electoral observation in venezuela 1998 - oaselizabeth m. spehar electoral observation in venezuela,...

Electoral Observations in the Americas Series, No. 19

Electoral Observation in

Venezuela 1998

Secretary General César Gaviria Assistant Secretary General Christopher R. Thomas Executive Coordinator, Unit for the Promotion of Democracy Elizabeth M. Spehar Electoral Observation in Venezuela, 1998 / Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.

p. : ill. ; cm. - (Electoral Observations in the Americas Series, no. 19) ISBN 0-8270-4122-5 1. Elections--Venezuela. 2. Election monitoring--Venezuela. I. Organization of American States. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy. II. Series JL3892 .O27 1999 (E) This publication is part of a series of UPD publications of the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. The ideas, thoughts, and opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the OAS or its member states. The opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors.

OEA/Ser.D/XX SG/UPD/II.19 July 29, 1999

Original: Spanish

Electoral Observation in

Venezuela 1998

General Secretariat Organization of American States

Washington, D.C. 20006 1999

This report was produced under the technical supervision of Edgardo C. Reis, Chief of the Mission, Special Advisor of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, and with the assistance of Steve Griner, Deputy Chief of the Mission and, Senior Specialist of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD). Design and composition of this publication was done by the Information and Dialogue Section of the UPD, headed by Caroline Murfitt-Eller. Betty Robinson helped with the editorial review of this report and Dora Donayre and Esther Rodriguez with its production. Copyright 1999 by OAS. All rights reserved. This publication may be reproduced provided credit is given to the source.

INDEX Foreword......................................................................................................................................... ix Introduction .................................................................................................................................... xi CHAPTER I General Information........................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER II The Electoral Observer Mission....................................................................................................5 1. Establishment of the Mission...................................................................................................7 2. Objectives and Activities........................................................................................................8 3. Organization and Logistics......................................................................................................9 CHAPTER III The Electoral System....................................................................................................................11 1. Political Divisions and Electoral Distribution..........................................................................13 2. The Franchise: Characteristics and Procedures.....................................................................14 3. Electoral Authorities.............................................................................................................18 4. The Automation Process ......................................................................................................21 5. Political Parties.....................................................................................................................24 6. The News Media .................................................................................................................25 7. The Plan República..............................................................................................................25 CHAPTER IV Regional Election of November 8, 1998 ......................................................................................27 1. The Pre-Election Period....................................................................................................29 1.1 Political Parties and Candidates...................................................................................29 1.2 Election Authorities .....................................................................................................30 1.3 Voting Automation......................................................................................................31 1.4 Civic Elections Instruction............................................................................................31 1.5 Election Campaign ......................................................................................................31 1.6 Election Complaints.....................................................................................................31 2. Election Day ......................................................................................................................32 2.1 Regional Reports.........................................................................................................32 3. Vote Count and Tabulation...............................................................................................36 3.1 Counting at the Polling Stations....................................................................................36 3.2 Counting and Tabulation at the Regional Election Boards..............................................37 3.3 Counting at the National Electoral Council ...................................................................38 3.4 Assessment of the Election Information System............................................................38

3.5 Description of the Process...........................................................................................39

3.6 Security Measures.......................................................................................................40 3.7 Evaluation...................................................................................................................41

4. Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................41 4.1 Technical Considerations.............................................................................................43 CHAPTER V Presidential Election of December 6, 1998..................................................................................45 1. The Pre-Election Period....................................................................................................47 1.1 Elections Authorities....................................................................................................47 1.2 The Plan República.....................................................................................................48 1.3 Voting Automation......................................................................................................48 1.4 Political Parties and Candidates...................................................................................48 1.5 Election Complaints.....................................................................................................49 2. The Election.......................................................................................................................50 2.1 Regional Reports.........................................................................................................50 3. Counting and Tabulating the Results ...............................................................................54 3.1 Projecting Trends – the Quick Count...........................................................................55 3.1.1 The Sampling Process.....................................................................................56 3.1.2 Estimates ........................................................................................................58 3.1.3 Results............................................................................................................59 3.2 Evaluation of the Election Information System..............................................................59

3.2.1 Description of the Process...............................................................................60 3.2.2 Security Measures...........................................................................................60 3.2.3 Evaluation.......................................................................................................61

3.3 Assumption of Office by the New President.................................................................61 4. Conclusions and Recommendations .................................................................................62 4.1 Recommendation........................................................................................................64 4.2 Consideration with Respect to the Information System.................................................66 CHAPTER VI Annexes .........................................................................................................................................67 1. Documents 2. Press communiqué 3. Letter from the Secretary of the National Electoral Council 4. Official Results 5. List of Observers

Glossary of Political Parties MVR MOVIMIENTO V REPÚBLICA MAS MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO PPT PATRIA PARA TODOS AD ACCION DEMOCRATICA COPEI COMITÉ DE ORGANIZACIÓN POLÍTICO ELECTORAL INDEPENDIENTE APERTURA APERTURA A LA PARTICIPACIÓN NACIONAL OPINA OPINIÓN NACIONAL CAUSA R CAUSA RADICAL IRENE INTEGRACIÓN, REPRESENTACIÓN, NUEVA ESPERANZA FD FACTOR DEMOCRÁTICO PRVZL PROYECTO VENEZOLANO ORA ORGANIZACIÓN RENOVADORA AUTÉNTICA URD UNIÓN REPUBLICANA DEMOCRÁTICA MIN MOVIMIENTO ELECTORAL DEL PUEBLO PCV PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA GE GENTE EMERGENTE ICC INDEPENDIENTES CON EL CAMBIO PLV PARTIDO LABORAL VENEZOLANO VU VENEZUELA UNIDA IPCN INDEPENDIENTES POR LA COMUNIDAD NACIONAL FIN FRENTE INDEPENDIENTE NACIONAL EL ELECTORES LIBRES SI MOVIMIENTO SOLIDARIDAD INDEPENDIENTE NR NUEVO RUMBO LL LLA-VE LA LLAVE DE VENEZUELA PARTICIPA PARTICIPACIÓN COMUNITARIA PQAC POR QUERER A LA CIUDAD RENECE RESCATE NACIONAL ELECTORAL ONDA ORGANIZACIÓN NACIONALISTA DEMOCRÁTICA

Foreword

Democratic ideals and principles have always been present in the inter-American system. The Charter of Bogotá, establishing the Organization of American States (OAS), formally proclaimed in 1948 that "the solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy." Forty years later, the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias emphatically reaffirmed this principle, including among the essential purposes of the Organization the promotion and strengthening of representative democracy. The signature of the Protocol gave rise to an unprecedented renewal of the commitment of the member states to defending and building democracy.

Within this context, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) is one of the instruments

the OAS can draw upon to support member states in their efforts to strengthen and consolidate democratic institutions. Established by João Clemente Baena Soares, who was then Secretary General, as agreed at the 1990 General Assembly session, the UPD offers a broad program of support to member states which, in full exercise of their sovereignty, request advisory services or assistance in their efforts to preserve or strengthen their political institutions and democratic processes.

With regard specifically to elections, the UPD provides assistance and technical advisory

services to national electoral agencies and organizes and dispatches electoral observation missions to member states that so request by applying to the Secretary General of the Organization. OAS activities in this field are based on the conviction that the electoral process is always an essential piece of the transition to or building of democracy.

The electoral observation missions of the Organization are intended to: (a) observe and report

to the Secretary General on the electoral process, using as a reference point the constitution and electoral law of the host country; (b) express the international community's support for the electoral process; (c) work with government, electoral, and party officials and with the population in general to ensure the integrity, impartiality, and reliability of the electoral process; (d) foster an atmosphere of public confidence and encourage citizen participation; (e) discourage attempts to manipulate elections; (f) serve as an informal channel for reaching a consensus if disputes arise among the various participants in the electoral process; and (g) make recommendations for improving the electoral system.

In order to meet these objectives, the OAS electoral observation missions deploy observers

throughout a country to monitor the different stages of the electoral process and compile their comments in a final report.

In general, the work of the OAS electoral observation missions focuses on those aspects and

mechanisms of the political and electoral process where differences or disputes among participants are more likely to arise or that could jeopardize the integrity and transparency of the results. The missions therefore closely follow both organizational and political aspects of the electoral process. On the organizational side, the missions pay special attention to the enforcement of election law, the actions of the electoral tribunal, logistical arrangements, civic education campaigns, and the observance of rules

x Foreword

governing the registry of candidates and voters. On the political side, the missions look at promotional campaigns, the behavior of the mass media, activities linked to elections in nongovernmental organizations, and government actions that might have an impact on the course of the electoral process.

The observations and analyses by the electoral observation team, combined with the

Organization's experience with elections, enable the mission to identify the weaknesses of a system with considerable accuracy and formulate possible solutions. As a result, mission reports generally include a number of recommendations for strengthening the electoral process.

This volume is part of a series designed to provide relevant information on some of the UPD's electoral observation missions, both to the general public and to readers with special interests. We trust that the study and analysis of these experiences will help to increase knowledge of circumstances in the countries in the region and promote democratic values and practices as the 21st century approaches.

Elizabeth Spehar Executive Coordinator

Unit for the Promotion of Democracy

Introduction On October 7, 1998, the Government of the Republic of Venezuela invited the Secretary General of the OAS to send an Observer Mission to witness and provide assistance for two rounds of voting to be held in that country: the regional elections, which were scheduled for November 8 of that year and in which Venezuelan citizens were to elect state governors and representatives to the National Congress and the Legislative Assemblies, and the presidential election, scheduled for December 6. The Secretary General, César Gaviria, accepted this request and decided on October 21, 1998, to establish an Electoral Observer Mission, subject to the availability of sufficient external funding to finance it. He appointed Edgardo C. Reis, a principal specialist in the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, as Chief of Mission. The observers worked in Venezuela until February 2, 1999, when the new President assumed office. Its purpose was to cooperate with Venezuelan society and its institutions to ensure high levels of integrity, transparency and credibility in the electoral process, keeping the Secretary General continuously informed This report is divided into two main sections. The first provides information on the establishment of the Mission and the political and electoral framework; the second reports on the Mission’s observer activities before, during, and after the elections. The report ends with the Mission’s conclusions and recommendations. We wish to express our sincere gratitude for the fine work and committed effort of the Venezuelan election authorities and the Unified Command of the National Armed Forces in organizing and conducting the elections of November and December 1998. We would also like to highlight the great sense of civic duty demonstrated by the citizenry in general.

Washington, March 1999

CHAPTER I General Information

Venezuela has a presidential system of government, based on the principle of separation of the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, as stipulated in its National Constitution. The President of the Republic, the members of the National Congress, and those of the regional Legislative Assemblies are elected for five-year terms under a system of universal suffrage based on a direct and secret ballot. All citizens over 18 years of age may vote. Elections are organized by the National Elections Council (CNE). The President of the Republic serves a single term and may not be re-elected until ten years thereafter. Ex-Presidents are members of the Senate. Executive power is exercised by the President and the ministers he appoints. Since 1989, as a result of decentralization, state governors have been elected by universal suffrage; formerly, they were appointed by the President. Legislative power is exercised by the National Congress, which has two chambers: the Senate, with 47 members, and the Chamber of Deputies, with 199 members. Judicial power is exercised by the Supreme Court of Justice, composed of 15 magistrates with jurisdiction over three specific areas (political-administrative, criminal, and civil matters), and 768 tribunals. The legal system is based on Roman law and the Napoleonic Code. The Constitution defines the legal aspects of the system, and laws and decrees are voted by the Congress.

CHAPTER II

The Electoral Observer Mission

1. Establishment of the Mission The Electoral Observer Mission for the 1998 Venezuelan regional and presidential elections (MOE-VEN) was led by Edgardo C. Reis, a principal specialist in the UPD, as Chief of Mission. It arrived in the country at the end of October. After making initial contact with the electoral, civil, and military authorities, it then set about exploring the best ways to meet its operational and functional needs. At present, all OAS Electoral Observer Missions must be funded by voluntary contributions from member countries or Permanent Observers of the OAS, or by other institutions. Consequently, MOE-VEN had to seek voluntary financial support to pay for its observer activities in Venezuela, and received it from Canada and the United States. This proved sufficient to cover the budget as originally planned, but there were delays both in extending the original invitation to the OAS and in applying for financial support, and the agreed funds were slow in being released. This meant that the Mission arrived in the country with little time to spare before the regional elections scheduled for November 8. Still, it was able to carry out all its basic observer duties in monitoring the election process. It also succeeded in maintaining a high public profile during the two electoral rounds, regional and presidential. MOE/VEN began with an exploratory mission to determine where observation was needed and how it should be performed, at the national and regional levels. Initial contacts were made between the Chief of Mission and the election authorities; representatives of political parties; the Chiefs of the Armed Forces; representatives of diplomatic missions, international organizations, and the news media; and other leaders of civil society. An observation timetable was drawn up to ensure that all the key events would be covered: the campaigns, media coverage, the performance of the Permanent Electoral Register, the automation process (which was one of the major challenges and innovations of the 1998 elections in Venezuela), the elections themselves, and the post-election activities leading up to the inauguration of the new authorities and the new President on February 2, 1999. The Mission initially consisted of 13 observers, men and women from six OAS member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Guatemala, Peru, and the United States), who were deployed throughout the country to witness the preparations for the regional elections of November 8, the conduct of the vote, the vote count, and the announcement of the results. For the presidential election, a considerably larger group of observers and data gathers was fielded, consisting of 70 men and women from 19 countries that were either OAS members (Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States,

8 The Electoral Observer Mission

and Uruguay) or permanent observers (Spain). This group again took up positions in the various regions of Venezuela to observe the preparatory stage and the conduct of the voting for President on December 6, the vote count (automatically or by hand), and the announcement of the results. 2. Objectives and Activities The ultimate purpose of MOE/VEN was to assess the integrity, transparency and reliability of the election process by monitoring the respect for and enforcement of the country’s laws and regulations, taking as its minimum frame of reference the basic instruments represented by the Constitution of Venezuela, the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation, the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations, and their regulations; the Charter of the OAS; the Agreement between the National Elections Council of Venezuela and the General Secretariat of the OAS on Electoral Observation Procedures, signed on November 2, 1998; and the Agreement between the Secretariat and the Government of Venezuela on Privileges and Immunities of Election Observers, signed on November 4. Specifically, MOE/VEN had the following objectives, among others: 1. To demonstrate international support for the democratic elections to be carried out in

Venezuela; 2. To help create an atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the elections could take

place, and thus to encourage citizen participation in the process;

3. To reduce any danger of manipulation by maintaining an active and disciplined international presence;

4. To certify the validity of the official results; 5. To make recommendations for strengthening the electoral system and process in

Venezuela; and

6. To produce historical documentation and information that might be useful in future elections, both in Venezuela and in other countries, with a particular focus on the innovation represented by the automation of voting procedures.

In pursuit of these objectives, the Mission adopted an intensive agenda of activities. In the run-up to the elections, these included maintaining constant contact with the election authorities (the National Elections Council and the regional election boards), with party representatives and candidates, with officials of the Armed Forces in charge of the Plan República (the name given to the military-led operation for the distribution and safekeeping of election materials), with the leaders of civil associations and organizations, and with the public in general, in order to monitor the process as it evolved. The observers also watched the campaign activities of the various candidates during this period. The Mission was available to receive complaints or formal denunciations from all parties involved in the elections, and undertook to pass these on to the election authorities and monitor their follow-up.

The Electoral Observer Mission 9

Another pre-election task was to conduct an audit of the Electoral Information System, and to keep a close eye on the functioning of the automation process in general and the voting machines in particular. On election day, the observers monitored the casting of ballots at polling stations and witnessed the vote count (manual or automatic), and the subsequent tabulation of votes by the agencies in charge. For the presidential elections, a similar program was performed. In addition, the Mission made a projection of voting trends based on a “quick count” taken on election day at a limited number of polls that had been pre-selected by statistical sampling. 3. Organization and Logistics The Mission established its headquarters in Caracas, the capital of Venezuela and the seat of the highest governmental and electoral authorities. At the same time, it set up permanent offices in seven regions, for the regional elections and in ten regions for the presidential elections. These regional offices extended the reach of the Mission to the country’s various states and municipalities. The areas on which the observation was to focus were chosen primarily in terms of their population density, their political representation according to the electoral map, and their socioeconomic stratification, with a view to maximizing the visibility for the Mission and ensuring the broadest possible geographic coverage. The same criteria were used in determining the number of observers to be assigned to each regional office. For the regional elections, the Mission covered activities in the Federal District and the states of Miranda and Vargas from its headquarters in Caracas. The remainder of the country was distributed among the regional offices as follows:

• Barinas office: covered the states of Barinas, Cojedes, and Portuguesa.

• Ciudad Bolívar office: states of Amazonas and Bolívar.

• Cumaná office: states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre.

• Maracaibo office: states of Falcón and Zulia.

• Mérida office: states of Mérida, Táchira and Trujillo.

• Puerto La Cruz office: states of Anzoátegui and Monagas.

• Valencia office: states of Aragua, Carabobo, and Guarico. From the Caracas headquarters, the coordinator serving as assistant to the Chief of Mission was responsible for the logistics of the observers’ deployment to the various regions, the coordination of

10 The Electoral Observer Mission

activities between headquarters and the regional offices, and the compilation of information coming in from those offices. At each regional office, a regional coordinator was responsible both for coordinating activities within the region and for communicating with the Chief of Mission and the coordinator at headquarters. To facilitate the compilation of the information they gathered, the observers were given a number of reporting forms for various aspects of their duties: receiving complaints, monitoring campaigns, verifying that polling stations were established and open, observing voting and vote-counting activities at those polls, and obtaining results from the “quick count.”

During the presidential elections, a larger number of observers were mobilized throughout the country, this time in ten major areas. Once again, the Caracas headquarters covered the Federal District and the states of Miranda and Vargas; the regional offices distributed the rest of the country among them as follows:

• Barinas: states of Barinas, Cojedes, and Portuguesa.

• Barquisimeto: states of Lara and Yaracuy.

• Ciudad Bolívar: states of Amazonas and Bolívar.

• Cumaná : states of Nueva Esparta and Sucre.

• Maracaibo: states of Falcón and Zulia.

• Mérida: states of Mérida, Táchira, and Trujillo.

• Puerto La Cruz: states of Anzoátegui and Monagas.

• San Fernando: state of Apure.

• Valencia: states of Aragua, Carabobo, and Guarico.

CHAPTER III The Electoral System

1. Political Divisions and Electoral Distribution The Republic of Venezuela is organized along federal lines. According to Article 2 of its Constitution, it is divided into 23 equal and autonomous states, a Federal District, and other territories and federal dependencies, which in turn are further subdivided into 333 municipalities. According to the Permanent Electoral Register, 10,991,482 people were eligible to vote in the 1998 elections, distributed among 20,201 polling stations located in 8,315 voting centers throughout the country.

TOTALS PER STATE

STATE

CENTERS

POLLS

TOTAL ELECTORS PER STATE

PERCENTAGE ELECTORS/TOTAL

FEDERAL DIST 568 2,002 1,178,648 10.72 % ANZOATEGUI 342 957 539,982 4.91% APURE 173 322 161,870 1.47% ARAGUA 316 1,190 688,483 6.26% BARINAS 300 536 263,319 2.40% BOLIVAR 429 925 500,536 4.55% CARABOBO 339 1,432 841,397 7.66% COJEDES 133 244 128,287 1.17% FALCON 450 789 397,192 3.61% GUARICA 256 559 295,128 2.69% LARA 544 1,338 707,958 6.44% MERIDA 368 679 347,690 3.16% MIRANDA 636 1,969 1,167,980 10.63% MONAGAS 267 591 320,433 2.92% NVA ESPARTA 123 320 189,343 1.72% PORTUGUESA 490 735 337,292 3.07% SUCRE 455 801 390,619 3.55% TACHIRA 458 932 465,193 4.23% TRUJILLO 419 686 313,609 2.85%

14 The Electoral System

YARACUY 273 464 234,991 2.14% ZULIA 704 2,188 1,242,823 11.31% AMAZONAS 45 73 39,175 0.36% DELTA AMACURO 118 157 59,920 0.55% VARGAS 109 312 179,614 1.63% TOTAL 8,315 20,201 10,991,482 100.00% For the presidential election only, the National Elections Council arranged for citizens living outside the country to be able to register and vote at the country’s diplomatic and consular offices abroad. By the closing date for registration (August 9, 1998), 10,637 voters had registered at 118 Venezuelan offices in foreign countries. 2. The Franchise: Characteristics and Procedures As stipulated in the Constitution, Venezuela has a form of government that is democratic, representative, responsible, and alternating. Sovereignty resides with the people, who exercise it through the organs of public power by means of the franchise. Popular sovereignty is thus expressed through the vote, which is enshrined in the Constitution, first of all in Article 110: “Voting is a right and a public duty. Its exercise is compulsory, within the limits and conditions established by law.” Universal, direct, secret, and compulsory franchise is thus the essential instrument through which the country’s democratic system functions and through which citizens participate in shaping the government. Article 111 of the Constitution provides that “all Venezuelans are electors who have attained 18 years of age and are not subject to civil prohibition or political incapacity.” Foreigners may be permitted to vote in municipal elections under certain conditions, among other things, that they have been residents of the country for more than ten years. Members of the armed forces are not entitled to vote while on active duty. Secondly, Article 112 of the Constitution awards the right to run for office to all electors 21 years of age or older, provided that they can read and write and that they meet the conditions defined by law for a given post. Among the other constitutional guarantees relating to the franchise are the freedom and secrecy of the ballot, and the right of minorities to proportional representation. Within the framework of these constitutional principles and guarantees, the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation was passed.1 The law was subsequently amended to, among other things, separate the calendar of elections for the various public offices that were to be held in December 1998.2 With the entry into force of the new Organic Law, substantial changes were made in the

1 Published in the Official Gazette, Special Edition No. 5,200, of 30 December 1997. 2 These reforms were published in the Official Gazette, Special Edition No. 5.233, of 28 May 1998.

The Electoral System 15

electoral system, and a number of institutions, such as consultative referendums, were introduced. The new law abolished the Supreme Elections Council and replaced it with the National Elections Council, while leaving in place the subordinate boards, with only a few changes in the system that had prevailed until 1997. The new law also expanded the scope of election management to include the formation, functioning, and abolition of political parties; citizen participation in the process as witnesses or representatives of political parties (monitors), voter registration, and the public drawing of lots to select members of the subordinate election boards. Furthermore, it created Compulsory National Service, which makes service on the subordinate electoral councils mandatory for voters who have been selected by lot and are not exempted by any of the terms of the law. Voters’ participation is not limited to the ballot. It also includes the possibility of their exercising active oversight of the legal propriety of an election, in the capacity of political-party monitors or representatives. The most innovative feature of the new law is the provision calling for full automation of voting, counting, tabulation, and adjudication. Where such a system cannot be implemented for reasons of transportation, security, or service infrastructure, the law allows continued use of a manual system if the National Elections Council so rules. In either case, whether the voting and counting system is automated or manual, the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation makes the following guidelines mandatory:

• Voters must be given sufficient and timely information on which system is to be used, automated or manual.

• Each candidate, and the political organization he or she represents, must be clearly

identified, whatever the voting technology. • Ballot secrecy must be maintained, and voters must be protected from any kind of

coercion or interference; no one is to be asked to show how he or she voted. • Votes must be recorded and counted correctly, and the system must record and count

only votes that are legitimately cast. • Each vote must be recorded individually, so that it can subsequently be verified, while

retaining ballot secrecy. During the preparatory stage, the election agencies have a number of specific duties:

• Updating the Permanent Electoral Register; • Convoking the elections; • Activating the Compulsory Electoral Service to select members of the subordinate

election boards;


• Accepting or rejecting proposed candidacies.

Election Day is one of the most important phases of the electoral process. This phase begins with establishing the local polling station, and culminates with the signing of a report recording the results of the poll after all votes have been counted. The polling station is supposed to be set up by 5:30 a.m. on election day and to open at 6:00, at the place previously announced. It must be open continuously until 4:00 p.m. of the same day, although it must remain open if there are still people waiting to vote. After voting is concluded, the following steps are taken:

• Counting the votes: The poll workers must count all the votes cast and determine which ballots are invalid. This stage is to be automated and to culminate with the signing of the tally sheet.

• Tabulating the votes: On the basis of the tally sheets, the election boards or the

National Elections Council, depending on the type of election, will total the votes automatically.

• Adjudication: After signing the tabulation report, the pertinent electoral bodies award

the office to the winning candidates.

• Announcement: The electoral bodies must announce the winning candidates, on the basis of these adjudications. This is the final action of the election management procedure.

Article 171 of the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation calls for the National Elections Council to define the procedure for deciding whether or not a ballot is valid, the criterion being to respect the voter’s choice: only ballots in which this cannot be determined are to be rejected. During the pre-election period, this article provoked lively debate in political and legal circles. One side argued that such a procedure was absolutely necessary amid legal incompatibility with the automated vote count. The other side expressed concern, in various legal publications, about the constitutionality of delegating the rules on the validity of a vote to regulations; the argument ran that using a regulation –a mechanism of lesser standing than a law—for such a purpose was tantamount to restricting a constitutional right, whereas rights thus protected can only be restricted by formal legislation. It should be noted that blank ballots are treated like spoiled ballots in the counting process; there is no breakdown of the two subcategories of invalid ballots. This decision was taken in view of the technical limitations of the voting machines, which use an optical scanner that does not differentiate. For appeals of electoral matters at the administrative level, the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation provides for a single recourse, the so-called "recurso jerárquico”, which must be filed with the National Elections Council. This serves to simplify the burden on individuals to exhaust administrative remedies before turning to the courts. For legal challenges, a further substantive amendment was introduced by the new law, which established the recurso contencioso electoral (an appeal to the courts) as the sole mechanism. This is a short, summary, efficient procedure that can be taken for redress against any act, decision, or


omission by the National Elections Council considered illegal. From the strictly procedural standpoint, the new law spells out time limits on the various stages of the process, the means of substantiating an appeal, the powers of the electoral judge, and the contents of the decision. Article 144 of the new law provides that at least 30% of candidates for national, state, municipal, and parish office must be women. Some political groups active in promoting greater participation by women in public life feel that setting a minimum quota for female candidates may help to improve current situation of Venezuelan women in various spheres of society, in particular with respect to their integration and participation in politics. Soon after the passage of the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation, in the light of both the imminence of the 1998 and 1999 elections and the need to give effect to the new provisions, an amendment was published on May 28, 1998, which made the following changes in it:

• The elections for mayors, councilors, and members of parish boards would be held during the second half of 1999, and the terms of the incumbents would accordingly be extended until then.

• A transitory clause provided that elections for governors, senators, and deputies should

be held separately from the presidential vote, on the second Sunday of November 1998.

• In order to ensure the timely installation of the voting automation system for the 1998

and 1999 elections, the National Elections Council was authorized to negotiate directly with firms it considered suitable for developing the system.

• To ensure the timely formation of the subordinate electoral bodies for the elections of

1998 and 1999, the National Elections Council was empowered to amend the time limits, rules and procedures for the drawing of public lots established in the law. In the case of selecting full members, alternates or reserve members for the local polling stations, the CNE may delegate the drawing of lots to regional, municipal or parish bodies.


• A transitory rule (Article 289) was added, providing that for the elections of 1998 and 1999, except for challenges on grounds of ineligibility, no decision to admit or reject a candidacy could be appealed either administratively or judicially.

• For the 1998 and 1999 elections, the chairman and the two vice chairmen of the Council

were authorized to exercise, jointly and by majority decision, all the administrative and functional powers assigned to the Council by Article 283; this had the effect of reducing the membership to three.

3. Electoral Authorities Article 24 of the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation provides for the following bodies to administer elections: the National Electoral Council, the Election Boards, and the local poll workers. There are three different kinds of Election Boards:

• Regional Election Boards (JREs), which have jurisdiction over both national elections for senators and deputies to Congress and regional elections for governors and deputies to the state legislatures;

• Municipal Election Boards (JMEs), with jurisdiction over municipal elections for mayors

and councilors; • Parish Election Boards, with jurisdiction over elections for parish boards.

To protect the independence of these bodies, Article 113 of the Constitution provides that they must be formed in such a way that no one political party or group dominates them. Accordingly, the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation guarantees political autonomy for all election agencies. Under Article 51 of the law, no one with ties to any political party may be either a member or secretary of the National Electoral Council. Thus any citizen may request the removal of members of the National Electoral Council or the election boards who are found to have direct or indirect, ties to any political organization or candidate. The Constitution also requires that election officials work in complete independence. Article 49 of the Organic Law therefore provides that the National Elections Council have full autonomy from other public organs. Given the periodic nature of elections, there are also a number of temporary election bodies. The Election Boards (articles 59 and 61), for example, cease to function either as soon as they have fulfilled their legal responsibilities or whenever the National Electoral Council so decides. Similarly, poll workers serve only on a particular election day. The National Electoral Council (CNE) is the highest body in the electoral administration, and is permanent. Its headquarters are in the capital and its jurisdiction covers the entire country. Its


functions, set out in Article 49 of the Organic Law, consist of directing, organizing, and supervising the elections and referenda referred to in that law - national, regional, and municipal. Its sole specific responsibility is to tabulate the vote for President and proclaim the winner, except where functions pertaining to other candidacies that normally fall to subordinate bodies are ceded to it (see Regional Election Boards, below). The Council has seven members and seven alternates, who are elected by a two-thirds majority of the members of both chambers of Congress. It elects its own president and two vice presidents by lot. It also elects a secretary, who may be removed at will. Council members or secretaries must be Venezuelan citizens, eligible to vote, 30 years of age or more, of recognized moral character, and without ties to any political party or group of voters. Their service is limited by Article 50 of the Organic Law to one constitutional term, i.e., five years. Article 55 sets out the powers of the Council. Some of these are institutional (relating to its own internal organization and functioning) normative (issuance of the General Election Regulations and the Referendum Regulations), or disciplinary (deriving from its nature as the highest electoral authority). But most of the powers are concerned directly with elections - the coordination, implementation and supervision of the electoral process, which include the following:

• Superintending the activities of the Electoral Register Office and the National Office for Financing Political Parties and Election Campaigns (see “Political Parties,” below);

• Deciding on the length of election campaigns and the rules for campaign publicity;

• Automating voting procedures;

• Awarding seats for additional senators and deputies; • Totaling the vote for President and announcing the winner;

• Calling elections;

• Under certain circumstances, totaling the votes for tabulating, adjudicating and

proclaiming regional and municipal candidates and announcing the winners; • Seeking the nullification of any election when there is good clause for such an action, by

vote of at least five members of the Council. The Regional Election Boards (JREs) are temporary, local electoral bodies whose main function is to direct, organize, and supervise elections in the federal entity in which they are based. They also have jurisdiction over the election of senators and deputies to the national Congress. The JREs consist of five members and their alternates, appointed by the National Electoral Council by a public drawing of lots. A member must be a Venezuelan citizen, eligible to vote, of recognized moral character, and without ties to any political party or group of voters. Neither the


members nor the secretary of an electoral board may stand for election to public office during their service. The authority of the JREs is limited essentially to the immediate supervision of election procedures under their jurisdiction. JREs are thus responsible for:

• Accepting nominations of candidates for state governor, senators and deputies to the national Congress, and deputies to the legislatures, provided they meet the legal requirements;

• Issuing credentials to representatives and monitors of political parties and voters’ groups

before the JREs, and to regional monitors in accordance with the law;

• Totaling the votes for senator or deputy to the National Congress, for governor, and for deputies to the state legislature, on the basis of the tally sheets from every polling station under their jurisdiction;

• Announcing the winners within a specified time. If they have not finished their work by

the end of that time, their authority is automatically ceded to the National Council. The local polling stations are the primary unit of the election administration on voting day, since they are responsible for setting up the individual polls, supervising voting, counting votes and submitting their tally sheets. Each polling station has five members and a secretary, plus their alternates. They must be Venezuelan citizens, eligible to vote, and able to read and write. In previous elections, poll workers had been nominated by political organizations, which in turn were responsible for training their representatives and looking after their logistical and travel needs. The new law divorces poll workers from political affiliation, and provides that they are to be selected by lot from lists of teachers, students, and voters. Each polling station is to be installed at a place and time determined by the National Council before election day. The quorum for installation is a simple majority, i.e., three of the members, who verify each other's credentials. Their principal function at this stage is to review the election materials by opening and inspecting the contents of the box delivered to the polling station by members of the Plan República of the armed forces. The poll is then formally inaugurated and the materials are put back in the box, which is sealed by a strip of adhesive tape that passes over the top and around the body. The president, members, secretary, alternates and voting-machine technician (if the poll is automated) of the polling station, must meet on elction day at 5.30 a.m. at the site of the poll. If any of the full members are absent, they will be replaced by alternates from the same polling station, or a neighboring one, or, failing that, by substitute members, pursuant to Article 8 of Partial Regulation No. 15 on the Organization and Functioning of Election Polls. Voting begins at 6 a.m. If a polling station is not functioning by 8.00 a.m. for lack of a quorum, ad hoc members will be designated for it from among the monitors of the political parties that obtained the greatest number of votes, in descending order, in the immediately preceding election for deputies to the National Congress for that jurisdiction, until the Municipal Election Board provides suitable replacements as approved by the Council. If by 11 a.m. the Board has been unable to replace the political party witnesses appointed as ad hoc members with full members or alternates or with nearby poll officials, those monitors will


remain as substitute members and will become full members (Article 21 of Partial Regulation No. 15). The functions of the poll workers are temporary, lasting only from the time when the poll has been set up until the tally sheet is signed. Their responsibilities are as follows:

• To supervise the vote and ensure that the election rules are strictly observed;

• To prepare the reports called for by the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation and its regulations;

• To protect and guarantee the right to vote, and ensure respect for and maintenance of

public order in the voting precincts;

• To produce a public report on the vote count. 4. The Automation Process As was said above, the new Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation confers a specific mandate on the Council to automate elections everywhere in the country except where geographic conditions make access difficult, or in electoral districts that have fewer than 600 voters, or where the infrastructure is inadequate for the equipment to work properly. The automation initiative is intended to restore voters’ confidence in election proceedings, reduce the abstention rate, reduce inconsistencies in the tally sheets of the polling stations, and announce election results quickly. A Spanish firm, INDRA, a holding company owned 63 percent by the Government and 37 percent by five banks and other private shareholders, received the automation contract. This company has four divisions, one of which, SSI (computer systems and services), was particularly relevant to the Venezuelan job because of its specialty in information technologies. It was to build and operate voting machines that could record votes as they were cast and tally them automatically. The responsibility of the poll workers would thus be limited to signing the reports printed by the machine after the polls closed and transmitting these data to the tabulation center. With the budget available, the Council was able to buy 7,000 voting machines for the entire country, to serve 16,738 polls in 4,852 voting centers. With this number of machines, the automated system would be able to handle 91.17 percent of registered voters. The voting machine adopted for the 1998 elections (model ES&S-100) works in three stages. First, when it is turned on and before voting begins, it prints out a “zero vote” report, confirming that no votes have previously been entered or recorded. The vote itself follows: the machine reads the ballots, identifies the voter's selection, and tabulates the results by categories. Once the voter has marked his ballot, he deposits it in the voting machine’s input tray. The machine then confirms whether the vote is valid, reads it, and adds it to the tally. The machine can read both sides of the ballot at the same time (which means that the ballot can be inserted in any position),


with up to 300 options for the face and reverse sides. It reads the voter’s marks with a double optical scanner and adds them to the total for each selection. Finally, at the end of election day, as part of the closing of the polls, the voting machine prints out an acta or report of the count, and is then blocked from any further human manipulation: it will produce only as many copies of the same report as are necessary to notify the authorities of the results and distribute them to the party monitors. This closing stage also includes transmission of the data to the tabulation center. During the 1998 elections, each of the Regional Election Boards maintained a regional tabulation center, where the data collected from each automated voting center were processed and the reports from the non-automated polls were transcribed by hand. These centers were thus responsible both for compiling all the information and awarding the offices to the winners. One feature of the voting machine allows for an audit of votes: a large, tamper-proof bin in which the ballots are stored as they are processed. This ensures that, in case of a challenge, the ballots will be available, unaltered, and can be re-counted. Each voting machine is attended by a specially trained technician, who must ensure that the polling station has sufficient infrastructure (space, electricity, telephone) to run the machine. During the inspection of the voting center prior to election day, the technician takes delivery of the voting machine and printer from the National Council’s automation office, and installs and tests them. On election day, the technician must set up the machine and the printer, ensure that the ballot counter is empty, print out a set of tally sheets with all data set at zero, and deliver these to the president of the polling station. The purpose of these reports is to satisfy the poll workers and party monitors that the counters in the voting machines start from zero, and this fact must be recorded in the polling station’s official report. Since one voting machine can service up to three polling stations, if one or two have not been set up, the zero tally reports are issued for all of them and voting will begin at the one or two that have been. This situation must be noted in a special report, signed by the members of the polling station (whether officially formed or not), by the party monitors, and by the machine technician (pursuant to Article 27 of Partial Regulation No. 15). While the vote is proceeding, the technician will oversee the functioning of each machine and perform the following tasks:

• Ensure that the machine is functioning properly;

• At the request of the president of the polling station, provide assistance to voters who need help in entering their ballots into the voting machine;

• Report to the president of the polling station any technical problem that may impede

normal voting activity, resolve it if possible, or report it by telephone to the support center for examination and solution.

The table below presents data on the status of polling booth automation, country-wide and by


state.

TOTAL PER STATE

AUTOMATED

MANUAL

STATE

Centers

Polls

Machines

Centers

Polls

Voters

Centers

Polls

Voters

FED DIST.

568

2,002

784

513

1,947

1,159.726

55

55

18,922

ANZOATEGUI

342

957

353

239

854

510,047

103

103

29,935

APURE

173

322

105

80

229

135,497

93

93

26,373

ARAGUA

316

1,190

432

253

1,127

668,417

63

63

20,066

BARINAS

300

536

160

123

359

221,037

177

177

42,282

BOLIVAR

429

925

313

235

731

444,121

194

194

56,415

CARABOBO

339

1,432

522

290

1,383

826,058

49

49

15,339

COJEDES

133

244

84

72

183

111,643

61

61

16,644

FALCON

450

789

250

200

539

327,071

250

250

70,121

GUARICO

256

559

189

134

437

258,592

122

122

36,536

LARA

544

1,338

457

308

1,102

639,463

236

236

68,495

MERIDA

368

679

220

176

487

292,853

192

192

54,837

MIRANDA

636

1,969

736

493

1,826

1,120,302

143

143

47,678

MONAGAS

267

591

204

147

471

282,454

120

120

37,979

NuEVA ESPARTA 123

320

134

103

300

181,246

20

20

8,097

PORTUGUESA

490

735

199

167

412

250,195

323

323

87,097

SUCRE

455

801

256

203

549

324,079

252

252

66,540

TACHIRA

458

932

292

206

680

399,315

252

252

65,878

TRUJILLO

419

686

186

145

412

248,148

274

274

65,461

YARACUY

273

464

150

125

316

191,653

148

148

43,338

ZULIA

704

2,188

786

494

1,978

1,173,665

210

210

69,158

AMAZONAS

45

73

27

24

52

33,215

21

21

5,960

DELTA AMACURO

118

157

40

36

75

44,431

82

82

15,489

VARGAS

109

312

121

86

289

171,028

23

23

8,586

TOTAL

8,315

20,201

7,000

4,852

16,738

10,014,256

3,463

3,463

977,226


58% 83% 91% 42% 17% 9%

5. Political Parties The Venezuelan Constitution (Articles 113 and 114) guarantees voters the right to join political parties in order to participate democratically in guiding the nation’s affairs. The parties have the right to monitor all elections in which they are running candidates (see list of parties and their abbreviations at the beginning of this report). To ensure that parties are democratic and that they are equal before the law, their establishment and activity is regulated by the Law on Political Parties, Public Meetings, and Demonstrations (Official Gazette No. 27,725 of 30 April 1965). The Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation empowers the National Council to investigate the source of funds flowing into campaigns and to limit them if it so decides by a vote of at least five members (Article 5 (10)). Article 201 provides for the creation of the National Office for Financing Political Parties and Election Campaigns, under the direction and supervision of the CNE, as the body responsible for enforcing the controls established by this and other national laws on funding election campaigns, political organizations, and candidates. The legislation also provides that political organizations and candidates may not accept anonymous contributions. 6. The News Media During its stay in Venezuela, the Mission maintained close ties with representatives of the various news media covering the elections. It drafted and distributed a series of press releases, relating primarily to the efforts of the OAS to promote democracy in the hemisphere, its participation in similar election observer missions elsewhere, the nature and composition of the Mission in Venezuela, its major activities and functions, and its observations on the process as it was unfolding (see Annexes). The media did much to publicize the presence of the OAS observers, noting in particular the contribution that the Organization was making to the transparency of the process. Statements and comments by the Chief of Mission were given close coverage. At the Mission’s various regional offices as well, the local media noted and identified the observers deployed in the area, and published frequent updates of their schedule. The Mission monitored media coverage of the elections exhaustively, analyzing and filing stories and articles from both the national and local newspapers.

7. The Plan República The Venezuelan armed forces have historically played an important role in support of the country’s election agencies since the establishment of the Plan República, which was created in 1962 in preparation for the elections of 1963. To ensure the stability of democratic institutions and respect for the Constitution and laws, the Armed forces have helped with logistical aspects of every election in the history of Venezuelan democracy. These Plans have been implemented in an unbroken series: the


current Plan is the eighth, and is part of the framework represented by the National Electoral Council and the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation. From the outset of the Mission’s activities, constant contact was maintained with members of the armed forces involved, in the distribution of election materials and the maintenance of security during the election process. The Plan República calls for deploying of 70,023 members of the Unified Command of the National Armed Forces throughout the country. On this particular occasion, they had to ensure the security of the voting machines from the moment they passed through Customs at La Guaira until they arrived at the regional INDRA warehouses and were sent from there to the various voting centers. They were also responsible for the safekeeping and transfer of the diskettes and flash cards containing the data from each ballot processed by a voting machine, the serial number of the machine, and the identification of the polling center. Members of the Plan República were consulted for their views on the election climate and were asked about their activities in support of the election process; in turn, they were kept informed of the presence of the Mission observers as they moved about the country. In all the regions visited, Plan República officers declared that the elections were taking place in an atmosphere of tranquillity, and they were optimistic that the process would run its course without serious incident.

CHAPTER IV Regional Election of November 8, 1998

1. The Pre-Election Period The Mission focused its efforts from the outset (including the run-up to the elections) on the following aspects: 1. Maintaining constant contact with and observing the activities of the Electoral Council

and Regional Boards, to monitor the unfolding of the electoral process. 2. Interviewing and maintaining a dialogue with civilian and military authorities, and in

particular with members of the armed forces responsible for the Plan República, with respect to logistics, distribution of election materials, and voting security.

3. Interviewing and keeping contact with the candidates and representatives of the

competing political parties and monitoring the conduct of their campaigns. 4. Answering questions and maintaining open channels of communication with the news

media to familiarize the public with of the Mission’s work and activities. From the moment it arrived in Venezuela, the Mission enjoyed the respect and consideration of all the players involved in the election process, and of the public in general. The various stakeholders took pains to facilitate the Mission’s work with all the means at their disposal, and at no time did the Mission encounter any resistance or obstruction. Both the electoral and political authorities and the media did much to highlight the presence of the Mission, expressing their full confidence in its efforts and their appreciation of the important role it was playing in ensuring the transparency of the elections.

1.1 Political Parties and Candidates The Mission made contact with the major political organizations participating in the election, and met with candidates, delegates, or representatives of the parties. During this dialogue the Mission was able to sound out their opinions on the course of events. All the party members interviewed expressed gratitude to the Mission and confidence in its role.

30 Regional Election of November 8, 1998

One group of candidates, delegates, or party representatives mentioned the “great effort” made by the election agencies and agreed that nothing was going seriously wrong. They also said they were satisfied with the automated voting system, though they found it rather complex. They expressed confidence in the voting machines, and attributed the problems with their use to human error. They pointed to the need to provide better training for the technicians in charge of them. They also called for better logistical planning and better training of poll workers. This position was shared by several parties: Partido Acción Democrática (AD), Partido Demócrata Cristiano (COPEI), Proyecto Venezuela, Partido Integración Representación Nueva Esperanza (IRENE), and others. Another group of candidates, delegates, and representatives acknowledged the organizational efforts made by the election authorities, but were nonetheless critical of the election process, pointing in particular to an absence of transparency in the results of the vote due to distrust of the voting machines. This led, in most of the cases where these parties failed to win, to challenges to the outcome and demands for audits and recounts. Charges of computer fraud were made, though never proved. This view was taken by the Movimiento V República (MVR), the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), and the Partido por los Trabajadores (PPT), among other parties.

1.2 Election Authorities One of the most important activities of the Mission was to monitor the activities of the National Electoral Council and the Regional Boards during the preparations for the elections. The Mission wishes to pay tribute to the warm reception and the support offered by officials of these bodies, who did so much to ensure the successful conduct of its work. The Mission received all the information it needed about their activities in organizing and supervising the elections. During the run-up to the elections the Mission was able to observe, in particular, the details of the installation of the polling station, the inspection of the voting centers and election materials in accordance with the planned procedures, and the accreditation of the last party monitors. The members of the election agencies declared themselves satisfied with the organization of the elections. In the case of members of the Regional Boards, the degree of satisfaction with their performance was especially noteworthy, since for most of them this was the first time they had taken on such a responsibility and they had had only a few months of training.

Regional Election of November 8, 1998 31

1.3 Voting Automation The Mission also sought to maintain constant contact with the national and regional managers of INDRA SSI, which had the automation contract. The Mission made a point of attending events sponsored by the company in various parts of the country to explain to the election agencies how the machines worked and how to use the mechanisms for receiving, verifying and certifying the tally sheets on election day.

1.4 Civic Elections Instruction Through its observers around the country, the Mission was able to monitor closely the training of poll workers and the publicity campaigns undertaken to teach the general public about voting. The Council signed an agreement with the Simón Rodríguez National University to train poll workers. It also developed an instruction manual covering the major aspects of the procedures to be followed by each polling station on election day. This manual dealt with some of the questions most frequently raised by poll workers, on such matters as their own duties and those of the voting-machine technicians, the powers of each, the way to cast votes and the steps to be followed, and how to prepare or authenticate the poll reports and tally sheets.

1.5 Election Campaign Campaign activities (rallies, speeches, caravans) had varying degrees of impact and repercussion in different parts of the country. While candidates in the largest electoral districts (Federal District, Zulia) threw themselves into their campaigning with great zeal, activities were relatively muted in other electoral districts, and public participation was modest. No incidents or problems of significance were noted during these events. In general, the election authorities were careful to enforce the pre-election blackout of political advertising, and the warnings they sent to any media organs that violated the ban were immediately obeyed.

1.6 Election Complaints Under the agreement signed between the Electoral council and the OAS General Secretariat on Electoral Observation Procedures, dated November 2, 1998, the Mission was empowered to inform the Council of any incident of irregularity or interference it observed or was told of. The Mission could also ask the Council for information on what it had done about such incidents. Thus, among their other duties, the Mission observers were responsible for receiving, processing, reporting, and monitoring all types of complaints about irregularities in the electoral process, provided that they were duly substantiated and documented. Complaints could be submitted to the Mission at any stage of the electoral process by individuals or organizations. The Mission had no power


of its own to open hearings or issue rulings in any specific case, but it could monitor the handling of complaints by the authorities, and report the results to the complainant. The Mission received no complaints of substantive irregularities in organization or logistics during the preparations for the regional elections of November 8. 2. Election Day On election day, from the opening of the polls until the vote count was completed, the observers deployed in the various regional offices of the Mission were engaged in making the rounds of the polling stations to witness the voting procedure at first hand. Every observer had a previously assigned route, designed to permit observation of a variety of polling stations in both urban and rural parishes and, in principle, in the areas with the greatest concentration of eligible voters, so as to get as representative as possible a picture on the region. Following is a summary of the impressions compiled by the observers in the various regions of the country on November 8. 2.1 Regional Reports

• Barinas Regional Office In most of the many polling stations visited on election day in the states of Barinas and Portuguesa, the polls were several hours late in opening. Even so, the citizenry showed great patience and devotion to civic duty, and many stood in line for up to four hours to vote. Despite these delays, the vote took place in a tranquil and orderly atmosphere. Voters had little difficulty with the new automated voting procedure. However, some technical problems and operating difficulties arose with the machines, and these could not always be readily resolved by the INDRA operators, who in some cases were not well-enough trained. While no problems of ballot secrecy were found, it was noted that in many cases, if a voter needed help from a poll worker or the machine technician with the new system of placing ballots in the voting machine and tearing off the security tab, that person could easily see how the ballot had been marked.


• Ciudad Bolivar Regional Office The election proceeded in a peaceful and even festive manner. It was noted, however, that in most of the automated voting centers, the small size of the premises, the arrangement of the voting booths and the number of party monitors (an average of seven per polling station), meant that activity was at times disorderly and confused. Election materials were delivered to the premises on time and nothing essential was found to be missing. The poll workers performed quite efficiently, although there were some delays at the start that reflected a certain lack of confidence or familiarity with the routine that betrayed insufficient training. Throughout the process, the poll workers generally behaved well, even when they had to work long hours without a break. In most of the voting stations visited, political advertising was noticeable in the immediately surrounding areas, mainly in the form of posters affixed to lampposts. These did not disrupt the process, and none of the parties complained about them. In all the municipalities visited, voters flocked to the polls in great numbers throughout the day, even after the official closing time. Generally, citizens had ready and immediate access to the polls, except where the massive turnout at certain hours caused long lines to form and led to occasional disruptions. The polls closed in normal fashion, though mostly not at the stipulated hour (4 p.m.) because there were so many voters still waiting in line to vote. By order of the CNE, polling stations could stay open as long as there were voters waiting. As a result, many remained open until about 10 o'clock.

• Cumaná Regional Office On election day in the state of Sucre, many voting centers, primarily in the most densely populated municipalities (Sucre and Bermúdez), experienced considerable delays in setting up the polling stations and opening for voting. In some cases, these were due to organizational shortcomings or problems in operating the voting machines. In other cases, those factors were compounded by the absence or late arrival of some of the citizens who were supposed to serve as members of the polling station teams. In the municipalities of Montes and Valdés, two polling stations (which fortunately had relatively few registered voters) were never set up at all. These two polls together accounted for only 45 voters, and thus represented a very small proportion of the electorate in the state of Sucre, which has 390,619 citizens. In both cases, members of the Armed Forces certified that they had been unable to deliver the election materials, as called for in the Plan República, because the appointed poll workers were not present. They also certified that the voters registered for those polls did not show up. The regional election authorities suggested, by way of explanation, that these voters might have migrated. Once the poll workers had overcome the initial confusion, no significant difficulties concerned with their training were noted. They were generally able to provide voters with adequate explanations on how to vote, even at the cost of slowing down the vote.


Some minor disruptions were noted, as a result of delays and the long backup of voters waiting to enter the polling stations, and also because there were so many party monitors crowded into what were frequently very small premises. But none of these led to incidents or violence. The climate, generally speaking, was calm and the citizen’s determination to participate was evident. Nearly 10% of the voting machines in this district were out of service, for various reasons. Problems were also encountered in transmitting data: in four municipalities, a total of 11 machines failed to transmit the results for their polling stations.

• Maracaibo Regional Office When the voting began, the poll workers revealed a certain amount of confusion about the new procedures, but as the day went on they became more familiar with the system and more adept at managing it. In general, the automated system functioned properly, although there was a good deal of perplexity among the voters about how to insert their ballot into the machine. The security-tab system introduced by the Electoral Council tended on one hand to increase delays in the vote, and on the other to lead the machine to reject many ballots because they had been mutilated in tearing off the tab. In most of the polling stations visited, space limitations made it awkward for three polls to operate with one voting machine, and as the day wore on there were occasional outbursts of frustration and tension among voters, poll workers, and monitors, who were very numerous at all the centers visited. With respect to ballot secrecy, it was noted in many cases that, when the voter was inserting the ballot into the machine, his choices were easy to see. However, no abuses of this situation to intimidate people or influence their votes were observed.

• Mérida Regional Office The level of training that poll workers had received varied considerably among the various voting centers visited. For most of them this was their first experience with running an election, and their lack of training was reflected in long delays in opening the polls, and in the slow pace at which the voting proceeded. But, it was clear that most of them took their duties and responsibilities very seriously. It was also observed that the relationship between poll workers and the party monitors was rather tense, especially during the first two or three hours on election day. Things improved gradually thereafter, although isolated arguments erupted at some polling stations over announcing the vote count quickly enough. The new automated voting system created some problems because of occasional defects in the machines, inadequate training of the technicians operating and supervising them, a shortage of space in the ballot bins, the inability of some voters to understand how to use the machines, and the failure of the presidents of some polling stations to issue clear instructions.


The flow of voters was too slow in most of the polling stations. At peak hours, it was clear that one machine was not enough to cope with the demands of three separate polls. It is likely that a good many voters, frustrated by the long wait, simply gave up and went away. The atmosphere in the state of Mérida was on the whole calm and positive. The desire of the citizenry for a change in the voting procedure and their interest in the new automated system were obvious. The voting process was slow, but it was safe and orderly. There was not a single instance of fraud or electoral manipulation. The observers were surprised at the determination and patience of the voters, who were willing to wait in line for hours to cast their ballots.

• Puerto La Cruz Regional Office The election authorities had done a good job of organizing the voting process in this region, and the poll workers showed on election day that they had been well trained. It has to be said, however, that the opening of the polling stations was considerably delayed by the late arrival of the people in charge of setting them up, and indeed some of them did not appear at all. The preliminary procedure for giving voters their ballots was also excessively slow and cumbersome, with long waiting lines and too many steps involved. When the voter finally got his ballot, it took him only a few minutes to actually cast his vote. Officers of the Plan República maintained security and public order in the electoral precincts and guaranteed voters’ access to the polls. This was no small task, given the large backup of citizens waiting their turn to vote, and the great numbers of party monitors milling about. The press was also given free access to cover events at the polling stations.

• Valencia Regional Office On election day, Mission members visited many voting centers in the municipalities of Valencia and Puerto Cabello, in Carabobo State. No problems or untoward activities of any kind were observed. It is important here to emphasize the good will and public spirit of the people who turned out at a very early hour to cast their votes. All the same, voting was for the most part quite late in getting under way. The polls did not open, on average, until about 8.45 a.m. There were a number of reasons for this delay, including the late arrival or non-arrival of some pollworkers. At some voting centers, arguments broke out between poll officials and party monitors. The cramped quarters housing some of the voting centers were certainly a cause of disharmony in this relationship. The poll authorities’ request that monitors maintain a prudent distance was often interpreted as an attempt to limit or restrict them in performing their functions. The polls closed late as well. Voting at some polling stations did not finish until 8.00 p.m. The automated counting process was long and tedious, taking about three hours at every polling station.


3. Vote Count and Tabulation

The observers from the Mission, deployed at various points around the country, witnessed the primary vote count at the polling stations (either manual or automated) and then went to the JREs and the CNE, where they remained until the official announcement of the results for the region.

3.1 Counting at the Polling Stations In general, the vote count, like the other stages of the process, was performed smoothly and without serious incident. In most cases, it atarted well past the hour at which the polls were supposed to close, because many voters were still waiting to cast their ballots. Monitors from most of the major political groupings were present for the count. The count took place in an orderly and acceptable manner, although some poll workers took longer than expected to finish, because of their unfamiliarity with how to handle the printouts. Following is a summary of the performance of the voting machines, according to information provided by INDRA. Note that the system had a failure rate of 7.67%, i.e., 537 machines were out of service during the day. States

Number of machines

Operational

Out of service

% operational

% out of service

Federal Dist. 784 736 48 93.88 6.12 Anzoátegui 353 314 39 88.95 11.05 Apure 105 95 10 90.48 9.52 Aragua 432 426 6 98.61 1.39 Barinas 160 151 9 94.38 5.63 Bolívar 313 293 20 93.61 6.39 Carabobo 522 501 21 95.98 4.02 Cojedes 84 83 1 98.81 2.37 Falcón 250 234 16 93.60 6.40 Guarico 189 173 16 91.53 8.47 Lara 457 399 58 87.31 12.69 Mérida 220 209 11 95.00 5.00 Miranda 736 632 104 85.87 14.13 Monagas 204 184 20 90.20 9.80 Nueva Esparta 134 126 8 94.03 5.97 Portuguesa 199 189 10 94.97 5.02 Sucre 256 235 21 91.80 8.20 Táchira 292 275 17 94.18 5.82 Trujillo 186 170 16 91.40 8.60 Yaracuy 150 146 4 97.33 2.67 Zulia 786 733 53 93.26 6.75 Amazonas 27 24 3 88.89 11.11 Delta Amacuro 40 37 3 92.50 7.50 Vargas 121 98 23 80.99 19.01 TOTAL 7000 6463 537 92.33 7.67


The success rate of data transmision from the voting machines to the corresponding tabulation centers was as follows: Total machines

Without phone line

% without phone line

Transmitting machines

Transmissions received

% transmissons received

7,000

902

12.89

6098

5112

83.83

3.2 Counting and Tabulation at the Regional Election Boards In general, the Regional Boards were found to be performing the counting process efficiently. They began to receive the envelopes containing the tally sheets at about 10.30 p.m. on election day, a Sunday, but in some cases they did not all arrive until early on Tuesday. The process was slow, but was absolutely transparent and normal, and it took place in the presence of representatives of the three political parties accredited to the regional agencies; under the election rules, the other parties were allowed to participate only as observers. Whenever a tally sheet was found to be missing, a backup copy was requested from the National Electoral Council and the parties. The regional tabulation centers performed their verification and certification of the tally sheets without incident; it was slow work, but was done completely transparently. The counting and tabulation in the regional electoral agencies, culminating with the announcement of the winners in each state, took only marginally longer than the CNE schedule called for and obeyed all the provisions of the new Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation and other rules and regulations.


3.3 Counting at the National Electoral Council The Organic Law provides that the CNE is to tally the national vote and announce the results of elections for President and for national senators and deputies, and those of plebiscites or referendums. When the national tally is completed, the number of valid votes cast for each candidate or each list is computed. The Council then announces the definitive results and awards the posts to the winners.3 Blank and spoiled ballots are treated as invalid. The national count was conducted as information on the partial returns for each jurisdiction came in from the regional tabulation centers.

3.4. Assessment of the Election Information System The Mission conducted an assessment of the election information systems used by the National Electoral Council and in particular the communication system adopted for the transmission of voting data. The Mission analyzed the integrity, transparency, and security of the process designed to monitor the count, from the close of each individual poll until the final results were at hand for the regional elections of November 8, 1998. The Organic Law calls for the automation of elections to shorten the time needed to announce the results and to limit opportunities for interference by poll workers and members of the regional and municipal election boards among other reasons. The CNE decided to use a machine that would tally votes automatically, thereby reducing the job of the polling station officials to signing the reports printed out by the machine after the polls close.

GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS* AMAZONAS: BERNABÉ GUTIÉRREZ (AD) ANZOÁTEGUI: ALEXIS ROSAS (MVR-PPT) APURE: JOSÉ GREGORIO MONTILLA (AD) ARAGUA: DIDALCO BOLÍVAR (MAS-MVR-COPEI) BARINAS: HUGO DE LOS REYES CHÁVEZ (MVR-MAS) BOLÍVAR: JORGE CARVAJAL (AD) CARABOBO: ENRIQUE FERNANDO SALAS FEO (PROYECTO

VENEZUELA) COJEDES: JOSE ALBERTO GALÍNDEZ (AD) DELTA AMACURO: EMERY MATA MILLÁN (MERI-COPEI-AD) FALCÓN: JOSE CURIEL (COPEI) GUARICO: EDUARDO MANUITT (MVR-PPT-MAS) LARA: ORLANDO FERNÁNDEZ M. (MAS-MVR-Convergencia) MÉRIDA: WILLIAM DÁVILA BARRIOS (AD) MIRANDA: ENRIQUE MENDOZA (COPEI)

3 Because of the death on January 11, 1999, of the Governor-elect of the State of Nueva Esparta, Rafael Fucho Tovar, new elections were called for March 14, 1999. By decision of the Supreme Court, the governorship of the state was assumed by the President of the outgoing legislative assembly, Bonaldy Rodríguez.


MONAGAS: LUIS EDUARDO MARTINEZ (AD) NUEVA ESPARTA: RAFAEL "FUCHO" TOVAR (COPEI-MAS) PORTUGUESA: IVÁN COLMENARES (COPEI-MAS-Convergencia) SUCRE: ELOY GIL (AD) TÁCHIRA: SERGIO "CURA" CALDERÓN (COPEI) TRUJILLO: LUIS ERNESTO GONZÁLEZ (AD) VARGAS: ALFREDO LAYA (MVR-MAS-PPT) YARACUY: EDUARDO LAPI (Convergencia) ZULIA: FRANCISCO ARIAS CÁRDENAS (COPEI-LA CAUSA R-

MVR) *See Annexes for results of the vote for national senators and deputies, and for state deputies. Source: National Elections Council (CNE). Since the Mission was not given documentation on the automated system or the technical manuals and operating instructions, it was unable to verify most of the information obtained from officials of the CNE and from the computer technicians of the INDRA firm, which held the automation contract.

3.5 Description of the Process The automatic vote-counting process is divided into two stages: obtaining the results for each polling station and consolidating the results at the regional and national levels. With respect to the first step, the voting machine adopted was the ES&S model. This is designed to read and process ballots, to transmit results to a tabulation center as soon as the polls close, and then to print out a tally sheet of the votes cast. This stage consists of three critical moments:

• Initiation: Before the actual voting begins, the voting machine is activated to print out a report of the contents of its database, which must read zero, meaning that no vote has been recorded for any of the candidates before the polls opened.

• Voting: Once voting begins, the voter must appear at his assigned polling station with

his ID card, which must contain the data verified and recorded in the electoral register. The president of the polling station then hands him the ballot and the “Voting Secrecy Folder.” The voter indicates the candidates of his choice by filling in the appropriate ovals “box” on the ballot, and places his ballot in the folder for privacy. He then tears off the security tab at the upper edge of the ballot. Next he inserts the ballot, in any position, into the voting machine, where the vote will be counted immediately and the ballot itself will be retained until the close of voting. The voter hands the detached security tab to the secretary of the polling station. The identifying data on the tab are noted in the electoral register, where the voter’s fingerprints and signature are also recorded, and his ID card is stamped as proof that he has voted and returned to him.


• Closing: Once the polling station or stations served by any one machine are closed, the machine technician, with the approval of the president(s) of the polling station(s), starts to transmit the results to the proper tabulation center, by modem, over a CANTV telephone line connected to the machine. The machine then prints out the tally sheets. Subsequently, the bin of marked ballots is opened and these are taken out and delivered to the poll workers, who put them, in a box for safekeeping without examining them.

To compile regional and national results, the Regional Election Boards have a regional tabulation center where the data transmitted from polling centers with automated voting machines are processed, and where the results from manual tallies are keyed in. The regional centers are thus responsible both for compiling the data for the automated and the manual polls within their jurisdiction, and for tabulating the results by means of a UNIX server connected to a series of microcomputers and a printer. This information will then be transmitted to the National Electoral Council, where the national tabulation center is located, for the official announcement of the election results.

3.6 Security Measures Following are some of the measures that are taken to guarantee the security of the automated voting process.

• Neither the poll workers nor the voting machine technicians have access to the completed ballots during the process. Only after the results have been transmitted and the tallies printed are the ballots removed from the bins in which they were deposited during the vote, and placed in a strongbox for safekeeping.

• All information is stored on the DRAM memory disk inside the machine, and on a non-

removable memory card (PCMCIA), which can be neither altered nor erased.

• The machine has a backup battery that can power it for up to 12 hours during an emergency.

• There is a double key system that enables the machine to be operated only when the

two activation locks are in agreement.

• A double optical scanner enables the ballot to be inserted into the machine in any position (either side up, frontward or backward).

• Data transmission is by the telephone network, from the automated voting centers to the

regional and national tabulation centers.

• Seven thousand telephone lines are dedicated exclusively to the transmission of tallies generated by the voting machines.

• The CNE has the capacity to transcribe all the tally sheets in case there is a general

failure of the transmission lines.

• The computerized system produces two copies of the machine reports from each state;


one copy is kept by the CNE, and the other goes to the Central Bank of Venezuela

• To the original document is added a facsimile with the data as transcribed from the reports produced by the manual system.

• Seals or stamps are used to secure the opening to the chamber where the memory card

is inserted.

• The menu control pulsers are deactivated for as long as the machine is open for the receipt of ballots.

3.7 Evaluation From the standpoint of the objectives for which it was planned, it is unquestionable that automation has helped to modernize the process, reduce involvement by poll officials, and allow an earlier announcement of the election results. But certain flaws in the process were also apparent: most of the polls opened much later than they were supposed to, and the slowness of the process produced long queues of voters at most of the polling stations visited. The decision that all polling stations served by the same machine had to be open before voting at any one of them could begin also held up the process and caused long waiting lines. Similarly, delays were occasioned by the requirement that all the polling stations had to close before the results could be compiled and transmitted. It should be noted that, with the system adopted, the Mission had no way to verify and certify the results generated by any voting machine, or to compare these with what would have been obtained by a manual vote count. Nor was it possible to consult and verify the data transmitted to the various tabulation centers, since only the totals by region were posted on the Internet. 4. Conclusions and Recommendations On the basis of its observation of the regional elections on November 8, 1998, the Mission offers the following conclusions and recommendations:

1. Voters went to the polls in an atmosphere of freedom and calm, demonstrating their commitment to democracy.

2. The national election authorities (the National Electoral Council and the regional election

boards) and the armed forces (through their members working with the Plan República) deserve credit for their efforts and achievements in terms of logistical organization, the distribution and collection of election materials, and the maintenance of security, which are indispensable requisites for the election process.

3. Difficulties arose early on election day because of delays in setting up the polling


stations. In some cases, these had to do with problems of organization, the availability of election materials and the operation of the automated voting machines, in many other cases with the non-appearance of poll workers at opening time and in some cases, with both.

4. Difficulties were also observed with the functioning of the new voting machines and

printers. Of these machines, 7.67 % (a significant proportion, although an acceptable one in the initial stages of a new process) suffered problems that could not be solved during the vote, which meant that ballots had to be counted by hand. In some polling stations, the build-up of ballots in the holding bins caused the machines to reject additional ones.

5. The operating difficulties with the machines, added to the delays in setting up the polling

stations, meant not only that very few of the polls observed opened on time (6 a.m.) but also that they had to work for several hours after the originally envisaged closing time of 4 p.m.

6. Poll workers were inadequately trained in some cases, and this contributed to the delays

at both the beginning and the end of the day, because many members were confused and unfamiliar with the procedures developed by the CNE. In many cases, in fact, where no delegate from the CNE was present at the voting center, the poll workers had to rely on Plan República troops to clear up misunderstandings about procedures.

7. Special mention must be made of the training of the technicians responsible for the

voting machines, since their role is crucial to the entire process. In many cases this training was inadequate, which led to further delays in voting. When the machines broke down (sometimes because of improper use), the technicians on hand were often incompetent to repair them.

8. Officials of INDRA reported receiving many calls on election day from technicians at

the polling stations, asking for help with the voting machines. This undoubtedly contributed to the delays experienced and offered further evidence of the need to provide better training for the technicians before the December 6 presidential elections.

9. The great number of political party monitors on hand posed some problems at polling

stations where space was limited. At the stations observed, although the individual voting cycle (identifying and registering voters, individualizing their ballots and recording the security tab, casting votes, and stamping identity cards) was fairly long, no irregularities were noted that might have affected the transparency of the process.

10. No other problems, events, or incidents were identified during the vote either inside the

voting centers or elsewhere, that might have prevented the normal conduct of voting, nor were any cases of voter intimidation found.

11. Members of the armed forces participating in the Plan República were present at all the

localities observed and helped to speed up the installation of the polling stations and the organization of the vote. These efforts were of fundamental importance in maintaining


order and meeting the objectives set by the CNE. The Plan authorities worked constantly with members of the regional and local election agencies, and played a key role in making decisions.

4.1 Technical Considerations In conversations with the CNE, the Mission suggested that for the presidential elections of December 6 the following points should be considered:

1. It would be a good idea to let a polling station start work as soon as it is set up, even though if another station that is to use the same voting machine is not yet ready (pursuant to Article 27 of Partial Regulation No. 15 on the Organization and Functioning of Election Polling Stations). Similarly, a polling station that has already closed should be allowed to tally its ballots even if others are still open.

2. On election day, the procedure followed at polling stations should be streamlined and

unnecessary tasks (for example, affixing the “Voted” stamp) eliminated. 3. It would be useful if as soon as election data were received at the national tabulation

center, they were posted on the Internet, in particular the results from each polling station.

4. Poll workers need better training, in particular to resolve the questions raised on

November 8. 5. There should be another trial run-through of the new election process to familiarize the

operators with their duties and test the efficiency of the transmission system. 6. It would be useful to prepare a contingency plan for replacing voting machines that

break down or develop problems during the voting on December 6.

CHAPTER V Presidential Election of December 6, 1998

For the presidential election, Observer Mission members were deployed in ten regions, with headquarters in Caracas and regional offices in the cities of Barinas, Barquisimeto, Ciudad Bolívar, Cumuná, Maracaibo, Mérida, Puerto la Cruz, San Fernando, and Valencia. Their activities began with the re-establishment of contacts that had been made previously, during the regional elections, with election authorities and with representatives of the political parties, the armed forces, the news media, and the general public, to learn about and observe the preparatory stage. On election day, observers witnessed the setting up and opening of the polling stations, observed the voting itself and the ballot count (automated or manual) by the poll officials, the tallying of the votes, the decision as to the winner, and the announcement of the President-elect by the CNE. The Mission also produced a projection of voting trends, using the “quick count” procedure based on statistical sampling. 1. The Pre-Election Period Once again, as had happened during the regional elections of November 8, the Mission was accorded respect and consideration by everyone involved in the campaign and by the public. In general terms, the Mission was provided with everything it needed to perform its functions and, except for a few limits on its access to information of an essentially technical nature, no obstacles were placed in its way. The election authorities and those of the political parties, the church, and the news media all welcomed its presence, in every region of the country, and reaffirmed their confidence in its role as witness to the transparency of the presidential election.

1.1. Election Authorities During the pre-election stage, the Mission observed the work carried out by the election authorities in preparation for the vote: the inspection of the voting machines, the organization and logistical efforts relating to setting up the polling stations, the accreditation of party monitors. All these activities were carried out smoothly and efficiently by the responsible authorities. In general, the election authorities declared themselves satisfied with the way the process was organized and were appreciative of the experience acquired during the regional elections, which had served to strengthen their confidence and understanding and enabled them to avoid some of the difficulties encountered on that occasion.

48 Presidential Election of December 6, 1998

1.2 The Plan República The officials responsible for the Plan República, both at the national level and in the regions where the Mission was deployed, were optimistic about security conditions for the election. The Mission itself saw nothing that might have called for intervention by Plan República forces to restore order or maintain security. The Mission also found that the members of the Plan República were thoroughly competent in their work of distributing election materials and maintaining order and security at the voting centers.

1.3. Voting Automation The Mission maintained constant contact, at both the national and the regional levels, with representatives of INDRA SSI, the company in charge of automating the vote. The Mission also attended and observed the election authorities’ inspection of the voting machines before the presidential vote.

1.4 Political Parties and Candidates Between 1958 and 1993 the political landscape of Venezuela was dominated by competition between two parties, Acción Democratica (AD) and the Comité de Organización Político Electoral Independiente (COPEI), which tended to split around 80 percent of the total vote. The political scenario for the 1998 campaign, however, showed that the bipartisan model that had prevailed through the 1993 election, had broken down; voters were realigning themselves across a new fabric of alliances, focused on two new political groupings: the Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR) and Proyecto Venezuela (PRVNZ). In this connection, it is important to note that during the last week of the campaign both AD and COPEI made major changes in their support. Both announced that, in the light of the performance of the MVR and PRVNZ candidates in pre-election voter surveys, and the advantage that the former appeared to enjoy, they would abandon their original candidates and support the Proyecto Venezuela candidate instead. Eleven candidates for President were listed on the December 6 ballot. Below is a list of the candidates who won the most votes.

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

Political Party/Alliance

Candidate for President

Comments on the Candidate

Graduated in 1975 from the Military Academy of

Presidential Election of December 6, 1998 49

MVR, MAS, PPT, PCV, IPCN, GE, SI, MEP, AA

Hugo Chávez Frías Venezuela with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and a degree in Military Arts and Sciences. In the Armed Forces he achieved the rank of Lt. Colonel. Founded the Movimiento Bolivariano and later the Movimiento V República.

PRVNZ, AD, COPEI, PQAC

Henrique Salas Römer

Economist, graduate of Yale University. Entered public life formally in 1983 when he was elected as a deputy to the National Congress. In 1989 be became the first Governor of Carabobo elected by popular vote, and was reelected some years later with 73% of the votes.

IRENE, LA LLAVE, FD, INCVF

Irene Sáez Conde

Graduated from the Central University of Venezuela in 1989 with a degree in political science; seven years later, took a specialized degree in Municipal Management. In 1992 became Mayor of Chacao and in 1995 was re-elected with 96% of the vote. Founded the IRENE party.

ORA, VU, FIN, URD, RENACE, ICC, ONDA

Luis Alfaro Ucero

Was one of the founding members of AD in 1942, and served as Secretary of Agriculture. In 1947 was elected deputy to the National Congress. Arrested and expelled from the country during the overthrow of Rómulo Gallegos, but returned to join the resistance against General Pérez Jiménez. Was elected to the national Senate in 1978.

1.5 Election Complaints

During the election the Mission received no complaints of irregularities that were serious enough to affect the proceedings or to cast doubt on their transparency. Such complaints as the observers received were duly noted and followed up, even though many of them were entirely groundless. In fact, not a single one was substantiated.

Electoral Complaints

State

Voting Center

Complainant

Complaint

Description

Federal District

Colegio La Consolación

Individual

Manipulation of vote

The ballots contained markings close to the box for one of the parties.

Apure

Escuela Básica El Recreo

MVR

Manipulation of vote

Some ballots had marks on them.

Portuguesa

Escuela Dunga Vieja

Individual

Change of location of polling station

The first site had to be changed because it was in poor condition.

Monagas

Escuela Básica El Silencio

MVR

Interference

Its monitor was denied access to the poll.

2. The Election


The presidential elections of December 6 were well organized and took place in a calm atmosphere, without serious incident. The polling stations for the most part opened on time or with little delay. The voting itself and the counting of the votes by the poll workers was handled with exceptional dispatch. In contrast to the regional elections, in which there were many offices to be filled and a plethora of ballots and candidates that unquestionably caused confusion, voters on this occasion were faced with a single ballot for the election of the President. The technical personnel assigned to the voting machines were better trained, which without a doubt significantly reduced operating problems. Also, the technicians generally maintained a prudent distance from the voters, and approached a machine only if it was not working properly or if a voter specifically asked for assistance. The armed forces played an essential role in the transport, distribution and safekeeping of election materials at the voting centers, and in collecting the tally sheets from the individual polls when the count was finished and transmitting them to the regional boards or the CNE. On election day, observers deployed at the Mission's various regional offices began their rounds of the different voting stations as soon the polls were set up and continued their observation activities until the final counts were taken. Each observer followed a previously planned route, designed to include both rural and urban areas, and, in principle, to be heavily populated, to ensure that the information they gathered was as representative as possible of the region as a whole. Following are summaries of the reports compiled by observers in various regions of the country during the vote on December 6. 2.1 Regional Reports

• Barinas Office In contrast to the earlier regional elections, the poll workers showed themselves for the most part to be thoroughly competent, and worked promptly and transparently. In compliance with recently issued decisions by the CNE regarding last-minute changes of candidates, in most cases the poll officials were careful to alert voters to those decisions. At some polling stations, the corrected version issued by the National Electoral Council did not arrive in time, or members of the Council or the regional boards failed to inform local poll workers about it, and in these cases voters had to be warned to mark just one box on their ballot, or else it would be counted as spoiled. No security problems were observed concerning voter access to the polls, which proceeded in an orderly and expeditious manner. Nor were any voters denied the right to cast their ballot. There were also no problems with ballot secrecy in this region. Nevertheless, at some polls the positioning of the voting booths, which were supposed to ensure privacy, was found to be less than ideal. No protests were lodged, however, nor was the course of voting in any way disrupted.

• Barquisimeto Office In this region, most of the polling stations opened on time or with very little delay. Most of the officially appointed poll workers were on hand, and in the few cases where they failed to show up,


alternate members were enlisted. At all the polls visited by Mission observers the essential voting materials were available on time, as required by law. It was noted, however, that some stations were missing certain non-essential items, such as the labels that were supposed to be affixed to unused materials, boxes for safeguarding the materials, etc. The process of setting up and opening the polling stations was faster and more orderly than in the regional elections, reflecting the fact that poll officials were more familiar with the materials and procedures. Thanks to this performance, the atmosphere was calm and voting proceeded normally in a well-organized and even festive manner. In all the municipalities visited, voter turnout was heavy, beginning at a very early hour. In contrast to the regional elections, there were no long lines, thanks to the greater skill of the poll workers, and also to the greater simplicity of the ballot. A clear demonstration of voter turnout can be seen in the abstention rate, which fell from roughly 50 percent in the previous elections to around 30 percent on December 6. The closing of the polls was handled completely normally, and in general the poll workers respected the closing time established by law. Where voters were still waiting, the polls remained open beyond the official closing time, but in few cases for more than another hour. The vote count, and all the other steps in the procedure took place in the presence of monitors from the various majority political groupings (AD, COPEI, MAS, MVR, Proyecto Venezuela, and others), with no serious incidents observed.

• Ciudad Bolívar Office Voters flocked to the polls in an orderly, festive, and peaceful atmosphere from the earliest hours of the morning. The voting process itself was normal and calm, and the few incidents reported were of minor importance and were promptly resolved, with no negative effect on the progress of the vote. In general, it was plain that the poll workers were better trained than during the regional elections, and they seemed more at ease with their responsibilities, thanks no doubt to the experience they had gained in the previous round. In none of the voting precincts visited by observers assigned to the region was there any evidence of political pressure or propaganda, or any intimidation of voters. Freedom of the press was strictly respected throughout the course of election day.

• Cumaná Office The vote in this region unfolded in a calm, well-organized, and spirited climate. Compared with the regional elections of November 8, it moved much faster and no long lines formed. By midday, there were few voters waiting. Similarly, there were far fewer difficulties in operating the voting machines. The technical


personnel in charge of the machines were more skillful and better trained, and this no doubt contributed to the smooth operation of the equipment. By the time the polls closed, only 1 percent of the voting machines had been reported in trouble in the states of Sucre and Nueva Esparta. Turnout was heavy everywhere, indicating a substantial reduction in the abstention rate. By early afternoon most of the polling stations had already exceeded the total number of voters recorded during the entire day for the regional elections. The vote had been completed at almost all the polling stations by closing time. At some stations, even though nobody was waiting at 4.00 o’clock, it was decided to postpone closing by half an hour in case some voters might show up late.

• Maracaibo Office On election day, members of the Plan República assisted in setting up and opening the polling stations, and helped by their presence to ensure that voters had access. There were no crowds or disturbances. Voters waited their turn patiently, and demonstrated a high degree of civic consciousness. The polling station officials were in general well trained. There was also an improvement in the technical competence of the INDRA personnel in charge of the voting machines, although in some cases the technicians could not deal with operational problems and had to seek help from supervisors. By election day most of the political advertising posters had been removed from public view, and the public ban on partisan demonstrations was respected. Plan República personnel ensured strict enforcement of the rules prohibiting party identification and the serving of alcohol.

• Mérida Office Most of the polling stations opened about an hour late. Thereafter, the vote proceeded very efficiently, reflecting the experience that the poll workers, and the voters themselves, had gained during the previous regional elections. The fact that the voting procedure itself was simpler (there was only one ballot, with fewer candidates, compared with the four ballots, the plethora of candidates, and the different forms of voting-by individual and by lists-in the November 8 election), together with the greater experience of both poll workers and voters, meant that voters flowed quickly through the polling stations all day. Most of the polls had closed by 4.30 p.m. Ballot secrecy was generally respected, and security provisions at the polls were on the whole excellent, thanks in part to the dedicated efforts of Plan República officials.

• Puerto La Cruz Office No major problems were encountered in this region in setting up and opening the polls, and the few small ones that occurred initially were quickly solved. Chief among these was the failure of some


poll workers to appear, which meant that alternate members, and in some cases political-party monitors, had to be enlisted. There was a very high turnout, beginning in the earliest hours of the day: by noon, more than half of the voters registered at each poll had already cast their ballot. Proceedings in general went much more smoothly than during the regional elections of November 8. The voting materials were correctly distributed under a well-organized logistical plan. Officials of the Plan República carried out their duties for the most part properly and efficiently. Generally speaking, poll workers were careful to inform voters that they must mark only one box on their ballot, in order for it to be counted as valid. Thanks to the attention that was paid to this detail, the number of spoiled ballots at each poll was low. The poll workers and party monitors performed well, and no incidents were recorded. Members of the regional boards and the INDRA representative made the rounds of polling stations throughout the day, supervising proceedings and answering questions from participants in the process. The voting machines functioned properly for the most part, and the few technical problems that arose were swiftly resolved.

• San Fernando Office Throughout the region, the process of setting up and opening the polling stations was completed between 6.30 and 7.00 a.m. in an orderly manner, and by the time the polls opened there were already large numbers of voters who had been waiting since early morning to cast their ballot. The voting process itself was orderly and well organized. Members of the Plan República were effective in their role as guarantors of voter security. Citizens enjoyed free access to their polling stations, and no attempts at voter coercion or intimidation were noted. At one polling station in the town of El Recreo, it was noted that approximately 400 ballots bore small spots of different colors. Upon closer examination, however, it was found that these markings were not intended to indicate or influence any voter’s choice, but were the result of sloppy printing. In centers where there was only one voting machine serving three separate polling stations, closing time was delayed if there were still voters waiting at any one of them; those that had completed their voting stayed open as well, and latecomers were accepted even after 5 p.m.

• Valencia Office In this region, there was some delay in setting up and opening the polls, and in general voting did not get under way until about 7.30 a.m. These delays were due for the most part to the late arrival of the poll workers. No problems were observed with the supply of essential election materials, nor were there any incidents that might have affected the integrity and transparency of voting. The atmosphere was calm and confident. The armed forces performed well, and ensured that the basic conditions of security for free exercise of the franchise were respected.


It was noted that party monitors and voters waiting in line were careful to abstain from any attempts to proselytize or to influence voting. In fact no incidents of any kind were reported during the process, and voters were free to exercise their franchise at all times during the day. 3. Counting and Tabulating the Results The vote count and tabulation were properly and quickly carried out, without incident of serious magnitude. The centers responsible for tabulating the results also performed their work without problems. According to the INDRA management, only a very small percentage of the voting machines experienced operational difficulties on election day. The few problems that did occur were generally solved quickly. Only 1 percent of the voting machines, nationwide, were out of order, a considerable improvement over the record of the regional elections on November 8. It should be noted that 96 percent of the valid votes cast were distributed between the two principal alliances supporting, respectively, Hugo Chávez Frías (56.2 percent) and Henrique Salas Römer (39.9 percent). It is also worth noting that voter participation and turnout in this election was higher, and abstention was consequently lower (35.7 percent). This was an improvement over both the recent regional elections and the previous presidential election. On December 4, 1998, only two days before the election, the CNE, acting under articles 159 and 171 of the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation, ruled that ballots would be considered invalid if voters placed a mark in more than one box. Despite the possible difficulties in making this announcement known, invalid votes (which included both spoiled and blank ballots) amounted to only 6 percent of the total ballots cast.

3.1 Projecting Trends – the Quick Count On election day, outcome trends can be projected by means of the "quick count" procedure that is normally used by OAS Electoral Observer Missions as a kind of audit of the official vote count. A "quick count" requires the prior selection, on the basis of statistical sampling, of a particular set of polling stations where OAS observers can witness the counting of the votes, and confirm the results. Applying statistical projection methods to these results, it is possible to project the outcome from the remaining polls around the country. Each candidate’s official percentage of the vote is compared with the results of this "quick count" projection, and if the two outcomes are not consistent, within a certain margin of error, problems with the official count may be suspected.4 This process, which has been repeatedly used by OAS Electoral Observer Missions, was once again applied to the Venezuelan presidential election of December 6, 1998. 4. It is important to point out that the significance of this “quick count” has to do not with predicting the winner (although this would be useful enough in its own right), but rather with its ability to reveal any suspicious discrepancies in the official count. For example, if the “quick count” points to a tie between two candidates, and the official data do so as well, there will be no reason to suspect any irregularity in the official count even if it is not possible to declare a winner, making due allowance for the known margin of error.


A special feature of this election was that at 82.9 percent of the polling stations around the country, the ballots were counted by machine. When the polls closed, the machine transmitted the results to the tabulation center by modem and printed out a tally sheet that served for the "quick count"; the ballots were kept in a closed container under the machine. Where the sample included polling stations that counted the ballots by hand, the "quick count" procedure was performed as in other countries. On the basis of the number of observers available to the Mission, the sample selected consisted of 60 polling stations across the country. As soon as the outcome of the count (manual or automatic) was obtained, each observer transmitted the data to the Mission’s computer center. Separate projections for various strata were combined to produce an estimated vote share for each candidate. In this way, the scheme selected represented a stratified random sample.

3.1.1 The Sampling Process From the 20,201 polling stations throughout the country, the strata for the sample were composed as follows: 1,432 in stratum 1; 1,758 in stratum 2; 2,188 in stratum 3; and 14,823 in stratum 4. Non-automated polls accounted for 17.1 percent of the total nationwide, and 16.7 percent (10 out of 60) in the sample. Following is a detailed breakdown of the primary and secondary samples designed to produce the "quick count" for the December 6 presidential election.

Primary Sample Registered Voters

State

Municipality

Parish

Voting Center

Polling Station

17,300 CARABOBO Miranda Miranda Esc. Daniel Mendoza 3 19,180 CARABOBO Valencia San José G.E. Pedro Castillo 1 19,590 CARABOBO Libertador Tocuyito Esc. B. Ofelia Matute 1 19,969 CARABOBO Valencia Miguel Peña U. E. Fund. Valencia 3 4,940 ANZOATEGUI Bolivar El Carmen G.E. Angel C. Bello 1 45,750 SUCRE Cajigal Libertad Esc. Estadal N° 598 1 46,930 SUCRE Ribero Sta María G.E. Eliso Silva 2 47,480 SUCRE Sucre Valentín V. Esc. Rómulo Gallegos 2 47,510 SUCRE Sucre Valentín V. G.E. Estadal Nva Esparta 7 60,260 ZULIA Mara La Sierrita Esc. Nac. Ana María Campos 4 61,000 ZULIA Maracaibo O. Villalobos G.E. Hermagoras Chavez 9 61,130 ZULIA Maracaibo Cristo Aranz E B N Magdalena Ocando 1 61,880 ZULIA Maracaibo C. Acosta Esc. Divina Pastora 7 62,180 ZULIA J. E. Losada M. Parra G.E. Abdenago Avila 1 62,680 ZULIA Miranda Altagracia Esc. B. Set. Prof. A. Cepeda 2 340 DTO FEDERAL Libertador La Pastora Esc.B. Div. Albertina Andress. 2 2,840 DTO FEDERAL Libertador El Recreo Oficina de Telégrafos 1 2,960 DTO FEDERAL Libertador El Valle Liceo José Avalos 8 3,410 DTO FEDERAL Libertador La Vega U. Educ. Nac. Pedro Fontes 5 3,420 DTO FEDERAL Libertador La Vega Col. Parroq. Arturo C. Alvarez 3 4,300 VARGAS Vargas Maiquetía Esc. Manuel S. Sanchez 2 8,070 APURE P. Camejo Codazzi E. B. Conc. S/N Médano Alto 1


9,280 ARAGUA Girardot Las Delicias E.B. Las Delicias 4 9,690 ARAGUA M. B. Irragory O. Costa Conc. Esc. N° 1995-1996 1 9,720 ARAGUA Libertador Sn.M. Porres E.B. San Isidro Labrador 4 9,882 ARAGUA S. Mariño Turmero C. Sup. Educ. Esp. A. Villena 3 9,910 ARAGUA Fco. Linares Sta Rita E. B. Arminda Morillo 9 10,910 ARAGUA Sucre Cagua E. B. Luis A. Alvarado 3 12,991 BARINAS A. Arvelo Sabaneta G.E. Elías Cordero Uzcategui 2 13,491 BARINAS Rojas Sta. Rosa Esc. Estadal Conc. 122 y s/N 1 14,971 BOLIVAR Heres La Sabanita Esc. Estadal B. Andrés Bello 3 21,560 FALCON Jacura Araurima E. B. Mixta 518 1 21,641 FALCON C. Manaure Yaracal E.B. Unit. Conc. Est. Altamira 1 21,720 FALCON Acosta S. J. Cayos G. E. Pedro Castro Ugarte 1 25,510 GUARICO L. Mercedes L. Mercedes U. E. Mons. Rodriguez A. 4 26,120 GUARICO Miranda Calabozo G. E. Pedro Itriago Chacin 1 27,120 GUARICO Roscio S. J. Morros E. Estadal N° 220-11 1 27,180 GUARICO Roscio S. J. Morros Esc. Graduada Amalia de Lara 2 29,571 LARA A. Eloy Blanco Piotamayo Esc. Concentrada Titinal 1 30,210 LARA Morán Morán Esc. Concentrada N° 4106-303 1 30,261 LARA Palavecino Cabudare Esc. Exp. Jacinto Lara 2 33,120 MERIDA Libertador Caracciolo E. B. Fermín Ruiz Valero 1 34,792 MIRANDA Independencia Sta Teresa E. B. Dos Lagunillas R. Leoni 2 35,402 MIRANDA Paz Castillo Sta Lucía U. E. Lía Imber de Coronil 2 35,461 MIRANDA Urdaneta Cua Colegio José María Carreño 4 36,791 MIRANDA Guaicaipuro Los Teques Grp.Esc. Simón Bolívar 2 37,373 MIRANDA Los Salias Sn. A. Altos Esc. San Francisco de Asis 1 37,540 MIRANDA Páez Río Chico Grp.Esc.Rafael Arévalo G. 5 39,090 MIRANDA Sucre Petare Grp.Esc.Rafael N. Baute 2 40,500 MONAGAS Maturín Sn. Simón Grp.Esc.Félix A.Caldero 5 41,020 MONAGAS E. Zamora El Tejero Grp.Esc. Lisandro Rivero 4 41,510 NVA ESPARTA Ant. del Campo Paraguachi E. B. Antolín del Campo 2 42,000 NVA ESPARTA Gómez Sucre E. B. José Cortez Madariaga 4 42,970 PORTUGUESA Guanare V.del Corom. U. E. Nac. Tucupido 1 43,510 PORTUGUESA Ospino Ospino Esc. Nac. Graduada Ospino 1 43,560 PORTUGUESA Páez Acarigua E. B. Hermanas Perazas 2 43,612 PORTUGUESA Páez Acarigua E. B. Luisa Graterol de Perez 2 43,751 PORTUGUESA Páez R. Peraza U. E. Espinital 1 43,762 PORTUGUESA Páez Payara Esc.Est.Conc. N° 143 Cajarito 1 50,100 TACHIRA San Cristóbal S. J. Bautista G. E. Nac. Bustamante 1

Secondary Sample Rgistered Voters

State

Municipality

Parish

Voting Center

Polling Station

16,600 CARABOBO Carlos Arévalo Belén E. B. Manaure 1 19,034 CARABOBO San Diego San Diego Colegio Monseñor de Talavera 4 19,141 CARABOBO Valencia San José Escuela Minerva 1 20,090 CARABOBO Valencia R. Urdaneta Liceo José Austria 9 4,570 ANZOATEGUI Anaco Anaco U.E. Anaco Corpoven 5 4,940 ANZOATEGUI Bolivar El Carmen G.E. Angel C. Bello 2 6,830 ANZOATEGUI Sotillo Pozuelo G.E. Cacique Paisana 4 44,820 SUCRE Benitez El Pilar Esc. Estadal N° 31 1 47,490 SUCRE Sucre Valentín V. Liceo Comb. Modesto Silva 4 57,861 ZULIA Baralt M. C. Matos E. B. Conc.Est. N E B 1 61,040 ZULIA Maracaibo O. Villalobos G. E. Don Bosco 1 61,940 ZULIA Maracaibo C. Mara G. E Carmelita Morales 2 62,392 ZULIA San Francisco D. Flores Esc. Nueva Venezuela 2 62,393 ZULIA Maracaibo L. H.Higuera Kinder Aquiles Nazoa 1 62,560 ZULIA San Francisco Los Cortijos Esc. Teresa Bustamante 3 280 DTO FEDERAL Libertador Catedral Esc. B. Bolívar 1


341 DTO FEDERAL Libertador La Pastora Esc. Unitaria N° 44 1 704 DTO FEDERAL Libertador Altagracia Jardín de Inf. Rafael M. Baralt 2 950 DTO FEDERAL Libertador El Paraiso Esc. Mario Briceño Iragorry 2 2,840 DTO FEDERAL Libertador El Recreo Oficina de Telégrafos 3 2,961 DTO FEDERAL Libertador El Valle Jardín de Inf Teotiste A. de G. 2 3,450 DTO FEDERAL Libertador La Vega E. B. Nac. Amanda Schnell 1 4,150 VARGAS Vargas Macuto Esc. Municipal Francis.Fajard 1 4,320 VARGAS Vargas Maiquetía Esc. Municipal Roscio 2 8,110 APURE P. Camejo S. J. Payara G.E. Juan Francisco Este 4 9,714 ARAGUA Libertador S. M. Porres Pre- Escolar Madre de Jesús 1 10,930 ARAGUA Sucre Cagua Antiguo Local E.B. F-L 6 12,580 BARINAS E. Zamora R.I.Mendez U. B. Daniel Navea 3 13,360 BARINAS Rojas Dolores Esc. Estadal N° 334 1 13,940 BOLIVAR Caroni Cachamay Colegio Nazaret 2 15,010 BOLIVAR Heres V. Hermosa Esc. Estadal Virgen del Valle 4 21,180 COJEDES San Carlos San Carlos Esc. Granja Anibal Dominici 1 21,643 FALCON C. Manaure Yaracal E. B. María de Eugenio Hoy 2 26,171 GUARICO Miranda Calabozo Esc. Juan E. Ledezma A. 1 26,470 GUARICO Monagas A. de Orituco U. B. Próspero Infante 1 27,220 GUARICO Roscio S. J. Morros G. E. J.De los Santos Pereira 3 29,690 LARA Morán Anzoategui Esc.De los Membrillos N°4 1 30,260 LARA Palavencio Cabudare Esc. Concentrada La Mata 1 33,040 MERIDA Libertador A.Spinettidin E. B. Emiro Fuenmayor 4 33,192 MERIDA Libertador Sagrario E. B. Coromoto 1 34,840 MIRANDA Lander Ocum. Del T G. E. Nac. Miranda 4 36,821 MIRANDA Guaicaipuro Los Teques Colegio Ambrosio Plaza 8 37,540 MIRANDA Páez Río Chico G. E. Rafael Arevalo Gonzalez 1 39,112 MIRANDA Sucre Petare Inst. Beltrán Russel 1 39,250 MIRANDA Sucre Petare E.B. Nac. Manuel Aguirre E. 3 40,520 MONAGAS Maturín Alto Godos E.B. Adriana R. de Sequera 3 40,523 MONAGAS Maturín Alto Godos E.B.Mario Briceño Iragorry 2 40,981 MONAGAS Maturín Alto Godos E.B. Apolinar Cantor 8 41,660 NVA ESPARTA Arismendi La Asunción Esc. Conc. N° 30-31 2 42,060 NVA ESPARTA V. I. Coche S. P. Coche E. B. Agustín R. Hernández 2 42,400 PORTUGUESA Agua Blanca Agua Blanca Esc. Nac. Quebrada Honda 1 42,820 PORTUGUESA Guanare Guanare E. B. José María Vargas 3 43,110 PORTUGUESA G. Boconoito Boconoito Esc.Nac.Conc.N° 2882 y Anex 1 43,150 PORTUGUESA Papelón Papelón Esc.Nac. Ciudad de San Felipe 2 43,788 PORTUGUESA Sucre Villa Rosa Esc. Estadal N° 244 1 43,841 PORTUGUESA Sucre Villa Rosa Esc. Estadal N° 259 1 48,780 TACHIRA Andrés Bello Cordero U. E. Dr. Villalobos 7 50,160 TACHIRA San Cristóbal S. J. Bautista Liceo Ramón Velazquez 7 51,090 TACHIRA Libertador E. Ochoa Esc.Pre-vocacional Puerto Nvo 1 56,260 YARACUY Nirgua Nirgua E. B. Miguel A. Granados 2

3.1.2 Estimates The percentage of votes for each candidate, the number of invalid votes, and the percentage of eligible electors who did not vote were estimated. A margin of error for each estimate was calculated, with a coefficient of confidence of 99%.


3.1.3 Estimates The following table sets out the results of the projected voting trends, based on the data collected from the “quick count.”5

Percentage of Votes per Candidate, Invalid Votes, and Abstentions

Confidence Limits (99%)

Candidates/Invalid/Abstentión

Percentage of Votes

Lower Limit Upper Limit Error

CHAVEZ FRIAS 58.2 52.9 63.4 5.3 SALAS ROMER 37.5 32.0 43.0 5.5 IRENE SAEZ 2.7 2.2 3.2 0.5 ALFARO 0.8 0.0 1.6 0.8 ALFREDO RAMOS 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.6 MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1 RADAMES MUÑOZ LEON 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 IGNACIO QUINTANA G. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ALEJANDRO PENA ESCLUSA

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

NICASIO FAUBLARK 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 SUJU 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 DOMENICO TANZI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Invalid votes 11.1 6.8 15.3 4.3 Did not vote

35.0 29.9 40.2 5.1

3.2 Evaluation of the Election Information System One of the tasks of the Electoral Observer Mission was to evaluate the election information system used in the presidential elections (the same as the one that had been used for the regional elections on November 8), for integrity, transparency, and security of the entire automation process, from the installation of the polling stations to the final results. The Mission encountered a great deal of difficulty in obtaining information for this work, particularly on the dates and times of the steps taken to audit the voting machines and run simulations on them. In particular, the company responsible for the automation process, INDRA Sistemas S.A., refused to provide the Mission with a copy of the technical manuals and procedures for the system. And it was only after much effort and repeated requests that the Mission received permission for a brief (10-minute) visit to the premises of the company's technical support services for the system. Faced with this lack of cooperation, and frustrated in its attempts to gain access to the system, the Mission was unable to confirm the information contained in the materials distributed by the CNE or supplied orally by officials of the CNE and employees of INDRA.

5 The values for each of the strata and the proportion of polling stations used in the estimates to obtain the sample are available from the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy-MOE/VEN 98.


3.2.1 Description of the Process

As was said above in evaluating the automated voting system for the regional elections, the process was divided into two stages: obtaining results from the polling stations and consolidating results at the regional and national levels. In the first stage, the opening of the polls, the conduct of the vote and the closing of the polls were similar to those described in the section on the electoral information system in the chapter on the regional elections. In the second stage, each set of data transmitted from a voting machine bears a unique identification symbol that distinguishes it from all other sets of data transmitted from the same or other machines, and there are also control records that ensure that the transmissions are made and received correctly. All the connections of the system are protected by keywords known only to the personnel handling the application. There were 7,000 voting machines distributed around the country, and they made it possible to automate the count for 91.17 percent of all registered voters. For totaling the results, each of the Regional Election Boards had a regional tabulation center, in which the data transmitted from each voting machine could be processed and totaled by means of a QNX server connected over a local communication link to various microcomputers, where the results from the non-automated polls could be digitized as well. The data are transmitted to the tabulation center, in the CNE, where there is a UNIX server connected over a local communication link to other equipment in which, after verification by the magistrates, the data for automated and manual polls are integrated and the official results are then announced. The applications for regional and national consolidation, and for entering the manual reports, use the Cobol programming language and a conventional file structure.

3.2.2 Security Measures For the sake of brevity, the reader need only be referred to the discussion on security measures in the chapter on the regional elections, to which the following may be added:

• About 4,000 "dedicated lines" were set aside exclusively to transmit the tally sheets produced by the voting machines;

• To make the results official, magistrates of the CNE must verify both the returns from

the voting machines and the data in the manual vote count reports received at the 24 regional tabulation centers.


3.2.3 Evaluation From the standpoint of the objectives for which the system was designed, to modernize the election process, alleviate the burden on the poll workers, and reduce the time before the official results were announced, these were in large measure achieved. However, it cannot be said that the system is fully secure and tamperproof. Actually, it has a number of weaknesses, primarily due to the use of an antiquated environment and an obsolete design that is extremely inflexible and does not allow for any necessary changes to be made within the short time available to the electoral authorities. (The machines had to be fully tested before the vote, and any last-minute changes would have required another entire round of testing, for which there was no time in many cases). Two simulations were run before the elections of November 8 and December 6, focused primarily on the functioning of the machines and the transmission of data. These simulations did not, however, include the regional and national tabulation of voting information from the printed tally sheets, or the applications for inserting data from annual reports. If total transparency is to be assured, steps will have to be taken to correct the following shortcomings:

• The software recorded on the memory cards of the voting machines must be verified; • During the count, the results generated by the voting machines should be checked

against those obtained from manual calculations; • The results transmitted by the polling stations to the tabulation centers must be

checked, since only data aggregated at the regional level are available over the Internet. Confidence in the automation process was based largely on the reputation of the company contracted for this purpose, and on the quality of its supervisors and technical personnel, who were selected and trained in accordance with a special agreement between INDRA Sistemas S.A. and the Simón Rodríguez National Experimental University (UNESR). But it must be added that the computer technicians of the CNE, who had the heavy responsibility of ensuring the transparency of the election process, betrayed a degree of frustration at their limited involvement in the entire automation process.

3.3 Assumption of Office by the New President When the new Constitutional President of the Republic, Lt. Col. (ret.) Hugo Chávez Frías, took office on February 2, 1999, the election process was concluded, and the activities of the OAS Electoral Observer Mission came to an end. 4. Conclusions and Recommendations The Mission offers the following observations and conclusions on the Venezuelan presidential elections of December 6, 1998:


1. The organization and course of the process were significantly improved over the regional elections on November 8, with their problems and disruptions. This reflected a generally better understanding of the newly adopted automation technology and the cooperation of the voters, who turned out in great numbers at the voting centers early in the day. Most of the polling stations opened somewhat late, between 30 minutes and an hour after the scheduled opening at 6 a.m., but this was substantially less than the delay during the regional elections. Few difficulties were reported in setting up the polling stations. A small proportion of officials, chosen by lot, failed to appear on time and had to be replaced.

2. The entire election, from the opening to the close of the polls and the ballot count, was

fully transparent. Voters went to the polls in a calm and orderly atmosphere, demonstrating their commitment to fulfilling their democratic responsibilities. Neither inside the voting centers nor in their immediate vicinity were any incidents reported that might have affected the integrity or transparency of the voting process, and no cases of voter intimidation were recorded.

3. With the benefit of the recent experience with the regional elections, the voting and

ballot count were much better organized and moved faster, even at polling stations where the tallying had to be done by hand. Among other reasons, this was because the voters were more familiar with the location of the polls and the voting procedures to be followed and because the ballot was much simpler and required each voter to select only one candidate and one political party (see annexes).

4. Members of the armed forces working with the Plan República were present at all the

locations visited by the Mission, and made a fundamental contribution to the organization of the polling stations.

5. In some electoral precincts, the arrangement of space was not conducive to ballot

secrecy, but no attempts were made to take advantage of the circumstances to influence or manipulate people's votes.

6. Despite the lengthy process all voters had to undergo (identify themselves and be

registered, have the security number on the tab of the ballot recorded, take the ballot into the booth, mark their preference on it, insert it in the ballot box or the voting machine, and retrieve their identity cards), the vote proceeded smoothly in the polling stations visited, and no irregularities were noted that might have affected the transparency of the process.

7. The Mission found some minor defects in the printing of the ballots. In the municipality

of El Recreo in the state of San Francisco de Apure, about 400 ballots were found to have ink spots near the boxes voters were supposed to mark, and these ballots were promptly replaced.

8. The fact that there were fewer party monitors at each polling station helped to prevent

crowds and congestion at the voting centers. Their number was generally restricted to


one per party or grouping, and in the judgment of the Mission this did nothing to detract from proper surveillance of the election process.

9. No great difficulties with the voting machines or printers were noted at any of the polling

stations visited. The occasional problems that arose were quickly dealt with, and had no effect on the smooth progress of either the vote or the count. In the country as a whole, according to INDRA and CNE sources, only 1 percent of the voting machines developed problems severe enough that they had to be shut down. The proportion of machines that were out of service was considerably lower than during the regional elections of November 8, indicating that many of the difficulties encountered then had been overcome in the meantime.

10. No formal complaints were filed with the Mission about anything that happened during

the December 6 election. However, the Mission did receive, for information purposes, copies of some complaints made directly to the election authorities.

11. By means of the “quick count” that is one of the routine activities of OAS Electoral

Observer Missions, the Mission was able to project the voting trends on the basis of a statistical sample and, by comparing the results with the official returns, to verify the transparency of the process of vote count and tabulation, both manual and automated.

12. The shifts that occurred in the major political alliances and consequently in the vote-

counting process produced no difficulties that can be said to have had an impact on the final results. The changes in alliances among the political parties, on the very eve of the election, had changed the rule for validating votes during the count: any ballot on which more than one box was marked was to be declared invalid (see annexes). In most cases, the chairmen of the polling stations complied with the instructions they received to warn voters as they received their ballots that they were to mark only one box.

13. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Mission considers that the elections of

December 6 were clean, clear, and transparent, and gave ample proof of the Venezuelan citizenry's sense of civic responsibility and devotion to democracy.

14. The objectives of automation (to modernize the election process so as to reduce the

burden on polling-station officials and shorten the time needed for announcing the official results) were largely achieved. But the system cannot be called entirely secure and tamperproof.

15. The Mission pays tribute to the National Elections Council and the Regional Election

Boards for the manner in which they organized and conducted the elections at a time when a whole new system was being introduced. The Mission also wishes to mention the important role played by the armed forces through their participation in the Plan República, and the contribution they made to the smooth progress of the event.

16. In addition, the Mission wishes to express its thanks for the support and facilities that

the election agencies and the civil and military authorities of Venezuela provided to its members, and to note the constructive role of the news media in providing sound information and instructions to the electorate.


4.1 Recommendation Following are some suggestions or recommendations arising out of the Mission’s work in Venezuela. They reflect in large part the experience that the OAS has accumulated in similar undertakings in other countries of the hemisphere. It is hoped that they will be found useful for purposes of improving the procedures and organization of future elections in Venezuela:

• Poll workers need better training and orientation to prepare them for each of the steps in the process: opening the polling station, conducting the vote, and counting the ballots. This training should include guidelines for dealing with political-party monitors, on the basis of a proper understanding of the powers and rights accorded these representatives by the Organic Law on Elections and Political Participation and its regulations. Similarly, the chairmen of the polling stations should be given instructions so that they can show voters how to cast their ballot and make sure that they understand.

• More effort should also be put into campaigns to teach as wide a public as possible

about voting procedures. This is an indispensable requirement for any free election, and is likely to have the further effect of reducing the number of invalid votes.

• With the introduction of automation, it is essential to provide better training for the

operators and technicians responsible for the voting machines, to ensure that the machines are not put out of service by technical breakdowns or human error.

• It would be a good idea to rethink the design of the ballot and its security tab. In some

cases, the ballots were so long and the box that voters were supposed to mark was so small as to render them impractical. Furthermore, the complex mechanism involving the security tab on the ballot-recording the number in the voters’ book and then tearing off the tab, with the risk of damage to the ballot that might prevent it from fitting into the voting machine–all these steps led to delays and difficulties that could easily be avoided. It would also be advisable to redesign and shorten the official poll reports, and perhaps to use different colors for each copy. Above all, the information required in each report should be simplified to avoid confusion.

• The listing of voters as they appear at the polls, a step that for the most part merely

repeats information already contained in the official voters’ book, is unnecessary and could be dispensed with.

• In selecting polling-station premises, it would be useful to bear in mind the need of

enough space for the poll workers and the voting machines and for ensuring ballot secrecy. This precaution would also help to eliminate the jostling and tension that can arise when so many players are interacting within a small space: poll workers, political-party monitors, voters, military personnel, and observers.

• The election authorities, and in particular the National Electoral Council, might wish to

review the list of citizens excluded from the electoral registers, and thereby denied the


right to vote. A careful study of these cases might well show that many of them should in fact be on the list. This would also offer an excellent opportunity for purging the national register.

• The lists of voters registered for each individual polling station, which are posted outside

the election precincts, should be printed in larger type. For many voters, particularly the elderly, they are virtually illegible.

• At polls where large numbers of voters are expected, confusion and delays can result

when a single voting machine must do service for three separate polls. The number of individual polling stations assigned to each machine should be reconsidered, and should be reduced to one or two if the size of the voting population so indicates.

• The Permanent Electoral Registry, an agency essential to ensuring that citizens receive

proper and timely documentation for exercising their franchise, needs institutional strengthening and modernization. Greater efficiency and better communications with other election authorities would contribute to cleansing the national register.

• Consideration should be given to stationing a representative of the National Council or

some subsidiary election agency at voting centers, to answer any questions poll workers may have. In the absence of such officials, it fell to military members of the Plan República to deal with them.

• It would be useful to consider amending the Organic Law on Elections and Political

Participation or approving regulations for it about the time limits for parties to change candidates, to give the Council time to modify the ballots on the one hand and notify voters of the changes on the other.

4.2 Consideration with Respect tothe Information System

1. Responsibility for the system should be transferred to the computer technicians of the Council, so they would be better able to evaluate and validate the entire electoral process.

2. It would be useful to develop a new electoral information system on a platform

that permits monitoring and assessing the process. The environment should use a fourth-generation programming language that can respond quickly to events as they occur. Similarly, a comprehensive database management system with access filters that will prevent unauthorized invasions should be adopted.

3. Technical staff of the Council should then be trained in the technologies adopted

for the new electoral information system. 4. Technical documentation for the new system and its various procedures should

be produced. 5. Data that are to be transmitted from various parts of the country should be


encrypted. 6. The voting-machine software should be changed so that a polling station that

has already closed can tally its ballots even if other stations using the same machine are still open.

7. It would be useful to review the procedures followed by poll workers, to speed

up the process and eliminate unnecessary tasks. 8. The tallies reported from each polling station should be posted on the Internet,

to ensure the transparency of the results. 9. A nationwide simulation exercise of the electoral system should be held, to test

the efficiency and effectiveness of the information and transmission systems. 10. A contingency plan should be drafted for replacing voting machines that break

down during election day.

CHAPTER VI Annexes