anyatīrthya,VinSg), i.e., substantialist philosophers such as Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣi-kas (AKVy),14 and arises out of the meditation on (heterodox) treatises(śāstracint[an]ādi, PVṬ).15 The innate view of self is common to puerileworldly people (bālapṛthagjana, VinSg) as well as to animals like ante-lopes and birds (mṛgapakṣin, VinSg, AKBh)16 and arises out of begin-ningless latent tendencies (anādivāsanā, PVṬ).17 According to Dhar-makīrti, both the speculative and the innate false views of self charac-terize the type of living beings traditional Buddhist scholasticism classi-fies as ordinary persons.

1.3. Pratītyasamutpāda. Nescience traditionally forms the first link inthe Buddhist twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (pratī-tyasamutpāda) and as such at least indirectly conditions thirst or crav-ing (tṛṣṇā, or love, sneha, or desire, rāga). This craving is in turn re-garded as the cause of suffering (duḥkhahetu), i.e., the factor thatprompts deluded people to act in order to quench their thirst, hence to

ba lta ba daṅ | mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la �jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni �jig tshogs la ltaba źes bya�o || de�aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste | lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kunbrtags pa�o || de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so so�i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha nari dags daṅ bya rnams kyi yaṅ yin no || kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyiyin par blta bar bya�o ||.

13 LAV 117,17�118,13, AKBh 290,19�21 (see n. 11 above), VinSg (see n. 12 above),PV 2.199 (see n. 47 below). Note that Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin callthe first of these two kinds of satkāyadṛṣṭi �ābhisaṃskārikā;� Manorathanandin de-fines it as skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī (see PVA 139,27�28 and PVV 79,20�23).

14 AKVy 463,17�18: yā ātmavādibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā |.15 PVṬ Ñe D131b6�7/P162a7�8: kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa�i

sgo nas byuṅ ba�o || lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa�i bag chags las byuṅ ba�o ||.16 See nn. 11 and 12 above.17 See n. 15 above.


be bound to saṃsāric existence.18 Dharmakīrti devotes many pratītya-samutpāda-like passages to account for the rise of craving and the otherdefilements out of the belief in the person. One of the clearest runs asfollows19: �The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self,thinking of it as] �I�. Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves forthe delights [for that self, and this] thirst conceals [from him] the draw-backs [of the things he deems conducive to these delights]. Seeing [but]qualities [to these things], he craves [for them thinking of them as hav-ing to become] �mine�, and appropriates (upā√dā) the means [that areconducive] to them. Therefore he [remains] in saṃsāra as long as heclings to [that] self.� These texts exhibit the traditional chain that linksnescience, craving, appropriation (upādāna) and (re-)existence(bhava[/jāti]), but fail to inform us further about the rise of passions ordefilements other than craving. The PVSV provides us with the mostexhaustive picture of Dharmakīrti�s account of the genealogy of defile-ments20: �The birth of all kinds of [moral] faults is due to the [false]view of self [i.e., to the clinging to self and one�s own, and] this [false

18 See PV 2.146a (duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ) and PV 2.185d (tasmāt tṛṣṇābhavāśrayaḥ) in Vetter 1990: 53 and 88.

19 PV 2.217�218: yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ | snehātsukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute || guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādha-nāny upādatte | tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre ||.

20 �Genealogy� as a free rendering of Karṇakagomin�s krama (lit. sequence, succes-sion; PVSVṬ 401,25�26: kena punaḥ krameṇa doṣāṇāṃ satkāyadarśanād utpattiḥ |).Satkāyadarśana is the prabhava (PVSV 111,11, gl. utpattikāraṇa PVSVṬ 401,20),the mūla (PV 2.196), the ekayoni (PV 2.211) of the defilements. PVSV 111,13�20(together with PV 1.222): sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt | sāvidyā ta-tra tatsnehas tasmād dveṣādisambhavaḥ || na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigra-ham antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ | na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ | ātmātmīyānu-parodhiny uparodhapratighātini ca tadabhāvāt | tasmāt samānajātīyābhyāsajam āt-madarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte | tau ca tatsnehaṃ sa ca dveṣādīn iti satkāya-darśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ | tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate |. See also PV 2.196ac: mohaśca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagraho vinā | tenāghahetau na dveṣaḥ � �Delusion isthe root[-cause] of [moral] faults, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [per-sonal] being. In the absence (vinā) of this [belief, there can be] no aversion for acause of evil (agha) [since the error of an injury to the self does not occur for onewho does not see any self].� PV 2.211: ātmagrahaikayonitvāt � rāgapratighayoḥ� �Because both desire and hostility have the belief in a self as their only source.�PV 2.212cd: tanmūlāś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam ||. �All the defilementshave this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the [false] view ofthe self.� On this point, see Franco 2001: 295�296.



view of self] is nescience [itself]; with regard to the [object which isclung to as being self and one�s own arises] love for those [i.e., for selfand one�s own, and] from this [love] are born such [evil defilements] asaversion. Indeed, the one who, without grasping (parigraha), sees thatthere is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unat-tached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for thatwhich does not hinder the self or one�s own, nor of that which opposesthe [said] hindrance.21 Therefore the [false] view of self, which is bornfrom the repeated habit (abhyāsa) of the [previous very] same [falseview of self], generates the [false] view of one�s own. Both of themthen [produce] love for those [two things, self and one�s own], and this[love in turn generates] such [evil passions] as aversion. Therefore all[moral] faults are born from the [false] view of self, and it is this [falseview of self] that is called �ignorance� (ajñāna) [in our doctrinal sys-tem].� Provided, once again, that he has not yet gotten rid of those de-filements that an ordinary person can eliminate by means of the mun-dane path of cultivation, the pṛthagjana is first and foremost typified byhis erroneous superimposition of ego-related aspects onto the selflessconstituents of reality, and by the correlative defilements that make himslave to saṃsāra and suffering.

2. The Idea of a Way Out

2.1. Gotra, kalyāṇamitra and the śrutamayī prajñā. There are somereasons to believe that at least some of Dharmakīrti�s commentators andepigones assented to the (mainly) Mahāyānist doctrinal complex thatentails such key notions as gotra (�family�), kalyāṇamitra (�spiritualfriend�), bodhicitta (�thought of enlightenment�) and praṇidhāna(�vow�).22 Asked to account for the cause(s) of a Bodhisattva�s first im-

21 See PV 2.219: ātmani sati parasaṃjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau | anayoḥsampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante || �When there is [a notion of] a self, [thereis] a notion of the other; from [this very] distinction between a self and another,both grasping (parigraha) and aversion [are generated and], bound to these two, allthe [moral] faults arise.�

22 On gotra, see PVP D16a5/P18a3�4, PVṬ Ñe D88b5/P108a3�4, TSP K872,1�7/Ś1055,14�20 and PVV 20,12�17 (on this passage, see Franco 1997: 24); on bo-dhicitta and praṇidhāna, see PVP D85a5/P98a1 (byaṅ chub kyi sems sṅon du soṅ bacan gyi brtse ba) and PVV 79,9 (praṇidhāna). See Eltschinger (2008, §§3.2�3 and5.4).


pulse toward the practice of compassion (karuṇā), Devendrabuddhi,Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla mention a particular type of living being(sattvaviśeṣa, PVP), i.e., a (specific) family (gotra PVṬ, gotraviśeṣaTSP) that we must understand as consisting of the bodhisattvagotra(�family of Bodhisattvas,� in contrast to the families of the Hearers[śrāvakagotra] or Buddhas-for-themselves [pratyekabuddhagotra]).Indeed, the bodhisattvagotra is intrinsically linked to compassion.23 Hisbelonging to this family causes the Bodhisattva, still as an ordinaryperson, to generate the (conventional) thought of enlightenment and tomake the vow of striving for awakening in order to alleviate the suffer-ing of living beings.24 Elsewhere I have argued that Dharmakīrti�s PV2.131cd�132ab can be interpreted as providing us with a functionalequivalent to the arising of the thought of enlightenment25: �[Wishing tocalm other people�s suffering,] the compassionate [Bodhisattva] en-gages in [the cultivation of] means to [calm suffering] in order to eradi-cate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal (upeya) and [its] cause re-main imperceptible (parokṣa), it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly]teach [others about them].� True to a well-documented Yogācāra tradi-tion, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Ravigupta also consider com-panionship with and service (sevā) to a �spiritual friend� to be instru-mental (< pratyaya) in the the rising of the first impulse of a (novice)Bodhisattva toward the practice of compassion.26 In addition to his ex-hortation to engage in compassion, this kalyāṇamitra�s main function isto teach Dharma or the path toward awakening (bodhimārga). Fromsuch a Buddha or skilled Bodhisattva, the yogin hears or learns (√śru)the Good Law (saddharma) or Word (pravacana) of the Buddha27: thisis the so-called wisdom born of listening (śrutamayī prajñā), which, just

23 See MSA 3.5 together with MSABh 11,18, Maithrimurthi 1999: 268 and nn. 153�154.

24 See BoBh D10,12�13/W15,11�12 and MSABh 15,2.25 PV 2.131cd�132ab: dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate || parokṣopeya-

taddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram |. See Eltschinger (2008, §§5.3�5).26 See Eltschinger (2008, §3.4).27 See Eltschinger (2008, n. 75). Interestingly, the Buddha�s Word seems to be nine-

membered (navāṅga) rather than twelve-membered (dvādaśāṅga) in the few placesit is mentioned by the epistemologists. See PVP D120b4�5/P139b3 (together withPVṬ Ñe D150b3�4/P186a2�3) and TSP K877,4�6/Ś1062,7�9. On this distinction,see Lamotte 1976: 157�159.


like the following �wisdom born of (rational) reflection,� the (novice)Bodhisattva obtains still as an ordinary person.28

2.2. Cintāmayī prajñā.29 The wisdom born of (rational) reflection mir-rors the concerns of a human �type� who is ideally possessed of twoproperties: first, his desire to engage (pravṛttikāma) in a religious pathand second, his practical rationality (prekṣāvattva, prekṣāpūrvakāritva).At this stage, the (novice) Bodhisattva submits the scriptural contentshe has previously heard/learnt to a rational inquiry (yukti) or examina-tion (parīkṣā, vicāra, etc.) that mainly proceeds by means of inference(anumāna, sādhana). Wisdom born of (rational) reflection consists inan ascertainment (niścaya, nirṇaya) of scriptural contents through theso-called means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), and results in (a) cogni-tion(s) that is/are termed �agreeing with the means of valid cognition�(pramāṇasaṃvādin), i.e., whose objects (artha) have proved to standcritical analysis by means of pramāṇas (pramāṇa[pari]śuddhārtha,pramāṇa[pari]dṛṣṭārtha) and hence are deemed to be worthy of (reli-gious) exertion/endeavour (abhiyogārha). Typical of this kind of objectare the four Noble Truths, which form the core or principal point(pradhānārtha) of the Buddhist teaching and which a rational personsubjects to inferential investigation in order to assess the reliability(avisaṃvāditva) of scriptures (āgama). In a philosophical narrative,30

28 See MSAVBh D142b5�6 on MSA 9.76a1 (dhāraṇāt): daṅ po so so�i skye bo�i dusna dge ba�i bśes gñen la brten nas | dam pa�i chos mñan pa daṅ | mñan nas tshig daṅdon gzuṅ ba daṅ gzuṅ ba rnams bsam źiṅ � �First when [still] an ordinary person(pṛthagjanakāle), [the Bodhisattva] learns (√śru) the Good Law (saddharma) rely-ing on a spiritual friend (kalyāṇamitram āśritya), grasps (√grah) the word(vyañjana?) and the meaning (artha) after he has learnt (śrutvā) [them] and reflects(√cint) upon the [things thus] grasped (gṛhīta) � �

29 On the cintāmayī prajñā, see Eltschinger (forthcoming 1). The present section is buta summary of (parts of) the second part of this study.

30 PV 2.132cd�135: yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate || tasyānityādi-rūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ | yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati ||phalasya hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate | sādhyate tadvipakṣo �pi hetorūpāvabodhataḥ || ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ | hetur virodhinairātmyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam ||. �Reflecting on [the means and the goal]through reasoning (yukti) and the Scriptures (āgama), [the compassionate Bodhi-sattva] inquires into the cause of the suffering [that is to be eradicated] and, throughthe particularities of suffering itself, [he inquires also] into the impermanent nature,etc., of the [cause in question]. Since in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffer-


Dharmakīrti relates how the compassionate Buddha-to-be, rationallyand scripturally (yuktyāgamābhyām), reflects upon the cause of suffer-ing and the antidote (vipakṣa, pratipakṣa) to that cause. The Bodhisattvafirst determines love (sneha, i.e., craving), itself generated by the beliefin self and one�s own (ātmātmīyagrahakṛta), to be the (destructible)cause of suffering. He then identifies the means (upāya) or factor(dharma) that is able to oppose, contradict (vi√rudh, √bādh) and de-stroy the cause of suffering: this antidote or antagonistic factor consistsin the view or perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness (nairātmya-darśana or °dṛṣṭi, śūnyatādṛṣṭi). In the stage of rational reflection,pramāṇas (i.e., inference) ascertain or determine the real aspects (bhū-tākāra, impermanence, painfulness, emptiness in the sense of the lackof one�s own [AKBh 400,2�3], selflessness, etc.) of entities and henceprovide the reflecting yogin�s cognition with aspects (ākāra) andobjects (ālambana) that contradict, oppose or counteract thesuperimpositions (samāropa, etc., namely, permanence, delight, one�sown, self, etc.) that ignorance, as a generalized erroneous perception(mithyopalabdhi), is responsible for. What the yogin is intent upon hereis nothing other than following a path that will enable him to counteract(pratipakṣamārga) the adventitious (āgantuka) filth of passions and

ing] sees that there is no end to the effect so long as the cause remains, he inquiresinto the antidote of the [cause of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for thedharma forming] the antidote of that [cause, it] is also ascertained by the [Bodhi-sattva�s] knowledge of the nature of the cause [itself]. [That] cause [is] attachmentbearing on dispositions, [an attachment which] is due to the belief in self and one�sown; [as for] the antidote to that [cause, it is] the perception of selfnessness whichopposes it.� On this important passage, see inter alia Franco 1989: 84�90, Vetter1990: 11�12, Eltschinger 2005: 397�408, Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.4) andDunne 2006: 505�507. It is easy to show that this passage narrates the Bodhisattva�srational determination of the Noble Truths. PV 2.131cd�132ab present us with amahāyānist account of the Bodhisattva�s being struck by his own as well as theother living beings� suffering (duḥkhasatya). This of course needs not be further in-vestigated since duḥkha is but an empirical fact. PV 2.132c�133ab and 135ac1 ac-count for the Bodhisattva�s inquiry into the origin of suffering (samudayasatya),whereas PV 2.134bd and 135c2d describe his determination of the path leading tothe destruction of suffering (mārgasatya). As to the destruction of suffering (nirod-hasatya) itself, it cannot be made the object of an analysis, but merely be hinted at,which we can observe in PV 2.133cd�134a, with its characteristic allusion to nivṛtti.On that passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005a: 397�408 and Eltschinger (forth-coming 1, §2.4).


hence establish his mind (citta = vijñāna) in its naturally radiant (pra-bhāsvara) and flawless (nirāsrava) condition.

3. The Path to Salvation

3.1. Pratipakṣamārga.31 According to Dharmakīrti, nescience consists inan erroneous perception (PV 2.213) that he identifies with the innatefalse view of self. This false view gives rise to thirst or craving, whichis regarded as the cause of suffering. The yogin who is eager to rid him-self of suffering will thus have to eliminate craving and other defile-ments by eradicating their cause. In other words, he will have to de-velop and cultivate the perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness,which acts as an antidote or antagonistic factor to the false view of self,in order to free himself from craving and suffering. This antagonismbetween avidyā = satkāyadṛṣṭi and nairātmyadarśana is based on thefact that these mutually opposing factors display contrary aspects of theobject (viparītālambanākāra).32 Two stanzas of PV 2 account well forthis mutual incompatibility and for Dharmakīrti�s general conception ofthe yogic path33: �Having[, due to nescience,] superimposed sixteenunreal aspects, viz. �lasting�, �pleasant�, �mine�, �I�,34 etc., on the four[Noble] Truths, one experiences craving [for such a superimposed ob-ject as delight, etc.]. 35The correct view, well cultivated,36 destroys thethirst together with its suite [of defilements such as selfishness, envy,etc.,37 insofar as this correct view], with regard to these [four Noble

31 Pratipakṣamārga in PVṬ Je D252a1�2/P299a8�b1 = PVSVṬ 401,12�13.32 PVP D115b3/P134a4: �gal ba de yaṅ* dmigs pa�i rnam pa phyin ci log pa�i sgo nas

yin no ||. * = ma rig pa daṅ bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba �gal ba according to PVṬ ÑeD147a3/P181b5�6.

33 PV 2.270�271: sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye | abhūtān ṣoḍa-śākārān āropya paritṛṣyati || tatraiva tadviruddhārthatattvākārānurodhinī | hantisānucarāṃ tṛṣṇāṃ samyagdṛṣṭiḥ subhāvitā ||. On anurodhin, see Vetter 1990: 27n.14.

34 See PVP D115b4�6/P134a5�8 and PVṬ Ñe D147b1�3/P182a5�8.35 According to PVP D116a2�3/P134b4�5, Dharmakīrti shows now that the path is the

counteracting factor because it is possessed with aspects that are contrary to theones superimposed by nescience.

36 According to PVP D116a6/P135a1, once the perception of unsubstantiality hasbecome coessential (sātmībhūta) with the mind through cultivation; on PVV103,8 (subhāvitā sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsaprāptavaiśadyā), see below §3.5.

37 Mātsarya and īrṣyā according to PVP D116a6/P135a1�2 and PVV 103,8�9 .



Truths], conforms to (anurodhin) the real aspects of the thing38 whichare contradictory to the [ones falsely ascribed by ignorance].�39 Nes-cience has one superimpose or grasp such unreal aspects as perma-nence.40 Once craving and all kinds of defilements arise, they bear uponobjects whose aspects have been superimposed.41 Now the perception ofunsubstantiality entails or goes along with the sixteen real aspects of theNoble Truths,42 i.e., is provided with aspects that are contradictory tothose superimposed by nescience. Cultivating this perception to its ma-ximum degree of intensity, i.e., up to the point where it becomes essen-tial to the mind or the psychic stream, will annul not only the innatefalse view of self, but also all the defilements that it gives rise to byproviding them with (pseudo-)objects. Such is the basic structure andgoal of Dharmakīrti�s path (mārga). Though this structure remains ba-sically the same for all types of Buddhist yogins (Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas and Bodhisattvas), differences are mainly concerned with theinitial motivation (nimitta, prayojana) guiding the yogin, and hence with

38 Literally: �aspects which constitute the true reality of the thing.� See Devendrabud-dhi�s and Manorathanandin�s explanations in PVP D116a3/P134b5 and PVV 103,6�8 respectively.

39 PVP D116a1�2/P134b3�4: lam ma rig pa daṅ �gal bar gyur pa na sred pa daṅ yaṅdon gyis �gal ba yin no źes bstan to ||. �[Dharmakīrti] teaches [here] that if the path iscontradictory to nescience, it is [then] indirectly (arthāt) contradictory to cravingtoo.�

40 PVP D115b6�7/P134a8�b2 presents us with the following unreal aspects with re-gard to tṛṣṇālakṣaṇo duḥkhahetuḥ: erroneous superimposition of asamudaya°, ahe-tu°, apratyaya° and aprabhavākāra. PVṬ Ñe D147b3�5/P182a8�b2 supplies forDharmakīrti�s and Devendrabuddhi�s °ādis in the following way: superimpositionof anirodha°, aśānta°, apraṇīta° and aniḥsaraṇākāra with regard to nirodhasatya;superimposition of amārga°, anyāya°, apratipatti° and anairyāṇikākāra with regardto mārgasatya.

41 Note PVṬ Ñe D147b5�7/P182b2�4: sgro btags nas ni yoṅs su sred ces bya ba�i tshiggis log par sgro �dogs pa sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi sred pa ñid gsal bar bstan pa yin no|| sgro �dogs pa�i yul la �jug pa�i sred pa de yaṅ sgro �dogs pa�i rnam pa ñid yin la |sgro �dogs pa�i rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñe ba�i ñon moṅs pathams cad ñid ma rig pa ñid yin pa de ltar na de�i raṅ bźin can ñid kyaṅ bstan pa ñidyin no ||.

42 See AKBh 343,16�19 together with Kośa 6.163 (Pruden 1991: III.930) and, fordefinitions, AKBh 400,1�401,17 together with Kośa 7.30�39 (Pruden 1991:IV.1110�1116).


the length of the cultivation as well as with the quality or scope of thesalvational result.43

3.2. Darśanamārga. When he practiced rational reflection on scripturalcontents, the yogin was still an ordinary person, and the compassion hewas endowed with still bore upon a hypostasised notion of living beings(sattvālambana).44 To put it in a more traditional way, we could say thatat this stage, the yogin was a Bodhisattva who has formed the initialresolution (prathamacittotpādika), abiding in the so-called adhimukti-caryābhūmi (�stage of zealous conduct�). The supramundane noblefactors that an ordinary person is per definitionem bereft of are thosethat arise on the so-called path of vision/seeing (darśanamārga), which(normally) opens up the Buddhist religious path properly speaking andcoincides, in a Mahāyānist perspective, with the Bodhisattva�s entranceinto the first stage (most commonly known as the �joyful stage,� pra-muditā bhūmiḥ).45 The state of an ordinary person ceases as soon as theyogin has entered the path of vision46: at this time, the yogin becomes anoble person (ārya[pudgala]) and enters the path of those who are un-dergoing religious training (śaikṣamārga). Like all the path structuresthat have been inherited from the Vaibhāṣika abhisamayavāda, Dhar-makīrti�s path is basically twofold, divided into a path of vision and apath of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga, though both are here included in thebroader category of bhāvanā). Dharmakīrti spells it out as follows47:�[Objection:] Inexistence (abhava) [i.e., liberation from saṃsāra,]

43 For differences between the darśanamārgas of the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas,see MS 3.15.

44 PVṬ Je D24b6/P29b2�3 = PVSVṬ 53,9: sattvālambanā pṛthagjanānām |. �sattvā-lambanā� refers itself to karuṇā and more generally, to the four �immeasurables�(apramāṇa).

45 See e.g. BoBh D223,22�25/W326,22�327,1.46 There are at least two interpretations with regard to the nature of the noble factors

referred to in the Vaibhāṣika definition of the state of an ordinary being: �To thenon-acquisition of which factors does the nature of an ordinary person refer? [Ac-cording to two interpretations, it is maintained that the nature of an ordinary person]is either the general non-acquisition of all (sarva) noble factors or the [specific]non-acquisition only of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with re-gard to suffering (duḥkhe dharmajñānakṣānti).� Nyāyānusāra 399b as translated inCox 1995: 203. See also Kośa 6.182�183n. 1 (Pruden 1991: III.1056�1057n. 165).

47 PV 2.199ac: satkāyadṛṣṭer vigamād ādya evābhavo bhavet | mārge cet sahajāhānerna �


should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., during the path of vi-sion],48 for the [false] view of self[, which is the cause of the connectionto a new birth,] ceases [at that time].49 [Answer:] No, because [at thattime] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of self].� We seethus that Dharmakīrti also accepted the two above-mentionedsatkāyadṛṣṭis: whereas the speculative one is to be eliminated by thepath of vision, the innate one, which arises from beginningless latenttendencies, can only be eliminated by the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārgaheya, PVṬ, PVV). Since one does not rid oneself of the innatesatkāyadṛṣṭi, i.e., the cause of rebirth (punarbhavahetu, PVP), by thepath of vision,50 love for the self (ātmasneha PVP, tṛṣṇā PVV) contin-ues beyond the path of vision and results in re-existence (punarbhavaPVP, janmaprabandha PVV).51 This amounts to saying that such Bud-

48 PVP D85a7/P98a4: lam daṅ po ste | mthoṅ ba�i lam; PVV 79,19: ādya eva mārgedarśanamārge. According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ Ñe D131b5/P162a6), Dharmakīrticalls the darśanamārga the �initial path� because darśanamārga occurs before thepath of cultivation, the path of those who are undergoing religious training (śaikṣa-mārga) and the path of those who no longer need religious training (aśaikṣamārga).On śaikṣas and aśaikṣa = arhat, see AKBh 365,16�366,7 and Kośa 6.230�233. Thecategory of Śaikṣa covers seven types of saints or noble persons (āryapudgala) ac-cording to AKBh 365,18�19 (sapta pūrvoktāḥ pudgalāḥ śaikṣā iti |), viz., four �can-didates� (pratipannakāḥ) and three �abiders� (phale sthitāḥ, AKBh 366,1�2): theones who are in the progress of realizing the four states of Srotaāpanna, Sakṛd-āgāmin, Anāgāmin and Arhat, and those who in fact are Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāminand Anāgāmin (AKBh 366,2�3). On the Srotaāpanna, see AK 6.29cd together withAKBh 353,20�22 (Kośa 6.194, Pruden 1991: III.953); on the Sakṛdāgāmin (devāngatvā sakṛn manuṣyalokāgamanāt sakṛdāgāmī, AKBh 358,1�2), see AK 6.35 to-gether with AKBh 358,1�3 (Kośa 6.208�209, Pruden 1991: III.964�965); on theAnāgāmin (kāmadhātvanāgamanāt, AKBh 358,16�17), see AK 6.36d together withAKBh 358,16�17 (Kośa 6.209�210, Pruden 1991: III.965�966).

49 Conclusion, PVP D85a7/P98a4�5: de yaṅ mi �gyur ba de�i phyir bdag tu chags paskye ba�i mtshams sbyor ba�i rgyu ma yin no źe na |. �But it does not occur [at thattime]; therefore, love for the self (ātmasneha) is not the cause of the connection to a[new] birth.�

50 Note also PVP D121a1/P139b7�8 (about abāhyaśaikṣas, i.e., Buddhist śaikṣas):lhan cig skyes pa�i �jig tshogs su lta ba ma spaṅs pa�i phyir ro ||.

51 See PVP D85b1�2/P98a5�7: bdag tu lta ba�i rnam pa gñis te | kun brtags pa daṅlhan cig skyes pa�o || kun tu brtags pa de ni de dag gis śin tu kun tu spyod pa�i chosma yin pas na spaṅs pas de ni skye ba�i kun nas �chiṅ ba�i rgyur mi �gyur ro || �jigtshogs su lta ba lhan cig skyes pa yaṅ srid pa�i rgyu gaṅ yin pa de ni de dag ñid kyisspaṅs pa ma yin no || de ma spaṅs pa�i rgyu�i phyir bdag tu chags pa ma log pa ñidyin pa de ltar na yaṅ srid pa yod pa yin no ||. PVV 79,20�23: dvidhā hi satkāyadṛṣṭir


dhist saints as the stream-enterer (srotaāpanna), the once-returner(sakṛdāgāmin) and the non-returner (anāgāmin) are still possessed of aninnate erroneous nescience (*sahajāvidyā viparītā?) that they will haveto eradicate by the path of cultivation.52

3.3. Bhāvanāmārga. At the end of the path of vision, the śaikṣas of theśrāvaka type obtain the religious fruit or result (phala) they were a can-didate for (pratipannaka) before entering the path. Depending on theextent to which they have, still as ordinary persons, eliminated the bhā-vanāheya defilements by means of a mundane path of cultivation,53 theyobtain the results of stream-enterer, once-returner and non-returner.54

As such they are reborn, respectively, seven times in the realm of desire(kāmadhātu), or only once, or no more, before they reach emancipationfrom saṃsāra, i.e., nirvāṇa. The supramundane path of cultivation they

ābhis[a]ṃskārikī yā skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī sahajā ca | tatra prathamādarśanamārge hīyate | na dvitīyā bhāvanāmārgaheyā | sā ca mohas tṛṣṇāyāś ca heturiti bhavati janmaprabandhaḥ |. PVṬ Ñe D131b7/P162a8�b1: de dag ñid kyis spaṅspa ma yin no źes bya ba ni thog ma med pa�i bag chags las byuṅ ba de ni bsgom pa�ilam ñid kyis spaṅ bar bya ba ñid yin pa�i phyir ro ||. For a similar distinction be-tween speculative-darśanaheya and innate-bhāvanāheya āvaraṇas, see Siddhi II.572and Siddhi II.639�640.

52 PVṬ Ñe D131b7/P162b1�2: bdag tu chags pa khas len pa ñid kyi phyir | rgyun duźugs pa la lhan cig skyes pa�i mi śes pa phyin ci log yod pa yin no źes bstan pa�iphyir |. See also ASBh 62,3�4, as quoted by Schmithausen (1987: II.440n. 931): sa-hajā satkāyadṛṣṭir bhāvanāprahātavyā: yām adhiṣṭhāya utpannadarśanamārgasyāpyāryaśrāvakasyāsmimānaḥ samudācarati |. �Innate [false] view of self is to be elimi-nated through cultivation: based on this (yām adhiṣṭhāya) [innate false view of self],egotism (asmimāna) occurs even in a Noble Hearer (āryaśrāvaka) in whom the pathof vision has arisen.� ASBh 62,9�11, as (partly) quoted by Schmithausen (1987:II.440�441n. 932): darśanamārgeṇa prahīṇaparikalpitasatkāyadṛṣṭimalasyāpy ārya-śrāvakasya pūrvābhiniveśābhyāsakṛtam � ātmadarśanam anuvartate yat tat punarmārgabhāvanayā prahātavyaṃ bhavati |. �Even in a Noble Hearer in whom the im-purity consisting in the speculative [false] view of self has been eliminated by thepath of vision, the [false] view of self, caused by the repeated habit of former clin-ging, goes on existing, which is still to be eliminated by the cultivation of the path.�

53 Laukikabhāvanāmārga at PVV 107,5�6; see also TS 3496�3497, and Kośa 6.iv�xi(Pruden 1991: III.xiv�xxii).

54 PVP D85a7/P98a4: rgyun du źugs pa la sogs pa; PVV 79,19: srotaāpannasya. PVṬÑe D131b5�6/P162a6�7: rgyun du źugs pa la sogs pa źes bya ba la sogs pa�i sgrasni lan cig phyir �oṅ ba daṅ phyir mi �oṅ ba gzuṅ ṅo || sdug bsṅal gyi bden pa mthoṅba ñid kyis de dag gis �jig tshogs su lta ba spaṅs pa yin no ||.


still need in order to get rid of the remaining defilements is then ex-tremely short. Highly different is the situation of the śaikṣa who is des-tined for Buddhahood and not for Arhatship, and who, still as an ordi-nary person, had made the vow to reach enlightenment in order to alle-viate living beings� suffering by teaching them the path to liberation. Asfar as I can see, this Buddha-to-be still must rid himself of three majorelements as he exits the path of vision. (1) Like Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves, he will have to uproot the innate false view of self to-gether with its attendant defilements, but (2) unlike Hearers andBuddhas-for-themselves, he will have to eliminate these defilementstogether with their traces or after-effects (vāsanā), which regularlymanifest themselves in Arhats through corporeal, vocal or mental defi-ciencies (kāyavākcittavaiguṇya). (3) The Buddha-to-be still must uprootthe so-called undefiled nescience or ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā, or°ajñāna, or °saṃmoha). To put it technically, the Bodhisattva musteradicate two kinds of obstacles (āvaraṇa) in addition to the innate falseview of self: the obstacle that consists in the defilements together withtheir after-effect (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa), and the obstacle that concealsthe knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa).55 Needless to say, this threefold uprootingdemands an incomparably longer path of cultivation than that taken byHearers and Buddhas-for-themselves.56 Whoever the yogin may be, thecultivation or repeated practice (abhyāsa) consists in the yogin�s prac-ticing (prayoga) or generating (utpādana, utpatti) repeatedly, �againand again� (punaḥ punaḥ, paunaḥpunyena),57 the salvational means,viz., the perception of unsubstantiality, in order to finally reach a directperceptual realization58 (sākṣātkaraṇa) of it.

3.4. Anābhogatā and svarasavāhitva. Dharmakīrti�s conception of aBodhisattva�s cultivation is based on a Mahāyānist path structure that

55 On all this, see Eltschinger 2005a: 408�436, and below §3.5.56 On the duration of the various religious careers (and especially the one of Bodhi-

sattvas), see Traité IV.1842, and n. 5 (pp. 1842�1843), and Siddhi II.731�733.57 Abhyāsa is defined as punaḥ punar nairantaryeṇotpādanam (PVSVṬ 398,9), as pau-

naḥpunyenānādikālam utpattiḥ (PVṬ Je D252b7�253a1/P300b6 = PVSVṬ 402,19),or else as punaḥ punaḥ prayogaḥ (AKVy 649,26), or as punaḥ punaś cetasi vinive-śanam (NBṬ S11,18�19/M67,5).

58 See PVP D54b7/P62a8, PVA 108,20 and 26, PVV 57,4, TS 3339�3340ab, TSPK16,1�3/Ś20,12�13, K876,17�19/Ś1061,14�16, passim.



entails various stages (bhūmi) as well as the parallel development ofinsight (prajñā, vipaśyanā) and compassion (karuṇā, kṛpā, dayā).59 Inthe most authoritative traditional accounts of a Bodhisattva�s career(caryā), the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage (acalā DBhS,niyatā BoBh, or the tenth abode, vihāra BoBh) stands out as a decisiveturning point. The Bodhisattva is now possessed of the �presentimentthat dharmas (ultimately) have no arising� (anutpattikadharmakṣānti);from now on his progression is irreversible (avaivartika). Especiallynoteworthy is the fact that all the factors and operations characterizinghim have now become spontaneous (< svarasena eva) on account of theintensity of the cultivation (bhāvanābāhulyāt),60 and develop withoutany intentional effort (anābhogena).61 This pertains to the Bodhisattva�swisdom as well as to his compassion, which from now on can properlybe termed �great compassion� (mahākaruṇā), and which no longerbears upon anything (anālambanā, because the Bodhisattva no longersees sattvas or dharmas).62 Note should also be made that the entranceinto the eighth (or seventh) stage coincides with the acquisition of �un-fixed� nirvāṇa (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa).63

The epistemologists� assent to this complex of ideas can be eas-ily documented. Dharmakīrti himself accepts the notion of an objectlesscompassion (anālambanā karuṇā),64 which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇaka-gomin declare to be proper to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, in con-tradistinction to ordinary persons and noble beings (ārya), have ridthemselves of the clinging to the object-subject dichotomy.65 Moreover,

59 Note Devendrabuddhi�s explanation of hetusampad in PVP D57b2/P65b2: bcomldan �das kyi thugs rje daṅ thabs goms pa rgyu yin no źes rgyu phun sum tshogs pagsuṅs pa yin no ||. Upāyābhyāsa = nairātmyadarśanābhyāsa = prajñābhyāsa. De-vendrabuddhi�s prayoga at PVP D57a1�3/P64b7�65a2 (see Eltschinger 2005a:405n. 45) makes it perfectly clear that nairātmyadarśana is prajñā.

60 See BoBh D219,17�220,2/W320,24�321,2 and Eltschinger (2008, §4.3 and n. 103).61 See DBhS (VII F) 58,6�9, (VIII C) 64,15�16 and 25�26, (VIII K) 67,10�19, and

(VIII C) 64,26�27. This is also termed the anābhogacaryā at LAV 43,9 (see Suzuki1999: 221�230).

62 See Eltschinger (2008, §4).63 On the apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, see the bibliographical references in Lamotte 1973:

II.47*�48*; see also Siddhi II.671�672 and Nagao 2000: 2�4.64 See PVSV 9,14�15.65 PVṬ Je D24b6�7/P29b3�4 = PVSVṬ 53,9�10: anālambanā grāhyagrāhakābhini-

veśavigatānāṃ buddhabodhisattvānām |.


Dharmakīrti associates �great compassion� (mahatī kṛpā) with Bodhisa-ttvas who are possessed of a durable substratum (sthirāśraya) and re-main in saṃsāra (in contradistinction to Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas).66 Last but not least, Dharmakīrti argues at length that com-passion proceeds spontaneously (svarasena) as it becomes the very na-ture (svabhāva) of the psychic stream and no longer requires any effort(yatna) in order to increase.67 The same doctrinal pattern also seems toobtain in the case of discernment (vipaśyanā), which, defined as �wis-dom bearing upon unsubstantiality� (nairātmyālambanā prajñā),68 isequivalent to the already mentioned perception of unsubstantiality andthe counteracting path it defines. The yogin�s nearly endless cultivationof nairātymadarśana gradually results in the latter�s becoming �co-essential� or �conatural� to the mind (citta), a process (or rather its re-sult) the epistemologists usually describe in terms of sātmya or sātmī-bhāva: after a certain point, the mind or the psychic stream (santāna)acquires discernment as its own nature,69 which amounts to saying thatit is coessential with the perception or cultivation of unsubstantiality,also referred to as the path or the antidote of the defilements (doṣaprati-pakṣa/°vipakṣa).70 Devendrabuddhi uses the expression *anābho-

66 See PV 2.197�198, below n. 73.67 See PV 2.120�131ab, and Eltschinger (2008, §2) for an English translation and

explanations.68 PVṬ Ñe D134b3/P166a1: lhag mthoṅ yin la źes bya ba bdag med pa la dmigs pa�i

śes rab bo ||. Note also BhK 1.219,23�220,4, where vipaśyanā bears upon the unsub-stantiality of all dharmas (sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvatālambana), and Kamalaśīla�sdefinition of vipaśyanā at BhK 3.5,17�20: bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate |bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhā-nām ātmātmīyarahitatā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣām eva māyopamatā |. �La vi-paśyanā est une analyse correcte. Elle est correcte parce [qu�elle porte] surl�inexistence de l�individu et sur l�inexistence des dharma. L�inexistence de la per-sonne consiste en ce que les agrégats sont privés de Moi; l�inexistence des dharmaest le fait qu�ils sont pareils à une magie.� Translation in Lamotte 1987b: 340.

69 PVSVṬ 400,13: vipaśayanāsvabhāvasya; PVP D90a1/P103b8: raṅ bźin yaṅ lhagmthoṅ ba yin; PVSVṬ 401,14: vipaśyanāsātmani sthitasya (= PVṬ Je D252a2, asagainst P299b1).

70 PVSV 110,18 (sātmībhāvāt � see PVṬ Je D249a6/P295b1 = PVSVṬ 398,11, wherethe santāna is said to be sātmībhūtadoṣapratipakṣa, to be treated as a bahuvrīhicompound), PVSV 110,24 (doṣavipakṣasātmatve, where the doṣavipakṣa isnairātmyadarśana according to PVṬ Je D250b1/P297a5�6 = PVSVṬ 399,17),PVSV 111,3 (vipakṣasātmanaḥ puruṣasya), PVSV 111,8 (pratipakṣasātmya°); PVV


ganairātmyadarśanaḥ puruṣaḥ to refer to this state,71 while Śākyabud-dhi regards nairātmyadarśana as proceeding spontaneously (svarasavā-hitva, or *svarasapravartakatva).72 As for �unfixed� nirvāṇa, an allu-sion (at least according to Śākyabuddhi) is found in a passage in whichDharmakīrti contrasts Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas on the one hand,and Bodhisattvas on the other73: �It is not true (na) that there [can be]no liberation [from saṃsāra], because once the previous saṃskāra [=karman] has been exhausted, there is no connection to another [painfulbirth. However,] those whose saṃskāra is of unexhausted force do re-main [in saṃsāra out of compassion, after having meditated upon thebenefit of the other living beings,74 and are] immaculate. And becausecompassion is weak [since it has not been cultivated intensively before],the effort in order to remain [in saṃsāra] is not great [and hence theabode in saṃsāra does not last]; on the contrary (tu), [those] whosecommiseration (kṛpā) is great do remain [in saṃsāra, being entirely]devoted to the other [living beings].� It is commonplace in Mahāyānaliterature for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas75 to hasten to reach nirvāṇabecause they are terrified of saṃsāra, whereas Bodhisattvas76 remain in

59,24: nairātmyabhāvanāsātmye; PVṬ Je D251a1�2/P298a2 ≈ PVSVṬ 399,25:sātmībhūtaṃ mārgam; PVP D89b1/P103a5: lam de�i bdag ñid can gyi sems; PVV83,14�15: sātmībhūtamārge. Note Devendrabuddhi�s definition of mārga at PVPD89b3/P103a8: bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba�i mtshan ñid can gyi lam (cf. PVV 83,11:nairātmyadarśanasya mārgas[ya]). Note also PVṬ Ñe D133a6�7/P164a7�8: dṅos poji ltar gnas pa bźin du �dzin pas źugs pa�i bdag med pa�i lam ni sems kyi raṅ bźin ñidyin pa�i phyir ro ||.

71 PVP D58a7�b2/P66b3�6 and D58a2�4/P66a4�6: bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba lhungyis grub pa�i skyes bu.

72 PVṬ Ñe D118b1�2/P144b8: raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis �jug pa ñid kyis raṅ bźin ñid yin pa�iphyir ro ||. Note also TSP K895,8�9/Ś1082,22�23: � iti svabhāvatvena prajñādī-nāṃ sakṛdāhitānāṃ svarasata eva pravṛttir bhavatīti siddham |.

73 PV 2.197�198: nāmuktiḥ pūrvasaṃskārakṣaye �nyāpratisandhitaḥ | akṣīṇaśaktiḥsaṃskāro yeṣāṃ tiṣṭhanti te �naghāḥ || mandatvāt karuṇāyāś ca na yatnaḥ sthāpanemahān | tiṣṭhanty eva parādhīnā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī kṛpā ||.

74 According to PVP D85a1/P97b3�4: gal te chags pa med pa dag sñiṅ rjes gnas pade�i tshe sñiṅ rje[s] gnas nas sems can gyi don yid la byas nas de dag yun riṅ por ci�iphyir mi gnas |. See also the prayoga that follows (PVP D85a1�3/P97b4�6).

75 PVP D85a3/P97b7: dper na ñan thos daṅ raṅ saṅs rgyas dag lta bu�o ||. PVV 79,11:śrāvakāṇāṃ tu karmaṇo niyatakālasthitikadehākṣepakatvāt.

76 PVP D84b7/P97b3: dper na byaṅ chub sems dpa� rnams kyi lta bu�o ||. Note, how-ever, Manorathanandin�s (PVV 79,10) explanation of anaghāḥ as samyaksam-buddhāḥ.


saṃsāra in order to honour their commitment to alleviate living beings�suffering.77 Though these Bodhisattvas are dispassionate (vītarāga?)and �endowed� with an undefiled (nirdoṣa?) series of aggregates(skandhasantati?),78 the force of their karmic impulses is unexhausted,79

�because all [their] provisions [of merit and knowledge] result in un-fixed nirvāṇa (*sarvasambhārasya apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaphalatvāt).� Be-cause of his great compassion, a Bodhisattva does not remain in nirvāṇa(unlike Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and because of his insight orwisdom, he does not remain in saṃsāra either (unlike ordinary peo-ple).80 As Devendrabuddhi puts it,81 �the reason why these great beings(mahāsattva) who are extremely affectionate without any [selfish] mo-tive (akāraṇaparamavatsala) remain uninterruptedly [in saṃsāra] is[their] great compassion (mahatī kṛpā), which proceeds spontaneously(svarasavāhin), because its practice (kṛpābhyāsa) is preceded by thethought of enlightenment (bodhicittapūrvaka).�

3.5. Āśrayaparivṛtti and Buddhahood. The practice of the path endswith the so-called transmutation of the basis [of personal existence]82

(āśrayaparivṛtti), which, like Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra), Dharmakīrtiinterprets (only in PV 2!) from a Sautrāntika perspective as the finaland irreversible elimination (niranvayavināśa) of defilements together

77 See BoBh D27,9�28,6/W40,3�41,12, TSP K872,1�7/Ś1055,14�10, and Eltschinger(forthcoming 1, §2.6).

78 See PVṬ Ñe D131b2/P162a1�2: gaṅ �du byed nus zad med can źes bya ba ni phuṅpo�i rgyun skyon med pa skyed pa la | �dod chags daṅ bral ba gaṅ dag la las kyi nuspa zad pa med pa yod pa źes bya ba�i don to ||.

79 According to PVṬ Ñe D131b2�3/P162a2�3: [dper na byaṅ chub sems dpa� rnamskyi lta bu�o źes bya ba ni byaṅ chub sems dpa� rnams ni las kyi nus pa zad pa can mayin te |] tshogs thams cad mi gnas pa�i mya ṅan las �das pa�i �bras bu can ñid yinpa�i phyir ro ||.

80 See MSAVBh D63b5�64a4, and Eltschinger (2008, n. 51).81 According to PVP D85a4�6/P98a1�2: gaṅ dag sems can chen po rgyu med par

mchog tu mñes gśin pa byaṅ chub kyi sems sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi brtse ba gomspa�i stobs kyis raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis �jug pa�i brtse ba chen po rgyun mi �chad par gnas pa�irgyu mṅa� ba [de dag gźan gyi ṅor ni bźugs pa yin | sems can gyi don gyi phyir | dusthams cad du bźugs pa � ] Note PVV 79,15: yeṣām akāraṇavatsalānāṃ mahatīkṛpā, as well as PVV 79,9: yeṣāṃ punar mahākṛpāṇāṃ praṇidhānaparipuṣṭasya �

82 PV 2.205ab: ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate |.


with their (productive) latent tendencies or germs (bīja).83 Whereas this(minimal) definition seems to be true of all the Buddhist liberatedminds whatsoever, it must be considerably enlarged when regarding thetransmutated basis of the Bodhisattva who has just (i.e., ipso facto) be-come a Buddha/Sugata. Dharmakīrti first spells this out in PV 2.135�136ab84: �The qualities and drawbacks of the [perception of unsubstan-tiality and its opposite] become [perfectly] clear to the [Bodhisattva]who practices the means [i.e., insight/discernment] repeatedly, in vari-ous ways and for a very long time. And because of the intensity thecognition [of unsubstantiality has reached] due to this [extremely longrepetition of practice], the after-effect of the cause [of suffering] isabandoned.� Because he sees in all clarity the qualities of the salvificmeans and the drawbacks of its opposite, the Buddha is able to instructliving beings in the path or the four noble truths,85 i.e., is possessed withśāstṛtvasampad and conversion through the teaching (anuśāsanīprāti-hārya).86 But no less important here is the fact that, due to this nearlyendless cultivation, the Bodhisattva has rid himself of the (non-productive) trace or after-effect of defilements. This after-effect of de-filements consists in a corporeal (kāya°), verbal (vāc°) and mental(buddhi°) defectiveness (vaiguṇya) or unwieldiness (akarmaṇyatā).87

This still affects liberated saints like the Arhat Maudgalyāyana, whokept hopping around because he had been born as a monkey 500 life-times earlier, or the Arhat Pilindavatsa who, because he had been abrāhmaṇa before, continued to say harsh and belittling words to his

83 On the āśrayaparivṛtti in Dharmakīrti�s works, see Eltschinger 2005b. Niranvayavi-nāśadharman in PVSV 110,22, TSP K875,20/Ś1060,13, is explained by Śākyabud-dhi and Karṇakagomin (PVṬ Je D250a3�4/P296b5�7 = PVSVṬ 399,7�9) as fol-lows: anvayaḥ kleśabījam | anvety utpadyate �smād doṣa iti kṛtvā | nirgato �nvayoyasmin vināśe sa niranvayavināśaḥ | sa dharmo yeṣāṃ doṣāṇāṃ te niranvayavināśa-dharmāṇaḥ | vāsanayā saha vināśadharmāṇa ity arthaḥ |. On Vasubandhu�s views asregards āśrayaparivṛtti, see Eltschinger 2005b: 181�182.

84 PV 2.135�136ab: bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāsya ca | gacchanty abhya-syatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām || buddheś ca pāṭavād dhetor vāsanātaḥ prahī-yate |.

85 As a tāyin or �protector� of the living beings (see PV 2.145�146ab).86 PVP D61a2�3/P69b5�7 (Eltschinger 2005a: 424). See Kośa 7.110�112 (Pruden

1991: IV.1166-1167).87 See PV 2.141c.



fellow monks.88 In other words, the (Bodhisattva/)Buddha has elimi-nated the obstacle consisting of defilements together with their after-effects (savāsanakleśāvaraṇa). But yet another type of abandonmentdistinguishes him from Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas: contrary tothem (or to Arhats), a Buddha has rid himself of unskilfulness in teach-ing the path (mārgoktyapaṭutā),89 which I interpret as Dharmakīrti�sallusion to undefiled ignorance (akliṣṭāvidyā, °ajñāna, °saṃmoha).90 Ifthis hypothesis holds good, we can safely consider our Bodhisattva�stransmutation of the basis also to entail the elimination of the obstaclethat conceals the knowable (jñeyāvaraṇa, and hence an omniscience ofthe sarvasarvajñatā-type), for the equation akliṣṭāvidyā = jñeyāvaraṇais easy to document in Buddhist Mahāyāna literature.91 Moreover, mostof the definitions of āśrayaparivṛtti include the elimination of both ob-stacles, the epistemologists being no exception.92

THE COGNITION OF A YOGIN

4. Yogijñāna as an Epistemological Topic

Let us now turn to the epistemological dimension of yoga proper.93

Dharmakīrti devotes two main passages to the so-called perception of

88 On the vāsanāsamudghāta, see Lamotte 1974, Traité IV.1755�1758, andEltschinger 2005a: 419�422. On the story of Maudgalyāyana, see PVṬ Ñe D118b4�5/P145a4�5, Lamotte 1973: II.300, Traité I.117n. 4 and Lamotte 1974: 92. On thestory of Pilindavatsa, see PVṬ Ñe D118b5�6/P145a5�7.

89 See PV 2.141d.90 See AKBh 1,13�15 (Kośa 1.2, Pruden 1991: I.1�2), Jaini 2001: 167�179,

Eltschinger 2005a: 423�424.91 See Eltschinger 2005a: 429�434.92 See PVṬ Je D115a1/P135b6 ≈ PVSVṬ 211,8�9.93 Among Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga (480�540?) is likely to have been the first

one to discuss the perception of mystics within the general framework of perception(pratyakṣa) as a means of valid cognition. However, the following statement seemsto exhaust Dignāga�s opinion on the subject: �[T]he yogin�s intuition of a thing in it-self unassociated (avyatibhinna) with the teacher�s instruction [is also a type of per-ception]. The yogin�s perception which is not associated (avyavakīrṇa) with anyconceptual construction of āgama (the authoritative words of the teachers) andwhich apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.� Hattori�s (1968: 27)translation of PS 1.6cd and PSV thereon. Sanskrit texts (< Vibh. 191n. 3 and 203n.1) in Hattori 1968: 94 nn. 1.48 (yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk) and


yogins (yogipratyakṣa),94 both of which refer their reader back to thereligious ideas we have considered so far, i.e., to the religious philoso-phy as expounded in PV 2. What do yoga and yogins consist of? Dhar-mottara (740�800) is one of the few authors to supply any substantialdefinitions of these two terms. According to ordinary understanding(loka), yoga consists of (psychic) concentration (samādhi), but accord-ing to (Buddhist) authoritative treatises (śāstra), it consists of tranquil-lity (of mind, śamatha) and discernment (vipaśyanā), which have (psy-chic) concentration and insight (prajñā) for their nature (°ātman), re-spectively. A yogin is one who is possessed of tranquillity of mind anddiscernment into the nature of things, one who strives for constant con-centration (< nityasamāhita) and discrimination of true reality (tattva-pravicaya?).95

1.49 (yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanaṃ pratyakṣam).Steinkellner�s reconstruction of PS(V) 1.6ab reads as follows: yogināṃ gurunirde-śāvyavakīrṇārthamātradṛk |. Note that PSV is also quoted in PVP D210b3/P246b56.Interestingly enough, Dignāga�s presentation is based on two notions the subsequenttradition will seemingly disregard. First, the perception of yogins grasps a �thing initself� (arthamātra); this expression I do not dare interpret further than Jinen-drabuddhi�s comment to the effect that °mātra (�only,� �in itself� in Hattori�s trans-lation) aims at excluding superimposed objects (PSṬ 56,15�57,1: mātraśabdo�dhyāropitārthavyavacchedārthaḥ |). Second, this perception is totally free from, orunmixed with scriptural concepts (āgamavikalpa), which on the one side matchesthe definitory non-conceptuality of perception well, but on the other side seems toconflict with the subsequent tradition�s insistence upon the four Noble Truths (onthis point, see Franco in present volume).

94 PV 3.281�286, PVin 1.27,7�28,8; see also NB 1.11. On yogipratyakṣa, see Vetter1964: 41, Steinkellner 1978, McDermott 1991, Pemwieser 1991: 21�50, Dreyfus1997: 413�414.

95 According to the following passages: PVinṬ D117b2�3/P135b1�2: �jig rten na nimñam par gźag pa la rnal �byor (em. �byor: DP �byor ba) yin la | bstan bcos las nitiṅ ṅe �dzin daṅ śes rab kyi bdag ñid źi gnas daṅ lhag mthoṅ la yin te | rnal �byor bade dag la yod pa de dag ni rnal �byor bas te | rtag tu mñam par gźag pa daṅ | de khona rnam par �byed pa la brtson pa�o ||. NBṬ S12,8�9/M70,2: yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sayasyāsti sa yogī | (≈ PSṬ 56,12: yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sa yeṣām asti, te yoginaḥ |), andDhPr 70,19�22 thereon: yogaśabdasya vyutpattim āha | yoga iti | samādhiś cittaikā-gratā | iha dharmottareṇa lokaprasiddhir āśritā | viniścayaṭīkāyāṃ tu śāstrasthitistenāvirodhaḥ | yad vā samādhigrahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatvāt prajñā ca vivekakaraṇa-śaktir draṣṭavyā | sa yasyāsti sa nityasamāhito vivekakaraṇatatparaś ca yogī |. PVA327,17�18: tathā ca śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo yoga iti vacanam |.


Let us start with Dharmakīrti�s definition of perception in hisPVin and NB, and disregard the possible evolution of his ideas on thistopic (cf. Franco, forthcoming). In PVin 1.4ab1, Dharmakīrti definesperception as cognition that is free from conceptual thought (kalpanā-poḍha) and is non-erroneous (abhrānta),96 conceptual thought being inturn characterized as a cognition whose appearance or image may beexpressed verbally.97 We may thus offer two defining conditions thatthe cognition of a yogin must meet in order to be termed a �perception�:first, it must be non-conceptual (and hence its content cannot be ade-quately expressed by words); second, it must be non-erroneous andreliable/non-belying (avisaṃvādin). The criterion of a given cognition�snon-conceptual character lies in its presenting a clear or vivid (spaṣṭa,sphuṭa) appearance or image. The vividness and hence the non-concep-tuality of a yogin�s cognition comes from the fact that this cognition isborn of cultivation (bhāvanāmaya, etc.) and arises out of this virtuallyendless process characterized as punaḥ punar utpādanam, as we haveseen above.98 Dharmakīrti spells this out as follows99: �[We have al-ready] presented the cognition of the yogins above [in the second chap-ter]. This [cognition] of the [yogins] is born of cultivation [and thereforeis] free from the [deceptive] net of conceptual thought (kalpanā)[; be-cause it is of a non-conceptual character, this cognition] presents a vividimage.� This depiction is indeed the forerunner of Dharmakīrti�s open-ing statement on the subject in PVin 1, where the second definitorycriterion has been duly integrated100: �That cognition which, as in thecase of fear, etc., vividly appears by force of cultivation, [and which is]

96 PVin 1.4ab1 = NB 1.4: pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam. Note also Dharmot-tara�s (PVinṬ D117a4/P135a2�3) definition of pratyakṣa in this context: gsal barsnaṅ ba don byed par bzod pa�i dṅos po�i raṅ bźin la ma �khrul pa daṅ | rtogs pamed pa�i śes pa ni mṅon sum yin no ||.

97 PVin 1.7,7 ≈ NB 1.5: abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā |.98 See n. 57 above.99 PV 3.281: prāg uktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayam | vidhūtakalpa-

nājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate ||. To be connected with PV 3.285 = PVin 1.31: tas-mād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evātibhāvyate | bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphu-ṭākalpadhīphalam ||. �Therefore, [be it] real or unreal, whatever is intensively medi-tated upon (atibhāvyate) results in a clear and non-conceptual cognition when thecultivation is perfected.�

100 PVin 1.28: bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭaṃ bhayādāv iva bhāsate | yaj jñānam avisaṃvāditat pratyakṣam akalpakam ||.


reliable [as well as] non-conceptual (akalpa), this is a [direct] percep-tion [too].� As Dharmottara has it,101 �due to cultivation, [this cogni-tion] appears vividly; because it appears vividly, [this cognition] is es-tablished (siddha) as non-conceptual; since it bears upon an entity thathas been �purified� by the means of valid cognition (pramāṇa-pariśuddhavastuviṣaya), [this cognition] is non-erroneous; therefore,why should it not be a perception, [if all] the other perceptions alsoappear vividly, are non-conceptual and non-erroneous?�

A cognition�s being the outcome of the intense cultivation of anobject by no means implies that the said cognition bears upon a real(bhūta) object (artha, viṣaya). Dharmakīrti adduces several examples inorder to show that the cultivation of unreal (abhūta) objects may alsoresult in a vivid and hence non-conceptual cognition. He says102: �[Peo-ple who are] deluded by confusion due to love, sorrow or fear, and bydreams about thieves, etc.,103 see [the respective objects] as if [thesewould] stand before [them,] though [these objects are] unreal.� But, onemay ask, how do we know that these deluded persons see, because oftheir cultivation of it, the object as if it would stand before them?104 Thisis to be inferred on the basis of these persons� outward behaviour, asDharmakīrti says105: �Since we see that, in accord with the delusion

101 PVinṬ D117a7�b1/P135a7�b1: bsgoms pas gsal bar snaṅ źiṅ | gsal bar snaṅ ba�iphyir rnam par rtog pa med par grub pa yin la | tshad mas yoṅs su dag pa�i dṅos po�iyul can yin pa�i phyir ma �khrul pa yin pas ci�i phyir mṅon sum ñid du mi �gyur |mṅon sum gźan yaṅ gsal bar snaṅ ba daṅ rtog pa daṅ bral źiṅ ma �khrul pa yin no ||.

102 PV 3.282 = PVin 1.29: kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ | abhūtānapi paśyanti purato �vasthitān iva ||. According to PVP D210b5/P247a1, this stanzaanswers the following question: gaṅ daṅ gaṅ śin tu bsgoms pa de daṅ de las gsal barsnaṅ bar �gyur ro źes bya ba de ñid gaṅ las yin źe na |.

103 PVP D210b7/P247a4 explains �etc.� as: myur du bskor ba daṅ �chi ltas la sogs pagzuṅ ṅo ||. See also PVṬ Ñe D215b6�7/P266b1�2 thereon: sogs pa smos pas ni myurdu bskor ba daṅ �chi ltas la sogs pa gzuṅ ṅo źes bya ba la | �di ltar �khor lo bźin dulus myur du bskor ba las dṅos po g.yo ba med pa yaṅ g.yo ba bźin du gsal bar dmigspar �gyur ba �aṅ �chi ba�i dus na lus daṅ sems kyi gnas skabs �ga� źig �chi ltas kyimiṅ can dṅos po yaṅ dag pa ma yin pa mthoṅ bar �gyur ro ||.

104 PVinṬ D119a1/P137a4: yaṅ de dag gis de mdun na gnas pa bźin du mthoṅ ba źesbya ba �di gaṅ las śe na |.

105 PVin 1.30ab: yathāviplavam āvegapratipattipradarśanāt |. �To be inferred� accord-ing to Vibh. 203n. 3 (anumeya). Eli Franco kindly suggests to me that one can inter-pret this statement in a slightly different manner: � since they show (their delu-sional) cognition by their agitation.


[they are the victims of], they act with agitation.� Some explanationsmay not be out of place. By �agitation� (āvega), we should understandphysical states such as trembling with joy, or being thrilled (roma-harṣa). By �behaviour� is meant a physical action (anuṣṭhāna) that con-forms to the specific vision of a deluded person: the first will stretch hisarms out in order to embrace his beloved, the second mourns or sighs,and the third boastfully seizes a sword.106 But one may also wonder whythe cognition at stake should be of an immediate (pratyakṣa) rather thanof a mediate (parokṣa) character.107 This Dharmakīrti answers as fol-lows108: �Because we do not see any behaviour of that kind when[someone] is conscious that his/her cognition is a mediate one(parokṣa).�

However, cultivating unreal objects is by no means limited todeluded or passionate people. The Buddhist meditation exercises thatbuild up, among other things, the (remote) preparatory path (prayoga-mārga) are also endowed with utterly unreal objects, as Dharmakīrtitells us in both his PV and PVin109: �We hold that, though [they are]unreal, the loathsome, the totality of earth, etc., which are created byforce of cultivation, are vivid and [hence] non-conceptual.� This in-cludes meditation such as cognizing a corpse turning blue (vinīlaka) orrotting (vipūyaka), or of a corpse that has become a skeleton (asthi-

106 See PVinṬ D119a1�3/P137a4�6: gus pas ni grims pa ste | spro ba�i dbaṅ gis �darba�i mtshan ñid can nam ba spu laṅs mtshan ñid kyi lus kyi gnas skabs so || bsgrubpa ni mthoṅ ba daṅ rjes su mthun par nan tan du byed pa ste | sdug pa la sogs �drenpa daṅ | �di na su su źes smra ba daṅ | ṅa rgyal daṅ bcas pa ral gri la sogs pa la �juba ste |. PVP D210b7�211a1/P247a5�6: de ltar na de ltar mthoṅ bas don mṅon dugyur pa bźin du | de daṅ rjes su mthun par bsgrubs pa la dmigs par �gyur na | gaṅ gisna de dag �dir lkog tu gyur pa�i miṅ can du yaṅ �gyur ba ma yin no źes bya ba de ṅespar gzuṅ bar mi �gyur |. PVV 203,9: yasmāt tadanurūpāṃ pravṛttiṃ ceṣṭante |.

107 According to PVinṬ D119a3/P137a6�7: �di sñam du gus pas bsgrub pa mthoṅ duzin kyaṅ | mṅon sum bźin du de dag gsal bar snaṅ ba yin par ji ltar ṅes śe na |.

108 PVin 1.30cd: parokṣagatisaṃjñāyāṃ tathāvṛtter adarśanāt ||.109 PV 3.284: aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādy abhūtam api varṇyate | spaṣṭābhaṃ nirvikalpaṃ ca

bhāvanābalanirmitam ||. PVin 1.28,7�8: tathā hy aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādikam abhūta-viṣayam api spaṣṭapratibhāsaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ca bhāvanābalaniṣpannam iṣyate ||.�It is indeed accepted [by us Buddhists] that [meditative exercises] like [the con-templation of] the loathsome and the totality of earth, which arise by force of culti-vation, present a vivid image and are non-conceptual despite [their] having an un-real object.�



saṅkalā),110 or meditation that has all entities (vastu) appearing as theearth, or as water, as they have unreal objects despite the fact that theimage they display is perfectly clear once the cultivation process hasbeen completed.111 The reason why these meditations have unreal ob-jects is, according to Vaibhāṣikas and to Dharmottara, that they consistin acts of attention that are directed towards imaginary or, better, voli-tional objects (adhimuktimanas[i]kāra).112

Since they arise from intensive cultivation of their objects, theaforementioned direct or immediate cognitions display a vivid imageand hence are non-conceptual. In this respect, they all meet the firstdefining condition of a perception. But since they bear upon imaginaryor volitional objects such as a beloved, an enemy or a putrefyingcorpse, they fail to meet the second. As belying/unreliable (visaṃvādin,asaṃvādin) cognitions, they do not lay claim to the �validity� that isinherent in a true perception. As Dharmakīrti himself says,113 �amongthese [vivid and non-conceptual cognitions that result from cultiva-tion,114 we] accept as a means of valid cognition [only] that perceptionwhich, born of cultivation, is reliable,115 just like [the one that is related

110 See PVinṬ D119b2/P137b7: mi sdug pa źes bya ba ni rus pa �brel pa�i rnam pa cangyi tiṅ ṅe �dzin to ||, PVV 203,22: aśubhā vinīlakavipūyakāsthisaṅkalādikā. Onaśubhā, see Kośa 6.148�153 (Pruden 1991: III.916�921).

111 PVinṬ D119b2�3/P137b7�8: zad par sa ni dṅos po mtha� dag sar snaṅ ba�i tiṅ ṅe�dzin to || sogs pa smos pas ni zad par chu la sogs pa�o ||, PVV 203,22: pṛthivī-kṛtsnādi bhūmayatvādi. On kṛtsnāyatanas, see Kośa 8.213�215 (Pruden 1991:IV.1277�1278).

112 PVinṬ D119b4/P138a1�2: mos pas byas pa rnal �byor ba�i spyod yul du �gyur barus pa la sogs pa rnams � On adhimuktimanas[i]kāra in the case of aśubhā, seeKośa 6.150 and 152 (Pruden 1991: III.918�919 and 920); on adhimuktimanas[i]kārain the case of the kṛtsnāyatana, see Kośa 8.214n. 1 (Pruden 1991: IV.1306n. 203).About this meaning of adhimukti, see Bhsd 14b�15a s.v. adhimucyate (2). Note alsoDevendrabuddhi�s (PVP D211b2�3/P248a1) explanation: raṅ gi rnam par rtog patsam gyis kun nas bslaṅ ba yin no || (*svavikalpamātreṇa samutthitāḥ), as well asPrajñākaragupta�s (PVA 327,14): atattvamanaskāratvād aśubhādīnām.

113 PV 3.286: tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi yat prāṅnirṇītavastuvat | tad bhāvanājaṃpratyakṣam iṣṭaṃ śeṣā upaplavāḥ ||.

114 According to PVV 204,9: tatra bhāvanābalabhāviṣu spaṣṭ[a]nirvikalpeṣu; PVPD211b4/P248a4: de sgom pa�i �bras bu�i śes pa de dag la.

115 See PVV 204,9: saṃvādy upadarśitārthaprāpakam.


to] the matter (vastu) [we] determined above [in chapter two]. All theremaining [cognitions] are [mere] delusions.116�

The condition of a yogic cognition�s reliability lies in its bearingon an object that has proved to stand critical analysis by means ofpramāṇas. In other words, this object must have been submitted to ra-tional inquiry (yukti), �purified� ([pari]śuddha) or ascertained as agree-ing (saṃvādin) with the means of valid cognition. This is tantamount tosaying that the object of a yogin�s cognition is one that has been re-flected upon (< √cint), examined (< vi√car) or ascertained (< niś√ci,vyava√sthācaus, nir√nī) by means of the above-mentioned cintāmayīprajñā. It is obvious that, as Dharmakīrti himself makes clear, this ob-ject only consists of the four Noble Truths117 that he submitted to infer-ential evaluation in the second chapter of his PV.118 When commentingon Dharmakīrti�s statement to the effect that yogic cognition has al-ready been treated, all commentators add that it has been explained �asbearing upon the (four Noble) Truths� ([caturārya]satyaviṣaya), andthis in the satyavicāracintā of the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter.119 In other

116 PVP D211b5/P248a5: dper na zad par sa la sogs pa lta bu�o ||; PVV 204,13�14:śeṣā ayathārthā upaplavā bhramā yathā aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādipratyayāḥ |.

117 See PVinṬ D118a2�3/P136a2�4 for a short summary on the four Truths: �bras burgyur pa ñe bar len pa�i phuṅ po lṅa ni sdug bsṅal lo || de dag ñid sred pa daṅ lhancig pas rgyur gyur pa ni kun �byuṅ ṅo || ṅes par legs pa�i raṅ bźin du gyur pa�i semsni �gog pa�o || raṅ bźin de ñid thob pa�i rgyur gyur pa bdag med pa la sogs pa�i rnampa can gyi sems kyi khyad par ni lam mo ||. �Suffering (duḥkha) consists of the resul-tant (phalabhūta) five constituents[-of-a-person] which one clings to (pañca upādā-naskandhāḥ). The origin (samudaya) [of suffering] consists of the same [five con-stituents] with the status of a cause (hetubhūta) because [they are] accompanied bycraving (tṛṣṇāsahita?). The destruction (nirodha) [of suffering, i.e., nirvāṇa,] con-sists of the mind (citta) having turned into a blissful condition (niḥśreyasasva-bhāvabhūta?). The path (mārga) [that leads to the destruction of suffering] consistsof a particular mind (cittaviśeṣa?) which, endowed with such [real] aspects as un-substantiality (nairātmyādyākāra[vat]?), is the cause of obtaining this very condition(tasya eva svabhāvasya prāptihetubhūtaḥ?) [that defines nirvāṇa].�

118 PV 3.286b: prāṅnirṇītavastuvat; PVin 1.27,11�12: āryasatyadarśanavad yathānirṇītam asmābhiḥ pramāṇavārttike; note also PV 3.281a: prāg uktaṃ yogināṃjñānam.

119 On PV 3.281a: PVV 203,1: prāk prathamaparicchede (= Pramāṇasiddhi) yogināṃjñānaṃ satyaviṣayam uktam; PVA 326,23: caturāryasatyaviṣayaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃprāg uktam; PVP D210b3�4/P246b6�7: sṅar bśad rnal �byor śes pa ni sṅar �phagspa�i bden pa bźi�i yul can du bśad pa na | bden pa dpyod pa gaṅ yin pa de źes byaba�i don to ||. On PV 3.286b: PVV 204,12�13: prāk prathamaparicchede nirṇītaṃ


words, as Devendrabuddhi has it,120 �not all cognitions of yogins areperception (pratyakṣa), but (kiṃ tarhi) [only] the one that has beenstated before, i.e., the one that has been stated before as bearing uponthe four Noble Truths.� According to Dharmottara,121 �the cognitionthat perceives (darśana) these [four Noble Truths], i.e., is aware ofthem in immediate manner (sākṣāt°/pratyakṣīkaraṇa), is perception(pratyakṣa).� And according to the same author,122 Dharmakīrti in hisPV has explained �how the four Noble Truths are �purified� bypramāṇas, and how they are to be cultivated (bhāvanīya) under suchaspects as impermanence (anityādi).� Now provided a yogin�s cultiva-tional and hence non-conceptual cognition has the four Noble Truths forits object, it meets the second defining condition of a perception.

vastu satyacatuṣṭayaṃ tasminn eva; PVA 327,32�33: prāṅnirṇītavastu paralokaca-turāryasatyādikaṃ tadviṣayam eva pratyakṣam | na tu kāmādiviṣayam |; PVPD211b5/P248a5: sṅar bden pa dpyad pa�i skabs su tshad ma�i dṅos po yaṅ dag parbstan pa bźin no. Note also NBṬ S11,18/M67,3�4: bhūtaḥ sadbhūto �rthaḥ | pra-māṇena dṛṣṭaś ca sadbhūtaḥ | yathā catvāry āryasatyāni |, and PVV 203,2 (satyasva-rūpaviṣaya) or 204,3 (āryasatyādi as a gloss on bhūtam). Prajñākaragupta�s para-loka is the only exception I am aware of in this particular context. The presence ofan �etc.� (°adi) is no argument since most if not all °ādis are explicable or even ex-plained as nairātmya or anitya[tā], which of course amounts to the four NobleTruths (note also that Dharmakīrti does not introduce an °ādi in this particular con-text).

120 PVP D210b3�4/P246b6�7: rnal �byor ba�i śes pa thams cad mṅon sum ma yin no ||�o na ci yin źe na | sṅar bśad rnal �byor śes pa ni [= PV 3.281a] | sṅar �phags pa�ibden pa bźi�i yul can du bśad pa na |.

121 PVinṬ D118a3�4/P136a4�5: �di [= bden pa] dag mthoṅ bar mṅon sum du byed pa�iśes pa gaṅ yin pa de mṅon sum yin pa |.

122 PVinṬ D118a4/P136a5: �phags pa�i bden pa bźi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam pardag pa daṅ | mi rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu bsgom par bya ba. Notethe whole of Dharmottara�s account of Dharmakīrti�s PV 2 (PVinṬ D118a4�6/P136a5�8): �phags pa�i bden pa bźi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam par dag padaṅ | mi (D:P bi) rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu źig (D:P om. źig) bsgompar bya ba daṅ | skye ba brgyud pa du mas dus ji srid kyi mthar thug par goms parbya ba daṅ | rgyu gaṅ la goms par byed pa byaṅ chub sems dpa� rnams kyi ni sñiṅ rjelas yin la | de las gźan rnams ni �khor ba las yid byuṅ ba źes bya ba gaṅ yin pa dethams cad ni | ji ltar Tshad ma rnam �grel du gtan (D:P bstan) la phab pa�i rnam pade ñid kyis �phags pa�i bden pa mthoṅ ba thabs daṅ bcas | yul daṅ bcas | rnam padaṅ bcas par khoṅ du chud par byas te | �dir ni yaṅ dag pa�i yul can gyi rnam parrtog pa goms pa las de�i don la dmigs pa�i mṅon sum skye ba ñid do źes bya ba detsam źig bsgrub (P:D bsgrubs) par �dod pa �ba� źig tu zad do ||.


In a most interesting statement of the PVin, Dharmakīrti relatesthe topic of yogijñāna back to the basic path-structure of Buddhism.The traditional threefold sequence or gradual progression (bhāvanā-krama) of insights is deemed to be the cause of a yogic cognition�s viv-idness and reliability123: �Having first grasped objects through a cogni-tion born of listening [to treatises that are favourable to cultivation124],and [then] ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting[upon them] by means of rational inquiry (yukti) [i.e., by means ofpramāṇas],125 yogins cultivate [those objects]. The [cognition] which, atthe completion of this [cultivation], appears as vividly as in such casesas fear [or sorrow, and hence is] non-conceptual [but which also] has atrue object [because it bears upon an object that has been formerly as-certained by pramāṇas], this is [also] the pramāṇa perception.�

Note should be made in this connection that the cognition atstake is said to be �born of cultivation� (bhāvanāmaya), which thecommentators explain as �caused by cultivation� (bhāvanāhetu[niṣ-patti]ka),126 an expression that matches Dharmakīrti�s own formulationswell (bhāvanāja, bhāvanābalanirmita, bhāvanābalaniṣpanna, bhāvanā-balataḥ127). In other words, this cognition does not consist in cultiva-tion, but arises at the very end of cultivation, once the cultivation proc-

123 PVin 1.27,7�8: yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yukticintāmayenavyavasthāpya bhāvayatāṃ tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva, tad avikal-pakam avitathaviṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣam. Dharmottara�s introduction (PVinṬD117b1�2/P135b1) runs as follows: �di ñid rnam par �grel pa na gsal bar snaṅ bañid kyi rgyu bsgom pa�i go rim ston par byed do ||.

124 See PVinṬ D117b3�4/P135b3�4: thos pa las byuṅ bas bsgoms pa daṅ rjes su mthunpa�i bstan bcos mñan pa�i rgyu can gyis bzuṅ ba ṅes pa�i don bsgom par bya ba |.

125 See PVinṬ D117b4/P135b4: rigs pas te tshad mas sems śiṅ ṅes par rtog pa ni rigspas (em. pas: DP pa) sems pa�o ||.

126 PVA 326,23�24: bhāvanāhetukam; PVV 203,1�2: bhāvanāhetuniṣpattikam.127 Respectively, PV 3.286c (bhāvanāja also PVV 203,10, PVV 204,10); PV 3.284d;

PVin 1.28,8; PVin 1.28a (see also PVinṬ D117a5/P135a4 and D119b3/P138a1,where stobs is explained as mthu; PVP D211b4/P248a3; bhāvanābalāt PVV 327,8and PVA 328,1). The commentators provide us with plenty of expressions: bsgomspa�i stobs las skyes pa (PVP D211b1/P247b7�8), bhāvanābalaja (PVV 203,18 and204,13), bhāvanābalabhāvin (PVA 327,32), bsgoms pa�i �bras bu�i śes pa (PVPD211b4/P248a4, PVinṬ D119a7/P137b4 and D119b1/P137b6), bsgoms pa�i mthulas (PVinṬ D119b5/P138a3).


ess has been completed (bhāvanāpariniṣpattau, tanniṣpattau128). This isindeed the way Dharmakīrti accounts for yogijñāna in the definition hesupplies in his NB129: �Arisen from the ultimate degree [reached by] thecultivation of a real object, the cognition of yogins, too[, is a direct per-ception].�

5. Yogijñāna in a Soteriological Perspective

5.1. Dharmakīrti repeatedly reminds his readers of the fact that he hasalready accounted for yogināṃ jñānam in the second chapter of his PV.This remark is a little puzzling insofar as this chapter does not provideany explicit treatment of the topic. Nevertheless, I think it suppliesenough materials for us to proceed further in our interpretation of theyogin�s cognition.

It is my contention that Dharmakīrti�s account of the yogin�scognition as vivid, non-conceptual and non-belying refers to the mind�sgnoseological condition at the end of the �cleansing� path, i.e., at themoment when all superimpositions and their concomitant defilements,even those of an extremely subtle nature, have been thoroughly andabsolutely eliminated. In other words, Dharmakīrti�s presentation con-cerns the mind or cognition of the mystic whose basis-of-existence hasjust been transmuted. The coincidence between Dharmakīrti�s bhāvanā-pariniṣpattau in the context of yogijñāna and his remark to the effectthat the basis-of-existence is transmuted due to the repeated practice ofthe path (tadabhyāsāt), is striking. It is brought out with particular clar-

128 PV 3.285c = PVin 1.31c (note PVV 204,4�5: bhāvanāyāḥ sādaranirantaradīrgha-kālapravartitāyāḥ pariniṣpattau); PVin 1.27,10 (sgom pa rdzogs śiṅ PVinṬD117b5/P135b5). Note also Devendrabuddhi�s explanation of bhāvanāmaya as bdenpa sgom pa rdzogs pa las (PVP D210b4/P246b7�8), as well as Dharmottara�sbsgoms pa mthar phyin pa (PVinṬ D119a6/P137b3). The process traditionally endsup with or culminates in the so-called �absorption similar to a diamond� (vajro-pamasamādhi, see AKBh 364,13�365,10 [Kośa 6.227�229, Pruden 1991: III.981�983]). This final moment in the path of cultivation marks the end of the �cleansing�process. I hold it to coincide with Dharmakīrti�s bhāvanāprakarṣaparyanta (NB1.11), or with his bhāvanāpariniṣpatti (PV 3.285c).

129 NB 1.11: bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti ||. Dharmottarainterprets °paryanta° as ablative case (NBṬ S11,23/M68,2: tasmāt paryantāt yajjātam), contrary to Jñānaśrīmitra�s locative (bhāvanāprakarṣaparyante, inSteinkellner 1978: 130n. 42).



ity in Devendrabuddhi�s commentary130: �Due to the [repeated] practice(abhyāsa) of the [aforementioned] path (mārga), i.e., once the cultiva-tion (bhāvanā) of the path defined as the perception of unsubstantiality(nairātmyadarśanalakṣaṇa) has been completed (niṣpatti), the basis[-of-existence] is transmuted (āśrayaḥ parivartate, = PV 2.205b): the defiled(doṣavat?) mind (citta) [now] has the property (dharma) absolutely[never] to [re]arise (atyantānutpatti?). The meaning (artha) [intendedby Dharmakīrti is the following]: the mind is [now] coessential with thepath (mārgasātmani sthitam).� Highly interesting in this connection isan allegedly Vaibhāṣika objection occurring in Prajñākaragupta�s PVA.Just before he turns to his criticism, the Vaibhāṣika opponent concedesthe following point:131 �It is true that [the cognition in question] pre-sents, due to [intense] cultivation, a vivid image of an object (vastu) thathas been [previously] established by the means of valid cognition, be-cause [in it] the object (artha) appears in its own [particular] form(svena rūpeṇa) when the opacity of nescience (avidyākāluṣya) has been[entirely] wiped away through cultivation.� I conjecture that the doc-trine that provokes the Vaibhāṣika�s assent encapsulates Dharmakīrti�sposition with regard to the cognition of yogins. As we shall see, thishypothesis accounts both for the vividness and for the truth that aredeemed inherent in a yogin�s cognition.

5.2. In the second chapter of his PV, Dharmakīrti presents us with thefollowing �realist� account of the nature (prakṛti) of cognition (vi-jñāna)132: �[Provided one accepts, unlike the idealist,133 that] the prop-erty of [all] cognition is to grasp an object, [one must also admit that]

130 PVP D87a4�5/P100a7�b1: lam de goms pa las bdag med pa mthoṅ ba�i mtshan ñidcan gyi lam de�i sgom pa rdzogs pa na rten ni yoṅs su gyur par �gyur | ñes pa daṅbcas pa�i sems śin tu skye ba med pa�i chos can yod na lam de�i bdag ñid la semsgnas par �gyur ro źes bya ba�i don to ||.

131 PVA 327,8�9: (vaibhāṣikā āhuḥ | nanu) vastuni pramāṇaprasiddhe bhāvanābalātspaṣṭābhateti yuktam | bhāvanayāvidyākāluṣyāpagame svena rūpeṇārthasya prati-bhāsanāt |.

132 PV 2.206�207a1: viṣayagrahaṇaṃ dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti saḥ | gṛhyate so �syajanako vidyamānātmaneti ca || eṣā prakṛtiḥ �

133 On the epistemological presuppositions of that passage, see PVP D87b5�88a4/P101a3�b3 (Eltschinger 2005b: 185�186), and TSP K872,27�873,7/Ś1056,21�25 (McClintock 2002: 213�214).


this [object] is grasped as it [really] is [i.e., as impermanent, etc.134].This [object] generates this [cognition of itself] by [its] existing nature(vidyamānātmanā). And this is [the object�s and the cognition�s origi-nal] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as itreally is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object].�Dharmakīrti�s presentation relies on a Sautrāntika doctrine, accordingto which direct perception is explained by the fact that the object castsor �projects� (arpaṇa) its own aspect (ākāra) and hence generates thecognition itself. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the third chapter of thesame work135: �Experts on rational inquiry consider that to be an ob-ject/be perceptible consists in being a cause [which is] capable of pro-jecting a [true] aspect [of itself] onto the cognition.� I believe we areleft with no other possibility than to accept the alleged reality of theaspects the entity casts onto consciousness. As Devendrabuddhi makesclear,136 these real aspects are those we already met in Dharmakīrti�sdescription of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, imperma-nence, painfulness, emptiness, selflessness, etc. The conclusion is theneasily drawn, as Kamalaśīla has it137: �It has been settled that the origi-nal nature of the [mind/cognition] is to grasp the real aspects of the ob-ject. It has also been explained that the real nature of the object consistsin momentariness, selflessness, etc. Therefore, [the mind] has but thegrasping of unsubstantiality for its nature.� In order to present us withthe nature of cognition, the epistemologists resort to, and reinterpret ac-cordingly, two highly valued traditional topoi, i.e., the alleged natural�luminosity� (prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā) of the mind or cognition,138 and theperception of true reality (tattvadarśana). Dharmakīrti describes thefirst in PV 2.208ab139: �[Therefore,] the mind is radiant by [its very]nature [i.e., grasps an object as it really is,140 whereas] impurities (mala)

134 Anityādyākāra in PVP D87b6/P101a4, D88b3�4/P102a4�5.135 PV 3.247b2d: grāhyatāṃ viduḥ | hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam ||.136 See PVP D88a4�5/P101b3�4.137 TSP K873,5�7/Ś1057,2�4: bhūtaviṣayākāragrāhitā asya svabhāvo nija iti sthitam |

bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat | tena nair-ātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva.

138 See Eltschinger 2005b: 180 and 190�192. On the mind�s natural luminosity, seeSeyfort Ruegg 1969: 410�454 and Lamotte 1987a: 51�60.

139 PV 2.208ab: prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ |.140 According to PVP D89a5/P103a1: �di�i raṅ bźin �od gsal te | yaṅ dag pa ji lta ba

bźin du �dzin pa�i raṅ bźin no ||.


[such as the view of self or craving] are [purely] adventitious [i.e., arenot its nature,141 and hence are removable].� According to the secondtopos, which, as far as I can see, Dharmakīrti does not explicitly alludeto in this particular context, to see the real aspects of things amounts toperceiving true reality. Thus, Devendrabuddhi142: �By its [very] nature,the mind thus consists of the perception of true reality, [whereas] impu-rities are [merely] adventitious.� Or, as Śāntarakṣita has it,143 �the mind,which consists of the perception of true reality, is radiant [by its verynature].�

Now how are we to account for the indisputable fact that we ac-tually do not perceive true reality, i.e., do not perceive real entities asimpermanent, painful, empty or selfless? In other words, how is it thatwe ordinary persons can at best infer these real aspects of things, andhence have but conceptual and nonvivid notions of them? Dharmakīrti�sanswer is as follows144: �On account of a certain cause (nimitta) [i.e., onaccount of an adventitious cause of error], the [mind] shifts (skhalat)from this [inherently veracious nature, superimposing such erroneousaspects as permanence on the object,145] and becomes uncertain (adṛ-ḍha), requiring a condition146 (pratyaya) for the removal [of this state],like the cognition of a piece of rope [as a snake].� In order to under-stand the first part of Dharmakīrti�s explanation, we should rememberwhat the state of an ordinary person consists of. The innate false view

141 According to PVP D89a6/P103a2: glo bur ba yin gyi de�i raṅ bźin ni ma yin no ||.142 PVP D89b1/P103a5�6: �di ltar sems ni ṅo bo ñid kyis de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba�i bdag

ñid can yin la | dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba yin pa. See also PVP D89b2/P103a7:sems kyi de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba de�i bdag ñid can; PVP D87b4/P101a1: sems kyiraṅ bźin ñid kyi de kho na ñid mthoṅ ba de�i bdag ñid can; TSP K895,10/Ś1083,11:tattvadarśanātmakam eva vijñānasya (sic); TSP K895,7/Ś1082,21: prakṛtyā tattva-darśanātmakatayā cittasya; TSP K895,19/Ś1083,15�16: tattvadarśanātmakam evacittaṃ siddham iti bhāvaḥ; TSP K896,4 (with no equivalent in Ś!): tattvadarśin;PVV 107,6: tattvadarśitvāt (said of the Blessed One); PVV 107,5�6: atattva-darśinaḥ (said of the vītarāgā bāhyāḥ).

143 TS 3435K/3434Ś: prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ tattvadarśanasātmakam |.144 PV 2.207a2d: asyās tan nimittāntarataḥ skhalat | vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam adṛḍhaṃ

sarpabuddhivat ||.145 According to PVP D89a2/P102b4�5: rtag pa la sogs pa�i rnam par sgro �dogs pas

�jug pa ni gźan du gyur pa�o || (where gźan du gyur pa is the Tibetan rendering ofSanskrit skhalat[/skhalana]).

146 PVP D89a2�3/P102b5�6: rkyen la ltos pa yin te | de ltar skyes bu�i �khrul pa gnodpa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa daṅ bcas pa yin no ||.


of self, i.e., nescience, causes pṛthagjanas to superimpose sixteen unrealaspects onto the four Noble Truths, e.g., permanence, pleasantness,mine and I. Because they are attached to I and mine, or to self and one�sown, ordinary beings crave for objects that delight the (pseudo-)self,and act accordingly in order to grasp them; they also develop aversionof whatever is deemed a threat to the self or its alleged property. Thusdefilements and depravities arise out of the false view of self.147 This isthe situation that Dharmakīrti alludes to when he says that the mind orthe cognition shifts from its own true nature.148 But, as Dharmakīrti hasit, this superimposing cognition is as uncertain or unsteady as the mis-taken cognition of a piece of rope as snake at night in a place where onemay suspect the presence of snakes.149 In the same way, nescience andthe superimpositions it is responsible for, no matter how deeply rootedin the mind, are removable because they are adventitious or unnatural tothe mind. Now what is needed to get rid of this shift? The epistemolo-gists� answer is unambiguous: an ordinary person who is deluded by thefalse view of self must resort to the means of valid cognition and es-pecially to inference. Here again we should remember that, still as anordinary person, one may, on account of belonging to a specific �fam-ily� and/or having met a �spiritual friend� like a Buddha or an advancedBodhisattva, listen to the Buddhist scriptures and hence develop faith orconviction (adhimukti), but one may also set about rationally reflectingupon scriptural contents by means of pramāṇas. This rational inquiry,mainly consisting of the ascertainment of the true aspects of the Noble

147 See §§1.1�3 above.148 We should, however, be cautious not to ascribe to him the mythological notion of a

�fall� or decay of the mind that would in turn imply the path to consist in the grad-ual recovery of a lost condition. Nescience is a beginningless (anādi) erroneous per-ception (mithyopalabdhi) that arises out of its own seeds (bīja) or latent tendencies(vāsanā) and that has been nourished by, and nourishes in turn, the so-called incor-rect judgement (ayoniśomanaskāra). On this last doctrinal point, see PVSV 8,20�21(ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayo �yoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt sarvadoṣot-patteḥ |), PVṬ Je D249b6�7/P296a6�7 ≈ PVSVṬ 398,25�26, PVṬ Je D253a4�5/P301a4 = PVSVṬ 403,8�9, PVV 101,10 and 367,10�11. On ayoniśomanaskāra asthe root of satkāyadṛṣṭi, see MS 2.20.9 in Lamotte 1973: II.115, Paramārthagāthā20 in Wayman 1961: 170, BhK 1.215,8�15.

149 See PVP D87b7/P101a6: dper na sbrul du �dris pa�i phyogs mi gsal bar thag pa lasbrul gyi śes pa lta bu�o ||. Cf. Vibh. 82n. 4: (mandamandaprakāśe) sarpopacitepradeśe. See also Lamotte 1973: II.109�110, and MS 3.8.2 in Lamotte 1973: II.163.


Truths, aims at shaping the salvational means (upāya), i.e., the percep-tion of unsubstantiality as an antagonistic or opposing factor ofsatkāyadṛṣṭi. There can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti�s vyāvṛttau pra-tyayāpekṣam (PV 2.207c) refers in the first place to the inferentialanalysis that is typical for the cintāmayī prajñā.150

As we have seen above, the cultivation of the salvational meansthat the yogin carries out is simultaneously of a cognitive and cleansingcharacter. The more our yogin sharpens his realization of the Truths andtheir corresponding aspects, the more he succeeds in uprooting the op-posite false views as well as the superimpositions and defilements theyare responsible for. But eradicating the adventitious impurities amountsto gradually freeing the mind of those malignant obstacles that pre-vented it from grasping the object as it really is, i.e., with its real as-pects of impermanence, emptiness, etc. During the path of vision, theyogin gets rid of gross superimpositions such as those the speculativefalse view of self gives rise to. Much more difficult to eliminate how-ever, is the innate false view of self, along with the remaining defile-ments (i.e., the bhāvanāheyakleśas) and their productive and non-productive vāsanās, the uprooting of which, in many Mahāyānist ac-counts, necessitates no less than eight complete stages or bhūmis (bhū-mis 2-9). During the first six of these bhūmis (2�7), the yogin must de-vote constant effort and �intentionality� (vikalpa) to his cultivation ofthe cleansing means; during the last two bhūmis (8�9), insight becomesspontaneous, effortless, and unintentional. The removal of the mostsubtle categories of bad dispositions now proceeds as �automatically�or �naturally� as the perception of unsubstantiality itself. At the end ofthe path of cultivation, the entire filth of impurities has been irrever-sibly destroyed, a psychological and existential situation described as atransmutation of the basis-of-existence. Now the mind only consists ofthe path; it has the perception of unsubstantiality or discernment for itsunique and indestructible nature. Dharmakīrti describes this as fol-lows151: �Of [these impurities] that were incapable [of annulling themind] before [the perceptual realization of unsubstantiality152], what(kva) [could] therefore be the capacity afterwards, with regard to a[mind] that [once the practice of nairātmyadarśana has been completed,

150 See §§2.1�2 above.151 PV 2.208cd: tat prāg apy asamarthānāṃ paścāc chaktiḥ kva tanmaye ||.152 According to PVP D89a6/P103a3: bdag med pa mthoṅ ba�i mṅon sum du byas pa.



entirely] consists (maya) of the [path]153?� The following excerpt ofDevendrabuddhi will provide a useful summary as well as transition tothe concluding part of my hypothesis154: �[Moral] faults [i.e., defile-ments,] lack the capacity to re-occur in the mind of the one who is ofone essence with the path (mārgasātmye sthitasya), for the nature(svabhāva) of the mind (citta) consists in the perception of true reality(tattvadarśanātmaka);155 it does not have for its essence the [moral]faults that are bound to [i.e., derive from] aspects that are contrary (vi-parītākāra) [to the ones which are ascertained by the means of validcognition]. Now its (= the mind�s) depravities (upakleśa) [arise] by for-ce of a [purely] adventitious condition (āgantu[ka]pratyayavaśāt?).156 Ifsomething opposes (√bādh) them,157 the mind that rests in its own[original] nature (svasvabhāva) provides the [moral] faults with no sup-port/resting-place (āśraya) anymore (na punar), because its nature ex-ists by force of [real] entities (vastubalapravṛtta).�158 As Devendra-buddhi has it, the mind or cognition now abides in its own proper andundefiled nature, which is nothing other than the grasping of the realaspects of the object projected onto it. The practice of the path, i.e.,

153 According to PVP D89a7�b1/P103a5: bdag med pa mthoṅ ba goms pa grub pa nade�i raṅ bźin lam de�i bdag ñid can gyi sems la (*nairātmyadarśanābhyāsaniṣpattautanmaye mārgasātmani citte).

154 PVP D87a7�87b2/P100b2�5: lam goms pa la gnas pa�i sems la ñes pa rnams yaṅ�byuṅ ba�i nus pa yod pa ma yin no* || de ltar na sems kyi raṅ bźin ni de kho na ñidmthoṅ ba�i bdag ñid can yin gyi | phyin ci log gi rnam pa daṅ rjes su �brel pa�i ñespa de�i bdag ñid can ni ma yin no || �di�i ñe ba�i ñon moṅs pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ globur ba�i rkyen gyi dbaṅ gis yin no || de la gnod pa yod na raṅ gi raṅ bźin la gnas pa�isems ni yaṅ ñes pa�i rten byed pa ma yin te | dṅos po�i stobs kyis źugs pa�i raṅ bźinñid yin pa�i phyir ro ||. *Cf. PVV 82,1�2: mārgasātmye �pi sthitasya cetasi na doṣā-ṇām utpattuṃ sāmarthyam asti |.

155 PVṬ Ñe D133a3�4/P164a2�3 explains tattvadarśanātmaka as follows: dṅos po ji ltaba bźin du gnas pa�i �dzin pa�i bdag ñid can (*yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇātmaka <PVV 82,14�15).

156 PVṬ Ñe D133a5/P164a4�5 explains āgantu(ka)pratyaya as follows: rgyu mtshan�ga� źig las bdag la sogs par sgro btags pas �jug pa�i �khrul pa�i śes pa.

157 PVṬ Ñe D133a5�6/P164a5�6: de la gnod pa yod na źes bya ba glo bur ba�i rnampas | de�i rgyu can gyi ñe ba�i ñon moṅs pa bdag med pa�i lam gyis bsal ba yod naźes bya ba�i don to ||.

158 PVṬ Ñe D133a6�7/P164a7�8: dṅos po stobs kyis źugs pa�i raṅ bźin ñid yin pa�iphyir ro źes bya ba ni dṅos po ji ltar gnas pa bźin du �dzin pas źugs pa�i bdag medpa�i lam ni sems kyi raṅ bźin ñid yin pa�i phyir ro || (*yathāvasthitavastugrahaṇa-pravṛttasya nairātmyamārgasya cittasvabhāvatvāt).


cultivation, has freed the cognition of the obstacles that avidyā was ul-timately responsible for; in other words the mind is now free from theobstacle that concealed the knowable. Of the real and pramāṇa-ascertai-ned aspects the object imposes upon it, which are the real aspects of thefour Noble Truths, the mind can have but a vivid and hence non-conceptual image. In other words: whereas the cintāmayī prajñā, i.e.,the (initially purely conceptual) ascertainment of true reality by meansof pramāṇas, is responsible for the reliability of the yogin�s cognition,the bhāvanāmayī prajñā gradually frees the mind of the defilements insuch a way that the aspects objects cast upon it appear vividly. Irrespec-tive of all subsequent interpretations of the yogināṃ jñānam, this in myopinion is what Dharmakīrti has in mind when he rather crypticallydescribes the cognition of yogins.

I would like to add a final remark. As far as I know, Dhar-makīrti does not describe the nature of discernment during the pathitself, i.e., before the āśrayaparivṛtti takes place. Now it is clear that,before entering the path of vision, the yogin has but an inferential andhence conceptual notion of such real aspects as impermanence, empti-ness and the like. I would incline towards considering that his cognitionof them remains a conceptual one, albeit extremely refined and hencevivid, throughout the path. But we ought not to forget that the mind is apurely momentary entity: the cognition that the path or the cultivationgenerates again and again may well be nothing like the cognition of theliberated one. This is exactly what the following stanzas of the Pa-ramārthagāthās account for159: �39. Defiled mind, of course (hi), is[something] that arises and ceases each time together with the Defile-ments. For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] neither[already] happened nor will it [ever] happen. 40. [For it is] not that this[very same defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [ratherwhat] arises [afterwards is] another [mind which is pure]. And [it is]

159 Paramārthagāthā 39�41: sahotpannaniruddhaṃ hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ sadā |kleśebhyas tasya nirmokṣo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati || na tad utpadyate paścācchuddham anyat tu jāyate | tac ca pūrvam asaṃkliṣṭaṃ kleśebhyo muktam ucyate ||yat kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantāc chuddhaṃ prakṛtibhāsvaram | na ceha śudhyate kaścit ku-taścid vāpi śudhyate ||. Text and translation in Schmithausen 1987: I.232�233 (seealso the commentary on the stanzas in Schmithausen 1987: I.161�162). See also theVaibhāṣika�s account of liberation (vimukti) in AKBh 388,19�389,4, andEltschinger 2005b: 190�192.


this [other mind that, although it had] not [been] defiled before, is called�liberated� from Defilements. 42. That which is defiled is, in this [sys-tem], absolutely [defiled]; [what is] pure is radiant by nature. And [thus(?) there is], in this [system], no [person or even dharma which] is puri-fied, nor is [he/it, a fortiori,] purified from anything.�


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Lamotte 1987b Étienne Lamotte: �Le troisième Bhāvanā-krama de Kamalaśīla.Traduction de la version tibétaine.� Pp. 336�353 of Paul Demié-ville: Le Concile de Lhasa, une controverse sur le quiétisme entrebouddhistes de l�Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l�ère chré-tienne. Paris, 1987: Collège de France, Institut des Hautes ÉtudesChinoises (Publication de l�Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises,7).

LAV Bunyiu Nanjio: The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Kyoto, 1923: The OtaniUniversity Press (Bibliotheca Otaniensis, 1).

Mahāvibhāṣā T27 (1545).Maithrimurthi 1999 Mudagamuwe Maithrimurthi: Wohlwollen, Mitleid, Freude und

Gleichmut. Eine ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung der vierapramāṇas in der buddhistischen Ethik und Spiritualität von denAnfängen bis hin zum frühen Yogācāra. Stuttgart, 1999: FranzSteiner Verlag (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien herausgegebenvom Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets an derUniversität Hamburg, 50).



McClintock 2002 Sara McClintock: Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason in theTattvasaṃgraha and the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā. UnpublishedPhD Thesis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University.

McDermott 1991 Charlene McDermott: �Yogic Direct Awareness as Means ofValid Cognition in Dharmakīrti and Rgyal-tshab.� Pp. 144�166of Minoru Kiyota: Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation. Theory andPractice. Dehli, 1991: Motilal Banarsidass.

MS See Lamotte 1973: I.MSA(Bh) Sylvain Lévi: Asaṅga. Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra, Exposé de la

doctrine du Grand Véhicule selon le système Yogācāra. Tome 1:texte. Paris, 1907: Librairie Honoré Champion.

MSAVBh Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāravṛttibhāṣya (Sthiramati). D n°4034, Mi1b1�Tsi 266a7.

Nagao 2000 Gadjin M. Nagao: �The Bodhisattva�s Compassion Described inthe Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra.� Pp. 1�38 of Jonathan A. Silk: Wis-dom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding. The Bud-dhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao. Honolulu, 2000: Uni-versity of Hawai�i Press (Studies in the Buddhist Traditions).

NB(Ṭ) S = Th. I. �čerbatskoj: Nyāyabindu. Buddijskij učebnik�� logikisočinenie Dharmakirti I tolkovanie na nego Nyāyabinduṭīkā so-činenie Darmottary. Osnabrück, 1970 (Petrograd, 19181): BiblioVerlag (Bibliotheca Buddhica, 7).

M Paṇḍita Dalsukhbhai Malvania: Paṇḍita Durveka Miśras�s Dhar-mottarapradīpa (Being a sub�commentary on Dharmottara�sNyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti�s Nyāyabindu.Patna, 1971: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan SanskritWorks Series, 2).

Nyāyānusāra T29 (1562).P Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in

the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo/Kyoto, 1957:Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute.

Pemwieser 1991 Monika Pemwieser: Materialien zur Theorie der yogischen Er-kenntnis im Buddhismus. Diplomarbeit zur Erlangung des magi-stergrades an der Universität Wien. Wien, 1991 (unpublished).

Pruden 1991 Leo M. Pruden: Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam by Louis de La ValléePoussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vol. Berkeley,1991: Asian Humanities Press.

PS(V) Ernst Steinkellner: Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti). Chapter I.www.oeaw.ac.at/ias/Mat/dignaga_PS_1.pdf. See also Hattori1968.

PSṬ Ernst Steinkellner/Helmut Krasser/Horst Lasic: Jinendrabuddhi�sViśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Chapter 1. Part I: Cri-tical Edition. Beijing/Vienna, 2005: China Tibetology ResearchCenter/Austrian Academy of Sciences.

PV 1�4 Yūsho Miyasaka: �Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Ti-betan).� Acta Indologica II (1971�1972), pp. 1�206. See also


PVV; for PV 2�3, see also PVA; for PV 1, see also PVSV; forPV 2.131cd�285, see also Vetter 1990. My numerotation of theverses in PV 2 follows the one of Vetter.

PVA Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam or Vārtikālaṅ-kāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharma-kīrti�s Pramāṇavārtikam). Patna, 1953: K.P. Jayaswal ResearchInstitute.

PVin 1 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇaviniścaya, Chapters 1and 2. Beijing/Vienna, 2007: China Tibetology PublishingHouse/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts fromthe Tibetan Autonomous Region, 2).

PVinṬ Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara). D n°4229, Dze 1b1�Tshe178a3/P n°5727, Dze 1b1�We 209b8.

PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (Devendrabuddhi). D n°4217, Che 1�326b4/P n°5717, Che 1�390a8.

PVSV Raniero Gnoli: The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti. The FirstChapter with the Auto-Commentary. Roma, 1960: Istituto Italianoper il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma, 23).

PVSVṬ Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Karṇakagomin�s Commentary on the Pra-māṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti. Kyoto, 1982: Rinsen Books Co.(Allahabad, 1943: Kitab Mahal).

PVṬ Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (Śākyabuddhi). D n°4220, Je 1b1�Ñe282a7/P n°5718, Je 1b1�Ñe 348a8.

PVV Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana: �Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇavārttika withCommentary by Manorathanandin.� Published as an appendix ofthe Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24�26(1938�1940).

Rahder 1932 Johannes Rahder: �La Satkāyadṛṣṭi d�après Vibhāṣā, 8.� Mé-langes Chinois et Bouddhiques 1 (1931�1932), pp. 227�239.

Schmithausen 1987 Lambert Schmithausen: Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and theEarly Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy.2 volumes. Tokyo, 1987: The International Institute for BuddhistStudies (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series, IVa/b).

Schmithausen 2007 Lambert Schmithausen: �Aspects of Spiritual Practice in EarlyYogācāra.� Journal of the International College for PostgraduateBuddhist Studies 11, pp. 213(/98)�244(/67).

Seyfort Ruegg 1969 David Seyfort Ruegg: La théorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Go-tra. Paris, 1969: École Française d�Extrême-Orient (Publicationsde l�École Française d�Extrême-Orient, Université de Paris, Fa-culté des Lettres et Sciences humaines).

Siddhi Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi deHiuan-Tsang. 2 volumes. Paris, 1929: Librairie Orientaliste PaulGeuthner (Buddhica, Documents et travaux pour l�étude du bou-ddhisme publiés sous la direction de Jean Przyluski, Première sé-rie: Mémoires, 5).

SNS Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. See Lamotte 1935.


Steinkellner 1978 Ernst Steinkellner: �Yogische Erkenntnis als Problem im Budd-hismus. Pp. 121�134 of Gerhard Oberhammer: Transzen-denzerfahrung, Vollzugshorizont des Heils. Das Problem in in-discher und christlicher Tradition. Arbeitsdokumentation einesSymposiums.� Wien, 1978: Publications of the de Nobili Re-search Library, 5.

Steinkellner 1979 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. ZweitesKapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmer-kungen. Wien, 1979: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie derWissenschaften (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Spra-chen und Kulturen Südasiens, 15).

Suzuki 1999 Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki: Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Delhi,1999 (London, 19301): Motilal Banarsidass (Buddhist TraditionSeries, 41).

T Junjirō Takakusu/Kaikyoku Watanabe: Taishō shinshū daizōkyō.Tōkyō, 1924�1932: Taishō Issaikyō Kankōkai.

Traité Étienne Lamotte: Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse deNāgārjuna (Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra). 5 volumes. Louvain-la-Neuve, 19812, 19812, 1970, 1976, 1980): Université de Louvain,Institut Orientaliste (Publications de l�Institut Orientaliste, 25, 26,2, 12, 24).

TṛBh Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya (Sthiramati). Sylvain Lévi: Vijñaptimā-tratāsiddhi, deux traités de Vasubandhu: Viṃśatikā et Triṃśikā.Paris, 1925: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion (Bibliothèquede l�École des Hautes Études, Sciences historiques et philolo-giques, 245).

TS(P) K = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasaṅgraha of ŚāntarakṣitaWith the Commentary of Kamalaśīla. 2 vol. Baroda, 1984: Orien-tal Institute.Ś = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shān-tarakṣita with the Commentary �Pañjikā� of Shri Kamalshīla. 2vol. Varanasi, 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series,1).

Vetter 1964 Tilmann Vetter: Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti. Wien,1964: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., Kommissionsverlag der Öster-reichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Österreichische Aka-demie der Wissenschaften, philologisch-historische Klasse, Sit-zungsberichte, 245).

Vetter 1990 Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in DharmakīrtisPramāṇavārttika. Der Abschnitt über den Buddha und die vier ed-len Wahrheiten im Pramāṇasiddhi-Kapitel. Wien, 1990: Arbeits-kreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien(Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 12).

Vibh. Vibhūticandra�s notes to PVV. See PVV.VinSg Viniścayasaṅgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi. P n°5539, Zi 1b1 �

�i 142b8.


Wayman 1961 Alex Wayman: Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript. Berke-ley/Los Angeles, 1961: University of California Press.

D O R J I W A N G C H U K

A Relativity Theory of the Purity and Validity ofPerception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism*

The mind is its own place, and in itselfCan make a heav�n of hell, a hell of heav�n.

John Milton (1608�1674), Paradise Lost

One devoid of self-cognitive mind that cognises true [reality],Would perceive even [pure] Buddha fields to be domains of baddestinations (e.g. hells).[For] one who realises the [true] reality of equality [taught by] theSupreme Vehicle,The very domains of bad destinations are domains of the Akaniṣṭha[and] Tuṣita [heavens].

sGyu �phrul le lhag and rDo rje gsang rgyud1

1. INTRODUCTION

On the whole, Tibetan Buddhist scholars have honestly striven toadhere to the doctrines of Indian Buddhism. But we do encounter fromtime to time philosophical theories and interpretations that are of purelyTibetan provenance. Most of them seem to be the product of an attemptto resolve conflicts and inconsistencies found in the heterogeneousIndian Buddhist scriptures and systems, which, as I have already tried toillustrate on the basis of the Buddha Nature theory, were dealt with indifferent ways.2 No doubt differences in interpretations provoked heateddebates, but it is precisely these and similar doctrinal disputes that gave

* I owe my thanks to Philip Pierce for kindly proofreading this article.1 sGyu �phrul le lhag (p. 425.6�7) and rDo rje gsang rgyud (p. 332.3�4):

yang dag shes pa�i rang rig blo med na ||bde gshegs zhing yang ngan song gnas su mthong ||theg mchog mnyam pa�i don nyid rtogs pa ni ||ngan song gnas nyid �og min dga� ldan gnas ||.

Note that the rDo rje gsang rgyud erroneously reads bla instead of blo in pāda a.This verse is cited by Mi-pham in his �Od gsal snying po (pp. 94.6�95.2), with thesGyu �phrul rgyas pa named as his source. Instead of ni in pāda c, he has na.

2 Wangchuk 2004.

216 DORJ I WANGCHUK

rise to fascinating philosophical ideas that are uniquely Tibetan. One ofthe most intriguing examples is the debate surrounding an Indo-TibetanBuddhist theory of knowledge, namely, on how beings of variousrealms and spiritual levels are said to perceive a common entity, forinstance, what is known to us humans as water. Some of the questionsthat Tibetan scholars have asked were whether what we call water existsat all as water, whether our perception of water is a valid cognition, orwhether it may be that water is not simply water after all but in fact pus(pūya: rnag), as it is perceived by hungry ghosts (preta: yi dwags);nectar, as it is perceived by gods; a goddess, as it is perceived byyogins; or still something else. They also pondered upon such questionsas whether there is a common and shared object of perception, and if so,what it is, and which of the perceptions�if every sentient being of thesix realms perceives it differently�is valid, and what the criteria ofperceptual validity are. Scholars from the four major schools of TibetanBuddhism (dGe-lugs, Sa-skya, bKa�-brgyud, and rNying-ma) whoreflected upon these questions came to varying conclusions, which willbe discussed elsewhere. This paper seeks to introduce a relativity theoryof the purity and validity of perception in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, oneessentially the result of attempts made by some scholars of the rNying-ma (or the Ancient) School of Tibetan Buddhism to answer the abovequeries, having apparently drawn their inspiration from Indian Buddhistsources.

The theory that I intend to present has revealed itself, as is oftenthe case, as more complex than initially assumed. Firstly, this theory ofperception does not concern an anthropocentric view of perception, andis not limited to human knowledge, but embraces the entire spectrum ofkarmically conditioned perceptions experienced by the six classes ofsentient beings, namely, gods, demigods, humans, animals, hungryghosts, and beings in hell. Secondly, human beings for one may haveaccess to various dimensions of perception. For instance, based onkarmic influences, a man may perceive an entity �x� as water�assomething that can quench his thirst�but he may also be able tomeditatively enhance his perception and perceive �x� as a female beingcapable of arousing samādhic ecstasy in him. Thirdly, this theorypresupposes varying understandings of ontology, logic andepistemology (pramāṇa), gnoseology (i.e. the theory of jñāna, which inthe Buddhist context can be understood as higher epistemology), andsoteriology�in the varying Buddhist philosophical systems�and this

PURITY AND VALIDITY OF PERCEPTION 217

makes the matter all the more complicated. Fourthly, there is a certainterminological constriction in having to express eastern thought inwestern languages, and one cannot always adopt or else try to getaround using western scientific or philosophical terms such as�relativity� and �relativism�3 without running risks of being misunder-stood.

2. THE HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL SETTING

Of the four periods of the history of Buddhist logic and epistemology(pramāṇa) in Tibet as proposed by Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp,4

namely, Ancient (i.e. pre-Glang-dar-ma Period, that is, pre-9th century),Pre-Classical (beginning with Klu-mes Tshul-khrims-shes-rab in the10th century), Classical (beginning with Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga�-rgyal-mtshan in the 12th century), and Post-Classical (beginning in the15th century), the Ancient Period witnessed the translation of only afew Indian works on Buddhist logic and epistemology.5 One is likely toassume that beyond these few translations Tibetan scholars of theAncient Period have really nothing to say or offer on matters pertainingto Buddhist logic and epistemology. Such an assumption wouldcertainly be justified if we were to think exclusively in terms ofcommentaries on pure Pramāṇa treatises belonging to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti school of Buddhist logic and epistemology, but notnecessarily if we were to consider Buddhist theories of knowledge andtheir application in more general terms. For example, the theory of fourkinds of yukti (�logical reasoning�), namely, reasoning [based on theprinciple] of dependence (apekṣāyukti: ltos pa�i rigs pa), reasoning[based on the principle of the ability of things to] cause effects(kāryakaraṇayukti: bya ba byed pa�i rigs pa), reasoning that establishes

3 I would like to thank John Taber for kindly acquainting me with MariaBaghramian�s monograph on relativism (Baghramian 2004). Unfortunately, it hasnot been possible to go into a discussion of whether my own employment of theterms �relativity� and �relativism� conforms to one or more of the numeroussemantic nuances and usages presented therein. I shall have to leave it up to readersfor themselves to judge if and to what extent the theory presented in this paper canbe described in those terms.

4 van der Kuijp 1989: 8�9.5 For the Pramāṇa texts translated during the Ancient Period in Tibet, see Frauwallner

1957.

218 DORJ I WANGCHUK

the tenability [of the other three types of reasoning] (upapattisādhana-yukti: �thad pa sgrub pa�i rigs pa), and reasoning [based on the rule-boundedness] of reality [itself] (dharmatāyukti: chos nyid kyi rigs pa), isparticularly interesting, for it existed in India prior to Dignāga andDharmakīrti, for the most part within the Maitreya-Asaṅga or Yogācāratextual milieu. Some of the earliest sources of the four yuktis may wellbe the Śrāvakabhūmi6 and Bodhisattvabhūmi7 (and not the Saṃdhinir-mocanasūtra,8 in spite of its sūtra status). The four yuktis are eithermerely alluded to or discussed in greater detail in these and other Indianworks. In Tibet, the topic seems to have been quite popular from earlyon, as the commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and the bKa�yang dag pa�i tshad ma ascribed to the Tibetan King Khri-srong-lde-btsan9 adequately demonstrate. One of the most detailed and systematicexplanations and applications of the four yuktis I have seen thus far,however, is that of the eleventh-century rNying-ma scholar Rong-zomChos-kyi-bzang-po (henceforth Rong-zom-pa),10 who evidently reliedon Candragomin�s Nyāyasiddhyāloka.11 Rong-zom-pa�s explanationsand applications of these four yuktis are very useful, containing as theydo intriguing deliberations on a number of ontological, epistemological,soteriological, and gnoseological issues.12 Although the four yuktis willnot be discussed in this article, it should be pointed out that earlyTibetan deliberations on theory of knowledge, including what I call therelativity theory of the purity and validity of perception, can best beunderstood at the backdrop of these four yuktis.

6 Śrāvakabhūmi (pp. 236.10�240.15).7 Bodhisattvabhūmi (p. 293.17�18).8 Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra X.7 (pp. 155�158).9 See Steinkellner 1989 and Powers 2004: 20, n. 43.

10 dKon mchog �grel (pp. 102.9�103.15); mDo rgyas (pp. 308.22�314.10); Theg tshul(pp. 487.20�491.20); sNang ba lhar sgrub (pp. 560.6�563.1). Mi-pham alsodiscussed the four yuktis on a number of occasions; see, for example, his mKhas �jug(pp. 296.3�300.4), his commentary on Madhyamakālaṃkāra 65 (dBu ma rgyan�grel, pp. 241.3�249.2), mDo sde rgyan �grel (pp. 667.2�668.4), Shes rab ral gri andShes rab ral gri�i mchan (pp. 790.1�792.4), and sKad gnyis shan sbyar (pp. 235.6�236.1). For the role Mi-pham envisioned for the four yuktis within the generalMahāyāna context, see his Legs bshad snang ba�i gter (p. 897.1�4). See alsoKapstein 2001: 317�343.

11 For a discussion of the authorship of the Nyāyasiddhyāloka, see Steinkellner 1984.12 Rang byung ye shes (pp. 124.21�125.22); dKon mchog �grel (pp. 103.15�109.9);

sNang ba lhar sgrub (pp. 563.1�567.6).


It was, however, only in the nineteenth century that the rNying-ma school managed to �colonise� the field of classical Buddhist logicand epistemology, primarily thanks to the efforts of Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846�1912),13 who became an authority in the fieldin his tradition. One of Mi-pham�s most significant contributions totheories of knowledge is his systematisation of the theory of two kindsof means of conventional valid cognition (i.e. cognition that has theconventional as its object) (kun tu tha snyad pa�i tshad ma: sāṃvyava-hārikapramāṇa),14 namely, one based on ordinary (lit. �of this-side,�i.e., this-worldly) perception (tshu rol mthong ba: arvāgdarśana/apara-darśana)15 and the other based on pure perception (dag pa�i gzigs pa:*śuddhadarśana).16 Mi-pham himself thought his theory to be a matterof great profundity (shin tu zab pa�i gnad) crucially relevant for bothtantric and non-tantric Buddhist systems. What can his motive forintroducing such a theory have been? Mi-pham was, like Tsong-kha-paBlo-bzang-grags-pa (1357�1419), a champion of the Pramāṇa andMadhyamaka systems, and he strongly believed in an intimate andnatural relationship between Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇa and Nāgārjuna�s

13 The few Pramāṇa works by Mi-pham are: (a) Tshad ma rnam �grel gyi gzhung gsalpor bshad pa legs bshad snang ba�i gter (MS, vol. 20, pp. 1�901); (b) Tshad ma kunlas btus pa�i mchan �grel rig [= rigs?] lam rab gsal snang ba (MS, vol. 8/hūṃ, pp.473�619); (c) Tshad ma rigs pa�i gter mchan gyis �grel pa phyogs las rnam parrgyal ba�i ru mtshon (MS, vol. 11/kha, pp. 549�751); and (d) bsDus tshan rtsod rigssmra ba�i sgo �byed (MS, vol. 27, pp. 285�353). See the bsTan pa�i mdzes rgyan (pp.676.5�677.2)�a work of mKhan-po Kun-bzang-dpal-ldan, or in short Kun-dpal(1872�1943), which includes some additional Pramāṇa writings of Mi-pham, ofwhich the Tshad ma rnam �grel gyi bsdus don nyi zla�i phreng ba seems particularlynoteworthy. For a discussion of Mi-pham�s theory of interpretation (as presented inhis Shes rab ral gri), see Kapstein 2001.

14 The term sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is attested in Prajñākaramati�s Bodhicaryā-vatārapañjikā (p. 180.25) and in Prajñākaragupta�s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (e.g.pp. 3.14, 5.23, 226.8). Cf. Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (p. 487.28): sāṃvyavahārikaṃpramāṇam. Prajñākaragupta also employs terms such as vyāvahārikapramāṇa (ibid.,p. 226.8) and sāṃvyavahārikapratyakṣa (ibid., p. 13.4). (I would like to thank EliFranco for drawing my attention to Prajñākaragupta�s work.) Note that Tibetansources also employ the expressions tha snyad dpyod pa�i tshad ma and tha snyad(pa�i/kyi) tshad ma.

15 Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 182.9, 13); Jackson 1987: 401, n. 103. Cf. Negi 1993�2005: s.v. tshu rol mthong ba.

16 Mi-pham, �Od gsal snying po (pp. 82.1�84.5) and Shes rab ral gri (pp. 800.3�801.4).


220 DORJ I WANGCHUK

Madhyamaka,17 or between the systems of the �Two Kīrtis,� namely,Dharmakīrti and Candrakīrti.18 Harmony between the doctrines ofDharmakīrti and Candrakīrti also meant for him harmony betweenYogācāra and Madhyamaka, and so too between the Nāgārjuna andMaitreya-Asaṅga traditions. The means of absolute valid cognition (i.e.cognition that has the absolute as its object) (don dam pa�i tshad ma:pāramārthikapramāṇa)19 emphasised by Nāgārjuna and the sāṃvyava-hārikapramāṇa emphasised by Dharmakīrti are often referred to as thetwo means of valid cognition of the two kinds of reality (bden pa gnyiskyi tshad ma gnyis).20 The explicit or implicit argument�analogous toDharmakīrti�s argument for the number of pramāṇas�is that becausethere are two kinds of prameya, namely, conventional and absoluterealities, there must be two kinds of pramāṇa, namely, sāṃvyavahārika-pramāṇa and pāramārthikapramāṇa.21 If something such as fire existson the conventional level, it must be attestable through sāṃvyavahāri-kapramāṇa for if it is not attestable through such a cognition, it cannotexist on the conventional level. Similarly, if there is an absolute realitysuch as emptiness, it must be attestable through pāramārthikapramāṇa,

17 Mi-pham, dBu ma rgyan �grel (p. 46.5�6): khyad par don dam pa�i tshad ma dpalldan klu yis ji ltar bzhed pa dang | tha snyad kyi tshad ma dpal chos kyi grags pas jiltar bzhed pa gnyis rags [= rigs] pa�i rgya mtsho chen por ro gcig tu bskyil zhing |.See also ibid. (p. 47.3): dbu tshad seng ge mjing bsnol.

18 See the intermediate verses (bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa) in the dBu ma rgyan�grel (pp. 13.6�15.2).

19 The term pāramārthikapramāṇa is attested, for example, in Prajñākaragupta�sPramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (p. 30.22; cited in Franco 1997: 50, n. 12). Cf. Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṃkāra (p. 67.12�13): pāramārthikaṃ pramāṇam. Prajñākaragupta alsoemploys the term pāramārthikaprameya (ibid., p. 215.13). Note that Tibetan sourcesalso use the term don dam dpyod pa�i tshad ma.

20 The terms tha snyad pa'i tshad ma and don dam pa'i tshad ma seem to go back tothe Pramāṇaviniścaya (p. 44.2�5): sāṃvyavahārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpamuktam | atrāpi pare mūḍhā visaṃvādayanti lokam iti | cintāmayīm eva tu prajñāmanuśīlayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyi pāramārthikapramāṇam abhimukhī-kurvanti |; Tibetan translation (Vetter 1966: 100.20�24): �di ni kun tu tha snyad pa�itshad ma�i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te | �di la yang pha rol rmongs pas �jig rten slubar byed pa�i phyir ro || bsam pa las byung ba nyid kyi shes rab goms par byas pasrnam par �khrul pas dben zhing dri ma med la log pa med pa don dam pa�i tshad mamngon sum du byed do ||. See also Mi-pham, Legs bshad snang ba�i gter (p. 553.14�17).

21 Such an argument is clearly inspired by Dignāga�s Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.2(Steinkellner 2005: 1) and Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇavārttika 3.1 (see the Pramāṇa-vārttikālaṃkāra, p. 169.10�11).


for reality that is not attestable through pāramārthikapramāṇa is not anabsolute reality. However, Mi-pham also belongs to a tradition thatpostulates the indivisibility of the two truths. Accordingly, he posits thatultimately there is only one single prameya,22 and hence only one singlepramāṇa, which he equates with self-occurring gnosis or with thegnosis of the Self-occurring One (i.e. the Buddha) (svayaṃbhūjñāna:rang byung gi ye shes). Tsong-kha-pa, when discussing, for example,Madhyamakāvatāra 6.71b, points out the consequence of denying theestablished Pramāṇa theories.23 He, for his part, apparently feared that adenial of the Pramāṇa theories would lead to logical, ontological,epistemological, and ethical-moral indeterminism (or arbitrariness), oras Thubten Jinpa in his study of Tsong-kha-pa�s Madhyamakaphilosophy correctly points out, to �epistemological scepticism,��ontological nihilism,� and �moral relativism,� all of which were forTsong-kha-pa different aspects of the same problem and equallyobjectionable.24 Mi-pham, too, could not imagine a world where thereare no reliable criteria to differentiate between valid and invalidcognition. If a cognition were to be arbitrarily regarded as valid orinvalid, how could one determine what is correct and incorrect, andwhat is right and wrong? He could thus in principle share Tsong-kha-pa�s concern.

Mi-pham, however, had a concern of another kind, which wasobviously not shared or addressed by his fellow Tibetan scholars fromthe gSar-ma (�New�) schools. The established epistemologicalparadigm, which is perhaps common to most Tibetan Buddhist schools,must have appeared too narrow and inadequate to him, for it did not andcould not address or explain Buddhist doctrines which he thought wereof greater significance. Buddhist scriptures are full of allusions to theideas of supernatural or supramundane phenomena or perceptions thatmake no sense to the ordinary human understanding. For instance, injust a single atom there are said to exist Buddha fields numbering as

22 For a similar idea, see Dharmakīrti�s Pramāṇavārttika 3.53d (as cited in thePramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra, p. 212.28): meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam.

23 Tsong-kha-pa, dGongs pa rab gsal (fol. 178b2�3): de ltar go ba de�i don yin parbzung nas tshad mas grub pa la yid brtan med do zhes smra na ni | don �di kho bos�di ltar rtogs so zhes pa gcig kyang gzhag tu med cing | tshad ma thams cad la skurpa �debs pas na shin tu mi �thad pa�o ||.

24 Jinpa 2002: 34, 175.

222 DORJ I WANGCHUK

many as the total number of atoms. It is even explicitly stated thatneither has the size of the Buddha fields been contracted nor the size ofthe atom expanded. How is one to deal with such an idea? Onealternative would be to dismiss it as mere rhetoric. Most Buddhistscholars would not go for this alternative. Another alternative would beto explain it as a miracle demonstrated by the supernatural power of abuddha, which de facto means that such a phenomenon or event is notattestable through any means of valid cognition. Some Tibetan scholarsmight accept this explanation. The problem with it, though, is theabsurd implications that it involves, particularly in a context where thesame entity �x� that appears to ordinary humans as water appears toyogins�who have fewer or no defilements or obscurations, whoundergo fewer or no sufferings, and are partially or totally released fromsaṃsāric bondage�as something else. At least from a Buddhist point ofview, the supposition that our ordinary perceptions, obscured byintellectual-emotional defilements, pain, sufferings, and bondage, arevalid or true, whereas yogic perceptions free from intellectual-emotional defilements, pain, sufferings, and bondage, are invalid orfalse sounds quite absurd and supercilious. Mi-pham�s motive thusseems to have been to propose an upgraded and updated theory thatcould explain otherwise logically unexplainable phenomena,particularly the idea of pure appearances and pure perceptions(thematised in both tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna scriptures).

3. MI-PHAM�S THEORY OF THE TWO KINDS OFSĀṂVYAVAHĀRIKAPRAMĀṆA

Mi-pham argues that there must be two types of sāṃvyavahārikapramā-ṇa, for any phenomenon on the conventional level has two modes,namely, the mode of appearance (snang tshul) and the mode ofexistence (gnas tshul). A conventional entity �x� such as water mayappear to be impure, but it always exists in a pure state; in its absolutemode of existence, however, it is always characterised by emptiness(śūnyatā: stong pa nyid).25 He thus classifies means of valid cognitioninto two types: sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa and pāramārthikapramāṇa.Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is further divided into one based on ordinary

25 Cf. the tables in Pettit 1999: 431�434.


perception (tshu rol mthong ba la brten pa kun tu tha snyad pa�i tshadma) and one based on pure perception (dag pa�i gzigs pa la brten pa kuntu tha snyad pa�i tshad ma). He distinguishes them on the basis of theircause (rgyu), nature (ngo bo), function (byed las), result (�bras bu), andexample (dpe), as follows:

Distinctions between the Two Types of Sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa

Basis ofDistinction

SāṃvyavahārikapramāṇaBased on Ordinary Perception(tshu rol mthong ba la brtenpa kun tu tha snyad pa�i tshadma)

SāṃvyavahārikapramāṇaBased on Pure Perception (dagpa�i gzigs pa la brten pa kun tutha snyad pa�i tshad ma)

1. Cause(rgyu)

Given rise to by dint of acorrect assessment of its lim-ited object, the [perceptible]phenomenon (rang yul choscan nyi tshe ba la tshul bzhinbrtags pa�i stobs las skyes pa)

Acquired as an outcome of thecorrect appropriation of truereality [during meditative ab-sorption] (chos nyid ji lta batshul bzhin dmigs pa�i rjes las�thob pa)

2. Nature(ngo bo)

Cognition that is provisionallynon-deceptive in regard to itsmere object (rang yul tsam lagnas skabs mi bslu ba�i rigpa)

Discriminating insight of greatrange possessed by a subject[surveying] the full gamut [ofphenomena] (ji snyed pa�i yulcan rgya che ba�i shes rab)

3. Function(byed las)

Elimination of superimposi-tion [and depreciation] in re-gard to the objects of ordinaryperception (tshul [= tshu rol]mthong gi yul la sgro �dogssel ba)

Elimination of superimposition[and depreciation] in regard tothe [normally] inconceivable do-main (bsam gyis mi khyab pa�ispyod yul la sgro �dogs sel ba)

4. Result(�bras bu)

Proceeding on after thepertinent object has beenexactly determined (skabs donyongs su bcad nas �jug pa)

Gnosis that cognises [phenom-ena] to the full extent (ji snyedmkhyen pa�i ye shes)

5. Analogy(dpe)26

Human sight (mi�i mig) Celestial sight (lha�i mig)

Mi-pham presented these two types of sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa on atleast two occasions, namely, in his general commentary on the*Guhyagarbhatantra (a fundamental tantric scripture of the rNying-maschool) called �Od gsal snying po, and in his work on hermeneutics

26 Not counted separately by Mi-pham.

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called Shes rab ral gri, on which he also wrote an annotatedcommentary.27 One important question is how original Mi-pham wasand how much he owed to his Indian and Tibetan predecessors. As faras I can see, no one before him had proposed and explained two kindsof sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa. On the other hand, although the Sanskritterm for dag pa gzigs pa�i tshad ma (*śuddhadarśanapramāṇa) has yetto be traced in Indian sources,28 the idea of pure perception(śuddhapratyakṣa: dag pa�i mngon sum) is attested in the Hetuvidyāsection of the Yogācārabhūmi29 as shown by Hōjun Nagasaki in hisarticle �Perception in Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts,�30 where it is listedand explained as one of the four kinds of pratyakṣa, the other threebeing perception by means of corporeal sense faculties (rūpīndriya-pratyakṣa: dbang po gzugs can gyi mgnon sum), perception [in theform] of mental experience (manonubhavapratyakṣa: yid kyis myongba�i mngon sum), and mundane perception (lokapratyakṣa: �jig rten gyimngon sum). Nagasaki interprets śuddhapratyakṣa in two ways: (a) asmanonubhavapratyakṣa and (b) as lokottarajñāna. One wonderswhether śuddhapratyakṣa could have meant both pure mundane gnosis(śuddhalaukikajñāna: dag pa �jig rten pa�i ye shes) and non-conceptualgnosis (nirvikalpajñāna: rnam par mi rtog pa�i ye shes). In Tibetansources, the idea of means of pure valid cognition occurs primarily inthe context of what is called �establishing the divinity of appearance�(snang ba lhar sgrub pa), that is, establishing the supramundaneness ofthe very mundane, the divinity of the very earthly�according to Mi-pham, a uniquely rNying-ma concern, which stems from the eleventh-century rNying-ma scholar Rong-zom-pa, and is described by him asthe �Lion�s Roar� (seng ge�i nga ro) of this scholar.31 Indeed Mi-pham�stheory of pure sāṃvyavahārikapramāṇa is clearly largely inspired by

27 �Od gsal snying po (pp. 82.1�84.5); Shes rab ral gri (pp. 800.3�801.4).28 Compare the expression pramāṇapariśuddhasakalatattvajña in the Pramāṇavārtti-

kālaṃkāra (p. 51.22).29 Hetuvidyā (p. 340.2�13).30 Nagasaki 1991: 223�225.31 Mi-pham, Nges shes sgron me (p. 103.4�5):

snang kun rang bzhin lhar sgrub pa ||snga �gyur ring lugs kho na ste ||kun mkhyen rong zom paṇḍi ta�i ||legs bshad seng ge�i nga ro yin ||.

For an English translation, see Pettit 1999: 222.



Rong-zom-pa�s writings, particularly those passages attempting toestablish the divinity of appearance.32

4. RONG-ZOM-PA ON ONTOLOGY, EPISTEMOLOGY, SOTERIOLOGY,GNOSEOLOGY, AND THE INDIVIDUALITY OF PERSONS

Undoubtedly Rong-zom-pa�s work on establishing the divinity ofappearances is unprecedented in the world of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism.He is said to have composed a set of seven works of varying size, whatone might call his �heptalogy,� on the establishment of the divinity ofappearances, of which only one is extant.33 The fundamental ideabehind the establishment of the divinity of appearances is thatphenomena, which appear to us in manifold ways, are in realityprimordially pure regardless of whether we perceive them as such ornot. One of Rong-zom-pa�s main arguments is that a dharma (�phenol-menon�) can hardly be impure if its dharmatā (�true reality�) is pure,for there is an essential connection between dharma and dharmatā.Both dharma and dharmatā are thus pure, and hence also divine. Forhim, then, divinity means purity. Where could Rong-zom-pa have gotthis idea from? The proposition that all phenomena are completely pureis widespread in tantric and non-tantric Mahāyāna literature. Inparticular, it plays a dominant role in the *Guhyagarbhatantra, atradition to which Rong-zom-pa belonged, and wherein the so-called (a)external world or habitat (snod), comprising five elements, (b) itsinhabitants (bcud), made up of five psycho-physiological aggregates(phung po), and (c) mental continua (rgyud), a set of eight kinds of�mind� (rnam par shes pa tshogs brgyad), are all said to be pure, thepurities of the external habitat (snod dag pa), its inhabitants (bcud dagpa), and the mental continua (rgyud dag pa) being referred to as �threekinds of purity� (dag pa rnam pa gsum).34 The central philosophy of the*Guhyagarbhatantra is that all phenomena are in their conventionalitycharacterised by great purity (dag pa chen po) and in their absoluteness

32 For Mi-pham�s own efforts to establish the divinity of appearance, see his �Od gsalsnying po (pp. 77.2�97.1).

33 See Rong-pa Me-dpung�s list of Rong-zom-pa�s writings (Tho yig, p. 239.5�6):snang ba lha sgrub che phra bdun du grags pa la sogs pa dag yin te |. See alsoAlmogi 1997: 248�249; 170�171.

34 Rong-zom-pa, dKon mchog �grel (p. 184.1�6).

226 DORJ I WANGCHUK

by great equality (mnyam pa chen po), and that the two modes arecharacterised by great indivisibility (dbyer med pa chen po). One of themain devices employed to establish such propositions is the four kindsof reasoning referred to above.

We may now set the theory proposed by Rong-zom-pa in thewider context of his assessment of the Mahāyāna doctrine. Broadlyspeaking, Mahāyāna Buddhism can be classified into tantric and non-tantric, although the borderline tends to be quite fluid or permeable.One generally assumes that non-tantric Mahāyāna is doctrinally moreconservative than tantric Mahāyāna. This is, however, not always thecase, inasmuch as some sūtras contain ideas that are more developedthan those found in certain tantras. This may help to explain why Rong-zom-pa occasionally�for example, in his dKon mchog �grel�speaks ofcommon (thun mong) and uncommon or special (thun mong ma yin pa)Mahāyāna. A distinction between the two is clearly made in accordancewith the degree of doctrinal conservatism. By �special Mahāyāna,� hemeans a school of Buddhist thought which postulates the idea of theindivisibility of the two kinds of truth (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyermed pa), that is, the idea that there is in reality one single truth, and thatits division into conventional and absolute is merely a device forenabling access to that single truth. This �special Mahāyāna� of Rong-zom-pa includes both tantric and non-tantric forms. To the group ofscriptures of the �special Mahāyāna� belong both sūtras, such as theVimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra and Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā, and tantras, suchas the *Guhyagarbhatantra. According to him, the �special Mahāyāna�is special for five reasons, which may be explicated as follows:35

(a) It is special because it proposes a special kind of ontology.Specifically, the only viable ontological reality is what the author calls�mere appearance� (snang ba tsam), behind the facade of which there isnothing. Even this �mere appearance� may or may not enduredepending upon the presence or absence of necessary and sufficientcauses and conditions.(b) It is special because it proposes a special kind of soteriology.According to this special soteriological model, one sees and seeks asolution in the problem itself, nirvāṇa in saṃsāra itself; release in

35 dKon mchog �grel (pp. 42.2�43.13). For a critical edition of the pertinent text and anEnglish translation, see Almogi 2006: 468�470 (text), 319�322 (translation).


bondage itself. In other words, the very duḥkhasatya is seen as anirodhasatya; the very samudayasatya as a mārgasatya.(c) It is special because it proposes a special kind of gnoseology. Seeing(or, knowing) the gnosis through which release is attained (vimukti-jñānadarśana: rnam par grol ba�i ye shes mthong ba)36 is special,because this gnosis is not conceived as something that can be attained orgenerated at a certain stage, place, and time but as being immanent hereand now, for our ordinary minds and mental associates are by natureself-occurring gnosis (svayaṃbhūjñāna: rang byung gi ye shes).(d) It is special because it proposes a special kind of epistemology. Itoffers, that is, a unique theory of perception in regard to the scope andvalidity of the various human and non-human, yogic and non-yogicperceptions. This is one of the sources feeding into the relativity theoryof the purity and validity of perception. We shall return to it later.(e) I am not sure how best the fifth aspect of the special Mahāyāna canbe expressed. The author apparently alludes to a special spiritualproclivity or disposition within the person, namely, the uniqueness ofhis or her cognitive, conative, and emotive faculty which allows accessto the so-called �non-dual mode� (gnyis su med pa�i tshul), clearlymeaning the indivisibility of the two kinds of truth referred to above.

5. THE PHILOSOPHICAL-DOCTRINAL PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE THEORY

The theory of the purity and validity of perception proposed by Rong-zom-pa can perhaps be best understood against the backdrop of threekinds of presuppositions, namely, his concept of ontology, soteriology,and epistemology. I employ the term �perception� in the sense of theTibetan terms mthong ba (or gzigs pa) and snang ba. Tibetan mthong baseems to mean primarily the �perception of an appearance� andsecondarily the �perceived or perceptible appearance� whereas snangba seems to mean primarily �perceived or perceptible appearance,� andsecondarily �perception of an appearance.� A direct ontic-epistemiccorrespondence between appearance and perception is presupposed bymost Tibetan scholars, since only that which is ontologically possible isepistemically cognisable; and only that which appears is perceived orperceptible.

36 Negi 1993�2005: s.v.

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(a) The Ontological Presuppositions of the Theory

One cannot talk about the theory of perception or knowledge if noknowable or perceptible is presupposed. Various Buddhist systems mayargue about the ontological status of the knowable, but I would assertthat within the Buddhist systems one tacitly assumes that there is a kindof reality, or nature to phenomena (whatever it may be) that iscognisable, timeless, and independent of being cognised and the personwho cognises it.37 It is said that buddhas may come and go, but the truthremains as it is (yathābhūtam), unaffected by its occasional rediscoveryor oblivion. This idea can be found in non-Mahāyāna sources (such asthe Saṃyuttanikāya and Aṅguttaranikāya), in non-tantric Mahāyānaliterature (such as the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra,and Jñānālokālaṃkārasūtra), and tantric sources (such as theVairocanābhisaṃbodhitantra).38 As we have just seen, for Rong-zom-pa, the only ontological reality is what he calls �mere appearance�(snang ba tsam). It is conceived of as being totally hollow, without anydefining characteristics whatsoever, rootless, bottomless, invariable, andsoteriologically neutral, and yet it is (i) the only viable basis forbondage and release, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa;39 (ii) the basis of definingcharacteristics (mtshan gzhi), that is, the basis for assigning variousdefining characteristics (mtshan nyid sna tshogs),40 (iii) the only viablepremise allowing for a dialogue between sentient beings of the sixrealms; yogins and non-yogins; experts and non-experts; (iv) the onlyviable shared object of independent perceptions.

37 See Vetter�s remark in Bsteh 2000: 48.38 For the universality of reality and its being independent of the appearance of a

tathāgata in both non-Mahāyāna and Mahāyāna sources, see Wangchuk 2007: 41�42, 78, n. 24.

39 Rong-zom-pa, Theg tshul (p. 513.4�6): mdor na gzhi gcig la rnam par dag pa�i �jigrten du snang ba dang | ma dag pa�i �jig rten du snang ba ste | de la ma dag parsnang ba ni | bslad pas bsgribs pa yin no zhe�o ||; ibid. (p. 513.20�22): snang ba denyid kyang byang grol dang �ching ba gnyis ga�i rkyen du �gyur bar mnyam pas |tshul gnyi� ga ltar yang bsgrub du [= tu] rung bar snang ngo ||; ibid. (p. 522.4�5):snang ba la skyon med na sems can gang gis bslus te �khor zhe na |.

40 Rong-zom-pa, Theg tshul (p. 465.20�24): snang ba tsam ni mkhas pa paṇ ṭi [= ḍi] tanas blun mo [= po] ba glang rdzi yan chad gang yang rung ste | las kyi bsgo skal laspyod pa mthun par snang ba dang | yongs su dag pa dang ma dag pa la stsogs pasnang ba bye brag mthun pa rnams la snang ngo zhes bsgrub mi dgos te | mtshannyid sna tshogs rnam par �jog pa�i mtshan [= mtshon?] gzhi yin no || mtshan nyid niji ltar snang ba de ltar bsgrub pa rdul �phra� mo tsam yang myed do ||.


Why can a nondescript appearance appear as various specificappearances, such as pus, water, nectar, and so forth? Mi-pham�s mainargument is that where there is appearance-and-emptiness, everything ispossible, and where there is no appearance-and-emptiness, nothing ispossible.41 Except for a slight modification in the wording, this is a clearreference to Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.14, according to whicheverything is possible for anything that exists in harmony withemptiness.42 According to Rong-zom-pa,43 appearances (snang ba)appear (snang) on account of (a) the power of delusion (�khrul pa�idbang), (b) the power of self-cognition (rang rig pa�i dbang), and (c)the power of the non-origination of true reality (chos nyid skye ba medpa�i dbang). These three causes or factors of appearances (snang ba�irgyu/rkyen gsum) have been explained as follows: First, the power ofdelusion is for all practical purposes the diverse latent tendenciesimplanted in the ālayavijñāna (�fundamental mind�) by the deludedmind (�khrul pa�i shes pa). Second, the power of self-cognition isexplained as the ability of the mind to cognise itself; that is, mind, beingalways self-cognitive, is not an inanimate entity (bem po) and offers nophysical resistance (rdos can). If the mind were not self-cognitive ordevoid of any cognitive characteristics (shes rig gyi mtshan nyid dang

41 Mi-pham, Nges shes sgron me (p. 101.4�5):des na rang gi lugs la ni ||snang stong ris su ma chad pa�i ||gzhi nyid cir yang ma grub pa ||gang snang kun la mnyam pa�i phyir ||dngos gcig sna tshogs par yang snang ||gang la snang stong rung ba na ||de la thams cad rung bar �gyur ||gang la snang stong mi rung ba ||de la thams cad rung mi �gyur ||.

For an English translation, see Pettit 1999: 220�221.42 Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.14 (cf. Vigrahavyāvartanī 70). See, for

example, the Tshig don mdzod (pp. 7.3�29.2), where Klong-chen-pa discusses sevenpositions on the universal basis (gzhi), alluding thereby to several rDzogs-chentantras. It is explained that the universal basis is neither (1) spontaneously present(lhun grub), (2) indeterminate (ma nges pa), (3) determinate (nges pa), (4) malleable(cir yang bsgyur du btub pa), (5) arbitrary (cir yang khas blang du btub pa), nor (6)manifold (sna tshogs), but (7) primordially pure (ka dag). The primordially pureuniversal basis is said to consist of the three inseparable qualities of emptiness,luminosity, and all-embracing compassion.

43 Rang byung ye shes (pp. 120.16�123.21).


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bral ba zhig), nothing would appear. Third, the power of the non-origination of true reality is also explained as the natural and intrinsicpurity (rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa / ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par dagpa) of all phenomena. Phenomena, not being anything (cir yang ma yinpa), can appear in any way (cir yang snang du rung ba), for they aredevoid of resistance (gegs med pa).

Of the three factors of appearances, purity and the ability of themind to cognise itself are the dominant conditions for appearances ofboth �pollution� (saṃkleśa: kun nas nyon mongs pa) and �purification�(vyavadāna: rnam par byang ba). The latent tendencies form thegeneral conditions for the appearance of both pollution and purification.Nonetheless, those appearances that are caused by negative latenttendencies (nag po�i bag chags) are called deceptive (slu ba), untrue (mibden pa), fallacious (�khrul pa), and unreliable (yid brtan du mi rungba), whereas those appearances that are caused by positive latenttendencies (dkar po�i bag chags) are called non-deceptive (mi slu ba),true (bden pa), non-fallacious (ma �khrul pa), and reliable (yid brtan durung ba). Although none of the appearances is ultimately true (yang dagpar bden pa), the less deceptive ones are provisionally regarded as non-deceptive by the wise, for they are non-deceiving to the extent that theybring about salvation.

(b) The Soteriological Presuppositions of the Theory

The main soteriological presupposition of the theory is that at least inprinciple anybody, at any given point in time and space, can gain fullaccess to true reality by means of meditative insight, and the correctcognition or insightful penetration of the truth has a soteriological orsalvific effect on the person who cognises or penetrates it. In otherwords, a person is liberated by gaining meditative insight into the truth.For most Buddhist scholars and mystics, it is the correct cognition oftrue reality, regardless of how it is defined by the various Buddhistsystems, that makes the spiritual or soteriological breakthroughpossible, and that the gnosis (jñāna: ye shes) of a buddha is by defini-tion direct valid cognition (pramāṇa: tshad ma). This notion of releaseupon seeing true reality is found in tantric sources such as the Caryā-melāpakapradīpa, and also in non-tantric Mahāyāna sources such as the


Abhisamayālaṃkāra and Ratnagotravibhāga.44 According to Rong-zom-pa, release upon seeing true reality is an idea common to all Buddhistsystems,45 which implies that the actual spiritual breakthrough inBuddhism is intellectual and not emotional.46

(c) The Epistemological Presuppositions of the Theory

The basic epistemological assumption is that a variety of perceptions ofone and the same entity �x� is possible. If all sentient beings of the sixrealms (or yogins and non-yogins) were to perceive an entity or reality�x� in an identical way, there would be no need for a dialogue. Themain point of divergence among sentient beings of the six realms (oryogins and non-yogins) is the characteristics of a so-called �mereappearance� as it appears to various beings in various degrees ofimpurity and purity. Rong-zom-pa explains that (1) hungry ghostsperceive water as extremely impure (shin tu ma dag par snang); (2)human beings as somewhat impure (cung zad ma dag par snang), (3)individuals of the pure realms as pure (dag par snang), (4) yogins orvidyādharas (�knowledge bearers�), who have command overphenomena, as extremely pure (shin tu dag par snang), and that (5)those who have exhausted all latent tendencies, clearly meaningbuddhas, are free from all appearances (snang ba thams cad dang bral),since for them all manifoldness has undergone complete cessation(spros pa thams cad yongs su zhi bar gyur). If all these perceptions wereequally valid or invalid, it would mean that there would be nothing thatone could call reality. If there were no such standard as the validity orinvalidity of perception, there would be no incentive for a dialogue.Rong-zom-pa thus rejects the arbitrariness of perceptual validity.

6. THE THEORY

Rong-zom-pa�s position is that in general no perception isindependently valid or invalid. Depending on the varying degree of

44 For several primary sources, see Wangchuk 2007: 199�200, n. 11.45 bDen gnyis �jog tshul (p. 32.6�8): �di ltar nyan thos kyi theg pa nas gzhi bzung nas |

rdzogs pa chen po�i mthar thug gi bar du | gang zhig yang dag pa�i don mthong narnam par grol lo zhes thun mong du grags pa yin la |.

46 See also Wangchuk 2007: 43�45, 199�200.

232 DORJ I WANGCHUK

purity and impurity of perception, there is only a relative validity ofperception; that is, the human perception of appearance �x� as water ispure, and thus valid, when compared to the preta�s perception of it aspus, but is impure when compared to the god�s perception of it asnectar, and thus invalid. The most maculate and thus the most invalidperception of all is that of a hell-being, whereas the most immaculateand thus the most valid perception of all is that of one who is subject tono obscuration whatsoever. It is this theory that I call the relativitytheory of the purity and validity of perception, and it can be formulatedas: �The validity of perception is directly proportional to the purity ofperception.�47

7. THE INDIAN BACKGROUND OF THE THEORY

While Rong-zom-pa certainly deserves credit for suggesting that thedegree of purity of perception determines the degree of its validity, it isclear that he drew his inspiration from Indian sources, particularlyregarding the validity of yogic versus non-yogic perceptions. The ideathat the perception of a person who has attained salvific release caninvalidate the perception of a person who is still bound can also befound in several Indian sources. For example, Candrakīrti argued that anon-yogin who has no gnosis and is not released is not an authority, andthat if this were not the case, it would imply that such a person hasperceived true reality and eliminated ignorance, and this in turn would

47 Rong-zom-pa, dKon mchog �grel (p. 43.6�7): �It should be known that if oneevaluates objectively, the purer these perceptions (snang ba), the truer (bden pa)[they are]� (gzu bo�i blos gzhal na snang ba de dag kyang ji lta ji ltar dag pa de ltade ltar bden par shes par bya�o ||). Ibid. (p. 104.4�7): �If these are evaluated with anobjective mind, the purer the perceptions (mthong ba), the truer (bden pa) [they are],inasmuch as [the objects of valid perceptions] are objects [perceived by] the lordsamong those who have purified the obscurations (āvaraṇa: sgrib pa), and because[perceptions] are relatively (ltos te rnam par bzhag na) enduring and non-deceiving(brtan zhing mi bslu ba)� (de rnams la gzu bo�i blos gzhal bar byas na | ji ltar ji ltarmthong ba dag pa de ltar de ltar bden pa yin te | sgrib pa�i dri ma dag pa rnams kyidbang po rnams kyi yul yin pa�i phyir dang | ltos te rnam par bzhag na brtan zhingmi bslu ba�i phyir ro ||). Ibid. (p. 105.2�3): �� if an objective assessment is made, as[stated] above, the [degree of] correctness corresponds to the [degree of] purity� (�gzu bo�i blos rnam par gzhag na | ji ltar dag pa ltar rig [= rigs] pa che ba ni snga mabzhin no ||).


imply the redundancy of the spiritual paths of the noble ones (ārya-mārga: �phags pa�i lam).48 That an undefiled cognition of a yogin caninvalidate the defiled cognition of a non-yogin and not vice versa hasbeen clearly stated by him in his Madhyamakāvatāra:49

The perception of eyes with a timira [disorder]Does not invalidate the perception [of eyes] without a timira [disorder].Similarly, a cognition that is devoid of immaculate gnosisDoes not invalidate an immaculate cognition.

He also states that only the gnosis of a buddha, and not other types ofgnosis, given their limitation (ekadeśatva: nyi tshe ba nyid), can bepratyakṣa.50 Veridical relativism is also suggested by Śāntideva in hisBodhicaryāvatāra 9.3�4ab. According to him, people (loka: �jig rten)are of two kinds: ordinary people (prākṛtako lokaḥ: �jig rten phal pa)and people who are yogins (yogiloka: rnal �byor �jig rten). Theperception or knowledge (dhī: blo) of the ordinary world can beinvalidated by that of the yogiloka, but not vice versa, as made explicitby Prajñākaramati.51 A qualitative distinction is also made among theperceptions of the various yogins, with the perceptions of the moreadvanced yogins successively able to invalidate the perceptions of theless advanced yogins. Following this logic, buddhajñāna, or theyogipratyakṣa of a buddha, will certainly be assumed to be the supremecognition that can invalidate the perceptions of all yogins who have notyet attained Buddhahood.52 In particular, Mañjuśrīmitra�s Bodhicitta-bhāvanā and Bodhicittabhāvanānirdeśa (also attributed to him) seem tohave directly inspired Rong-zom-pa.53

48 Candrakīrti, Madhyamakāvatāra 6.30.49 Madhyamakāvatāra 6.27:

mig ni rab rib can gyi dmigs pa yis ||rab rib med shes la gnod min ji ltar ||de bzhin dri med ye shes spangs pa�i blos ||dri med blo la gnod pa yod ma yin||.

50 Madhyamakāvatāra 6.214.51 Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (p. 158.11).52 Cf. Nāgārjuna, Ratnāvalī 4.91.53 Bodhicittabhāvanā (P, fols. 2b7�3a2; D, fol. 2b1�3; S, vol. 33, pp. 810.18�811.5);

Bodhicittabhāvanānirdeśa (P, fol. 59a5�b5; D, fol. 48a1�7; S, vol. 33, pp. 188.20�189.20). See particularly the latter (P, fol. 59a8; D, fol. 48a3; S, vol. 33, p. 189.6�7):sems can gyis mthong ba rnams ni �khrul pa yin par mngon no ||; ibid. (P, fol. 59b5;D, fol. 48a7; S, vol. 33, p. 189.18�20): de ltar sems can gyis mthong ba rnams ni rig

234 DORJ I WANGCHUK

8. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We have seen that the only feasible ontology for Rong-zom-pa is mereappearance, which is rootless, unrestricted, invariable, soteriologicallyneutral, and yet the only viable basis for saṃsāra and nirvāṇa.Strikingly, for him, mere appearance, like a mirage, operates inaccordance with the principle of dependent origination (rten cing �brelbar �byung ba: pratītyasamutpāda). Depending on the presence orabsence of causes and conditions, it may appear or disappear. What hedoes seem to posit is the sphere in which the mere appearance operates,namely, the dharmadhātu, the sphere of reality itself, just as he positsthe space in which mirages appear or disappear. According to hisepistemology, a mere appearance may be perceived as extremelyimpure, somewhat impure, pure, extremely pure, or not perceived at all,and the degree of the purity of perception determines the degree of itsvalidity. Here the person by whom mere appearance is not perceived atall is a buddha, whose gnosis (if it exists at all)54 represents the upperlimit of the perceptual scale. Just as a mirage is an optical illusion andthe perception of it a perceptual delusion, a mere appearance is anillusion, and the perception of it, no matter how pure or impure,ultimately a mere delusion. A buddha, being free from all delusions,perceives no illusions. Not perceiving an optical illusion such as amirage in the open air may be designated as seeing space. Similarly, notperceiving any mere appearance in the dharmadhātu, the sphere ofreality, is clearly designated as perceiving the dharmadhātu.


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54 On the Indian and Tibetan controversies on whether a buddha possesses gnosis(jñāna: ye shes), see Almogi 2006.



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O R N A A L M O G I

The Materiality and Immanence of Gnosis inSome rNying-ma Tantric Sources*

1. INTRODUCTION

In certain rNying-ma (�Ancient�) tantric sources one finds the notionthat gnosis is immanent in the human body, or more precisely, in thecentre of the heart. From the description of gnosis found in thesesources (i.e. as having, for example, colours and shapes), one gets theimpression that the gnosis abiding in the body is in a way understood asa material entity. In this paper I shall attempt to present what may becalled the meta-physiology of this gnosis and its abode as conceived inthese sources. First of all I shall briefly look into the perception and roleof the human body in Buddhism in general, and then discuss shortly theconcept of the inherence and immanence of gnosis and thesoteriological goal and models relevant to the discussion. This will befollowed by a discussion of gnosis itself, which is conceived of as afocal point of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa that is laid bare at some criticalmoments such as death, and if recognised could trigger the collapse ofthe entire saṃsāric machinery.

2. THE PERCEPTION AND ROLE OF THE HUMAN BODY IN BUDDHISM

In non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, the psycho-physiological complex of aperson comprising five aggregates (phung po lnga: pañcaskandha) isconsidered impure, impermanent, painful, and non-substantial. Inparticular, the human body is perceived as consisting of thirty-siximpure substances1 and is often meditated upon on the basis of nine

* I would like to express my thanks to Prof. Eli Franco for his useful comments and toPhilip Pierce for proofreading this paper.

1 These impure substances (mi gtsang ba�i rdzas) are various bodily parts and fluids�hair, nails, flesh, bones, bladder, liver, pus, blood, excrement, and the like. The listof thirty-six, however, varies slightly from one source to another. See, for example,the lists found in the Śikṣāsamuccaya, p. 209.3�11 (a translation is found in Bendall

242 ORNA ALMOGI

notions of repulsive [objects], that is, by imagining the various stages ofthe decomposition of the body.2 Such meditation is clearly intended tocombat one of the numerous intellectual-emotional defilements (nyonmongs pa: kleśa)�the greatest challenge for the seekers of salvation inBuddhism�namely, attachment, particularly to one�s body and thebodies of others. In Mahāyāna, the human body is also conceived of asillusory and empty. Nonetheless, despite an apparent negative attitudetowards the human body, the usefulness of the body has beenrecognised as being the basis for human existence, which latter enablesone to tread the path to salvation. The Buddha�s teachings areconsidered as mere aids with the help of which one is to cross the riverof saṃsāra and are thus often compared to a boat that one leaves behindafter crossing the river.3 This analogy is occasionally also employed inthe case of the human body�for example, in Śāntideva�s Bodhicaryā-vatāra, where it is stated that a bodhisattva should view his body asbeing like a boat and use it to fulfill the needs of living beings.4 In thetantric context, the human body, which plays now a greater role,particularly in the so-called higher tantric systems, is often compared to

& Rouse 1922: 202); Arthaviniścayasūtra, pp. 23.5�24.4 (reference to furthersources and a short discussion of the development of the list and differencesbetween existing lists are provided by the editor in n. 9), and p. 41, where a slightlydifferent list is given. Note that most of these substances are included in the list ofbodily parts found in the Mahāvyutpatti, nos. 3929�4065.

2 The nine kinds of meditation on repulsive [objects] (mi sdug pa sgom pa: aśubha-bhāvanā), also referred to as nine notions of repulsive [objects] (mi sdug pa�i �dushes dgu), are listed in the Mahāvyutpatti (nos. 1155�1164) as follows: (1) thenotion of a bluish [corpse] (rnam par (b)sngos pa�i �du shes: vinīlakasaṃjñā), (2)the notion of a putrefying [corpse] (rnam par rnags pa�i �du shes: vidhūtika/vipūyaka-saṃjñā), (3) the notion of a maggot-infested [corpse] (rnam par �busgzhig/ bzhigs pa�i �du shes: vipaḍumakasaṃjñā), (4) the notion of a decomposing[corpse] (rnam par bam pa�i/�ber ba�i �du shes: vyādhmātakasaṃjñā), (5) the notionof a reddish [corpse] (rnam par dmar ba�i �du shes: vilohitakasaṃjñā), (6) the notionof a devoured [corpse] (rnam par zos ba�i �du shes: vikhāditakasaṃjñā), (7) thenotion of a lacerated [corpse] (rnam par mthor ba�i �du shes: vikṣiptakasaṃjñā), (8)the notion of a burned [corpse] (rnam par tshig pa�i �du shes: vidagdhakasaṃjñā),and (9) the notion of a skeleton (rus gong gi �du shes: asthisaṃjñā). See also BHSD,s.v. aśubhabhāvanā, where several sources are provided.

3 For references, see Almogi 2009: 272, n. 98.4 Bodhicaryāvatāra 5.70. See Steinkellner 1981: 57 (for a German translation of the

pertinent verse) and Crosby & Skilton 1995: 40 (for an English translation). See alsoCatuḥśataka 2.1 (Lang 1986: 32 (Tibetan text) and 33 (English translation)).

MATERIALITY AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS 243

a boat, here, however, in a somewhat different sense; that is, the bodyitself is now to be steered to reach the shore of salvation.5 One of thearguments offered by some Tibetan Buddhist authors for the essentialityof a human body for tantric practices is the indispensability of a bodyendowed with the six elements (khams drug gi bdag nyid can: ṣaḍdhātv-ātmaka),6 which only a human body is said to possess.7 This isapparently because the so-called �white� and �red� bodhicitta, that is,the male �semen� and female �blood,� which are substances which onlya body endowed with the six elements can possess are necessary for the�secret empowerment� (gsang ba�i dbang: guhyābhiṣeka) and �insight-gnosis empowerment� (shes rab ye shes kyi dbang: prajñājñānābhiṣe-ka).8 One finds different lists of these six elements. The most commonis that of the six (cosmic) elements found already in Pāli sources whichinclude earth, water, fire, wind, space, and the mental element.9 In thetantric context, one occasionally finds a slightly different list in whichthe mental element (rnam par shes pa�i khams: vijñānadhātu) isreplaced with �gnostic element� (ye shes kyi khams: jñānadhātu).10

5 For examples of the analogy of a boat with the human body in the tantric context,see Dasgupta 1962: 44�45 & 90, where several songs by tantric adepts are translatedand discussed.

6 See Negi 1993�2005, s.v. khams drug gi bdag nyid can, where the Vimalaprabhā isgiven as a source. See also Vajragarbha�s Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā 6.73d (Shendge2004: 44; Tibetan: 123.13), where the expression ṣaḍdhātukaṃ kulam (khams drugrig can) is employed.

7 See Mi-pham�s bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 65.4�66.2), where the necessity of aphysical body endowed with six elements for the practice of Vajrayāna is discussed.

8 For a discussion of �white� and �red� bodhicitta, see the section on what has beendesignated by Dorji Wangchuk �psycho-physiological bodhicitta� in Wangchuk2007: 217�225.

9 See, for example, Majjhima Nikāya iii 63 (an English translation is found in Horner1959: 105; Ñāṇamoli & Bodhi 1995: 926, §5), where also other lists of six elementsare provided. For a discussion of these six (cosmic) elements, see Langer 2001,chap. 6, which however focuses on the mental element (viññāṇa).

10 Tshig mdzod chen mo, s.v. khams drug ldan: nam mkha�| rlung| me| chu| sa| ye sheskyi khams rnams ldan pa�i mi�i lus rten gsang sngags rdo rje theg pa sgrub pa�i snoddu rung ba|. See also Negi 1993�2005, s.v. ye shes kyi khams, where references tothe Vimalaprabhā are given. Cf. Vajragarbha�s Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā 6.73�74(Shendge 2004: 44; Tibetan, 123.12�15), where the six elements mentioned consistof the four great elements�earth, water, fire and wind�and in addition semen(śukra: khu ba) and (menstrual) blood (rajas: rdul), and where jñānadhātu is alsomentioned, but not as one of the six. This source is cited by Mi-pham in his Dus�khor �grel pa (p. 710.3�4). Semen and (menstrual) blood are commonly considered

244 ORNA ALMOGI

The tantric attitude towards the human body is generally more positivethan the one found in non-tantric Buddhism. The body is now conceivedof as a microcosm containing the entire universe, is meditativelyenvisioned as the pure (though illusory) body of a deity, and is not to beabused in any way.11 Most important of all, the body is considered theabode of gnosis, the attainment of which is the soteriological goal of allBuddhist vehicles and the unfolding of which is often referred to in thetantric context as great bliss.12

3. THE INHERENCE AND IMMANENCE OF GNOSIS

Normally, gnosis is conceived of as a liberating insight that is acquiredby a yogin by sheer dint of sustained and correct meditative practices onthe path, which culminates with the gnosis of a buddha.13 Yet oneencounters not only the concept of acquired (or transcendental) gnosis,but also the concept of inherent (or immanent) gnosis, which ischangeless. This idea is greatly underscored by the rNying-ma tantrictraditions, and such rDzogs-chen expressions as �gnosis that abides on

in Indian works, including Buddhist ones, procreatory elements stemming from thefather and mother, respectively (Das 2003: 3�5, §1.5 and 14�29, where the problemof identifying the female fluid is discussed). This reminds one of yet another list ofsix elements, that is, bone, marrow, and semen, inherited from one�s father, andflesh, skin, and blood, inherited from one�s mother recorded in the Tshig mdzodchen mo (s.v. mngal skyes khams drug: �dzam bu gling pa�i mi mngal skyes rnamsma�i mngal du tshang bar ldan pa�i khams drug ste pha las thob pa�i rus pa dang|rkang| khu ba bcas gsum dang| ma las thob pa�i sha dang| pags pa| khrag bcas drug|).This list more or less corresponds to the list of seven elements commonly listed inIndian (medical) works which has in addition the �nutrient fluid� or �chyle� (rasa-dhātu), and �fat� instead of �skin� (Das 2003: 19�20, § 2.4); �skin,� however, isoccasionally included as one of the seven elements, commonly replacing rasadhātu(ibid. pp. 273ff., §§10.7ff.). It is also reported that there is some confusion betweentwo lists found in tantric literature: one of seven, beginning with skin instead ofrasa, and of six, again having skin but lacking semen (ibid. p. 276, §10.8).

11 On the importance of the body in tantric practices, see Dasgupta 1962: 88�92;Snellgrove 1987: 288�294.

12 bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 43.6�44.3). On the notion of great bliss, see Almogi2009: 134�137.

13 It may be noted that although teachings on the gnosis of the Buddha or a buddhapervade the diverse Buddhist scriptures, the true existence of such a gnosis has beena subject of debate among Buddhist scholars, particularly in Mādhyamika circles.For more on this issue, see Almogi 2009.



the [universal] ground� (gzhi gnas kyi ye shes) and �gnosis thatillumines from within� (nang gsal gyi ye shes) are quite popular. But theidea that gnosis abides and pervades the body can be found in a numberof Indian sources as well. For example, the Dharmadhātustavaattributed to one Nāgārjuna compares the gnosis which abides in thebody wrapped in kleśas to milk in a container that is mixed with water,and states that just as a goose is able to extract the milk from the water,so is a yogin able to mine the gnosis abiding in the body from within thekleśas. Similarly, the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, apparently roughly citingfrom the Dharmadhātustava, compares the gnosis abiding in the body toa lamp inside a pot that can shine without only if the pot is broken, andso the gnosis can manifest only when the body is �broken� with the helpof a master.14 Other sources, too, such as the Hevajratantra,15

Vajraghaṇṭa�s (or Ghaṇtāpāda�s) Cakrasaṃvarapañcakrama,16 the rDorje me long gi rgyud,17 and dPe chung rang gnas,18 a small work

14 See Wangchuk 2007: 202�203, where sources in which this idea is found, includingthe Dharmadhātustava, Hevajratantra, and Caryāmelāpakapradīpa, are provided.

15 The Hevajratantra is often cited in this connection by rNying-ma authors. See, forexample, the gSang bdag dgongs rgyan (p. 23.2�3), gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p.278.1�3), and bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (p. 61.3�4).

16 Cakrasaṃvarapañcakrama (p. 152.13�14):hṛdaye vartate nityaṃ bindur eko nirakṣaraḥ |tañ ca bhāvayatāṃ puṃsāṃ jñānam utpadyate dhruvam ||.I thank Prof. Harunaga Isaacson for drawing my attention to the Sanskrit version ofthis text. The Tibetan text reads (p. 160.8�11; P, fol. 261a5�6; D, fol. 225a5; S, vol.11, p. 569.15�17):

rtag tu snying la gnas pa yi||thig le gcig la �gyur med de||de sgom byed pa�i skye bo la||nges par ye shes skye bar �gyur||.

This verse is cited in the bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (p. 61.4).17 rDo rje me long gi rgyud (p. 536.5�6):

lus can snying la gang gnas pa�i||rang �byung zag med ye shes gzugs||mi shigs thig le bde chen po||nam mkha� lta bur kun khyab pa||mi gnas chos sku�i rang bzhin te||.

Cf. the citations in the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 429.1�2) and bKa� brgyadrnam bshad (p. 61.3�6).

18 dPe chung rang gnas (P, fol. 594a1; S, vol. 43, p. 1234.18�19):mi shigs ye shes thig le ni||sku gsung thugs kyi rdo rje�i bdag||

246 ORNA ALMOGI

attributed to Vilāsavajra, are often cited as scriptural support for theidea that this gnosis pervades the body and is changeless. The rDo rjeme long gi rgyud, for example, describes this inherent and immanentgnosis as self-occurring (rang byung), undefiled (zag med), anindestructible seminal drop (mi shigs thig le), great bliss (bde ba chenpo), pervasive in the same way as space (nam mkha� lta bur kun khyab),unfixed (mi gnas), and as having the nature of the dharmakāya (chossku�i rang bzhin). Likewise, the dPe chung rang gnas describes it as anindestructible gnostic seminal drop (mi shigs ye shes thig le), the natureof a buddha�s Body, Speech, and Mind, free from singularity andplurality, and as appearing in manifold ways, and so indeterminable.

The Buddha Nature (tathāgatagarbha) theory is employed todoctrinally legitimatize the inherence and immanence of gnosis withinone�s body,19 and indeed this gnosis is identified with the BuddhaNature itself.20 Such an idea, however, is not without its doctrinalproblems, particularly given its similarity to the non-Buddhist idea of aneternal �soul� (ātman). The problem becomes even more acute when theinherent and immanent gnosis, as we shall see later, is described interms of colours and shapes. One thus sees efforts on the part of rNying-ma scholars to distance the Buddhist idea of inherent and immanentgnosis from the non-Buddhist idea of an eternal soul.21

4. THE SOTERIOLOGICAL GOAL AND MODELS

The fact that gnosis is inherently and immanently present and pervasivein the body is in itself regarded as soteriologically irrelevant; that is,unless one explores and exploits this gnosis, one remains bound insaṃsāra and will continue to suffer. Gnosis should be elicited from thebody primarily by manipulating the physiological bases skilfully. Ifgnosis were not found within one�s body, it could not be elicited bysuch techniques, just as oil cannot be gained from sand or butter fromwater.

gcig dang du ma rnam spangs pa||sna tshogs snang ba mtshon du med||.

Cf. the citation in the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 429.2).19 See, for instance, the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 278.3�6).20 See, for example, Klong-chen-pa, Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 13b1): de bzhin

gshegs pa�i snying po chen po�ang de yin te|.21 See the gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, pp. 278.6�280.4).


Different tantric traditions may have one or more models forgaining access to the gnosis inherent and immanent in one�s body. Here,I should like to allude to the two tantric soteriological models found inthe rNying-ma tantric tradition, namely, the models of (1) �Way ofEfficient Strategy� (thabs lam) and (2) �Way of Release� (grol lam),primarily as presented by Mi-pham rNam-rgyal-rgya-mtsho (1846�1912) and rDo-grub �Jigs-med-bstan-pa�i-nyi-ma (1865�1926).22 In therNying-ma tradition, the sGyu �phrul rgya mtsho�i rgyud, regarded asthe explanatory tantra of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, is often quoted as ascriptural authority for the division into these two models.23 Thabs lamuses special yogic techniques called �striking at the core� (gnad dubsnun pa: marmaprahāra) of the physical bases (rten: ādhāra), namely,the channels (rtsa: nāḍī), vital winds (rlung: vāyu), and seminal drops(thig le: bindu), and as a result the gnosis emerges inevitably (btsanthabs su: haṭhena). This model is subdivided into two types, involving(a) the upper aperture (steng gi sgo: ūrdhvadvāra) and (b) the loweraperture (�og gi sgo: adhodvāra). Grol lam, on the other hand, usesspecial yogic techniques to strike directly at the core of the gnosis, sothat it emerges without having to depend on the body.24

Since thabs lam concerns the manipulation of the physiologicalbases (channels, vital winds, and seminal drops), it is particularlyrelevant to the present discussion. The idea behind these yogic practicesinvolving the exploitation of one�s physiological bases and resourcesfor soteriological purposes is that the various degrees of spiritualrealisation and qualities that a bodhisattva following the non-tantric

22 For a description of the thabs lam and grol lam, see Mi-pham�s �Od gsal snying po(pp. 47.6�51.6) and rDo-grub�s mDzod lde (pp. 424.2�440.1). See also Klong-chen-pa�s Yid kyi mun sel (pp. 143.2�146.2); Lo-chen Dharma-shrī�s gSang bdag dgongsrgyan (pp. 20.1�23.3); Kong-sprul�s Shes bya mdzod (pp. 810.2�811.23).

23 gSang bdag zhal lung (vol. e, p. 301.4); mDzod lde (p. 424.2�3); Shes bya mdzod (p.810.4): bshad rgyud rgya mtsho las| grol lam thabs su rnam par bstan|| zhes so||. Thetext in the sGyu �phrul rgya mtsho�i rgyud itself reads (p. 10.2): grol thar [= thabs?]lam du rnam par bshad||.

24 The alchemic procedure of transforming iron into gold instantly by the efficientmanipulation of a mineral called mākṣika (MW, s.v.) is given as an analogy of thethabs lam technique, while the alchemic procedure of transforming iron into goldgradually by efficiently manipulating a jewel called kaustubha (MW, s.v.) is givenas an analogy of the grol lam technique (gSang bdag zhal lung, pp. 303.1�304.2;�Od gsal snying po, pp. 48.1�49.5; mDzod lde, p. 426.2�3). For more on thesemodels, see Wangchuk 2007: 224�225.

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Mahāyāna is said to accrue at the various stages (sa: bhūmi) and on thevarious paths (lam: mārga), and the two kinds of accumulation, namely,the accumulation of beneficial resources (bsod nams kyi tshogs: pūṇya-saṃbhāra) and the accumulation of gnosis (ye shes kyi tshogs: jñāna-saṃbhāra), can be accrued by a yogin by making his normally dysfunc-tional channels, vital winds, and seminal drops functional (las su rungba).25

5. THE META-PHYSIOLOGY ACCORDING TO THE GSANG THIGS ANDRELATED WORKS

We shall now delve briefly into �meta-physiology,� particularly itsrelation to immanent gnosis and its abode. It is not possible to provide acomprehensive picture of the divergent descriptions of the channels,vital winds, and seminal drops found in the various old and new tantricsources. Even within the rNying-ma tradition alone there seems to be noone shared understanding of the matter. I shall, therefore, limit myselfto a few works of the tradition of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, the mostfundamental tantra of the rNying-ma school, and primarily to a shortwork entitled gSang thigs/thig (i.e. Secret Seminal Drop) and acommentary on it, both attributed to the Indian master Vimalamitra.26

Notably enough, although these two works are classified as Mahāyogatexts, their content seems to be also found in texts belonging to theAnuyoga and Atiyoga systems.

I shall begin with the main channels and the six points of psycho-physiological energy called cakras. Commonly there are said to be threeaxes (srog shing: akṣa)27 and four or six cakras. The three axes are:28

25 Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 106a1�b4). The sGyu �phrul rdo rje is cited to bolsterthis idea.

26 The gSangs thigs (spelt there gSang tig) is listed in the lDe�u chos �byung (p.318.15) as one of the thirty-one minor pieces of literature on the Māyājāla cycle.

27 See, for example, the sGyu �phrul rgya mtsho�i rgyud (p. 11.1�2):�khor lo bzhi dang srog shing gsum||me rlung �gro bas nam mkha�i ba||bzho ba steng du rnam par grags||.

This verse is cited in the Yid kyi mun sel (p. 145.5�6), mDzod lde (p. 427.6), andShes bya mdzod (p. 810.14�16). Elsewhere the three axes are also called the �threechiefs� (gtso mo gsum). See, for instance, the bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 58.5,63.5) and Negi 1993�2005, s.v. gtso mo, where the Hevajratantra is indicated as a


1. the central main channel, called dbu ma or dbu ma�i rtsa(madhyanāḍī),29 and referred to elsewhere as kun �dar ma (avadhūtī)

2. the right main channel, called ro ma (rasanā)3. the left main channel, called rkyang ma (lalanā)

The six cakras are identified as:30

1. the �cakra of great bliss in the forehead� (spyi bo bde chen gyi �khorlo)

2. the �cakra of the Saṃbhoga[kāya] at the throat� (mgrin pa longsspyod kyi �khor lo)

3. the �cakra of the Dharma[kāya] at the heart� (snying ga chos kyi�khor lo)

4. the �cakra of the Nirmāṇa[kāya] at the navel� (lte ba sprul pa�i�khor lo)

5. the �cakra of fire� (me dkyil), also called the �fire of Brahmā�(tshangs pa�i me), situated four fingers below the navel

6. the �cakra of conditions� (rkyen gyi �khor lo), situated below the�cakra of fire�

The *Guhyagarbhatantra tradition emphasises the cakra of theDharma[kāya] at the heart,31 which is therefore described in the

source. These three channels are also said to stand like three pillars (ka ba�i tshul dugnas). See the Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 9a3, 10a3).

28 mDzod lde (p. 428.2): srog shing gsum ni| dbu rkyang ro gsum mo||.29 Negi 1993�2005, s.v. rtsa referring to the Vimalaprabhā.30 mDzod lde (pp. 427.6�428.2): �khor lo gsum phrag gnyis ni| spyi bo bde chen gyi|

mgrin pa longs spyod kyi| snying ga chos kyi| lte ba sprul pa�i �khor lo ste rtsa ba�i�khor lo bzhi dang| de �og sor bzhi gzhal bar lte ba�i gtum mo las yar �bar ba rgyudgzhan du tshangs pa�i me zhes grags pa�i me dkyil dang| de�i �og na me de sbor byedthur sel gyi rlung ste rkyen gyi �khor lo gnyis so||. See also the Shing rta chen po(vol. 2, fols. 9a5�10a3), where varying numbers of cakras are discussed.

31 mDzod lde (p. 429.6): lugs �dir snying ga�i gnad gtso bor byed de|. See also the Shesbya mdzod (p. 810.16�24), where it is stated that the meditative practices involvingthe manipulation of the cakras at the heart, navel, throat, and forehead are taught inthe thirteenth chapter of the *Guhyagarbhatantra, and that the meditative techniquesof striking at the core (gnad du bsnun pa) of these four cakras are called the�quintessential instruction (or rather, here, meditative technique) of Samantabhadra�(kun tu bzang po�i man ngag), the �quintessential instruction of Samantabhadrā�(kun tu bzang mo�i man ngag), the �quintessential instruction of accurate procedure�


250 ORNA ALMOGI

associated literature in greater detail, and with which I shall be mainlyconcerned in this paper, since it is the location where gnosis is said toabide.

(a) Eight Pure Essence Channels (rtsa�i dwangs ma brgyad) or EightPetals of Channels (rtsa�i �dab ma brgyad) in the Centre of the Heart

The gSang thigs and its commentary, which seem to be the mainsources for this particular meta-physiology, are not without textualproblems.32 Nonetheless the main points can be more or less extracted,occasionally with the help of other works dealing with the same topic,such as Klong-chen-pa�s Shing rta chen po.33 According to these works,there are eight pure essence channels (rtsa�i dwangs/dangs/dwang ma),commonly referred to in the literature as petals of channels (rtsa�i �dabma), in the cakra of the Dharma[kāya] in the heart. Three of them,described as great, are said to be outer ones, and five of them innerones. In the centre of the five inner ones there is the seminal drop (thigle: bindu) of bodhicitta (i.e. bodhicitta in its gnoseo-physiologicalsense). It is located in an empty space within the heart, where the eightpure essence channels form a network with secondary channels (rtsabran) said to resemble a curved rope (thag pa gug pa). Of these eightpure essence channels, three are said to be of true reality (chos nyid kyirtsa), one of gnosis (ye shes kyi rtsa), three of one�s continuum (rangrgyud kyi rtsa), and one of qualities (yon tan gyi rtsa).34

(sbyor ba dag pa�i man ngag), and the �quintessential instruction of great pervasion�(khyab rdal chen po�i man ngag), respectively.

32 Most particularly, the commentary does not seem to be a coherent text. It appearsthat it is the result of the merging of two different commentaries, possibly by twodifferent authors, since each point is explained twice and often slightly differently,not so much, that is, in a contradictory as in either a repetitive or supplementarymanner. Moreover, the reading of both the basic text and its commentary is oftenuncertain. The fact that the extracanonical versions found in the NyK often offerreadings different from the ones found in the canon only adds to the ambiguity ofthe reading. To resolve these problems a careful edition of these texts and theconsultation of related works will be necessary, a task that cannot be undertaken inthe present paper.

33 Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 8b5�17a3, 50b4�55a2).34 Note that according to the bKa� brgyad rnam bshad, three channels are of true

reality, three of gnosis, one of the continuum, and one of qualities (pp. 58.6�59.1):snying ga�i rtsa �dab brgyad kyi gsum ni chos nyid kyi rtsa zhes bya| gsum ni ye shes


These essence channels are described as follows: Inside thechannels of true reality there is a yellow light (�od ser po), circular inshape (dbyibs zlum po) and resembling a mixture of mercury (dngulchu) and melted butter (zhun mar). Its essence-syllable (snying po:hṛdaya) is OṂ; its phonic seeds (sa bon: bīja) are SU, situated on top ofthe essence-syllable, and TRI, situated beneath it. The colour of thesethree syllables is said to be like the colour of a pitched tent made of silkbrocade (za �og gi gur phub pa).

Inside the channel of gnosis there is a blue (mthing ga) light thatis square in shape, and like a raised rope (zhags pa bsdogs/thogs pa).35 Itresembles a mirage on the surface of a river in springtime, or a dewdrop(zil pa) on the tip of an ash-coloured leaf of grass (rtsa skya�i kha na).36

The essence-syllable is HŪṂ, and the phonic seeds are A, situated ontop of the essence-syllable, and NRI, situated beneath it. Inside thechannels of one�s continuum there is a red light (�od dmar po) in theshape of a crescent (zla gam). It resembles a red silk pennon (le brganlce) running through a crystal ball (shel sgong). The colour is also saidto resemble liquid copper tinged with brass. The essence-syllable isĀḤ,37 and the phonic seeds are PRE, situated on top of the essence-syllable, and DU, situated beneath it. The channel of qualities isdescribed only briefly in the gSang thigs and its commentary, and in theother works consulted by me. It can be merely stated at this stage thatthe light found in it is dark-red (�od dmar nag),38 and that the qualitiessituated in it are said to be both good and bad.

kyi rtsa zhes bya| gcig ni rang rgyud kyi rtsa zhes bya| gcig ni yon tan gyi rtsa zhesbya ste de ltar brgyad do||.

35 The precise meaning of zhags pa bsdogs pa and its connection with a square shapeis not quite clear. Cf. the Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fol. 12a5�6): zhags pa thogspa�am sbrul �khyil ba dang �dra�o||. See also the bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (p. 59.3),where the shape is also compared to a �coiled snake� (sbrul dkyus pa).

36 The text names here as an alternative the colour red in the shape of a crescent (zlagam) and compares it to a red silk pennon (le brgan lce) running through a crystalball (shel sgong) and compares the light of the following channel to a mirage, and soforth. It seems, however, that the description of these two channels was mistakenlyreversed.

37 The forms A and Ā are also found, but they seem to be faulty.38 This detail is missing in the gSang thigs and is supplemented from the bKa� brgyad

rnam bshad (p. 59.4�5). Note, however, that some paragraphs later there is areference to the dark-red colour which runs through the channel�s pure essence of

252 ORNA ALMOGI

The syllables A and NRI are said to run through the breath�simpure essences (snyigs ma: kaṣāya); SU and TRI, through thechannel�s impure essences; and PRE and DU, through the blood�simpure essences. The channel�s pure essence (rtsa�i dwangs ma) runsthrough the yellow light; the breath�s pure essence (dbugs kyi dwangsma), through the blue; and the blood�s pure essence (khrag gi dwangsma), through the red. The phonic seeds are the causes of saṃsāra, andthe essence-syllables are the causes of gnosis and thus nirvāṇa. Thesetwo, namely, the causes of purification and pollution, are said to becommonly mixed with one another, and they in turn to be mixed withthe seminal drop of bodhicitta.

The yellow light of the channels of true reality houses thefundamental mind (kun gzhi�i rnam par shes pa: ālayavijñāna); the bluelight of the channel of gnosis, the mental perception (yid kyi rnam parshes pa: manovijñāna); the red light of the channels of one�s continuum,the defiled mind (nyon mongs pa�i yid: kliṣṭamanas); and the dark-redlight of the channel of qualities, the five types of sense perception (sgolnga�i rnam shes). Taking birth as a god or a human is said to befacilitated by the mental perception, and the seeds of such births arefound in the syllables A and NRI; taking birth as a semi-god (lha mayin: asura) or an animal is facilitated by the fundamental mind, and theseeds of such births are found in the syllables SU and TRI; and takingbirth as a hungry ghost (yi dwags: preta) or hell-being is facilitated bythe perceptions of the senses and the defiled [mind], and the seeds ofsuch births are found in the syllables PRE and DU.39 This arrangementis said to be found in the continuum of each of the sentient beings of thesix realms. The above description of the eight essence channels in theheart can thus be summarised in the form of a table as follows:

the five doors, that is, the five sense organs�with no mention, though, of thechannel of qualities.

39 The correlation of the phonic seeds TRI and PRE with animals and hungry ghosts,respectively, is according to rDo-grub�s mDzod lde (p. 431.1�6). The gSang thigs�grel pa has it the other way around, which is obviously an error, evidently due toconfusion between these two phonic seeds (TRI being often spelt TRE).


Type ofchannel

3 channels of truereality (chos nyidkyi rtsa)

1 channel ofgnosis (ye sheskyi rtsa)

3 channels ofone�s continu-um (rang rgyudkyi rtsa)

1 channelof qualities(yon tan gyirtsa)

Colour yellow blue red dark-red

Shape circle square crescent

Type of pureessence (dwangsma)

channel�s pureessence (rtsa�idwangs ma)

breath�s pureessence (dbugskyi dwangsma)

blood�s pureessence (khraggi dwangs ma)

Essence-syllable (snyingpo: hṛdaya) =cause of purify-cation/ gnosis /nirvāṇa

OṂ HŪṂ ĀḤ

Phonic seeds(sa bon: bīja) =causes of pollu-tion /ignorance/saṃsāra

SU and TRI runthrough thechannel�s impureessence (rtsa�isnyigs ma)

A and NRI runthrough thebreath�s im-pure essence(dbugs kyisnyigs ma)

PRE and DUrun through theblood�s impureessence (khraggi snyigs ma)

Type of mindresiding in thechannel

Fundamentalmind (ālaya-vijñāna)

mentalperception(manovijñāna)

defiled mind(kliṣṭamanas)

five typesof senseperception

Birth caused bythe pertinentphonic seedsand type ofmind

semi-gods &animals

gods &humans

hungry ghosts & hell-beings

(b) The Five Pure Essences (dwangs ma lnga)

The gnosis immanent in the body is closely related to the pure essencesjust mentioned, which are described as follows:1. The channel�s pure essence (rtsa�i dwangs ma), located in the centreof the heart, resembles a white silk thread (dar dkar gyi skud pa) and issaid to be as thin as 1/50th of the diameter of a strand of a horsetail (rtarnga) and to have the form of a cobweb (ba thag), serves frombeginningless time as the support of the psycho-physiological complex(phung po�i rten byed), and therefore is a pure essence of the elements.

254 ORNA ALMOGI

On the saṃsāric level it appears as the element of earth, while on thenirvāṇic level it appears as the female deity Locanā; it is in fact thegnosis of great emptiness (stong pa chen po�i ye shes), for it serves asthe base from which everything assumes the nature of the purifieddharmadhātu (rnam par dag pa�i ngang du ma gyur pa med pa�i rtenbyed).2. Within the channel�s pure essence is the blood�s pure essence (khraggi dwangs ma), which resembles cinnabar (mtshal cog la ma). This, too,is a pure essence of the elements, for it purifies the psycho-physiological complex (phung po dag par byed) from beginninglesstime. It appears as water, while in reality it is the female deity Māmakī.It is in fact the gnosis of equality (mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes:samatājñāna), whose nature it is to collect or gather everything into thesphere apart from anybody�s bidding (bkol ba med par dbyings gcig tusdud pa�i bdag nyid).3. The breath�s pure essence (dbugs kyi dwangs ma), said to steam like avapour (rlangs pa: bāṣpa) of fine grains of gold (sa le sbram) that havebeen found beneath the earth, functions from beginningless time as abasis for the lightness and mobility of the psycho-physiologicalcomplex (phung po yang zhing g.yo ba�i rten byed), and so it, too, is apure essence of the elements. It appears as wind, but in reality it is thefemale deity Samayatārā (dam tshig sgrol ma). It is the gnosis ofperforming (beneficial) activities (bya ba sgrub pa�i ye shes: kṛtyānu-ṣṭhānajñāna), whose nature it is to move in the sphere of great bliss(bde ba chen po�i dbyings su bskyod pa�i rang bzhin).4. The warmth�s pure essence (drod kyi dwangs ma) is said to resemblethe glittering (�od kyi ngad) or mere shimmer (ngad tsam zhig) of amirror in the sun. Its nature is to ripen (smin par byed pa�i rang bzhin)the psycho-physiological complex from beginningless time, and thus it,too, is a pure essence of the elements. It appears as fire, while it is inreality the female deity Pāṇḍaravāsinī (gos dkar mo). It is the discerninggnosis (so sor rtog pa�i ye shes: pratyavekṣaṇajñāna), that is, gnosisthat realises everything as the sphere of great bliss (thams cad bde bachen po�i dbyings su rtogs pa�i ye shes).5. Within this multi-coloured light exists the great seminal drop ofbodhicitta. It is the great pure essence (dwangs ma chen po). It serves asa support for the illumination of the psycho-physiological complex(phung po gsal bar byed pa�i rten byed), and thus it, too, is a pureessence of the elements. It appears like space, but it is in fact the all-pervading gnosis, the female deity Samantabhadrā (kun tu bzang mo). It


MA TERIALITY AND IMMANEN CE O F GNO SI S 255

provides space for all that both appears and is empty to be illuminatedin the absolute sphere of reality (snang stong thams cad yang dag pa�idbyings su gsal ba�i go skabs �byed). This seminal drop, whichresembles liquid gold or the disk of the rising sun, is insight, the essenceof all female deities. That which looks like a precious stone called ze�uka/kha40 placed in the cavity of this liquid gold is the essence of themale deities including Samantabhadra, the king of method, and thatwhich looks like the quartz karketana41 hanging from a rail (gdang) isthe mirror-like gnosis (me long lta bu�i ye shes: ādarśajñāna). This isthe essence of the sphere of reality (dharmadhātugarbha), the cause ofall ultimate goals (don dam).

The above description of the five pure essences is summarisedin the next page. In brief, the gnosis (or �awareness,� as it is oftenreferred to in the rDzogs-chen literature) inherent and immanent in thebody, whose essence is said to be primordially pure (ngo bo ka dag girig pa), abides in the centre of the heart of all sentient beings as thegreat pure essence in what Klong-chen-pa calls the �precious secretwomb� (rin po che�i sbubs), or the �naturally luminous palace,� whichis a residence consisting of light, whose radiance flows through theeight petals in the form of the remaining pure essences, correspondingto the various kinds of gnosis.Mi-pham,42 however, equates the first four pure essences with the pureessences of the earth element (sa�i dwangs ma), water element (chukhams kyi dwangs ma), fire element (me�i sa bon dwangs ma), and windelement (rlung gi dwangs ma), respectively, while also designating thebrilliant inner space (bar snang sang sang po), which provides theneeded room (go �byed), as the pure essence of the space element (nammkha�i dwangs ma). Within the concentrate of these five pure essences(dwangs ma lnga �dus) is said to reside the mind�s pure essence (semskyi dwangs ma), which is referred to above as the great pure essence(dwangs ma chen po) and described as bodhicitta, the great seminaldrop that has gnosis as its essence (ye shes snying po�i thig le chen po).Thus the expression �six great pure essences� (dwangs ma chen podrug) is employed by him.43

40 It is not clear what precious stone ze�u ka/kha might be.41 See Mahāvyutpatti no. 5949; MW, s.v. karkeṇata; karketana.42 bKa� brgyad rnam bshad (pp. 59.6�61.1).43 See ibid. (p. 62.2).

256 ORNA ALMOGI

Type ofPureEssence

Resem-blance

Function Appear-ance (saṃ-sāra) =one of theelements

Actual na-ture (nirvā-ṇa) = oneof the fivefemaledeities

Type ofgnosis

1. channel�spureessence

whitesilkthread

serves as asupport forthe psycho-physiologicalcomplex

earth Locanā gnosis of greatemptiness (stongpa chen po�i yeshes)

2. blood�spureessence

cinnabar purifies thepsycho-physiologicalcomplex

water Māmakī gnosis of equali-ty (mnyam panyid kyi ye shes:samatājñāna)

3. breath�spureessence

�vapour�of gold

serves as thebasis for thelightness andmobility ofthe psycho-physiologicalcomplex

wind Samayatārā gnosis of per-forming (benefi-cial) activities(bya ba sgrubpa�i ye shes:kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna)

4.warmth�spureessence

glitteringof a mir-ror in thesun

ripens thepsycho-physiologicalcomplex

fire Pāṇḍara-vāsinī

discerning gno-sis (so sor rtogpa�i ye shes:pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna)

5. greatpure es-sence =seminaldrop ofbodhicitta

liquidgold orthe diskof therisingsun

impartsglow/radi-ance to thepsycho-physiologicalcomplex

space Samanta-bhadrā

all-pervadinggnosis = mirror-like gnosis (melong lta bu�i yeshes: ādarśa-jñāna)

6. NATURAL EXPOSURE TO THE INHERENT AND IMMANENT GNOSIS

According to the rNying-ma tantric tradition, a qualified masterintroduces the disciple to the inherent and immanent gnosis within him,and the disciple is supposed to recognise it and finally experience it as asoteriological event by practising one or more of the prescribed yogicpractices. If a yogin succeeds in achieving the desired soteriologicalgoal during his life, so much the better, but even if he does not, a


number of options have been put at his disposal. We have seen that themeta-physiological bases and the inherent and immanent gnosis havebeen conceived of as having a �support-supported relationship� (rtendang brten pa�i �brel pa), which is, strictly speaking, a very weakrelationship.

The question is what happens when the psycho-physiologicalbases of a person give in and cease to function as substrata for theinherent and immanent gnosis. Such moments, such as upon theoccasion of dying, are opportunities that a yogin is supposed to seizeand turn to soteriological advantage. Dying in Buddhism may bedefined as a process during which the physiological constituents of aperson gradually withdraw and cease to function as substrata for thepsychical constituents (i.e. mind and the mental factors), and duringwhich the entire psycho-physiological apparatus of an individual totallycollapses. It is said that the intellectual-emotional defilements (nyonmongs pa: kleśa) described as the eighty inherent conceptual entities(rang bzhin gyi rtog pa brgyad bcu), namely, thirty-three associatedwith desire (�dod chags: rāga), forty associated with aversion (zhesdang: dveṣa), and seven associated with disorientation (gti mug:moha), succumb at the end of the dissolution process. The process ofdissolution is vividly described by Klong-chen-pa in his Shing rta chenpo.44 The white pure essence of the right main channel (inherited fromone�s father) dissolves into the upper end (yar sna) of the centralchannel, marked with the syllable HAṂ. The red pure essence of theleft main channel (inherited from one�s mother) dissolves into the lowerend (mar sna) of the central channel, marked with the syllable A. Thewhite and red pure essences dissolve finally into the �great pure essenceof the luminous gnosis in the heart� (snying ga�i ye shes �od gsal gyidangs ma chen po). All gross and subtle conceptual entities cease, andthe inherent and immanent gnosis is laid bare. This is a unique momentin saṃsāric existence�when the inherent and immanent gnosis is rid ofall its obscurations (sgrib pa: āvaraṇa) and is in all respects identicalwith a buddha�s gnosis. In the event of recognition at this juncture, thisgnosis would remain naked forever and not be defiled ever again. Inother words, a sentient being would become a buddha then and there.According to Klong-chen-pa, this is what makes the idea of the so-

44 Shing rta chen po (vol. 2, fols. 106b5�109a6).

258 ORNA ALMOGI

called �release on the primordial ground� (ye thog tu grol ba) found inthe rDzogs-chen literature so rational.45

An ordinary person would simply pass by this critical momentwithout even having realised it. For a yogin who has still not been ableto make the final breakthrough, the amount of time in which theinherent gnosis remains in its immaculate state would depend on thelength of what is called a �meditation day� (bsam gtan gyi zhag), whichvaries according to the quality of the yogin�s meditative training. Ameditation day is the period of meditative absorption that is completelyfree from conceptual thoughts. In other words, it is the gap between thepreceding and the following conceptual thought, and is thuscharacterised by luminosity and lucidity. The longer one manages toabide in such a meditation day during the meditative practice, thegreater is the chance that one becomes completely awakened duringsuch moments of a total collapse of the psycho-physiological apparatus,and one is thus commonly advised to stabilize one�s meditativeconcentration while still alive.46

7. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the present paper an attempt has been made to provide a general ideaof the meta-physiology of the gnosis said to be inherent and immanentin the centre of the heart of all sentient beings; its abode; and how one�sphysiological constituents can be exploited to induce this gnosis tomanifest. It has also been shown that although this gnosis can be causedto emerge by means of meditative techniques, it can also becomemanifest in the course of a natural process of dissolution, and that theneven an ordinary being can come very close to a state normallyaccessible only to a fully awakened being. I should like to conclude bystating that, while one does occasionally find statements thatdescriptions of this gnosis in terms of light, colours, shapes, and the likeare merely meant as aids for confused sentient beings who have not yetrecognised this gnosis within themselves,47 the physicality and

45 Ibid. (vol. 2, fol. 109b3): bzhi pa�i dus su phra ba thim pas sgrib pa mtha� dag bralba�i skabs shig der �byung bas ye thog tu grol ba�i �thad pa ste| sangs rgyas mngondu byed dus bzhin no||.

46 Ibid. (vol. 2, fols. 109b3�110a4).47 Prajñāpraveśa (P, fol. 413b5�6; S, vol. 43, pp. 837.19�838.2):

sems can ma lus thams cad la||


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sGyu �phrul rgya mtsho�irgyud

sGyu �phrul rgya mtsho zhes bya ba�i rgyud. In NyG, vol.22 (za), pp. 1�103.

Shendge 2004 Malati J. Shendge, ed., Ṣaṭsāhasrikāhevajraṭīkā: ACritical Edition. Delhi: Pratibha Prakashan, 2004.

Shes bya mdzod Kong-sprul Yon-tan-rgya-mtsho, Theg pa�i sgo kun lasbtus pa gsung rab rin po che�i mdzod bslab pa gsum legspar ston pa�i bstan bcos shes bya kun khyab [rtsa �grel](on cover: Shes bya kun khyab). Eds. rDo-rje-rgyal-po &Thub-bstan-nyi-ma. Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang,2002.

Shing rta chen po Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-�od-zer, rDzogs pa chen po semsnyid ngal gso�i �grel pa shing rta chen po. 2 vols. In Ngalgso skor gsum, vols. nya & ta. Gangtok: Dodrup ChenRinpoche. Reprint: Thimphu: National Library of Bhutan,n.d.

Śikṣāsamuccaya Cecil Bendall, ed., Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium ofBuddhist Teaching Compiled by Çāntideva Chiefly fromEarlier Mahāyāna-sūtras. 1897�1902. BibliothecaBuddhica 1. Reprint: Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992.

Snellgrove 1987 David Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism: IndianBuddhists and Their Tibetan Successors. 1987. Reprint:Boston: Shambhala Publications, 2002.

Steinkellner 1981 Ernst Steinkellner, tr., Eintritt in das Leben zurErleuchtung (Bodhicaryāvatāra): Lehrgedicht desMahāyāna aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt. Śāntideva. Diede-richs Gelbe Reihe. Munich: Eugen Diederichs Verlag,1981. Reprint: 1989.

Tshig mdzod chen mo Krang-dbyi-sun et al., Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo.Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang, 1993.

Wangchuk 2007 Dorji Wangchuk, The Resolve to Become a Buddha: AStudy of the Bodhicitta Concept in Indo-TibetanBuddhism. Studia Philologica Buddhica MonographSeries 23. Tokyo: The International Institute for BuddhistStudies, 2007.

Yid kyi mun sel Klong-chen-pa Dri-med-�od-zer, dPal gsang ba�i snyingpo�i spyi don legs par bshad pa�i snang bas yid kyi mun pathams cad sel ba. In NyK, vol. 27 (sha), pp. 5�182.

P H I L I P P AND R É MAA S

The So-called Yoga of Suppression in thePātañjala Yogaśāstra∗

In his outstanding pioneering study �Strukturen yogischer Meditation�Oberhammer1 shows beyond doubt that the Pātañjala Yogaśāstra (PYŚ)teaches four kinds of yogic meditations which differ from each otherwith regard to their respective objects of meditation as well as with re-gard to their structure, i.e. in the treatment (or development) of contentof consciousness within meditation.2 The present paper takes up Ober-hammer�s line of thought with regard to the first two kinds of medita-tion which are the subject of larger parts of the PYŚ�s first chapter, theSamādhipāda. A fresh look at these meditations has become possible(and indeed necessary), as there has been a good deal of scientific pro-gress within the last thirty years.

First of all, there has been a considerable advancement in yogaphilology. Oberhammer had to rely on the first edition of the Pātañjala-yogaśāstravivaraṇa (Madras 1952), which is based on one single manu-script. The version of the basic text (i.e. the YS together with the YBh)published together with the Vivaraṇa is not, as the title of the editionmight suggest, a critically edited text. Very probably the editors simplycopied it from the edition published by Kāśīnātha Śāstrī Āgāśe as No.47 of the Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series in 1904.3 Every now and thenthe editors of the Vivaraṇa modified the text of their exemplar with

∗ Sincere thanks to Professor Eli Franco for his thought provoking comments on anearlier version of this paper. I would also like to thank Susanne Kammüller, M.A.and Dr. Elizabeth De Michelis for taking a close look at my English.

1 Cf. the review of Oberhammer�s work by Alper 1980.2 Oberhammer 1977: 134�230. Since the publication of Oberhammer�s study, Frau-wallner�s interpretation of the PYŚ as dealing with only two different kinds of me-ditation (1953: 427�443) is clearly outdated. Bronkhorst 1993: 68�75, who ap-parently is not aware of Oberhammer 1977, distinguishes two kinds of meditation inthe YS leading to saṃprajñāta samādhi and to asaṃprajñāta (samādhi) respectively.

3 Cf. Maas 2006: xiii�xxv.

264 PHILIPP ANDRÉ MAAS

readings they derived from a reconstruction of the Vivaraṇa�s basictext.4

In the meantime, we have not only come into possession of anew critical edition of the Vivaraṇa�s first chapter (YVi), but also of acritical edition of the first chapter of the YS together with the YBh,based on 21 printed editions and 25 manuscripts (Maas 2006).5 Accord-ing to manuscript colophons and secondary evidence, both texts takencollectively bear the common title Pātañjala Yogaśāstra and, as I arguein the introduction to my edition, probably have one single, common�author� named Patañjali.6 This author would have collected the sūtrasfrom different sources and furnished them with explanations, which inlater times came to be regarded as the YBh.7 The date of the work isstill uncertain, but a time span reaching from 325 to 425 A.D. seems tobe most likely.8

In accordance with Frauwallner (1953), Oberhammer calls thefirst two types of yoga as discussed in the PYŚ �yoga of suppression�(Unterdrückungsyoga). This, however, is an unfortunate designation, asit evokes misleading associations. �Unterdrückung,� according to Fröh-lich�s Wörterbuch der Psychologie has a double meaning. In psychologythe word designates �the complete deletion of a reaction; in contrast to�inhibition� (Hemmung) which can be removed �.� In psychoanalysis,on the other hand, �suppression� means a �voluntary suppression of cer-tain impulses for action (Handlungsimpulse); in contrast to repression(Verdrängung)�.9 In the course of this paper it should become obvious

4 Cf. Maas 2006: xiix.5 Critically edited texts, of course, facilitate the correct understanding of passageswhich have been corrupted in the course of the transmission. The critical edition ofPYŚ I.29 provides two striking examples for an improved text. The vulgate readsthe corrupt svarūpadarśanam instead of the correct svapuruṣadarśanam in I.29,3,and instead of the correct madīya puruṣaḥ, it reads yaḥ puruṣaḥ (or simply puruṣaḥ)in the next line. For a more detailed discussion of these variants cf. Maas 2006:lxviii f., 104 f., and 168 f.

6 Bronkhorst 1985: 191�203 comes to the same conclusion, albeit for different rea-sons.

7 The identification of Patañjali�s �source books� is of course impossible as no syste-matic expositions of pre-classical Yoga have come down to us. For the considerableinfluence of Buddhist terminology on Patañjali see La Valée Poussin 1936�1937.

8 Maas 2006: xii�xix.9 Fröhlich 1993: 413, col. 2, s.v.: �Unterdrückung (suppression). [1] Bezeichnung fürdie vollständige Löschung einer Reaktion; im Unterschied zur Hemmung, die durch


THE SO-CALLED YOGA OF SUPPRESSION 265

that neither of these meanings is applicable in yoga psychology. In us-ing the designation �yoga of suppression� Frauwallner has neither apsychological nor a psychoanalytical connotation in mind. In his view,the use of �suppression� is justified by the type of meditation which Pa-tañjali teaches in the first chapter of his work, starting with YS I.2 yo-gaś cittavttinirodhaḥ �yoga is the shutdown of the mental capacity�sprocesses.�10 The aim of this type of yoga, according to Frauwallner isto �suppress all mental activity, and to eliminate cognition�11. The sec-ond part of this statement is not fully consonant with the text fromwhich it is derived. If deletion of cognition as a whole were the aim ofyoga, this would imply not only a deletion of mental processes, but alsoa deletion of the self, which is per definitionem pure consciousness. Pa-radoxical as this might seem, the aim of yoga is not the elimination ofconsciousness but the deletion of consciousness content.12 Moreover,the term �suppression� should be avoided because of its use as technicalterm in psychology and psychoanalysis. In replacing the term, I wouldsuggest the expression �non-theistic yogic concentration,� which woulddo justice to its theistic variant, as well as to samāpatti and to saṃyama,which are under discussion in later parts of the PYŚ.13

Before discussing �non-theistic yogic concentration,� I wouldlike to briefly brush up our knowledge of the metaphysical and onto-logical foundations of Sāṅkhya Yoga, as far as they are indispensablefor the following discussion of yogic states of consciousness and formsof meditation.14

Classical Sāṅkhya Yoga is known to be an ontologically dualis-tic philosophy. It upholds that the world is divided into two fundamen-tally different kinds of entities. On the one hand there exists an infinite

spontane Erholung u.ä. wieder aufgehoben werden kann.� [2] Allgemeine psycho-analytische Bezeichnung für das willkürliche Unterdrücken bestimmter Handlungs-impluse bzw. Handlungsweisen; im Unterschied zur Verdrängung, die durch unbe-wußt wirksam Abwehrmechanismen erfolgen soll.�

10 Oberhammer 1977 argues convincingly that the first chapter of the PYŚ does notdeal with one single kind of meditation, but with three different types.

11 Frauwallner (1953: 438): �� sucht man durch den Yoga jede geistige Tätigkeit zuunterdrücken und damit auch jede Erkenntnis auszuschalten.�

12 Cf. the immediately following summary of �the metaphysical and ontological foun-dations of Sāṅkhya Yoga.�

13 For which see Oberhammer 1977: 177�209, and 209�230.14 Cf. Schmithausen 1968: 331.


number of transcendental �selves,� or �spirits� (puruṣa). The selves arepure consciousness, bare of any content. They are infinite�not only innumber but also with regard to time and space�inactive, and un-changeable. Besides the selves, the world consists of the products ofprimordial matter (prakti) which is completely unconscious, active andchangeable. The products of matter not only make up all things of theoutside world, but in human beings they also fashion the sense-capaci-ties (buddhīndriya) as well as the mental capacity which is most fre-quently called citta.15 These metaphysical assumptions are crucial forthe view of classical Sāṅkhya Yoga on epistemological issues, as men-tal processes are thought to depend upon the existence�and as it were�interaction��of both kinds of entities. The mental capacity suppliesthe content of a mental process to the self, which by �seeing� it �pro-vides� the mental content with consciousness. Everyday experience, ofcourse, does not conform to this analysis. We neither experience con-sciousness without content, nor do we experience content without con-sciousness. According to Sāṅkhya Yoga, however, the analysis of men-tal processes in every day experience as being of a uniform nature iswrong. It is caused by nescience (avidyā), which deludes the self aboutits own true ontological status. The self�pure consciousness�is at-tracted by the mental capacity like iron is attracted by a lodestone. This�attraction� is possible because of the mutual compatibility or fitness(yogyatā) of the self and the citta. The mental capacity, which consistsmainly of the luminous substance sattva, one of three constituents ofprimordial matter, is often called �the visible� (dṣya). It displays itscontent to the self, which frequently is designated as �the seer� (draṣṭ).Their compatibility is determined by their nature and cannot�in termsof Sāṅkhya Yoga�be meaningfully questioned.

Being under attraction of the mental capacity, the self identifieswith it. The self is erroneously convinced to be affected by the contentof experience. It feels happiness and suffers pain, although these, aswell as all other kinds of mental events, exclusively take place withinthe mental capacity. In reality, the self, due to its transcendental onto-logical status, is incapable of being anything else than it is, viz. pure,contentless, and unchanging consciousness.

15 The terms manas or buddhi are also in frequent use without any apparent differencein meaning. Cf. Frauwallner 1953: 411.


The aim of Sāṅkhya Yoga in its soteriological dimension is toend the wrong identification of the self with its mental capacity onceand for all, which amounts to the final liberation from the cycle of re-births and its innate suffering. The means to this end is the realization ofthe ontological difference between the self and matter in meditativeconcentration, which is therefore called �knowledge of the difference�(vivekakhyāti). This knowledge is the final content of consciousness, thelast involvement of the self with its mental capacity. When the citta isno longer interested in such �knowledge of the difference,� even thiscontent ceases to exist and gives room for the un-eclipsed self percep-tion of the self. The mental capacity continues to exist as long as theliberated yogi lives, due to mental impressions (saṃskāras) which it hasstored. Finally, after the physical death of the yogi, the mental capacitydissolves in matter (prakti). The self, on the other hand, continues toexist in isolation (kaivalya), freed from the bonds of the cycle of re-births.

Right at the beginning of his work, Patañjali (PYŚ I.1,2 f.) de-fines yoga in a very general way:

yogaḥ samādhiḥ; sa ca sārvabhaumaś cittasya dharmaḥ. kṣiptaṃ mūḍhaṃ vi-kṣiptam ekāgraṃ niruddham iti cittabhūmayaḥ. tatra vikṣipte cetasi vikṣepopa-sarjanībhūtaḥ samādhir na yogapakṣe vartate. yas tv ekāgre cetasi sadbhūtamarthaṃ dyotayati, kṣiṇoti kleśān, karmabandhanāni ślathayati, nirodham āmu-khīkaroti, sa saṃprajñāto yoga ity ākhyāyate. sarvavttinirodhe tvasaṃprajñātaḥ. tasya lakṣaṇābhidhitsayedaṃ sūtraṃ pravavte�yogaścittavttinirodhaḥ (YS I.2).

Yoga is awareness / concentration; and this is the quality of the mentalcapacity in all its states (literally: levels). Fixed, dull, distracted, one-pointed,and shut down [these] are the states of the mental capacity. Of these,awareness / concentration which exists in [the first three states including] thedistracted one, as they are under the influence of distractive factors (likedisease, lethargy etc.16), do not belong to the part of [the enumeration whichmakes up] yoga [proper]. On the other hand (tu), [concentration being]conscious [of an object] (saṃprajñāta) is called yoga, which [occurring] in aone-pointed mental capacity, makes the really true object appear,17 destroysthe defilements, loosens the bonds of karman, [and] brings about the shutdown[of mental processes]. When all mental processes are shut down, however,[concentration] is not conscious [of any object]. With the intention to give adefinition of this [concentration not conscious of an object], the [following]

16 The whole group of distractive factors is listed in YS I.30.17 I take the expression sadbhūtaṃ artham to refer to the self (puruṣa).


sūtra (YS I.2) has been composed: Yoga is the shutdown of the processes ofthe mental capacity.

Patañjali uses the word �yoga� in a number of related meanings. In itsbroadest sense �yoga� designates awareness as a characteristic of men-tal processes in general. There are, however, different kinds of aware-ness, which qualify five states of the mental capacity. Three states arenot specifically yogic, and this is the reason why Patañjali excludesthem from his exposition. Nevertheless, as Wezler convincingly showson the backdrop of information provided by the Vivaraṇa, the arrange-ment not only of those states specific to yoga, but also of the first threeones is �quite consistent[ly] � determined by the final goal� of yoga,viz. stopping the mental processes in general.18 The first state, called�fixed,� is characterised by a strong and involuntary connection be-tween the mental capacity and its object.19 The mental capacity, com-pletely attached to its object, is incapable of becoming aware of anydifferent object. It is quite obvious that an involuntary fixation to a sin-gle object completely rules out the possibility of mental training, andthis is the reason why Patañjali places this state at the beginning of hisenumeration.

The second place is held by the �dull� mental capacity, which isequally involuntarily connected to a single object. Its connection to theobject, however, is very weak. Although the explanations of the YVi arenot comprehensive, one can quite safely regard the dull mental capacityas having a very basic and limited awareness of its object only.20 Themental capacity is not able to perceive the object distinctly. Thisweakness is the reason why the dull state in terms of yoga psychology issuperior to the state called �fixed.� The lack of firmness seems toprovide the condition for an awareness of different objects, which leadsto a possible transition of the mental capacity to the next higher state,called distracted.

18 Wezler 1983: 23. Wezler is not aware of Oberhammer 1977 and clings to Frau-wallner�s differentiation of nirodha- and aṣṭāṅgayoga.

19 YVi 150,2 f.: kṣiptam aniṣṭaviṣayāsañjanena stimitam. �The attached [mental capa-city] is paralysed by clinging to a not deliberately chosen object.� Cf. Wezler 1983:20. Oberhammer (1977: 136, n. 6) translates as �... das durch die Färbung durchnicht angestrebte Gegenstände gebannte [psychische Organ].� I do not see any ne-cessity to emend °sañjanena to °rañjanena. Moreover, the grammatical number of°viṣaya° is singular; cf. the following interpretation of this passage.

20 The only explanation is mūḍhaṃ nirvivekam (YVi 150,3).


For this state, too, the explanations of the YVi are quite scarce.It simply paraphrases vikṣiptam as nānākṣiptam �being fixed to several[objects].� Wezler takes this to mean that the mental capacity is boundto several objects simultaneously.21 I doubt that this interpretation iscorrect. The distracted mind is rather bound to several objects in a shortsuccession of time. It corresponds to our everyday awareness, whichusually lacks permanent concentration on a single object. The content ofconsciousness changes according to the different sense data which cometo the mind by means of the sense capacities. The mental capacity isattached to one object for a more or less short period of time, and be-comes attached to the next when it has lost interest in the preceding one.Presumably because the mind in its distracted state is connected toseveral objects, it develops a certain distance, or�as the author of YVihas it�impartiality to its objects. This impartiality provides the mentalcapacity with the freedom to deliberately choose a desired object,which, of course, not only is the precondition for acting as an autono-mous subject, but also for entering upon the path of mental training andspiritual progress.

A voluntary connection of sufficient strength between the men-tal capacity and a deliberately chosen object, which comes about everynow and then in the distracted state, is the characteristic of the statecalled one-pointed (ekāgara), the first of the specifically yogic states.

Patañjali�s discussion of yoga proper starts with PYŚ I.12. Thispassage deals with two methods conducive to the shutdown of mentalprocesses, viz. practice (abhyāsa) and detachment (vairāgya). Their ef-ficiency is elucidated by a comparison of the mental capacity with ariver being capable of flowing in two directions. The mind-river eitherflows, when guided by practice and detachment, in the direction ofwell-being (kalyāṇa) or, when uncontrolled, in the contrary direction ofa bad condition (pāpa). Detachment in this context is said to obstructthe stream towards objects, in other words, it prevents the mind fromentering into an involuntary connection with objects.

Patañjali elaborates on the concept of detachment in PYŚ I.15�16. He teaches that detachment is of two kinds, a lower and a higherone. Lower detachment refers to all things which are subject to percep-tion, like women, food, drinks and the execution of power. Moreover, it

21 Wezler 1983: 22:�[The] citta clearly � [does] not [have] one object only, butseveral at a time.�



also applies to objects which are known from authoritative tradition,like heavenly objects. The detached mental capacity, even when in con-tact with these objects, keeps a neutral attitude. It neither wants to avoidnor does it want to possess them, because it sees their defect, which ob-viously lies in their transient nature. This sovereignty of the mind indealing with objects is called �consciousness of the controllability [ofall objects]� (vaśīkārasaṃjñā).22

The second kind of detachment is called �detachment from theconstituents of matter� (guṇavaitṣṇya) and refers to the entities be-longing to the realm of matter (prakti) in Sāṅkhya Yoga ontology. Themind, because of practice of �perception of the Self� (puruṣadarśanā-bhyāsāt), is satisfied with the self�s difference from the realm of matter,and therefore becomes detached from all potential objects. The highestdegree of detachment, according to Patañjali, is �only clearness ofknowledge� (jñānaprasādamātra). This is knowledge without content,in other words, an unrestricted self-perception of the self, which is�orleads to�the liberation of the self from the cycle of rebirths. In order toachieve this self-perception, the yogi has to cultivate detachment as anall-embracing and unrestricted attitude towards the content of his con-sciousness. Even the liminal content which exists in the mental capacityat the border with liberation has to be given up in a final step. When un-restricted perception of the self has been achieved, this experience ter-minates attachment once and for all. Patañjali, in a remarkable passage,lets the liberated yogi describe the degree of his detachment. He says:

�prāptaṃ prāpaṇīyam, kṣīṇāḥ kṣetavyāḥ kleśāḥ, chinnaḥ śliṣṭaparvā bhavasaṃ-kramaḥ, yasyāvicchedāj janitvā mriyate, mtvā ca jāyate�, iti (PYŚ I.16,5 f.).

�I have attained all that is attainable, I have destroyed all defilements beingsubject to destruction, I have cut the succession of existences with its [tightly]connected joints, due to the continuation of which after having been born, onedies, and after having died, one is born [again].�

22 Cf. the YVi�s gloss in 218,8 ff.: vaśīkartuṃ śakyante �syām avasthāyāṃ sarve gau-ṇāḥ padārthāḥ, vaśīkartavyatvena saṃjñāyante. vaśīktāni ca tasyām avasthāyāmindriyāṇi saṃjñāyante. vaśīkaraṇam vā saṃjñāyate �syām iti.In this state [of mind] all things (padārtha) consisting of the constituents of matter(gauṇa) can be controlled [so that] one is aware of their being controllable. And oneis aware of the sense-capacities as being controlled. Or one is aware of their controlin this [state of mind].


As mentioned before, PYŚ I.12 names a second concept besides �de-tachment� which is conducive to the shutdown of mental processes, i.e.�practice� (abhyāsa). Within a comparison of the mental capacity to ariver �practice of perception of the difference [between the self andmatter]� (vivekadarśanābhyāsa) is said to open the stream to well-being.23

In the passage immediately following Patañjali gives a moredetailed definition: �� practice is the effort for steadiness (YS I.13).�24

He explains: �The mental capacity�s state of flowing calmly, when itsprocesses are reduced, is steadiness. � Practice [means] complying tothe methods with the desire to produce this [steadiness].�25

This quotation confirms the analysis of the specifically yogicform of concentration (samādhi) outlined above. In order to belong toyoga proper, concentration has to fulfil two requirements: (1) It mustconsist of a stable connection between the mental capacity and an ob-ject, and (2) the object has to be a deliberately chosen one. The secondrequirement corresponds to �detachment� from all objects being poten-tially subject to an involuntary connection caused by attachment. Thefirst requirement, i.e. stability of the connection, is the aim of practice.

The structure of the �non-theistic yogic concentration� as beingconscious of its object is briefly described in PYŚ I.17:

vitarkavicārānandāsmitārūpānugamāt saṃprajñātaḥ (YS I.17).

vitarkaś cittasyālambane sthūla ābhogaḥ. sūkṣmo vicāraḥ. ānando hlādaḥ.ekarūpātmikā saṃvid asmitā. tatra prathamaś catuṣṭayānugataḥ samādhiḥsavitarkaḥ. dvitīyo vitarkavikalaḥ savicāraḥ. ttīyo vicāravikalaḥ sānandaḥ.caturthas tadvikalo �smitāmātraḥ. sarva ete sālambanāḥ samādhayaḥ (PYŚI.17,2�6).26

[Concentration is] conscious [of an object], because it is accompanied bythinking, by evaluation,27 by joy, and by the form [?] (rūpa) of individuality(YS I.17).

23 PYŚ I.12,6 f.: vivekadarśanābhyāsena kalyāṇasrota udghāṭyate.24 � sthitau yatno �bhyāsaḥ (YS I.13).25 cittasyāvttikasya praśāntavāhitā sthitiḥ. [�] tatsaṃpipādayiṣayā sādhanānuṣṭhā-nam abhyāsaḥ (PYŚ I.13,2 f.).

26 The parallels to the Buddhist dhyāna meditation (for which see Eimer 2006: 25)have been noted by Bronkhorst 1993: 71; cf. also Cousins 1992: 148 and 151 ff.

27 The meanings of vitarka (Pāli vitakka) and vicāra as stages of samādhi in Buddhismand Yoga are the subject of Cousins 1992. He concludes that �[f]or the canonicalabhidhamma, vitakka � is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it


�Thinking� is the mental capacity�s gross investigation28 of an object29. Thesubtle investigation is �evaluation.� �Joy� is pleasure. Consciousness having asingle form is �individuality.� Of these [four kinds], the first concentration,which is accompanied by all four [kinds of consciousness content], isaccompanied by thought. The second, which is devoid of thought, isaccompanied by evaluation. The third, which is devoid of evaluation, isaccompanied by joy. The fourth, which is devoid of this [joy], is individualityonly. All these concentrations have an object.

Four key words sketch the development of the mental capacity towardsconscious concentration: Thinking (vitarka), evaluation (vicāra), joy(ānanda), and individuality (asmitā). Each keyword is characteristic ofone phase in the development of concentration. In the first phase, allfour forms of mental activity exist in succession. Nevertheless, it is�thinking� which establishes the connection between the mental capa-city and its deliberately chosen object, the self.30 �Thinking� obviouslyhas to be understood as the comprehension of the teachings concerningthe �self� in Sāṅkhya Yoga philosophy, which provides a basis for thepractice of the perception of the self (puruṣadarśanābhyāsa). In the se-cond stage, the connection between the mental capacity and its object is

upon a (meditative) object. Vicāra � is the ability to explore and examine anobject� (153). Oberhammer (1977: 149 f.), whose work seems to be unknown toCousins, draws upon Vasubandhu�s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya and Yaśomitra�s com-mentary thereon. He concludes his discussion stating that �� Vitarka und Vicāraein von Sprache � begleitetes diskursiv-begriffliches Erfassen des Gegenstandesist. Der Unterschied der beiden scheint � darin zu liegen, daß der Vitarka ein prü-fendes Überlegen (ūhaḥ, paryeṣaṇam) ist, während der Vicāra jene erwägende Ein-sicht am Ende ist, in der das prüfende Überlegen auf das Ergebnis hin überstiegenwird, und die daher subtiler als jenes genannt werden kann� (150).

28 ābhoga according to BHSD (99, col. 2, s.v), means �effort,� �endeavour.� Ober-hammer (1977: 148) takes it as �tasting (Verkosten)�; Cousins (1992: 148) pre-sumably in accordance with the meanings �ideation, idea, thought� which are re-corded in PTSD (103, col. 2, s.v.) translates more appropriately as �directing (themind) towards.�With some hesitation I decide to translate as �investigation,� whichshould be taken as �directing the mind towards an object in order to grasp it con-ceptually.�

29 The meaning �object� for ālambana is recorded in pw (187, col.1, s.v.) for Buddhisttexts. It was not properly included inMW (�also dharma or law belonging to manas�153, col. 2, s.v.), but it found entry into BHSD (105, col. 2, s.v.). Oberhammer(1977: 148) in translating �Objektstütze� apparently follows Woods� (1914: 40)�supporting [object].� The correct translation was already known to Ganganatha Jha(1934: 30).

30 Cf. Oberhammer 1977: 156.


fixed to a degree which makes a rethinking of yoga philosophy dispen-sable. The yogi can draw upon the insights he has gained from his oc-cupation with yoga teachings concerning the self, and does not need toinvestigate the subject again. This presumably is the reason why �eva-luation� is termed a �refined� investigation of the object in comparisonto �thinking� which is seen as gross. In the third phase, which is charac-terised by joy, the connection between the mental capacity and its objectis deprived of its conceptual and linguistic dimension. The self, whichin the previous phase was the object of conceptualisation, now turnsinto the content of a direct, joyful experience. The passage citedunambiguously states that the penultimate concentration has twoaspects, the characteristic aspect of joy, and a secondary aspect of indi-viduality. The last mentioned aspect is not only a constituent of con-sciousness in this phase of concentration, but of experience in general.Experience by its very nature belongs to an individual, who is able torefer to the subject of experience with the pronoun �I.� Usually, how-ever, individuality is eclipsed by the content of consciousness, and doesnot turn into an object of perception. In the final stage of conscious con-centration the situation is different. As joy, the content of consciousnesscharacteristic in the previous phase has been given up, it is now theform of consciousness that turns into a content of consciousness, ex-perienced as individuality, or�according to the author of YVi�as thestate of being experience only (pratyayamātratā).31 Nevertheless, con-sciousness here still is a consciousness of something. It is being con-scious of belonging to an individual. The self, therefore, does not ex-perience itself as being ontologically different from matter. It still per-ceives as the subject of perception in association with its mental capa-city. And the existence of a content within the mental capacity justifiesthe designation �concentration being conscious of an object� (saṃpra-jñātasamādhi) even in its ultimate phase.

The transition from concentration having a content to content-less concentration is the subject of PYŚ I.18:

athāsaṃprajñātaḥ kimupāyaḥ, kiṃsvabhāva iti?

virāmapratyayābhyāsapūrvakaḥ saṃskāraśeṣo �nyaḥ (YS I.18).� tasya paraṃ vairāgyam upāyaḥ. sālambano �bhyāsas tatsādhanāya na kalp-yate, iti virāmapratyayo nirvastuka ālambanīkriyate. tadabhyāsapūrvakaṃ cit-

31 YVi 223,8: asmitā pratyayamātratā.


taṃ nirālambanam abhāvaprāptam iva bhavati. sa eṣa nirbījaḥ samādhirasaṃprajñātaḥ (PYŚ I.18,1�7).

What means is there for [concentration being] not conscious of an object, andwhat is its nature?

The other [concentration], which has a remainder of impressions, is precededby practicing the cessation experience (YS I.18).� The means to this [concentration] is higher detachment. Practice having anobject is not capable to bring about this [concentration]. Therefore, thecessation experience, which does not refer to a thing (nirvastuka), is used as itsobject. The mental capacity, preceded by the practice of this [cessationexperience], having no object [at all], seemingly becomes non-existent. Thisseedless (= having special impressions [?])32 concentration is not conscious ofan object.

Higher detachment is the means to bring about concentration that is notconscious of an object. This supports the role of detachment as outlinedabove. In order to finish the interaction between the mental capacity andthe self, the remaining content of consciousness, viz. the experience ofindividuality, has to be given up. The consequence is severe. The yogi,in order to let the transcendental self appear within the mental capa-city�clear and un-eclipsed by any content of consciousness�even hasto detach himself from the coherence of his own existence as an indi-vidual. The yogi, as it were, gives up his empirical personality in orderto win his true self.

How can this goal be achieved? The very nature of �individuali-ty,� the content of consciousness in the ultimate phase of conscious con-centration, rules out the possibility of any act of will. The only reasonfor a transition from concentration with content to concentration with-out content therefore is the self-perception of the self (puruṣa), whichby itself leads the mental capacity away from the realm of matter. Itseems that it is this dynamism that found its way into the definition ofhigher detachment in the following statement:

32 YVi 226,15 glosses nirbījaḥ with saṃskāraviśeṣasvabhāva[ḥ] but this does not con-tribute much to my understanding of the term. Maybe Patañjali alludes to a conceptdiscussed in PYŚ II.4. There we learn that defilements may exist in the mentalcapacity in a latent (prasupta) form. These defilements exercise their effect as soonas the mental capacity comes into contact with an object which serves as a trigger.This, however, does not happen in the case of yogis who have �burned� the de-filement-seeds with the fire of prasaṃkhyāna meditation.



puruṣadarśanābhyāsāt tacchuddhipravivekāpyāyitabuddhir guṇebhyovyaktāvyaktadharmakebhyo viraktaḥ (PYŚ I.16,2 f.).

Because of practising sight of the self (puruṣadarśanābhyāsāt) the [yogi]having his mental capacity satisfied with distinguishing the pureness of the[sight] (or: of the self) [from the sight itself]33 is detached from all constituentsof matter, whether their characteristics are manifest or not manifest.

The starting point for the development to concentration without contentis individuality. This content decreases in proportion to the increasingclearness of the perception of the self. When almost no content is left,the very insignificant remainder serving as �support� of the mental ca-pacity is called �cessation-experience� (virāmapratyaya). The YVi ex-plains the compound �cessation-experience� as a descriptive determina-tive (karmadhāraya) compound.34 Accordingly, the expression does notdenote an experience having the content of cessation, but an experiencebeing characterised by cessation. In other words, it is the final experi-ence of the mental capacity immediately before its complete loss ofcontent. The YVi gives an illustrative example. It compares the liminalexperience with the final flame of a fire that has consumed its fuel.35

In the state of being free from content, the mental capacitymakes room for the unlimited consciousness of the self. In dealing withthis state of consciousness Oberhammer correctly refers to PYŚ I.3

33 YVi 219.10 ff.: tad iti puruṣadarśanam parāmśyate. tasya śuddhis tacchuddhiḥ.nirṇiktakleśādimalatvam. athavā tasya puruṣasya śuddhis tacchuddhiḥ. tacchuddestadālambanadarśanam pravivicyate. tatpravivekenāpyāyitā buddhir asya yoginaḥ.[The word] �its� (tad) refers to the sight of the self. The compound tacchuddhiḥ is adependent determinative compound with a genitive case relation. [�Pureness of thesight of the self� is] the sate of having the defilements of taints (kleśa) etc. cleansed.Or otherwise, �its pureness� [means] the pureness of the self. [The yogi] disting-uishes the pureness [of the self] from the sight, which has the [self] as its object. Theyogi�s mental capacity is satisfied with distinguishing it.

34 YVi 225,10: virāmaś cāsau pratyayaś ca virāmapratyayaḥ.35 YVi 225,11-13: sarvaviṣayebho vinirvartamānasya vinirvartanakāle prāg apratya-yā-{read apratyayatā-}patteḥ pratyayarūpatvam etat{instead of etat read etasya[?]}. yathā pāvakasya jvalataḥ prakṣīyamāṇendhanasya śanaiḥ śanir upaśāmyataḥprāg aṅgāratāpatter jvalātmatā.At the time of turning away, [immediately] before the state of non-experienceoccurs, [the mental capacity] which is turning away from all objects [still] has[some] experience, like a flaming fire, when its fuel is being consumed, little bylittle becomes diminished, immediately before it assumes the state of being embers,[still] consists of a flame.


which gives a very short description of the cessation of all mentalprocesses:36

tadā draṣṭuḥ svarūpe �vasthānam (YS I.3).svarūpapratiṣṭhā tadānīṃ cicchaktir, yathā kaivalye (PYŚ I.3,2 f.).

Then the seer (i.e. the self) abides in his own form (YS I.3). At that time thecapacity of consciousness (i.e. the self) is grounded in its own form, just as inisolation.

The second yogic concentration, which I am going to discuss briefly, isa variant of yoga as outlined so far. It shares, however, the general aimof meditation, i.e. the realization of unrestricted self perception of theself, and therefore also culminates in concentration which is not con-scious of an object (asaṃprajñāta samādhi).37 In its initial stages it hasthe supreme lord (īśvara) as its object. I would therefore like to namethis kind of yoga �theistic yogic concentration.� The �theistic yogicconcentration� is based on a special concept of God which lacks anysectarian or mythological element.38

The summary of Sāṅkhya Yoga ontology given above did noteven once refer to the supreme lord. This exclusion was justified, as theontological dualism of Sāṅkhya Yoga includes the concept of a supremelord alongside of the transcendental selves (puruṣa), but only as in prin-ciple identical with liberated selves, the only difference between thesupreme lord and �ordinary� liberated selves being that the latter, beforebecoming liberated, were subject to bondage. The supreme lord, on theother hand, was never bound to the realm of matter in the past, nor willever be bound in future. Apart from this, God and the selves areidentical.39 They are pure, unchanging, contentless consciousness. Thequestion arises of course about how the transcendental nature of Godcan be brought in harmony with the concept of God�s activity within theworld according to Sāṅkhya Yoga? In other words: How can a transcen-

36 Oberhammer 1977: 161.37 Cf. Oberhammer 1977: 177.38 Cf. for the following exposition Oberhammer 1977: 162�177.39 PYŚ I.24,1�10: atha pradhānapuruṣavyatiriktaḥ ko �yam īśvara iti?kleśakarmavipākāśayair aparāmṣṭaḥ puruṣaviśeṣa īśvaraḥ (YS I.24).�kaivalyaṃ prāptās tarhi santi bahavaḥ kevalinaḥ. te hi trīṇi bandhanāni cchittvā kai-valyaṃ prāptāḥ. īśvarasya tatsaṃbandho na bhūto, na bhāvī. yathā muktasya pūrvābandhakoṭir jñāyate, yathā vā praktilīnasyottarā bandhakoṭiḥ saṃbhāvyate, naivamīśvarasya. sa tu sadaiva muktaḥ sadaiveśvara iti.


dental self, pure consciousness, which per definitionem is totally freefrom any kind of activity, intervene in the world which is the realm ofmatter? The texts points out that God�s effectiveness within the world isquite limited. At the beginning of each of the cyclically reoccurring cre-ations of the world, he assumes a perfect (prakṣṭa) mental capacity,made out of the luminous substance sattva, in order to provide instruc-tion to a seer, and to start a lineage of teachers and pupils.40 This pro-cess, according to Sāṅkhya Yoga, is not an activity in the full sense ofthe word. It is an event that takes place in accordance with His com-passionate nature. Besides this, the concept of God in Sāṅkhya Yogaleaves no room for a this-worldly activity. The soteriological efficiencyof devotion to the supreme lord is therefore not a result of God�s action.It is brought about by �theistic yogic concentration.�

Patañjali provides a basis for his discussion of �theistic yogicconcentration� by way of philosophical reflections on the relationshipbetween verbal denotations (vācaka), i.e. words, and the objects of de-notations (vācya), i.e. the referents of words. God, according to PYŚI.27, is denoted by the praṇava, the sacred syllable om, which is his de-notation.41 Patañjali holds a theory of language, which claims a perma-nent connection (saṃbandha) between the objects of denotations (vāc-ya), and verbal designations (vācaka).42 This permanence apparently canbe put down to an identical structure of language and its referent.Although the relationship between language and its meaning is constantand non-accidental, the shape of phonetic entities�viz. the form ofwords�is non-constant and accidental, because it is established andmaintained by convention (saṃketa). The form of phonetic entities canbe subject to change, the logical structure of language cannot.

The author of YVi adds an empirical argument. The connectionbetween the syllable om and God is fixed, because the employment ofthe mantra inevitably brings about its effect. It is therefore comparableto the connection between food, which is the object of cooking, and fire,which is the agent of cooking. If there was no fixed connection between

40 PYŚ I.25,8�11: �jñānadharmopadeśena kalpapralayamahāpralayeṣu saṃsāriṇaḥpuruṣān uddhariṣyāmi�, iti. tathā coktam: �ādividvān nirmāṇacittam adhiṣṭhāyakāruṇyād bhagavān parama ṣir āsuraye jijñāsamānāya provāca� (Pañcaśikha,according to TVś and YVā), iti.

41 PYŚ I.27,1: tasya vācakaḥ praṇavaḥ (YS I.27); vācya īśvaraḥ.42 PYŚ I.27,3: sthito �sya vācyasya vācakena saṃbandhaḥ.


these two entities, fire would not be a suitable means for cooking. In thesame way, if there was no fixed connection between the syllable om andGod, muttering of the mantra would not bring about a direct experienceof the supreme lord.43 The means to this direct experience is describedin the opening passage of PYŚ I.28:

vijñātavācyavācakatvasya yoginaḥ�tajjapas tadarthabhāvanam (YS I.28).

The yogi, who has thoroughly understood that [God] is the object ofdenotation and [the syllable om] is its denotation, mutters the [syllable om] andmakes its referent visible.

The interdependence of mantra-muttering and yogic concentration isthe subject of a stanza from the Viṣṇupurāṇa, which Patañjali cites asauthority for his outline of the theistic yogic meditation.

svādhyāyād yogam āsīta yogāt svādhyāyam āmanet |svādhyāyayogasaṃpattyā para ātmā prakāśate || (PYŚ I.28,5 f. = VPurāṇa6.6.2)

One should practice yogic meditation after mantra-repetition, after yogicmeditation, one should perform mantra-repetition. By means of theaccomplishment of mantra-repetition and of yogic meditation, the highest selfbecomes visible.

The author of YVi explains the process leading to an experience of Godas follows: Initially mantra-repetition establishes an orientation of themind towards the supreme lord. Once this orientation is secured, the yo-gi practices a meditative vision (dhyāna) of God. When his mind is un-distracted and the vision has become solid, he takes up an internalisedform of mantra-repetition, which apparently increases the clearness ofthe vision, until finally the supreme lord is the only content of con-sciousness.44 Then the mental capacity of the yogi attains one-pointed-ness.45

43 YVi 278,1�3: vācyavācakayor asthitasambandhatve tu praṇavarūpeṇābhimukhībha-vatīśvara iti nāvakalpate. na hi pācyapācakasambandhe �navasthite pācakāgnyu-pādānam pākārthaṃ kalpate. If the denotation and the object of denotation did nothave a settled connection, the direct appearence of the supreme lord in the form ofthe praṇava would not be possible. As [for example], if the connection between[food which is] the thing to be cooked and the thing that cooks were not settled, theutilization of fire as the agent of cooking would not be fit for the purpose ofcooking.

44 YVi 279,14�280,2:� �svādhyāyāt� praṇavajapād īśvaram praty avanatacittaḥ san�yogam āsīta� tadartham īśvaran dhyāyet. tadarthadhyānāc ca pra{ instead of ca


The similarity between the non-theistic yogic concentration hav-ing a consciousness content (saṃprajñāta samādhi) and its theistic vari-ant is obvious. The states of the mental capacity are identical in bothcases in that they both have a single content, which at first sight, how-ever, seems to differ. In the first case it was the individual self, in thetheistic variant the content is the supreme lord. If we remember the con-cept of God as outlined above, the difference is practically reduced tonothing, as both are identical in nature.

Patañjali provides an account of the experience of identity of theself and God in PYŚ I.29, which sums up the result of the theistic yogicconcentration:

kiṃcāsya bhavati tataḥ pratyakcetanādhigam[aḥ]� (YS I.29). � svapuruṣa-darśanam apy asya bhavati: �yathaiveśvaraḥ śuddhaḥ, prasannaḥ, kevalo, �nu-pasargas, tathāyam api buddheḥ pratisaṃvedī madīyaḥ puruṣaḥ,� ity adhigac-chatīti. (PYŚ I.29,1-5)

Moreover, from this (mantra-repetition and yogic meditation) [t]he [yogi] ac-quires the realization of his inner consciousness (YS I.29). [This means,] heeven acquires sight of his own self (puruṣa). He realizes: �As God is pure,clear, alone and free from trouble, so also is my self here that experiences itsmental capacity.�

The yogi�s realization that his own self is identical in nature with thesupreme lord must not be understood as knowledge gained by concep-tual thinking. This would, of course, not be compatible with the one-pointedness of the mental capacity. The realization rather has to be seenin analogy with the non theistic yogic concentration with content as de-scribed above. In non-theistic meditation the content of consciousness is

pra read cāpra with manuscript L}calitamanāḥ �svādhyāyam� praṇavam �āmanet�manasābhijapet. � tathā ca praṇavajapaparameśvaradhyānasampatyā �para ātmā�parameṣṭhī �prakāśate� yogina iti.� �after mantra-repetition��after muttering the syllable om�[the yogi] inasmuchas he has a mental capacity which is directed to God should �practice yogic medi-tation��should visualise God, the referent of the [syllable om]. And after the visu-alisation of the referent [of the syllable om], [the yogi] having a mind which is notwandering [around] should practice mantra-repetition�[he] should [silently] mutterthe syllable om in his mind. � And this way, by means of the accomplishment ofmuttering the syllable om and of visualising the supreme lord, the highest self�theone who is standing at the highest position� �becomes visible� to the yogi.

45 PYŚ I.28,2�4: tad asya yoginaḥ, praṇavaṃ japataḥ, praṇavārthaṃ bhāvayataś, cit-tam ekāgratāṃ saṃpadyate.



the individual self which experiences itself as the subject of individuali-ty. The self-realization in this state is imperfect, since the self as thesubject of an experience is still bound to its own mental capacity. In thecourse of development, the remaining content of the mental capacity isreduced, and finally the self perceives itself as pure consciousness. Inthe theistic variant the starting point is similar. Here too the self experi-ences a self, viz. God. This experience is not a direct one. The self canonly perceive the content of its own mental capacity, and therefore justhas an image of God. In the course of the meditation, this content ofconsciousness gradually decreases. The image of God as a self becomesweaker and weaker, and the eclipse of pure consciousness by a contentof consciousness vanishes. Finally, when all mental processes are shutdown, the mental capacity allows for an unrestricted self-perception ofthe self, a concentration which is not conscious of any object (asaṃpra-jñāta samādhi).


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M A R C U S S C H MÜ C K E R

Yogic Perception According to the LaterTradition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta∗

Normally knowledge depends on a corresponding object. In the case ofperception the correspondence is even stronger; the object has usually toexist at the same time and place as the perception that gives rise to it.But can perception as a means of valid knowledge bring something intoconsciousness, at least in some special cases, if the object is absent?Must the validity of perception be confirmed by empirical evidence, orcan it be valid even if its object is not presented to consciousnessthrough a contact between sense and object?

These questions deal with general problems in a theory ofknowledge. They are also crucial to the Rāmānuja School�s division ofperception (pratyakṣa) into sense perception (indriyapratyakṣa) andother types of perception such as perception of yogins (yogipratyakṣa).Rāmānuja himself discusses in his Śrībhāṣya the difference betweensense perception and other types of cognition whose object was eitherperceived earlier or is in no way perceptible (Śrībh 27,15-20). In thiscontext he considers recollection (smaraṇa) and means of valid knowl-edge, such as inference (anumāna), authoritative tradition (āgama) andthe perception of yogins. Although these kinds of means of valid knowl-edge have no directly perceived object, they are nevertheless consideredto be valid. He admits that means of valid knowledge like perceptionborn from a sense faculty (indriyajanman), requires a simultaneous ob-ject, i.e. its nature is restricted (svabhāvaniyama) to an object beingpresent at the moment it is perceived (svasamakālavartin). However,Rāmānuja argues, this is not the case for the above-mentioned means ofvalid knowledge and differentiates between them in the following way:

∗ I would like to express my gratitude to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek and Will Rasmussenfor improving the English of this article. I am also indebted to Vincent Eltschingerand to Eli Franco for valuable suggestions with regard to my Sanskrit translationsand the clarity of my thoughts.

284 MARCUS SCHMÜCKER

�For such indeed is the natural restriction of a perception bornfrom a sense faculty that it grasps an object which exists at the sametime [as its perception]. [But] this is not the case for all cognitions andmeans of valid cognition, because one observes that recollection,1 in-

1 Although recollection is listed here together with inference, etc., it is not consideredby Rāmānuja to be a means of knowledge (pramāṇa). For this reason he states �cog-nitions and means of valid cognitions�; recollection is to be subsumed under theformer, but not under the latter. Cf. also n. 3 below, where Rāmānuja rejects the va-lidity of yogic cognition on the ground that it is mere recollection. However, the sta-tus of recollection in the Rāmānuja School is somewhat ambiguous, for recollectionplays a significant role in the process of gaining valid knowledge, as frequentlypointed out by later exponents of the viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition. Their views, however,diverge. For Meghanādārisūri the view that recollection lacks validity is not accept-able (NDy 183,17: � smṛtitvam aprāmāṇyam ity anaṅgīkārāt). He distinguishes be-tween two aspects of recollection. Recollection relies on an object that was previ-ously perceived by some other means of cognition, and by which a mnemonic trace(saṃskāra) is left on the soul. In this respect recollection lacks validity. However,recollection does not amount only to an image of an object, but by the mere fact ofits own independent existence (svasattayā) or by the fact of being a recollection(smṛtitvam) it distinguishes itself from its own basis/support (svāśraya), i.e. the pre-ceding perception, and is in this respect independent and valid. Cf. NDy 183,18-19:sāpekṣatvam evāprāmāṇyam. sāpekṣatā ca viṣayaparicchede smṛter iti tatraivāprā-māṇyam. svasattayaiva svāśrayaṃ prati svaparicchedān na tatra sāpekṣateti na prā-māṇyahānis tatra. �The invalidity [of recollection consists] only in its dependency[on a means of valid cognition like a previous perception]. And the dependency con-sists in the recollection�s determination of the object. Therefore only in this respectrecollection lacks validity. [But] because it determines itself, by its mere existence,as different from its own basis/support (lit. it discriminates itself in respect to its ba-sis), it does not depend on that [support]. Thus, it does not lack validity in respect tothat [self-determination].�For Parāśarabhaṭṭa, another important exponent of the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition, seeOberhammer 1979: 115; Oberhammer comments on the passage smṛtiḥ pratyakṣaṃaitihyam anumānaṃ catuṣṭayam iti pratyakṣādyaviśeṣeṇa vedānuvādāc ca quoted inVeṅkaṭanātha�s NP 67,15 (in Oberhammer 1979: 44-45 (Fragment 8): �Fest steht,daß er [Parāśarabhaṭṭa] die Erinnerung, die auf einer durch Erkenntnismittel hervor-gerufenen gültigen Erkenntnis beruht, ebenfalls als gültige Erkenntnis betrachtet hat.[...]. Es sieht so aus, als sei der von ihm erwähnte vedānuvādaḥ im Anschluß an ei-nen oder mehrere Gründe (vgl. vedānuvādāc ca) vorgebracht worden, um dieGleichwertigkeit der Erinnerung mit den anderen durch Erkenntnismittel entstande-nen Arten gültiger Erkenntnis durch ein autoritatives Zeugnis zu belegen.�For Veṅkaṭanātha�s discussion of smṛti see for example NP 45,1: smṛtimātrāpra-māṇatvaṃ na yuktam iti vakṣyate, abādhitasmṛter loke pramāṇatvaparigrahāt. Formore detailed explanation to relationship between perception and recollection cf. NP


YOGIC PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VIŚ IṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA 285

ference, authoritative tradition, the perception of yogins, etc., grasp an[object] even if it exists in another time. And this is precisely the reasonwhy the means of valid cognition are invariably connected to their ob-jects. For a means of valid cognition�s relation with [its] object does notconsist in [its] invariable connection with a contemporaneous (svasama-kālavartin) [object], but rather in its opposing the falsehood of the as-pect [of the object] such as it appears [in the cognition] as related withthis [i.e. the means of valid cognition�s] space, time, etc.�2

Although in this passage Rāmānuja presents a clear distinctionbetween means of valid knowledges whose object is absent (kālāntara-vartin) and means of valid knowledge whose object is present at thesame time as the means itself (svasamakālavartin) and admits the valid-ity of a means of knowledge, even if the contact between sense faculty(indriya) and object (viṣaya) is not simultaneously given, in his Śrī-bhāṣya he does not elaborate much on yogipratyakṣa and its differencefrom a means of valid knowledge like sense perception.3

Perception (pratyakṣa), according to Rāmānuja, presupposes anobject (viṣaya) which usually has to exist at the same time (svasamakā-lavartin) as the cognition it gives rise to. This requirement becomesclear in his concepts of non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) and conceptual(savikalpaka) perception. Both perceptual forms of cognition � whichare enabled by the differentiating features of the object (saviśeṣaviṣaya)and which rely on sense faculties (indriyāpekṣa) � are dependent on

289-293. For Veṅkaṭanātha�s commentary on the quoted passage of the Śrībhāṣya,especially to the word smaraṇa, see TṬ 144,27.

2 Śrībh 27,15-20: indriyajanmanaḥ pratyakṣasya hy eṣa svabhāvaniyamaḥ, yatsvasamakālavartinaḥ padārthasya grāhakatvam. na sarveṣāṃ jñānānāṃ pramāṇā-nāṃ ca, smaraṇānumānāgamayogipratyakṣādiṣu kālāntaravartino �pi grahaṇadar-śanāt. ata eva ca pramāṇasya prameyāvinābhāvaḥ. na hi pramāṇasya svasamakāla-vartināvinābhāvo �rthasaṃbandhaḥ, api tu yaddeśakālādisaṃbandhitayā yo �rtho�vabhāsate, tasya tathāvidhākāramithyātvapratyanīkatā.

3 The context of the other passage where Rāmānuja deals with yogic perception is thefollowing: Having refuted that Brahman cannot be proved by normal perception, hegoes on to refute that perception produced by yoga is a pramāṇa for Brahman, evenif yogic perception as mentioned in the quotation above is accepted as means of va-lid cognition. He states Śrībh 97,16-18: �[�] Neither [can perception] produced byyoga [prove Brahman]. Even if this [cognition], which is born at the end of intensemeditation, presents [its content] vividly, it has no validity as a means of knowl-edge, because it consists only in the memory of what has been experienced before.�(nāpi yogajanyam. bhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajanmanas tasya viśadāvabhāsatve �pipūrvānubhūtaviṣayasmtimātratvān na prāmāṇyam.)


each other and are necessary for reaching a complete knowledge of anentity (vastu).

Thus, although the first perception apprehends the object to-gether with its differentiating features (saviśeṣaviṣaya) and could beverbalised in words such as �this [object] is of such and such [quality]�(ittham ittham), it is nevertheless incomplete4 in determining the object,because the generic structure (saṃsthāna) is cognised by the nirvikalpa-kapratyakṣa in only one perceived individual/object. Therefore, for Rā-mānuja, the two perceptions deviate from each other by the fact that therecurrence (anuvṛtti) of the generic structure which is common to dif-ferent objects or beings like cows cannot be grasped in the first percep-tion, but is indeed recognised in the second and subsequent perceptions,the savikalpakapratyakṣa. The required succession of the two percep-tions and their dependency on an object which is present at the sametime it is perceived, is summarized by Rāmānuja in the followingwords:�When grasping the object the first time, it is not known that [the uni-versal] cowness, etc., has a form that recurs. [But] in the [following]second and subsequent cognitions of the thing, there is the knowledgeof recurrence. [The fact] that cowness etc., which has the form of thegeneric structure of the object that is connected to the first cognition, isqualified by the property of recurrence, is to be ascertained by the sec-ond and subsequent cognitions of the object; therefore the second andsubsequent cognitions are conceptual. The recurrence of cowness, etc.,which has the nature of the generic structure of the object such as thedewlap is not grasped during the first cognition of an object; thereforethe first cognition of an object is non-conceptual.�5

However, the manner in which Rāmānuja describes this processof the two perceptions is quite closely connected with the knowledge�s

4 Śrībh 23,5-6: �A cognition [of an object] with some qualities is called non-concep-tual, It is not devoid of all distinguishing qualities, because such a kind of cognitionis never observed and is impossible.� (nirvikalpakaṃ nāma kena cid viśeṣeṇa viyuk-tasya grahaṇam, na sarvaviśeṣarahitasya tathābhūtasya kadācid api grahaṇādarśa-nād anupapatteś ca.)

5 Śrībh 23,9-14: prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe gotvāder anuvttākāratā na pratīyate. dvitī-yādipiṇḍagrahaṇeṣv evānuvttipratītiḥ. prathamapratītyanusaṃhitavastusaṃsthāna-rūpagotvāder anuvttidharmaviśiṣṭatvaṃ dvitīyādipiṇḍagrahaṇāvaseyam iti dvitīyā-digrahaṇasya savikalpakatvam. sāsnādivastusaṃsthānarūpagotvāder anuvttir naprathamapiṇḍagrahaṇe ghyata iti prathamapiṇḍagrahaṇasya nirvikalpakatvam.


dependency on sense faculty. But it seems that Rāmānuja does not pur-sue the matter further, for example he does not raise the question howyogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) could proceed even if the object isabsent (kālāntaravartin) and can be known independent of sense facul-ties (indriyānapekṣa).

His follower Meghanādārisūri, an important 13th century expo-nent6 of the Rāmānuja tradition, provides more details about yogiprat-yakṣa. In his Nayadyumaṇi, in the chapter defining the means of validcognition (pramāṇanirūpaṇa), especially in the section defining percep-tion (cf. pratyakṣanirūpaṇa, NDy 187-194), Meghanādārisūri describesnot only the conditions under which an object (viṣaya) can be known bymeans of valid knowledge, but also refers to yogic perception (yogiprat-yakṣa) and its taking place independently of a sense faculty (indriyāna-pekṣa), whereas perception (pratyakṣa) directed towards sense-objectsis normally defined as arising through the contact between an object andthe senses (indriyārthasaṃnikarṣaja). After explaining non-conceptual(nirvikalpaka) and conceptual perception (savikalpaka) he equates thefirst to sense dependent and the second to sense independent perceptionand identifies yogic perception with savikalpakapratyakṣa (NDy191,20-24).

However, the definition of yogic perception as independent ofsenses � also defined as extrasensory perception (atīndriya) � requiressome further explanation, because, for Meghanādārisūri, other beingslike the highest Self, i.e. the paramātman, the released souls (mukta)and the eternal souls that have always been free from saṃsāra (nitya-mukta), are also characterized as having this kind of perception. But arethey therefore to be classified as yogins and is their type of extrasensoryperception to be characterized as conceptual perception (savikalpaka-pratyakṣa)?

To provide the background that clarifies where Meghanādārisūriplaces yogic perception between normal perception and perception ofother transcendent beings, the following account will be guided by twoquestions: (1) What conditions define normal perception? (2) How doesnormal perception differ from yogic perception?

6 Meghanādārisūri�s lifetime cannot be dated exactly. Because he does not mentionVeṅkaṭanātha (1268-1369), but quotes Śrīharṣa (1125-1180) he can be dated to thebeginning of the 13th century.


(1) DEFINITION OF NORMAL PERCEPTION

In comparison to Rāmānuja�s view of objective reality and the indi-vidual being�s process of cognition Meghanādārisūri�s explanationsseem to elaborate and do not deviate from the authoritative statementsof the Śrībhāṣya. Nevertheless his exposition of the perceptions processare more detailed and facilitates its description.

Also for Meghanādārisūri empirical evidence is achieved by dif-ferent qualifying properties (dharma) such as being not separately (ap-thak) connected to an underlying substrate. Thus an object (viṣaya) canbe analysed as qualificand (viśeṣya) and qualifier (viśeṣaṇa), i.e. a sub-strate together with its qualifying property (dharma). It is important tonote that this definition of an object�s constitution is essential for speak-ing about perceptible objects which are qualified entities (viśiṣṭavastu).Thus, it cannot be argued that properties (dharma) alone can exist ifthey are not based on an underlying substrate, nor can the substratealone (vastumātra) exist if it is not qualified by properties.7

What kind of cognition of an individual being corresponds tosuch a defined objective reality and in which way is its cognition de-scribed? Even according to Meghanādārisūri already the first momentof perception, defined as non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapraty-akṣa) enables the distinct identification of an object. Here again, onecan point to the general thesis of the togetherness of qualificand (viśeṣ-ya) and qualifier (viśeṣaṇa): Just as no entity, i.e. an object, exists with-out qualifier, so is no cognition without an object.8

7 The relation (saṃbandha) between a substrate and its qualifying properties is notdefined as being a third, connecting entity; rather the substrate and its qualifying en-tity are defined as innately connected to each other. In general, it can be said that theRāmānuja school�s concept of a self-relating qualifier and qualificand differs fromother views of the relationship between the two, as for instance the monistic Advai-tic position, which argues that the mere substrate (vastumātra) is perceived, denyingits relation to something else by rejecting the cognition of manifold qualifiers (viśe-ṣaṇa). In this respect, the tradition of Rāmānuja school also argues against definingthe relation (saṃbandha) between qualifier and qualificant as inherence (samavāya).A discussion against inherence (samavāya) can be found in Rāmānuja�s Śrībhāṣyato Brahmasūtra 2.2.12; for Meghanādārisūri�s refutation of the relation (saṃbandha)as inherence (samavāya) compare NDy 193,3-14.

8 Strictly speaking, the term �non-conceptual� (nirvikalpa) is possibly misleadingagainst this background of such a fundamental thesis of the Rāmānuja school, be-cause one is already aware of qualifying (viśeṣaṇa) properties (dharma) in the firstmoment of perception.


The requirements for non-conceptual perception are illustrated by Me-ghanādārisūri in the following passage: �And a non-conceptual [per-ception] does not reveal a bare entity [i.e. without any qualifiers], be-cause the appearance of such a bare entity is not possible without pro-perties like universal, etc. [�]. Therefore, the knowledge of all [people][arises] as indeed being qualified by some qualifiers.�9 Again in thiscontext one can point out that perception of reality is enabled by anobject as being qualified. If one argues that the substrate alone (vastu-mātra) is the object of perception, a second perception that brings aboutfull knowledge of the object would be impossible, because what hasbeen perceived in the first instant must be recollected in the second per-ception. Neither the substrate alone nor only properties ungrounded inan underlying substrate can be recollected, but only something which isqualified by properties. Thus, Meghanādārisūri goes on to describe theprocess of knowledge in the following words: �Otherwise, in the secondand subsequent cognitions [of the same object], no recognition of theobject that is connected to the first [cognition] would be possible. Andif there is no [recognition of the object that was initially perceived],there would be no cognition of [an object] being qualified by many qua-lifiers.�10

A person is unable to be entirely aware of an object in the firstmoment, because of the swiftness (śaigrya) of the first moment it isseen (NDy 188,13). Therefore the initial perception of an object doesnot enable a person to grasp it completely; this requires a second levelof knowledge, i.e. the conceptual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa).Nonetheless, in Meghanādārisūri�s view, what enables the transition tothe second level, the knowledge of the object being qualified by manyqualifiers (anekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhī)? And what differentiates the twocognitions, i.e conceptual and non-conceptual perception?

Even if an object is completely known, only a few qualities areperceived in the first moment. The difference between non-conceptualperception and conceptual perception lies in the fact that a normal per-son cannot cognize the particular generic structure (saṃsthānaviśeṣa) at

9 NDy 188,8-9: na ca vastumātrāvabhāsakaṃ nirvikalpakam, jātyādidharmavidhura-tayā vastumātrasya pratibhāsānupapatteḥ. [�] ataḥ kenacid viśeṣeṇa viśiṣṭatayaivasarveṣāṃ jñānam.

10 NDy 188,11-12: anyathā dvitīyādipratyayeṣu prathamābhisaṃhitārthapratyabhijñā-naṃ na syāt. tadabhāve ca tasyānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhīr na syāt.



the initial non-conceptual stage. For the perceiving person, such a par-ticular generic structure appears through its recurrence (anuvtti) whichis itself explained as a property (dharma) and of which one does notbecome conscious (ullekhita) during the first moment of perception.11

Thus the process of knowledge can be described in the follow-ing way: initially one is aware of just a few qualifiers (katipaya-viśeṣaṇa). This is followed by the knowledge of the object as qualifiedby many qualifiers (anekaviśeṣaṇa). The second perception, therefore,is a conceptual perception entailing the knowledge that an object isqualified by many different qualifiers and that the object�s many quali-fiers correspond to the manifold concepts (vividhavikalpa) of the per-ception.12 Only at this point is the full correspondence between a per-ception based on a sense faculty and an object completed. It is due tothe recurrent nature of the universal that qualifies the substrate, quaqualifying property,13 that the object that was initially incompletely per-ceived becomes completely known in the subsequent step of know-ledge.14

Also in the next passage, Meghanādārisūri clearly states that anobject is known as being qualified, and it is recognized through thequalifying property, i.e. recurrence, in a second perception: �In thismanner, when one grasps [an object] as qualified by [a universal] suchas cowness, which is called the generic structure of the entity, this

11 Cf. also NDy 188,5-7: nirvikalpakaṃ ca ghaṭāder anullekhitānuvttidharmagha-ṭatvādikatipayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayārthāvacchedakaṃ jñānam. �Non-conceptual [per-ception] is a cognition which determines an object such as a pot to be qualified by[just] a few qualifiers such as potness, whose properties [such as] recurrence havenot [yet] been consciously figured out.�

12 Cf. NDy 188,15: vividhatvaṃ ca dharmabhedaktam ity anekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatvadhīreva savikalpakam.

13 It is perhaps quite important to point out in this context that the recurrence (anuvtti)is to be understood as a property (dharma) of the generic character (saṃsthāna), i.e.the universal (jāti) qualifying a certain individual; this is clear from compounds likeanuvttyādidharma- (NDy 188,16), anullekhitānuvttyādidharma- (NDy 188,18),anullekhitānuvttidharmaghaṭatva- (NDy 188,5), ullekhitānuvttyādidharma- (NDy191,20); and from the following quotation (Śrībh 23,9-14): gotvāder anuvttidhar-maviśiṣṭatvam. Especially a compound like anullekhitānuvttidharmaghaṭatva-(NDy 188,5) (for the translation, see fn. 7) makes clear that recurrence (anuvtti) is adharma of the universal (jāti), i.e. the generic character (saṃsthāna) of the particularobject.

14 That Meghanādārisūri follows closely Rāmānuja�s concept of perception is obviousfrom Śrībh 23,9-14.


[grasping] is conceptual, because in the second and subsequent cogniti-ons, the concepts of properties such as recurrence [gradually] arise.�15

The last key-term which is necessary for demonstrating theprocess of cognizing briefly according to Meghanādārisūri is saṃsthā-na, i.e. generic structure, which in turn he�following closely Rā-mānuja�equates with a universal (jāti) (NDy 188,27 saṃsthānarūpa-jātiº, NDy 189,2 gotvādisaṃsthānaº). In the first perception one graspsonly the object as qualified by the generic structure (NDy 189,4 saṃ-sthānādiviśiṣṭavastumātragraha); it is not known as the particular ge-neric structure of an object; but in the second cognition, i.e. the concep-tual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa), a particular structure (saṃsthā-naviśeṣa) is consciously figured out (ullekha). And for recognizing theparticular saṃsthāna of the particular object it must become consciousby the cognition of its recurrence (anuvttidhī) in many individuals;such a cognition arises from the recurrence of the first perceived genericcharacter not associated with the particular object (NDy 189,2 gotvādi-saṃsthānādimātrānuvttiº).

The following list summarizes the key terms Meghanādārisūriuses to differentiate the two forms of perception:

nirvikalpakapratyakṣakatipayaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaanullekhitānuvttidharmaanuvttyullekhābhāvasaṃsthānādiviśiṣṭavastumātragraha

savikalpakapratyakṣaanekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaullekhitānuvttidharmasaṃsthānaviśeṣollekha

Thus both forms of knowledge, i.e. non-conceptual (nirvikalpaka) andconceptual (savikalpaka), are necessary for someone who depends onthe first cognition, i.e. on the use of sense faculty.

This presentation of Meghanādārisūri�s definitions of perceptionwas necessary to understand the context in which he deals with per-ception of a yogin (yogipratyakṣa).

15 NDy 188, 15-19: tathā vastusaṃsthānākhyagotvādiviśiṣṭatayā grahe dvitīyādipratīti-ṣv anuvttyādidharmavikalpodayāt savika[l]patā tasya.


(2) HOW DOES PERCEPTION OF A YOGIN (YOGIPRATYAKṢA) DIFFER FROMNORMAL PERCEPTION?

For explaining the way in which Meghanādārisūri deals with yogic per-ception two important issues must be taken into consideration. One isthe sense-independency; the other is the difference between the yoginand other beings like the mukta, i.e. �liberated,� the nityamukta, i.e �eter-nal souls that have always been free from saṃsāra,� and the highest Be-ing, i.e. the paramātman, whose perception is also said to be indepen-dent of sense faculties. Because Meghanādārisūri understands the yoginas a being still existing in the saṃsāra (saṃsārin), perception is stillaffected by the influence of karman;16 thus, the perception of the yoginis not to be equated with the cognition of these mentioned transcendentbeings, which are liberated from bondage.

Apropos the first point: for Meghanādārisūri, the distinction be-tween normal perception and yogic perception concerns exactly thenecessity of a first, sense-relying immediate perception. Yogic percep-tion, on the other hand, is immediate knowledge that nevertheless deter-mines an object (arthāvacchedaka) independently of the sense faculties.Meghanādārisūri distinguishes between the two forms of cognition, i.e.normal perception and yogic perception, by stating: �The knowledgewhich determines an entity in an immediate manner is a conceptual[perception], because it is qualified by many qualifiers whose propertiessuch as recurrence etc., are consciously figured out. And the exclusionfrom non-conceptual perception is [pointed out] through the words�consciously figured out� (ullekhita) etc. And [such a conceptual knowl-edge] is twofold: yogic perception and non-yogic perception. Of these,the perception of a yogin is an immediate cognition determining the

16 According to Meghanādārisūri, the knowledge (jñāna) of the souls still bound in thesaṃsāra (baddhāḥ) as �contracted by the connection with the body which is causedby karman� (NDy 249,1 karmanimittadehasaṃbandhasaṃkucitajñānāḥ). Comparealso Veṅkaṭanātha�s passage in NP 70, 2-4, where he establishes his division ofpratyakṣa in yogipratyakṣa and ayogipratyakṣa also by reason of karman: asmadādi-pratyakṣaṃ dvividhā � yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti. tatra yogipratyakṣaṃprakṛṣṭādṛṣṭaviśeṣajam. tat yuktāvasthāyāṃ manomātrajanyam. viyuktāvasthāyāṃ tubāhyendriyajanyam api.


object independently of the senses etc. The demarcation from non-yogicperception [is seen in the expression] �independent of the senses�.�17

For the yogin every relevant factor for the progress of cognizingbeginning with the non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpakapratyakṣa)like the swiftness (śaigrya) of the first moment of the object�s percep-tion or the crossover to the knowledge of the recurrence (anuvttidhī) ofmany properties (anekadharma) can be omitted, because he is able todetermine the object (artha) without a simultaneous and sense depen-dent perception.

So far it is clear from this passage that yogic perception is ameans of explaining how knowledge can have an object independent ofthe time and place in which it is perceived.18 Meghanādārisūri charac-terizes such a knowledge later on by the expression deśādiviprakṣṭār-thāvacchedaka, i.e. �[a knowledge, which] determines an object that isremote from the place, etc., [where it is perceived]� (NDy 192,11). Nev-ertheless for such an object it is necessary to have been cognised in anearlier time through an earlier cognition, being then evoked again in aconceptual cognition.

To the second point: both, the yogin and the highest Self (para-mātman) together with the other kinds of souls (mukta, nityamukta)mentioned above are characterized as having perception that is indepen-dent of the senses. Meghanādārisūri�s discussion about the meaning of�independent of senses� should be presented in the following. The pas-sage in which he explains the difference between the perception of theyogin and that of the highest Self starts with an objection in which theopponent denies that the Śrībhāṣya teaches yogipratyakṣa. By showing

17 NDy 191,20: ullekhitānuvttyādidharmakānekaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭatayā sākṣādvastuvya-vacchedakaṃ jñānam savikalpakaṃ. ullekhitetyādipadān nirvikalpakavyāvttiḥ tacca dvividham � yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti. tatra yogipratyakṣam indri-yādyanapekṣam arthāvacchedakaṃ sākṣājjñānam. indriyādyanapekṣam ity ayogi-pratyakṣavyavacchedaḥ.

18 Again it can be pointed out in this context that what is defined by Meghanādārisūrias non-yogic perception presupposes an object known by sense faculties and be-longs to the above mentioned process of nirvikalpika- and savikalpikapratyakṣa of anormal person; he states NDy 192,27-28: purodeśādisaṃbaddhapadārthānām indri-yāṇāṃ ca saṃnikarṣaviśeṣasāpekṣaṃ sāksādavacchedakaṃ jñānam ayogipraty-akṣam. �A non-yogic [conceptual] perception is a cognition which determines [itsobject] in immediate manner [and] which depends on a special connection betweenthings that are connected to place, etc., [being located] before [the perceiver] and thesenses/sense faculties.�


that even the highest Self can be called a yogin (cf. NDy 192,20-21) andcan be connected with extraordinary qualities such as supernaturalknowledge (jñāna) and power (śakti), Meghanādārisūri argues that Rā-mānuja, too, considers yogic perception to be acceptable. And sinceother beings such as the above mentioned nityamuktas, �souls that havealways been free from saṃsāra,� muktas, �liberated souls,� and evensaṃsārins, �souls still bound in the saṃsāra,� can be connected to suchextraordinary qualities, they can, according to Meghanādārisūri, also beclassified as yogins. But this does not imply that every being which isdefinable as a yogin cognizes by a conceptual perception (savikalpaka-pratyakṣa) and it does not imply that the sense-independent cognition ofthe yogin and of the other beings can be equated. For instance, the yoginremains still in contrast to the highest Being and other beings, becausesuch a yogin is focused in the conceptual perception on particular ob-jects (artha), albeit remote in time or space, whereas the highest Self�scognition is turned to everything (sarvatra).

These distinctions become clear in the following passage, bywhich Meghanādārisūri tries to demonstrate that yogic perception is ac-cepted in Rāmānuja�s Śrībhāṣya. He refutes the opinion of an opponentthat Rāmānuja does not teach yogipratyakṣa by the following argument:�Even the perception of the highest Self and the liberated souls is in-cluded in yogic perception, because it is the same [as yogic perception]inasmuch as it is independent of senses etc. Precisely for this reason onecan read in the section about the antaryāmin [=Śrībh 175,16-18]: �Andfor the highest Self, its being a seer, etc., does not rely on the senses�.�19

But the opponent raises the objection against the equivalence, because itis the case that the paramātman is able to have immediate awareness ofeverything (sarvasākṣātkārasāmarthya), but for a soul still remaining inthe saṃsāra, even if it is a yogin, immediate perception of everything isimpossible. A second time Meghanādārisūri points out that also theperception of the highest Self (paramātman) is contained in the yogin�sform of perception; he argues: �Also for the highest Self, etc., their wayof perceiving is contained in the way the yogin perceives, because of

19 NDy 191,28: paramātmamuktapratyakṣasyāpi yogipratyakṣa evāntarbhāvaḥ, tasyā-pīndriyādyanapekṣatvasāmyāt. ata eva hy antaryāmyadhikaraṇe na ca parasyātma-naḥ karaṇāyattaṃ draṣṭtvādikam ity uktiḥ.



their [i.e. the paramātmans and the yogin�s] identity by an added con-dition (upādhi) consisting in the independency from the senses, etc.�20

In the following passage he differentiates step by step the mean-ing of �independent of senses� (indriyānapekṣa). The yogin�s way ofknowing as conceptual cognition (savikalpaka) is still connected to a li-mited area of objective reality, while �being independent of senses� as-cribed to the highest Self means that such a being has a cognition of thereality on the whole; another aspect of their difference in perceptionconsists of the meaning of the body (śarīra). The yogin like every otherbeing in the saṃsāra has a body, which he can transcend in state of me-ditation, but, in contrast, for the highest Self never any dependency on abody and sense faculty is necessary. According to the School�s traditionfor the highest Self the cognition by senses connected with the body isonly a play (līlā). It is further noticeable that Meghanādārisūri uses theexpression atīndriyārthajñāna, i.e. �knowledge of extrasensory objects,�for qualifying the cognition of every transcendent soul. But the yogin�sknowledge can be only qualified in this manner during the state of me-ditation (yuktāvastha), whereas Meghanādārisūri applies the independ-ency of senses (indriyānapekṣa), when he discusses either the identity(sāmya/aikya) of perception between the yogin and the highest Self, orwhen he considers the conceptual perception of the yogin alone. Theimplication might be that independency of sense faculty does not entailcognition of extrasensory objects (atīndriyārtha), because it can be ap-plied for the savikalpakapratyakṣa just as well. Nevertheless everyknowledge of extrasensory objects (atīndriyārtha) is independent ofsenses. Meghanādārisūri continues his defence of yogic perception inthe following words:

�If [perception] depends on the senses, etc., the fact that it (i.e.,perception) determines objects that are spatially, etc., remote is not es-tablished. But the perception of a yogin is only a conceptual perception,because it does not depend on the grasping of the object. For, if theprocess of knowledge depends exclusively on the means of the senses,the recurrence, etc., of the generic structure, etc., is not known. [�] Thecognition of yogins, however, determines all objects, together with theirqualities, which are found in a place that extends only as far as the placeconnected [to the yogins]. In contrast, the support of the highest Self

20 NDy 192,11: indriyādyanapekṣatvarūpopādhyaikyāt paramātmādipratyakṣasyāpiyogipratyakṣāntarbhāva eva.


etc., is not only referring to yogic perception, but it is referring to every-thing. However, for souls still bound in saṃsāra, an object that is be-yond the senses is only determined in the state of meditation; at anyother time, there is [still] dependency on the senses.�21

Again Meghanādārisūri differentiates between the knowledge ofthese souls still bound in the saṃsāra and of the highest Self togetherwith the liberated souls:

�The highest Self and the liberated souls always have knowl-edge whose objects are beyond the senses. For them, appropriatingthemselves a body, senses and so on, is only a play. At that time (i.e.,when they play), [their] knowledge determines an object also by theway of sense faculty etc.�22

It is clear from this passage that the meaning of sense independ-ent perception which determines an object varies and is not the same,when it is ascribed to the yogin and to the highest Self. But to establishwhy in fact even the highest Self could be called a yogin Meghanādā-risūri refers to another meaning of the word yogin: the Self�s being ayogin is based on the meaning of �being connected with� (ºyogitvam)supernormal qualities.

The same kind of knowledge he applies for the souls �that havealways been free from saṃsāra� (nityamukta) and for the liberated(mukta) souls after the time of their release. But for the yogin still boundin the saṃsāra becoming qualities equal to the highest Self, i.e. to beconnected with extraordinary qualities, is according to their merit (puṇ-ya). Meghanādārisūri concludes the passage in the following words:

�And here and there it is observed that the highest Self, etc., isreferred to by the word yogin, etc. The reason for the use of the wordyogin to the highest Self is because it is also endowed with qualities likeknowledge, power, etc. And it is only due to the innate natures of [thesouls] that have always been free from saṃsāra that they are endowed

21 NDy 192,11-17: indriyādyapekṣatve deśādiviprakṣṭārthāvacchedakatvam asid-dham. yogipratyakṣaṃ tu savikalpakam eva, viṣayagrahaṇe vilambābhāvāt. jñāna-prasarāpekṣāyāṃ hi saṃsthānāder anuvttatvādyapratītiḥ. [�] yogināṃ tu jñānasyayāvaddeśasaṃbandhaḥ taddeśasthasarvapadārthānāṃ saguṇānām evāvacchedaka-tvam. paramātmyādyanugrahas tu na yogipratyakṣa eva, kiṃ tu sarvatra. saṃsāri-ṇāṃ tu yuktāvasthāyām evātīndriyārthāvacchedakatvam. anyadendriyādisāpekṣameva.

22 NDy 192,17-19: paramātmā muktāś ca sarvadātīndriyārthajñānāḥ. teṣāṃ śarīren-driyādigrahaṇaṃ tu līlāmātram. tadendriyādidvārāpy arthāvacchedakatā jñānasya.


with these qualities [i.e. jñāna, śakti, etc.]. But for [souls that have be-come] released, they manifest [these qualities] after their release. Bycontrast, for yogins still bound in saṃsāra, the degree of their mani-festation [of these qualities] is due to the degree of their merit.�23

To sum up: By referring to passages in Meghanādārisūri�s sec-tion defining perception (pratyakṣanirūpaṇa) it could be pointed outthat for different souls various forms of perception are required; theirform of cognition alters according to the distance or the soul�s beingbound to the saṃsāra. Non-conceptual perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa) is connected only to perception relying on sense faculty. Thenormal soul, whose body is still affected by karman depends on suchkind of first perception, but it is also able to cognize objects by yogicperception, i.e. a conceptual perception (savikalpakapratyakṣa). Even ifthe latter itself does not rely on sense faculty it is in line with empiri-cally perceived objects. Already for transcendent souls, i.e. the li-berated, the eternally liberated and the highest Self, complete independ-ency from sense faculty (atīndriyārtha) can be established. Sense inde-pendent (indriyānapekṣa) means here a cognition which has an object,but which in no manner is experienced by normal sense faculty.


NDy Nayadyumaṇi by Meghanādārisūri. Critical edition with introductionand notes by Krishnamacharya and T. Viraraghavacharya. [MadrasGovernment Oriental Series 141] Madras 1956.

NP Nyāyapariśuddhi: Nyāyapariśuddhiḥ by Sri Venkatanatha Sri Vedān-tāchārya with a Commentary called Nyayasar by Sri Nīwāsāchāryaed. with Notes by Vidyābhusan Laksmanāchārya of Brindāban.Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 251. Benrares 1918-1923.

Oberhammer1979

Gerhard Oberhammer, Materialien zur Geschichte der Rāmānuja-Schule I. Parāśarabhaṭṭas Tattvaratnākaraḥ. [Sitzungsberichte derphil.-hist. Klasse = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Spra-chen und Kulturen Südasiens Heft 14]. Wien 1979.

Śrībh Śrībhāṣya by Rāmānuja. Publishers: Academy of Sanskrit Research.

23 NDy 192,20-24: paramātmādeś ca yogiśabdādivācyatā tatra tatra dśyate. jñāna-śaktyādiyogitvam api yogiśabdapravttinimittaṃ paramātmanaḥ. nityamuktānāṃ casvabhāvād eva tadyogitvam. muktānāṃ tu muktyuttarakālaṃ tadāviṣkāraḥ. saṃsāri-yogināṃ tu puṇyatāratamyāt tadāviṣkāratāratamyam.


Melkote 1995.TṬ Tattvaṭīkā: Śrīmadvedāntadeśikagranthamālāyāṃ vyākhyānavibhāge

ttīyasaṃpuṭam.Tattvaṭīkā-Nikṣeparakṣā-Saccaritrarakṣā-Śrīpañca-rātrarakṣā-savyākhyāna-Bhugalonirṇayādika. Śrīkāñcī Prativādi-bhayaṅkaraḥ Aṇṇaṅgarācāryaḥ. Kanjīvaram 1941.

MARION RASTELLI

Perceiving God and Becoming Like Him:Yogic Perception and Its Implications in the

Viṣṇuitic Tradition of Pāñcarātra1

Yogic perception, even if not always understood in the same manner asin Buddhism, also holds its own position in the theistic traditions ofIndia. This paper will examine yogic perception and its implications inthe tradition of Pāñcarātra. The Pāñcarātra is a Hindu tradition that wor-ships Viṣṇu as Supreme God. The earliest evidence of this traditiondates back to the pre-Christian era,2 and the tradition is still present incertain aspects of the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition in South India today. Thispaper is mainly based on texts from about the ninth to the thirteenth orfourteenth centuries.3

A follower of the Pāñcarātra has two religious goals, liberation(mukti, mokṣa) from transmigration on the one hand and worldly pleas-ure (bhukti, bhoga; literally: enjoyment) on the other. The Pāñcarātrateachings concerning liberation from transmigration describe, as inmany other Indian religions, a continuous cycle of rebirths that arecharacterised by suffering. This suffering can only be stopped by thetermination of transmigration. Worldly enjoyment is the fulfilment ofall wishes one can imagine, as for example wealth, offspring, the fulfil-ment of sexual wishes, the death of an enemy, or the attainment of su-pernatural powers.

For the most part these two goals are striven for through the per-formance of rituals in which Viṣṇu or his spouse Lakṣmī, or still an-other subordinate deity, is worshipped. In these rituals, yogic practices

1 I am grateful to Eli Franco for his helpful comments as well as to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for suggesting various stylistic corrections of the English manuscript.

2 Cf. Härtel 1987.3 For the dates of the JS, SS, AS and PārS, see Rastelli 2006: 49-54, on the date of the

PādS ibid. 58f., on the date of the LT ibid. 274, n. 832.


300 MARION RASTELLI

are very often used. However, Yoga can also be independently practisedas means for reaching these goals outside of the rituals.

First I will deal with Yoga as an autonomous practice. Here wecan basically differentiate between two kinds of practices. One is apractice that usually consists of eight elements, which for the most partare to be practised one after the other. This practice is called aṣṭāṅga-yoga, Yoga with eight constituents, and is similar to Classical Yoga.4

The other practice is called layayoga, �reabsorption Yoga�. In thisyogic practice, several objects are meditated on in a particular order,each object being reabsorbed into the next. In the following, I will lookat these practices in more detail.

The first two elements of the aṣṭāṅgayoga,5 restraint (yama) andobservance (niyama), are prerequisites for this Yoga practice. They in-clude ideal mental attitudes of the yogin, such as abstinence from caus-ing injury, veracity, compassion and patience, and practical precepts forhis daily life, such as moderate eating habits, ascetic exercises, worshipof God and the study of holy texts.6 The third constituent is the correctposture (āsana) that the yogin is to assume during his Yoga practice.The fourth component is breath-control (prāṇāyāma), which helps theyogin to control his mind. The fifth element is called �withdrawal�(pratyāhāra). This means that the mind is withdrawn from the objects

4 Cf. Phillip Maas� paper in this volume.5 The following description of the aṣṭāṅgayoga is based on the yogapāda of the PādS

and AS 31-32. The practice of the aṣṭāṅgayoga is also mentioned in LT 16.31a and28.39d-48b. In this paper, I will not deal with all the Yoga descriptions in Pāñcarātratexts available to me, but primarily with those that explicitly speak about perceptionin the state of Yoga.

6 The full list of yamas and niyamas in the AS (31.18-30b) is as follows: yamas: truth(satya), compassion (dayā), steadiness (dhṛti), purity (śauca), celibacy (brah-macarya), patience (kṣamā), straightforwardness (ārjava), moderate food (mi-tāhāra), abstinence from theft (asteya) and from causing injury (ahiṃsā). niyamas:hearing (i.e., the study) of the settled doctrines (siddhāntaśravaṇa), munificence(dāna), resolution (mati), worship of God (īśvarapūjana), contentment (saṃtoṣa),mortification (tapas), faith (āstikya), shame (hrī), recitation (japa) of mantras andother texts, following observances (vrata). A similar list can be found in PādS yp1.7-10b. For further lists of yamas and niyamas in Pāñcarātra texts as well as othertexts, cf. Rastelli 1999: 179-182.

PERCEIVING GOD AND BECOMING LIKE HIM 301

of the senses and is focussed on the object of meditation.7 The next,sixth, step is the fixation (dhāraṇā) of the mind on the object of medita-tion. The seventh element is the visualisation (dhyāna) of the object ofmeditation in a manner that is exactly prescribed. The eighth and finalconstituent is absorption (samādhi), the immersion in meditation. I willdeal with its nature a bit later.

Some of the aṣṭāṅgayoga elements are also practised in theframework of the layayoga8. The yogin here also has, of course, to sit ina particular posture, control his breath and withdraw his mind from theobjects of the senses.9 And he is to visualise an object of meditation. Inthis visualisation, however, one finds a difference between the aṣṭāṅga-yoga and the layayoga. While in the former a single, static object ismeditated on, the object of the layayoga is dynamic.

In the layayoga, several objects are visualised in a particular or-der, namely in the �order of destruction.� What does this mean? Ac-cording to the Pāñcarātra�s concept of creation there is a fixed sequencein which the various constituents of the world arise. The material con-stituents, which are considered to be manifestations of God,10 arise outof the primary matter, which also is considered to be a manifestation ofGod. The various divine manifestations of God arise out of the SupremeGod Vāsudeva. In some texts the two series of creation are combinedwith one another.11 At the time of the destruction of the world, its con-stituents are dissolved into each other in the reverse order of their crea-tion, until only its ultimate source, primary matter and, finally, God,remains. The layayoga imitates this process of destruction. The yoginvisualises object after object in their order of destruction until he finallyreaches the Supreme God.

7 AS 32.56-57, PādS yp 4.8c-9b. PādS yp 4.9c-13b also gives an alternative definitionof pratyāhāra: the drawing of the mind from one point of the body to another and ineach case the subsequent fixation of the mind on these altogether eighteen points.

8 The following description of the layayoga is based on SS 6.194c-214, PārS 7.484-494, and LT 24.23c-32. For translations into German of the first two passages, seeRastelli 2006: 508-509 and 491-493.

9 These elements are explicitly mentioned in SS 6.198c-203b. They are also probablyimplied in the other descriptions.

10 Cf. Rastelli 1999: 98f.11 For the creation of the divine manifestations and of the material constituents of the

world cf., e.g., Rastelli 1999: 45-60; for the combination of the two creations, seeParS 2.29ff. and Rastelli 2006: 354.

302 MARION RASTELLI

To illustrate such a process I will give a similar example fromthe Lakṣmītantra. In this meditation, three immaterial aspects of crea-tion are traced back from their most immanent form to their most tran-scendent, namely, the states of consciousness, the Vyūhas, which arethe most important divine manifestations of Viṣṇu, and the constituentsof the mantra om. In doing so, the elements of the various levels areequated with each other.

state of con-sciousness deity constituents of om

waking (jāgrat) Aniruddha a

dreaming(svapna) Pradyumna u

deep sleep(suṣupti) Saṃkarṣaṇa m

fourth state(turya) Vāsudeva ṃ

state beyond thefourth (turyātīta) Lakṣmī-Nārāyaṇa

The yogin begins with the visualisation of the deity Aniruddha, who isequated with the waking state. He then mentally dissolves Aniruddhainto the first constituent of the mantra om, the letter a. a is then dis-solved into the deity Pradyumna, equated with dreaming, and Pra-dyumna is again resorbed into the letter u. u is dissolved into the deitySaṃkarṣaṇa, who is equated with deep sleep. The text then says thatSaṃkarṣaṇa is to be resorbed into the deity Vāsudeva without mention-


ing the intermediate step of the letter m.12 Vāsudeva, who is equatedwith the �fourth state�13 and with the last constituent of the mantra om,the anusvāra (ṃ),14 is reabsorbed into the brahman, the most transcen-dent form of God, which is represented by the couple Lakṣmī andNārāyaṇa in this context15 and which is equated with the state beyondthe fourth (turyātīta) state.16 Through steps such as these, in the layayo-ga the yogin moves gradually from more immanent levels to the mosttranscendent.

Common to both kinds of Yoga is the mental visualisation of anobject, be it a single object or a final object in a series of visualised ob-jects. The object of meditation can be of various types and depends onthe yogin�s aim. As mentioned above, very often the object is Viṣṇu or

12 Saṃkarṣaṇa is equated with the letter m of the mantra om; cf. LT 24.8. There aretwo possible reasons why this intermediate step of Saṃkarṣaṇa�s dissolution into mis not mentioned. One possibility is that beginning from the level of Saṃkarṣaṇaupwards, deities and letters are no longer differentiated; cf. LT 24.30-31b, whichsays that Vāsudeva is the �half measure-unit� (ardhamātraka, i.e. the letter ṃ, thelast constituent of the mantra om; cf. also LT 24.19-20) without differentiating be-tween deity and letter. The other possibility is that from this point the intermediatesteps with regard to the letters are implied but not explicitly mentioned.

13 The fourth state is a state of the soul that is beyond the three states of consciousnessnormally experienced in life. The concept of these four states of consciousnessoriginally derives from the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. For the given context, cf. the LT�sdefinition of the four states of consciousness: �Waking is the manner of proceedingof the external senses. The activity of the internal organ, in which impressions(saṃskāra) remain, when the power of the external senses is overcome by darknessis to be known as dreaming. When this [activity] is not existent, [this] is deep sleep.When the activity of the external and internal senses of a wise one who is not over-come by darkness [and] adheres to sattva stops, the continuous flow of tranquillityof pure sattva, is called fourth state.� (LT 22.23b-26b: jāgrad bāhyendriyakramaḥ |bāhyendriyāṇāṃ tamasābhibhūte vibhave sati || 23 antaḥkaraṇavṛttir yā saṃskāra-pariśeṣiṇī | sā svapna iti vijñeyā tadabhāve suṣuptikā || 24 tamasānabhibhūtasya satt-vasthasya vipaścitaḥ | bāhyāntaḥkaraṇasthāyā vṛtter uparame sati || 25 śuddhasatt-vaprasādasya saṃtatis turyasaṃjñitā | Cf. also LT 7.19c-24b for another passage de-fining the four states of consciousness).

14 There are several concepts of how the mantra om is broken into elements. The num-ber of units is often dependent on the number of entities that are equated with it (cf.Padoux 1990: 19ff.). Here, four constituents are needed in order to equate them withthe four states of consciousness and the four Vyūhas. Thus, the mantra om is con-sidered to be made up of the four units a, u, m, and ṃ.

15 Cf. LT 2.15c-16b.16 LT 24.25c-32a.

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Lakṣmī or a deity subordinate to Viṣṇu. How this object is visualised isprescribed by the texts exactly. Often the alternative is offered of visual-ising the God or the Goddess with or without a form; see again an ex-ample from the Lakṣmītantra: �Being well concentrated17, he is to visu-alise me18 as the unparalleled, inexplicable, unconceptualizable, spotlessLakṣmī, who is easily attainable everywhere, who is present in everycognition. Alternatively, the yogin [is to visualise me] with a form, asthe Supreme Padmā, with hands [showing] the vara[da-] and the ab-haya[mudrā]19, resembling the calyx of a lotus, with a lotus in the hand,endowed with auspicious marks. Or else [he is to visualise me as] theGoddess sitting on Nārāyaṇa�s lap, attaining the same essence [as He],consisting in consciousness and bliss, as well as Śrī�s husband who hasthe same nature [as I have].�20

Prolonged visualisation in this or a similar manner leads to ab-sorption (samādhi). It is usually in this state that the object of medita-tion is perceived, moreover, only this object and nothing else; cf. againthe Lakṣmītantra: �Having effected the visualisation in the right man-ner, he is to resort to absorption, in which [all] three, [i.e.,] the visualis-ing [person], the visualisation and the visualised [object] are dissolved.Then I alone appear, the eternal, complete I-ness. When I, the greatocean of consciousness, have reached singleness, then nothing else ap-pears, I alone, the Supreme One.�21

17 Although derived from the same root (samā √dhā) as the term samādhi, heresusamāhita probably does not mean that the yogin is in the state of samādhi as he at-tains this state only later (cf. LT 28.46ab; see below). Rather it probably expressesthe fact that the yogin needs more �power of concentration� to visualise the formlessGoddess than for visualising her in a particular form.

18 I.e., Lakṣmi, who is giving this prescription.19 The mudrā granting wishes (varada) consists in the right hand being raised with its

palm turned away from the body; the mudrā for fearlessness (abhaya) consists in theleft hand hanging down with its palm turned towards the body; cf., e.g., JS 8.104-105b.

20 LT 28.41d-44: māṃ dhyāyet susamāhitaḥ || 41 anaupamyām anirdeśyām avikalpāṃnirañjanām | sarvatra sulabhāṃ lakṣmīṃ sarvapratyayatāṃ gatām || 42 sākārāmathavā yogī varābhayakarāṃ parām | padmagarbhopamāṃ padmāṃ padmahastāṃsulakṣaṇām || 43 yad vā nārāyaṇāṅkasthāṃ sāmarasyam upāgatām | cidānanda-mayīṃ devīṃ tādṛśaṃ ca śriyaḥ patim || 44.

21 LT 28.46-48b: samyaṅ nidhyānam utpādya samādhiṃ samupāśrayet | dhyātādhyānaṃ tathā dhyeyaṃ trayaṃ yatra vilīyate || 46 ekaivāhaṃ tadā bhāse



For a better understanding of this description of achieving theperception of the object of meditation, I would also like to quote a fewdefinitions of the state of absorption: �Absorption is produced by theconstituents [of Yoga] such as restraint, etc. [It is] persistence in theSupreme brahman, which is called �abode of Śrī�. [It is] indeed devoidof any activity. Indeed it consists in direct perception. [It is] the state ofthose who know the true brahman. [It] abides in the non-distinction ofthe visualising [person] and the visualised [object and] is produced bymy grace.�22 �The third [method for attaining the ultimate goal], how-ever, is the undeviating, steady perception that has the nature of absorp-tion. It is an excess of grace indeed that is produced by excellentsattva.�23 �The yogins know this [visualisation] that in this manner isgradually increased by a continuous flow of remembrance and that isthe appearance of only the object as absorption.�24

What do these passages tell us about the nature of samādhi?First of all, it is a continuous, persistent, steady state that is devoid ofany activity. In this state, which starts with visualising an object, thevisualising person and the visualised object become one. This is empha-sized very often.25 We will see that there are different ways to under-

pūrṇāhaṃtā sanātanī | aikadhyam anusaṃprāpte mayi saṃvinmahodadhau || 47 nān-yat prakāśate kiṃcid aham eva tadā parā |.

22 LT 16.31-32: yamādyaṅgasamudbhūtā samādhiḥ saṃsthitiḥ pare | brahmaṇi śrīnivā-sākhye hy utthānaparivarjitā || 31 sākṣātkāramayī sā hi sthitiḥ sadbrahmavedinām |dhyātṛdhyeyāvibhāgasthā matprasādasamudbhavā || 32.

23 LT 16.39: tṛtīyas tu samādhyātmā pratyakṣo �viplavo dṛḍhaḥ | prakṛṣṭasattvasaṃ-bhūtaḥ prasādātiśayo hi saḥ ||.

24 AS 32.70c-71b: tad evaṃ smṛtisaṃtānajanitotkarṣaṇaṃ kramāt || 70 arthamātrāva-bhāsaṃ tu samādhiṃ yogino viduḥ | This definition could be influenced partly byRāmānuja�s Śrībhāṣya, which describes meditation (dhyāna) as �having the form ofa continuous flow of uninterrupted remembrance, like a stream of sesame oil� (ŚrībhI 55,1-56,1: dhyānaṃ ca tailadhārāvad avicchinnasmṛtisantānarūpam.), and partlyby the Yogasūtra�s definition of absorption (�Just this [visualisation] that is the ap-pearance of only the object [and] that is, as it were, void of its own form is absorp-tion.�; YSū 3.3: tad evārthamātranirbhāsaṃ svarūpaśūnyam iva samādhiḥ.)

25 See also SS 6.213c, PārS 7.493c, PādS yp 5.17 (see p. 309). Not all Pāñcarātrins,however, agree that the yogin achieves a complete non-difference with his object, asthis is against the doctrine of the Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta. Viśiṣṭādvaitavedānta is influ-ential in the Pāñcarātra and teaches a �differentiated� (viśiṣṭa) and not a completenon-difference between the soul and the Supreme God; for a discussion of this, cf.Rastelli 2006: 511-516.

306 MARION RASTELLI

stand this statement. Here, we have to relate it to the statements thatabsorption consists in �direct perception�, that it is �undeviating, steadyperception�, that �only the object� appears and nothing else. This meansthat the yogin perceives only the object and loses his awareness of self.

Finally, two of the quoted passages state that the state of absorp-tion is produced by grace. This means that the yogin must make an ef-fort to achieve this state, but if the Goddess appears to him is still herown step. However, I would like to emphasize that both passages men-tioning grace are from the Lakṣmītantra, and that I could not find simi-lar passages in any other Pāñcarātra text to date. Thus, the necessity ofgrace to achieve the state of absorption is not a general Pāñcarātra view.

The yogin is now in the state of absorption and perceives hischosen object, for example, Viṣṇu or Lakṣmī. This perception is, how-ever, not the end of the Yoga practice and not the ultimate goal of theyogin. Rather it brings about a state that is literally called the �state ofconsisting-in-Him/Her/it� (tanmayatā), depending on which object waschosen for meditation.26

Let us look at a passage from the Sātvatasaṃhitā that describesthis process. In this particular case, the process is preceded by mentalvisualisations of mantras of the four Vyūhas of Viṣṇu, which were al-ready mentioned above, namely, Aniruddha, Pradyumna, Saṃkarṣaṇaand Vāsudeva. These visualisations are accompanied by recitations ofthe respective mantras, and both the mental visualisation and the recita-tion aim at the yogin�s identification with the mantra.27 After describing

26 The attainment of tanmayatā is also described in Śaiva texts; cf. Vasudeva 2004:433-435.

27 Cf. SS 6.206-210b: �And then, having mentally repeated the mantra-king Anirud-dha, who is in the waking state (cf. p. 302 for the equation of Aniruddha with thewaking state), a hundred [times] with an ātman that is not different from him, his(i.e., Aniruddha�s) majesty and knowledge arise for him (i.e., for the yogin) on ac-count of the efficacy of the recitation of his mantra, which (efficacy) is connectedwith the persistence in the identity [with Aniruddha]. At the end of a year [theyogin] possesses non-duality with him on account of [this] repeated exercise. Hav-ing, however, then repeated the Pradyumnamantra two hundred [times], also con-tinually with the [thought] characterised by non-duality: �I am he� in exactly thesame manner, he becomes wise [and] one whose doubts are dispelled by [this] exer-cise on account of its (the Pradyumnamantra�s) power in the course of this sametime.� (tato jāgratpadasthaṃ cāpy aniruddhaṃ ca mantrarāṭ (mantrarāṭ can be usedin the sense of an accusative in �tantric Sanskrit�. I am grateful to HarunagaIsaacson for this information.) | parāvartya śataṃ buddhyā tadabhinnena cātmanā ||


this meditation, the Sātvatasaṃhitā states: �By means of this method,which is accompanied by an increase [in the number] of recitations, healso is to make the whole group of mantras mentioned before the sub-ject [of his meditation] till the Venerable One, whose manifestation isdissolved, who is spotless, infinite, a treasure of glowing splendour,compact consciousness and bliss, transcendent, unparalleled, [and]calm, appears at the place with the characteristics mentioned (?), till he(the yogin), concentrating his self on Him and giving up the perform-ance of recitation, through the non-difference of the visualising [person]and the visualised [object] attains the state of consisting in Him. Whenhe who is joined with the Venerable One attains stability in absorptionthat is free of a cognizable [entity] on account of repeated exercise, hethen becomes28 the brahman.�29

The procedure here is described quite clearly. The yogin visual-ises and recites the mantra until Vāsudeva, i.e. Viṣṇu, appears to him.Then he, ending his recitation, concentrates on Vāsudeva until the dif-ference between himself, the visualising person, and Vāsudeva, thevisualised object, disappears and the yogin becomes �consisting inVāsudeva�.30

206 tanmantrajapasāmarthyāt tādātmyasthitibandhanāt | mahimā tu savijñānas tadī-yas tasya jāyate || 207 abhyāsād vatsarānte tu tadadvaitasamanvitaḥ (v.l.) | athapradyumnamantraṃ tu parāvartya śatadvayam || 208 yo �yaṃ so �ham anenaivāpyadvaitena sadaiva hi | evam eva samabhyāsād matimāṃś chinnasaṃśayaḥ || 209 tat-prabhāvāc ca tenaiva tathā kālena jāyate |).

28 sampadyate can mean �he becomes� or �he attains�. Following Alaśiṅga Bhaṭṭa,who quotes MuṇḍU 3.2.9: brahmaiva bhavati to explain this expression (SSBh120,12), I choose the first meaning. Cf. Rastelli 2006, nn. 1630 and 1640 for differ-ent possibilities of understanding the word sampadyate in this context .

29 SS 6.210c-214: anena kramayogena japavṛddhyānvitena tu || 210 nikhilaṃ cāpyadhīkuryād mantravṛndaṃ puroditam | yāvad ābhāti bhagavān sthāne pūrvokta-lakṣaṇe || 211 pralīnamūrtir amalo hy anantas tejasāṃ nidhiḥ | cidānandaghanaḥśānto hy anaupamyo hy anākulaḥ || 212 samādhāyātmanātmānaṃ tatra tyaktvā ja-pakriyām | dhyātṛdhyeyāvibhāgena yāvat tanmayatāṃ vrajet || 213 yadā saṃvedya-nirmukte samādhau labhate sthitim | abhyāsād bhagavadyogī brahma sampadyatetadā || 214.

30 Cf. also the much shorter description of the AS: �Having then resorted to absorp-tion, the one having attained the state of consisting in Him obtains the completepower of the one abounding in śakti.� (AS 32.71c-72b: tataḥ samādhim āsthāyatanmayatvam upāgataḥ || tasya prabhāvam akhilam aśnute śaktiśālinaḥ |).

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What �consisting in God� means can be seen more clearly inother passages in the Saṃhitās.31 The following passage gives us an ideaabout the nature of the state of �consisting in God�, although it is notfrom a yogic context but that of a ritual: �By means of the visualisationthat was taught before, he is then to visualise himself and [his] body inthe form of Viṣṇu, which is abounding with the aggregate of the six[divine] qualities, in [his] own form, in all forms or in a form as desired.�I am the Venerable One; I am Viṣṇu, Nārāyaṇa, Hari. I am Vāsudevaindeed, the Pervader, the abode of beings, the Spotless One.� Havingeffected a very firm self-awareness of such a form, O Sage, the best ofthe sādhakas soon becomes consisting in Him.�32 As in the SS (cf. n.27), but here more clearly expressed, the devotee attains the state ofconsisting in God by means of a meditative reflection in which he formshis self-awareness in such a way that he conceives his I as being Viṣṇu,feeling himself as Viṣṇu in the sense of �I am Viṣṇu�. Consequently he�consists in Viṣṇu�.

We also find similar descriptions in other Saṃhitās. The LTsays at the end of the prescriptions for the layayoga described above:�And having dissolved this fourth state into the state beyond the fourthstate, which has the nature of [the couple] Lakṣmī and Nārāyaṇa, hehimself is to assume the divine �I-ness� of Viṣṇu. Having attained sucha state of dissolution, the one consisting in this [I-ness] then gradually[is to ...]�33. In a description of a yogic exercise for attaining the brah-

Becoming �consisting in Viṣṇu� in the context of yogic meditation is, however, notalways connected to a visual perception. There are several descriptions of this proc-ess in which visual perception is not mentioned. Although in these cases tanmayatāis also a result of mental visualisation, immediate perception does not occur. Itarises immediately after the visualisation (see SS 17.451c-452c ≈ PādS yp 5.24c-25c, PārS 7.493, LT 24.32, 38cd, 44.12.).

31 The following part of this paper, which discusses tanmayatā, is based on Rastelli2006: 503-507.

32 JS 11.39c-42: tatas savigrahaṃ dhyāyed ātmānaṃ viṣṇurūpiṇam || 39 pūrvoktadhy-ānayogena ṣāḍguṇyamahimāvṛtam | svarūpaṃ viśvarūpaṃ vā yathābhimatarūpakam|| 40 ahaṃ sa bhagavān viṣṇur ahaṃ nārāyaṇo hariḥ | vāsudevo hy ahaṃ vyāpī bhū-tāvāso nirañjanaḥ || 41 evaṃrūpam ahaṅkāram āsādya sudṛḍhaṃ mune | tanmayaścācireṇaiva jāyate sādhakottamaḥ || 42.

33 LT 24.31c-32: turyātīte ca tat turyaṃ lakṣmīnārāyaṇātmani || 31 pravilāpya svayaṃdivyām ahaṃtāṃ vaiṣṇavīṃ śrayet | tanmayas tādṛśaṃ prāpya layasthānaṃ tataḥkramāt || 32.


man, the PādS gives: �... and, thinking of the eternal brahman that lookslike a thousand lightning bolts [and] resembles the fire at the end of theyuga in the centre of the heart-lotus, having made his consciousness toconsist in it ...�34 In these two passages, the �I-ness of Viṣṇu� is as-sumed, or the individual consciousness is made to �consist in the brah-man�. Thus these passages also indicate that the devotee feels himself tobe Viṣṇu or the brahman.

As I mentioned above, the state of absorption, which is a pre-condition for attaining tanmayatā, in which the visualising person andthe visualised object become one, can be understood in different ways,namely, the subject becoming one with the object or the object becom-ing one with the subject. If we look again at the end of the passage fromthe SS quoted above: �... till he, concentrating his self on Him and giv-ing up the performance of recitation, through the non-difference of thevisualising [person] and the visualised [object] becomes �consisting inHim�. When he who is joined with the Venerable One attains stability inabsorption that is free of a cognizable [entity] on account of repeatedexercise, he then becomes the brahman.�35, it is rather the object thatmerges into the subject than vice versa. The devotee is in a state inwhich he identifies his I with Viṣṇu, i.e., his self-awareness is that ofbeing Viṣṇu, and in a state that is �free of a cognizable entity�.

We also find other passages that describe the disappearance ofthe object of meditation in the state of absorption: �And he is to con-template the object so long until he does not contemplate the object[anymore]. For if the existence [of the object] has become non-existent,his nature is declared as the Supreme One.�36 �The oneness of both thepersonal soul and the Supreme One is to be known as [the state of] ab-sorption, which accomplishes the goals of virtuous people. Performingthe visualisation �I indeed am the Supreme brahman�, being constantlyfirm like a pillar, he does not perceive objects. Just as external waterthat enters the motionless ocean abandons [its] moving nature, in thesame manner the personal soul of the yogin who is in absorption be-

34 PādS yp 5.24c-25: hṛtpuṇḍarīkamadhyasthaṃ smaran brahma sanātanam || 24vidyutsahasrasaṃkāśaṃ yugāntānilasannibham | tanmayaṃ ca svacaitanyaṃ kṛtvā(�) || 25. PādS yp 5.24c-28 is based on SS 17.451c-456.

35 SS 6.213c-214 (for the Sanskrit text see n. 29).36 JS 33.34c-35b: tāvac ca bhāvayel lakṣyaṃ yāval lakṣyaṃ na bhāvayet || 34 bhāve hy

abhāvam āpanne svasvabhāvaḥ paraḥ smṛtaḥ |.


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comes dissolved into the Supreme ātman (paramātman) in Vai-kuṇṭha.�37

However, we have seen that there is also another perspective onthis state. Let us look again at the passage from the AS quoted above:�The yogins know this [visualisation] that in this manner is graduallyincreased by a continuous flow of remembrance and that is the appear-ance of only the object as absorption. Having then resorted to absorp-tion, the one having become consisting in Him obtains the completepower of the one abounding in śakti.�38 In this description of becomingconsisting in God, self-awareness is not mentioned. And the definitionof absorption does not say that it is free of objects. On the contrary, thisstate consists in the appearance of an object. Subjectivity and thus self-awareness disappear.

This difference is, however, indeed only one of perspective,since the final result is the same, namely, the yogin becomes �consistingin God�. According to the one viewpoint, the subject, i.e., the yogin, andthe object, e.g. Viṣṇu, become one. The subject becomes the object andthe object disappears. This means the yogin becomes Viṣṇu; he is, in hisself-awareness, Viṣṇu. According to the other perspective, the subjec-tivity of the yogin disappears and the object alone appears. This doesnot mean, however, that the yogin ceases to exist. He continues to exist,but in his self-perception he has become the object that he has meditatedupon.

In the context of the AS, the object of meditation is Sudarśana,39

Viṣṇu�s manifestation as a discus (cakra), a weapon used in battle. Thismeans that in the state of absorption only Sudarśana appears for theyogin and the yogin becomes �consisting in Sudarśana�. Concretely thismeans that the yogin possesses all of Sudarśana�s abilities.40 These abili-ties include, for example, superhuman powers such as becoming as

37 PādS yp 5.17-20b: jīvātmanaḥ parasyāpi yad aikyam ubhayor api | samādhiḥ sa tuvijñeyaḥ sādhvarthānāṃ prasādhakaḥ || 17 aham eva paraṃ brahma tad iti dhyānamāsthitaḥ | sthāṇubhūto dṛḍhaḥ śaśvad viṣayān nāvabudhyate || 18 yathā bāhyajalaṃvārāṃ praviṣṭaṃ niścalaṃ nidhim | calasvabhāvaṃ tyajati tathā jīvaḥ pralīyate || 19paramātmani vaikuṇṭhe samādhisthasya yoginaḥ |.

38 AS 32.70c-72b (for the Sanskrit text see nn. 24 and 30).39 Cf. AS 32.59.40 Cf. AS 32.72ab: �He obtains the complete power of the one abounding in śakti.� (for

the Sanskrit text see n. 30).


small as an atom, the ability to destroy many enemy armies single-handedly, the attainment of whatever one desires, the subjugation of allbeings, and even omniscience and omnipotence.41 The possession ofthese abilities clearly shows that the yogin has subjectively become Su-darśana.

Thus, the final result is ultimately the same, independent ofwhether the subject has become the object, or whether only the objectexists in the end. A passage from LT 44 even describes these two possi-bilities side by side: �Constantly thinking [of Tārikā�s saṃjñāmantra42],the yogin, whose body has been made to consist in Her (i.e., Tārikā) byrepeated exercise, having become consisting in myself, attains my state.Or I, being known by him, having come to [his] direct perception, fulfilevery wish, whatever the yogin desires.�43 This passage describes first aprocedure by which the yogin becomes consisting in Tārikā by means ofthe meditation on her saṃjñāmantra. By this he becomes consisting inthe Goddess of which Tārikā is a manifestation, and he reaches the stateof being the Goddess. Alternatively, the passage describes a process inwhich the Goddess enters the yogin�s perception. The yogin is facedwith the Goddess as an object, probably as the only object. This meansthat the yogin either becomes the object of meditation � he becomesconsisting in it � or he faces the object, perceiving it exclusively.44

�Consisting in him� (tanmayatva, tanmayatā) probably does notmean that the yogin and God are completely identical. One could ex-plain the state of tanmayatva perhaps by the following analogy: An ob-ject made of wood �consists in wood�. It has all properties that woodhas. Nevertheless the object is not identical with wood. In the same waythe yogin �consists in Viṣṇu� and has all his properties, but he is notidentical with Viṣṇu insofar as Viṣṇu cannot be reduced to the person ofthe yogin.

41 AS 32.72c-76.42 śrīṃ svāhā; see LT 44.7ab, 9, and 11ab.43 LT 44.12-13: smaran satatam abhyāsāt tanmayīkṛtavigrahaḥ | yogī manmayatāṃ

prāpya madbhāvaṃ pratipadyate || 12 ahaṃ vā bodhitā tena sākṣātkāram upeyuṣī |vidadhe sakalaṃ kāmaṃ sa yogī yaṃ yam icchati || 13.

44 The actual difference here could be that in the first alternative, the yogin attainsliberation (mokṣa; indicated by the expression �he attains my state� [madbhāvaṃpratipadyate]?) and in the second, enjoyment (bhoga).

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The concrete consequences of tanmayatva are not the same inevery case, but they are determined by the object of meditation, whichin turn has been chosen according to the goal being striven for. If thegoal is liberation from transmigration, an adequate object of meditationis the Supreme brahman. By means of the meditation on the brahman,the yogin becomes �consisting in brahman,� he achieves the state ofbrahman, which means liberation. If the goal of the yogin is supernatu-ral powers, he is to meditate on a manifestation of Viṣṇu that is able tobestow them, such as his discus manifestation Sudarśana, as we haveseen in the example from the AS. Through the meditation on Sudarśana,the yogin becomes �consisting in Sudarśana� and thereby attains thesame powers as this divine manifestation.

Up to now I have described the achievement of the state of�consisting in God� by yogic means, i.e., by mental visualisation andabsorption, which in some cases are accompanied by the perception ofthe object of meditation and in other cases are not. However, the per-ception of God and the state of �consisting in Him� can also be attainedby other means.

I mentioned at the beginning that the religious goals of Pāñcarā-trins are mainly reached by rituals. In some of these rituals, God canalso be perceived and/or the state of tanmayatā can be attained. Suchrituals are mainly for the purpose of the achievement of worldly pleas-ure (bhukti, bhoga).45

These rituals are usually performed in an isolated place, wherethe devotee, following several observances, lives for a certain period.His main duty is to worship a particular manifestation of God, which hehas chosen according to the aims he wants to achieve.46

A general principle in Tantric ritual worship, to which Pāñcarā-tra worship also belongs, is that everything involved in the ritual, that is,the devotee, the implements and substances used in the ritual, the ritualplace, etc., must be suitable for the deity being worshipped. What is

45 tanmayatā can, however, also be attained in rituals for the purpose of liberation fromtransmigration and is actually a precondition for them; cf. the quotation from JS11.39c-42 above (p. 308) or JS 13.8c-10b.

46 In the following, I only give a very condensed description of this kind of ritual wor-ship, including only the elements most important for understanding the achievementof tanmayatā and the perception of deities. For a detailed description, cf. Rastelli2000.


adequate for a deity is only that which is like the deity. Nothing that isinferior to the deity is suitable for it. Thus the devotee must make every-thing involved in the ritual like the deity, including himself. There areseveral methods for making something like the deity. One is placing(nyāsa) mantras onto an object. Placing mantras means, for example,that the devotee places several mantras that represent various aspects ofthe deity onto his body.47 Doing this, he makes these aspects of the deitypresent on his body and thus his body becomes �like the deity�. Thiseffect is intensified by another method, namely, the devotee�s mentalidentification with the deity, as given in the passage quoted from the JS(p. 308).48 A further method is assuming the outward appearance of thedeity being worshipped. If the deity, for example, is usually consideredto wear red garments and certain types of adornments, the devotee is towear similar garments and adornments in order to have the same out-ward appearance as the deity. This method is also usually supported bythe mental identification with the deity.49 We see that the devotee has tobecome like the deity, �consisting in it� (tanmaya), already before itsworship. However, �consisting in the deity� can also be the result ofritual worship.

There are two main means for worshipping a deity for the pur-pose of the fulfilment of worldly wishes. One is the repeated recitation(japa) of a mantra a huge number of times. A mantra is a manifestationof the deity. It has two forms, a language form, e.g., the words oṃ namobhagavate vāsudevāya, and a visual form, e.g., an anthropomorphicbody.50 By reciting the language form of the mantra, which is accompa-nied by the visualisation of the mantra�s visual form, the deity is madepresent in both aspects.

47 For a detailed description of placing mantras on the devotee�s hands and body, cf.Rastelli 1999: 239-246.

48 Cf. also JS 6.185c-187b: �Listen well, Divine ṛṣi. I tell you [the upāṅgamantras]along with their secret doctrine. On account of their placing, the mantra manifesta-tion is mastered by the sādhaka wherever it be and it soon gives fruits to the oneconsisting in it. On account of their placing [and] on account of the meditation on[their] pervasion, the one who has mastered the mantras is equal to the Lord of thegods.� (samyak śṛṇuṣva devarṣe sarahasyaṃ vadāmi te || 185 yadvinyāsāt sādhakasyasiddho vai yatra kutracit | phalado mantramūrtis syād acirāt tanmayasya ca || 186 syāddeveśasamo mantrī tannyāsād vyāptibhāvanāt |).

49 Cf. Rastelli 2000: 329-331.50 For more details on the mantra, see Rastelli 1999: 119-140.

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The other means is offering huge numbers of oblations (homa)to the fire in which the deity has been made present previously, al-though this is generally done fewer times than the recitations. These aimat satisfying the deity.51

By these two methods, making the deity present by reciting andvisualising its mantra and satisfying it by fire oblations over a long pe-riod, the deity is forced to appear to the devotee. It then appears face toface with him and comes into his perception. It admits that it has beenmastered by the devotee and will be at his disposal from that time on:�Then, Brahmin, the Venerable Jayā herself comes. �You have masteredme well, Son. Free of fear and affliction, perform the action that is de-sired with my mantra.� Having so spoken, the Goddess, who has thenature of Nārāyaṇa, disappears.�52

The devotee has now attained his goal. By means of the mantrahe has mastered he can fulfil every wish that comes to his mind. Somepassages mention that this ability is accompanied by tanmayatā: �Hewho has mastered the mantra, having attained the state of consisting inhim, obtains all wishes.�; �Making Vāsudeva evident to his senses bymeans of many hundred recitations53 [and] by the same number of offer-ings to the fire, he firmly becomes consisting in Him. What is the use ofthese many words? By means of worship rituals, a man attains whateverstate is desired [by him].�54

Obviously, the state of tanmayatā described as the result of wor-ship has another quality than the tanmayatā that must be attained as a

51 For the mantra recitation and the oblations to the fire, see Rastelli 2000: 332-334(referring to the JS). References from other Saṃhitās are, e.g., NārS 5.7 and PādS cp24.83 (see below).

52 JS 27.118c-120b: tato bhagavatī vipra samāyāti jayā svayam || 118 susiddhāsmi ca teputra manmantreṇa samācara | yad abhīṣṭaṃ tu vai kāryaṃ niśśaṅko vigatajvaraḥ ||119 uktvety adarśanaṃ yāti devī nārāyaṇātmikā | Cf. also Rastelli 2000: 334-336(referring to the JS). For references from other Saṃhitās see, e.g., AS 44.21-22b,PādS cp 24.83 (see below), 169c-170, 25.266c-267, 28.77c-78b, 33.140c-141b.

53 Literally: by a hundred recitations in very large numbers (mahaughaiḥ).54 NārS 5.35cd: sarvān kāmān avāpnoti mantrī tanmayatāṃ gataḥ || PādS cp 24.83-84:

mahaughaiś śatajāpena tāvadāhutisaṃkhyayā | sākṣātkurvan vāsudevaṃ tanmayobhavati dhruvam || 83 kim ebhir bahubhiḥ proktaiḥ padaṃ yad yad abhīpsitam | tattad āpnoti puruṣaḥ samārādhanakarmabhiḥ || 84. Cf. also NārS 3.119-120b (see hereespecially the v.l. advayatāṃ [�non-duality-ness] in the place of tanmayatāṃ). NārS3.55cd gives tanmayatā as the particular achievement after the vāsudevamantra hasbeen recited 600,000 times.



precondition of ritual worship. By becoming �consisting in God� as aprecondition of worship, the devotee becomes like God in order to beadequate for worshipping him. This state is, however, neither permanentnor does it mean that the devotee is able to fulfil all his wishes throughit. tanmayatā as the result of successful worship, on the other hand, hasthese qualities: it is permanent and the devotee can obtain all his wishes.

We have seen that perception of God and the state of �consistingin Him� can be attained by different means: by yogic meditation on theone hand and by ritual worship on the other. At first view, these meansseem to be very different, but in fact they have a lot in common. Theyuse similar methods that, despite their different emphasis, aim at thesame two goals, namely, making an object present and thus perceptibleon the one hand, and identification with this object on the other.

Let us compare yogic meditation and ritual worship as describedabove. Yogic meditation starts with the visualisation (dhyāna) of anobject, for example, Viṣṇu. This visualisation can be connected with theyogin�s conscious mental identification with his object and/or with therecitation of the mantra that represents the object.55 Sometimes it iseven preceded by placing mantras on the devotee�s body, as I have de-scribed in the ritual context.56 Prolonged visualisation leads to absorp-tion (samādhi). Here the visualisation is perfected to such a degree thatthe object of meditation appears to the yogin so realistically that he ac-tually perceives it. He perceives it exclusively, leaving behind even hisperception of himself. Or, from another point of view, the yogin�s iden-tification with his object is perfected to such a degree that he actuallyfeels he is this object. In both cases he may achieve tanmayatā, that is,become like the object.

Ritual worship done in order to master a mantra and thereby toachieve worldly pleasure is preceded by placing mantras on the devo-tee�s body and sometimes by assuming the outward appearance of thedeity worshipped. These are the first steps of identification with thedeity being worshipped. In this ritual practice, the repeated recitation(japa) of the mantra, many times and over a long period, is central. It is

55 Cf. the example from the SS described above (p. 306), in which both identifyingvisualisation and recitation are applied. In the JS, recitation is also explicitly taughtas an element of Yoga practice (JS 33.10d-12b; cf. also Rastelli 1999: 339f.).

56 This is the case in the yogic meditation of the SS described above (p. 306); cf. SS6.195-197b.

316 MARION RASTELLI

connected with the visualisation of the mantra, thus making both as-pects of the mantra present, the linguistic and the visual. Fire offeringsseem to be a purely physical activity. However, this physical activity,done with the purpose of satisfying the deity, makes the devotee awareof the presence of this deity and enables him to enter the right frame ofmind for its presence. Through these methods that make the deity pre-sent and allow the devotee to identify himself with it, the presence ofthe deity becomes so real that on one hand it appears to the devotee inmanifest perception, and on the other, he feels himself to be the deityand thus to possess all its powers.

To sum up, we have considered yogic perception and the per-ception of supernatural objects effected by other means, both of whichare followed by the yogin�s becoming like the object. The methods usedto reach these states are different. Despite that, the various methods aresimilar in that they all make their object mentally present and let theadept identify with it.


AS Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā: Ahirbudhnya-Saṃhitā of the Pāñcarātrā-gama, ed. M.D. Ramanujacharya under the Supervision of F. O.Schrader. Revised by V. Krishnamacharya. 2 vols. Adyar 2nd ed.1966 (repr. 1986).

cp caryāpāda.Härtel 1987 H. Härtel, Archaeological Evidence on the Early Vāsudeva Wor-

ship. In: Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae Dicata, ed. G. Gnoliet L. Lanciotti. Roma 1987, 573-587.

JS Jayākhyasaṃhitā: Jayākhyasaṁhitā, ed. E. Krishnamacharya.Baroda 1931.

LT Lakṣmītantra: Lakṣmī-Tantra. A Pāñcarātra Āgama, ed. V. Krish-namacharya. Madras 1959 (repr. 1975).

MuṇḍU Muṇḍakopaniṣad: In: Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads. Vol. I.(Upaniṣadic Text with Parallels from extant Vedic Literature,Exegetical and Grammatical Notes), ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D.Vadekar. Poona 1958, 38-47.

NārS Nāradīyasaṃhitā: Nāradīya Saṁhitā, ed. R.P. Chaudhary. Tiru-pati 1971.

Padoux 1990 A. Padoux, Vāc. The Concept of the Word in Selected HinduTantras. Translated by J. Gontier. Albany 1990.

PādS Pādmasaṃhitā: Padma Samhita, crit. ed. S. Padmanabhan and R.N.Sampath (part I), S. Padmanabhan and V. Varadachari (part II). Ma-dras 1974, 1982.


ParS Paramasaṃhitā: Paramasaṁhitā [of the Pāñcharātra], ed. andtranslated into English by S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar. Baroda1940.

PārS Pārameśvarasaṃhitā: Pārameśvarasaṃhitā, ed. Govindācārya.Śrīraṅgam 1953.

Rastelli 1999 M. Rastelli, Philosophisch-theologische Grundanschauungen derJayākhyasaṃhitā. Mit einer Darstellung des täglichen Rituals.Wien 1999.

Rastelli 2000 id., The Religious Practice of the Sādhaka According to theJayākhyasaṃhitā. Indo-Iranian Journal 43/4 (2000) 319-395.

Rastelli 2006 id., Die Tradition des Pāñcarātra im Spiegel der Pārameśvara-saṃhitā. Wien 2006.

Śrībh Śrībhāṣya: Śrībhāṣya, ed. T. Vīrarāghavācārya. 2 vols. Madras1967.

SS Sātvatasaṃhitā: Sātvata-Saṁhitā. With Commentary by AlaśiṅgaBhaṭṭa, ed. V.V. Dwivedi. Varanasi 1982.

SSBh Sātvatasaṃhitābhāṣya: see SS.Vasudeva 2004 Somadeva Vasudeva, The Yoga of the Mālinīvijayottaratantra.

Chapters 1-4, 7, 11-17. Critical Edition, Translation & Notes.Pondichéry 2004.

yp yogapāda.YSū Yogasūtra: Pātañjala-Yogasūtra-Bhāṣya-Vivaraṇam of Śaṅkara-

Bhagavatpāda, crit. ed. P.S.R. Sastri and S.R. Krishnamurthi Sas-tri. Madras 1952.

Part II

Meditation and Altered States ofConsciousness from an Interdisciplinary

Perspective


K A R L B A I E R

Meditation and Contemplation in High to LateMedieval Europe

In the Western European history of meditation and contemplation theperiod from the 12th to the 15th century differs significantly from thetimes both before and after. Earlier forms undergo important changesand the foundations are laid for spiritual practices of which severaldominated until the 20th century. Four trends are of special importance:� The development of elaborate philosophical and theological theorieswhich treat meditation and contemplation systematically.� The democratization of meditation and contemplation.� The emergence of new methods, especially imaginative forms ofmeditation.� The differentiation between meditation and contemplation and theirestablishment as methods in their own right accompanied by discus-sions about their relation and the transition from one to the other.The following article will treat these trends and other related develop-ments concentrating on Richard of St. Victor, the Scala Claustralium ofGuigo II and the Clowde of Unknowyng.

A. RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR�S EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH

The Regular Canons of St. Victor, an abbey outside the city walls ofParis, ran one of the most famous schools for higher education in the12th century. They developed a new form of philosophy and theology,unifying the monastic mystical tradition and spiritual practice with aspirit of critical reflection and systematical thinking typical of the risingscholasticism. In a practical and theoretical sense the Victorines con-nected science with a specific form of life.1

1 Cf. S. Jaeger, Humanism and ethics at the School of St. Victor in the early twelfthCentury, in: Mediaeval Studies 55 (1993) 51-79.

322 KARL BAIER

Richard of St. Victor (?-1173) �must be counted as the most significantof the Victorine mystics, both for the profundity of his thought and hissubsequent influence on the later Western tradition.�2 He affected Tho-mas Gallus and Bonaventura, the English mystics Richard Rolle, WalterHilton and the anonymous author of the Cloud-texts, as well as Germanand Flemish mysticism. It is probable that his influence extended (indi-rectly) as far as the Spanish Carmelites of the 15th century, Teresa ofAvila and John of the Cross.3 Richard wrote two works concerningmeditation and contemplation which are of special importance. Benja-min minor, also called The twelve Patriarchs, interprets Jacob, hiswives, concubines and twelve sons as stages of preparation for the stateof ecstasy which is symbolized in Benjamin, the last of the patriarchs.Emphasis is given to self-knowledge and the development of certainvirtues.4 Benjamin major or De gratia contemplationis, also known asThe Mystical Ark, is a comprehensive manual on contemplation.5

In Benjamin major I, 3-4 Richard develops a hierarchical systemof different modes of cognition and correlates it to four basic cognitivefaculties which he took from Boethius: sensus, imaginatio, ratio and

2 McGinn 2004: 398.3 See S. Chase, Contemplation and Compassion. The Victorine Tradition, Maryknoll

2003, 141.4 The symbolical meaning of Benjamin is based on the Latin version of Psalm 68:27:

Ibi Benjamin adulescentulus in mentis excessu (�There is Benjamin the youngest, inecstasy of mind.�) On Richard�s concept of self-knowledge see H. Nakamura,�Cognitio sui� bei Richard von Sankt Viktor, in: R. Berndt and others (ed.), �Scien-tia� et �Disciplina�. Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahr-hundert, Berlin 2002, 127-156.

5 The Latin texts of most of Richard�s works are found in: Richardi a Sancto VictoreOpera Omnia, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne, Paris 1855 (Patrologia Latina 196). I quotethe Latin text of Benjamin maior from the edition by Aris. Translation of mainworks into English: Richard of St. Victor, The twelve patriarchs. The mystical arc.Book three of the Trinity. Transl. and introd. by G. A. Zinn, Mahwah 1979. For in-terpretations of his theory of meditation and contemplation see J. Ebner, Die Er-kenntnislehre Richards von St. Viktor, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie desMittelalters. Texte und Untersuchungen. Bd. XIX, Heft 4, Münster i. W. 1919; Ruh1990: 397-406; S. Chase, Angelic Wisdom. The Cherubim and the Grace of Con-templation in Richard of St. Victor, Notre Dame, London 1995; Aris 1996; Spijker2004: 127-184; McGinn 2004: 395-418.

MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION 323

intelligentia (sense-perception, imagination, discriminative rationality,intuitive insight).6

The lowest mode of awareness is termed cogitatio which isdominated by the first two of the Boethian faculties of the mind. It is�the careless looking around of the mind tending to deviate.�7 This kindof thinking is essentially driven by curiosity and other passions. It is arestless movement, lost in the multiplicity of things and does not lead toany valid results. �The senses [with the help of imagination, KB] offerimages to reason (ratio) where they become the objects of all kind ofthoughts. These wander around purposelessly. When the mind comesupon one of these free-floating thoughts and wants to know more aboutit, it has to concentrate and cogitation turns into meditation.�8

Meditation is a much more focused way of thinking. It emergeswhen cogitatio starts to become seriously interested in something whichit has uncovered. Meditatio and the following ways of cognition aresubsequent steps on a progressive path towards truth.9 Richard defines itas �the eager exertion of the mind which affectionately tries to investi-gate something.�10 The dominant mental faculty is ratio, discursivethinking, which investigates the cause (causa), mode (modus), effect(effectus), purpose (utilitas) and inner structure (ratio) of its objects.Meditation finally merges into contemplation, the fulfilled act of insightthat meditation is in search of:�If the mind after a long time of searching finally finds the truth, then itusually happens that it receives the new insight with appetite, gazes at it

6 See Boethius, Philosophiae Consolatio, ed. Ludwig Bieler, Turnhout 1957 (CorpusChristianorum Series Latina 94) V, 27-30.

7 Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9, 31-32): Cogitatio autem est improvidus animi respec-tus ad evagationem pronus. If not mentioned otherwise the translations of the Latintexts are mine.

8 Spijker 2004: 145.9 See Benjamin maior V, 12 (Aris, 137, 19-21): Ecce quibus promotionum gradibus

sublevatur animus humanus. Meditatione profecto assurgitur in contemplationem,contemplatione in admirationem, admiratione in mentis alienationem. (�Look,through which stages of advancement the human mind is elevated. Through perfectmeditation it is raised into contemplation, through contemplation into admira-tion/astonishment, through admiration/astonishment into the alienation of themind.�)

10 Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9, 28-30): Meditatio vero est studiosa mentis intentiocirca aliquid investigandum diligenter insistens [...].

324 KARL BAIER

with wonder and jubilation and stays in this amazement for a longertime. This means to exceed meditation within meditation and to proceedfrom meditation to contemplation. Because the characteristic of con-templation is to dedicate itself to that which it sees full of joy and withastonishment/admiration.�11

Contemplation is a free gaze of the mind into the visible mani-festations of (divine) wisdom accompanied by astonishment/admiration,a gaze which � as already Hugh of St. Victor (1096-1141) said, whomRichard quotes in this respect � is poured out everywhere over thethings to be known.12 Whereas cogitatio is like crawling on the floorand meditatio like walking and sometimes running, contemplatio iscomparable to a free flight (liber volatus) and a view from above, whichsees the whole landscape at once whereas the meditating person has towander on the surface of the earth from one point to the other discrimi-nating and collecting the different parts and dimensions of the meditatedobject.

The disclosure of truth in contemplation is intrinsically con-nected with the mood of astonishment/admiration (the meaning of theLatin �admiratio� as Richard uses it is somehow located between �as-tonishment� and �admiration�). That is because what is revealed to thecontemplative mind expands the established horizon of understanding(it is supra aestimationem as Richard says) and opens the human cogni-tion in an unexpected way (praeter spem) towards an insight which ex-ceeds its former capacity of understanding.13 We feel astonish-ment/admiration, whenever we realize a new perspective or discoversomething new (novitas visionis et rei), which changes our way of look-

11 Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 10,13-17): Nam veritatem quidem diu quaesitam tan-demque inventam mens solet cum aviditate suscipere, mirari cum consultatione, eiu-sque admirationi diutius inhaerere. Et hoc est iam meditationem meditando excedereet meditationem in contemplationem transire. Proprium itaque est contemplationiiucunditatis suae spectaculo cum admiratione inhaerere.

12 Benjamin maior I, 4 (Aris, 9,25-28): Contemplatio est libera mentis perspicacia insapientiae spectacula cum admiratione suspensa vel certe sicut praecipuo illi nostritemporis theologo placuit, qui eam in haec verba definivit: Contemplatio est perspi-cax et liber animi contuitus in res perspiciendas usquequaque diffusus.

13 Cf. Benjamin maior V, 9 (Aris, 133,15-134,18).



ing at things. In contemplation the leading faculty of the mind is puraintelligentia, pure intuitive insight into sublime and divine things.14

Contemplation is followed by the highest level of cognition, ex-cessus or alienatio mentis, which is treated primarily in the fifth book ofBenjamin Major.15 �The alienation of the mind happens when the mindlooses the remembrance of things present and, transformed by divineaction, acquires a state of the soul, that is alien and inaccessible to hu-man effort.�16 The soul is then outside itself in that sense, that it is tran-scending its natural capabilities and for a while loses the perception ofthe world around it and even of itself. Richard uses a poetic metaphorfor this process: As the light of dawn vanishes when the morning sunappears, so the light of human insight is flooded with divine light andsees things beyond the limits of mere human comprehension. This stateof mind is mainly brought about by a deep love of the Divine. Richarddistinguishes between different levels of ecstasy: a state in which onlythe activity of the corporeal senses is suspended, one in which imagina-tion has come to a standstill and a final absorption in which even intelli-gentia is no longer active. All forms of ecstasy are accompanied byexaltation and intense joy. After the excessus mentis the mind returnsonce again to itself and can then recollect and meditate or contemplatethe gifts which have been bestowed upon it.

Richard bases his theory of meditation and contemplation ongeneral epistemological and ontological considerations, and therebydoes not restrict it to certain Christian presuppositions and spiritual dis-ciplines. But of course it is related to practices which formed a part ofhis daily life as a monk for whom the bible was the ultimate source of

14 Benjamin maior I, 3 (Aris, 9,19-20): Specialiter tamen et proprie contemplatio dici-tur, quae de sublimibus habetur, ubi animus pura intelligentia utitur.

15 Evagrios Pontikos and Dionysios Areopagita discriminate in an analogous mannerbetween theoría and ékstasis. See W. Völker, Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseu-do-Dionysius Areopagita, Wiesbaden 1958; Ruh 1990: 57-63 and Aris 1996: 53-54.For an extensive treatment of ecstasy in medieval piety and theology see B. Weiß,Ekstase und Liebe. Die Unio mystica bei den deutschen Mystikerinnen des 12. und13. Jahrhunderts, Schöningh: Paderborn 2000; specifically for the 12th century seeR. Javelet, Extase chez les spirituels du XIIe siècle, in: Dictionnaire de spiritualitéascétique et mystique 4, 2109-2120.

16 Benjamin maior V, 2 (Aris, 124, 324-27): Mentis alienatio est quando praesentiummemoria menti excidit et in peregrinum quendam et humanae industriae inviumanimi statum divinae operationis transfiguratione transit.

326 KARL BAIER

wisdom and salvation. Albeit strong systematical intentions he articu-lates his thoughts on spirituality and contemplation often in the form ofbiblical exegesis. Moreover, his interpretation of the Holy Scriptures isin itself meant as a process which aims at spiritual transformation.Richard�s exegetical works are a written articulation and model of thisprocess and are intended to lead the reader towards contemplation.

�Richard presents the biblical text as a starting point from whichthe reader, participating in the reconstruction of the text, will composehis thinking (cogitationes) and his feeling (affectiones) by mimeticallyfollowing the text. In this way, Richard describes and guides the innerprocess. Sometimes he will emphasize the way to contemplation; atother times, the subject of contemplation.�17

This way of writing has its roots in the monastic practice ofreading the Bible, lectio divina. Indeed, the trias of lectio, meditatio andcontemplatio appears regularly in the writings of the Victorines.18 Per-haps more than anything else, meditation and contemplation were inte-gral parts of their interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. It was the Car-thusian Guigo II (?-1188 or 1192/93), who, influenced by the Victori-nes, elaborated what was probably the most influential medieval theoryof lectio divina leading from simple reading to the ecstatic union withGod.

B. GUIGO II: MEDITATION AND CONTEMPLATION AS PART OF BIBLICALHERMENEUTICS

Guigo�s Scala Claustralium (ladder for monastics), also known as Scalaparadisi (the ladder to paradise) and Epistola de vita contemplativa (let-ter on the contemplative life) contains one of the most concise analysisof spirituale exercitium (spiritual exercise) written in the High MedievalAges.19 The abbot of La Chartreuse unfolds an elaborate understanding

17 Spijker 2004: 130.18 See e. g. Hugh of St. Victor, Didascalicon III, 10; V, 9.19 For a critical edition of the text see Guigo II. Introductions and interpretations: The

introduction to the above mentioned volume Sources Chrétiennes 163, 7-79; Tug-well 1984: 93-124; Ruh 1990: 220-225. McGinn 2004: 357-359; Dariuz Dolatowski,Die Methode des inneren Gebetes im Werk �Scala Claustralium sive tractatus demodo orandi� des Guigo II. des Karthäusers, in: J. Hogg (ed.), The Mystical Tradi-tion and the Carthusians, vol. 2 (AC 55/2), Salzburg 1995, 144-167.


of meditation and contemplation which integrates the two as well asprayer into the reading and interpretation of the Bible. Lectio divina wasthe fundamental individual monastic practice of Benedictine monasti-cism which usually took two to three hours a day. In the course of theearly medieval period it had become more or less identical with thememorizing of biblical texts for liturgical purposes. It was only in the11th century that the tradition of the Desert Fathers was revived and thenew order of the Carthusians who took part in this reform movementunited the lifestyle of the hermit with monastic community life. This ledto an interiorization of religious reading which is reflected in Guigo�stext.20 Influenced by the early scholastic culture he approaches his topicin a systematical way, trying to clearly define the various stages of thehermeneutical process which leads to a mystical understanding of theHoly Scriptures:�Reading is a busy looking into the scriptures with an attentive mind.Meditation is a studious activity of the mind, which searches for somehidden truth under the guidance of one�s own reason. Prayer is a devoutturning of the heart to God to get evils removed or to obtain goodthings. Contemplation is a certain elevation of the mind above itself,being suspended in God, tasting the joy of eternal sweetness.�21

The whole exercise can be described in more detail as follows (Iuse the masculine form because the text was addressed primarily tomonks):

20 The shift towards personal experience is part of broader changes in spirituality,away from the liturgical, ritual devotions of the earlier Middle Ages. These changescontinue during the 12th century. See G. Constable: The Reformation of the 12thCentury, Cambridge 1996. C. W. Bynum, Jesus as Mother. Studies in the Spiritual-ity of the High Middle Ages, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1984, 16-17 sums up the de-velopments which also affected the spirituality of the Victorines: �The fundamentalreligious drama is now located within the self, and it is less a battle than a journey �a journey towards God. Hagiography [...] focuses increasingly on inner virtues andexperiences (often accompanied by external phenomena as trances, levitation, andstigmata) rather than grand actions on the stage of history.�

21 Guigo II, 84,32-38: Est autem lectio sedula scripturarum cum animi intentione in-spectio. Meditatio est studiosa mentis actio, occultae veritatis notitiam ductu pro-priae rationis investigans. Oratio est devota cordis in Deum intentio pro malis re-movendis vel bonis adipiscendis. Contemplatio est mentis in Deum suspensae quae-dam supra se elevatio, aeternae dulcedinis gaudia degustans.

328 KARL BAIER

� lectio: The monk reads the Bible in his cell � usually murmuring thetexts with a low voice � and follows the literal sense of the text as atten-tively as possible.� meditatio: If he comes across a passage or a single sentence whichtouches his heart and awakens his special interest, he starts to repeat itagain and again (a practice which traditionally is called ruminatio, therumination of the text). He illumines it with the help of rational thinking(ratio) by connecting the passage in a free, associative manner withother texts of the Bible which come into his mind, because they containthe same or similar keywords as the text which he is actually reading.The focus of meditatio is the moral sense (sensus moralis) of the Bible.It aims at insights as to what is of real importance in life according tothe Word of God, how one should act in order to achieve this, whatevils in one�s own soul would be obstacles to attain it and how to over-come them. The example Guigo is giving for this process shows that hedefines meditatio according to the somewhat rationalized Victorine un-derstanding and like it at the same time still clings to the traditionalmonastic way of dealing with the Bible. This line of thought is not somuch shaped according to Aristotelian syllogisms or philological accu-racy as in later academic theology. Using the scripture in a very freeway the meditating monk wove a web of allusions and quotations whichwere meant to create an emotional impact and deepen it. In this respectGuigo�s art of meditation is very similar to the rhetoric of medievalmonastic sermons and the style of exegetical works of his time. Thebasis for this kind of thinking was the mnemonic culture of the monas-teries.22

� oratio: The next step is to ask God for everything that is required forthe necessary change of one�s life and for opening the soul to His pres-ence. The Christian tradition has always seen a close connection be-tween meditation/contemplation and prayer. If we take the widest senseof the word and understand prayer like John of Damascus as every kind

22 M. Carruthers, The Craft of Thought. Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Im-ages, 400-1200, Cambridge 1998, 115: �Though the goal of spiritual life is the un-mediated vision of God, divine theoria, one can only get there by travelling throughone�s memory. A person�s entire memory is a composition among whose places,routes, and pathways one must move whenever one thinks about anything. This iswhy the most powerful, the most fruitful engine of the mind in meditation was con-sidered to be that pia memoria of which Hugo of Rouen spoke.�


of �elevation of the mind towards God� then of course meditation andcontemplation are just different forms of prayer.23 Guigo uses the termin the popular restricted sense of petitionary prayer and describes it asthe spontaneous result of meditation on the moral sense of the Bible.The view that meditation leads to petitionary prayer was a commonfeature in High Medieval spirituality, founded on the belief that a sub-stantial change of one�s way of life would only be possible with thehelp of the Divine. Hugh of St. Victor recognizes the same transitionand St. Bernard explains it in a very similar way to Guigo: �Meditationteaches us what is lacking, prayer obtains it for us [...] By meditation werecognize the dangers which beset us and by prayer, at the gift of ourLord Jesus Christ, we escape them.�24

� contemplatio: God �does not wait until it [the soul, KB] has finishedspeaking, but interrupts the flow of its prayer in mid-course and hastensto present himself and come to meet the yearning soul, bathed with thedew of heavenly sweetness.�25 The deepest level of understanding ofbiblical texts is gained when one experiences their mystical sense (ana-gogia, sensus mysticus). This can only be fully realized in contempla-tion as a direct encounter with God. Guigo does not discriminate be-tween contemplatio and excessus mentis as Richard did. For him con-templation is the immediate ecstatic encounter with the Divine. He de-scribes the experience of God�s loving presence as sweetness (dulcedo),a very popular expression in medieval monastic literature.26 The mostimportant biblical reference is psalm 33: 9: Gustate et videte quamsuavis est Dominus!: �Taste and see how sweet the Lord is!� In our textdulcedo is an ecstatic bliss compared by Guigo with sexual ecstasy, acommon thought, since medieval exegesis interpreted the erotic poetry

23 John of Damascus: De fide orthodoxa III 24 [PG 94,1089]: elevatio mentis adDeum.

24 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Feast of St. Andrew 10 cited according toTugwell 1984, 115.

25 Guigo II, 96,159-164: Dominus autem [...] non expectat donec sermonem finierit,sed medium orationis cursum interrumpens, festinus se ingerit et animae desiderantifestinus occurrit coelestis rore dulcedinis perfusus [...]. I quote the English transla-tion of Tugwell 1984, 96.

26 See F. Ohly, Geistige Süße bei Otfried, in: Friedrich Ohly, Schriften zur mittelalter-lichen Bedeutungsforschung, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt 1977,93-127; R. Fulton: �Taste and see that the Lord is sweet� (Ps. 33: 9): The Flavour ofGod in the Monastic West, in: The Journal of Religion 86 (2006) 169-204.


330 KARL BAIER

of the Song of Songs as an allegory of the mystical union between Godand the soul.27

According to our abbot and many other medieval authors theencounter with God takes place in the acies mentis, the peak of themind. This word and its many synonyms like apex mentis, synderesis,radix animae and abditum mentis signify the very core of the humanperson which was considered to be the �place� of the mystic union withGod. The unity of the human soul, its undivided, centered being, wasthought of as transcending the manifold cognitive, emotional and vo-litive faculties and their respective activities. One of the basic differ-ences between meditation and contemplation is that in meditation thedifferent faculties of the soul are working, whilst in contemplation theiractivities are calmed down and the ineffable center of the soul awak-ens.28 In the eyes of Guigo, whose Chartusian way of life was directedtowards silence, solitude and prayer, the experience of tasting thesweetness of the Lord is not something very extraordinary. God answersto the longing of the soul with His self-communication even before itspetition has come to an end. Contemplation thus appears to be a notunusual culmination of the lectio divina.

After distinguishing between the four stages of spiritual exerciseGuigo shows how they depend on each other. Reading without medita-tion remains without fruit, while meditation without the guidance ofreading can lead to errors. Prayer without meditation is lukewarm.Meditation not followed by prayer has no effect, while prayer leads tocontemplation. The attainment of contemplation without prayer happensonly rarely.29

This very coherent system of spiritual exercise remains influen-tial until the present day where the protagonists of a revival of lectiodivina relate to it.30 But through developments that began in the time

27 See D. Turner, Eros and Allegory. Medieval Exegesis and the Song of Songs,Kalamazoo 1995.

28 For the history of the concept which can be traced back to stoic and neoplatonicphilosophy see E. von Ivánka, Plato christianus. Übernahme und Umgestaltung desPlatonismus durch die Väter, Einsiedeln 21990, 315-351.

29 See Guigo II, 112,349-354.30 See e.g. M. Casey, Sacred Reading. The Ancient Art of Lectio Divina, Ligouri 1995,

58-63; E. Friedmann: Die Bibel beten, Münsterschwarzach 1995, 18-23; J. Johnston:Savoring God�s Word. Cultivating the Soul-Transforming Practice of ScriptureMeditation, Colorado Springs 2004, 87-91.


when the Scala Claustralium was written, the different steps that Guigohad unified into a single practice either lost their importance, changedor differentiated themselves into separate disciplines.

C. SURVEY OF THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATE MEDIEVAL AGES

1. The decline of lectio as spiritual practice

Which changes with respect to meditation and contemplation did Chris-tian Spirituality undergo in the two centuries after Guigo? Firstly, thelink between the reading of the Bible and meditation lost its importance.�One of the reasons for the relative downfall of the old tradition of read-ing as the essential discipline of the spiritual life was the combination ofmore rigorous canons of exegesis with a more frankly speculative no-tion of meditatio.�31 Also the rise of imaginative techniques (which willbe treated below) had the effect that the Bible was often replaced bymanuals for meditation like the Vita Christi which transformed the bib-lical narratives into a sequence of scenes more suitable for visualizationand surrounded by commentaries which were easier to digest than theoriginal text. Whereas the quantity of devotional literature was explod-ing, only few Christians had access to the Bible, at least to the wholetext. As many heretical sects based their criticism of the Church on acareful study of the Holy Scripture, the Church officials were not veryenthusiastic about translations and the spreading of too much Bible-knowledge.

2. Democratization of Monastic Practices

It is characteristic of the Late Medieval Ages, that meditation and con-templation ceased to be a monastic privilege and became more andmore popular. This development is linked to social changes which didnot happen in the solitude of La Chartreuse but in the flourishing townsof that time. Increasing participation and creativity of lay people wereimportant factors in almost every dimension of the late medieval urbanculture. One side of this development was the growing wish to play anactive part in religious life. We also find a steady expansion of lay liter-

31 Tugwell 1984: 107.

332 KARL BAIER

acy in urban society especially among the mercantile and artisanclasses. The techniques of bookmaking had been developed enough tolet a market of religious books emerge. Spiritual Handbooks (calledspeculum or rosetum) became widespread. They usually containedcompilations of monastic mystical theology, simplified schemes of theascent to God, prayers, descriptions of visions and edifying storiesabout saints and miracles.32 These books were not written in the lan-guage of the Latinate elite but in the vernaculars and contributed to thetransfer of Latin theology and monastic spiritual literature into thecommon language of the people.

The rising religious interest of the lay people was moreoverstrengthened by the resolutions of the 4th Lateran-Council (1215) whichprescribed annual confessions as a duty and formulated the program ofreligious education for everybody. Within this context the scheme ofpenance-meditation was of increasing importance and became probablythe most influential and popular form of meditation. It usually startswith a reflection on the calamity and corruption of man and the confes-sion of one�s own sins (miseria nostra), while the second part deals withthe compassion of God especially as revealed in the life of Christ(misericordia Dei). The meditation ends in praise of God.33 This way ofmeditating was a kind of internalization of popular methods of cateche-sis, preaching and education. It helped to stabilize the reign of the reli-gious system and therefore it is not astonishing that its practice receivedofficial encouragement.

An extra-liturgical, individualized piety flourished �which,though often originating in religious communities, quickly found favourwith the laity.�34 The patterns of the new spirituality were often relatedto more or less traditional monastic forms, which have been adopted forthe needs of the urban citizens. Typical for the dispersion of monasticspirituality in the world outside the monasteries is the title given to the

32 See Steinmetz 2005: 82 and M. G. Sargent, Minor Devotional Writing, in: A. S. G.Edwards: Middle English Prose. A Critical Guide to Major Authors and Genres,New Jersey 1984, 147-175.

33 Penance-meditation was originally a monastic practice. The most influential literaryparadigms for it´s secularized use are John of Fécamp, Meditationes sancti Au-gustini and Anselm of Canterbury, Meditationes et Orationes, both 11th. century.

34 Duffy 2005: 233.


Middle English version of Guigos Scala Claustralium: �Ladder of clo-ysteres and of othere Goddis lovers�.35

The secularized forms found their way back into the monasteriesand hermitages and influenced the practice of monks and nuns. The newmendicant orders which consciously chose the urban societies as theirfield of activity led a much more �worldly� life than the traditional com-munities which lived in the countryside and followed the Benedictinerules. Therefore they also had to face the need to develop new ways ofreligious practice. Of course the clergy was also affected by the spreadof monastic forms of spirituality in the Christian cities. So, from LateMedieval Times onwards meditative and contemplative practices be-came increasingly popular among all strata of the literate EuropeanChristian society.

3. The New Mysticism

One side of this popularization was the emergence of what BernardMcGinn has called �New Mysticism.� He characterizes this movementas follows: �In Western Christianity, mysticism remained closely boundto monasticism until the thirteenth century, when reforms in religiouslife, especially the Beguines and the Mendicants, marked an importantchange. Older forms of mysticism, based on the withdrawal from theworld and programs of moral discipline and contemplative prayer, didnot die out, but they were challenged by new lifestyles encouragingtypes of mysticism that were more democratic, in the sense of beingopen to all (and therefore also communicated in the vernacular), as wellas �secular� in not demanding flight from the world.�36

Part of the New Mysticism was a revival of Denys the Are-opagite. Thomas Gallus (the last important theologian from the schoolof St. Victor) and others reinterpreted his apophatic theology in the light

35 Guigo II, A ladder of foure Ronges by which man mowe wele clyme to heven:Deonise Hid Divinite, ed. P. Hodgson, London 1955 (Early English Text Society231), 100/6-7. See Steinmetz 2005: 139.

36 B. McGinn, Mysticism, in: Hans J. Hillebrand (ed.): The Oxford Encyclopedia ofthe Reformation, Vol 3, New York/Oxford 1996, 119-124: 119.

334 KARL BAIER

of a dichotomy between intellectus and affectus, intellect and love.37

God is incomprehensible through the intellect, they said, but love tran-scends rational thinking. It alone is able to touch the divine mystery andto unite with it. The apex or acies mentis is now qualified as apex affec-tionis, the centre of a pure selfless love of God (amor castus) whichdoes not want anything from Him, transcends all bounds of knowledgeand meets God in mystical darkness. In order to cultivate this approachto the Divine New Mysticism emphasized special forms of practice,which supported imageless devotion and the calming of thought-activities. The term �contemplation� was increasingly used not only todescribe a state of mind but also to denote these methods. Meditationand Contemplation which used to be different stages of one continuousprocess now became autonomous spiritual practices.38 Whereas medita-tion, as shown above, found its place within the framework of the offi-cial religious system, the popularization of techniques of contemplationregularly caused tensions with the authorities of the Church, which fi-nally led to the marginalization and even condemnation of this form ofreligious life.

4. The Rise of Imaginative Techniques

In the Late Medieval Ages meditation is understood as a practice not somuch based on associative and argumentative thinking like in the 12th

century but on imagination. It no longer starts from reading the Biblebut rather from the imagination of biblical scenes which have been re-moved from their original context and retold in special manuals for theirusage within imaginative meditation techniques. Anselm of CanterburysMeditationes, Bernhard of Clairvaux and especially Aelred ofRievaulx�s method of meditation (which was originally meant as a part

37 For the differences between this view and Denys� mystical theology see D. Turner,The Darkness of God. Negativity in Christian Mysticism, Cambridge 1995, 186-194.

38 It is oversimplified to think that an exaggeration of analytical thinking was respon-sible for the destruction of what is idealized as the innocent unity of medievalprayer. For this view see T. Keating, Foundations for Centering Prayer and theChristian Contemplative Life, New York 2004, 21: �Unfortunately this passion foranalysis in theology was later to be transferred to the practice of prayer and bring toan end the simple, spontaneous prayer of the Middle Ages based on lectio divinawith its opening to contemplation.�



of eremitical piety) had created the basis for this form of meditation.Now the imagination of the Life of Christ and especially the passionbecame the central devotional activity.

One should imagine oneself directly taking part in the mysteriesof the life of the saviour. As Aelred of Rievaulx says: �Sta nunc quasi inmedio�, �Place yourself quasi in the middle [of the imagined situa-tion].�39 The imaginations were not limited to visual phantasies, there-fore I hesitate to call them visualizations. The meditator did not look atinner images but participated in a dramatic event in which all senseswere involved. This included the performance of certain postures andmovements, talking with the imagined persons, touching them, smellingthe odors of heaven and hell and sometimes even swallowing drops ofJesus� sweat and blood.

The paradigms for the most popular forms of imaginative medi-tation are to be found in the Meditationes Vitae Christi (≈ 1300,wrongly attributed to Bonaventura) and in Ludolf of Saxony�s VitaChristi (after 1348) one of the most widespread spiritual books of theLate Medieval Age. A passage from Ludolf�s book shows that the fol-lower of imaginative meditation considered this approach as superiorcompared to the hearing and reading of the Bible and imageless devo-tion:

�Oh good Jesus, how sweet you are in the heart of one whothinks upon you and loves you [...] I know not for sure, I am not ablefully to understand, how it is that you are sweeter in the heart of onewho loves you in the form of flesh than as the word, sweeter in thatwhich is humble than in that which is exalted [...] It is sweeter to viewyou as dying before the Jews on the tree, than as holding sway over theangels in Heaven; to see you as a man bearing every aspect of humannature to the end, than as God manifesting divine nature, to see you asthe dying Redeemer than as the invisible Creator.�40

Famon Duffy comments on this: �The enormous imaginativepower of this form of meditation, and its spread into the world of the

39 Aelred of Rievaulx, De institutione inclusarum in: C. H. Talbot (ed.): AelrediRievallensis Opera Omnia (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 1), Bre-pols 1971: 639-682: 679 (§ 33).

40 Quoted according C. A. Conway, The Vita Christi of Ludolph of Saxony and latemedieval devotion centred on the incarnation. A descriptive analysis ( Analecta Car-tusiana 34) Institut für Englische Sprache und Literatur: Salzburg 1976, 56.

336 KARL BAIER

[...] laity, is evident from the accounts Margery Kempe has left of hervisionary experiences, which seem in places to be little more than lit-eral-minded paraphrases of the relevant sections of the MeditationesVitae Christi or of Richard Rolle�s almost equally influential Medita-tions on the Passion, works read to her by the spiritual directors shefound in such abundance in fifteenth century East Anglia.�41

Visual media were used to support and sometimes also to re-place the imaginative methods of meditation. In the daily life practice oflay people as well as in the monasteries, visualization was often re-placed by contemplating pious paintings, drawings and woodcuts,which were created especially for this purpose. Images should serve assimulacra of visionary experience.42

The Books of Hours (Horae) which were from the 14th centuryonwards among the first mass produced books are good examples forthis. They not only contain psalms and other prayers which should beperformed at certain times of the day, but also illustrations as visualmaterial for meditation and prayer. Paintings or woodcuts of the Trinity,of the life of the Virgin, of the saints with their emblems, above allscenes depicting the suffering and death of Christ, served in themselvesas focuses of the sacred, designed to evoke worship and reverence.They were often conceived as channels of sacred power independent ofthe texts they accompanied. The fifteenth century had seen the circula-tion of devotional woodcuts which the faithful were encouraged tomeditate on, to kneel before, to kiss.43

The arguments of the theoreticians who tried to substantiate thepractice of imaginative meditation are very similar to the argumentsrhetoricians traditionally used to underline the importance of imagina-tion for the art of creating impressive speech. It could well be, that gen-erally the late medieval introduction of imagination into meditation is

41 Duffy 2005: 237.42 See J. Hamburger, The Visual and the Visionary: The Image in Late Medieval Mo-

nastic Devotions, VIATOR (Medieval and Renaissance Studies) 20 (1989) 161-182:K. Krüger, Bildandacht und Bergeinsamkeit. Der Eremit als Rollenspiel in der städ-tischen Gesellschaft, in: H. Belting, D. Blume (ed.), Malerei und Stadtkultur in derDantezeit: die Argumentation der Bilder, Hirmer: München 1989, 187-200 and K.Kamerick, Popular Piety and Art in the Late Middle Ages. Image Worship andIdolatry in England 1350-1500, New York 2002.

43 Duffy 2005: 214.


only an extension of the rhetorical structure which is so typical for theWestern European style of meditation from the Hellenistic schools ofphilosophy until Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556).44 It is, for example,obvious from the style of Aelred of Rievaulx´s writings that he was verywell educated in rhetorics and purposely uses colourful images to createemotional responses within the reader´s mind. From here it is only ashort step to the new forms of meditation, as in meditation imaginationis also is used �ad maiorem impressionem�, to create a greater impres-sion as Ludolf says.45 It thus functions as a link between the cognitiveand the emotional faculties of the human being. The meditative imagi-nation of biblical scenes (Is this different from �visualization�?) aimedat the emotional involvement in the life of Jesus and Mary.46 It shouldfinally lead to conformatio, a deep emotional mimesis with the protago-nists (not only Jesus and Mary but also the shepherds who adore thenew borne Jesus or Simone of Cyrene who helped Jesus to carry thecross etc.) of the holy drama � further supported by practices like real orimagined self-flagellation or standing with widespread arms to imitatethe crucifixion etc.47

This identification should not only intensify the experience ofGod�s redeeming love as present in the life and death of Jesus Christ.According to rhetoric and the late medieval theory of Christian medita-tion affectus mentis and effectus operis correspond with each other: onlythe arousal of proper emotions is able to affect a certain behavior. In thelong run the emotional conformatio with the biblical moral examplesshould build up good habits, cultivate virtues like compassion, humility,obedience etc. This intention of the imaginative techniques is quiteclose to Guigo�s understanding of meditatio, but the means to attain ithave changed significantly.

As already mentioned, the tie between meditation and contem-plation was loosened. The new meditation techniques tended to become

44 See P. Rabbow, Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike, München1954.

45 Vita Christi 4b, cited according Baier 1977: 484.46 See F. O. Schuppisser, Schauen mit den Augen des Herzens. Zur Methodik der

spätmittelalterlichen Passionsmeditation, besonders in der Devotio Moderna und beiden Augustinern, in: Walter Haug, Burghart Wachinger, Tübingen 1993, 169-210.

47 See P. Dinzelbacher, Christliche Mystik im Abendland. Ihre Geschichte von denAnfängen bis zum Ende des Mittelalters, Paderborn 1994, 333-334.

338 KARL BAIER

self-sufficient rituals without any space for contemplative prayer. InLudolfs Vita Christi the basic unit of practice consists of three parts:lectio, meditatio (sometimes completed by conformatio) and oratio inthe form of a concluding prayer.48 He has no distinct concept of con-templation and uses considerare, contemplari, meditari and attendere asequivalent expressions.49 At the end of some chapters or certain pas-sages Ludolf summarizes the content of the previous meditation andinvites the practitioner to become absorbed with it. But even this morecontemplative mental process is connected with thoughts, intense emo-tional movements, exclamations of pain, questions etc.50

D. THE EMERGENCE OF CONTEMPLATION AS AN INDEPENDENTEXERCISE IN THE CLOWDE OF UNKNOWYNG

The Clowde of Unknowyng, written between 1375 and 1400, and nowa-days one the most famous of all late medieval mystical texts, is suitableto exemplify the outlined developments.51 The anonymous author wasprobably a Carthusian. He addresses his text to a disciple, a young man,who was about to start an eremitical life. The text is an introduction tocontemplative prayer which the author conceives as the highest form ofChristian spirituality. �His prime motive is to teach a �special prayer�over and above the �preiers that ben ordeynid of Holy Chirche�.�52 Theauthor is very conscious about the fact that his manual, written in Mid-dle English, will not only circulate among Latinized circles of religiousspecialists but is bound to reach a broader audience. Therefore he in-

48 See Baier 1977: 488-489.49 See Baier 1977: 489.50 See Baier 1977: 497-498.51 The full title of the text is A Book of Contemplacyon, the whiche is clepyd the

Clowde of Unknowyng, in the whiche a Soule is onyd with God. I use the criticaledition by P. Hodgson. Introductions and interpretations: W. Johnston, The Mysti-cism of �The Cloud of Unknowing�. A Modern Interpretation (Religious Experience8) St. Meinrad 1975; P. Hodgson, Introduction, in: P. Hodgson (ed.), The Cloud ofUnknowing and Related Treatises, ix-lxii; R. W. Englert, Scattering and Oneing. AStudy of Conflict of the �Cloud of Unknowing� (Analecta Cartusiana 105), Salzburg1983; J. P. H. Clark: The Cloud of Unknowing. An Introduction. Vol. 1: An Intro-duction (Analecta Cartusiana 119/4), Salzburg 1995, Vol. 2: Notes on �The Cloud ofUnknowing�, (Analecta Cartusiana 119/5), Salzburg 1996; Steinmetz 2005.

52 P. Hodgson, Introduction, xxi with reference to Cloud 41, 1-2.


cludes instructions concerning the distribution of the book. It should notbe given to those who are merely curious about its content, but rather topeople who fulfill the criteria of being ready for contemplation. Thoseto whom the book is passed on should be advised to take the time toread the whole book, not only parts of it.53 Obviously he wants topropagate the practice of contemplation, but on the other hand he em-phasizes that he does not simply call upon everybody to just try it. In-stead those who feel motivated to try his method should first thoroughlytest themselves.54

The text follows the traditional discrimination between vita ac-tiva (actyve liif) and vita contemplativa (contemplatyve liif). It also al-ludes to a stage in-between which is at the same time the second degreeof active life and the first degree of contemplative life.55 So altogetherwe have three stages. The first stage of vita activa consists of works ofmercy and charity. The second stage of vita activa which is at the sametime the first stage of vita contemplativa is goostly meditacion. The sec-ond stage of vita contemplativa attends to the specyal preier. These dif-ferent ways of religious exercise are related to the active life in theworld and to monastical or eremitical life respectively. The author is infavor of the second, which he thinks is the perfection of Christian lifeand the best condition for contemplative prayer. But, as already said, theCloud was not written for monastics and hermits only. The prologueexplicitly says, that the following explanation of contemplative prayer isalso meant to help people who are living an active life but are motivatedby the Holy Spirit to participate at least from time to time in the specyalpreier as highest practice of contemplative life.56 Moreover, because itis written in Middle English one could say that the Cloud answers to thegrowing interest of the laity in the vita contemplativa and participates inthe democratization of contemplation. The author attempts to maintain astandard of quality, to avoid the vulgarization of contemplative practice.

53 See Cloud 74, 72-73.54 See Cloud 75, 74-75.55 Out of reasons which cannot be discussed here, the author of the Cloud avoids

speaking about a vita mixta which since Augustine and Gregory the Great was theusual expression for a form of life participating in both, vita activa and vita contem-plativa.

56 Cloud 2, 7-13.


340 KARL BAIER

1. The Concept of Meditation

Meditation is thought of as a practice for beginners, a preparation forthe achievement of contemplation. The author knows Guigos� schemeand mentions the first three parts of it as three �menes [...] in the whichea contemplatiif prentys schuld be ocupyed, the whiche ben theese: Les-son, Meditacion, & Oryson.�57 These three are now taken together asone exercise called goostly meditacion. Its main topics should be mansowne wrechidnes connected with sorrow and contrition, the Passion ofChriste with the awakening of pity and compassion and the joyes ofheven resp. the chiftes (of God) which should evoke thanks andpraises.58 The Cloud here obviously refers to the main points of repen-tance-meditation. Not only reson and affeccioun but also ymaginaciounis needed for this exercise. Of course the author was familiar with theimaginative methods of meditation which were flourishing in his reli-gious surroundings.

Within the context of the Cloud meditation fulfills a positivefunction as a kind of necessary domestication of the powers of imagina-tion.59 Because of their corroboration with sin the inner images and withthem the emotional part of the human soul have to be trained and re-shaped. Through correct meditation one can overcome the manifolddistracting thoughts and empty fantasies which usually preoccupy themind of the practitioner. But the author makes clear, that the techniquesof imagination and meditative reflection are nothing more than a begin-ning, and that he is obviously not interested in detailed analysis andexplanations. Instead much space is given to the treatment of dangerswhich arise from imaginative techniques. He criticizes the literal under-standing of images and metaphors. He makes jokes about differentkinds of hysterical behavior caused by a wrong practice of affective andimaginative meditation and warns of deceptive visions.60 The activity ofimagination in meditation is repeatedly connected with a harmful cori-ouste which only scatters the attention of the practitioner.61 The very

57 Cloud 39, 23-25.58 Cloud 29, 35-47.59 See Cloud 65, 65-66.60 See Cloud 52,28-59,18.61 For the role of coriouste in the Cloud-texts see Steinmetz 2005: 63-87.


heart of spiritual life is only reachable through a radical abandoning ofthe imaginative interior space.

2. Entering the Cloud. The Practice of Contemplation

The Middle English term contemplacyon or contemplaccion is onlyrarely used by the author of the Cloud.62 Instead he prefers to describe itwith terms like blynde thoucht or nakyd feeling or calls it specyal preier.The latter is not conceived as the last phase or perfection of meditation.Although it culminates in an ecstasy (excesse of the mynde, overpassyngof thiself) of the kind which Guigo describes as contemplation, it is notidentical with it. Contemplation in the Cloud of Unknowing is not only astate of mind or a certain experience of union with God. It has becomean exercise in its own right, which is caused by a call from above thatchanges the whole spiritual life significantly, leading to a new form ofpractice. The author mentions different signs which show that the timefor starting contemplative prayer has come: a spontaneous and long-lasting joy when one hears or reads about the possibility of contempla-tion and a decrease of inspiration in usual meditation.63

The step from meditation to contemplation means starting topractice a form of prayer which aims at a wordless silence filled withthe love of God. Inner silence is produced and supported through undi-vided attention on the meaning of single monosyllabic words, especiallySin and God, without any discursive mental acts.64 The method of re-ducing prayer and meditation to a very short formula or as in our case toone word (very often the name of Jesus) has a tradition which goes backto the Desert Fathers. It was, and in the Cloud still is, meant as a supportof the so-called continual prayer which should accompany the activitiesof daily life and act as a means to gain mystical union with God.65 In thelate Medieval period it was a well known monastic practice, as one cansee for example from nuns� vitae like the Dominican Tößer Schwestern-

62 See Steinmetz 2005: 171-176.63 See Steinmetz 2005: 133-137.64 See Cloud, 40,15-44,14.65 For the historical roots see I. Hausherr, The Name of Jesus, Kalamazoo 1978.

342 KARL BAIER

buch (14th century).66 The Cloud adds something new to these informal,individual practices. It contrasts the already well established system ofmeditation with a systematized form of contemplation. By recommend-ing Sin and God as mantras the two most important topics of repen-tance-meditation are connected with contemplative prayer and elevatedto a higher level of understanding. The transition from meditation tocontemplation in his time started to become a much discussed questionand the author of the Cloud tries to develop criteria which are able toevaluate when one is ready to begin with contemplation.

Through the proposed way of contemplation one should leavebehind distinct considerations of the self, sins, creation and God under a�cloude of forgetyng.� What should remain in the end is an empty mindsurrendered to �nakyd� i.e. self-forgetful love, which aims at God him-self and not at one of his divine goods which the practitioner may desireto possess. In order to reach out towards union with God, one must beatupon the cloud of unknowing which lies between ourselves and God,with the �sharp darte of longing love�. This has to become a settledhabit.67

As in the theology of Thomas Gallus with its priority of love,for the author of the Cloud the pointe of spirit (apex mentis) is an apexaffectionis, syngulertee of affeccioun, which transcends cognition andtherefore resides in a cloude of unknowyng. If the practitioner reachesthis point he enters a nothing (noucht) which is everything (Al) becausein it one learns to comprehend all things at once without discriminativeknowledge.68 In this nothingness God and the soul are revealed in theironeness. It may seem difficult to reach this point, but like many con-templatives after him, the author of the Cloud assures us that contem-plation is a very easy and fast way to God, presupposed that throughdivine grace the flame of love has been ignited.69

66 E. Stagel, Deutsches Nonnenleben. Das Leben der Schwestern zu Töß und der Non-ne zu Engelthal. Eingel. und übertr. von M. Weinhandl. Vorw. von A. Haas, Steinam Rhein 2004.

67 J. P. H. Clark, The Cloud of Unknowing: An Introduction, Vol. I: Introduction,Salzburg 1995, 32.

68 See Cloud, 67,37-68,21.69 See Cloud, 9, 25-26.


E. LATER DEVELOPMENTS

In the 15th century not only the meditation of the Life of Christ flour-ished but also the methodical structuring of thought within meditationbecame extremely elaborated. The representatives of the Devotio mod-erna wanted to establish a most effective program of spiritual trainingwhich should guarantee the spiritual success of each of the devotees bya systematical cultivation of the inner man. Wessel Gansfort (1419-1489) went beyond all previous efforts in systematizing meditation. Heconstructed an ordo scalaris rationalis, a rational system of meditation,whose twenty-four steps are based on the structure of the human mind,which Gansfort in Augustinian manner divided into memoria (memory),intelligentia (intellect) and voluntas (will and emotion).70 Extensivelyusing concepts of humanistic rhetoric he constructed a method capableof developing any topic for any length of time by systematically arous-ing the three faculties. The Devotio moderna influenced Ignatius ofLoyola whose ejercicios espirituales and especially his � compared toGansfort � simplified method of meditation with the three powers of thesoul became the most powerful paradigm of Christian meditation untilthe 20th century.

The more meditation became formalized the more its limitationsand dangers became obvious. �The ignorant find it too great a tax ontheir energies; the imaginative cannot pursue it without encounteringendless distractions; the simple-minded ask if no more direct approachcan be found for them to the sanctities of prayer.�71 There was the ten-dency of too much self-reflection, a scrupulous observation of ones ownmental processes which never reaches the point of a simple openingtowards the divine mystery. Fear of hell was often more cultivated thanthe pure love of God.

Protagonists of contemplative prayer continued to spread theirforms of practice in reform (lay) circles, religious orders and a largenumber of spiritual books. The limitations of meditation, the misuse ofit, the transition from meditation to contemplation and the cultivation ofinner silence remained a topic of discussion among the Spanish Mystics

70 See D. Snyder: Wessel Gansfort and the Art of Meditation, Diss. Cambridge/Mass.1966.

71 R. A. Knox: Enthusiasm. A Chapter in the History of Religion, Notre Dame 1994,245-246.

344 KARL BAIER

of the 16th century, Madame Guyon and her companions and also inpietism. Although nobody went so far as to abandon contemplation intoto practitioners of contemplation had to face serious repressions. Thepoints of criticism remained the same through the ages: neglect of thecultivation of Christian virtues, antinomianism, denial of salvationthrough the mediation of the Church and its sacraments. The inquisitionpersecuted several groups which were connected with the practice ofcontemplation. It started with the heresy of the �Free Spirit� (con-demned in 1311), followed by the Alumbrados (condemned in 1525).The last strike hit Quietism. With the condemnation and imprisonmentof leading Quietists at the end of the 17th century, the contemplationmovement which had started in late Medieval Europe came to its end.

Only with the growing influence of Eastern religions and the re-vival of Western mysticism from the end of the 19th century onwardsdid the popularization of contemplative practices start all over again.The 20th century became the Age of the decline of the Baroque form ofEuropean meditation and gave birth to a second contemplation move-ment within Western Christianity. Shortly after the end of World War IIGiacomo Cardinal Lercaro � an expert in Christian meditation and con-templation who later became one of the important reformers of the Sec-ond Vatican Council � asked: �Why did the rich blossom of prayermethods which characterized the 17th and 18th century expire completelytoday? Why do they hardly survive � with the exception of the Ignatianwhich is too often explained and taught in a miserable way [�]? Whywas discursive prayer declared to be the ultimate stage attainable with-out the help of extraordinary Grace?�72

People did not wait until clerics and theologians had found proper an-swers to these questions (in fact hardly anybody went further intothem), but instead started to practice Yoga, New Age- and Buddhistmeditation or attended courses in which old forms of contemplativeChristian prayer were taught in a modern way. But this is another chap-ter altogether.

72 G. Kardinal Lercaro, Wege zum betrachtenden Gebet, Basel/Freiburg/Wien 1959[1947], 357.




Aris 1996 M.-A. Aris, Contemplatio. Philosophische Studien zum TraktatBenjamin Maior des Richard von St. Viktor. Mit einer verbesser-ten Edition des Textes, Josef Knecht: Frankfurt/Main 1996.

Cloud The Clowde of Unknowyng, in: The Cloud of Unknowing andRelated Treatises, ed. by P. Hodgson, Salzburg 1982, 1-74.

Baier 1977 Walter Baier, Untersuchungen zu den Passionsbetrachtungen inder Vita Christi des Ludolf von Sachsen. Ein quellenkritischerBeitrag zu Leben und Werk Ludolfs und zur Geschichte der Pas-sionstheologie (Analecta Cartusiana 44), Institut für englischeSprache und Literatur: Salzburg 1977.

Duffy 2005 F. Duffy, The Stripping of the Altars. Traditional Religion inEngland 1400-1580, New Haven/London 22005.

Guigo II Guigo II, Epistola de vita contemplativa (Scala claustralium), in :E. Colledge, J. Walsh (ed.), Guigues II le Chartreux: Lettre sur lavie contemplative (L'Échelle des moines). Douze méditations, In-troduction et texte critique, Traduction française par un chartreux[Maurice Laporte], Sources Chrétiennes 163, Paris 1970, 82-123.

McGinn 2004 B. McGinn, The Presence of God: A History of Western ChristianMysticism, Vol. II: The Growth of Mysticism, The CrossroadPublishing Company: New York 2004.

Ruh 1990 K. Ruh, Geschichte der abendländischen Mystik. Band 1: DieGrundlegung durch die Kirchenväter und die Mönchstheolo-gie des 12. Jahrhunderts, Beck: München 1990.

Spijker 2004 I. van�t Spijker, Fictions of the Inner Life. Religious Literatureand Formation of the Self in the Eleventh and Twelfth Century,Brepols: Turnhout 2004.

Steinmetz 2005 K.-H. Steinmetz, Mystische Erfahrung und mystisches Wissen inden mittelenglischen Cloudtexten, Berlin 2005.

Tugwell 1984 S. Tugwell, Ways of Imperfection. An Exploration of ChristianSpirituality, Darton, Longman and Todd: London 1984.

D I A N A R I B O L I

Shamans and Transformation in Nepal andPeninsular Malaysia

This article is dedicated to halak Macang

INTRODUCTION

This article is a preliminary presentation of the different beliefs relatedto shamanic transformation into animal and plant forms in Asian sha-manism and in particular in the ethnic groups around which my fieldresearch has been and is currently centered: the Chepang of southerncentral Nepal and the Jahai and Batek in peninsular Malaysia. Despitethe geographical distance and significant cultural differences betweenMalaysia and Nepal, it is particularly interesting to note the similar atti-tude towards the forest. Both the Chepang � even though they aban-doned their nomadic hunter gatherer lifestyle around forty years ago �as well as the Jahai and the Batek of peninsular Malaysia are still de-pendant on the rainforest to a great extent. In fact, there is still one no-madic hunter gatherer group of Batek living in the large jungle � now anational park � of Taman Negara.

The theories (Hamayon 1990: 293-320, Ripinsky-Naxon 1993:22-23, Vitebsky 1995) about how the different forms of shamanismthroughout the world are intimately linked to the world of hunting, na-ture and the wild, at least historically speaking, are well known. Despitethe necessary changes and adaptations of shamanic cultures to muta-tions in social, economic and political conditions, the figure of the sha-man generally remains that of a �hunter of souls� even in societies nolonger based on hunting and gathering.

For the Chepang, despite the fact that they have been sedenter-ized for several decades now, the most important deity in their pantheonis Namrung, the god of hunting. According to Chepang mythology,Namrung, believed to reside in the world of humans, was created by theother deities so he could hunt for them and provide them with freshfood every day. Namrung lives alone, surrounded only by his �hunters�(Namrung shikāri), a pack of wolves (or wild dogs) that follow him

348 DIANA RIBOLI

wherever he goes. Certain Chepang shamans describe Namrung as be-ing a half man and half wolf (or half dog) that avoids the company ofhumans despite the fact that he lives in their world.

While most of the other deities in the Chepang pantheon cur-rently have Hindu names despite the fact that their characteristics oftendiffer significantly, Namrung has never been associated with any othersupernatural being in any other religion or different ethnic group.

Chepang shamans are somewhat reticent about Namrung: in theareas inhabited by the Chepang hunting has been prohibited for manyyears and the Chepang believe that for this reason Namrung has turnedagainst humans and conjures up different problems for them as he nolonger receives daily offerings of blood from wild animals. The Nam-rung-pujā, a ceremony dedicated entirely to this deity and performedgenerally by old and expert shamans at least once a year, during which aritual hunt takes place in the course of which at least one wild animal iskilled (Riboli 2000: 213-219), is held in secret in many Chepang areas.

It is interesting to note that the Semang-Negrito of peninsularMalaysia and in particular the Jahai and Batek, who have been the sub-ject of my research for the last three years, do not appear to have anysupernatural being particularly linked to hunting activities despite thefact that hunting is still an essential component of these cultures. TheBatek and the Jahai recognize the existence of one deity only, calledGobar or Karei, the irascible god of thunder that punishes humans bysending down storms. Neither the Batek nor the Jahai acknowledge theexistence of other deities, only benign spirits that live in the jungle andhelp humans in difficulty. For the Batek and the Jahai the rainforest is aclosed universe, divine and perfect, a sort of maternal uterus that is thebeginning and end of everything. For this reason, as we shall see below,the rainforest is also the world where shamanic journeys take place.

For hunter gatherer populations like the nomadic Batek bands orpopulations that have more or less recently abandoned a regime of hunt-ing and gathering such as the Jahai of peninsular Malaysia and theChepang of southern central Nepal the separation of the two conceptualworlds �nature� and �culture� which has been the subject of many an-thropological debates has no particular significance.

In the words of Tim Ingold:

�I shall argue that hunter-gatherers do not, as a rule, approach their environ-ment as an external world of nature that has to be �grasped� conceptually andappropriated symbolically within the terms of an imposed cultural design, as aprecondition for effective action. They do not see themselves as mindful sub-

SHAMANS AND TRANSFORMATION 349

jects having to contend with an alien world of physical objects; indeed theseparation of mind and nature has no place in their thoughts and practice. (In-gold 2000: 42)

In the Jahai and Batek of peninsular Malaysia and the Chepang ofsouthern central Nepal the jungle represents a perfect cosmos whereplant, animal and human spheres co-exist in harmony. In this sense theforest in some way represents a primordial world that reconnects with amythical �golden age� when there was no clear distinction between thehuman, plant and animal worlds and no distinction between thesespheres and the supernatural world either.

Numerous mythologies throughout the continents refer to theexistence of this perfect and almost undifferentiated primordial worldusing similar patterns. One of the most complete accounts is that nar-rated by Nâlungiaq, a Netsilik woman, to Knud Rasmussen, accordingto which at the time of the myth humans lived happily and all had su-pernatural forces (Rasmussen 1931: 208). At that time humans wereable to communicate directly with the deities and could also fly, assumeany form and move freely between the three cosmic zones � the heav-ens, earth and the underworld � there was no distinction as death andsuffering were inexistent. Freedom was absolute, animals were ex-tremely friendly and also communicated with the human race. Humanscould transform themselves into animals at will, and animals couldtransform themselves into humans. The same language was spoken byall, and all lived and hunted in the same way. As a result of a series ofcosmic events and catastrophes this harmony was destroyed and thethree cosmic spheres separated, as did the spheres of the animal, plantand human worlds. From that point onwards only shamans, despite thefact that they are often believed to be much less powerful than theirforefathers, can in some way relive and re-enact the harmony of pri-mordial non-differentiation. Those who receive the call to shamanism,which in itself for the most part pre-supposes the possibility of commu-nication between the world of the divine and the world of humans, ac-quire the ability to move between the three cosmic zones. Similarly, thetwo worlds � animal and plant � and the animal world in particular,appear to play an extremely important role for shamans, who are inmany cases attributed with the ability to effectively undergo metamor-phosis.

Shamanic metamorphosis into animal and vegetal forms � in thesame way as shamanic journeys � is only a re-elaboration of the pri-


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mordial pattern when harmony, peace and perfection were possible dueto the non differentiation-collaboration between all living beings andbetween the latter and supernatural beings.

Shamanic journeys and transformation into animal and vegetalforms pre-suppose an alteration of effective reality, the reality experi-enced by most humans. In other words, shamans overcome their limitsand the human limitations of the five senses, and reacquire (recall?) thelanguages and abilities of other worlds, in particular those of the animaland plant worlds.

TRANSFORMATION AND ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The ability to undergo transformations is mainly only attributed to thosein possession of the faculty to temporarily abandon a state of con-sciousness common to human beings in order to enter �altered� states ofconsciousness. Though Mircea Eliade (Eliade 1951) and others haveacknowledged in ecstatic journeys an essential element which shouldilluminate, define and distinguish shamanism from other complexes andpractices, at present, also thanks to much field research and to morespecific and extensive work, it is a well known fact that there are othershamanic complexes in which altered states of consciousness and ec-static journeys are almost absent. It should be noted however that inmany cases these are shamanic cultures, such as those of many Siberiangroups, which have experienced dramatic historical and cultural devel-opments. Moreover, in order to clarify the content and argument of thistext, I would like to emphasize that generally speaking, despite the factthat different shamanic activities such as certain therapies appear to beperformed in some ethnic groups without the assistance of altered statesof consciousness and without the requirement for cosmic journeys, forshamanic transformation or metamorphosis into animal and plant formsaltered states of consciousness appear to be absolutely necessary.

These states can have different natures and entities: they cantake on the form of violent and apparently uncontrollable trances or canbe experienced almost without any movement when the shaman (as wewill see in the case of the Batek and the Jahai) leaves his sleeping bodyat night to send his shadow soul into an animal to which he is especiallyattached.

Altered states of consciousness (ASC) are one of the most stud-ied topics in shamanism. However, what scholars simply call �trance�


or ASC is probably a much more complex cultural and sociologicalmatter. Physical manifestations during shamanic trance states appear tobe almost always identical, but what began to puzzle me during myfieldwork in Nepal with the Chepang ethnic group (1991-1999) was thatnot all altered states of consciousness during a shamanic séance are feltand experienced by shamans, patients and the surrounding public in thesame way.

In fact, there are trance states during which shamans embodysupernatural beings or ancestors� spirits � which in one of my earlierworks I named �incorporatory� trances � and trance states during whichthe shaman�s soul is supposed to journey to other cosmic zones. Inamed this last category �trances of movement� (Riboli 2002: 143-159).

As already indicated, the physical manifestations of both typesof trances can be very similar: the shaman�s body jerks and tremblesand he/she begins to sweat profusely, experiencing what appears to besensorial detachment. Both instances involve a journey. However, in thefirst case the journey is undertaken by the supernatural being toward theshaman, whereas in the second case, it is the shaman�s soul that movesto the supernatural world.

Beside these typologies of ASCs that mostly occur during sha-manic séances in public, there are more personal and secret alteredstates of consciousness experienced by shamans who are able to trans-form themselves into other entities, mostly into animal form. I decidedto name this third category �trances of transformation.�

Shamanic transformation and shape-shifting has been docu-mented and is well known worldwide, despite the fact that not muchspecific research has been conducted on the subject. This is probablyone of the most difficult fields to investigate because � as far as weknow � the majority of shamans need to be alone in order to leave theirhuman form.

As indicated earlier, the shamans� faculty to transform them-selves is quite often linked to something like a past mythological�golden age� when all shamans were extremely powerful, could trans-form themselves at will into animal and plant forms and were some-times even believed to live together with deities and supernatural be-ings.

During my field research in Nepal and peninsular Malaysia Inoted that what scholars generally term trance or ACS is actually a col-lection of states experienced in different ways by shamans and the so-

352 DIANA RIBOLI

cieties they belong to, quite distinct from the purely physical manifesta-tions that appear during trances. I arrived at this conclusion first of allby observing that the Chepang language has no single term for the word�trance,� and according to the documents and writings of RoberteHamayon there is no such definition in most of the Siberian languageseither (Hamayon 1990: 33).

In fact, after discussing this with shamans or pande as they areknown in Chepang, it was pointed out that it would be impossible forthere to be one single term to describe situations in which supernaturalbeings are believed to possess the body of the shaman, and thereforejourney to the world of humans, and situations where the opposite is thecase, when shamans undertake the journey and abandon their terrestrialbodies to travel to other cosmic zones. As mentioned earlier, I decidedto name the first type of trance �incorporatory trance� and the secondcategory �trance of movement.� In earlier works, I added the categoryof �initiatory trances�, or altered states of consciousness, which occurduring the call to the profession and shamanic initiation, and differ fromthe earlier categories in that the latter are usually not controlled by theshaman him/herself, who, at least apparently, would appear to play amuch more passive role (Riboli 2002:165).

There are most certainly other types of shamanic trances andother types of altered states of consciousness more difficult to documentin that most occur when the shaman is alone and often occur outsideshamanic séances, which are open to the public (trance of transforma-tion). Many forms of shamanism throughout the world document thebelief that shamans can transform into non-human entities, and animalforms in particular.

Aside from any eventual transformations, the link between theanimal world and the world of the shaman is present and important theworld over. The guiding spirits of shamans often present themselves inanimal form and the ornithomorphic symbols of many Siberian sha-manic costumes is a clear reference to the magic flight to the skies(Djakonova 1978: 160-161), whereas the use of skins, bones and otherparts of different animals such as the reindeer and the bear in shamaniccostumes is linked to journeys into the underworld (Holmberg 1922: 14-18, Lommel 1967: 108). In many cases shamanism is still linked to themagic of hunting. Many Chepang pande are carried to the skies duringtheir journeys by a large bird, and journey to the underworld on a largefish. In other parts of the world it is believed that the most powerful


shamans can understand animal language and communicate with them(Stutley 2003: 16-17).

In contrast to most of the dominant religions of the planet,where the animal world is held to be inferior to the world of humans,shamanism universally believes that the animal world is powerful andclose to the world of the supernatural, and it is therefore only logicalthat shamans in many parts of the world should be able in some way tocontact and somehow encompass animal elements. It is probably noteasy to investigate shamanic transformation into animal form, becausein many cultures (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1975: 43) shamans believe this tobe a private act as some may not have total control over their instincts inanimal form and could act in a manner totally contrary to the traditionalethical norms of their cultures.

CHEPANG SHAMANISM AND TRANSFORMATION

In Nepal and amongst the Chepang especially, the idea that pande havethe ability to transform into animals is linked to a mythical time, agolden age when shamans had extraordinary powers far superior tothose they have today, when the distinction between the world of hu-mans and the world of animals was still not very clear (Riboli2000:127-130). As in many other shamanic cultures the Chepang be-lieve the world is divided into three zones: the heavens (akās) � whichhas nine levels - the earth in the middle where humans live, and theunderworld (pātāl). The pātāl is described as being a beautiful place fullof forests, rivers and animals for hunting, inhabited by the forefathersand most Chepang deities. Access to the underworld is believed to beextremely dangerous and only expert and powerful pande can undertakethe journey there. Most journeys undertaken by pande are to the under-world and this is why the Chepang refer to their shamans (and very of-ten the whole ethnic group) as �tunsuriban� what describes this ability.

According to Chepang mythology, initially the pātāl was inhab-ited by humans as well as by supernatural beings. At that time illnesses,suffering and malign spirits were unheard of. Humans and animalsspoke the same language and deities and all the inhabitants of the un-derworld had the ability to undertake journeys and fly to other cosmiczones. Some versions note that primordial harmony was shattered be-cause humans had begun to spoil the underworld with their physicalneeds. As a result, certain deities decided to create a land far from their

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own and send the humans to live there. While this intermediary landwas being created two male deities � Batisé and Tiwasé � sacrificed thecow Lendemuri. Its hide became the soil of the intermediary land andits bones hills and mountains. Unfortunately, however, the two deitiesfailed to decapitate the cow in one fell swoop and it took three attemptsbefore they succeeded, during which the animal groaned in pain. Thesesounds gave birth to demons and malign spirits that had not existed upto that point. From that point onwards only the pande are allowed tojourney to all the cosmic zones and communicate directly with super-natural beings. The more powerful pande are also believed to have theability to transform themselves into animals, mainly felines.

Shamans believed to be able to undergo transformation arecalled gurau, but it would appear that there are only very few of these inexistence, and in eight years of research I have never met anyone whotalked about this openly. One of the clans that make up the Chepang iscalled gurau, though none appears to remember the reason for thisname. All pande set the time of the last gurau as being more or less atthe time of their grandparents and all agree that at the dawn of humanityall shamans were gurau or extremely powerful humans able to trans-form themselves at will into different animals, especially tigers. Thenature of these first pande and perhaps of other men was not yet welldefined and distinct from the world of animals, which would appear tobe proved by the fact that the Chepang believe that at that time bothmen and pande in particular could also understand the language of ani-mals and were therefore able to communicate with them.

In the course of my research, which was centred on aroundthirty pande, I only encountered three women in the profession, thoughall three were considered to be particularly powerful. One of these, DamMaya, a well-known pande to whom people come for advice from vil-lages many days walk away, is one of the few cases that I suspect couldbe a gurau. Dam Maya is in fact the only pande I met who said that shecould call up a tiger in the course of a shamanic séance, what was con-firmed by the other inhabitants of her village. In fact, these were notreal tigers, but a sort of smaller feline of similar dimensions to a leop-ard. Despite the fact that she never admitted to being able to transforminto a tiger or other dangerous animal, Dam Maya freely recounted thatshe often transformed herself into an insect, bird or �some other animal�(Riboli 2000: 121) in order to journey to the pātāl.



My research in this field may well have been fairly superficial,as transformation into predatory animals is often believed to be linkedto black magic. In fact, in one village I was told of a pande whom eve-ryone considered to be expert in black magic who was held responsiblefor making a girl very ill, and was thought to be responsible for themauling of the few animals � mainly chicken and goats � usually keptin Chepang villages. After these serious acts, the pande was maltreatedand forced to go and live in another village. Neither the person in ques-tion nor the inhabitants of the village would confirm this story directlybut everyone gave the impression that the animal predator that hadkilled the domestic animals was the pande himself transformed intofeline form, as there were no animals of this type in the area where thevillage was located.

Almost all the Chepang believe that the souls of dead shamanscan transform into different animals where the human part is still recog-nizable from certain physical peculiarities such as missing paws, partsof the faces or even missing beaks in the case of birds, or parts of thebody which have developed irregularly.

The primordial and perfect original world of the Chepang attrib-uted all humans with the ability to transform into tigers, and felines andother animals were believed to be able to transform into human form.At that time there was obviously no differentiation between the twoconceptual worlds of nature and culture, no evil or suffering and noblack magic. The natural world and its forests, courses of water andwild animals was in perfect harmony, a sort of ideal world which for theChepang is embodied only in the underworld where the souls of worthyforefathers go to live after death. The equivalence between the naturaland primordial worlds and perfection changed when at some point theworld of humans was forced to separate from the world of the super-natural for different reasons. According to the Chepang, all pande ini-tially remained gurau with the ability to transform into animal and fe-line forms in particular. For a certain period of time, certainly up to thepoint when the ethnic group was forced to abandon their nomadic life-style of hunting and gathering, according to sources there was an abso-lute permeability between the world of humans - or rather between theshamanic world - and the natural world which had extremely positivevalences.

As the world of humans progressively and clearly distanced it-self from nature, many began to associate the dimension of the �wild� �

356 DIANA RIBOLI

as represented by the felines � with negative connotations linked todanger and black magic. It is probably no coincidence that while manyChepang pande state clearly and proudly that up to a few generationsago their shaman forefathers were gurau, or shaman-tigers, they arereticent about their personal abilities to metamorphose into animal andfeline forms for fear of being accused of dabbling in black magic.

As we shall see, this situation differs significantly from that ofthe Semang-Negrito groups in peninsular Malaysia, who are still inti-mately linked to the rainforest and its flora and fauna.

SEMANG-NEGRITO SHAMANISM AND TRANSFORMATION

Shamanic transformation into animals would appear to be substantiallymore documented for South-East Asia. For the past three years I havebeen working on a research project in peninsular Malaysia entitled�Traditional Medicine and Traditional Beliefs among the Semang-Negrito of Peninsular Malaysia with particular reference to the Jahaiand Batek Ethnic Groups.� In Malaysia, indigenous groups are referredto with the collective term �Orang Asli�, or �Original People.� Nowunfortunately making up only 0.8% of the population, the Orang Aslihave been divided up into three groups on the basis of their differentethnic and linguistic origins: the Proto-Malay, the Senoi and the Se-mang-Negrito, each of which consist of different ethnic groups. Thefirst inhabitants of this area would appear to be the Semang-Negrito,who lived in the area for at least 4000 years. Groups of Negrito stillexist in different parts of Asia, especially in the Andaman Islands andthe Philippines. Unfortunately, anthropologists have not yet found asatisfactory alternative term for Negrito, particularly offensive andreminiscent of colonial times, which translates from the Spanish as �lit-tle black man� and for this reason some of the scholars working in thearea prefer to add the term Semang, another term used to describe thesegroups.

The term �Negrito� was used because of the physical attributesof the individuals in these ethnic groups, who differ from the rest of thepopulation in their very dark skin, frizzy hair and short stature, particu-larly noticeable in older generations.

All the Semang-Negrito of peninsular Malaysia have verystrong ties with the world of the rainforest and, as noted earlier, somegroups of Batek still lead nomadic lifestyles in one of the oldest jungles


in the world. Though it is not known exactly how many nomadic Batekthere are, numbers could be estimated at something between 400 and500 individuals.

Many Orang Asli groups experienced a rapid abandonment ofnomadic life at the end of the 1940s, during the so-called �Emergency,�when the British colonial empire, concerned about the uprising ofcommunist guerrillas using the jungles as a base, and even more con-cerned about possible collaboration between the former and the OrangAsli, decided to relocate many indigenous groups out of the jungle.Many Orang Asli and most of the Semang-Negrito still live in villagesallotted to them by the government.

For centuries Malaysia has been a multiethnic country. MalayMuslims, who currently hold the political power, make up around 60%of the population, with around 30% Chinese, who are generally in con-trol of the economy, 8% Tamil from southern India and the remainderrepresenting the Orang Asli and other minorities. A few years ago aproject was introduced for the Islamisation of many Orang Asli groupsbased on what has been defined by the government as �positive dis-crimination,� which provides material goods and better opportunitiesfor education and employment for those who convert to Islam.

However, in many aspects Islam is poles apart from the tradi-tional cultures of most Orang Asli and this is also reflected in the differ-ent considerations that Muslim Malays and ethnic minorities have aboutthe rainforest and animals.

For the Malays the world of the jungle is dark, wild and terrify-ing, and populated by malevolent spirits and ghosts, in total contrast tothe ideas of progress and modernity favored by the dominating class.For the Orang Asli and the Semang-Negrito in particular, the junglerepresents a comforting maternal uterus, being there to satisfy all theprimary requirements of its inhabitants or of those who respectfully turnto her for help (Tuck Po 2004). Despite all the dangers that the jungleundeniably presents, the Semang-Negrito and Batek in particular withtheir nomadic life based on hunting and gathering have no fear of it, andmost supernatural beings believed to live there are considered to befriendly towards humans. Most friendly of all are the poetic cenoi,something like our fairies, described as tiny beautiful perfect men andwomen who live inside flowers and offer help to humans in distress.

The animal and plant worlds hold particular importance for theSemang-Negrito. One of the most powerful taboos, the breaking of

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which can bring extremely serious consequences, is to laugh at animalsor subject them to ridicule.

Though shamanism amongst the Semang-Negrito seems to be indecline, until not long ago the most powerful shamans were believed tobe able to transform themselves into plants, animals and tigers, the big-gest felines in the rainforest, in particular, and this belief may still beencountered today.

Though tigers are feared, the nomadic Batek still identify withthem in some way. As pointed out by Tuck Po, tigers have many char-acteristics in common with the Batek. As part of the animal world, ti-gers should belong to the category of game, instead they are predators,not hunted by humans or any other animal. Tigers inhabit the Batek�sfavorite habitat: they move following courses of water, enjoy playing inthe water, and belong to the foothills (Tuck Po 2000: 174). Their habitsand environments are fairly similar, though it is very important thatthere be reciprocal respect and that a certain distance be kept betweenthe two. The analogies appear to have remained unchanged since theprimordial period when there was no differentiation between humansand animals, but following the separation of the two spheres, as therewas no longer any possibility of direct communication, any close con-tact between the two would be dangerous.

According to many Batek and Jahai sources, tigers and ele-phants have abilities which are superior to those of other animals. Mostimportantly, tigers possess the ability to see potential prey in red even atnight and elephants see anything that can be consumed in green. Apartfrom the chromatic distinction linked to the search for food, these ani-mals and tigers in particular are attributed with a sort of second sight.When tigers encounter humans, the feline immediately sees a form of x-ray image that can distinguish bones and all internal organs. This sec-ond sight is also associated with the ability of tigers to �instantly read�the hearts of humans, their morality, good nature and generosity. ManyJahai and Batek believe that good humans have nothing to fear unlessstarvation forces animals to attack immediately.

Some Jahai and Batek elders, one of whom is the old shamanMacang referred to in detail below, believe that ordinary human beingscan also communicate with the big cats. When asked what course ofaction to take in a close encounter with a tiger or elephant, the old menexplained that it was usually better to stay still. One should try not tofeel fear (the smell of fear will incite the tiger or elephant to attack) and


look the animal in the eye in a gentle and friendly fashion. An old Jahaiman recounted that many years ago when he was out hunting one dayhe found himself a few meters away from a large female tiger and feltno fear. He crouched down and looked the tiger gently in the eyes, reas-suring her that he would not disturb her and excusing himself for inad-vertently entering her territory. The conversation with the animal con-tinued for some time as the man explained he was searching for food forthe many children he had left behind at the camp. He told the tiger hehad three children and found out that the tiger was also hunting for foodfor her cubs. When asked what language was used for this communica-tion between himself and the cat my informant was unable to explainexactly. He said he spoke Batek with the tiger and that she replied sim-ply by looking at him and communicated her thoughts to him by what Iwould call telepathy. The man later added he suspected this was no or-dinary tiger but a shaman in tiger form. In any case what is interesting isthat there is still, albeit limited, communication between humans andanimals.

The strong tie between tigers and humans is also illustrated inmany stories related to were-tigers. In the words of Tuck Po:

A number of myths posit the problems of were-tigers: sometimes a human is re-vealed to be a tiger in disguise, at other times, a tiger longs for human relation-ships and assumes human form to achieve it. It is one thing, as with shamans, forthe Bateks to appropriate the tiger�s power for benign purposes; it is quite an-other when the tiger turns that power against people. For then the control is com-ing from the tiger: the more or less equal co-existence � the partnership betweenpeople and tigers � is upset. Things become upside down. The general problemthen is that the boundary between human and tiger societies is extremely thin.(Tuck Po 2000: 175)

Generally speaking, it is preferable for the worlds of felines and humansto remain separate despite and perhaps due to their similarities, thoughin certain cases there would still appear to be some form of communica-tion between the two. This certainly does not apply to Batek and Jahaishamans who instead mainly transform themselves or send theirshadow-souls into plants and animals in a return to the harmony of theirorigins.

According to documentation collected by Kirk Endicott at theend of the 1970s, the Batek believe that certain especially powerfulshamans have tiger bodies that they can use at night in the forest (Endi-cott 1979: 132-141). At night, while the shaman is sleeping, hisshadow-soul abandons his body to enter the body of the tiger. At sunrise


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the shadow-soul returns to its human body, and the tiger goes off tosleep in the depths of the forest. The function of these tiger shamanswould appear to be linked to positive acts and they are believed to beable to protect humans from attacks by real tigers during the night.Once the shamans take on their tiger forms they run the same risks asthe real felines, the difference being that in the event of illness or nonmortal injury, as their animal body was guided by the shadow-soul, theshaman may know the cure. However, if they fall into a trap their des-tiny will be the same as that of a real tiger. For this reason tiger shamansstay as far away as possible from groups of humans and hunters in par-ticular. Despite the fact that the tiger shamans retain some of their hu-man features even though this may not be very evident and consistsmainly of resemblance to physical traits of the face of the shaman withthe muzzle of the tiger his shadow-soul has entered, hunters might notrealize this and could proceed with a kill. When a tiger shaman is killedin his animal form by mistake, the same destiny will face the sleepingshaman immediately. Similarly, when the shaman dies in his humanform the same destiny applies to his tiger-body.

Though I have noted a decline in many of the shamanic prac-tices described by Endicott in the 1970s, I can however confirm, con-trary to the beliefs of certain scholars, that despite the strong pressuresand tensions they are continually subjected to, both Batek and Jahaiforms of shamanism still survive today. As mentioned earlier, part ofmy research is centered round groups of Batek who are still nomadic,and another part is being conducted in a village of Jahai who have beensedenterized for around thirty years. Shamans are known by the Batekas halak and by the Jahai as jampi. In fact, it should be noted that cer-tain Jahai use the term jampi to indicate shamans with lesser powers,similar to herbalists, and the term halak to refer to real shamans.

Batek halak and Jahai jampi do not appear to experience tranceswith very evident external physical manifestations. All knowledge andsongs, especially those of a therapeutic nature, are received in thecourse of dreams, which are very personal and in many cases kept se-cret. In fact, for these ethnic groups dreams and trances are consideredto be almost the same, which probably also explains the fact that tigershamans only abandon their human body for the body of one of the bigcats which mainly move about and hunt at night when the shamans aresleeping and probably dreaming.


To indicate the state of trance and its experience, both halak andjampi use the Malay expression �berjalan dalam mimpi,� or �walking inyour dreams�. Thanks to the clearly therapeutic songs they receive, sha-mans can carry out spirit journeys, which mainly take place in the realmof the earth.

In the course of field research carried out in the jungle of TamanNegara in 2005, I had the opportunity of meeting and working with oneof the oldest and most respected Batek halak: Macang. Macang wasprobably already very ill with tuberculosis and died in June 2006. Hisdeath appears in some way to have been a form of encouragement forthe younger generations rather than another blow for Batek shamanism.

One day, when I was walking with Macang in the thick jungle insearch of medicinal plants, the old halak asked me to stop and rest awhile. After we had sat down, slightly apart from each other, he beganto sing quietly and move his arms about almost as if in a dance. Later onhe explained that the very act of walking in the jungle corresponded to ashamanic journey; only his body was walking with me, but his soul wasflying from a mountain to a river to rest on a tree or flower.

When he was younger, Macang was able to transform into a ti-ger during these states, but given his venerable age, he no longer hadthe strength and preferred to transform himself into a tree or flower. Inany case, whether in the form of tiger, tree or flower, the need to be-come part of the lush vegetation the Batek live in is evident. This is nolonger, as in many other forms of shamanism, a journey to the heavensor the underworld, but a form of return to that mythical age when allbeings lived in harmony and the boundaries between the worlds of hu-mans and animals and even plants were still not clearly defined.

Macang, now at the end of his life, recounted that he had foundit particularly pleasant to transform himself into a flower. For Batekculture, like that of the Jahai, flowers have a strong symbolic signifi-cance and are closely linked to the world of the supernatural. As ob-served by Kirk and Karen Endicott:

During all-night singing sessions, which might culminate in trancing and com-munication with the superhuman being, both men and women donned bandoliersof fragrant leaves, mainly wild gingers, and wore flowers or fragrant leaves intheir waistbands and hair. People said these decorations were pleasing to the su-perhuman beings because they are what the superhumans themselves wear. Thegood smells of the flowers and leaves were also thought to attract the superhu-man beings to come down and listening to the singing. (Endicott, Kirk andKaren, 2008: p.32)

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In many of the therapeutic songs received during dreams by Macang,names of plants and flowers with extraordinary powers are repeated.The halak himself told me that the very act of knowing and repeating aparticular melody (kept a secret from most people) and chanting thenames of two specific plants bestows the ability to fly anywhere onearth to any destination.

In a way the jungle and all its creatures are considered to becloser to the sphere of the deities and are certainly in themselves divine.This concept is probably what makes the Batek pantheon appear to beso lacking in supernatural beings.

As already noted, most Batek and the Jahai believe in only onegod1, known as Gobar by the Batek and Karei by the Jahai. Despite thefact that neither Batek nor Jahai speak willingly of this divinity, it isstill greatly feared and respected. Gobar-Karei would appear not to beparticularly interested in human affairs and usually manifests himself inthe role of punisher. In any case, most Batek and Jahai appear to believethat the god of thunder does not live in the heavens, as one would natu-rally presume, but on the earth, alongside the cenoi, the spirits whichguide and help humans and shamans in particular. During one of mylast periods of fieldwork in Malaysia from July to September 2006, Imet more groups of Batek and Jahai and discovered that a few of thembelieve that Gobar-Karei probably lives in the sky.

Gobar-Karei is also believed to live in the depths of the jungle,probably on a mountain, in complete isolation and solitude. The rainfor-est is again centre of the universe, in some way all-encompassing sothat anyone becoming part of it comes closer to the world of the divini-ties. With this assumption it would be easy to understand how shamanicjourneys correspond to journeying through the forest-universe, evenbetter if in the form of a tree, flower or animal, and especially in theform of the tiger, the most powerful, most respected, most mysteriousand feared feline of the jungle.

When I learnt of Macang�s decease, believed by many to be thelast of the great halak, I was afraid that a significant part of traditionalBatek culture and beliefs had also been lost. Towards the end of his life,

1 During the seventies Endicott collected many testimonies about the existence ofother Batek deities (Endicott 1979:161-190). The Batek and Jahai I have encoun-tered to date only mention the god of thunder and very rarely the existence of thewife of this divinity who in any case is described as a sort of double of the latter.


the Batek and nomadic bands of Taman Negara with whom the old ha-lak lived appeared no longer to have complete faith in his abilities de-spite their respect for him. However, after his death, his knowledge andpowers would appear to have been passed on to a new, very young gen-eration of shamans. On the first day of my return to Taman Negaramonths later, I was immediately informed that after the funeral cere-mony Macang�s shadow-soul had entered a tiger that had often visitedthe different Batek camps at night without ever attacking any humans.The tiger had calmly entered the camp I had visited a couple of nightsearlier and everyone said they had recognized the features of Macang�sface on the tiger.

In this way Macang had regained full vigor, the strength of hisyouth and his powers. Despite their great fear, also considering the in-crease in the number of attacks against humans, the Batek appeared tofind the presence of the big cat near the camp reassuring. Macang intiger form would be able to protect humans from eventual attacks byother wild animals and was somehow a living testimony to the �force ofthe jungle� many young people had begun to lose faith in. That sameevening, while discussing the event, a group of youngsters little morethan adolescents enthusiastically declared that this appearance clearlydemonstrated that the Batek were still able to �receive� and �use� theforce of the jungle, which would soon once again re-invigorate theirethnic group so threatened by a multitude of external problems and inparticular by the radical change of customs proposed by the officialculture of the country.

While continuing my research I learnt that many young peoplehad begun to receive dreams in which Macang taught them about theshamanic profession. Thus, in the course of the last few months, com-pletely unexpectedly, a new generation of halak appeared to be forming,though it is still too early to arrive at definitive conclusions given thatthe future shamans, many of whom are little more than adolescents,confess that Macang himself had explained that it would be years beforetheir knowledge was complete and they would be able to celebrateceremonies.

Of the many young persons selected to become future halak,one of the most mature candidates, who confessed he had received thecall before Macang�s decease, is a young man who for the moment pre-fers to remain anonymous and whom I shall refer to simply as B.

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B. believes he is a scorpion-shaman, as he feels strong ties tothis animal. Almost every night he sends his shadow-soul into the bodyof a large scorpion and pushes his way to the river to catch crabs. For B.this transformation is an extremely satisfactory experience. As soon ashe finishes his favourite food, he allows himself to be transported by thewaters of the river to the bank and crawls back into the foliage of theplants and large trees.

The other young persons who have received the call more re-cently have stated they belong to the category of halak-butterflies. Theyfrequently enjoy flights through the jungle in the form of butterfliesthough their knowledge is still limited and sometimes confused. Both B.and these young people recount that when they venture out into the jun-gle alone, at some point, apparently without meaning to, they lose thesense of perception of their surroundings. For many hours they are notaware of what is happening to them and usually, after these states areover, awake at a location in the forest, they have no recall of havingjourneyed to. For the moment no-one has the ability to send theirshadow-souls into tigers or elephants, and in fact, this form of transfor-mation requires full knowledge and awareness.

The increase in shamanic vocation and generally speaking thecurrent status of Semang-Negrito shamanism could well reflect a certainmore or less conscious resistance to the propagation of the dominantIslamic religion. During my fieldwork with a group of Jahai sedenter-ized around thirty years ago I came across several shamans, whosepowers were considered to be inferior to those their colleagues had beenattributed with in the past.

The Jahai village is located in the north of Malaysia, close to theborders with Thailand, and is surrounded by jungle. Though the con-sumption of game and wild boar in particular is prohibited in Islam, theJahai diet is still mostly based on the products of the jungle. The jungleis missed, respected and loved, and though it is feared much more bythe Jahai than the Batek nomads, even in this case it continues to be thecentre of the universe.

Jahai jampi also �walk in their dreams,� receive magic chantsand fly to beautiful and mysterious places in the forest. For the moment,only one of the jampi I have had frequent conversations with has said hehimself cannot transform into tiger form, but has a tiger-spirit whom hecan call on at will to defend the village in the event of danger and espe-



cially if there are real tigers roaming in the area at great peril for villageinhabitants.

This tiger-spirit is perfectly visible, but never attacks human be-ings, and at night it even engages in fierce battles with real tigers thatcome too close to the village. The similarities with evidence collectedby Kirk Endicott are numerous, though at this actual stage in my re-search, this tiger-spirit would not seem to be hosted by a humanshadow-soul. The same jampi said he was sure there were still manyJahai shamans who could transform themselves into animal forms suchas tigers and elephants, and plant forms such as flowers and trees.

Both Jahai and Batek also believe that in most cases, as notedwith the decease of the old halak Macang, once the souls of deceasedshamans have abandoned their human forms, they enter the body of atiger to continue living in the jungle, a form of reversion to the primor-dial situation.

Participation in the world of the rainforest is clearly evident inthe deep respect and knowledge Jahai and Batek have of the jungle, andeven in simple everyday gestures such as the adornment of hair andbody with flowers and leaves which the women in particular undertakelong and tiring expeditions to collect. The jungle provides food, shelterand medicinal plants for a whole multitude of illnesses. It is a perfect,autonomous universe that has no need of any help from the outside.And it is for this reason that the forest is in a way used for dressing: itmay take hours to find a rare flower to wear in one�s hair, but all effortsare rewarded in the end because in some way the sublime beauty andperfection of that flower will transfer to the person wearing it.

Transformation into animal and plant forms of Batek halak andJahai jampi is experienced as a form of return to a natural state per-ceived as supreme and perfect, in exact contrast with the Malay percep-tion where nature is diametrically opposed to culture. In its quality as aperfect and supreme state, nature is always perceived in a positive fash-ion, and metamorphoses into dangerous animals are never interpreted asexpressions of black magic, in contrast with the gradual change in per-ception in the Chepang of southern central Nepal.

The Malays and many environmentalists would prefer the no-madic Batek to abandon their way of life and would like the jungle tobecome a mere destination of great interest for tourism. But for theBatek and in a way also for the sedenterized Jahai, a jungle withouthuman presence is a dead jungle, because in order for the universe to

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maintain its equilibrium all its creatures should be present and in con-tinuous exchange. Betraying the jungle by abandoning it or repudiatingit would correspond to the loss of a culture and identity, the conse-quences of which would be very serious.

Though the Batek nomads fear the tiger, as we have seen, theydo not feel particularly threatened by it. In fact, in the jungle where theylive, which is part of the national park, there is still sufficient space toallow the big cats plenty of hunting grounds, and it is only on extremelyrare occasions that there have been reports of tigers attacking humans.

The situation is somewhat different for the sedenterized Jahai,as the tropical forest area they live in has been dramatically reduced tocreate space for oil palm plantations. It is no longer rare for there to beoccasions when starving tigers, confused by the continuous and brusquechanges in territory, enter villages and attack humans. This situation isextremely stressful for the Jahai, who interpret it as a form of vengeancewreaked on them by Mother Forest, who has been betrayed andwounded. For this reason in particular the role of the jampi is more im-portant than ever, as he can still communicate with the jungle and caneven, in the form of an animal or by calling on the assistance of thespirit-tigers, control this justified rage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Djakonova 1978 P. Djakonova, The Vestments and Paraphernalia of a Tuva Sha-maness. Shamanism in Siberia (V. Diószegi and M. Hoppáledrs.), ed. Akademia Kiado. Budapest 1978. 68-78.

Eliade 1951 M. Eliade, Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïque del�extase, ed. Payot. Paris 1951.

Endicott 1979 K. Endicott, Batek Negrito Religion: The World-View and Ritualsof a Hunting and Gathering People of Peninsular Malaysia, ed.Clarendon Press. Oxford 1979.

Endicott 2008 K. and K. Endicott, The Headman was a Woman. The GenderEgalitarian Batek of Malaysia, ed. Waveland Press. Long Grove2008.

Hamayon 1990 R. Hamayon, La chasse à l�âme. Esquisse d�une théorie du cha-manisme sibérien, ed. Société d�Ethnologie. Nanterre 1990.

Holmberg 1922 U. Holmberg, The Shaman Costume and its Significance. An-nales Universitatis Fennicae Aboensis B, 1, no. 2. 14-18.

Ingold 2000 T. Ingold, The Perception of the Environment. Essays in liveli-hood, dwelling and skill, ed. Routledge. New York 2000.

Lommel 1967 A. Lommel, Shamanism: The Beginning of Art, ed. McGraw-Hill.New York 1967.


Raichel-Dolmatoff 1975 G. Reichel-Dolmatoff, The Shaman and the Jaguar: A Studyof Narcotic Drugs among the Indians of Columbia, ed. TempleUniversity Press. Philadelphia 1975.

Rasmussen 1931 K. Rasmussen, The Netsilik Eskimos: Social Life and SpiritualCulture. Report of the Fifth Thule Expedition, 1921-1924, vol.8,Copenhagen 1931.

Riboli 2000 D. Riboli, Tunsuriban. Shamanism among the Chepang of Centraland Southern Nepal, ed. Mandala Book Point. Kathmandu 2000.

Riboli 2002 D. Riboli, Trances of Initiation, Incorporation and Movement:Three Different Typologies of the Shamanic Trance. SHAMAN,Vol. 10 (2002). Molnar and Kelemen Oriental Publishers. Hun-gary. 143-159.

Ripinsky-Naxon 1993M. Ripinsky-Naxon, The Nature of Shamanism. Substance andFunction of a Religious Metaphor, ed. State University of NewYork Press. New York.

Stutley 2003 M. Stutley, Shamanism: An Introduction, ed. Routledge. LondonTuck Po 2000 L. Tuck Po, Forest, Bateks, and Degradation: Environmental

Representation in a Changing World. Southeast Asian Studies,Vol. 38, No. 2, September 2000. 165-184.

Tuck Po 2004 L. Tuck Po, Changing Pathways: Forest Degradation and theBatek of Pahang, Malaysia, ed. Lexington Books: Lexington

Vitebsky 1995 P. Vitebsky, The Shaman, ed. Duncan Baird Publishers Ltd. Lon-don 1995.

D A G M A R E I G N E R

Transformation of Consciousness throughSuffering, Devotion, and Meditation

This paper deals with the spiritual and personal development of sha-mans and mediums in Central Nepal. It is based on the work I havedone with traditional healers in Central Nepal. The study was carriedout from 1984 to 2005 for the total duration of 36 months.1

Initially I focused on Tamang shamans living in the middle hillseast of Kathmandu Valley. The Tamang constitute the largest ethnicminority in Nepal. They came from the southern part of Tibet and speaka Tibeto-Burmese language (Bista 1967:52ff). A great number of sha-mans can be found among the Tamang. Especially in the multi-culturalareas of Central Nepal, a large part of their clientele are members ofother ethnic groups, because it is the healers� reputation rather than theircultural background that attracts customers. During those inter-ethnicconsultations Nepali, the lingua franca of Central Nepal, is spoken.

Due to economic and political pressures, more and more peopleof all ethnic groups have moved from the middle hills to the KathmanduValley. This in turn has resulted in an increasingly dense population ofpredominantly low-status people who strive to make a living and due tobad working conditions have a lot of health problems. To visit hospitals,that may sometimes be rather poorly equipped, is a fairly expensive andalienating undertaking. Furthermore, Western-style doctors usually donot offer treatment for psychosocial problems and provide no emotionalsupport for those who do not come to terms with their new living condi-tions, especially children who have been sent to town by their parents inorder to make some cash for increasing the family income.

1 I would like to thank the Austrian Funds for the Advancement of Research andScience for the generous financial support of this research (1995 to 1997: CharlotteBühler habilitation stipend, 2001 to 2003: Research project �Shamans� Comments intheir Rituals�).


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Due to the changing social situation, the study focused on inter-cultural therapies, with a special emphasis on the following basic issues:How much common background or assumptions about the world andthe functioning and values of societies is necessary for rendering inter-cultural therapies effective? Which roles do the myths, that have beenhanded down the generations, play for successful healing of patients?What has become of shared knowledge and worldview in an interethnicsetting? What are the similarities and differences in the healing methodsapplied by various specialists? An investigation of this kind calls for theintegration of different types of traditional healers belonging to differentethnic groups. In Central Nepal healers who establish a strong connec-tion to the spiritual domain are mainly shamans, mediums and tantrics.The tantrics were difficult to approach because their practice is based ona secret body of knowledge that is accessible only to few people, and inaddition a fair number of them do not use their abilities for healing.

The mediums and shamans may differ in their contact with thespiritual world. Even though Reinhard (1976:16), in his definition of ashaman, states that he or she either becomes possessed (that is the casefor a medium as well) or goes on a magical flight, there are consider-able cultural differences. Because of that I use the term medium forthose who are not in the Himalayan tradition, and reserve the term sha-man for those healers among the ethnic minorities in the middle hills ofNepal who have also migrated into the Kathmandu Valley.

Most of the mediums in the Kathmandu Valley belong to theethnic group of Newar. They are the original inhabitants of the Valleyand still comprise a large percentage of the population. They have theirown language, Newari, which belongs to the Tibeto-Burman languagegroup (Bista 1967:16ff, Gellner 1994:30). Due to continued migrationinto the valley there is an ongoing shift in population and cultural domi-nance. Today there are also non Newar mediums and Newar healerswho work more in the style of shamans and trace their shamanic powerback to their forefathers. They even claim to have received some para-phernalia handed down from ancestors and to have learned ritual tech-niques from them. One Tamang healer I have met calls herself a tantric,but she has not undergone a formal initiation specific for tantrics, andthe mantras she works with have not been given to her by a humanteacher but in her dreams and visions. Some of the shamans who belongmainly to the groups of Tamang, Gurung, Magar, Sherpa, Chetri andBrahmin have changed traditional healing methods, partly because a

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lack of traditional knowledge, and partly because of the need or pres-sure to adjust to the multi-cultural area they live in. The question arisesto what extent the concepts of illness causation and the understanding ofsymbolic therapeutic actions have to be shared by healers and patients.According to most traditional healers it is the connection with deitiesand tutelary spirits that is crucial in order to make the treatments effec-tive.

THE CALLING

Shamans and mediums usually have a calling experience, which signi-fies that they have been chosen by a spiritual power to become a healer.Often the experience is not recognized as such right away, and the cho-sen person�s unusual behavior is at first interpreted as a disturbance ofher or his well-being for a variety of reasons. The cause to which thedisturbance is attributed depends on the chosen person�s social envi-ronment and the interests of lay people or the point of view of medicalspecialists who make the diagnosis. Thus, there are often contradictingassumptions regarding the cause of a person�s unusual behaviour.

Pfeiffer (1994:213) has pointed out that maybe we should notspeak of an initial illness but of a crisis. When an ordinary illness iscured, the person can go back to her or his life. In contrast, due to theexperiences the person has undergone she or he probably has grown andcan continue life on a higher level. A crisis will definitely change peo-ple�s life; if someone is able to overcome the crisis he or she will moveon as a more mature person; but if a crisis is not resolved, the chancesare high of gliding into pathology. A calling experience is obligatoryand if it is not complied with it will lead to death or madness. In anycase, a call will bring with it a lot of difficulties. Therefore most of thechosen persons beg the deities to stop the process, because they areafraid of the changes in their lives, the confrontation with the illness-causing powers and the suffering they will have to go through. In addi-tion, they can never be sure that they will overcome the crisis and be-come respected persons who are likely to be re-integrated in their com-munities.

A shaman�s or a medium�s crisis often starts with a period ofdisturbing events that cause indisposition or a feeling of being ill due tounknown reasons. The hardships that persons usually have to undergoin the course of the process of becoming healers are expressed in differ-

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ent ways. The following narration of a female medium is centred roundthe difficulties in her life and her suffering, up to the point when sheconsidered committing suicide:�Sixteen years after my marriage I got my first child. That time my hus-band started to drink a lot of alcohol and gave me more and more trou-ble. I was very sad and I did not want to stay with him anymore. I feltlike going somewhere to kill myself. Until I did not have a child hemade me feel very bad about not having a child, and now I have a child,but he does not feed it. Where could I go to have peace? I thought therewas no use to live on, even though people would say bad things aboutme. To continue living with him would not do any good. Then I said tomyself �just go to the field�. Because my financial situation was verybad, one family let me work on their field for my livelihood. As long asI was working on the field they would not take it back. One day, when Iwas very depressed, I went to the field to cut paddy. Suddenly some-thing came on my leg. First it was a very small snake that felt cold onmy skin. When I looked around it came to my shoulder where I feltsome kind of heaviness. I did not know what had come up on my body.Later on I saw that the snake was standing right behind me. When I sawthat it was standing on its tail, I thought that it must be Bhagwān. Then Itook a bunch of paddy where the snake could crawl onto and put it onthe ground. Right after that I felt a sensation like electric current run-ning through my body. First I did not know what to do, but then Ithought if I stay on the field, my husband would not come to see methere, nobody would come to see me there. I called the two women whowere working on the field next to mine to show them the snake. I toldthem that it was very small before, but now it is so big. That was Bhag-wān who had come to me, because there was so much hardship in mylife, so much poverty, and I was not able to go anywhere. Because Iwanted to die, Bhagwān came to help me and gave me the power to healother people.�

The medium told that she was nine years old when she becamevery sick for the first time. After that she was fine until she got marriedat the age of eighteen. For days she was in a strange state crying, laugh-ing, screaming and beating her husband. She was taken to a local healerand later also to a hospital where the doctor said that nothing was wrongwith her and there was no need to bring her to the hospital.

In the case of this woman, the resentments of family membersof the older generation who were afraid that the traditional life-style and


social order could be endangered were an important factor for prolong-ing her suffering. Especially the parents-in-law refused to accept hercalling, because as a healer she should not bow down to their feet, sitlower than they or touch anything polluted by them, such as food left-overs or dirty clothes. Eventually this obstacle was overcome and themedium was able to set up a regular practice.

One Newar medium had problems with her family memberswho were not religious and did not believe that mediums could be effec-tive healers. Her father was a politician who considered it as inappropri-ate that his daughter was a medium. She was expected to be a goodhousewife, taking care of all the practical matters in the home. Onlywhen her mother became seriously ill and was cured by her daughtershe was finally acknowledged as a healer.

A male medium had extraordinary experiences from his earlychildhood that were due to his special connection with Hariti Mā. She isthe Buddhist goddess of smallpox, who is believed to be a spirit (yakṣa)converted to Buddhism and the guardian of young children (Gellner2001:2003). Although this medium had to suffer a lot, because it wasnot realized that a deity had come over him, he was also protected bythe goddess so that nothing serious or life threatening would happen tohim. When, finally, Hariti spoke through him, it was also his legitimisa-tion that he would become a powerful healer. Despite the suffering hetook his experiences more lightly, at least afterwards when he was al-ready a well-established healer. The way he told his life story inter-spersed with funny incidents made his listeners laugh and difficultevents lay in the past:

�I was very sick (bimāri) for a long time. One health assistant came andgave injections, he gave injections for such a long time and nobodyknew what was wrong with me. He checked my pulse and said thatnothing bad would happen. He always gave medicine to me. Then onetime a man from the village who traded with buffaloes came. My grand-father asked him what was happening to his grandchild. At that timenobody was able to move my head that was standing straight like a rockand I had become very thin. The man from the village said that the headshould not be kept like that. Doctors had already given so much medi-cine to me. Then the man took some rice and checked my problem and

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said: �Alas! You should do pujā2 for Mā!� Following his advice I wasgetting better every day.�

Like in other narrations it was emphasized that Western-typemedicine is of no use for problems of this kind. Sometimes it is evenconsidered as a treatment that could make the condition of the sufferingperson worse. Only the man from the village realized that Hariti Mā hadan influence on the young man, who should manifest devotion to thedeity. Later in life his condition became again very serious:�After I had married off my daughter, I was possessed very often. Atthat time I was throwing things here and there and made much mess inthe house. Everyone was so scared that my brother decided to bring thearmy doctor from nearby. They tried to calm me down and I was givenan injection in my buttock. It was so painful! I asked the army doctorwhy he had given me an injection, because there are no cuts and nofever. Then I became unconscious. As soon as I was awake I behavedlike mad again. Then they took me to the hospital. I said to someone:�you are not a doctor�, and he replied: �Prabhu3, you are in tension!�Why should I have been in tension? I did not have any problem. Thedoctor was so surprised and said: �It is not like this, Prabhu.� Later theyalso wanted to give oxygen to me, but I told them that I did not needany oxygen and pulled the tube out. Finally they sent me back to thehouse. � Some time later they brought a shaman. He started to do ahealing ritual for me and went on for such a long time. I grabbed thelittle broom from him and said: �How can you heal me with this?�4 Af-ter that he left the house, the doctor and the health assistant were alsogone. You could ask those people who were sitting here at that time.And then it was all over. I poured a bucket of water on myself and tooka bath. Everyone realized that something had changed. It was aroundten years ago. Since then I have a lot of power.�

The Nepali word bimāri means sick, but its connotation is ex-tensive, ranging from just not feeling well to being seriously ill. Whenhe told about the incidents with the doctors, of course, he understoodthem from the point of view of his present life. Injections and oxygenseemed as crazy treatments that could not make his condition any better.

2 Ritual to honour the deity.3 Respectable way of addressing god.4 If a person already has a strong connection with deities, no healer or doctor can do

anything.



The medium even pointed out that the doctors regarded him as a god �but one who needed medicine to calm him down. The outrageous be-havior was considered as a transient state of mind and not as an illness,so also the shaman was not able to cure him with simple methods likebrushing out illness-causing agents. As soon as the strange behavior hasceased, the power of the deity invested in the shaman can be used fully.

A calling experience or a deity revealing itself through a chosenperson is usually followed by a long period of intense personal andspiritual development that should also lead to a life-style that is suitablefor deities. Sometimes such a period also precedes the calling experi-ence or is considered to be part of it. The traditional shamanic initiationceremony that introduces the neophyte to the public and after which heor she is accepted as a mature shaman - if the tests are mastered - (Pe-ters 1998:77ff) is often not carried out anymore, especially in the Kat-mandu Valley. Mediums traditionally just start to practice and are re-spected more and more if their treatments are successful. Some of themhave an experienced medium that helps them establish their practice,but they do not learn anything from that person.

PURITY

To be pure is something essential for the work of mediums as well asfor that of shamans. A kind heart, a good way of life, and helping otherpeople are considered as most important in the career of spiritual heal-ers. This implies also avoiding pollution in everyday life. If a personshows unusual behavior or is ill for a prolonged time, bringing him orher in contact with something polluted can be used as a provocationtechnique to find out the reason for the person�s strange state. A Ta-mang shamaness told about the time before it became clear that she wasgoing to be a healer:

�One day my husband, who was working in the army at that time, waspreparing for his written test that is required to be taken by military menin their barracks. I was trembling and one of my hens was movingaround. It was quite a big hen. Suddenly the hen was caught by a wildcat and carried away. � A footman on duty threw a rock at the wild catwhich ran away leaving the hen at the spot. Because the hen was notdead, it came back running toward us fast. When we looked at it, wesaw two small holes at its neck that were caused by the wild cat whencarrying the hen away holding it with its teeth. After some medicine

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was applied on the wounds the hen suffered even greater pain. My hus-band proposed to cut the hen, which was quite big, and eat it rather thanlet it go like that. I did not agree to eat it. He persuaded me to eat thechicken trying to convince me that it was not dirtied by anybody, nottasted at all, but only injured by the wild cat. So we cooked the chickenin the evening and ate it. After dinner I went to bed while my husbandwas still reading. Exactly at twelve o�clock in the night deities ascendedon me and I began to tremble. In that trembling state I hugged a cottonquilt firmly. When my husband looked at me, I laughed. Later on myhusband told me that I laughed boisterously as he looked at me and hewas very much scared at the situation. It was a hot month but even thenI was hugging the quilt and laughing like mad. Then he tried to wakeme up shaking me and asked me why I was laughing like that. He toldme later that the more he wanted to know the reason for my laughter,the louder I went on laughing. At this he became very scared and keptthe door wide open so that he could run away in case I came down uponhim. Then he splashed water over my face from a brass pot with aspout. Instantly I stood up from my bed and asked him angrily why hehad made me eat chicken that had already been tasted and fouled. Myhusband expressed his surprise at this question and said that he had notdone that. Again I shouted at him that he indeed had given me the pol-luted chicken that had already been tasted and fouled by the wild cat.After this I trembled vehemently. I went on shivering and trembling allover. The fouled chicken was the root cause of all this.�

Due to the strong connection with deities, pollution cannot betolerated anymore. For the husband of the shamaness this also meansthat he too has to change his life, respecting the situation. In the narra-tion of the shamaness the polluted hen precipitated a series of eventsthat set an end to her suffering and eventually made her a healer ac-cepted by the community.

Stories like this are told many times in pretty much the sameway. They show the paths from being a disturbed person to becomingsomeone who needs special treatment - because of the strong connec-tion with spiritual beings - so that the therapeutic actions can exert posi-tive effects on the whole community and its individual members. Suchincidents also give legitimisation to the healers. Thus, shamans who donot know the �creation myths� sing their own life stories during thelong rituals. They say that no specific texts have to be recited, but that


anything that describes their position and how it came about fulfils thesame function.

Pilgrimages are important for gaining and renewing power, butpollution can happen easily on the road. At the pilgrimage places peopleare under the protection of the deities and the atmosphere is so strongthat no accident happens and in a trance-like state people avoid every-thing that could cause pollution.

The Tamang shamaness told that on the way back from a pil-grimage place she met a man who was in a very serious state. Despitethe fact that shamans work as �individual� healers they undertake pil-grimages in smaller or larger groups. Undertaking pilgrimages in groupsis partly due to practical reasons, in terms of expenses and entertain-ment, and partly for creating opportunities to share experiences andprovoke each other in a sort of contests. On such a special occasionthere are usually also quite a number of lay people accompanying thehealers, attending them and getting blessings at a holy place. Accordingto the shamaness, the other healers present at the place where theyfound the sick man, left saying that they were not able to bear the ex-treme chill there. But the sick man was wreathing with acute pain in hisheart. When asked what had happened he answered: �Mother, I am go-ing to die, the pain is unbearable. Please, do something!� The sha-maness said that she started to examine him, wondering where shecould find some ashes5 at a place like that:

�I picked up some soil dust instead, and when I had just touched him, Ifound it was effective. I blew my breath over his body chanting mantrasand gave him some empowered water to drink. After that I told him toleave the place immediately, because it was not suitable for a sick manto stay any longer at such high altitude. We asked him to go ahead of usand sat down on the hill. All the members of our group had not yet as-sembled together. We borrowed a plate from the sick man to eat somesnack. Later it was found out that the plate had been left unclean. I feltits effect immediately. At first I had thought that it was clean and pureand so I had borrowed it. As soon as I had eaten I felt a shiver all overmy body. It struck my mind that I had eaten from a defiled plate. In aninstant I felt its pressure. I said that the plate was unclean and defiled.

5 Used for treatments. Purified ashes are used along with blowing mantras on a sickperson, and are sometimes also ingested orally.

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The sick man, on the other hand, got better after ten minutes� walk.Unclean and defiled food does not suit me and I have to be given onlypure food. As soon as I realized that the food was impure, I threw up.Then I felt like defecating. When everything I had eaten had come outcompletely, I was relieved.�

Also in this case the deities with whom the shamaness was con-nected so strongly did not tolerate any impurity. The only way to dealwith such a situation is to get rid of everything polluted right on thespot. This may not be done intentionally, but it happens and it works.

Eating outside one�s house always bears dangers with it andshould be avoided as far as possible. A young male medium told that healways cooks his meals himself to make sure that they are not pollutedby anyone and that there are no impure ingredients in the food. He doesnot eat chicken meat or chicken eggs and therefore he also stays awayfrom noodles because there might be chicken products in them. Whichkinds of food items are considered to be impure is said by the deities,and is culture-specific to a large extent. Those healers who follow astrict discipline stay home as much as possible, at least insofar as eatingand drinking are concerned. In general, it can be said that the ethnicminorities from the hills feel more relaxed about their food.

Even though the healing methods of shamans and mediums arebased on specific cultural traditions, they can be applied in regard toclients from different cultures and at any place in the world. OutsideNepal the practical everyday life can be quite difficult. A shamanesstold that during her visit to America she had lots of problems with herfood, because she cannot eat some types of meat and several kinds ofvegetables. Furthermore, if she eats something that has been touched bya person who is impure for some reasons, it will have a bad effect onher.

A Newar medium, who was asked if she had practiced as ahealer while living in the United States, replied that it was too difficultto avoid the food she is not supposed to eat and that she suffered a lotbecause she was punished by the deity. After a dispute with her onlyson who had lost everything in business, she wanted to earn somemoney to build a house. A Brahmin family, for whom she had workedbefore, agreed to send her to some relatives in the United States to cookfor them and do other chores in the household.


�I went alone and stayed over there only for three months. Then I couldnot bear to touch anything polluted, because it had a very bad effect onme making my body tremble. I was desperate and I suffered a lot. Mā[Hariti] would not allow me to touch anything impure. I cannot eat beefor pork and so I had a very hard time over there. One day I cooked porkand so I had to clean the meat. At night Mā said that I have to do a ritualfor her, she was gritting her teeth and expressing her anger. When I gotup the following morning one of my fingers was swollen very much andI felt a lot of pain. I told them about my finger and asked them to takeme to a doctor. They scolded me and said that it is not like in Nepal,doctors are too expensive in America. What to do? Then I put some ashthat I had taken with me from Nepal on my finger. I wanted to sit inmeditation, but there was no place for that. The only thing I could dowas to go to the bathroom, like going to the toilet, lock the door and sitin meditation. I started to see Mā and got blessings from her. I did notwant to get out of the bathroom anymore. They knocked at the door andasked me what I was doing in the bathroom for such a long time. Then Itold them that I wanted to go back to Nepal.�

The medium found it difficult to find a suitable place for devo-tional rituals but she is sure that Ma is present all over the world. Due tothe insensibility and ignorance of some people in America she was notable to adjust and to work as a healer. Even her host family from Nepalhave become estranged from their traditional way of life and threatenedthe medium that she would end up in a mad house if she continued toshow such strange behavior.

INTERRUPTION AND CONTINUITY

Even if a calling is accepted, but a person cannot continue the path thathe or she has been chosen to follow, there will again be serious prob-lems and/or illness and suffering. The growing union with spiritualpowers cannot be reversed anymore. Some women may neglect theirprofession because they are very busy with their children and thehousehold. Men may look for a different job to earn more money tosupport their families and then find it too difficult to continue the spiri-tual path in a secular surrounding. A shamaness told about her life:

�After I got married and had come here, I did not work as a healer forsix years. Then I had a very serious crisis again. For three months I was


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lying in bed sleeping. There was no pain, nothing of that sort, but I wassleepy all the time and did not know what was going on around me.When I got up I had to vomit, when I slept there was no vomiting. Inthis room I was lying all day and night. At the beginning of the fourthmonth � it was on a full moon day � I heard a voice ordering me to getthe shaman�s equipment that I had used before. When I had everythingwith me I should do a ritual in my house. Only thereafter I would be-come alright. Like we are talking now this was told to me. I was notable to get up and so I asked my husband to bring the equipment. Myhusband replied: �Today, I am not on leave. Tomorrow I will get leave,so I could go to the village tomorrow. But I will ask my father.� Thenthe father said he would go to get the things. He might have reached myhome � how funny � my japmālā6 arrived in my bed. How did it come?Nobody knows that. I was sleeping like this,7 it was right in my hand.Then I felt as if I awoke from a sleep and I wanted to get up. For a mo-ment I was afraid that I would vomit again after getting up. But when Igot up I found myself very light. I was told to take a bath. Since therewas no tap there I asked some relative to go and fetch a pot of water andalso get me some titepāti8. She wanted to know what for I needed that. Itold her that I wanted to take a bath. �If you are so sick, how are yougoing to take a bath?� I replied that I had to take a bath that day. Thewater and the titepāti were brought, I took a bath, and I threw away myclothes. That morning after taking a bath I became very fresh, strongand light. Then I told my younger sister to smear the house with cow-dung9, because I would do a ritual that night. Father and the others ofthe group who had gone to my village would arrive home bringing mystuff. At that time we had cows and my younger sister did everythingneeded. In the evening I did a special ritual in my house. Then suddenlythe disease was gone forever. It was not there any more. Because I hadquit working as a healer for some years, I had to bear all that.�

When the shamaness was prepared to practice again as a healer,all her complaints suddenly disappeared. Her instant recovery from thecrisis lasted until the end of her life. Being her neighbor during several

6 Rosary used for muttering the name of a god or a religious formula repeatedly.7 Shows lying back.8 Bitter weed (Artemisia vulgaris).9 To clean and purify it.


periods of my fieldwork I had the chance to observe and take part in herhealing work for some time. She never showed any signs of confusion,disorientation, depression or lack of energy again. More and more cli-ents came to consult her, because she was considered to be a powerfulhealer. When she got old and felt she would die soon, she went back toher village bringing with her the ritual paraphernalia so that someone ofher father�s family could use them.

A calling influences a person�s whole life until the end. If thedemands of deities or ancestor spirits are not obeyed, suffering, insanityor death will ensue. Even if a person becomes sloppy in regard to devo-tional and healing practice later in his or her career, life will definitelybecome very hard. One Tamang shaman, a specialist for the old tradi-tional rituals, neglected devotion and purity for some years. During thisperiod there were a lot of problems in his family and the shaman startedto drink in the early morning so that he was hardly able to see his pa-tients. His clientele as well as his income dwindled and this in turnmade him drink even more. Eventually the shaman managed to get outof the vicious circle so that his life took a different turn again.

Regardless of how many obstacles there are and how much suf-fering someone has to endure, the deities� demands to improve life-style, to work hard on overcoming the crisis, to give in to spiritual pow-ers and get transformed bear many consequences. For the maturedhealer the issue is not if life has become more or less enjoyable andcomfortable, but to accept life the way it is. Family, mundane activitiesor even hardship are slowly fading as emotional experiences. With timeconflicts dissolve and relationships are seen in a different light. A me-dium told about her situation right after having set up her practice as ahealer:

�Because of Bhagwān my life has changed a lot. I cannot eat what Iwant, and my husband is still young, so sometimes he gets angry withme and tells me that he wants to marry another woman, because he hasa desire for things, but I do not feel any desire. I just want to stay clean,quiet, and calm�. If I did not have my daily responsibilities it would begood. I just want to show devotion to the deities.�

GAINING POWER, KNOWLEDGE AND CLIENTS

In order to strengthen the connection with the spiritual world after acalling, deities and ancestor spirits must be worshipped regularly. One

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common technique is reciting the names of deities and concentrating onthem. During this process there is a loosening of ego boundaries and achange in the sense of being oneself. A growing submission of the ownperson to spiritual powers takes place.

Repetition of these words mero bhakti guruko śakti �my devo-tion, the guru�s power� is also used for devotional practice. It does notmake any difference if the words are pronounced aloud or silently. Ac-cording to many shamans, continued remembrance of gurus is essentialfor successful healing: �Without guru nothing can be done.�

Notably, the devotional exercises do not have to follow a certainpattern, so that each healer develops his or her own individual style.One shamaness, for example, takes a bath and performs a pujā withpure water from a well nearby every day in the early morning. Patientsmay arrive before she has finished her pujā in her house. When she isstill doing her devotional exercises they have to stay outside whereaslater they wait for their turn inside the healer�s room. Specific practicesmight change over the years. Once she told me that she gets up at threeo�clock in the morning to visit some holy places in addition to her usualdaily routine.

A shaman living in the Katmandu Valley has integrated handreading (which has happened to learn in the public parks of Katmanduas a child) into his healing practice. Although hand reading and sha-manic techniques come from quite different cultural traditions, theircombination is not considered as inappropriate. In the course of theyears he has become quite popular and sees sixty to hundred clients perday. When asked if he also performs the traditional night rituals he re-plied: �I work from six o�clock in the morning until six, seven or eighto�clock in the evening. How can I work during the night, too? If somepeople want a traditional Tamang ritual I refer them to someone else.� Itappears that the demand for the elaborate night rituals is decreasing.

Performance of only short therapies also means that there is nomore reciting on a regular basis of the �creation myths�, telling aboutthe beginning of shamanic practice and the paraphernalia that have beenused since primordial time. Those myths used to be an essential part ofa traditional healing ritual. Because this shaman (who also practiceshand reading) did not want to break with the tradition, he started singingthe myths every Saturday morning before seeing the clients. In this wayhe remembers his gurus and practices devotional meditation. In his


opinion it is one important factor that has made him such a popularhealer.

Many Newar mediums follow a very strict daily discipline.They get up very early to take water from a tap or well, that should notbe touched by anyone, and clean all the plates and cups used for rituals.Afterwards they take a bath with however much water there is and washface, hands and feet or the whole body. They do some kind of medita-tion, remember the deities by saying their names, and give offerings.Before the healing sessions they should not eat anything and not evendrink tea in order to be pure and clean.

Meditation practices and presentation of devotional offeringshave aesthetic qualities. Special words are spoken in rhythmical ways orsung in melodies created by the individual healers in connection withtheir tutelary deities. The various kinds of materials used as offeringsare arranged according to the wishes of the deities. There are no specificdemands and no rules to be followed by the healers. It is a creativeprocess that is being shaped instantaneously in the given situation.

It may happen that during devotional exercises a person�s bodystarts trembling. This too is interpreted as a sign that someone is con-nected with a spiritual power. Rhythmical drumming, singing, andtrembling are also used to mark the beginning of the ritual time10, inwhich different processes are made possible and the laws of everydaylife are somewhat relaxed and alleviated. Drumming and dancing aretraditional techniques of the shamans; trembling is a technique for sha-mans as well as for mediums.

Furthermore, drumming, dancing and trembling are highly efficienttechniques for inducing altered states of consciousness.11 The term tech-nique implies intentionality, but the shamans and mediums say that thetrembling just happens. Certain behaviors influenced by deities caneven show up suddenly, for example, in the streets. In such cases thehealers go in front and the people behind them will be protected.

Reinhard�s definition (1976:16) states that �a shaman is a personwho at his will can enter into a non-ordinary psychic state�. Crapanzano(1977:9f) argues that the emphasis on control may be of more impor-

10 Compare Turner (1989) and van Gennep (1909).11 The effect of rhythmic movements of the body can be used in any culture. Contem-

porary music therapy in the West emphasizes the therapeutic value of rhythm and itsimportance in the development to a healthy person.

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tance for the Western observer than to the healers and their communi-ties. Deities can act through shamans and mediums at any time, but itnever happens at an inappropriate moment. Uniting with deities leads tonon-dual action that is �spontaneous (because it is free of objectifiedintention), effortless (because it is free from a reified �I� that must exertitself), and �empty� (because one is wholly the action, so that there isno dualistic awareness of an action)� (Loy 1988:10).

In order to be able to work as a shaman or a medium, one has toexplore the spiritual world, overcome fears and gain the ability to con-trol demons and other illness-causing spirits.

Whatever ability or knowledge is needed for working as a healeris learned through connection with spiritual powers. A shamaness toldthat she has learned everything from the spirit of her deceased fatherand the deities with whom he has been connected. During her dreamsspiritual teachers lead her to some places, and give her mantras andeverything else she needs for her work. The teaching might also takeplace while she is awake and engaged in some daily routine. �Myimagination (kalpanā) reaches at other places. The body remains here,but I reach to places far away. At that time I am fully absorbed in myplays and conversations with the spirits.� When she was asked if shealso visits other places in her imagination while performing healingrituals, she answered:

�No, I don�t. Now I am fully mature. I have completed my staying inthe cave.12 I have already eaten the incense and the lamp and completedplaying with the spirits. Thus, I am now a fully trained shaman, theknowledge has penetrated me completely. That is the reason why I cando everything that a shaman has to do. If it were not like that, spiritualpowers13 would come over me only at moments, and at other times theywould leave me alone. Deities have made me experienced by asking meto do a thing like this and another thing like that. I learned from themday by day slowly and gradually. Now I have achieved all the required

12 guphā � traditionally structure for storage (Peters 1998:94); in this shamaness� casea military tent was put up on a cremation ground. The tent was provided by her hus-band�s colleagues. Usually a shaman has to stay there for three days and three nightscontinuously, deal with illness-causing spirits or demons to show that he/she has o-vercome fears and is a mature healer.

13 Helping spirits who are invoked at the beginning of healing rituals.



skills. It was only when I was a beginner that I went outside in theflights of imagination. Now everything comes rushing towards me.�

Under the influence of deities, healers exhibit extraordinarypowers. One medium told that just by blowing a mantra on a rope thatwas tied around him, the rope would open. He also emphasizes thatsome people in his community changed their minds perceiving his spe-cial abilities: �When I just moved my hand a coconut came out of it.Then people slowly started to believe in the power that was in me andstarted to respect me.�

Deities come over the healers and show themselves in differentappearances, speak and act in unusual ways. One medium has a post-card that shows �herself� with the faces and attributes of several deities.During her healing sessions she sits behind a thick cloth so that peoplemight not become frightened by the appearances. For the advancedhealers corporeal form and mind are non-dual.

�� it is a radically transformed world. The familiar, everyday world ofmaterial objects was formerly balanced by an ego-consciousness thatwas supposed to be observing it. The disappearance of that discreteconsciousness requires a new explanation of what awareness is. Theawareness that was previously understood to be observing the world isnow realized to be one with it. No longer do �I�, as the locus of con-sciousness, see something external. Rather, the non-dual, self-luminousnature of the world stands revealed. When we want to describe this ex-perience, what shall we say?� (Loy 1988:210).

Bāgh Bhairab, a fierce powerful deity in the shape of a tiger,comes in critical stages of healing sessions and brings a special atmos-phere into the room.14 When I asked a shamaness how she feels whenBāgh Bhairab comes over her she answered: �At that time my aware-ness changes, and even my body becomes more or less like a tiger. I canfeel the shape of a tiger from the inside.� According to her, in theGolden Age it was possible to transform into a tiger completely. An-other shaman told that he could become a tiger if he knew the rightmantra.

14 The ability of shamans who transform themselves into tigers or other animals is awidespread belief (see also Riboli in this volume).

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CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE I

Scharfetter (1996:72ff) points out that in Western societies for personwho is awake and conscious the ego (I, me) stays the same continuouslyin the course of one�s life and personal history. The consciousness ofthe I is the certainty that �I am myself� all the time. Furthermore, Schar-fetter notes that we do not have consciousness, but we are conscious-ness. In his opinion the I is something abstract that stands for the humanperson being oneself. Being one with the cosmic consciousness is whathe calls transpersonal, a trans-ego-experience.

Even though Scharfetter (2004) takes into account cultural dif-ferences, he emphasizes the dangers of the spiritual path. If the demar-cation of the I (i.e., the border of one�s own person), the consistency ofthe I (i.e., the certainty that one has a coherent life, being the same allthe time) or the activity of the I (i.e., the certainty that one�s own ex-periences, thinking, and acting are determined by oneself) decrease ap-preciably, one glides into a pathological state. Ego-boundaries can beloosened at times to experience an oceanic feeling, but in everyday lifethere is no room for that.

Spiritual healers in Nepal have given up their sense of beingoneself to a large extent; their actions are not done with their own inten-tion, and the calling constitutes a break in the coherence of their lives.Yet, they are perfectly fine and able to help the people around them.During the healing sessions shamans and mediums are treated like dei-ties. Clients bow down to them, offer incense and give those deities,who like to have light, burning wicks to eat. Sometimes they also askfor a special kind of incense or even burning coal. An atmosphere ofawe is created that opens up the patients so that even very short treat-ments exert a big effect.

Some deities like to eat burning wicks that are offered by thepeople in the audience. The healers swallow the burning wicks that aregiven to them, but the light is an offering for the deities with whom theyare united. While watching a video recording that showed deities com-ing over her during a healing session together with a medium, the sha-maness was very surprised. Sounds, gestures, and movements weredetermined by the deities. She had never seen herself like this and said:�This is not me. My appearance is the same as Kāli�s. Nobody will saythis is me. My voice is different. Look at my eyes! Some said that theyhad seen different faces but I never believed them. Now it is becomingclearer to me.�


One medium through whom several deities speak during thehealing rituals sings a devotional song addressing Mother Earth. In thecourse of the song she herself becomes Mother Earth.

Mātā you are Mother EarthIt is only your supportWith which we have been livingMother Earth MātāBe kindWho else is there for usCarrying the load of the earthHas been difficult, MātāThis is Kāliyug15

When it is difficult to keep up the earthLiberate the people of the worldBe kindI cannot bear it allI cannot carry the earth anymoreIf I leaveThen the world will be finishedBe kindOh Buddha Bhagwān

The medium�s identity has changed: she is herself and not herself, she isnot a perceiver who perceives something that is separate from herself;the consciousness of the I is not set against the world that she could beconscious of.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bista 1967 Jor Bahadur Bista, People of Nepal, Ratna Pustak Bhandar 1967.Crapanzano 1977 Vincent Crapanzano, �Introduction�, in V. Crapanzano and V.

Garrison (eds.), Case Studies in Spirit Possession, Wiley & Sons,New York 1977, 1-39.

Eigner 2001 Dagmar Eigner, Ritual, Drama, Imagination. Schamanische The-rapie in Zentralnepal, Wiener Universitätsverlag, Wien 2001.

15 The present age that has been preceded by three others. It is the Black Age in whichbad qualities of people are prominent, prosperity declines, and everything will cometo an end.

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Gellner 2001 David Gellner, The Anthropology Buddhism and Hinduism: We-berian Themes, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2001.

Loy 1988 David Loy, Nonduality. A Study in Comparative Philosophy,Humanity Press, New Jersey 1988.

Peters 1998 Larry Peters, Tamang Shamans. An Ethnopsychiatric Study ofEcstasy and Healing in Nepal, Nirala Publications, New Delhi1998.

Pfeiffer 1994 Wolfgang Pfeiffer, Transkulturelle Psychiatrie, Georg ThiemeVerlag, Stuttgart 1994.

Reinhard 1976 Johan Reinhard, �Shamanism and Spirit Possession: The Defini-tion Problem�, in J. Hitchcock and R. Jones (eds.): Spirit Posses-sion in the Nepal Himalayas, Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi1976, 12-20.

Scharfetter 1996 Christian Scharfetter, Allgemeine Psychopathologie, GeorgThieme Verlag, Stuttart 1996.

Scharfetter 2004 Christian Scharfetter, Das Ich auf dem spirituellen Weg, VerlagWissenschaft & Praxis, Sternenfeld 2004.

Turner 1989 Victor Turner, Vom Ritual zum Theater. Der Ernst des menschli-chen Spiels, Qumran, Frankfurt 1989.

Van Gennep Arnold van Gennep, Übergangsriten, Campus, Frankfurt 1986.1909/1986

J O H N R . B A K E R

Psychedelics, Culture, and Consciousness:Insights from the Biocultural Perspective

INTRODUCTION

The contributions in this volume attest to both our extraordinary humanabilities to voluntarily enter into altered states of consciousness and tothe sophisticated conceptual frameworks that people draw upon to com-prehend these states. Although certainly not exhaustive, these papersdemonstrate that a wide variety of techniques for inducing altered statesof consciousness have been developed in both traditional and moderncontexts. They also make it clear that these states can vary both in termsof the experiences they are associated with and the ways that these ex-periences are interpreted and understood.

In this paper, I will employ a biocultural perspective as I discussa methodology for altering consciousness that is different from all of theothers presented at this symposium: the ingestion of psychedelic sub-stances. The use of psychedelics may be more ancient than all of theother techniques for altering consciousness discussed in this volume.Yet in spite of the widespread use of these substances across culturesand throughout time, cultural training and individual variation continueto play as great a role in shaping their effects and outcomes as they doin the meditative and contemplative traditions. What is more, the factthat profound altered states of consciousness can be spontaneously in-duced through exogenous agents as well as through long periods of trai-ning makes the study of psychedelics very useful for discerning theroles that cultural expectations and individual characteristics play inshaping the experiences of an altered state and the ways in which theseexperiences will be understood. Moreover, since psychedelic substancesare almost �guaranteed� to produce effects in even naïve individuals,they can help us to understand the constructive potential that alteredstates of consciousness may have for a much wider population than just


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those persons who are both motivated and privileged enough to studyand practice meditation and other similar techniques.

THE BIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE

The biocultural perspective is an emerging anthropological paradigmthat aims at developing a more comprehensive framework for under-standing human life by incorporating biological insights into explana-tions of sociocultural phenomena. While biological scientists are able todraw upon the robust explanatory framework provided by neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory when investigating such topics as intras-pecies cooperation and interspecies competition, researchers who inves-tigate such cultural phenomena as politics or warfare do not yet have anequally well-articulated and integrated view of their phenomena at theirdisposal. Biological insights offer a way out of this theoretical impasse.

As in the other social and behavioral sciences, many of the theo-ries developed within anthropology have downplayed or even deniedthe role that biological factors play in human social life. This tendencyhas its roots in the Enlightenment, when such thinkers as John Lockeargued that the mind of a newborn infant was like an �empty cabinet�which his or her culture then filled with knowledge (Harris 1968:10-16). To be sure, there were great differences in opinions as to what kindof �wood� this empty cabinet may have been made off (contrast therather pessimistic perspective that Thomas Hobbes offered on humannature with the more romanticized view of Jean Jacques Rousseau).This �enlightened� thinking led to numerous nineteenth century ideasbased upon the general notion of social �progress,� which were framed(whether implicitly or explicitly) in ways that provided justification forthe imperial, colonial, and missionary activities of the European powers.The focus on the influences that social and technological complexity,religious beliefs, and even geographical latitude and climate could haveon human life represent an early emphasis on �nurture� (as opposed to�nature�) that overlooked the very real biological differences betweenindividuals. This trend found perhaps its most extreme example in therecent postmodern movement, whose proponents frequently complainthat efforts to identify the biological bases of human life represent an

PSYCHEDELICS , CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS 391

attempt to assert the �hegemony� of science over other, equally legiti-mate �narratives� about the human condition (cf. McKinley 2000).1

However, ignoring our biology can make it well nigh impossi-ble to comprehend even quite simple aspects of human life, such as whydifferent people have different dietary requirements, or why some peo-ple are more sensitive to sunlight than others. When looking at con-sciousness, leaving biology out of the picture can make it difficult tounderstand why one person can more readily attain a particular state ofconsciousness than another, or why changing our mental state may af-fect our breathing, digestion, and body temperature. Because the biocul-tural perspective considers both the biological mechanisms and proc-esses that make human consciousness possible and the cultural tech-niques and explanatory frameworks that are used to produce and under-stand any particular consciousness state, it offers a comprehensive andpowerful paradigm for understanding the effects of different techniquesfor altering consciousness.

Two biological facts about humans are especially pertinent tothe present discussion: 1) modern humans are descended from animalsthat possessed smaller and simpler brains; and 2) humans differ fromone another with respect to numerous micro-features of our brains andnervous systems. Although these facts may appear to be so basic as tobe trite, they have important implications for the present discussion. Invertebrates, the brain is the integrative center for almost all nervoussystem functions. As vertebrates evolved, their brains acquired increas-ingly powerful abilities to not only control their bodies, but also to re-tain memories of past events, learn from present experiences, and con-template ever more complex scenarios about the future. The diversityfound in the vertebrate subphylum today bears witness to the stages inwhich vertebrate brains�and their associated abilities�evolved. Sim-ple vertebrates, such as the fish and amphibians, possess quite limitedmental abilities, and consequently exhibit a rather narrow spectrum ofbehaviors, social groupings, and experiential states. Others, especiallythe birds and mammals, are capable of a much wider range of behav-

1 One colleague of mine told me of a conference she had attended in which a shoutingmatch had erupted between supporters of postmodernist thinking and proponents ofa more empirical view. When one empiricist attempted to introduce genetic evi-dence in support of his argument, his appalled opponent shouted out �You don�treally believe in genes, do you?�

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iors, social groups, and experiential states (see Griffin 2001 for a moredetailed discussion).

The ultimate expression of this trend, of course, is the humanbrain, which has also acquired the ability to communicate what it haslearned to others. In addition to the macroevolutionary processes thathave made humans distinct from all other animals, the microevolution-ary processes of random mutation and selection, and the process of in-dividual development, make each of us distinct from one another. As aresult, every human possesses a somewhat different constellation ofmental qualities, resulting in disparate degrees and types of intelligen-ces. Because states of consciousness are directly linked to brain func-tioning, this implies that each of us varies in terms of our abilities tolearn about and enter into altered states of consciousness.

THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Although we commonly speak of �states� of consciousness, this choiceof terms glosses over the ever-changing nature of conscious experience(cf. Zinberg 1977). Mammalian consciousness shifts between three pri-mary modalities, each of which in turn consists of a wide range of expe-riential states: the waking state, REM sleep, and deep sleep. Put simply,the mammalian waking state is the modality in which animals are ableto actively engage their external world, while REM sleep and deep sleepallow animals to recover from their exertions and process their wakingexperiences.

Within these three primary modalities of consciousness existcountless subtle variations. In the waking state, we may at one momentbe alert and focused on the task at hand, while the next moment mayfind us drowsy and unable to concentrate at all. Even when we are com-pletely awake, our ability to focus our attention varies, as do the objectsthat engage our awareness. These fluctuations in our mental activityhave long been recognized, and some meditative traditions explicitlyaim at taming our �monkey mind,� the tendency of our attention andawareness to wander (cf. Chodron 1999).

The monkey metaphor raises interesting questions as to how andwhen our ancestors first became able to voluntarily induce altered statesof consciousness and to utilize these for constructive purposes. Evencasually observing another animal is sufficient to see that like humans,it too has periods of activity and quiet, and that the objects that may


interest it at one moment will be ignored at another. We can assume thatthe consciousness of our ancestors, like that of humans and other ani-mals today, was characterized by similarly alternating periods of alert-ness and drowsiness, focus and lack of focus. As their intelligence andself-awareness increased, our ancestors would have needed to be able toexert some degree of control over these shifts in conscious awareness,for there would have always been those basic �reality checks� that camefrom the external world, whether in the form of predators that they nee-ded to evade or potential mates that they would have wanted to recog-nize. The selective pressures coming from the world outside of theirbodies would have been unforgiving, and those individuals who couldnot quickly respond to important events in their external world wouldhave paid with their lives.

Evolutionary fitness is measured by the number of offspring anindividual produces, and therewith the number of genes that the indi-vidual is able to contribute to the next generation. Clearly, those indi-viduals that were better able to rapidly disengage from the internalworlds of deep and REM sleep and face their external worlds in a real-ity-based manner (that is, one that would benefit their survival and re-production) would possess advantages over those that were less capableof doing so. Moreover, as brains increased in size (especially relative toan animal�s body size), animals became more capable of both process-ing the information being provided by their senses and to remembertheir previous experiences. This led to increases in their abilities to dis-cern the differences between specific events and to envision alternativescenarios about both the causes and the implications of these events.These increases in intelligence, coupled with the development of morecomplex social groups in which individuals could observe, interact, andlearn from one another, eventually led to the emergence of culture(Bonner 1980).

The broad strokes of these evolutionary events are documentedin the fossil record, and we know much about the general sequence inwhich they occurred in our own hominid lineage (see, e.g. Johanson1996). But are these increases in intelligence and social complexityenough to explain the emergence of the types of consciousness tradi-tions discussed in this volume? This is not likely. For one thing, allknown contemporary traditions of consciousness alteration rely upondetailed and nuanced models for describing the effects of the experi-ences they aim at evoking, and these models are communicated through

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language (examples may be found in the other papers in this volume).While we will never be able to fully reconstruct the sequence of evolu-tionary events that led to the appearance of Homo sapiens, the fossilrecord clearly indicates that modern humans are descended from smal-ler brained animals that lived in social groups of about 100 individualsor less. With brains no larger than those of a modern chimpanzee, andlacking a system of language like that used by all human groups today,it is safe to assume that the traditions of consciousness alteration de-scribed elsewhere in this volume did not�indeed could not�exist untilour ancestors had acquired not only the anatomical features that makethese experiences possible, but had also developed the linguistic abili-ties that enabled them to describe their experiences to their fellows andto discuss with one another what these experiences meant.

We do not know when our ancestors first acquired the capacityfor language as we now know it. In all likelihood, a number of stepswere necessary before human language could emerge (see Mithen 1996for one possible scenario). Lacking language, it would have been im-possible to develop the explanatory models found in the meditative tra-ditions discussed in this volume. Without language to teach a personhow to achieve a meditative state, it is likely that the first mystical sta-tes of consciousness that our ancestors experienced were spontaneousevents.

While extreme activity�including excessive physical exertion,hunger and thirst, and sleeplessness�may have elicited these events,there are other possibilities, and these are present in many environmentsaround the world. The number of plants, fungi, minerals, and even ani-mals capable of rapidly inducing profoundly altered states of con-sciousness is unknown, but it is large (see Rätsch 2005). As our forag-ing ancestors browsed through their environments in search of food andother resources, they would have occasionally and unavoidably encoun-tered psychoactive agents. As they gained familiarity with their effects,they would have learned that some of these agents could help them tostay awake, others would cause them to fall asleep, and still others wereable to induce experiences unlike any they had ever known. It is thislatter group of agents that may have served as the catalysts that wouldeventually lead to the emergence of other techniques for voluntarilyaltering consciousness.



PSYCHEDELICS AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Of all the naturally occurring psychoactive substances, those with themost profound effects upon consciousness have become known bymany names. Lewis Lewin, the German physician regarded as the fatherof modern toxicology, called them �phantastica� (Lewin 1980[1927]).Some of the other terms that have been put forth include �hallucino-gens� (Hoffer et a. 1954), �entheogens� (Ruck 1979), and �psychointe-grators� (Winkelman 1995). In the present context, perhaps the mostappropriate term is �psychedelic�, a term coined in 1956 (Osmund1957). The word literally means �mind manifesting�, and refers to theabilities of such substances as LSD, mescaline, and psilocybin to tem-porarily suspend our normal perceptual and mental functioning whilehaving little effect upon memory. Visual and other sensory effects arecommon, and higher dosages can lead to a complete dissolution of anindividual�s awareness of himself as an individual (producing a sense of�merging�), an inability to distinguish between perceptions arising frominside and outside of the body, and the temporary suspension of normalcognitive and affective interpretations of perceptions.

A wide variety of substances can produce these effects, and theuse of these substances has been documented throughout the world(Dobkin de Rios 1984, Furst 1990, Schultes 2001). Depending upontheir chemical structure, their mechanisms of action vary considerably.Some naturally occurring psychedelic substances (such as the tropanealkaloids) can produce lethal as well as visionary effects. In spite ofsuch dangers, Datura, Mandragora, Atropa, Nicotiana, and other mem-bers of the Solanaceae family have been used for shamanic, initiatory,and other ritual purposes since prehistoric times (cf. Baker 1994, Wil-bert 1987). The use of such plants reflects both our basic human predi-lection to enter into altered states and the fact that almost any psychoac-tive substance can be utilized for personally integrative and culturallyconstructive purposes when used appropriately.

The use of the more powerful hallucinogens, such as mescalineand psilocybin, is also ancient. Ayahuasca, a preparation made by boil-ing the stems of the Banisteriopsis caapi vine together with the leavesof the Psychotria viridis bush, has been used by Amazonian tribes forcenturies. The pharmacology of ayahuasca is extraordinary, for sub-stances present in the caapi vine (Banisteriopsis caapi) inhibit the re-lease of an enzyme�monoamine oxidase�that normally breaks downthe substances present in the chacruna leaves (Psychotria viridis). The

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potent visionary effects characteristic of ayahuasca can only beachieved when these two plants are used in combination. When andhow the indigenous peoples of South America first learned to combinethese two plants is unknown, but its use is now so pervasive in theAmazon basin�and increasingly elsewhere�that ayahuasca may bethe most commonly used psychedelic preparation in the world today(for more on the history, pharmacology, and psychology of ayahuascaas well as numerous personal reports, see Metzner 1999).

In contrast to the traditional use of psychedelic substances innon-western cultures, the modern use of psychedelics in the West hasoften been associated with the idea of �bad trips.� One reason is ourlong-standing cultural attitudes towards altered states of consciousnessin general, for of all the world�s cultures, those whose roots lie in theeastern Mediterranean basin are the least likely to have institutionalizedreligious traditions of altering consciousness (Bourguignon 1973). To-day�s western �hallucinophobic� attitude has a long tradition. The pro-scriptions against �pagan� religions issued by the Emperor Theodosiusin 380 C.E. when he adopted Christianity as the official religion of theempire suppressed such previously accepted practices as the Eleusinianand Dionysian Mysteries (or forced them far underground), and resultedin a loss of knowledge concerning the proper ways to use psychedelicsubstances.

During the next sixteen hundred years or so, most Europeanknowledge about the proper ways to use these substances and exploittheir effects for constructive purposes was lost. Consequently, few wereprepared for the rediscovery of the psychedelic substances that began inthe nineteenth century and accelerated in the twentieth, especially afterthe discovery of LSD in the 1940s. Many of the first experiments inwhich chemists and other researchers ingested LSD and psilocybin pro-duced such unanticipated effects that it was thought that these sub-stances produced a kind of transitory psychotic state (Stoll 1947). The�psychotomimetic� and �toxic psychosis� models that were developedto explain these effects led some clinic and hospital administrators tourge their physicians, nurses, and other attending staff to have experi-ences with these compounds so that they could gain temporary accessinto the worlds that their patients were thought to inhabit on a more orless permanent basis. It was thought that this would enable these healthcare workers to better understand their patients and to develop moreeffective methods for treating them. But many of these �normal� people


noticed that their experiences were completely different from those oftheir patients, and it quickly became clear that new models were needed(see Grob 1994 for a more detailed discussion).

Humphry Osmond, the British psychiatrist who coined the term�psychedelic�, used LSD to treat psychiatric patients who did not re-spond to more conventional treatment methods. He and his colleaguesadministered extremely high doses (usually once) in order to evokeexperiences that would literally overwhelm their patients and lead themto reassess their lives (Osmond 1957). This treatment method, whichaimed at essentially bypassing repressed traumatic events and eliciting areligious �conversion� experience, worked especially well with alcohol-ics and other patients with rigid personality structures (see also Sher-wood 1967-68).

In contrast to this largely North American methodology, muchof the clinical work performed in Europe followed a protocol in which aseries of low to medium dosages of a psychedelic agent were adminis-tered in conjunction with psychoanalysis and group work. This �psy-cholytic� (literally: �mind dissolving�) approach aimed at peeling backthe layers of personality and memory as if they were an onion, allowingrepressed material to emerge into conscious awareness at a pace andtempo that could be tolerated by patients. This treatment strategy al-lowed patients to uncover, understand, and accept the traumatic eventsof their past, and gave researchers unanticipated insights into the dy-namics of the mind (Sandison 1954a; Sandison 1954b; Grof 1976).

In addition to these clinical studies, psychedelic substances werealso given to artists and other persons to assess the impact they mighthave on creativity (Dobkin de Rios 2003). As increasing numbers ofpeople were being exposed to psychedelics, it was only a matter of timebefore they would �escape� from the laboratory and make their way tothe streets, where millions of individuals were ultimately able to taketheir own psychedelic �trips�. By the early 1960s, the settings in whichpsychedelics were used varied enormously, ranging from individual andsmall group sessions in natural settings or at home to large scale gather-ings at parties and concerts. Lacking any traditional contexts for usingthese substances, some people were unprepared for the personal andtranspersonal insights that accompanied the spectacular visual and othersensory effects, and they experienced �bad trips�. Others suffered phy-sical injury because they were temporarily unable to react appropriatelyto external events. Yet for many people, the inner worlds revealed by

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these substances were mysterious and beautiful, and they offered a starkcontrast to the images of violence and destruction that were comingback from Vietnam and to the crass consumerism and the push for con-formity that were the legacies of the return to normalcy after World WarII. For many in this group, the vistas revealed by psychedelics sug-gested alternative ways of living that were quickly perceived as threatsto the existing social order. The psychedelic insights expressed in thelyrics to the Beatles� song �All You Need is Love� were matched byhyperbole from more conservative quarters. For example, C.W. Sandi-man, who was then serving as the chairman of the New Jersey NarcoticDrug Study Commission, described LSD as �the greatest threat facingthe [United States] today, � more dangerous than the Vietnam War�(cited in McGlothlin 1967:42).

Laws were quickly passed that prohibited the manufacturing,distribution, use, or possession of psychedelic substances. By the mid-1960s, all legitimate scientific research using psychedelics on humanpatients had been curtailed. In spite of a large body of research suggest-ing that psychedelic experiences can be beneficial for personal andspiritual growth (e.g., Pahnke 1972, Smith 2000, Winkelman 2007),most people in the West continue to view psychedelics in a highly nega-tive light. Clearly, the influence of cultural attitudes about altered statesremains powerful.

CULTURAL CONTEXTS: SACRAMENTS VS. SACRAMENTALS

If we recall the role that culture plays in such mundane aspects of hu-man life as what types of things can be eaten or when a person mayengage in sexual activities, it should not be surprising that cultures alsohave something to say about what states of consciousness are allowedand what these states mean. The cultural context in which psychedelicsare used is one of the most important variables for understanding theireffects. To distinguish between the use of psychedelics in societies thatpermit and even encourage their use from the use that occurs in socie-ties in which such use is proscribed, it is useful to differentiate psyche-delic �sacraments� from psychedelic �sacramentals� (Baker 2005).

In spite of their profound effects upon consciousness, the �ma-jor� psychedelic agents (psilocybin, mescaline, LSD, ayahuasca) havefew adverse effects upon a person�s physical health. Indeed, unless aperson has serious psychological issues, the most dangerous aspect of


psychedelic use has to do with the possibility of a person harming them-selves while he or she is unable to perceive or understand the outsideworld, and with the potential legal consequences that can result from thepossession and use of these substances. In contrast, traditional societiesboth respect these substances and provide supervision for novices, bothto prevent harm and to help them deal with any issues that may arisewhile they are in an altered state. In such societies, the first use of apsychedelic substance often has an initiatory quality, and experiencedusers coach novices about the types of experiences they should expect.Armed with a detailed �map� of the worlds they will be entering, con-vinced of the significance of their experiences, and supervised whilethey are in the altered state, a novice�s fears can be allayed and positiveoutcomes become more likely.

In societies which have little or no understanding of psychedelicsubstances, or which view them with fear and suspicion, psychedelicuse tends to occur clandestinely, and users typically have no guides. Asthey explore their new worlds, they must find their own way throughthe tangle of their visions, thoughts, and emotions. The emergence ofrepressed memories or a vision of an unexpected nature may evoke ter-ror in a user, and any issues that are not resolved during the acutephases of the psychedelic experience may emerge later as a �flashback.� In spite of these possibilities, many people in such societies haveexperiences that provide personal insights that they interpret as benefi-cial (cf. Stolaroff 1999).

When the use of a psychedelic substance occurs in an acceptingand supportive context that promotes the importance of the experiencesfor both the individual and society, we may refer to such use as a �sac-rament.� Thus, both the ancient mysteries of Demeter that were carriedout for centuries at Eleusis (Wasson 1998) and the contemporary use ofpeyote among both the Huichol Indians of Mexico (Myerhoff 1974) andthe members of the Native American Church (Stewart 1987) may beconsidered to be psychedelic sacraments. They are sacraments becausethey occur in culturally sanctioned ritual settings, and novice users areprovided with a shared cultural framework that enables them to antici-pate what they will experience and to understand their experiences oncethey have passed. Under such conditions, the use of psychedelic sub-stances is considered beneficial and aids in integrating the individualinto their society.


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In contrast, the use of psychedelic substances in societies whichprohibit their use can lead a person to question that society�s value sys-tem if he or she has an experience different from that which they havebeen taught to expect. Any rituals or interpretational models that maysurround such use will tend to be either personal in nature or be sharedby only a small group of individuals. Although the individual may findtheir experiences beneficial, the larger cultural context will not agree.Under such conditions, idiosyncratic interpretations of psychedelic ex-periences are common, and these interpretations may not lead to greatersocial cohesion. It is for these reasons that I have used the term �sacra-mental� to distinguish these contexts of use from their more traditionaland accepting counterparts (Baker 2005).

The western emphasis upon individual development�often atthe expense of other members of the group�stands in stark contrast tothe emphasis traditional societies place upon integrating the individualwithin the group. In and of themselves, psychedelic agents do not pro-mote anti-social attitudes. It is the context in which they are used thatdetermines whether the experiences may lead to social cohesion orfragmentation. A society that can accurately describe and teach itsmembers to safely navigate through the visionary worlds revealed bypsychedelics will minimize the possibility that these members will re-sort to �counter�- (or even �anti�-) social interpretations for these ex-periences. A society that tells its members that these experiences areillusory or have no meaning risks having its members question its othervalues as well.

THE UNIQUE NATURE OF ALL ALTERED STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The �sacrament�/�sacramental� distinction underscores the role thatcultural expectations play in shaping the experiences and interpretationof an altered state. The idea that some people are more susceptible to�bad trips� because of repressed traumas or other personal, biographicalfactors points to the role that may be played by individual psychologicaldifferences. Moreover, it is likely that basic genetic (and thus molecu-lar) differences between individuals also play a role in determining sen-sitivity to psychedelic substances. For example, the effects of LSD areknown to be at least partially related to a specific type of serotonin re-ceptor site known as 5-HT5a (Grailhe 1999), and the gene which codesfor this protein is polymorphic in humans (i.e., it has more than one


expression). Studies have been conducted into the role that this geneticvariation may play in schizophrenia (Iwata 2001) and in major depres-sion and bipolar disorders (Arias 2001), but the results have been equi-vocal. Yet just as psychedelic substances exhibit affinities to specificreceptor sites, it is likely that structural differences in those receptorsmay affect the uptake of these substances and therewith the extent towhich their effects will be elicited.

My aim here is not to provide an overview of the physiologicalmechanisms involved in psychedelic activity, but to point out that thevariation which humans exhibit at the molecular level is also likely toshape the experiences elicited by psychedelic agents. Thus, the un-avoidable genetic and psychological uniqueness of each individual sug-gests that the experiences a person has while in a psychedelic state willalways be somewhat different than those of another individual, evenwhen the same psychedelic substance is being used at the same time inthe same cultural context. The American anthropologist Anthony F.C.Wallace has described culture as a system that organizes the diversity ofhuman views of reality (Wallace 2003). Thus, in traditional societies,the preparatory phase in which novices learn to interpret and anticipatetheir experiences will help to channel their experiences into similarcourses, yet there will always be some individual idiosyncrasies in theseexperiences. But in societies that do not provide such preparation, anindividual�s experiences while in a psychedelic state are much morelikely to diverge from those of her fellows, and idiosyncratic interpreta-tions are far more likely as well.

Moreover, since each psychedelic substance has its own uniquechemical structure, each of these substances will affect the nervous sys-tem in a different way and elicit a unique state of consciousness. Theconstant changes in the neural �wiring� in an individual as well as therole of experience also suggest that no two psychedelic states of con-sciousness can ever be identical. Even in the same person, prior experi-ence (or lack thereof) will shape the ways in which a psychedelic ses-sion unfolds. Although we speak of consciousness �states�, in realityconsciousness is fluid.

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THE IMPLICATIONS OF PSYCHEDELICS FOR UNDERSTANDINGMEDITATION AND YOGIC PERCEPTION

Although this paper has focused on the use of psychedelics, I believethat the points it raises apply to consciousness in general, and to medita-tion and yogic perception in particular. All organisms must be able topay some attention to the world around them, and their ability (or in-ability) to do so has been a potent evolutionary selective force. Yetnormal mammalian functioning also depends upon an animal being ableto periodically withdraw from the outer world, both to restore the bodyand to process mental events. Meditative techniques represent a newand uniquely human way of withdrawing from the outer world. Whilemeditative traditions differ in terms of the techniques they utilize andthe ways in which they are interpreted and understood, all involve shiftsin consciousness away from the normal ways in which humans interactwith the external world.

As with psychedelic substances, cultural training and personalhistories will affect an individual�s abilities to enter into and learn frommeditative experiences. This fact has been recognized by many medita-tive traditions and conceptualized in manners consonant with the otherassumptions of the cultures in which they arose. According to the Hinduand Buddhist traditions that are the primary focus of this volume, forexample, it may take many lifetimes for an individual to overcome theirnegative karma and achieve a birth that is conducive to attaining mok-sha or nirvana. This negative karma is said to be the result of pastthoughts and actions. What such traditions have not considered�atleast as far as I am aware�is the role that what we now call geneticfactors may play in shaping a person�s mood, intelligence, or memory.

What makes the study of psychedelics particularly interesting inthe context of this volume is that they explicitly remind us of the rolethat even small-scale molecular processes can play in the large-scalepicture of human consciousness. It is for this reason that I am arguingthat a comprehensive understanding of any type of methodology foraltering consciousness must consider not only the cultural assumptionsassociated with that methodology, but also the insights offered by biol-ogy. In other words, consciousness is a product of processes that occurfrom the �bottom up� as well as the �top down.� Understanding con-sciousness requires that we look at both.

Psychedelic substances also provide us with another importantlesson. Unlike most meditative and contemplative traditions, which


demand that practitioners devote extended periods to learning andgradually refining their abilities, the effects of psychedelic agents arerapid in their onset and almost impossible to overlook. Psychedelicsoffer a short-term �break� from normal reality that a person can easilywork into their schedule. Consequently, they have the potential to �de-mocratize� consciousness by making it possible for large numbers ofpeople to explore the worlds that exist within them and to examine andrefine their conceptions and attitudes about the world. How helpful itwould be if our cultures would provide us with both an accepted meansand an accurate map for exploring these worlds.

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404 JOHN R. BAKER

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S H U L A M I T H K R E I T L E R

Altered States of Consciousness as Structural Variationsof the Cognitive System

ABSTRACT

The chapter presents a new approach to defining consciousness in termsof an innovative theory of meaning (Kreitler & Kreitler). Most of theexisting approaches to consciousness are based on the assumption thatdifferences in consciousness consist primarily in degrees of awareness,so that it may seem superfluous to dwell on the characterization of vari-ous so-called alternate states of consciousness (SOCs). However, ananalysis of different SOCs reveals several major dimensions in whichthey differ, e.g., status of the �I� or sense of control. The new approachis cognitive and is based on the theory of meaning which deals with thecontents and processes underlying cognitive functioning. The majorthesis is that SOCs are a function of encompassing changes in the cog-nitive system brought about by specific organizational transformationsin the meaning system. Structural changes of this kind may affect cogni-tive functioning, personality manifestations, mood and affect, as well asphysiological processes. The new approach may enable matching ofcognitive tasks to adequate SOCs, the production of SOCs by self-controlled cognitive means, and even the definition of new SOCs.

DEMYSTIFYING CONSCIOUSNESS

According to Dennett (1991: 21) �human consciousness is just about thelast surviving mystery�, whereby mystery he defines as a phenomenonthat people do not know how to think about and where to look for an-swers about it. This paper is designed to make a contribution to demys-tifying consciousness by embedding it in a relevant context, which mayinspire thoughts about consciousness, and possibly the basic compo-nents for a new theory of consciousness (Kreitler 1999; 2001; 2002).

408 SHULAMITH KREITLER

CONSCIOUSNESS AND AWARENESS

Any survey of the common definitions of consciousness readily revealsthat most of them tend to equate consciousness with the mental state ofawareness (Sutherland 1995; Dennett 1996). This conception has itsorigins in the approaches to consciousness prior to Freud (Whyte 1962:17ff) and has been adopted and developed by Freud and the psychody-namically oriented psychologists (Freud 1981).

According to this approach consciousness is considered as aproperty that varies along one continuum, best described in terms of thetriarchic set �conscious,� �preconscious� and �unconscious.� The contin-uum is mostly positioned perpendicularly, with consciousness charac-terizing its upper end, unconsciousness its lower end, and preconscious-ness holding a middle position, in between the extremes. The upper endof the continuum represents ordinary consciousness, with its highlyvalued qualities of awareness and clarity, to which other similarly val-ued characteristics became attached, mainly logical reasonable thinking,control of drives and emotions, the power of volition, reality-orientationand self-regulation of behavior. The lower end of the continuum standsfor the various altered states of consciousness (SOCs). Since awarenesswas considered as the major property of consciousness, it did not makemuch sense to dwell on the characteristics of the various altered statesof consciousness, all of which seemed to be characterized by low orfuzzy awareness. Differences among SOCs were dealt with, if at all, interms of the external stimuli or triggers, such as drugs, alcohol or hyp-notic induction.

Psychodynamically oriented theoreticians may differ in the de-scriptions they provide of the contents of the unconscious. Thus, ac-cording to the Freudians (Freud 1981) the contents are mainly sexualand aggressive drives and personally repressed issues, whereas accord-ing to the Jungians (Jung 1982) they also include collectively sharedarchetypes of structures and meanings of general importance for humanbeings. But differences in contents of this kind did not lead these theo-reticians to attribute psychological importance to differences amongSOCs that have been experienced and documented by many people andpeoples.

ALTERED CONSCIOUSNESS AS VARIATIONS OF COGNITIVE SYSTEM 409

MULTIPLE PHENOMENA

The assumption that consciousness is characterized mainly by aware-ness leads to a unidimensional conception of consciousness. This ap-proach seems to be too narrow and may result in an erroneous concep-tualization of the problems of consciousness.

Our first step towards a different approach would be consideringthe phenomena that are relevant for consciousness. The literature anddocumentation of consciousness contain a long list of concepts, labels,descriptions, or terms denoting SOCs (e.g., Barber, Spanos & Chaves1974; Blackmore 2004; Eliade 1964; Fischer 1978; Foulkes 1990; Ha-bel, O�Donoghue & Maddox 1993; Harrison 1989; Kakar 1992; Orn-stein 1977; Riboli 2000; Singer & Antrobus 1972; Wulff 2000; Zuck-erman 1969). Let us mention at least some of the major ones.

A regular textbook or encyclopedia mentions SOCs that cancome about through physical disorders, such as indigestion, fever, ni-trogen narcosis (deep diving), a traumatic accident or deprivation offood or water or sleep or oxygen; states induced by meditation, prayer,or techniques bound with specific disciplines (such as Mantra Medita-tion, Sufism, Yoga, Surat Shabbda Yoga); intoxication states inducedby psychoactive substances or opioids (e.g., LSD, mescaline, heroin,marijuana, MDMA or ecstasy, psychedelic mushrooms, datura or jim-son weed, peyote, ketamin, ayahuasca, DXM or dextromethorphan,amphetamines, cocaine, including perhaps also the lower-grade ones,such as nicotine, caffeine and Ritalin or methylphenidate); states in-duced by sensory deprivation (also called floating tank, sensory attenua-tion tank or Restricted Environmental Stimulation Therapy or FloatationREST); states induced by physical means, such as postures, dancing orbreathing exercises; mental disorder states, such as mania or psychosis;states bound with hypnosis, self-hypnosis or guided imagery; sleep,dreaming, lucid dreaming, and transitional states between sleep andwakefulness (hypnagogic and hypnopompic, false awakening, and sleepparalysis); drunkenness (e.g., induced by the consumption of alcohol);states induced by shamanistic practices, including music and drugs;mystical experiences; oceanic experience; psychological states likeflow, as well as intense emotional states (e.g., fear or panic, love, anger,sadness or depression); peak experiences; trance states including raptureor religious ecstasy, Samadhi, �possession� and �channeling�; and thestate often produced by immersion in a crowd.



The list that uses the terms commonly applied in this contextpresents a mixture of several points of view. The main ones are (a) con-tents that characteristically appear in the described states (e.g., mysticalexperiences), (b) conditions under which the states characteristicallyoccur (e.g., sleep, mental disorders, physical state of deprivation, sen-sory deprivation), (c) techniques used for inducing particular states(e.g., meditation, hypnosis, shamanistic practices, music, dancing), and(d) chemical or other substances applied as triggers (e.g., psychoactivedrugs, alcohol, stimulants). Sometimes the category of chemical sub-stances is further subdivided into classes of drugs in line with their gen-eral effects, such as stimulants, opioids, psychedelics, dissociatives anddelirants.

It is possible that one or more of the states categorized underone of the four major headings is similar to or identical with a statecategorized under a completely different heading, for example, a stateinduced by hypnosis and a state triggered by a certain drug.

This unclarity calls for a new attempt to construct a taxonomy ofthe different SOCs which would enable productive research consideringthe whole range of observed variations.

MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS

Several approaches are possible to the issue of setting up a taxonomy ofSOCs. Those of potentially greatest interest are the psychological andthe physiological ones. The psychological approach to be applied herehas the advantages of being closer to the phenomenological-experientiallevel of SOCs and of being based at present on a larger store of infor-mation than the physiological one is. It may be hoped that in the futurethe two sets of characterization will be combined.

The psychological approach proposed here consists in defining aset of dimensions, each of which may get different values. It is expectedthat this approach will result in the characterization of each state of con-sciousness by a profile of values along each of the dimensions. The firstpart of the task is to define the relevant dimensions.

There are several proposals of dimensions for mapping the con-sciousness phenomena. One often applied dimension refers to the con-tinuum from the outer being to the inner being and is rooted apparentlyin different mystical traditions including the Indian, Jewish (Kabala,Hassidism) and European (Gooch 1972; Lilly 1972). It is often de-


scribed in metaphorical terms as representing a variety of axes, the mainones being from the subjective to the objective, the personal to the im-personal, the illusory to the absolutely true, the material to the spiritual,and the temporary to the constant. Two other proposals are oftenquoted. Tart (1975) suggested two orthogonal dimensions of irrational-ity and of the ability to hallucinate, which define the locations of threeclusters labeled REM dreaming, lucid dreaming and ordinary con-sciousness. Fischer (1978) proposed two dimensions fanning to thesides from one origin: one along the perception-hallucination continuumof increasing ergotropic arousal (of the sympathetic nervous system),which describes a gradual turning inward toward a mental dimensionwhile turning away from the physical arousal, and includes creative,psychotic, and ecstatic experiences; and another dimension along theperception-meditation continuum of increasing trophotropic arousal,which includes the hypoaroused states of Zazen and Yoga Samadhi.

To our mind these proposals are inadequate. The axis from theouter to inward reality is overly general and vulnerable to metaphoricalexpansion and fuzziness; irrationality and ability to hallucinate are bothcognitive characteristics and do not seem sufficient to cover the wholevariety of experiential phenomena, beyond the three clusters discussedby Tart; the two dimensions of ergotropic and trophotropic arousal de-fine in fact one dimension of arousal and is also too limited in scope.

The following dimensions are based on preliminary investiga-tions and present an attempt to do justice to the field in psychologicalterms. They emphasize aspects of the phenomena that, on the one hand,are sufficiently close to the observed characteristics to have at least facevalidity, but, on the other hand, have the potential to account for charac-teristics that may not be directly observable, so that they have constructvalidity. It will be noted that the dimensions refer to specific psycho-logical variables.

The listed dimensions do not stem from any specific psycho-logical theory and may match different theoretical approaches. Further,none of the dimensions was defined in view of one specific state of con-sciousness, so that they all apply to all the different SOCs. At presentthere are 9 dimensions, but the number may change somewhat in thefuture. Brief definitions and examples will follow the presentation ofeach dimension.


1. Salience and status of the �I�. This dimension describes the role,salience and status of the I in the different SOCs. In ordinary con-sciousness the I is experienced as the major agent of all actions, clearlydelineated and differentiated from external reality, in charge of all itscomponents, which include also the body. It functions actually as �themeasure of all things�. In dream states the I is not always prominent,and often occupies a secondary role in the fringes; in hypnosis the I mayrelinquish its ruling status and transfer it to another agent, such as thehypnotizer; in an oceanic experience the I may experience a sense ofconnectedness to everything in the vicinity or even a feeling of �one-ness� with all beings; in shamanistic states the I may even give up itsexistence and get transformed into the shapes or functions of other be-ings, human or animal; and even in a state of immersion in a crowdsituation the individual may lose the sense of one�s self.2. Sense of control and ability to control. The strength of the sense ofcontrol and the domains in regard to which control is exercised or felt tobe viable differ in the various SOCs. Thus, in ordinary consciousnessthe individual may feel having control of oneself and one�s behavior aswell as over the closer environment, but neither over physiologicalprocesses within one�s body nor over reality at large. In some dreamstates a person may feel having control over external reality (e.g.,changing some parts of reality); and in hypnosis - over physiologicalprocesses, if the instructions are adequately given. In other SOCs onemay experience loss of control over one�s muscles and ability to move(e.g., �false awakening�) or in contrast experience the ability to fly (e.g.,shamanistic flights).3. Clarity of thought. Clarity of thought, sharpness of attention, andability to concentrate and to focus when performing any cognitive actvary from one SOC to another, regardless of the contents of thethoughts. Clarity is increased in the states of inspiration as for examplein �Flow� and after ingesting stimulants, but it is decreased in states offatigue, disorders of metabolism, liver, kidneys, lungs, or heart as wellas following toxic exposure, carbon dioxide or opioid toxicity.4. Precision of perception in regard to external reality and envi-ronment. Precision of reality perception is fairly good in ordinary con-sciousness, but it is impaired for example in states of sleep or intoxica-tion due to alcohol ingestion or certain drugs, when even the perceptionof constancies is transformed and time and place disorientation mayfollow. The hallucinogenic drugs produce hallucinations that impair


external reality perception. In other states it may be enhanced, as forexample in depression or increased fear, especially in regard to thethreatening stimuli. In some SOCs due to the ingestion of certain drugsthere is an enhanced perception of colors and sounds of music, but fol-lowing other drugs (e.g., LSD) there may be dramatic changes in per-ception.5. Precision of perception in regard to internal reality and envi-ronment. In some SOCs there may be an enhanced perception of innerstates, physiological or others (sometimes called intuitions), as in hyp-nosis or specific types of meditation, whereas in other SOCs there maybe complete dissociation from the inner and bodily processes.6. Emotional involvement. The different SOCs differ greatly in theamount and direction of emotional involvement. Some SOCs are char-acterized by low degree of emotionality, sometimes to the point of dis-sociation. In other SOCs there is a tendency toward intensified emo-tions, as in a crowd situation with a �charismatic� leader, or after inges-tion of certain drugs. The evoked emotions may be positive (followingthe ecstasy drug) or negative (e.g., fear, anxiety, disorientation).7. Arousal. Basically this dimension describes the differences in arousalthat characterize SOCs, which may range from peaks of hyperarousal(e.g., following a leader in a crowd situation, ecstatic experiences, orpsychosis) to low level of hypoarousal (e.g., dream states, following theingestion of sedatives).8. Kind of cognitive processes activated. A large body of data indi-cates that SOCs differ greatly in the cognitive processes that are promi-nent or weak while they last. Thus, some SOCs are characterized bylogical and systematic thinking, primarily verbal (e.g., ordinary con-sciousness); some � by creativity (perhaps LSD; and other SOCs � byimagial (imaginative?) integrative thinking that produces connectionsand relations between different themes or domains (e.g., night dreams).9. Accessibility and inhibition of certain kinds of information(kinds of and amount). This dimension focuses on accessibility of in-formation. In no SOC is all available information also accessible. Inordinary consciousness the accessible information refers primarily tothe external interpersonally shared reality that is socially and culturallyconfirmed and approved. The inaccessible information refers mostly topersonal information of a threatening nature, emotions, often the nega-tive ones, as well as drives and wishes that are classified as taboo inone�s culture, or traumatic experiences and memories that are bound to


significant figures in one�s life. Basically, all the inaccessible informa-tion is of the kind viewed as �unconscious� by the psychodynamic ap-proaches. In dream states the accessible information refers to personalemotions and experiences of the kind labeled as unconscious in ordinaryconsciousness, while the inaccessible information refers to external andinterpersonally shared reality. In drug induced states, such as followingthe ingestion of ayahuasca information referring to spiritual and reli-gious themes is apparently accessible while the information referring toexternal and interpersonally-shared reality is inaccessible. In a state ofbeing in love the accessible information includes all the good qualitiesof the beloved one and those that express optimism in general, but allthe weaker features pointed to mostly by others are inaccessible.

The presented dimensions were selected for their relative gener-ality and ability to account for other psychological phenomena that dif-fer among the SOCs but could be derived from one of the dimensions ora combination of several dimensions, whereby both higher and lowervalues on the relevant dimensions need to be considered. Thus, for ex-ample, suggestibility could be derived from low values in Dimension 3,�Out-of-the-Body� experiences are likely to be facilitated by low valueson Dimension 1, when the strongly delineated boundaries of personalidentity are weakened. High values on Dimension 1 are involved in I-Thou relations and empathy for others (but not identification) that re-quire clarity and stability of the personal identity. Telepathy and para-psychological effects also require the activation of values on specificdimensions, most likely high values on Dimensions 9 and 5. All theeffects that are presented as dependent on one or more dimensions maybe considered as derivatives or secondary manifestations of the dimen-sions.

Some of the derivatives are more complex because they seem todepend on a combination of several values of several dimensions. Oneexample is healing power, actual or virtual. There is evidence that insome SOCs the individuals report experiencing being endowed with ahealing power, which may be illusory or actual (e.g., shamanistic states,mystical experiences). One may surmise that in specific SOCs the senseof this particular power is more likely to be evoked or elicited than inothers. Dimensions that are probably involved include low values onDimension 1, high on Dimensions 5, 6 and 9. The second example isspecific scientific disciplines. It seems that specific sciences thrive moreor better under specific SOCs than under others. For example, psychol-



ogy as a science requires among others a high value on Dimension 1given that its basic unit of inquiry is the human individual; the life sci-ences require high values on Dimensions 3 and 4; while mathematicsrequires also high values on Dimension 5.

Table 1: Schematic presentation of dimensional profiles of four SOCs

Dimensions Ordinary Con-sciousness

Hypnosis Dreams Ecstatic state

Status of the I High Medium Low High

Control High Low Low Low

Clarity High Low Low Low

Externalreality

High Low Low Low

Internalreality

Low High High Medium

Emotion Medium Medium High High

Arousal Medium Medium Low High

Thinking Logical Imagial Paralogical Unsystematic

Information External HighInternal Low

External LowInternal High

External LowInternal High

Low

The dimensions could be used for setting up profiles characterizingdifferent SOCs. (See Table 1 for examples). At present some of theprofiles may be incomplete due to missing information. The dimensionsmay also be helpful in organizing the different SOCs into clusters on thebasis of similarities among them in several of the dimensions. A taxon-omy of this kind could promote the efforts of matching the psychologi-cal characteristics present and future physiological information aboutprocesses mediating the psychological phenomena. A further use of theprofiles could be that they would help in devising additional elicitationprocedures for the different SOCs (in line with the specific values onthe dimensions). Another advantage is that the profiles could promotediagnosing specific benefits and risks of the different SOCs. For exam-ple, some SOCs are characterized by highly accurate perception of ex-ternal reality, whereas other SOCs may be characterized by enhancedfantasy functioning. The former SOC would seem to be adequate fortasks such as monitoring screens for detecting the earliest signs of dan-


gerous weather changes, whereas the latter SOC would be more ade-quate for tasks such as producing creative advertisement. Most impor-tantly, the profiles could help in selecting the appropriate SOC for per-forming a particular task, if the means and procedures for eliciting thediverse SOCs are under our control (see Kreitler 2002).

CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION

An examination of the different dimensions and the range of effects thatthey represent reveal a large number of phenomena that are affected bychanges in SOCs. Some investigators treat the changed aspects as onepackage and lump them together under a general term, such as �mentalfunctioning� (Tart 1972: 1203). Others (Farthing 1992) provide a de-tailed list of the domains in which changes take place: attention, percep-tion, imagery and fantasy, inner speech, memory, higher-level thoughtprocesses, meaning and significance, time perception, emotional feelingand expression, arousal, self-control, suggestibility, body image, senseof personal identity. Despite its length it is unlikely that the list is com-plete. Notably missing are effects in the domain of behavior, includingmotor actions, and physiological processes.

However it may be, scanning the list, even though it is partial,raises the question of what kind of system in the living organism couldbe responsible for such a diversity of effects? There is only one systemthat could be considered as a candidate for this role. At least at present,on the psychological level cognition is the only system that has beenshown capable to promote, originate, enable and affect phenomena inall the named domains, ranging from perception to behavior, includingall the cognitive processes, emotions, and personality traits.

There are a great many indications in the writings about con-sciousness that suggest the intimate relations that have long been notedbetween consciousness and cognition. Many investigators have notedthat consciousness and changes in consciousness affect cognition. Forexample, ordinary consciousness promotes learning new and complexmaterial (Baars & McGovern 1996: 74-75; Hardcastle 1995); a hypnoticstate intensifies the individual�s imaginative processes (Barber, Spanos& Chaves 1974). Others considered cognition as the object of con-sciousness, so that consciousness has been described as referring tocontents contained in �primary memory� (a kind of short-term workingstore) defining the �psychological present� (James 1890/1950). Another


conceptualization emphasizes cognition as the antecedent, condition orcause for consciousness (Mandler 1984). Most prevalent is the concep-tion of cognition as the function of consciousness, evident in regard to aspecific cognitive subsystem, e.g., episodic memory (Tulving 1983), orthe majority of cognitive processes (Baars 1988: chap. 10).

The close interrelatedness of consciousness with cognitive proc-esses and contents encourages attempts to construct cognitive theoriesof consciousness. Some of the better known ones have been proposedby investigators of different theoretical orientations (e.g., Baars 1988;Johnson-Laird 1988; Kihlstrom 1993; Nastoulas 1994; Velmans 1996).However, these attempts have been limited in the scope of their contri-butions to the understanding of consciousness, mainly because of sev-eral assumptions they share concerning consciousness and cognition.

One major assumption concerns the unidimensional character ofconsciousness, conceived solely in terms of a continuum denoting dif-ferences in clarity and awareness. As noted, this assumption leads todisregarding differences between the SOCs, lumping all those that arecharacterized by apparently lower awareness under the heading of �un-conscious states�. Another important assumption concerns the consid-eration of cognition as a set of subsystems, each reflecting one of thestandard functions, such as memory, attention or problem solving. Otherfunctions, including dreaming or daydreaming are mostly overlooked aswell as the underlying substratum that may maintain the functioning ofall of the separate subsystems. According to this approach, conscious-ness is distinct from cognition, which it may however affect. More im-portantly, changes in consciousness are viewed as mediated by agentsexternal to consciousness, or for that matter, to cognition (e.g., physio-logical phenomena, drugs) and are not themselves cognitive.

These assumptions, one or more of which may be implicit, haveresulted in too narrow conceptualizations of both cognition andconsciousness, which do not suffice for a comprehensive theory.

Despite these critical remarks, cognition is the context wesuggest as relevant for the comprehension and study of consciousness.We will outline a blueprint for a new cognitive approach to conscious-ness that is based on other assumptions. According to this new approachconsciousness and cognition are considered as inextricably boundtogether. Though distinct, one cannot be described satisfactorily withoutthe other. Further, consciousness is viewed as a characterization of thecognitive system as a whole, not just of this or another part of it. It


expresses or manifests something that inheres in or depends on thetotality of the cognitive system. The cognitive system itself is conceptu-alized as including not only processes (e.g., abstracting, categorizing),as is commonly assumed, but also contents (e.g., memories, informa-tions) which are involved in the performance of all cognitive functions,both the standard ones (e.g., memory, problem solving) as well as thenot yet standard ones (e.g., dreaming). All these assumptions derivefrom the basic conceptualization that cognition is a psycho-semanticsystem, namely, it is a meaning-processing and meaning-processedsystem, or in more specific terms, it is a system that produces, assigns,stores, retrieves, transforms, applies and elaborates meaning. Thisassumption will become clearer after the next section that deals withdefining meaning and illustrating its role in cognition.

MEANING AND COGNITION

The theory of meaning is based on a large body of data and empiricalstudies (Kreitler & Kreitler 1988; 1990a; 1993b). Meaning is defined asa referent-centered pattern of cognitive contents. Referent is the input,the carrier of meaning, which can be anything, including a word, anobject, a situation, an event, or even a whole period, whereas meaningvalues are cognitive contents assigned to the referent for the purpose ofexpressing or communicating its meaning. For example, if the referentis �Town,� responses such as �includes buildings� or �it is bigger than avillage� represent two different meaning values. The referent and themeaning value together form a meaning unit (e.g., Town � includesbuildings).

Five sets of variables are used for characterizing the meaningunit (see Table 2): (a) Meaning Dimensions, which characterize thecontents of the meaning values from the viewpoint of the specificinformation communicated about the referent, such as the referent'sSensory Qualities (e.g., Grass - green), Feelings and Emotions it evokes(e.g., Storm - scary) or experiences (e.g., I - love my sister), Range ofInclusion (e.g., Body - the head, arms, torso and legs); (b) Types ofRelation, which characterize the immediacy of the relation between thereferent and the cognitive contents, for example, attributive (e.g.,Summer - warm), comparative (e.g., Summer - warmer than spring),exemplifying instance (e.g., Country - the U.S.); (c) Forms of Relation,which characterize how the relation between the referent and the

AL T E R E D CO N S C I O U S N E S S A S VA R I A T I O N S O F CO G N I T I V E SY S T E M 419

cognitive contents is regulated, in terms of its validity (positive ornegative; e.g., Yoga - is not a religion), quantification (absolute, partial;Apple - sometimes red), and form (factual, desired or desirable; Law -should be obeyed, Money - I wish I had more); (d) Referent Shifts,which characterize the relation between the referent and the presentedinput, or - in a chain of responses to some input - the relation betweenthe referent and the previous one, for example, the referent may beidentical to the input or the previous referent, it may be its opposite, or apart of it, or even apparently unrelated to it (e.g., when the stimulus is�U.S.� and the response is �I love New York,� the response refers to apart of the stimulus) ; (e) Forms of Expression, which characterize theforms of expression of the meaning units (e.g., verbal, denotational,graphic) and its directness (e.g., actual gesture or verbal description ofgesture) (Kreitler & Kreitler 1990a).

Table 2: Major Variables of the Meaning System: The MeaningVariables

MEANING DIMENSIONS FORMS OF RELATION

Dim.1

Contextual Allocation FR 1 Propositional (1a: Positive; 1b: Nega-tive)

Dim.2

Range of Inclusion (2a:Sub-classes; 2b: Parts)

FR 2 Partial (2a: Positive; 2b: Negative)

Dim.3

Function, Purpose &Role

FR 3 Universal (3a: Positive; 3b: Negative)

Dim.4

Actions & Potentialitiesfor Actions (4a: byreferent; 4b: to referent)

FR 4 Conjunctive (4a: Positive; 4b: Negative)

Dim.5

Manner of Occurrence& Operation

FR 5 Disjunctive (5a: Positive; 5b: Negative)

Dim.6

Antecedents & Causes FR 6 Normative (6a: Positive; 6b: Negative)

Dim.7

Consequences & Re-sults

FR 7 Questioning (7a: Positive; 7b: Negative)

Dim.8

Domain of Application(8a: as subject; 8b: asobject)

FR 8 Desired, wished (8a: Positive; 8b:Negative)



Dim.9

Material SHIFT IN REFERENTB

Dim.10

Structure SR 1 Identical

Dim.11

State & Possible changein it

SR 2 Opposite

Dim.12

Weight & Mass SR 3 Partial

Dim.13

Size & Dimensionality SR 4 Modified by addition

Dim.14

Quantity & Mass SR 5 Previous meaning value

Dim.15

Locational Qualities SR 6 Association

Dim.16

Temporal Qualities SR 7 Unrelated

Dim.17

Possessions (17a) &Belongingness (17b)

SR 8 Verbal label

Dim.18

Development SR 9 Grammatical variation

Dim.19

Sensory Qualities (19a:of referent; 19b: byreferent)

SR 10 Previous meaning values com-bined

Dim.20

Feelings & Emotions(20a: evoked by refer-ent; 20b: felt by refer-ent)

SR 11 Superordinate

Dim.21

Judgments & Evalua-tions (21a: about refer-ent; 21b: by referent)

SR 12 Synonym (12a: in originallanguage; 12b: translated inanother language; 12c: label inanother medium; 12d a differ-ent formulation for the samereferent on the same level)

Dim.22

Cognitive Qualities(22a: evoked by refer-ent; 22b: of referent)

SR 13 Replacement by implicitmeaning value


TYPES OF RELATIONa FORMS OF EXPRESSION

TR 1 Attributive (1a: Quali-ties to substance; 1b:Actions to agent)

FE 1 Verbal (1a: Actual enactment;1b: Verbally described; 1c: Us-ing available materials)

TR 2 Comparative (2a:Similarity; 2b: Differ-ence; 2c: Complemen-tariness; 2d: Relation-ality

FE 2 Graphic (2a: Actual enactment;2b: Verbally described; 2c: Us-ing available materials)

TR 3 Exemplifying-Illustrative (3a: Exem-plifying instance; 3b:Exemplifying situa-tion; 3c: Exemplifyingscene)

FE 3 Motoric (3a: Actual enactment;3b: Verbally described; 3c: Us-ing available materials)

TR 4 Metaphoric-Symbolic(4a: Interpretation; 4b:Metaphor; 4c: Symbol)

FE4 Sounds & Tones (4a: Actualenactment; 4b: Verbally de-scribed; 4c: Using availablematerials)

FE5 Denotative (5a: Actual enact-ment; 5b: Verbally described; 5c:Using available materials)

a Modes of meaning: Lexical mode: TR1+TR2; Personal mode: TR3+TR4b Close SR: 1+3+9+12; Medium SR: 2+4+5+6+10+11; Distant SR: 7+8+13

Each individual tends to use only a part of the different meaningvariables in assigning meaning to inputs. The individual�s tendenciesfor meaning assignment can be assessed through the Meaning Test,which yields information about the individual�s meaning profile,namely, the frequency with which the individual uses each of themeaning variables.

Each meaning variable has characteristic manifestations in thedifferent spheres of cognitive functioning. For example, the meaningdimension Locational Qualities is involved in performance of tasks thatrely on spatial and locational aspects, such as finding one�s way orstoring things. A body of data has shown in regard to a great manycognitive tasks that a set of different meaning variables is involved inthe performance of each task, and that individuals who use most or all


of these meaning variables frequently (according to their meaningprofile) succeed better in the performance of the specific task than thosewho do not use them often. Specific patterns of meaning variables -which could be called �meaning profiles of tasks� - were found tocorrespond to good performance on cognitive tasks which assess spatialnavigation, curiosity, creativity, constancy, problem solving, planning,learning of reading and reading comprehension (Arnon & Kreitler 1984;Kreitler & Kreitler 1985b; 1986a; 1986b; 1987a; 1987b; 1990b; 1990c;1994; Weissler 1993). Such patterns reveal, as it were, the infrastructureof the cognitive processes involved in performing the cognitive act of,say, planning or solving a problem, thereby providing insight into thecognitive dynamics characteristic of the act.

When meaning variables are used for exploring the cognitiveprocesses involved in specific cognitive tasks, they are grasped in adynamic sense, whereby each meaning variable corresponds to someprocess (e.g., the meaning dimension �range of inclusion� - to analyzinginto components; the comparative type of relation - to detectingsimilarity or difference). The meaning system can however beconceptualized also in a static sense, whereby each meaning variablecorresponds to some specific domain of contents (e.g., the meaningdimension �sensory qualities� - to contents such as sensations ofdifferent kinds; the metaphoric type of relation - to metaphors). Thedynamic and static manifestations of each meaning variablecomplement each other.

The central role that meaning fulfills in regard to cognition hasled to the conceptualization of cognition as a meaning-processing andmeaning-processed system. This conceptualization expresses one of thebasic functions of meaning, which is to provide the infrastructure andthe raw materials for cognitive functioning. However, our studiesrevealed other basic functions of meaning, a major one being in thedomain of personality. A body of research has shown that each ofalmost 300 personality traits and tendencies was correlated with aspecific set of meaning variables (Kreitler & Kreitler 1990a; 1993a;1997). These findings support the conceptualization that each personal-ity trait corresponds in fact to a unique pattern of meaning variables thatis characterized by specific qualities. Again, an individual whosemeaning profile contains the meaning variables that define a particularpersonality tendency would show evidence of behaving in line with this


personality tendency. Thus, a second function of the meaning system isto provide the cognitive foundations for personality traits.

Further, studies showed that the meaning system provides thecognitive raw materials for the self-concept (Kreitler & Kreitler 1987c),and is also similarly involved in the elicitation, selection and imple-mentation of emotions (Kreitler 2003; Kreitler & Kreitler 1985a;1987a). In conclusion, it seems justified to assume that cognition, as itis modulated and activated by the infrastructure of meaning, ispotentially adequate and capable to account for SOCs. How does thistake place?

COGNITION AND SOCS

Cognition is a system that is constantly activated since it is involved inall cognitive acts and other activities of the organism which depend oncognitive support, regardless of whether the acts are conscious or not. Ineach activity only those cognitive processes and contents that arerelevant for the task as well as accessible to the individual are involved.One major factor that defines and modifies the accessibility of theadequate cognitive processes in the individual is the state of thecognitive system in the course of performing the task. The state of thecognitive system is defined in terms of the kind and number of meaningvariables that are in a focal position and salient at the time, namely, theyhave an organizational primacy and a functional advantage for elicita-tion and involvement in the act, whereas the other meaning variables arein the background in different states of inactivation.

A great many changes occur in the cognitive system due toongoing cognitive operations. These include actions elicited by someexternally presented task, such as solving a problem; handling sometask arising from the needs of the cognitive system itself, e.g.,organizing material; or performing a cognitive act in response to theneeds of other systems in the organism, e.g., emotional or social. Someof the changes are relatively small, for example, in contents defined aschanges within one meaning variable, others may be larger in the sensethat more processes are involved, or more complex, in the sense that thechanges are interdependent and more enduring. However, regardless ofhow encompassing or how long they last, these changes do not affectthe cognitive system as a whole.


Changes that affect the whole cognitive system may be broughtabout by means of organizational transformations in the meaningsystem. These kinds of transformations take place because of the needsand dynamics of the meaning system itself sui generi or in response tothe needs of the organism, for example, reorganizing when a mass ofnew contents has become available, developing structural complexity,complementing a rudimentary or fragmentary view of reality, etc.Changes motivated by the dynamics of the meaning system typicallyconsist of placing in the focal position one or more specific meaningvariables or even merely one or more meaning values and changingaccordingly the whole structure of the meaning system (organizationaltransformation). Changes motivated by the meaning system include, forexample, placing in a focal position (a) the meaning dimensions�Contextual Allocation,� �Results and Consequences,� and �Causes andAntecedents� which manifest the so-called �abstract approach�; (b) themeaning dimensions �Sensory Qualities,� �Size and Dimensions,��Weight and Mass,� and perhaps also �Locational Qualities� - all ofwhich manifest the so-called �concrete approach� or �concrete thinking�;or (c) the meaning dimension �Feelings and Emotions,� which wouldmanifest the �emotional approach.� Likewise, we could refer to the�evaluative-judgmental approach,� when the meaning dimension �Judg-ments and Evaluations� is in the focal position, the �actional approach�when the meaning dimension �Actions and Potentialities for Actions� isin the focal position, the �comparative approach� when one or more ofthe comparative types of relation is in the focal position, the �disjunctive(or either/or) approach� when the disjunctive form of relation is in thefocal position, or the �nonverbal approach� when one of the nonverbalforms of expression (e.g., gestural, graphic) is in the focal approach. Asa matter of fact, almost any of the meaning variables and quite a numberof sets of meaning variables could serve as foci for the meaning systemand be the carriers of an organizational transformation.

In order to exemplify the process of organizational transforma-tion and its effects one set of studies will be described briefly. Thestudies dealt with two complementary organizational structures of themeaning system: one focused on the interpersonally-shared (or lexical)mode of meaning and the other on the personal (or subjective) mode ofmeaning (see Table 2). The definitions and experimental procedureswere based on prior findings about the salience of these modes ofmeaning in interpersonal and personal communication. The interperson-



ally-shared mode of meaning is defined by the two following types ofrelation: 1. the attributive, which relates the meaning value to thereferent directly in a substantive (e.g., Flower - in the garden) oractional way (e.g., Dog - can bark); 2. the comparative, which relatesthe meaning value to the referent through the mediation of anotherreferent, by way of similarity (e.g., Sea - has the same color as the sky),difference (e.g., House - unlike a tent is built of wood or bricks),complementarity (e.g., Wife - has a husband and husband has a wife),and relationality (e.g., Highway - broader than a path). In contrast, thepersonal mode of meaning is defined by the two following types ofrelation: 1. the exemplifying-illustrative, which relates the meaningvalue to the referent by way of an example, in the form of an instance(e.g., Wisdom - Moses), an image portraying a situation (e.g., Mother-hood - a woman holding a baby in her arms) or a scene with dynamicelements (e.g., Aggression - an unemployed person comes to thegovernment agency for employment, the clerk tells him that there is nowork for him, the person feels warm anger rising in him, his fistsclench, his vision becomes blurred etc.); 2. the metaphoric-symbolic,which relates the meaning value to the referent in a mediated way usingnon-conventional contents, in the form of an interpretation (e.g., Life -the unknown known), metaphor (an image related interpretatively to amore abstract referent, e.g., Wisdom - cool water in the desert at noon),or symbol (a metaphoric image that resolves contrasting elements, e.g.,Love - a fire that produces and consumes) (Kreitler 1965). A methodwas developed for inducing experimentally each of the meaning modesso that the participants acted when their cognitive system was structuredin line with one or the other mode (Kreitler, Kreitler & Wanounou1987-88). In different groups of participants the findings showed thatunder the impact of induction of personal meaning - as compared withtheir performance under the impact of interpersonally-shared meaninginduction - participants scored higher on visual memory tasks,identifying embedded figures, recalling faces; performed better oncreativity measures of fluency, flexibility and originality; reported manymore unusual and bizarre experiences; produced a greater number ofassociations; grasped texts more often in metaphoric terms; made moremistakes on judging the validity of logical syllogisms; had lower scoreson reality testing and emotional control in the Rorschach test; and hadhigher scores on scales assessing emotions (negative as well aspositive). Findings of this kind demonstrate first, that it is possible to


produce cognitive changes by manipulating modes of meaning, second,that the produced cognitive changes are of various kinds and in variousdomains, and third, that the level of performance of specific cognitivetasks depends on the organizational state of the cognitive system.

The changes brought about by the placement of differentmeaning constituents in a focal position include changes in the nature,salience, and interconnectedness of contents and cognitive processesthat affect cognitive functioning. But the changes are not limited to thecognitive sphere. Since, as noted, the meaning system is also involvedin personality traits, the self-concept and emotions, it is likely that theorganizational transformations of the meaning system affect thesespheres too, directly or indirectly. Hence, one may expect theorganizational transformations of the meaning system to be manifestedin the form of changes in cognitive functioning (e.g., changes inattention, memory, creativity, the difficulty of solving different types ofproblems, styles of decision making, fluency and flexibility ofassociations, etc.), in the self concept (e.g., thoughts about oneself, self-esteem, one's biographical narrative, the experiential atmosphere of theself, etc.), in personality traits (e.g. changes in the strength and salienceof different traits and other personality dispositions), and in emotions(e.g., changes in the strength and salience of different emotions andmoods). These changes in turn may bring about further changes in theaffected domains as well as in other domains, including overt behaviorand physiological reactions.

BLUEPRINT FOR A MEANING-BASED COGNITIVE THEORY OFCONSCIOUSNESS

In view of the theoretical considerations and empirical findingspresented above, it seems justified to suggest that SOCs are products ofchanges that concern cognition as a whole, reflecting organizationaltransformations in the meaning system (Kreitler, 1999; 2001; 2002).Since cognition is involved in the functioning of many systems in theorganism, the suggested definition may be expanded by emphasizingthat SOCs refer to a total state of the individual that in principleencompasses, in addition to the cognitive system, also other systems inthe individual (emotions, personality, self) affected directly by changesin the meaning system or the cognitive system or both. The abovedefinition refers to SOCs rather than to consciousness for two reasons.


First, as noted earlier, consciousness is identified by many investigatorsas awareness, which is only one of the dimensions in terms of whichSOCs may differ. Secondly, according to the approach presented in thischapter consciousness is the overall quality that refers to the state of thecognitive system, and since the cognitive system is always in somestate, it would be more precise and correct to refer to the State ofConsciousness (SOC) rather than to consciousness.

It may not be superfluous to reiterate at this point that accordingto the here suggested definition, conscious-unconscious adjectivesdescribe the state of different contents and processes in each SOC.Hence, unconsciousness is not a SOC or an altered SOC but denotes aspecific degree of availability or readiness for evocation and can beapplied in regard to each SOC. In each SOC there are contents orprocesses that are not available and may hence be considered as"unconscious". The difference between the SOCs consists then merelyin the kind of contents or processes that are unconscious. Thus, everySOC has an unconscious but the SOCs differ in the duration of theunconsciousness, the ease with which the unconsciousness can beovercome or suspended and mainly in the rules defining which material(contents or processes) is rendered unconscious.

Defining SOC as reflecting the state of the cognitive system(and other systems) under the sway of a meaning-based organizationaltransformation has several theoretical implications and practicalapplications. First, in contrast to the definitions that assume theexistence of �the� consciousness (presumably denoting ordinaryconsciousness) and so-called altered SOCs, the suggested meaning-based definition implies that there are an infinite number of potentialSOCs and all are evaluated as of equal potential importance and status.Indeed, any one of them can become dominant for any duration and cancome to characterize a given culture. It is possible that some of thepossible SOCs are not yet known or described. Moreover, it is likelythat it is even possible to invent new SOCs.

In principle, any organizational transformation in the meaningsystem may be considered as generating a SOC. Thus, there is aninfinite number of possible SOCs. In practice, however, not allorganizational transformations affect the cognitive system and othersystems (personality, emotions, etc.) to the same extent. Sometimes thechanges may be minimal, or hardly noticeable, so that they may passunnoticed or may be experienced as fluctuations in the prevailing SOC.


In other cases the changes may be very salient, so much that they areclearly experienced or considered as alterations in consciousness (viz.altered SOCs).

The extent of the changes could be associated with theirduration, but does not depend on them. There may be dramatic changesin the SOC that may last milliseconds and yet be noticed, sometimeseven treasured for a lifetime. Another factor that can affect the extent ofthe changes is probably the number and nature of the meaning variablesthat are placed in the focal position in the meaning system bringingabout the organizational transformation in the system. It may beassumed that there exist core variables in the meaning system whoseplacement in a focal position yields a far-reaching organizationaltransformation (e.g., the modes). Further factors affecting the extent ofthe changes are probably the salience of emotional reactions among thechanges, and the difference between the resulting SOC and the onehabitual for the individual.

It is likely that some changes in SOCs become noticeablebecause they are sanctioned by the culture to which the individualbelongs, or are bound to a specific technique that is salient in aparticular culture (Faber 1981). Thus, the training of Yoga may focuson differentiation of SOCs that a regular untrained person from Westernculture can hardly make sense of. A case in point is the differentiationbetween the following two consciousnesss states that form part ofBuddhist meditation: Dhāraṇā and Dhyāna. Dhāraṇā (=�fixation ofattention�) is described as the first step of deep concentrativemeditation, when the target object is held in the mind without waveringof consciousness, but the meditating person, the act of meditation andthe object of meditation remain separate. Though consciousness isfocused on one object, awareness of the object is still interrupted.Dhyāna (=�concentration,� �meditative stability�) is described as amore advanced stage of meditation, when consciousness of the act ofmeditation dwindles away, and only the consciousness of being and theobject of concentration continue to exist in the mind. As a result,awareness of the object is complete and without any interruption(Fischer 1978: 42; Maehle 2006: 234). Admittedly, an untrained personcan hardly be expected to comprehend and apply SOCs of this kind.

Another important implication of the suggested definition ofSOC is that SOC depends upon and is characterized by changesoccurring in the cognitive system (through an organizational transform-


ation in the meaning system), regardless of the nature of the agent orconditions that brought about the changes. Even when the changes areinduced by conditions external to meaning and cognition, for example,behavioral, emotional, physiological, technological (e.g., virtualreality), the changes that form the basis for SOC occur in cognition.

This conclusion as well as the findings of the studies oninducing interpersonally-shared and personal-subjective meaning modesindicate that it is possible to generate SOCs by psychological meanstailored to produce the targeted SOCs. The use of psychological induc-tion methods may broaden infinitely the range of individuals that willexpose themselves to SOCs and the range of SOCs that they willexperience. Notably, the psychological induction methods of SOCs willeventually make it possible for individuals to produce desired SOCs byself-controlled cognitive means.

Moreover, by using psychological induction methods it may bepossible to produce not only already known SOCs but also new not yetdocumented or experienced SOCs. Generating and inventing SOCsdepend on values of SOCs in terms of the defining dimensions (e.g.,Table 1) and the relations between these values and the meaningvariables of the meaning system.

There are three major reasons for improving the potentialities ofexperiencing SOCs and expanding the range of available SOCs. Onereason is that some SOCs are apparently accompanied by enjoyableexperiences, which many people seek out and crave for, as manifestedin the popularity of various drugs and stimulants. Another reason is thatSOCs seem to lead to unraveling new and hitherto unknown aspects ofoneself, others and the world, which make possible the attainment of adeepened knowledge of the self and reality. It is possible to speculatethat the exposure of new aspects of the personal and impersonal realitymay in principle culminate in the formation of new scientificdisciplines. The third reason is of a more practical nature. Since there isevidence that some cognitive tasks are performed better under specificSOCs than under others (see above the set of studies on the induction ofmodes of meaning), it is of importance to be able to elicit for eachcognitive task the SOC that promotes its performance in the bestpossible way.

In sum, the means for inducing, defining and creating SOCsprovided by the new approach presented in this paper may serve toexpand our view of consciousness, our methodology for studying



consciousness and our ability to manipulate, shape and experienceconsciousness.

ABBREVIATIONS

SOC State of consciousnessREM Rapid Eye Movement

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R E N A U D V A N Q U E K E L B E R G H E

Mindfulness and Psychotherapy

The Revival of Indian Meditative Traditionswithin Modern Psychology, Psychotherapy, and

Medicine

I. INTRODUCTION

Within the last ten years the practice of mindfulness entered the fieldsof scientific medicine and psychotherapy. For sure, mindfulness is avery ancient and useful medicine going back to times immemorial. ThePali word satipat t hāna - usually translated as mindfulness - also meansthe way of mindful remembrance or recognition. Some Buddhist textsdescribe satipat t hāna as a clear and easy means leading to enlighten-ment and liberation from suffering. In Majjhima Nikāya 1,10 (Bhikkhu1995: 145) we read for example:

Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the sur-mounting of sorrow and lamentation, for the disappearance of pain and grief,for the attainment of the true way, for the realization of Nibbāna � namely, thefour foundations of mindfulness.

These few words claim that the practice of mindfulness is able to liber-ate everyone from all kinds of sufferings and psychological burdens.Moreover, they clearly indicate that this practice can lead to nibbāna orthe supreme state of enlightenment. Mindfulness is called �fourfold�(cf. Majjhima Nikāya 1, 10, 31-38), because we have to focus our mindon four areas:

1. On our own body: breathing, moving, digesting, the use of ourfive senses, as well as focusing on the decay of our body afterdeath, clearly looking at the decomposition of all organs up tothe final structureless heap of bones. The latter part of thismindfulness training sounds like a shamanic initiation practice(cf. Eliade 1983: 65-67).

436 RENAUD VAN QUEKELBERGHE

2. On our own feelings and passions: mainly focusing on theirprocesses of �becoming, intensifying, declining and disappear-ing�.

3. On our own thoughts and ideas: not only clearly registering theircontext, but also and most important their process of becoming,sustaining and disappearing.

4. On external things or beings: their coming and going, but alsoon Buddha�s central teachings such as the four noble truths.

Looking at the satipat t hāna-sutta from a psychological and therapeuticperspective, the following main aspects emerge:

• We should observe one by one the contents of our mind just assomebody opening a jar full of different beans and berries, de-scribing every item very cautiously.

• We should observe the coming and going in every mind proc-ess.

• Buddha insists on different stages of mindfulness. The trainingmust be adapted to the trainee�s level.

• He also insists on gaining a meta-perspective or �meta-narrative�. The trainee has to focus on the dhamma or the prin-ciple of non-substantiality or impermanence,

• satipatt hāna cannot be delegated to other people. It is always amatter of one's own mind experience.

• Buddha insists upon strong motivation and perseverance. As tothe duration of the training, we find no precise statement: it canlast from at least seven days up to seven years and more.

• Buddha, however, is very optimistic: if people are really moti-vated, the satipat t hāna method will indeed be successful, i.e.,will lead to nibbāna.

The satipat t hāna-sutta relies on a kind of universal metaphor: a wayleading from a starting point (e. g., some actual level of consciousness)to an end point, a supreme mind transformation or remembrance. At anystarting point, we will encounter a suffering mind. At the end point, wewill enjoy enlightenment or liberation from any suffering. This kind ofmetaphor is also very common or central for modern mindfulness ther-apy. Here we start our journey at some point of suffering - for example,a social phobia or a pernicious depression - and we try to reach a pointof liberation or at least the alleviation of complaints.

MINDFULNESS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 437

In the last decade or so, the parallels between psychotherapy andwisdom traditions such as Taoism, Hinduism, and predominantly Bud-dhism were deeply reflected by psychotherapists, far beyond meta-phoric superficiality. For example, cognitive behavior therapy and psy-choanalysis started to focus on training mindfulness as a privilegedmethod to overcome a lot of clinical symptoms and sufferings. Needlessto say, the programs and goals of modern therapy are distinctly differentfrom the specific agenda of yogic trainings. Nevertheless, quite a lot ofintensive studies have renewed the emphasis on the utility of a dialogueat all levels (so to speak: from a meta-theoretical to a hyperpracticallevel).

The recent shifting within cognitive behavior therapy fromsymptoms as �contents� towards attitudes or mental modalities as �con-text� offers a certain analogy with the traditional distinction betweenpure consciousness as context and conscious processes or structures ascontents within Buddhism or other Asian wisdom traditions.

The following three metaphors briefly illustrate the relationshipbetween �context and content� in mindfulness or Asian wisdom tradi-tions (cf. van Quekelberghe 2007: 168-196):

1. emptiness, pure peace of mind, pure silence (context) versusego-related passions (contents)

2. endless ocean versus �ego-waves�3. crystal like, pure mirror versus plenty of mirages (thoughts,

feelings,�).

Such metaphors try to describe the subtle difference between con-sciousness itself (for example, pure awareness) and the contents of con-sciousness.

Ad 1. Emptiness versus passions

A progressive detachment from strong passions and countless strivingsleads to a kind of a context without any perceivable content, a �pureawareness.� Surely, as soon as we try to further describe this context,we produce a lot of new contents. Therefore, the Asian traditions arepsychologically right and wise in their saying that we have to experi-ence primarily and not to think about emptiness. Great silence, innerpeace, �no mind,� and pure awareness are usual descriptors of such a


conscious experience. Only if we enter deep into our �heart��beyondthoughts and feelings�and discover our awareness as endless, infinite,without beginning, timeless, indivisible, then we can observe all con-scious contents, so to speak, beyond our own limited conscious ego.

Developing emptiness or pure consciousness leads not only to akind of awakening or enlightenment, it also helps to overcome plenty ofpsychic sufferings and cognitive bias of our own mind.

Ad 2. A limitless ocean of pure awareness/mind versus waves ofthoughts, feelings, strivings, or passions

The endless ocean, similar to the �Dirac-Sea� or the quantum vacuumof modern physics, presents the first or last context, the infinite groundfor all real or potential phenomena or contents (cf. van Quekelberghe2005: 77-91). Patañjali-Yoga tries to bring this limitless awareness intothe focus of a mindful meditation through complete cessation of any�wave or disturbing content� of one's own mind: citta-vṛtti-nirodha .This resonates through the Patañjali-Sūtra like a �mantra� and is a goodexpression of the relationship between pure awareness or mind and itscountless vṛttis or contents. For Patañjali the drastic reduction of vr ttisis undoubtedly the best medicine, mainly because of quieting and free-ing the mind, and at the same time the best means to achieve mokṣa .Moreover, the nature of our mind is oceanic. Dazzled with �contentwaves,� we often oversee the endless ocean as context in and out of us.

Ad 3. A mirror reflecting all kinds of contents

Many wisdom traditions describe pure awareness or mindfulness as amirror endlessly reflecting all possible mind contents. Surely, such ametaphor is to be found in many shamanic traditions. A mirror on thechest belongs to the attributes of numerous Siberian shamans (cf. Eliade1983: 134-135). In Buddhism (e.g., Fa-Tsang), Sufism (e.g., Rumi) orChristianity (e.g., Gregory of Nazianz), only a soul free from ego-related views is able to generate a pure awareness or mindfulness mir-roring the only �one context� of all possible contents, namely, accord-ing to the spiritual vocabulary of each tradition: Emptiness, Satcitān-anda, God, Great Spirit, Shiva-Consciousness, Absolute Oneness, Nir-vān a and so on.


All three metaphors focus on the necessity for stepping backfrom a close bondage to endless contents in order to come in touch withthe changeless one context. Spiritual traditions, mainly yogic and Bud-dhist meditative schools claim that stepping back from any content andat the same time opening an endless context of awareness are decisivesteps for the achievement of mind enlightenment.

While modern psychotherapy refers more and more to the dis-tinction between context and content, only a few therapists, however,are fully aware of the spiritual dimension of such a distinction. Themore we try to understand or even experience the meaning of a �con-tentless context,� the more, I guess, we have to open our mind to anabsolute, endless or spiritual dimension, i.e., the very deep dimension ofour own mind.

II. BUDDHISM AND PSYCHOTHERAPY: A BRIEF SURVEY OF A BEGINNINGDIALOGUE

In the following brief survey, four main areas of modern medicine orpsychotherapy with relevance for Buddhist views and meditations forhealth care or psychotherapy are overviewed. These areas are:

1. Classical psychiatry and psychoanalysis,2. Jung and the Neo-Freudians,3. Cognitive behavior therapy,4. Transpersonal psychology and psychotherapy.

1. Classical psychiatry and psychoanalysis

Franz Alexander (1891-1964), professor of psychiatry, psychoanalystand founder of the first Institute for Psychosomatics worldwide, pub-lished a well known study in 1931, entitled �Buddhistic training as anartificial catatonia�. In this article, he describes the Buddhist meditationas narcissistic self-absorption, a kind of artificial schizophrenia, and as acompulsory masochistic practice killing any emotion. Furthermore,Alexander describes Lord Buddha as a neurotic man not having ana-lyzed his repressed emotions and their transfer to his followers. Thisearly study inspired many leading psychiatrists and psychoanalysts tofocus on the parallels between schizophrenic regression or at least com-pulsory disorders and yoga or Buddhist meditative practices (cf. Alex-ander and Selesnick 1966).



The German psychiatrist Johannes Schultz was surely one fa-mous exception. The development of his autogenic training in the thir-ties was largely influenced by his positive view of the yogic traditions.Finally, Arthur Deikman (1977) was the very first psychiatrist whofought against the naïve arrogance of psychiatry and psychoanalysistoward Eastern meditative practice.

2. Jung and the Neo-Freudians

C.G. Jung rejected the psychoanalytic view of Asian or Buddhist medi-tations as infantile regression, autistic defense formation or narcissisticneurosis. He studied different Eastern traditions and recognized theirtherapeutic power. Terms such as �Mandala, I Ching, Tao or Yoga� areoften to be found in his collected works. Nevertheless, he believed thatan integration of Western psychotherapy and Eastern meditation was - ifever possible - not desirable. Therefore, he often quoted Kipling'swords: �East is east and West is west. And never the twain shall meet.�

Quite independent from Jung, the so-called Neo-Freudians suchas Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harold Kelman got in touch withZen-Buddhism in the fifties. Karen Horney (1885-1952) met the nowrenowned Zen author Daisetz T. Suzuki in the winter of 1950/51.Shortly after this meeting, she lectured about Zen-Buddhist principlesand practices at the American Institute for Psychoanalysis. Horney sawa deep relationship between the Zen-mindfulness of �Here and Now�and the free floating attention in psychoanalysis. She understood thiskind of attention as an endless, non-judgemental and warm-heartedmindfulness in sharp contrast to the positivistic, neutral attitude of hercolleagues (cf. Horney 1987: 19-21). Erich Fromm (1900-1980) organ-ized a conference in Cuernavaca (Mexico) on Zen-Buddhism and psy-chotherapy, inviting Daisetz T. Suzuki as keynote speaker. In the firstbook on Zen-Buddhism and psychoanalysis (Fromm et al. 1960),Fromm emphasized strong convergences between both traditions. Hebelieved that Zen, like psychoanalysis, was able to free the individualfrom all unconscious or repressed strivings. Kelman (1960), a student ofKaren Horney, considered psychoanalysis as a meditative training inmindfulness and emphasized the development of a therapist-client-relationship in analogy to the relationship of guru and disciple as a radi-cal new perspective for modern psychoanalysis.


The psychoanalyst and psychologist Jeffrey Rubin (1985) triedto integrate Buddhism into a so-called contemplative psychoanalysis.Even if he somehow confused the Buddhist conception of egoless-ness(Pali: anatta) with psychoanalytic narcissism theory, he strongly advo-cated a free dialogue between Buddhism and psychotherapy (cf. Rubin,1996). Brazier (2003), Magid (2002), Molino (1998), and Safran (2003)have developed this free dialogue further.

The New York psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Barry Magid(2002) is perhaps the best known representative of this new era. In con-trast to the previous pioneers such as Horney, Fromm, or Kelman,Magid is not only a psychotherapist, but also a Zen master. Within hisintegrative psychoanalytic Zen practice, Buddhist issues such asenlightenment or egoless-ness are discussed psychoanalytically; on thecontrary, transference or defense mechanisms are questioned from aBuddhist point of view.

3. Cognitive behavior therapy and Buddhism

Mikulas (1978, 1981) was the first behavior therapist arguing for anintegration of Buddhist meditation into behavior therapy. He delineatedmany common aspects of behavior therapy and Buddhism, as for exam-ple:

• emphasis of individual self-control skills,• few theoretical constructs,• preference for observation and description of behavioral se-

quences,• mainly focusing on concrete contents of conscious experiences,• clear distinction between observable behavior and problematic

ideas such as �person, ego, identity, world�,• reduction of anxiety reactions with the help of relaxation, dis-

traction, self-control procedures,• emphasizing possible behavior changes by means of rehearsal,• emphasizing regular exercise,• optimistic view of learning capacities.

De Silva (1985) found such exercises in Buddha's sayings clearly corre-sponding to modern techniques of behavior therapy. Kabat-Zinn's mind-fulness-based stress reduction program (MBSR) - developed during theeighties on the basis of Buddhist satipat t hāna according to the tradition


of the Burmese monk Mahasi Sayadaw - was surely the primary sourcefor the further integration of vipassanā and Zen-meditation into cogni-tive behavior therapy. Grossman et al. (2004) have recently published areview and meta-analysis of MBSR-studies. The statistically significantresults strongly indicate that the mindfulness-based stress reductionprogram can have an important positive impact on a broad range of psy-chic and psychosomatic disorders.

Linehan (1987), Hayes (2002), and Teasdale and Segal (Segal etal. 2002) are the foremost representatives of the so-called �third genera-tion� (and up to now the last generation) of behavior therapy, namelythe mindfulness cognitive behavior therapy. Marsha Linehan workingwith borderline patients introduced mindfulness meditative exercisesinto her behavior therapy programs in order to develop a radical, non-judgemental acceptance of any present situation. Some aspects of hertraining remind us of Gestalt therapy. Perls (1893-1970) has alwaysclaimed a narrow relationship between the main principle of Gestalttherapy (concentration on the �here and now�) and the principles ofZen-Buddhism.

Linehan's dialectic behavior therapy is based on the concept of�wise mind.� As a synthesis of cognitive and emotional systems, this�wise mind� is at the same time the source and the goal of any concen-tration on the �here-and-now� of any situation with a radical, non-judgemental acceptance. For Linehan, �wise mind� is the cornerstone ofacceptance and mindfulness within therapy and the source of a sort ofuniversal spirituality, so to say beyond Buddhism or Christianity (cf.Robins, Schmidt, and Linehan 2004).

Inspired by Kabat-Zinn, Segal et al. (2002) I have developed theso-called mindfulness cognitive behavior therapy� with special pro-grams for the treatment of clinical depression. Empirical results showthat a mix of mindfulness, meditative and cognitive skills is more effi-cient than a cognitive training alone (cf. van Quekelberghe 2007: 210-214). Steven Hayes (2002, 2004) has developed the acceptance andcommitment therapy� (ACT). The influence of Buddhist vipassanāmeditation on ACT cannot be overseen. Meditative concentration and anon-judgmental approach to any experience are its main components.Hayes emphasized:

1. the learning of diffusion, making a clear distinction betweenverbal or cognitive representations and the direct experience of


situations (cognitive fusion and getting entangled in contradic-tions often lead to psychic disorders),

2. the learning of the difference between our ego as context andour various ego-contents.

Mindfulness meditation greatly contributes to both these learning goals.The second main component, the distinction between context

and content, surely leads to a spiritual view of our own self. Whilelearning a kind of de-identification from all our ego-contents, we comevery close to the meditative Asian traditions which emphasize the step-ping back from all forms of strong attachment to contents. It is interest-ing to note that Hayes (2004: 20-21) refers to a �transcendent sense ofself� which cannot be identified with any ego-content. He also refers tothe metaphor used by the transpersonal therapist Roberto Assagioli.According to Assagioli, we should see our own ego as the chessboardand not plainly identify ourselves with any white chess piece (for ex-ample, our good thoughts or feelings) or with any black chess piece (forexample, our bad thoughts or feelings).

4. The transpersonal psychotherapy and Buddhism

An important area of dialogue between Asian traditions and psycho-therapy is surely the transpersonal psychology and therapy. Since thelaunching of the Journal of Transpersonal Psychology (1969) and thefoundation of a scientific society (1970), many psychiatrists, psycholo-gists, and social scientists have greatly contributed to a broad dialoguebetween Asian wisdom traditions and modern science (especially psy-chiatry and psychotherapy). Authors such as Ken Wilber or Stan Grofhave largely influenced the development of this new research area. Inmy book (van Quekelberghe 2005), I describe the main fields of thistranspersonally or spiritually oriented psychotherapy.

III. THE BODHISATTVA WAY: A POSSIBLE IDEAL FOR A SPIRITUALLYORIENTED (POST)MODERN PSYCHOTHERAPIST?

The Bodhisattva ideal belongs to Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Bodhi-sattva (bodhi: Sanskrit for �enlightening/enlightenment�; sattva: San-skrit for �being�) is centering all his/her life on enlightenment and thefreeing of all sentient beings from suffering. The Bodhisattva resolves


to achieve a pure state of mind for the liberation of other beings fromthe chains of craving and suffering. The Bodhisattva vow goes like this:

The sentient beings are countless; I vow that I'll free all of them fromsuffering.The illusions are countless; I vow that I'll destroy all of them.The dharma gates are countless; I vow that I'll go through each of them.The enlightenment is endless; I vow that I'll realize it!

In Mahāyāna Buddhism we have two main types of Bodhisattvas: thetranscendent and the transient or human ones. Transcendent Bodhisatt-vas are for example Avalokiteshvara (Bodhisattva of compassion) andMañjushrī (Bodhisattva of wisdom).

The transient or human Bodhisattva has to go through 10 sta-tions (Sanskrit �bhumi�) before achieving a transcendent or completelyenlightened state of consciousness. There are at least six perfections tobe trained:

1. generosity2. passionless behavior3. patience4. courage5. mindfulness6. wisdom

The training of such attitudes leads to the following four stable charac-teristics of the Bodhisattva state of consciousness, the so-called brah-mavihāras:

1. mettā (Pali for �goodness�)2. karunā (Pali for �compassion�)3. muditā (Pali for �serenity�)4. upekkhā (Pali for �equanimity�)

Perfect wisdom and compassion, the essential characteristics of anytranscendent Bodhisattva, emerge out of the training of the six perfec-tions (Sanskrit: pāramitās) and the four brahmavihāras as perfect statesof consciousness. Both characteristics are grounded in the primary per-ception of an unitary (endless) context for all possible contents.

The Bodhisattva way could be helpful for any spiritually ori-ented therapist - not only for Buddhist therapists - at multiple levels ofactions and different stages of training, for example:



• developing a profound compassion for any suffering human be-ing,

• enjoying the alleviation of suffering (surely a good remedyagainst the burn out syndrome),

• developing more acceptance and more mindfulness of one' sown emotions and cognitions,

• reducing our own defense mechanisms and resistance, i.e., be-coming more flexible in all kinds of situations,

• developing perfections (pāramitās) such as generosity, patience,and courage is surely quite adequate for long term patientsand/or low motivated clients

• the third bhumi (Sanskrit: prabhākara) means �radiant cha-risma.� So the more a therapist progresses along the Bodhisattvapath, the more he/she will be able to communicate non-verballysome sort of �positive healing energy.� This non-verbal cha-risma will also reduce the resistance and/or motivate the patientsto go beyond a verbal level of comprehension and communica-tion.

These few examples show us that the Bodhisattva way should be usefulfor any post-modern therapist interested in cultivating a spiritual dimen-sion along acceptance and mindfulness. It should be clear that this wayis really open to all forms of �Weltanschauung�: agnostic, atheistic,theistic, Hinduistic, Jewish, Christian, Islamic, etc.

IV. NĀLANDĀ

Finally, I would like to point to Nālandā as to our real need for post-modern �wisdom research centers� to help physicians, psychotherapists,teachers and others on the long way towards a fully enlightened andenlightening mind. Nālandā, 60 miles south of Patna (Bihar, India), wassuch a wisdom research center for nearly eight hundred years (V-XIIIcenturies c.e.). Such a center offered the possibility for long retreats andthe teachings of top skilled persons such as Nāgārjuna or Naropa.

We need many post-modern �wisdom research centers� in orderto promote a sustained, deep, and competent move of modern medicineand psychotherapy towards more mindfulness, acceptance and spiritual-ity.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander 1931 F. Alexander, Buddhistic training as an artificial catatonia. Psy-choanalytic Review 18 (1931) 129-145.

Alexander & Selesnick 1996 F. G. Alexander & S. T. Selesnick, The history ofpsychiatry: An evaluation of psychiatric thought. Harper & Row.New York 1966.

Bhikkhu 1995 B. Bhikkhu, The middle length discourses of the Buddha: A trans-lation of the Majjhima Nikāya. Wisdom Publications. Boston1995.

Brazier 2003 C. Brazier, Buddhism on the couch. Ulysses. Berkeley 2003.De Silva 1986 P. De Silva, Buddhism and behavior change : Implications ther-

apy. In : G. Claxton (Ed.), Beyond therapy: The impact of Easterntraditions on psychological theory and practice. Wisdom Press.London 1986, 217-231.

Deikman 1977 A. Deikman, Comment on the GAP report on mysticism. Journalof Nervous and Mental Disease 165 (1977) 213-217.

Eliade 1983 M. Eliade, Le chamanisme et les techniques archaiques de l�extase. Payot. Paris 1983.

Fromm 1960 E. Fromm, Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. In: E. Fromm, D.T. Suzuki, & R. De Martino (Eds.), Zen Buddhism and Psycho-analysis. Harper & Row. New York 1960, 77-141.

Grossman et al. 2004 P. Grossman, L. Niemann, S. Schmidt, & H. Walach, Ergebnisseeiner Metaanalyse zur Achtsamkeit. In: T. Heidenreich & J. Mi-chalak (Eds.), Achtsamkeit und Akzeptanz in der Psychotherapie,ed. DGVT. Tübingen 2004, 701-726.

Hayes 2002 S.C. Hayes, Buddhism and acceptance and commitment therapy.Cognitive & Behavioral Practice 9 (2002) 58-66.

Hayes 2004 S. C. Hayes, Acceptance and commitment therapy and the newbehavior therapies. In: S. C. Hayes, V. M. Follette, M. M. Line-han (Eds.), Mindfulness and acceptance. Guilford Press. NewYork/London 2004, 1-29.

Horney 1987 K. Horney, Final lectures. In: D. H. Ingram (Ed.), Final Lectures,ed. Norton. New York 1987.

Kelman 1960 H. Kelman, Psychoanalytic thought and Eastern wisdom. In: J.Ehrenwald (Ed.), The history of psychotherapy: From healingmagic to encounter. Jason Aronson. New York 1960, 328-333.

Linehan 1987 M. M. Linehan, Dialectical behavioral therapy: A cognitive be-havioral approach to parasuicide. Journal of Personality Disor-ders 1 (1987) 328-333.

Magid 2002 B. Magid, Ordinary mind. Exploring the common ground of zenand psychotherapy. Wisdom Publications. Boston 2002.

Mikulas 1978 W. L. Mikulas, Four noble truths of Buddhism related to Behav-ior therapy. Psychological Record 28 (1978) 59-67.

Mikulas 1981 W. L. Mikulas, Buddhism & behavior modification. Psychologi-cal Record 31 (1981) 331-342.


Molino 1998 A. Molino, The couch and the tree: Dialogues in Buddhism andpsychoanalysis. North Point Press. New York 1998.

Robins et al. 2004 C. J. Robins, H. Schmidt III, & M. M. Linehan, Dialectical be-havior therapy : Synthesizing radical acceptance with skillfulmeans. In: S. C. Hayes, V. M. Follette, & M. M. Linehan (eds.),Mindfulness and acceptance. Guilford Press. New York / London2004, 30-44.

Rubin 1985 J. B. Rubin, Meditation and psychoanalytic listening. Psychoana-lytic Review 72 (1985) 599-613.

Safran 2003 J. D. Safran (Ed.), Psychoanalysis and Buddhism: An unfoldingDialogue. Wisdom Publications. Somerville, MA 2003.

Segal et al. 2002 J. Segal, V. Zindel, J. Williams, G. Marks, & J. D. Teasdale,Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy of depressions. GuilfordPress. New York 2002.

van Quekelberghe 2005 R. van Quekelberghe, Transpersonale Psychologie undPsychotherapie. Dietmar Klotz. Eschborn bei Frankfurt/M. 2005.

van Quekelberghe 2007 R. van Quekelberghe, Grundzüge der Spirituellen Psycho-therapie. Dietmar Klotz. Eschborn bei Frankfurt/M. 2007.

M I C H A E L D E L M O N T E

Empty Thy Mind and Come to Thy Senses: ADe-constructive Path to Inner Peace

�For there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so�William Shakespeare, Hamlet

1. INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, we live in an age of hyper-communication � in terms ofboth sheer quantity and speed. If one takes a complete break from one�soffice for a couple of weeks, then the e-mails, text messages, letters,faxes, phone messages, etc, pile up and await us in intimidating bulk, alldemanding instant attention upon our return. On top of all of these wehave the ever-present radios, televisions, newspapers, magazines, vid-eos, DVDs and the like also competing for our limited mental space. Ifthis were not enough, bill-boards try to out-perform each other for ourspecial attention � as do the many demands of our work colleagues andlast, but hopefully, not least, the demands of our loved ones, familiesand friends.

Then there is the endless chatter � at work, social gatherings andconferences. The chattering species � or �Homo chatteraticus� � wouldpunningly describe our manifest nature - especially that of our sub-species that dwells in our modern expanding urban sprawls. Is it anywonder that we compulsively prattle so much? Our minds are probablyover-stimulated, with a constant barrage of hyper-communication on alevel to which our so-called �primitive� ancestors were relatively unac-customed.

Our over-talkative mouths reflect, of course, our unstoppableminds: Minds which find it increasingly difficult to switch off. Evenwhen we go on holidays we take these over-stimulated, hyper-activeminds with us on frenetic attempts to �enjoy ourselves� via novel formsof stimulation (de Botton, 2003). Well, not quite always � if we knowhow. Never before has quiet meditation been more appropriate as anantidote to this volume of mental overdrive. A real mental vacationmeans just that � a vacant mind. Meditation � whether by means of con-


450 MICHAEL DELMONTE

centration on only just one stimulus at the time, or temporarily (trying)to remain mindful, i.e. practicing being a neutral, non-judgmental ob-server � aims at minimizing the thinking/analytical mind and fosteringclearer sensory and reflective awareness instead. Paradoxically, deepmindfulness, if practiced competently, can eventually lead to a peacefulvoid or �mindlessness� � characterized by a state of �no thought� �even if it is only for brief moments initially.

2. THE TALKING CURE

So what can we do with anxiously driven and chronically over-arousedminds? Typically, one option is to offer them the �talking therapies�with a �talking cure� in mind! So we have Freud�s �free association�monologues, cognitive therapy�s �cognitive restructuring� dialogues,and many other variants all using verbalization as their modus operandi.I have no doubt that these are often very useful approaches � usually inthe earlier (i.e. �repair�) stages of psychotherapy when dealing withdeficits, conflicts and defenses, but I am less convinced that this alwaysremains the case, for example, with those among us with varying de-grees of obsessive thinking. Can problems of the pained and over-activemind exclusively be solved by the thinking mind? Hopefully some clar-ity on this shall emerge as we proceed.

3. INTERNALITY VERSUS EXTERNALITY

You may object that I am also right now engaging in communicativechatter! Well, yes, this has to do with externality. Talking and writingare useful means of communication between �objects,� i.e. betweenpeople. Internality, must not, however, be neglected. We are not justobjects to each other, we are also subjects. Our internal space � our sub-jectivities � should not be overlooked. Again this is where meditation isalso valuable. When we attend to our inner space we often notice howour incessant thinking is like a compulsion, well-nigh impossible tostop, even when we claim that these thoughts are often unwanted. Thisrepetitive thinking has typically been dealt with in cognitive therapy by�thought stopping�, but evidence suggests that a gentler approach,based on the acceptance of unwanted cognitions via mindful �witness-ing�, may be more effective (Tolle, 1999, 2005; Thich Nhat Hanh,1975, 1991, 2003; Barnes-Holmes, et al, 2004). This is not a defeatist

EMPTY THY MIND AND COME TO THY SENSES 451

acceptance, but rather a mindful choice. Hayes and Smith (2005) referto the acceptance emergent from mindfulness practice as �radical accep-tance.�

�Awakening� our �inner observer� capacity is what mindfulnessmeditation promotes. Much of our private thinking is comprised of un-productive monologues at best (often telling ourselves illusory stories),but also by destructive imaginary, internal disputes and conflicts. Manypeople suffer from minds which are ceaselessly engaged in anxious ordepressive self-statements, in weary �battles� and the like, with little inthe way of creative outcome. Many of us also �live in our heads,� dis-connected from our bodies. What can be done about all of this? For astart one can begin to raise one�s awareness level via mindfulness train-ing.

4. MINDFULNESS AND DIS-IDENTIFICATION

It may be easier to start mindfulness training by observing our physicalbodies in action, e.g. simply by watching ourselves walking as in walk-ing meditation. We can do likewise for various other daily activities, forexample, while washing our hands or eating. The mindful practice ofHatha Yoga affords us an excellent means to deepen awareness of ourembodiment. Paradoxically, when we apply our �inner observer� to ourown thinking minds while practicing mindfulness, it is not necessarilywith the intention of �refining� our thinking, but rather to learn how todis-identify from it (Assogioli, 1965; De Mello, 1990; Holmes, 1997;Tolle, 1999; DelMonte, 2000, 2003). Observing our thoughts, likeclouds passing through the sky without either rejecting or clinging ontothem, is what dis-identification is basically about. Thereby one learns tolet go temporarily of unsolicited and invasive thoughts so as to have aless �muddied� consciousness, and eventually to let go momentarily ofall thoughts, rendering moments of stillness � or better still, the �justbeing � of clearer consciousness (see �Adaptive Dis-identification�later). Although consciousness without thought is a possibility, its op-posite, thought without some consciousness is not (excluding the Freu-dian repressed unconscious). Consciousness thus appears to be primary,and from it emerges thought as a secondary epi-phenomenon: An epi-phenomenon that can become �parasitic,� in the sense that conscious-ness can play the role of a reluctant host to our unbidden thinking - as indreams, obsessional ruminations and when �hearing voices� (auditory


hallucinations). When, in meditation for example, we experience con-sciousness without thought, we may be in touch with �just being�, i.e.our deeper essence beyond mental and physical form. Brain activationproduces cognitions and emotions. Quieten this brain activity withmeditation and one is left with the �no thought� of clear consciousness.Thus consciousness appears to be primary and mentation secondary.

5. AWARENESS TRAINING

It is possibly obvious by now that the early stages of mindfulness prac-tice can also be seen as a form of sensory awareness training. Aware-ness training often starts with self-observation (De Mello, 1990). Asalready mentioned, we have several objects of choice on which to focusour attention, such as our breathing, hearing, and so forth. We learn totrain, i.e. sensitize, all our senses in this way. This is best done non-analytically and in the �hic et nunc� (here and now) mode. We can alsoobserve our cravings, our dislikes, our clutching and needy minds inaction and via �just letting-be,� learn to side�step them. Such stoic sidestepping can be seen as a form of adaptive dissociation. Identificationwith the desired contents of one�s mind, i.e. with one�s attachments,typically leads to fear of their loss, and consequently to emotional dis-tress, pessimistic thinking and compensatory behavior. These cravingscan be simply observed, and, for a change, neither judged nor actedupon. We can also become attached to, and identified with, our pain,losses and suffering, as in a felt sense of prolonged victimhood. (SeeAttachments section below).

So developing an awareness of our varied attachments is anotheraspect of mindfulness training, contradictory as some of these attach-ments may seem to be. Craving for sensory gratification, for continuedexistence and for annihilation, corresponding to the Freudian constructsof libido, ego and the death instinct (See de Silva, 1990), can all beproblematic. Dependence on sensory gratification implies dependenceon instinct and on externality. Craving for continued existence is a de-nial of impermanence, and craving for annihilation is surrender to thedeath wish, i.e. to Thanatos. This can be seen in impulsive aggressionturned outwards on others (sadism), or inwards on oneself (masochism),as found with drug and alcohol abuse, self-harm and suicide. Behind thedeath wish is often a desire to return to a non-suffering peaceful statefree of longing, frustration and fear. This peace can, temporarily, be


attained on earth much more constructively via meditation, yoga andmindfulness practice.

Many approaches to mental health see the development of self-awareness as beneficial. The insight gained through psychoanalysis ispurportedly transmutative in terms of neurotic symptoms (Freud, 1900).Likewise, the self-awareness fostered in Gestalt therapy (Perls, et al.,1973) was seen as therapeutic. (See later for psychodynamic, Gestaltand constructivist approaches to awareness). Schwartz (1983) saw self-attention per se as playing an important homeostatic, and thus integra-tive, role. It has also been argued, with some empirical support, thatmeditation in general, and mindfulness meditation in particular, is con-ducive to well-being (Shafii, 1973b; Carrington & Ephron, 1975;Deatherage, 1975; Brown & Engler 1980; DelMonte, 1984a, 1985,1990; DelMonte & Kenny, 1985).

Moreover, it has been suggested that increased (non-neurotic)self-awareness, with its attendant clarity of vision, should allow one tomake more informed choices, and thus enable one to discard old habits,attitudes and attachments that no longer serve our evolving needs. The-se claims are addressed (see later) in the context of our attachments topeople, objects, emotions and ideas, as well as in the context of ourattempts to foster self-awareness via self-attention strategies. So is therea link between self-attention and health?

6. SELF-ATTENTION, AWARENESS AND SELF-REGULATION

Schwartz�s (1983) disregulation theory can be catch-phrased as: �Re-pression and Disease versus Mindfulness and Health�. He postulatedthat awareness is linked to health and that repression is associated with�dis-ease�. He produced considerable empirical evidence that repressorsshow elevated levels of psycho-physiological distress such as electro-cortical (brain-wave), electromyographical (muscular) and, especially,cardiovascular arousal. These latter findings are consistent with somelater work of my own also showing a significant relationship betweendefensiveness and haemodynamic arousal in general and cardiovasculararousal in particular (DelMonte, 1984a, 1985). Repressors also reportsignificantly more physical illness than �true low anxious� subjects (seeSchwartz, 1983).

Schwartz agrees with Galin (1974) when he proposed that re-pression is produced by a functional cerebral disconnection syndrome in


which the left hemisphere (which is usually associated with verbal andanalytic functioning) becomes functionally isolated to varying degreesfrom the right hemisphere, with its relative non-verbal (e.g. emotional)and spatial function. Schwartz produced evidence that repressive sub-jects appear to show more (right hemisphere) cerebral lateralizationwith regard to negative emotions and in situations which are potentiallythreatening. He also quotes other evidence indicating a relative attenua-tion of information transfer from the right to the left hemisphere in �re-pressive� compared with �true low anxious subjects.� Traumatic memo-ries tend to be stored in the right parietal lobes (van der Kolk & Fisher,1995). Overall, the right hemisphere seems to be activated in the ex-pression of difficult and disturbing emotions, and the left hemispheretends to be associated with the expression of positive emotions such asjoy and happiness. Two months of mindfulness training has been shownto lead to a significant shift to a higher ratio of left-sided compared withright-sided brain activation (Davidson, et al, 2003).

Warrenburg, et al. (1981), reported a significantly high propor-tion of hypertensives being repressors. For these hypertensive individu-als, the more relaxed they said they were during the speech-task thehigher their blood pressure! This observation is supported by other evi-dence that high blood pressure (internal arousal or �noise�) can be usedto dampen cognitive awareness of distress (Dworkin, et al., 1979; Del-Monte, 1984a).

Schwartz (1983) argued that self-attention, as practised in vari-ous mindfulness meditation techniques, �seems to have specific auto-nomic, self-regulatory, stabilizing effects on physiological functioning�(p.114). He contended that self-attention can promote localized healing,�especially if the self-attention is guided by relevant imagery that istargeted to the appropriate part(s) of the body� (p.114). This suggestionis interesting in terms of the often quoted pioneer work done by Simon-ton and Simonton (1974) and by Meares (1978) in which they usedmeditation and visualization exercises with cancer patients.

In a similar fashion the insight gained in psychotherapy may betherapeutic. There is some evidence that those receiving psychotherapyare less likely to subsequently report physical illness (Rosen & Wiens,1979). Psychotherapy typically aims to enhance insight and awareness,as well as provide a corrective attachment experience. But do we needto distinguish between such positive attachment experiences, and ourtendency to clutch indiscriminately in many directions?



7. ATTACHMENTS

Much has been said elsewhere (DelMonte 2003, 2004) about our clutch-ing minds attaching to opinions, appearances, possessions, success,power, status, prestige, wealth, pride and so forth. Less has been statedabout our minds� equal capacity to identify with, and stay with, suffer-ing, by either living in the past in holding onto bygone insults, losses,hurts, defeats, etc, or by anticipating the future in pessimistic, paranoidor hypochondriacal ways. Victimhood can become a fixed identity, i.e.an attachment and even a way of life (Tolle, 1999; Bruckner, 2000).The �Pain-body� (Tolle, 1999, 2005) and the pain-mind are often char-acterised by an exaggerated need to wallow in and talk about sufferingcompulsively and self-righteously � usually blaming others for our cur-rent misery. Then there is the compulsion to compare and judge othersfrom a �knowing� position. Engaging in such non-compassionate �sit-ting in judgment� and �forming opinions� self-righteously about othersonly isolates us. Psychic pain is inevitable if one is identified with one�segotistic mind, which seeks a constant array of ego gratifications, in-cluding the need to be always right or victorious. Ego identificationslead us to cling to past gains, regret past losses and worry about futuresnags, snares, pitfalls and more losses; thereby taking us away fromliving fully in the present reality � especially when it can have so muchto offer. Life inevitably involves a series of gains and losses. Griffin(2001) saw adjustment to loss as a lifelong regenerative learning proc-ess. Losses also open up new opportunities.

Then there is the social domain. Attachment has both physio-logical and psychological components. Developing a �theory of mind�in childhood facilitates the latter (Fonagy, et al, 1994). People oftenremark on the proclivity of human beings to form strong emotionalbonds. We are popularly described as �social animals�. However, thereis considerable variation in this tendency to seek out others and to main-tain contact. Social �stickiness� does not appear to be spread out evenlyin the population. Some individuals deliberately enhance their out-reaching social skills, whilst others, for a variety of reasons, use variousstrategies to distance themselves from people or to withdraw into them-selves. I shall go on to explore the way Eastern techniques, in particular,can be used to alter these apparently opposite inclinations � to either�connect� with others or to retreat from them.

Much has been written about the manner in which children learnto socialize as they grow up. Establishing �healthy� roles and social


links is seen as a prerequisite to mental health. Those of us who areunable to form and sustain intimate affiliations are usually perceived ashaving serious emotional problems � but so are those whose emotionalbonds are overly dependent. In other words, extremes in emotional dis-tance, that is, being too closely enmeshed in a dependent way or, at theother end of the scale, being excessively self-reliant, are consideredsocio-maladaptive in adults (see Birtchnell, 1997).

As already alluded to, we not only become attached to people,we also form strong attachments to a range of objects and experiences,such as the taste of certain foods and drinks, the sound of particularforms of music, our possessions such as childhood toys, paintings, or-naments, land, houses, money, etc. Moreover, we also become attachedto the non-material realm in terms of our languages, religions, ethnicgroups, theories, ideologies and achievements. We may identify withsuch attachments, to the point of describing ourselves in terms of theirlabels. So we may characterize ourselves as �communist,� �nationalist,��feminist,� �Protestant,� �Orthodox,� �liberal,� �left-wing,� �Afrikaans-speaking,� �humanist,� etc. We also characterize these attachments inegotistical terms, e.g. my religion, my flock, my people, my career, myterritory, in my opinion, and so forth, and express strong dislikes ofother identities. So, is our real identity the sum of such potentially divi-sive, personal attachments, or is this just our mask hiding a deeper es-sence? We may cling as arduously onto non-material as onto materialattachments, e.g. try persuading an �opinionated� person to change hismind! Attachments do not always make much rational sense. We canbecome attached to, or enmeshed with, other peoples� difficulties, ourown personal problems and abusive relationships. Attachments canlimit, hold and constrain consciousness to particular viewpoints, atti-tudes and perspectives. They can imprison and isolate us, and impedeour further development.

8. ATTACHMENT AND LOSS

However, attachment and loss are two sides of the same coin. Nothingis permanent � all is flux. Much is illusion and even delusion. All in-vestments are potential losses � if not during our current lifetimes thencertainly upon their physical ends. We all live in the shadow of death �the ultimate narcissistic blow!? This knowledge � colored by our ownpersonal history of previous losses (both emotional and material) � has


as a consequence that we can feel varying degrees of insecurity aboutour desired attachments.

Paradoxically, the various objects and people on whom we havebecome dependent for our emotional identity and security may alsobecome the very source of our deepest anxiety, as observed in the�separation anxiety� linked to their feared loss. Although with emo-tional attachment comes varying degrees of social support, this supportis often at a price � namely that of burdensome counter demands andresponsibilities! Caring for others can be emotionally draining � not justrewarding.

9. DEFENSIVE DETACHMENT

Some of us try to avoid this anxiety by means of a �schizoid defence�.It is likely to be found in those who are fearful of the risks involved inemotional inter-dependence, often due to past failures and hurts in thisarea. This defense is characterized by a contrived emotional detachment(largely unconscious) based on an exaggerated attitude of personal self-sufficiency, often where childhood bonding with care-givers was pain-fully inadequate or insensitive. In the absence of adequate parental at-tunement and nurturing behavior, emotional self-dependency may besought via varying degrees of emotionally insulating and �autonomous�behavior. An extreme version of this defense could be the affective�non-attachment� (and non-attunement) found in borderline personalitydisorder, where long-term intimacy is too uncomfortable to be sustained(see Holmes, 1997). However, several variants of defensive isolation, orextreme egoism, exist. Solipsism, for example, is an intellectual ration-alization for this cut off stance in life. But is mere withdrawal adequate?How can one really enjoy such false �escapism� when surrounded byothers who may be in pain? This issue of defensive detachment shall beexpanded on later. (See �Problems with Detachment and Dis-identification�).

10. ADAPTIVE DIS-IDENTIFICATION

Not all forms of detachment are mal-adaptive defenses. Some psycho-therapists deliberately encourage a form of non-attachment as a way ofcoping with potential loss. For example, both Assagioli (1965) and,later, Holmes (1997) refer to the strategy of �dis-identification� when


dealing with psychic pain (see earlier �Mindfulness and Dis-identification�). Assagioli�s viewpoint was similar to that of those Bud-dhists who perceive our tendency to identify in a clinging way withobjects of our desire as ultimately leading to the pain of their actual orimagined loss. He described cognitive exercises to encourage the devel-opment of a mental set of �dis-identification� as a counter-force in cop-ing with this tendency to over-invest and to over-identify ourselves withour physical bodies, emotions, thoughts, etc., and with our attachmentsin general. The objective of Assagioli�s �dis-identification� exercises isto be less at the mercy of our longings, wishes and desires. One finds anecho here of the Buddhist dictum, already referred to, that craving is thesource of suffering. Mindfulness training can raise awareness of ouracquisatorial nature and help liberate us from the slavery of endlessgrasping, of which contemporary materialism and consumerism areobvious hedonistic examples. For Freud (1900, 1912, and 1930) the pullof the pleasure principle is not freedom, and is only one side of a dual-ism � the other side being the displeasure which inevitably follows inthe heels of pleasure seeking. Psychological freedom also comes fromletting go of defensive and reactionary views, and from moving abovepolarised construing as in �them versus us� attitudes.

Let us now look at a non-clinical example of dis-identification.The exile is an interesting case, especially if he, or she, comes from apoorly understood cultural background or ethnic group. Being an exilein a foreign land often means that one�s former cultural identity has tobe suspended while a new one is being constructed. Todorov (1996)refers to the latter process as acculturisation. Here we should also speakof de-constructing one�s former persona (or de-culturisation) and devel-oping a new identity (or mask?). This can be a painful process, charac-terized by considerable nostalgia for lost familiarities and by obses-sional reminiscing about the lost world in an attempt to keep it mentallyalive while we construct a new one. But this process is rarely fullycomplete, so that one is left as a transcultural hybrid betwixt twoworlds. Rather than view this new state of affairs as a failure, it couldon the contrary be seen as an adaptive dynamic in which one�s identityis �elastic.� Fixity gives way to resilient flexibility in which acquisitions(identifications) are constantly being balanced by losses (dis-identifications) to produce a freshly evolving self.


11. NON-ATTACHMENT TECHNIQUES OF THE ORIENT

In the Orient there is a long tradition going back thousands of yearslinked to Hinduism, Taoism and Buddhism, of using various techniquessuch as meditation, Yoga, Tai-chi, Qi-gong and so forth to achieve al-tered mental states characterized by equanimity and non-grasping, bymoving beyond (i.e. "transcending�) the issues and problems ontowhich our thoughts can �stick� (see Mascaro, 1962; DelMonte, 1995a;DelMonte, 2000). Meditation, Hatha Yoga, and Qi-gong exercises canbe used to focus on bodily posture, breathing and the contents of one�smind. They (like the use of Zen Koans) also play down the value ofintellectualization, rationalization and other aspects of what is known as�shi-shen� in ancient Chinese Qi-gong. Shi-shen, or conceptual knowl-edge, must be balanced by �yuan-shen� which lies beyond conceptualconsciousness, yet permeates all aspects of life � being its very source.Yuan-shen is seen as the dynamic force inherent in �Qi�. Qi could bereferred to as �vital energy� in the West. Yuan-shen, being essentiallyineffable, is difficult to symbolize, e.g. to put into words. During medi-tation and Koan contemplation one tries to side-step the discursive mindwith its focus on conceptual knowledge or shi-shen. The periods ofmeditative �no thought� characterized by stillness, silence and opennessmay present opportunities to experience the ineffable yuan-shen re-ferred to above. Moreover, yuan-shen may be phenomenologically simi-lar to Jung�s (1958) �collective unconscious�, namely a vast, loose, pre-verbal, pre-conscious and inchoate transpersonal resource of vast poten-tial. This resource can be �tapped into� more readily by the use of cer-tain techniques such as meditation in which the chattering conceptualmind is temporarily silenced. Lose thy mind and come to thy senses � inthe here and now! (See �Gestalt Therapy Perspective�).

Dorcas argued that meditation and Qi-gong are similar insofaras they both use attentional concentration and mindfulness to tune themind to �an advanced level of consciousness, in which the divisionsbetween subject and object cease to exist, the division between me andnot me melts away and in which one feels at one with the entire uni-verse" (Dorcas, 1996, p.13). This advanced state of consciousness isalso hallmarked by �choiceless awareness� (Krisnamurti, 1991) in so faras such awareness implies a non-seeking and non-clutching approach tothe contents of perception.

Bearing the above train of thought in mind, a distinction canusefully be made between �detachment�, which implies detaching, i.e.



withdrawing interest or giving up something previously valued on theone hand, and �non-attachment� on the other, which implies a moreneutral or non-grasping stance whilst accepting, in a non-possessivemanner, all of that which momentarily forms part of our experientialworld. Whereas detachment can seem anti-social, non-attachment doesnot imply a lack of compassion, nor indifference to the world or to thelot of others. Detachment can also be seen as harboring strong defensiveundertones and may have little to do with maturing through life�s ex-periences � be they work or love related.

12. MINDFULNESS MEDITATION PRACTICE

Advanced practitioners of meditation often focus their attention on thephenomenology of consciousness by means of introspective mindful-ness (see DelMonte, 1995a; Kabat-Zinn, 2005). With mindfulness tech-niques the meditator is encouraged to maintain �a quiet awareness,without comment, of whatever happens to be here and now� (Watts,1957). The objective of mindfulness meditation is �to come to knowone�s own mental processes, to thus begin to have the power to shape orcontrol the mental processes, and finally to gain freedom from the con-dition where the mental processes are unknown and uncontrolled, withthe individual at the mercy of his own unbridled mind� (Deatherage,1975, p.134). Hendricks (1975) sees such introspection as a form ofdiscrimination training which helps meditators to observe their ownthoughts in a relatively detached way. He speculates that �since nearlyeveryone has a certain number of neurotic thoughts mental health isdependent upon the ability to recognize that they are �just thoughts�(p.145). This approach can be applied to depressive, anxious and obses-sive cognitions, and several authors have done just that (e.g. Kabat-Zinn, 1996; Teasdale, 2000).

A variant of meditative mindfulness (analytic mindfulnessmeditation) can also used to observe the psychic nature of felt attach-ments, with their complex interwoven webs of emotional, cognitive,attitudinal and behavioral sub-components. In observing the very con-struction of consciousness in this non-attached (i.e. non-grasping ornon-identificatory manner) practitioners hope, at least temporarily, tomove beyond the pull of their unbridled yearnings and the push of irra-tional dislikes. Being mindful of the impermanence of all material andpsychic attachments facilitates awareness of the ephemeral nature of our


personal consciousness, laden as it is with regular eruption of instinctivecraving. Freedom is where craving is converted into mindful choice. Ifcravings are invariably suppressed then we are no freer than if we al-ways yield to them! Full acceptance of �the now,� by neither clinging tonor rejecting our experiences, is the essence of mindfulness. Its aim is tofree us from our reactionary minds, i.e. minds dominated by raw instinctand by past conditioning.

Mindfulness meditation encourages an opening to broader con-sciousness. In this way it is similar to some forms of spiritual practice.One can say that such meditation favors an opening of our intuitive self.It fosters this intuitive self over our more driven instinctive self andreactive conditioned self, as well as over our split-off cerebral self. Theinsights gleaned from meditation are not to be limited to personal gain,but should be transformed into relational acts of kindness, compassion,respect and tolerance of others. Acceptance of the suchness of realitydoes not preclude compassionate work towards improving the lot ofourselves and of others.

13. THE SILENCE OF MEDITATION

Meditation, with practice, can become very simple. For example, wecan learn to observe the silence within us � if we progress that far. Mo-ments of timelessness may emerge as may a sense of formlessness. Ourpersonal experience of timelessness is just a small chip off the eternity�block,� just as our experience of formlessness yields a sense of infin-ity. These moments of dwelling in timelessness and formlessness, how-ever brief they may be, nevertheless yield a sense of unity where thedualistic discursive mind has suspended its �me/other� construing. Byletting go of dualistic sense-making and just �letting be� one approacheswhatever emerges with increasing equanimity. Deeply silent meditation,characterized by �no thought� and by a sense of unity, brings us face-to-face with the unmanifest, i.e. with yet-to-be expressed potential - a realbreak from repetitive and predictable thinking.

This dichotomy between the discursive mind and no-thoughtdoes not imply an inherent conflict. Thinking undoubtedly has its valueand place � especially when we use thought and speech to facilitateinformative, creative, humorous or playful communication. Silence, onthe contrary, facilitates communion (Shafii, 1973a), i.e. the meeting ofminds (or rather of �hearts�) non-verbally through intuition, feeling,


empathy and sensation. As Jung pointed out (Jung, 1958) there are fourways of knowing � i.e., thinking, sensation, feeling and intuition � withthinking being increasingly favored in contemporary Western culture.However, with the silence of meditation one uses focussed sensory at-tention (sensation) to foster the emergence of the intuitive mind.

The practice of silent meditation leading to �no thought� can bedescribed as the �via negativa� (the empty way) as opposed to the �viapositiva�, which is the more habitual mode as seen daily in our discur-sive minds. They represent opposite ways of sense making. The path ofmeditation (silence) should not seek to negate the mind in action, butrather to assist in the liberation of one�s self from blind allegiance to ourinstinctual impulses, obsessions and compulsions (Freud�s id), and alsofrom fleeing from our dislikes and fears. It may also free us from theimpoverishment resulting from our maladaptive defenses which primar-ily serve to limit our awareness, and from judgmental attitudes (Freud�s�harsh� super-ego). Silence and mindful meditation thus facilitate theemergence of �creative emptiness� in which �benevolent depersonaliza-tion� is fostered, i.e. the discarding of unhelpful id and super-ego im-pulses and control (see Moncayo, 2003 for fuller exposition).

14. SILENCE IN PSYCHODYNAMIC PSYCHOTHERAPY

Western insight psychotherapy, compared with Eastern mindfulnessmeditation, is a neophyte on the world stage. Both, nevertheless, areconcerned with awareness, in so far as the insight sought from therapyand the mindfulness emergent from meditation may be similar. How-ever, most forms of psychotherapy use verbalization as their modusoperandi. A common view held by psychoanalysts is that those who donot learn to �think through (i.e. to symbolize verbally) are bound to �actout� and to go on suffering � as with the hysterically inclined who tendto �feel� too much. Hence we have the �pain-body� (Tolle, 1999), asomatizing body impoverished in terms of its capacity for reflectivethinking. While one would not dispute that there is great merit in the�talking cure� approach there is, nevertheless, a growing corpus ofopinion on the value of some fecund silence in therapy. For example,the obsessionally inclined, in thinking (and often talking) compulsively,block out feelings, and, in so doing, demonstrate that we cannot alwaysjust �think� our way out of problems. In therapy they typically havedifficulty in being �in touch� with feelings � their own and those of


others � and are usually very uncomfortable with silence. Hence theendless chatter, which is often split off from feeling. This is sometimespejoratively referred to as �free disassociation� (Perls, et al, 1973) orsplit-off intellect. (See Gestalt Therapy Perspective later). These peoplemay need to learn that speech, just like music, is given deeper meaningby being punctuated by fertile silence so that something more profoundthan words may emerge. According to O�Donoghue (1977) �If you areoutside of yourself, always reaching beyond yourself, you avoid the callof your own mystery. When you acknowledge the integrity of your soli-tude, and settle into its mystery, your relationships with others take on anew warmth, adventure and wonder�. Thereby silence can foster a senseof compassionate communion.

However, silence on the part of the patient was seen as resis-tance by Freud (1912). But, Balint (1958) argued that �if we can changeour own approach � from considering silence as a symptom of resis-tance to studying it as a possible source of information � then we maylearn something about this area of mind�. Later authors saw silence asindicative of shyness, shame, sorrow, anger, hostility, psychic absenceand fear (Shafii, 1973a; Coltart, 1992). Silence has also been construed,at times, as adaptive regression to pre-verbal sense-making (as opposedto malign or psychotic regression � Shafii, 1973a).

The psychoanalyst Coltart (1992) goes as far as saying that �myown preference above all others, is for a silent patient.� This may bebecause the relatively silent patient allows the analyst ample time towork with the visceral felt-sense of the counter-transference. It shouldcome as no surprise that Coltart also described herself as a practitionerof meditation and Buddhism. This is a long way from Freud who typi-cally did not work with the counter-transference, and who saw religiousexperience, meditation and mysticism as regressive, irrational and mal-adaptive phenomena, i.e. forms of �oceanic� fusion and oneness withmother, or the wish to re-experience intra-uterine life (Freud, 1930). Tofacilitate the patient in adaptive regression the therapist must also becapable of silence, e.g. by avoiding premature, aggressive and excessiveinterpretations, instructions or comments. In this way pre-verbal trau-mata can be �re-experienced and mastered again in silence� (Shafii,1973a).

Dreams also tend to be silent. It is well known that Freud (1900)described dreams as the �royal road to the unconscious.� Perhaps lesswell known is that Jung (1958) similarly described meditation as a �sort


of a royal road to the unconscious� (p.508). Jung, however, also sawmeditation as a �surrender� to the collective unconscious, as its practiceleads primarily to an indefinite experience of oneness and timelessness,which according to Jung are hallmarks of the collective unconscious.Kretschmer (1962) also saw meditation in a similar light, and I quote�Dreams are similar to meditation except meditation gains the reactionof the unconscious by a technique which is faster than depending ondreams� (Kretschmer, p.76). However, it may take several years ofpractice to arrive at the adeptness of an �advanced� meditator.

By now it should be obvious that it is not just meditators whostrive to clear the mind of its sticky attachments. Psychoanalysts likeBion (1970), Shafii (1973a) and Coltart (1992) also see value in ana-lysts themselves temporarily creating an empty or �fallow� state ofmind during clinical sessions so as to be more receptive to the patient�stransferences (see DelMonte, 1995b). Bion (1970) advised therapists toforsake memory, desire and understanding during clinical practice. Hequoted from a letter written by the English poet John Keats in 1817 inwhich Keats referred to �negative capability� as �when a man is capableof being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reach-ing after fact and reason� (Bion, 1970, p.125). Here we see a psycho-analyst advising his colleagues not to hold too tightly onto one�s profes-sional opinions and theories when dealing with an individual patient.This is also a variant of mindful non-attachment. The silent mindfulnessemergent from meditation training allows the analyst to listen moredeeply to their patients, to receive their projections, and to let go ofthese projections after the therapy session. Other forms of therapy, inparticular Gestalt therapy, also question the value of too much focus onverbalization in therapy.

15. GESTALT THERAPY PERSPECTIVE

Perls was influenced by Tao philosophy as well as by Freud, Reich,Mareno, Gestalt psychology and existentialism. He emphasized per-sonal responsibility in the resolution of problems. Both Gestalt therapyand meditation techniques focus on the �hic et nunc� (here and now) ofexperience, i.e. both meditation and the various Gestalt techniques playdown the value of verbalization. In fact, Perls, et al (1973) stated thatverbalization, as in free-association, could become a sort of escapist�free-disassociation� from feelings and emotions. Together with obses-



sional verbalization, Perls also saw excessive rationalization as a de-fense against subjective feelings.

Instead, Perls stressed the importance of �contact� and �sens-ing,� hence his admonition �lose your mind and come to your senses�.He described many specific techniques, involving sensation, used tofoster awareness. In this regard it is worth noting that Perls definedhimself as an existentialist who applied the phenomenological approach(Perls, et al, 1973). The phenomenological method used by many exis-tentialists is a method of subjective inquiry originally developed byEdmund Husserl and later used by Martin Heidegger as a means to ex-amine one�s immediate experience. It has to do with a critical and scru-pulous inspection of one�s mental processes and one�s consciousness. Itinvolves an attempt to exclude all assumptions about external causes ofinternal phenomena. (See DelMonte, 1989, for a fuller discussion ofphenomenology and existentialism). As existentialist phenomenologyconcerns subjective awareness without prejudice (prejudgment) it couldbe argued that it closely resembles the technique of mindfulness medita-tion in that the latter is purportedly characterized by a de-automatizationof experience (i.e. the dropping or suspension of perceptual and cogni-tive habits). With both the mindfulness and phenomenological methodsone strives for a permeable (or open) stance to the flux of consciousnesswithout trying to punctuate any experience had. In this way both meth-ods are typified by what Perls calls �confluence�, i.e. the absence offigure/background contrasts.

In both meditation and Gestalt therapy the observer role is val-ued. For example, Perls encouraged patients to observe tension andanxiety and not to engage in �pre-mature relaxation.� In other words,Perls promoted �approach techniques� rather than avoidance. In thesame way in mindfulness meditation one is encouraged to observesteadfastly one's moods, feelings, thoughts, and so forth in a non-attached and non-judgmental way, i.e. neither clinging to them norpushing them away.

Perls, like Schwartz (1983) and many practitioners of medita-tion saw awareness per se as being therapeutic. This even included awa-reness of simply �being� for which he used his �internal silence� and�make a void� techniques. Perls acknowledged an influence from Taophilosophy here, and the similarity between Perls�s internal silencetechnique and the �no thought� strategy of concentrative meditation is


striking (See earlier and DelMonte, 1990, for a fuller discussion on �nothought�).

Perls also used breathing exercises similar to those found inbreath meditation. Both involve paying attention to one�s breathing. InGestalt therapy there are also exercises for focusing on anxiety, panic,depression, fatigue, psychosomatic symptoms and behavioral problems� all in order to �integrate� and resolve them, thus leading to Gestalt�closure.� Likewise, mindfulness is increasingly being used with a simi-lar range of psychological disorders (Kabat-Zinn, 1996, 2005; Teasdale,2000). Finally, it has been argued by McGee, et al., (1984) that thoseexperiences which are too threatening to one�s core psychological func-tioning may be suspended as �unexperienced experiences,� i.e. withoutbeing fully processed or integrated at a conscious level. Such experi-ences remain akin to the �unfinished business,� the �unfulfilled needs�or the �incomplete Gestalten� of Gestalt therapy. These incompleteGestalten tend to be at low levels of awareness and �acted out� behav-iorally or hysterically in order to be communicated or when trying toachieve closure. In this sense the symptoms of hysteria are seen to befunctional and symbolic (Szasz, 1972). It may be that the weakening ofone's cognitive defenses during Gestalt exercises, free association andmeditation facilitates the abreactive emergence of incomplete Gestalten(or repressed material). Following abreaction, patients can check on anyemotions that they have just experienced. Such enquiry should enablethe client to put some verbal structure onto these preverbal feelings. Bylearning to put verbal form on feeling the client is in a better position todiscuss his or her experiences with others � including the therapist. Put-ting verbal form on feelings, i.e. labeling them is also an aspect of con-structivist psychotherapy.

16. PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY APPROACH

George Kelly (1955) saw man as living in two realities, firstly the real-ity beyond human perception and secondly our interpretations or per-sonal constructions, as he would put it, of this primary reality. ForKelly, man is like a scientist developing bi-polar constructs in order tomake sense of the world by looking for repetitive patterns of similarityand difference among a series of events occurring through time. Even asinfants, before we acquire language, we construe events dichotomouslyvia bi-polar discriminations such as �milk versus not milk�, �mother


versus other,� �thick versus thin,� �hot versus cold,� and so forth.Therefore, initially these discriminations or constructs are pre-verbal,that is, they have not been verbally labeled. Although a growing childlearns to attach verbal labels to many such discriminations, much ofadult construing remains non-verbal (or somatic). As each personmoves along the dimension of time he, or she, develops his or her ownpersonal construct system to be used in the anticipation of events. Theconstruct systems of �normal� individuals are constantly being �up-dated� in the light of newly assimilated evidence. Such accommodationor revision of our construct systems allows for a better fit with primaryreality.

As McWilliams (1984) postulates, both Buddhist psychologyand personal construct theory acknowledge that normal human under-standing of the universe involves the use of dualistic dimensions tomake sense of a unitary universe. Buddhist approaches would empha-size the need to see through this illusion of duality via practices such asmindfulness meditation. On the other hand, constructivist psychologistswould focus on the reality of a more sophisticated and more effectivepersonal construct system in order to be able to more accurately predictevents. Buddhists and many Eastern writers such as De Mello (1990)would see suffering as stemming from our desire to force the unitaryworld to conform to our dualistic and egocentric cravings, beliefs andvalues. A fundamental concern about dualistic construing is that it cre-ates conceptual divisions and boundaries in a universe that Buddhistspostulate to be inherently holistic, unitary and in flux. Thinking tendstowards dualism. Concepts tend to fragment reality. Different languagesfragment reality in their own unique ways, rendering exact translationsimpossible. As McWilliams says, �to the extent that we attend to con-ventional, dichotomous, ideas about the universe, we are taken awayfrom direct, immediate experience of the universe�. McWilliams con-tends that the Buddhist viewpoint is that it is possible to transcend thedelusion of our self-invented dualistic world, and, in seeing the trans-parency of our construct system, experience a greater sense of unity(with the universe). Such an experience comes from an awareness ofhow we personally construct our subjective view of this greater reality.This awareness may be unfolded through mindfulness meditation prac-tice. An aim of this practice is to put us in touch with the inter-penetration and the inter-dependence of all forms of life, and also withcompassion and �inter-being� (Thich Nhat Hanh, 1975, 1991, 2003).


Kelly was adamant on the notion of bi-polarity of constructs.One always abstracts on the basis of both similarity and contrast. Di-chotomy is seen as an essential feature (and limitation) of thinking it-self. Whilst Kelly says that one can transcend one�s biography and notbecome a victim of circumstance, one can only do this through develop-ing alternative constructs. One never escapes from one�s construct sys-tem, but always assimilates the world through it or through its elabora-tions. Thus, when one transcends a particular bi-polarity, one tends toclimb to a higher and more abstract level, but to a level which, nonethe-less, is structured in bi-polar terms. It may be that some meditation andyoga approaches are directly or indirectly attempting to elaborate thenon-verbal construing of the person so that it supersedes the verbally-labeled constructions. From this point of view one could initially betalking about �descendence� from the psyche to the soma, rather thantranscendence. One, therefore, has to distinguish between descendence,ascendence and transcendence. Descendence implies moving �down�from cognitive to pre-verbal or somatic construing. In psychodynamicterms this is known as adaptive regression as opposed to psychotic re-gression. Here there may be a gradual decrease in the level of cognition(thinking) right down to the unconscious level. Ascendence, on theother hand, describes a movement �up� to a higher and more abstractbi-polar construct, i.e. to super-ordinate construing within one�s per-sonal construct system. Such super-ordinate construing may, if taken farenough, be seen as the supra-conscious (Assogioli, 1965) and may alsobecome difficult to verbalize. Transcendence, as in �no-thought�, is thefeeling of unity or bliss when the meditator has the experience that he orshe has transcended the bi-polarity of all construing � but nonetheless isstill construing at a very basic somatic level in terms of balance, pos-ture, respiration, osmo-regulation, blood pressure and other vital aspectsof one�s metabolism. Transcendence is, therefore, where the personrecovers his or her non-verbal sense of �oneness� by not confusing theduality of our personal bi-polar construing with the essential unity ofgreater reality. Both ascendance and descendence, in so far that theyside-step the bi-polar thinking mind, may involve varying degrees oftranscendence.


17. PROBLEMS WITH DETACHMENT AND DIS-IDENTIFICATION

As I mentioned earlier, there are individuals whose attachments areproblematic, being either, too intense and overly dependent, or in theother direction, practically non-existent. Does meditation ever encour-age an exaggerated introverted stance to the external world, at timesbordering on pathological dissociation and fostering social isolation, i.e.the avoidance, or even rejection, of the relational domain?

Epstein (1990) thought that meditation could lead to �narcissis-tic emptiness� as ego-strivings aimed at the external world are negated.Castillo (1990), in a similar vein, could see excessive meditation prac-tice as leading to pathological de-realization and de-personalization asboth the external world and the self are eschewed. These commentsshall be returned to later.

So what is it about Eastern techniques, like meditation, that maylead to these concerns? Are there any parallels with Western techniquessuch as hypnosis in general and auto-hypnosis in particular? For exam-ple, Wang (1998) described similarities between �internal Qi-gong� andself-hypnosis. Both can be used to raise finger temperature, an indicatorof relaxation (Song, 1998). It can also be argued that adaptive dissocia-tive processes may be operative, to varying degrees, in meditation, hyp-nosis and Qi-gong. All require a capacity for relaxed absorbed attentionin the practitioner which is directed inwards and away from externalstimuli.

Those forms of meditation which employ a relaxed posture, clo-sed eyes and the rhythmical and monotonous repetition of a mantra,encourage a shift away from one�s habitual construing of external real-ity towards a trance-like state in which suggestibility may be enhanced(see DelMonte, 1981; 1984b). Thus mantra meditation, like hypnoticinduction, can weaken one�s ability to marshal one�s cognitive defenses,thereby encouraging partial dissociation between external reality andone�s inner world dominated by memories, fantasies, wishes, desires,and the like. It has also been argued that turning attention away from theexternal world facilitates an exploration of the internal realm, includingthe unconscious and archetypal imagery in the Jungian sense (see Del-Monte 1995a, 1995b). Such an exploration would usually be seen as�adaptive� regression. Adaptive regression operates in the �service ofthe ego� (Shafii, 1973b). It purportedly leads to a fuller familiarity withone�s internal world.



18. PATHOLOGICAL REGRESSION

Adaptive regression can be contrasted with �pathological� regression.The practice of meditation is typically associated with adaptive regres-sion, but it can also lead to pathological regression, i.e. back to primi-tive psychic functioning with those who are emotionally vulnerable andprobably in need of psychotherapy prior to taking up meditation. Thepractice of meditation can, especially with novices, increase suggestibil-ity (DelMonte, 1981). The monotonous repetition of a mantra, the re-laxed posture and the reduced sensory input all tend to increase regres-sive mentation and hence facilitate a relaxation of one�s cognitive, e.g.intellectual, defenses.

This regression can become pathological with some individualswhen it no longer serves healthy ego functions nor Eros (love, the life-force or Qi), but instead becomes fixated on the id, or worse still, onThanatos (the death-drive, i.e. the wish to return to an undemandingpre-incarnate state). It is thus not surprising that several decades agoAlexander (1931) described meditation as a �sort of artificial schizo-phrenia with complete withdrawal of libidinal interest from the outsideworld� (Alexander, p.30). He is referring to the meditators� attemptednon-attachment to desires and drives, and to their avoidance of ego-gratification. Here people can be split off emotionally from others, frommeaningful relationships and escape from troublesome aspects of sociallife into isolated self-absorption. This fostered (maladaptive) dissocia-tion between the self and one�s surroundings can, for those at risk, leadto de-realization, as one becomes estranged from once-familiar aspectsof the external world. It can also lead to defensive de-personalization asthe (often excessive) meditator may dis-identify from his or her periph-eral social constructs (and even to some degree from one�s personalconstructs) and thus increasingly withdraw into a minimalist core disso-ciated from the external trappings of selfhood and devoid of the neces-sary motivation to deal with outside demands. The twin effects of suchavoiditive de-realization and de-personalization can amount to a prema-ture dis-engagement from life in which relationships � both of the�heart� and of work � are neglected in favor of an obsession with thecomplexity of one�s internal space. Here meditation, in some cases, maylead more to self-absorption than to self-awareness. Such self-absorption has little to do with either creative de-personalization or withadaptive �transcendence.� As it lacks compassion for, and social en-gagement with, others the relational aspect of growth is neglected.


19. THE VULNERABLE

Not everybody is suitable, i.e. ready for meditation. In the West, thosewho take up meditation tend to be more anxious, neurotic and to reportmore problems than the population at large (DelMonte, 1990). Thosewith dissociated-identity disorders, as well as psychotic, narcissistic,very shy, schizoid, paranoid and socially phobic individuals, i.e. thosewho are already having difficulties in the social domain, and whoseability to �read� other people�s emotions and to empathize is impaired,may inadvertently come to use meditation as a schizoid defense to es-cape even further from others and end up feeling even less connectedand thus more isolated.

Furthermore, immature or traumatized people with very poorlyintegrated personalities may use meditation to �escape� into a split offsub-personality which is less orientated to the outside world. In otherwords, when meditation practice induces solitary escapist dissociation,poorly adapted �alter-egos� may emerge in those whose personalitiesonly hold together rather loosely.

It thus is argued that the deliberate fostering of non-attachmentto the external world, i.e. to mundane reality, may lead to a pathologicaldetachment (or indifference) in those who are already emotionally andsocially frail. Likewise, deliberate dis-identification from the contentsof one�s consciousness can also be used as a mal-adaptive defense bythose whose self-identity has remained under-developed and never blos-somed. In other words, when special techniques are used to foster non-attachment and dis-identification this can, for some, have varying de-grees of pathological dissociation as its outcome. This is not to argueagainst the obvious benefits of adaptive non-attachment, dis-identification and mindfulness as practised by the majority of medita-tors However, it does suggest that with more vulnerable individuals, i.e.those with poor ego-strength, psychotherapy may be indicated to helpbuild up their ego-strengths before they embark upon prolonged medita-tion practice, as the latter is about learning to side-step identificationwith one�s over-reactionary and egotistic mind. It should be easier tomeditate successfully with a reasonably well-integrated ego. Paradoxi-cally, one needs considerable ego-strength in order to successfully sus-pend reactionary ego-functioning by means of meditation.


20. CONCLUSION

In general, practices like meditation, Hatha Yoga, Qi-gong, Gestalttherapy and some forms of insight�orientated psychotherapy, by en-couraging quiet adaptive introspection, circumspection and mindful-ness, can, with many people, serve psychological growth (Eros) by en-couraging the development of a more reflective self through an explora-tion of the conditioned and furtive aspects of consciousness, and of theclutching nature of our attachments and of our dualistic obsessionalthinking. The resultant self-awareness should help clarify our desiresand choices.

However, all techniques can be used inappropriately by the vul-nerable. Thus meditation can encourage dis-engagement and de-motivation with respect to the external world and lead to an escape intoan inner-self, to the detriment of social engagement, emotional attach-ments and cathecses. Here neither love nor work satisfaction can beproperly experienced, as the individual in the premature grasp of Thana-tos forgoes compassion and the interactional aspect of living. Life doesinvolve taking risks, both with attachments and with the building up ofa sense of self-identity � even if death shall finally transform all physi-cal and mental attachments into naught (or into the spiritual domain?).The fear that nothing of the body and of the mind (like castles in thesand) can survive in their present forms prompts many of us to try totranscend these passing aspects of experience in a quest for somethingdurable beyond the dance of earthly impressions. However, the defen-sive pursuit of escapist �transcendence� can itself become a form ofselfish ego-striving. Such escapist �transcendence� is really a culti-vated, but maladaptive, form of dissociation.

The dilemma facing all of us as self-conscious and reflective be-ings is, how to build up and forge an internal sense of self, how person-ally and socially to sustain this fragile sense of self and attain a continu-ity of deeper identity, while living in the shadow of impermanence anddis-continuity. The ancient practices of meditation, Yoga and the like,as well as the contemporary practices of Gestalt therapy, constructivistand psychodynamic psychotherapies, offer us some choice out of manypossible approaches in dealing with this challenge; but no approach iswithout its own limits and risks. Balance is required in dealing with thisdilemma.

Our quest for knowledge and fulfillment has two principal ori-entations � namely those typified by introversion and those by extraver-


sion. Both are valuable and neither should be neglected. It is a questionof equilibrium. Introversion naturally implies introspection and elabora-tion of our subjectivity and self-awareness, whereas extraversion in-volves circumspection and adaptation to cultural reality, thereby en-hancing social awareness. Such extraverted social adaptation more typi-cally occurs during the first half of life. On the other hand, with intro-spection one is connected inwardly with our essence, i.e. the mystery ofthe self (- a microcosm of the universe?). Such introspection tends tobecome more important to us as we age, but can be precipitated at anystage of life if in crisis.

Circumspection is the sine qua non of enhancing our sense ofrelatedness to external form, i.e. to social convention and to �languag-ing�. Inwardness (i.e. subjectivity) and outwardness (i.e. objectivity)can be complementary. (Also see Nino, 1997, on this topic). Put psy-chodynamically, self-psychology should be balanced by object rela-tions. It may be tempting to escape from harsh external reality by takingrefuge inwardly into illusions and even delusions. Likewise, one canremain in exile from one�s true core-self by being overly adapted to andconcerned with external reality, and by developing a false self or fa-cade. Bridging the chasm between our inner and outer worlds allows fora two-way flow that enriches both in the process, and brings them moreinto harmonious alignment. This is the nature of our connection with thesocial and physical worlds of which we form a part.

A final point is that the Western obsessive focus on individual-ism, with the forging of a strong individual identity, can create a neuro-sis around the loss of this over-valued persona or mask. When we iden-tify with this mask we are identified with a limited and false self. Thetraditional Eastern emphasis on developing a social sense of collectiveidentity, i.e. an awareness of social inter-penetration, which does notoverly focus on individualism, may facilitate attempts to dis-identifyfrom over-invested egoism. The aim of meditation, Yoga, (and otherEastern techniques) and some forms of psychotherapy is not to becomeatomised emotional islands, but rather to be more in touch with the per-sonal, social and spiritual aspects of living. Some individuals also usemindfulness meditation to foster a personal relationship with the spiri-tual domain, and as a preparation for an after-life. However, this questis enhanced by wholeheartedly including the relational aspect of ourspirituality in our daily living by practising compassion, loving kind-ness, inter-being and the like. We can thereby evolve our capacity to


perceive, and to relate to, the deeper essences in both ourselves and inothers.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Orna Almogi Universität Hamburg, Asien-Afrika-Institut, Edmund-Siemens-Allee 1,D-20146 Hamburg, [email protected]

John Baker Moorpark College, Life SciencesDepartment, 7075 Campus Road,Moorpark, CA 93021, [email protected]; [email protected]

Karl Baier Universität Wien, Institut für ChristlichePhilosophie, Freyung 6a/2/4,A-1010 Vienna, [email protected]

Michael M. DelMonte St. Edmundsbury Hospital, Lucan, CountyDublin, [email protected]

Dagmar Eigner Medizinische Universität Wien, Institut fürGeschichte der Medizin, Währingerstrasse25, A-1090 Vienna, [email protected]

Vincent Eltschinger Österreichische Akademie derWissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- undGeistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, [email protected]

Eli Franco Universität Leipzig, Institut für Indologieund Zentralasienwissenschaften, Schiller-strasse 6, D-04109 Leipzig, [email protected]

Shulamith Kreitler Tel Aviv University, Department ofPsychology, Tel Aviv 69978, [email protected]

Anne MacDonald Universität Wien, Institut für Südasien-,Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Uni-Campus AAKh, Hof 2.1, Spitalgasse 2-4,

CONTRIBUTORS482

A-1090 Vienna, [email protected]

Lawrence McCrea Cornell University, Department of AsianStudies, 370 Rockefeller Hall, Ithaca NY14853, [email protected]

Philipp Maas Universität Wien, Institut für Südasien-,Tibet- und Buddhismuskunde, Uni-Campus AAKh, Hof 2.1, Spitalgasse 2-4,A-1090 Vienna, [email protected]

Marion Rastelli Österreichische Akademie derWissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- undGeistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, [email protected]

Diana Riboli Fotomara 93-9311745 Neos KosmosAthens, [email protected]

John Taber University of New Mexico, PhilosophyDepartment, MSC 03 2140, Albuquerque,NM 87131-0001, [email protected]

Marcus Schmücker Österreichische Akademie derWissenschaften, Institut für Kultur- undGeistesgeschichte Asiens, Prinz-Eugen-Strasse 8-10, A-1040 Vienna, [email protected]

Renaud vanQuekelberghe

Universität Koblenz-Landau. Mailingaddress: Dürkheimerstr. 140a,D-67227 Frankenthal, [email protected]

Dorji Wangchuk Universität Hamburg, Asien-Afrika-Institut, Edmund-Siemens-Allee 1,D-20146 Hamburg, [email protected]

483ONTRIBUTORSC