edwards medieval theories of distinctions

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MEDIEVAL THEORIES OF DISTINCTION

Sandra Stanton Edwards

A DISSERTATION

in

Philosophy

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciencesof the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of theRequirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

1 9 7 4

Supervisor of Dissertation



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E D W A R D S , S a n d r a S t a n t o n , 1 9 4 4 - M E D I E V A L T H E O R I E S O F D I S T I N C T I O N .

U n i v e r s i t y o f P e n n s y l v a n i a , P h . D . , 1 9 7 4 P h i l o s o p h y

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

© 1 9 7 4

SANDRA STANTON EDWARDS

A L L R I G H T S R E S E R V E D

produced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


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TNTBX

Abelard, Peter, 20, 253

Accident, (see Substance)

Act (and potency), 62-63

Albertus Magnus, 255

Alexander of Hales, 20, 254-255

Angels, 73-74

Aquinas, St. Thomas, 5, 6, 11, 14-17, 20, 21, 22, 30-86, 186, 190, 191,204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 216, 218, 222, 229-31,234, 242, 244, 256-335

Aristotle, 1, 2, 3, 33-34

Austin, J.L., 7

Bochenski, I.M., 48

Boethius, 1, 252

Bonaventure, St., 20, 21, 87-105, 209, 210, 219, 222-3, 225, 336-357

Common nature, 163-165

Concept, 27, 176, 196

Difference, analogical, 33, 34; essential, 102-104; formal, 37-43; generic,53,34; material, 35-37; specific, 33, 34; numerical, 33, 34,64, 169

Distinction, 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 22, 30-34; adequate, 146-148; of attributes, 91-98, 225; formal, 136-146, 150-151, 157-166, 172-174,184-186, 212, 226-227; intentional, 110-118, 208, 225-226;

modal, 28, 148-149, 213-214, 228; rational, 4, 10, 13, 20, 21,27, 32-33, 47-59, 79-83, 98-102, 107-109, 152-153, 174-178,190-196, 207 , 213, 222; rea.', 4, 10, 13, 20, 21, 27, 32-33,35-47, 61-78, 88-91, 105-107, 120-127, 129-151, 153-157, 170-172, 180-190, 201-207, 214-215, 218-221; res and ratio. 178-179;secundum quid. 135-151, 153-157; simpliciter, 129-135, 157-160;verbal, 59-61

Durandus of St. Pourcain, 3, 212, 376-377

iii



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iv

Base easentiae & esse existentiae, 116-118

Essence, and existence, 66-71, 74, 120-126, 182-183

Essence, and individual, 71-73, 74

Form (see Matter)

Formality, 137-145

Francis Mayron, 167, 429-430

Geach, Peter, 236-239

Genus, and difference, 161-163, 188-190

Gilbert of Poiree, 20, 252

Giles of Rome, 20, 120-127, 183, 202, 206, 212, 219, 371-375

God, 74-77, 79-82, 92-98, 99-102, 159-161, 190-195, (see also Trinity)

Godfrey of Fontaines, 212, 376

Haecceity (see Common Nature)

Henry of Ghent, 11, 20, 105-119, 202, 204, 208, 209, 211, 220, 223, 225-226,358-370

Hugh of St. Victor, 254

Identity (see also Difference, Distinction, Unity), 3, 5, 6, 7, 229-235;relative, 236-249

Intentio. 110-118

Intuitive cognition, 134-135

John of St. Thomas, 3, 5, 377-378

Johnson, WJB., 246

Lemmon, E.J., 76n

Lewis, C.I., 54n, 108



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V

Matter (and form), 43, 64-65, 88-90, 105, 154-156, 180, 204

Modi se habendi. 91-98

Moore, G.E., 247-248

Object, formal and material, 154n

Ockham, William of, 5, 5, 11, 18-20, 21, 22, 169-199, 202-205, 209, 210, 215,214, 216, 217, 221, 224, 227-228, 252-254, 255, 240-241,451-478

Owens, J., 69

Perry, J,, 238

Peter Damian, 255Peter John Olivi, 378-379

Peter Lombard, 255

Petrus Thomas, 450, 167

Potency (see Act)

Primo diversa, 155-156, 165

Principles, 14, 15, 16

Quine, W. V., 238, 246

Richard of St, Victor, 254

Ross, J.F., 81

Scotus, John Duns, 5, 11, 17-18, 21, 128-168, 184-186, 188, 204, 205, 206,209, 210, 212, 215-216, 217, 220, 226-227, 231-232, 241,390-429

Soul, 77-78, 159, 205-206

Stokes, M. , 6

Stout, 0., 247-248

Suarez, Franciscus, 5, 10, 27-30, 202, 213, 215, 221, 224-225, 228, 240, 241,242-243, 244



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Substance (and accident), 44, 65-66, 103, 156-157

Supposition, 192-195

Terms (connotative and absolute), 175-176, 182, 194

Tertullian, 2, 252

Transcendentals, 200

Trinity, 1, 8, 74-77, 90-98, 172-174, 205, 240

Unitive containment, 141-145

Unity (see also Identity), 5, 229-255, 245

Universsils, 16, 17, 18, 19 , 69-71, 163-165, 183-186

Van Fraassen, 54

Vollert, C., 4

Wiggins, D., 239

Wolter, A., 209



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TABUS OF CONTENTS

Index.......................................... iiiBibliography.................................... .

Introduction1. General Survey............................. 12. Agreement and disagreement amongthe

philosophers. ............................ 103. Sources of disagreement

A. Aquinas................................14B. Scotus................................ 17C. Ockham.......... .....18

4. Development of the theories.................. 203. Nature and methods of inquiry....... 226. Suarez' s treatment......................... 27

Chapter I; St. Thomas Aquinas1. General survey.......................... ..*302. The real distinction................. 35

A* The material difference.................. 35B. The formal difference............ 37C. Other real distinctions................. 43

3. The rational distinction.................... 47A. The meaning of "ratio/'........ .47B. The process of knowing................... 50C. The nature of the rationaldistinction...... 53D. Foundations of rational distinctions ....54E. Summary............................... 57

4. The verbal distinction...................... 595. Applications of these distinctions............61

A. The real distinction...... ............... 61B. The rational distinction................. 78

6. Conclusion......... 83

Chapter II: Minor Philosophers1. St. Bonaventure............................87

A. General survey......................... 87B. The real distinction.......... ........88C. The distinction of attributes............ 91D. The rational distinction.................98B. The essential difference................102F. Conclusion.... ...................104

2. Henry of Ghent.................. 105A. The real distinction............ 105B. The rational distinction................ 107C. The intentional distinction............. 110D. The uses of the intentionaldistinction.... 116B. Conclusion............. 118

vii



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3. Giles of Rome............................ 120

Chapter III: John Duns Scotus1. General survey......... ............1282. The real distinction......................129

km Real simoliciter..................... .129B. The real distinctions secundum quid...... 135

i. Formal distinctions............. ...*136ii. Other distinctions secundum quid..... 146

C. Summary....... 1493. The rational distinction...................1524* Applications of the distinctions.......... .*153

A. The real distinction...................153B. The formal distinction................. 157

5* Conclusion.............................. 166

Chapter IV: William of Ockham

1. General survey.......................... .1692. The real distinction......... ............ 1703. The formal distinction..... »....... 1724. The rational distinction.................. 1745. The distinction between res andratio........ 1786. Summary ........ *.... 1797. Applications of these distinctions.......... 180

A. The real distinctions................. 180B. The rational distinction...............190

8. Conclusion.............................. 197

Chapter V: Conclusion1. Comparative summary.................. .....2002. Accounts of identity and unity............. 2293. Distinctions and identity................ ..236

Appendix...................................... 250Early philosophers........................... 252St. Thomas Aquinas......................... ..256St. Bonaventure............................. 336Henry of Ghent............................... 358Giles of Rome........ 371Godfrey of Fontaines........................ ...376Durandus of St. Pourcain........... ...376John of St. Thomas.......................... 377Peter John Olivi.................. 378John Duns Scotus..............................380Francis Mayron ......................... 429Petrus Thomas. ................. 430William of Ockham............... .431



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TABIS OF CHARTS

Real distinctionAquinas......................................... 218Bonaventure.......... .219Giles of Rome............................ 219

Henry of Ghent...................................

220Scotus...... *.................... 220Ockham................................ 221Suarez. .................... .221

Rational distinctionAquinas............................ .222Bonaventure................................ 222Henry of Ghent............ .....223Scotus.......................................... 223Ockham...................... ..224Suarez.................. *................. 224

Other distinctionsBonaventure...................................... 223Henry of Ghent................... 223Scotus. ........... *.............226Ockham........... .227Suarez..................... 228

ix



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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Albertus Magnus: Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, ed. Borgnet. 38 vols. Paris:

Vives, 1890-1899.Alexander of Hales: Suama Theologies. 4 vols, Florence: ad Claras Aquas

(Quaracchi), 1924-1946.

Aristotle: The Works of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross. 12 vols. London: Oxford

University Press, 1955.

Austin, J.L.: Sense and Sensibilia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964

Baudzy, Leon: Lexioue Philosophiaue de Guillaume d*Ockham* Paris: Lethiel*

leux, 1958.

Bochenski, I.M.: M0n Analogy," in Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy, ed.

J. F. Ross. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Publishing Co., 1971.

Boethius: In Porphvrium Commentarium. in Patrologia Latina;. ed. Migne,

vol. 64. Paris, 1844.

Bonaventure: Opera Omnia. 8 vols. Florence: ad Claras Aquas, 1882. 1

Bridges, Geoffrey G.: Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae, O.F.M.

St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute, 1959.

Cajetan: nnmmflnta-rv to Being and Essence. Tr. L. Kendzierski and F. Wade.

Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1964.

Cunningham, F.A.: "St. Thomas on Distinctions," New Scholasticism, 36, 1962

PP. 279-312.

Dun* Scotus, John: Opera Omnia, ed. L. Wadding. 16 vols. Lyons, 1639:

rept. Hildesheim: 01ms, 1968.

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l Philosophies! Writings. trans. A, Wolter. Indianapolis*

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orum. Libri IXIX. 2 vols. Venice, 1572; rept. Hants, Eng.* Gregg, 1964*

Gabbay, D. and J. MoravBcik* "Sameness and Individuation," Journal of

Philosophy. 70, no. 16 (Sept. 20) 1973, pp. 513-526.

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theque S.J., 1961.

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Hugh of St. Victor. Summa Sententiarua. in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne,

vol. 176. Paris, 1844.



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John of St. Thomas: the Material Logic of John of St. Thomaa. tr. Yves

R. Simon, J.J. Glanville, G.D. Hollenhorst. Chicago} University

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Johnson, WJ8.: Logic. 3 vols. New York* Dover Publications, 1964.

Lemmon, B.J.s Beginning Logie. Londons Kelson, 1963*

Levis, C.I.S in Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. LaSalle, 111.}

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Mayron, Francis: Tractatus Foraalitatua and jya Libroa Sententiaroa.

Venice, 1320; rept. Frankfurt/Main: Minerva, 1966.

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Moody, Ernest} The Logic of William of Qckfcya. Mew York: Russell &

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vain: Bibliotheque 3.J., 1962.

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Peter Abdl&rd: Theologia Christiana in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne,

vol. 178, Paris, 1844.

Owens, Joseph: "Commas. Mature," in Inquiries, ed. Ross. (See Boohenaki).

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Perry, John* The Sane F," Phil.Rev.. 79*2 (April) 1970, pp. 181-200.

Peter Banian* Be Fide Catholica in Patrologia Latina, ed. Migne, vol.

145. Paris, 1844.

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Peter Thomas* Quodlibet. ed. M.E. Hooper and E .M. Buytaeri. St. Bona

venture, N.I.* Franciscan Institute, 1957.

Quins, Willard Y.O.t Reference and Modality," in From a Logical Point

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Resnick, Michael* Elementary Logic. New York: McGraw Hill, 1970.

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J. Vrin, 1958.

Ross, James F.t "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language,"

in Anninas. «d. A. Kenny. Sew York* Doubleday, 1969.

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ed. M. Hunitz. New York* New York University Press, 1971.

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Stout,G.P.: "The Nature of Universals and Propositions,” in Studies in

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____________ * Traotatus de gpirituallfrus Creatuyia, ed. L.W.Keeler.

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XV

Wiggins, Davidi Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. Oxford: Black-

well, 1967.

Wolter, Allan: “The Formal Distinction,* in Studies in Philosophy and the

Hiptfflgy of Philosophy. ed* J *K* Byan and B*H* Bonansea* Washington*

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: 'The Realism of Scotus,* Journal of Philosophy. 59> 1962,

pp. 725-736.



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IHTRODUCTIOH

1. General Surrey

Beginning with the thirteenth century, most major medieval phil

osophers developed theories of distinction or accounts of the ways in

which one entity can be distinct or different from another* Such

theories are to be found in the works of Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus,

Oakham, Suarez, and many minor philosophers* There seem to have been

at least two sources for such theories — Aristotle's discussions of

numerical, specific, and generic sameness and difference, and theologi

cal discussions of the nature of the Trinity.* Commentaries on Aris

totle's classifications of sameness and difference often focused on the

problem of universals, while commentaries on the Trinity focused on the

problem of how three distinct divine Persons could share one essence*

The problems are not unrelated, and while they were originally handled

separately, from the thirteenth century on attempts were made to present

unified theories of distinction which would apply to the solution of

both problems*

The term "distinction" appeared first in discussions of the

Trinity, usually contained in commentaries on Boethius's treatise On the

Trinity, and was only later used to signify any type of difference,

Âristotle, Metaphysics. Belta 7, 1016b 53, Topics. I, 7*

1



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diversity, or otherness* The following words of Tertullian are echoed

by Peter Abelard, Peter Damian, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Victor,

Bichard of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, and many

others!

The Son is not other than the Father by diversity,however, but by distribution; nor other by division,but by distinction. 2

Until the thirteenth century, discussions of the problem of universals

usually involved the use of words like "difference,1* "diversity," and

3"otherness," but not the word "distinction."

Medieval philosophers accepted Aristotle*s belief that every

thing which is, is one, i.e. that 'being' and 'one* are convertible

4notions. They also followed Aristotle in believing that 'same' and

'other* (or 'distinct') are transcendentals convertible with 'being*

qua 'being*:

. .. other in one sense is the opposite of the same(so that everything is either the same as or otherthan everything else). . .. 'Other or the same'can therefore be predicated of everything with regard to everything else — but only if the thingsare one and existent, ... 5

Scotus is in substantial agreement when he says, "Every being compared

T̂ertullian, Liber Adversus Praxeam. Ch. IX, in Patrologia Latinaed. Migne, vol. 2 (ParisYl844)«

3See, for example, Boethius and Gilbert of Poiree in the Appendix.

Âristotle, Metaphysics. Gamma, 2, 1003b 22.

Âristotle, Metaphysics. Iota, 3, 1054b 14ff.



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with every other being is either the same as that or diverse; 'same' and

'diverse' are therefore contraries immediately agreeing with 'being' and

convertible with it" (74,75)• And Ockham notes that "just as anything re

lates to being, so it relates to unity. And consequently it relates to

being distinct or indistinct" (45).

Sameness or identity is a type of unity and1distinction (which

was often described as the negation of unity — see Aquinas 6,7 and

Suarex, p. 16) a type of multiplicity. This notion, too, is derived from

Aristotle who says that "sameness is a unity of the being either of more

than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one" and

that things axe other if they are "more than one."̂ Wherever then there

are many entities, these are distinct in some way.

Because of this intimate relation between being and unity, same

ness, and distinction, the kinds of being that there are determine tha

kinds of unity, sameness, and distinction according to many medievals*

John of St. Thomas (l) says that "Unity and distinction must follow upon

the order and intelligible character of being." Being was usually

divided into two types by medieval philosophers, real or mind-independent

being, and conceptual or mind-dependent being (ena rationls). This deter

mined the division of identity and distinction into real and conceptual

types. Durandus of St. Pourcain acknowledges this when he says, "Since

'same' and 'different' divide 'being', so just as 'being* is taken in two

ways, 'identity' and 'difference' (are each taken in two ways]" (l).

Âristotle, Metaphysics. Delta, 9, 1018a, 5ff.



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4 'So there axe real distinctions or differences which exist independently

of the intellect and its operations, such as distinctions obtaining be

tween two things or the principles of these things. There are also dis-

7tinctions which are either wholly or partly manufactured by the intellect.

Purely conceptual or rational distinctions (distinctio rationis or dis-

tinctio secundum rationem are the usual Latin equivalents) have no foun

dation outside the intellect, while distinctions partly created by the

mind and partly founded on the nature of things are conceptual distinctions

with real foundations. Aquinas’s conceptual distinction of divine attri

butes, Bonaventure’s distinction of attribution, Henry of Ghent’s inten

tional distinction, and the distinction of reasoned reason” of Suarez

and the later Thomists are of the latter sort.

Because of the connection between being and distinction, the

theory of distinctions of any particular medieval philosopher provides a

key to his conception of beings

The main reason why a philosopher's theory of distinctions is important is that his solution to the problemof distinctions is a key to his concept of being. Fordistinctions are based on the nature of being; therefore a metaphysician’s view of the nature of distinctions leads to an understanding of his doctrine of beingitself. 8

An understanding of a philosopher's theory of distinctions is also impor

tant to an understanding of his solutions to various metaphysical problems

such as that of universals. Also any philosopher’s theory of distinctions

provides a key to the understanding of his notions of identity.

The division of distinction into the real distinction (distinctiosecundum rem) and the conceptual distinction (distinctio secundum rationem)was clearly made as early as Alexander of Hales, although there are occasional earlier mentions in Gilbert of Poiree and others. See Appendix.

8Cyril Vollert, Introduction to Suarez's On the Various Kinds of Dis

tinction. p. 12.



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"Distinction* has often recently been defined as a negation of

identity, and similar definitions are either explicitly or implicitly

Q

given by medieval philosophers* Aquinas says, "those are distinct one

of which is not the other" (l). (Aquinas distinguished between the "is"

of predication and the "is" of identity (147) and, since there can be a

distinction between two relata one of which is truly predicated of the

other, it would appear that he here means to deny or negate the "is" of

identity and not the "is" of predication (62)). Scotus and uckham use

"distinction" and "nonidentity" almost interchangeably. Suarez says that

distinction consists formally in a negation and notes that where things

are really distinct, there is "no vestige of real identity in them".1̂

John of St. Thomas also describes the real distinction as "a negation or

absence of identity" (3)»

Although the above sort3 of description are common to medieval

philosophers, it is frequently the case that unity and identity are de

fined in terms of negations of division or distinction. Suarez says,

"unity implies a negation of division, and is therefore opposed to multi

tude which arises from division or distinction."*1 Aquinas describes

numerical unity as a lack of distinction or division (3,50), and says

that things which are one or the same in species or genus are undivided

with respect to species or genus (7,48,50). Unity is the absence of

%ee, for example, Michael Eesnick Elementary Logic (H.Y.: McGrawHill, 1970), p. 360s "Two objects are distinct if and only if they arenot identical." Also D. Kalish and R. Montague, Logic (N.Y.: Harcourt,1965). p. 217.

F̂rancis Suarez, On the Various Kinds of Distinctions, trans. CyrilVollert (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1947), p. 16, p. 17.

11-Suarez, p. 16.



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multiplicitywhich arises from some division or distinction; sameness is

the lack ofa type of division or distinction. Michael C. Stokes has

summed this relation up as follows;Things are called 'one' in species, genus, or simply inkind, just because one cannot divide or distinguish thekind of one from the kind of the other. • . . Things arecalled one by continuity because one cannot use a gap.. . to distinguish more than one thing in the whole.There are various ways in which things can be distinguished from each other; if two of them cannot in oneway be distinguished, then as far as that way is concerned they are one thing. 12

Because of these descriptions of unity and identity in terms of

lack of distinction, it would appear that, for Aquinas and Suarez at

least, distinction is a more fundamental notion than either unity or

identity. That is. it is more fundamental in the sense that we under

stand unity and sameness by means of multiplicity and distinction. This

is also supported by the fact that identity was regarded as a relation

(see Aquinas. 6). A relation, however, obtains between at least two

relata, and for there to be two or more relata, there must be some dis

tinction between them.

The very fact that each of the philosophers discussed in this

paper developed a theory of distinctions indicates the fundamental impor

tance of distinction for each of them. Types of identity are normally

discussed by them only in connection with types of distinction. Bxcept

for occasional comments on numerical, specific, and generic identity, the

types of identity which would correspond to the types of distinction

discussed are only infrequently treated. That is, each philosopher

M̂ichael C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington, B.C.* Center for Hellenic Studies, 1971), P* 12.



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provides a careful analysis of statements like "x and y are really dis

tinct,* but little attention is given to analyses of the corresponding

statements such as "x and y are really identical.* It may have been

assumed that, once a type of distinction had been analyzed, the corres

ponding type of identity could be easily constructed because it would

amount to an absence of such a distinction. It may have been thought

that, with words like “same,* “identical," and "one,* the negative uses

"not the same,""distinct," "many," wear the trousers in J.L. Austin's

13sense. That is, we may attach a definite sense to the assertion that

things are identical, the same, or one in some way only by a considera

tion of the ways in which they might not have been the same, identical,

or one. To say that "x and y are identical" is to exclude possible ways

in which x and y might have been distinct; to say that "x and y are one"

is to exclude possible ways in which x and y might have been many. While

medieval philosophers sometimes say that entities are distinct because

they are not the same in some way, they more often say that entities are

the same or one because they are not distinct or many in some way. for

each of them then a theory of distinctions is also a theory of identity

and to some extent a theory of unity.

The problems which seem to have motivated medieval philosophers

to develop theories of distinction were those the solution of which re

quired a reconciliation of some identity with some distinction. These

problems were either metaphysical or theological in nature. On the meta

physical side there was the problem of universals — how can many numeri-

^J.L. Austin, Sense and Senaibilia. (N.Y.: Oxford U. Press, 1964),p. 70.



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cally distinct things somehow he the same or similar in nature? And how can

one and the same individual have different characteristics or fall under

different concepts? On the theological side there was the problem of the

Trinity — how can many distinct supposits share one essence? And the

question of divine attributes such as goodness and mercy — how can one

simple and indivisible deity have many distinct characteristics? There

are obvious parallels between the metaphysical problems and the theological

problems and solutions for the metaphysical problems were quite often

adapted to the solution of the theological problems. The solutions re

quire explanations of how .some types of distinction are compatible with

some types of identity. The usual division of distinction and identity

into real and conceptual types provided such explanations for many phil

osophers, for conceptual distinction is compatible with real numerical

unity of relate according to them, while a real distinction is compatible

with conceptual or rational identity of relata. Bach philosopher's

solution involved certain variations of his own on these ideas. Other

problems, such as the problem of the distinction of the powers of the

soul, were recognized, and theories of distinction were adapted to handle

these as well.

Theories of distinction can thus be regarded as accounts of the

different ways in which things differ (and derivatively of the different

ways in which things can be the same or one). A distinction can obtain

between any two entities, e.g. Peter and Paul, Peter and Lassie, Peter

and the Biffel Tower, re and yellow, the rectangularity and whiteness of

this paper, Peter and the color red. The members of each pair are non

identical, for it is just as true to say "Peter is not identical with



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9

Paul," as it is to say "Peter is not identical with Lassie," "Peter is not

identical with the Eiffel Tower," "The rectangularity of this paper is not

identical with the whiteness of this paper," or "Peter is not identical

with the color red." The members of each pair are different but the differ

ences are not entirely comparable. The ways in which Peter differs from

Paul are different from the ways in which Peter differs from the Eiffel

Tower, but they are less different from one another than from the ways in

which Peter differs from yellow or the rectangularity of this paper from

the whiteness of this paper. If an account of these different ways of

differing cannot be located in the nonidentity they all have in common,

then it must be found either in the relata themselves, or in the proper

ties b7 which they differ in each case. That is, an account will be

governed by the nature of the relata, i.e. whether they are individuals,

properties, or an individual and a property, or it will be governed by

the nature of that with regard to which the relata differ,

Medieval philosophers were concerned with classifying such dif

ferences according to similarities they exhibit, providing theoretical

descriptions for these hinds of differences, and outlining conditions

necessary and sufficient for a particular hind of difference to obtain

between relata. They were also concerned to show how such differences

either obtain independently of the mind or are created by the mind, and

in the latter case how we can determine the extent of the role which the

mind plays.

Not only were hinds of distinction classified according to simi

larities and differences they exhibit, but so were hinds of sameness or



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10

identity* Suarez remarks that

... if we consider relative sameness between things thatare really distinct* and then compare the identity whereby Peter is the same as himself with the identity where

by he is the same as Paul* we can say that the identitiesare really diverse» since one is a sameness of thing* theother a sameness of reason. 14

These theories have a great deal of historical importance for the

understanding of the metaphysics of medieval philosophers. They may also

have some contemporary interest in relation to theories of identity and

solutions to problems similar to those confronting the medievals.

2* Agreement and disagreement among the Philosophers

The theories of distinction developed by Aquinas* Bonaventure,

Henry of Ghent* Giles of Rome* Scotus, and Ockham differ widely in their

applications to the solution of standard problems* but there are several

areas in which most of them agree. All* for example* accept the division

of being into rational or conceptual beings (entia rationia) and real

beings orprinciples of real beings. Consequently all provide accounts

of bothreal and conceptual distinctions. Inone form or another most of

them accepted some type of distinction of an intermediate nature. Such

a distinction is caused partly by our manner of apprehending objects* and

partly by some real difference existing outside the intellect. The object

of the distinction is usually one thing or substance which is disposed to

form diverse concepts in the understanding*

One of the areas of greatest disagreement is the exact nature of

the real foundation for such intermediate distinctions. There was no dis-

^Suarez, p. 63.



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XI

pute over instances where the foundation was some real difference of

principles such as that of matter and form in a thing, but in cases where

the distinction obtained between two aspects of a thing which did not

really differ in that thing, questions arose as to how those aspects were

related to the thing in question. Aquinas maintained that these aspects

are virtually in a thing because of the powers such a thing has, i.e. the

vegetative and animal powers in a man. But they are not really different

parts of the man because of his unity and simplicity (he has one and not

many substantial forms). Henry of Ghent maintained that such aspects are

in the thing but only potentially different from one another until this

thing is considered by an intellect and compared with other things. The

aspects become actually different in the thing only as a result of some

mind's distinguishing them on the basis of such a comparison. In either

case, these aspects (call them A and B), are not different in the thing

(call it a) apart from some intellect's comparing £ with other things b,

and £ in which A and B are really different (e.g. when Jj. has A but not B,

and £ has B but not A, or conversely)•

In contrast to Aquinas and Henry, Scotus maintained that such a

difference of A and B in £ must be real. A and B are really different

aspects of a, what he calls "formalities•" They differ in £ independently

of any intellect's comparison of £ with other objects. The distinction

here is the formal distinction which is real, but not as great as the

numerical distinction of two things (see Chapter 3). The formal distinc

tion was challenged on many points. William of Ockham, while holding that

there is a type of formal difference between Persons of the Trinity, cate

gorically denied that such entities as formalities exist. Other philoso



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12

phers such as Giles of Rone, Godfrey of Fontaines, Durandus of St* Pour*

cain, flatly rejected the possibility of there being a type of distinction

which is neither a distinction of things nor a distinction of ways of conceiving the same thing*

Disagreements among medieval philosophers arose in two other areas.

First, medieval philosophers disagreed as to how certain particular dif

ferences were to be classified* For example, is the difference between

the intellective and volitive powers of the human soul more like the real

distinction between Peter and Paul, or is it more like the conceptual dis

tinction between Peter's humanity and animality? Second, they disagreed

as to what constituted the evidence by which two extremes or relata were

discovered to differ in some particular way. That is, different responses

are given to the following questions: how do we determine that & and b

differ really (or conceptually, or formally, etc.), and what conditions

must be fulfilled for there to be a real lor conceptual, or formal, etc.)

distinction between & and b? Some philosophers maintained that for & and

£ to differ really it was necessary that each be capable of existing apart

from the other. Others maintained that this condition is n t only neces

sary but sufficient as well. Still others use the more general condition

of opposition of & and b,with regard to some property F.

The two areas of disagreement are interrelated, for the conditions

given for each type of distinction determine how particular cases are to

be classified. Likewise the grouping together of particular cases of dis

tinction because of similarities they exhibited determined what conditions

would be necessary and/or sufficient for a type of distinction to obtain

between extremes. Disagreements in all of the areas mentioned were usually



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13

due to differences in the metaphysics of the philosophers concerned*

Ockham's conceptualism* for example* caused him to give conditions for

real distinctions which would have been unacceptable to a realist like

Scotus* As a result* Ockham frequently classifies as real particular

distinctions which Scotus would classify as formal*

With regard to the real distinction* there was agreement over

which particular distinctions were to be classified as real in many in

stances* while there was some disagreement both over the general descrip

tion and the evidence needed to prove that a particular distinction was

real. For example* there was disagreement between Scotus and Ockham as

to whether every real distinction must be a distinction between things*

but there was general agreement that numerical distinctions were real*

Lists of conditions for each type of distinction varied* Some philoso

phers, as already indicated* took the mutual separability of the relate

as evidence for their real distinction* while others took the opposition

of the relata as evidence*

There was general agreement also as to the description of a con

ceptual distinction as one which does not exist entirely independently of

the intellect. Usually conceptual or rational distinctions were sub

divided into two types — those which were purely mental, and those which

were conceptual yet had real foundations. The conditions given as neces

sary and/or sufficient for each type of conceptual distinction varied from

philosopher to philosopher* and there was great disagreement as to whether

some particular distinction was conceptual only or whether it had a real

foundation. Finally* there was much disagreement as to the general descrip

tions for each type of conceptual distinction.



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3* Sources of Disagreement

14

The metaphysics of various medieval philosophers differ, and these

differences are in large part responsible for the disagreements indicated

above. Each philosopher has certain general goals of his own and certain

problems that he is attempting to resolve. Adjustments are often made in

his theory of distinctions in order that such problems may be resolved in

accordance with his basic metaphysical assumptions. It is sufficient for

this Introduction to indicate briefly how different solutions to one par

ticular problem, the problem of universals, affect the different theories

of distinction of the major philosophers.

A. Aquinas

Certain pairs of intrinsic principles of things are fundamental to

the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas. One member of each pair is re

lated to the other member of the pair as act i3 related to potency (that

in a substance which is related as form actualizes that in a substance which

is related as matter, etc.). Corporeal substances are composed of both

matter and form, substance and accident, essence and existence. Each such

individual substance has its own form, but the forms of several individuals

qua forms may be indistinguishable. For example, Peter and Paul are differ

ent individual men, but if their human forms are considered in abstraction

from their materiality, these forms are indistinguishable. In regard to

being menr Peter and Paul fail to differ. On the basis of this lack of dif

ference, the mind can form the concept 'man' which includes only what is

indistinguishable in Peter and Paul qua being men, and which is applicable

to both. Forms in things are many, not one, and universality arises only



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15

through the understanding*

But if Peter and Paul are indistinguishable with regard to fonn,

what is it that makes them different individuals? Aquinas's answer is that

signate matter (matter existing under determinate dimensions) is the prin-

ciple of individuation in corporeal substances* Such matter has quantity

and thus "matter existing under these dimensions is distinguished from that

vhich is under other dimensions" (14) - Such matter is also a subject which

is not received by anything in the way that form is received by matter* Be

cause of the matter and dimensive quantity in a corporeal substance each is

an individual* i.e. each is undivided in itself and divided from everything

else (3). Because of the difference in dimensive quantities of matter, the

matter of Peter has a different spatial location and different accidents of

other sorts from the matter of Paul. Their forms are individuated by com

position with signate matter (in a derivative sense of "individuated") so

that Peter's humanity is not Paul's humanity. Since he rejects the doctrine

of universal hylomorphism, Aquinas needs a different principle of individu

ation (or "individualization") for spiritual substances. It is the form of

each substance which is proper to it alone that marks it off from other

spiritual substances. Such substances are specifically, not numerically,

distinct from one another*

In corporeal and spiritual substances alike there is a composition

of essence with existence, and when several substances are indistinguish

able as to essence, e.g. when all are humans, they differ not only with

respect to matter or form but also with respect to their acts of existence.

The existence of Paul is not the existence of Peter although both are men.

In order to account for both the possibility of universality and



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16

the possibility of singularity, what are related in a thing as matter and

form (and what are related in a thing as essence and existence) must be

really different. If matter and form were really identical and only concep

tually different in Peter, Peter would have nothing in common with Paul.

His form would be peculiar to him. And if the essence humanity were really

identical with the individual Peter and his existence, the concept 'man*

would not be applicable to other individuals such as Paul or John*

Universality is accounted for by one member of each pair, singu

larity by the other member of the pair. Peter and Paul are specifically

the same because their forms qua forms are indistinguishable. They are

numerically different because the signate matter of one has a different

dimensive quantity from the signate matter of the other. Such principles

are not themselves things or beings, but composites of such principles are

things or beings. The real distinction must be interpreted then in such

a way as to account for distinctions of principles in things as well as

distinctions between things and substances. For example, such principles

are not mutually separable according to Aquinas. So mutual separability

cannot be a necessary sign for a real distinction of relata. Opposition,

or what today might be called discexnibility, is used by Aquinas a neces

sary condition for a real distinction. Since act and potency are funda

mentally and ultimately opposed, so are the analogous members of the fol

lowing pairs of principles: matter and form, substance and accident, es

sence and existence. Most other real distinctions, e.g. numerical, and

specific distinctions, are founded on real distinctions between such prin

ciples. Conceptual or rational distinctions on the other hand are not

always reducible to such distinctions of principles, but are either wholly



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17

or partly founded on distinctions made by the intellect*

B. Scotus

Buns Scotus agrees with Avicenna and Aquinas that specific natures

such as humanity are neither one cor many of themselves but are indiffer-

1 5ent both to unity and multiplicity, and to universality and singularity.

Such natures really exist in things, but universality and singularity must

both be accounted for. A nature is not singular of itself, hence it lacks

the numerical unity of an individual. But it must have some kind of unity

in order that universal concepts, which are basic to science, not be fic

titious. Our concepts of humanity and equinity and the like must each cor

respond to some unity on the part of a nature as it exists in things.

Scotus concludes that a nature as it exists in things has a real unity which

is less than numerical unity. Consequently there is a real foundation in

things for a specific concept. Universality is accounted for by the fact

that such natures can be understood by the intellect apart from any indi

viduating conditions. Singularity is accounted for by the fact that the

nature is "contracted” to each individual which has this nature. The

nature exists in the individual as a real being which i3 less than a numeri

cal being. Scotus calls such a being a formality. A formality is less than

a form — it is not a thing and cannot exist apart from the thing to which

it belongs. Anti one form can contain several formalities as the specific

form contains formalities of genus and difference. The nature is contracted

to the individual by an individual difference (haecceltaa) which also is

a formality of the thing. These two formalities, neither of which has numeri-

Aquinas, Be Snts et Essentia, ed. Boyer(Rome: Universitatis Gregor-ianae, 1966), p. 30.



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18

cal unity of itself, are formally distinct. A formal distinction is a dis

tinction of formalities within an existing substance.

A distinction of formalities is, in many respects, similar to a dis

tinction of things. Both distinctions obtain independently of the mind and

the relata of both types of distinction cause distinct formal objects in the

understanding. The two types of distinction differ in that the relata of a

distinction of things are mutually separable, while the relata of the formal

distinction are neither separable from each other nor from the thing to

which they both belong. Not only nature and haecceity, but also the powers

of the soul, God's attributes, transcendentals convertible with 'being,'

divine Persons, and genus and specific difference in a thing, are formally

distinct. For Scotus, the real distinction must then be described broadly

enough to include not only a distinction between things, but also a dis

tinction between two formalities of a thing. Thus his realism, his belief

that common natures must be real beings, leads Scotus to modify the real

distinction and elaborate a subdivision of it which will help account for

both the fact that we have universal concepts which have real foundations,

and the fact that singular beings exist.

C. Ockham

Scotus adopted the formal distinction in order to explain both how

natures become universal and how they become singular. Villiam of Ockham,

on the other hand, takes singularity as given and seeks an explanation only

for universality. Everything that is, is singular or numerically one and

this applies as much to entia rationis or concepts as it does to real beings.

For Ockham there is then only one type of difference, a numerical difference



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19

between singulars. Still we can distinguish between distinctions in which

the relata are both things, distinctions in which the relata are both

concepts, and distinctions in which one relatum is a thing and the other

a concept.

Since there are no beings which are not singular, there is no such

being as Scotus's formality with its unity less than numerical unity.

Ockham rejects the formal distinction in all but certain theological con

texts, and even in these it is interpreted as a peculiar kind of distinc

tion between things. There are no common natures existing in things, hence

universals can only be concepts founded on similarities exhibited by singu

lar beings. A universal is a sign formed by the understanding which is

applicable to, or predicable of, many singulars. There is no unity in the

singulars themselves,which corresponds to the unity of the universal, for

there is no common nature existing independently of the mind.

If every being is singular, then every being is logically indepen

dent of any other singular being. One singular can exist independently of

another singular at least by divine power, for no contradiction is involved

in separating such entities. Separability of relata constitutes both a

necessary and a sufficient condition for any difference of singulars accord

ing to Ockham.

Through these examples it can be seen how the metaphysics of different philosophers lead them to different solutions to common problems, and

also to different answers to certain fundamental questions about distinctions,

e.g. if a and b, differ, and £ and £ differ, are these two differences the

same or are they different? Are there several kinds of difference or dis-



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20

tinction, or only one kind? Which cases of differences fall under each

general type? Disagreements on these and other points often have their

roots in the diverse metaphysical systems of the philosophers and the

strategies they employ to resolve many problems*

4* Development of the Theories

The terminology of theories of distinction, i.e. "real distinc

tion," "rational distinction," etc., seems to have come into general use

only in the thirteenth century. Peter Abelard, writing in the first half

of the twelfth century, rarely uses the term "distinction" and, although

he refers to numerical, essential, and definitional differences, he makes

no attempt to classify such differences as either mind-independent or

mind-dependent. Occasional hints of the later division of distinction

into two types appear in the works of philosophers like Gilbert of Poiree

(see Appendix), and Alexander of Hales writing shortly before Bonaventure

and Aquinas is already using the terminology that they will use (see Ap

pendix). Aquinas and Bonaventure are already thoroughly familiar with the

terminology. For them a real distinction is mind-independent, and the sign

of such a distinction is the discernibility of the relata with regard to

some property. Their successors Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent charac

terize a real distinction as one obtaining between things independently

of the mind* Scotus attempts to characterize a real distinction broadly

and subdivides it into a distinction between things and a distinction be

tween formalities of one thing.

Both Aquinas and Bonaventure acknowledge two types of rational dis

tinction — the distinction which is purely conceptual, and the distinc

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Furthe r reproduction prohibited without permission.


37/493

tion which has some real foundation outside the intellect. As indicated

above, there is some dispute as to the exact nature of the real foun

dation for the latter type of conceptual distinction. Scotus transforms

the rational or conceptual distinction with a real foundation into the

formal distinction thus making it more real than conceptual. After Scotus,

the dispute usually takes the form of inquiring whether some type of dis

tinction is possible which is intermediate between the real and the

rational. But the so-called "intermediate" distinctions in question (the

intentional, the formal, etc.) are usually classified by their proponents

as either rational or real (when "real" is understood as equivalent to

"mind-independent"). The question should then be whether there is or can

be a type of being (e.g. a formality or some objective counterpart of a

concept which does not represent the whole reality of a thing) intermediate

between a thing and a concept. Scotus, Olivi, and others admit such real

beings, while other philosophers such as Ockham reject all such intermedi

ate types of being.

The development of the medieval theories of distinction is to

some extent progressive. For example, the earlier philosophers do not

devote much attention to theoretical descriptions of the different ways

of differing that they acknowledge, but such descriptions are important

for Scotus and Ockham. Also Aquinas and Bonaventure are more inclined

to include their accounts of ways of differing in their solutions to

various problems which concern them. Aquinas makes little attempt to

describe distinctions apart from these contexts. Bonaventure, on the

other hand, offers clear descriptions of ways of differing, but he re

lates them to various theological problems in such a way that it is dif-



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22

ficult to isolate his descriptions from these contexts.

Most early accounts of ways of differing are also incomplete.

Aquinas occasionally mentions differences which he does not classify as

either real or rational, while Bonaventure neglects to classify many in

stances of differences which are not of theological interest. By Ock

ham's time (the early fourteenth century) theoretical descriptions have

become clear and precise and are usually isolated from discussions of

particular problems. That is. Ockham's descriptions of ways of differing

are designed to apply to cases other than those he specifically discusses.

He clearly outlines his descriptions, his classifications, and the condi

tions for each type of distinction, and every distinction mentioned is

classified as either real, rational, formal, etc. Part of the reason for

his greater clarity and precision may be the amount of effort he expends

criticizing the work of his predecessors.

5. Nature and Methods of Inquiry

The purpose of this paper is to provide a detailed examination of

several of these medieval theories. With the exception of a few works

dealing with particular philosophers, the problem of distinctions in medie

val philosophy, although often referred to, has not been fully treated since

16Suarez published hi3 treatise on distinctions in 1597. Mention of theories

of distinction is most often made in connection with the problem of universals.

Thus Allan Wolter, in discussing Scotus's realism, presents a brief discus-

16M. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: G. Bridges,Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae; "The Formal Distinction" by A.Wolter; "Distinction according to St. Thomas" by F.A. Cunningham. Seebibliography for more complete information.



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sion of distinctions in general as well as a discussion of Scotus*s for

mal distinction in particular, and relates the formal distinction to a

17detailed analysis of Scotus*s position on universale. Other writers on

medieval philosophy such as Mclnerpy, Weinberg, Maurer, and Gopieston

nmirw similar mention of theories of distinction in connection with the

problem of universals and the various attempted solutions. An under

standing of theories of distinction is important to an understanding of

medieval philosophy in general, and this paper represents an attempt to

remedy the past neglect of these theories.

Attention in the text of the paper is focused upon the theories

of several major figures in medieval philosophy, i.e. Aquinas, Scotus,

and Ockham. Some attention is also devoted to lesser figures with inter

esting theories such as Bonaventure, Giles of Rone, and Henry of Ghent.

The following works by Aquinas were consulted: Sunma Theologies (Migne

edition), Summa Contra Gentiles (Leonine edition), Super Libros Senten-

tiarua (Vives ed.),De Potentia Dei (Vives ed.), J)e Base et Essentia (ed.

Boyer), De Spiritualibus Creaturis (ed. Keeler), De Veritate (Vives ed.),

In Metaphvsicam Aristotelia Commentaria (Cathala ed.), In Aristotelis

Librum de An-tum Commentaria (Pirotta ed.), Expositio super Librum Boethii

de Trinitate (ed. Decker), with occasional references to other works. All

references to Bonaventure are from the Opera (Quaracchi ed.). The major

works consulted in this collection were the Commentaria in Quatuor Libros

Sententiarum. the Breviloauii. and the Guaestiones Disputatae de livsterio

17Allan Wolter, "The Realism of Scotus," Journal of Philosophy. (Nov.,

1962).



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Trinitatis. Henry of Ghent1 s Quolibet and Sumaa Quaestionem OrdinArium

were consulted, as well as Giles of Rome's Theorems on Existence and Es

sence (trans. Murray). Most of Scotus's passages on distinctions are

found in the following works: Reportata Parisienais (Wadding ed.), Com

mentaria Oxoniensia (Vatican and Wadding eds.), Quaestiones Subtilissimae

in Metaphyaicam Aristotelis (Wadding ed.,), and feuodlibeta (Wadding ed.).

Finally, the following works by Ockham were consulted: Summa Logicae

(ed. Boehner), Quotlibeta Sentem (Louvain ed.), and the Scriptum in Librum

Primum Sententiarum Qrdinatio.

A separate chapter has been devoted to each of the three major

figures, and discussions of several lesser figures are found in a fourth

chapter. Similar procedures have been followed in each of. these chapters.

First, material has been extrapolated from the works (listed above) of each

philosopher in which mention is made of distinctions. A description of

the philosopher's theory, based on these extrapolations, is then presented.

Second, the conditions or signs for each type of distinction are isolated

from discussions of particular problems, examined, and outlined. An

attempt is made to determine which conditions the philosopher considers to

be necessary, which sufficient, and which both. Third, each philosopher's

theory of distinctions, i.e. his theoretical descriptions of the ways of

differing, his classifications of various examples, and the conditions he

gives for each way of differing are examined in the light of his metaphys

ical system and the particular problems he is trying to solve with his

theory. This is important in view of the fact that each philosopher has

his own strategy — his theory of distinctions is designed to solve certain

problems of a metaphysical or theological nature which confront him.



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Finally, the applications of each philosopher's theory to the problems he

was trying to solve are examined-

The concluding chapter is devoted to several aspects of; thesetheories: l) a comparison of the various theories; 2) a construction of

theories of identity corresponding to the theories of distinction; 5) the

relation of these theories to contemporary philosophy. With regard to 3)»

similarities between some of the medieval theories and contemporary

theories such as Geach's which attempt to justify the relativity of iden

tity are noted. The reasons presented by Wiggins and others for rejecting

this relativity thesis are noted and imply also the rejection of aspects

of medieval theories such as Aquinas's and Scotus's. It is pointed out

that with some modification these medieval theories can be regarded as

providing different criteria rather than different kinds of distinction

and identity and that 3uch criteria still play a central role in metaphys

ical theories.

An Appendix is provided at the end of the paper which gathers to

gether the textual quotations necessary for an understanding of medieval

theories of distinction. These passages are difficult to come by and have

not been gathered together before. Consequently the Appendix may serve

as a useful tool for anyone wishing to examine critically either the state

ments made in this paper, or other treatments of distinction such as that

of Suarez. This Appendix does not, of course, provide a complete catalogue

of every discussion of distinction made by any of the philosophers dis

cussed in this paper.

The passages in the Appendix are organized according to author (and

subject insofar as this was possible). For example, all the major passages

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Furthe r reproduction prohibited without permission.


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from Aquinas's works are grouped together. Within this section, all the

passages relating to the real distinction are grouped together, all the

passages relating to the rational distinction are grouped together, and

so on. Each passage is given a number. For example, each passage from

Aquinas, together with its English translation, is numbered consecutively

beginning with the number 1. There is a separate grouping of quotations

for each philosopher, and in each case passages within the group are

numbered consecutively beginning with the number 1. In the text itself,

references to these passages in the Appendix are cited within parentheses

in the text, e.g. Bonaventure (27,34)* This means that the appropriate

passages are those numbered 27 and 34 in the section of the Appendix

devoted to Bonaventure. When a direct quotation is made in the text, the

first number within parentheses indicates the number of the passage which

is quoted in whole or in part. Any subsequent numbers within the same

parentheses indicate other relevant passages by the same author. When

another author is also cited, his name is given before the numbers of the

relevant passages in his section, e.g. Aquinas (2l); Scotus (67)*

Belov each passage in the Appendix, the source of the passage

is given. For example, a passage from Scotus might be from 1 Ox., d.2,

a.3, n. 17 (Vatican I, p. 354). This means that the passage is from

Scotus's Commentaria Qxoniensia. Book I, distinction 2, question 5, num

ber 17, Vatican edition of Scotus's works, volume I, page 354. More de

tails concerning the exact sources are located in the Bibliography, e.g.

authors' full names, full titles of works, editions, place of publication

and date of publication, etc. A list of abbreviations used in such Appen

dix citations is included at the beginning of the Appendix. Most of the



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translations in the Appendix are my own, and where they are not, this

fact is noted*

6* Suarez's Treatment

One of the few works devoted exclusively to the theory of dis

tinctions in general is Francis Suarez's On the Various Kinds of Distinc

tions. first published as part of his Disputationes toetaphvsicae in 1597*

In this work Suarez examines some of the theories of his predecessors for

the purpose of ascertaining just what sorts of distinctions there are. He

is particularly interested in determining whether there is some kind of

distinction, for example a formal distinction, intermediate between a real

distinction (understood as a distinction between things) and a purely ratio

nal distinction. Suarez adopts the real distinction of things, the distinc

tion of reasoning reason (purely conceptual distinction), and the distinc

tion of reasoned reason (conceptual distinction with a real foundation) of

the later Thomists. He criticizes and finally rejects distinctions like

Scotus's formal distinction on the grounds that such a distinction can be

adequately accounted for by the distinction of reasoned reasons

. . . many things are distinguished in objective conceptsaccording to our point of view, although they are onlymentally distinct through inadequate concepts, . . . .All these can be distinguished in definition by a meremental distinction, whenever a definition does not

adequately represent a thing as it is in itself, but asit is exhibited in a concept of ours. 13

18Suarez, p. 27. The objective concept mentioned is the counterpart

of the formal concept. A formal concept represents a thing outside theintellect. An objective concept is a concept only derivatively — it isthe reality represented by the formal concept. This division goes backto Aquinas who said that a ratio could be in the mind as the significateof a word, and in a thing also when the ratio is a likeness of a thing (42).



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Suarezs's innovation is a modal distinction, i.e. a distinction

either between two modes of one thing, or between a thing and its mode.

Modes "are something positive and of themselves modify the very entities

by conferring on them something that is over and above the complete es-

19sence as individual and as existing in nature." Thus the inherence of

a quantity in a substance would be a mode of this quantity. This dis

tinction is a real one in that the difference between two modes or a mode

and the thing modified exists independently of the intellect. It can be

called a "distinction from the nature of the case" (ex natura rei) al

though it is not as great as a distinction between two things.

Once he has described real, modal, and rational distinctions in

general, Suarez sets out certain conditions or "signs" for each type of

distinction. In so doing he rejects certain signs proposed by his pre

decessors and contemporaries for the same distinctions* Thus he says

that the mutual separability of two things is a sufficient, but not a

necessary, condition for the real distinction of these things. A non

mutual separability of extremes is sufficient to show that one of these

extremes is a mode and the other a thing. An absence of any such signs

for real distinctions is sufficient to show that a distinction is

+ i 20conceptual.

There are several respects in which Suarez's treatment differs

from the treatment given distinctions in this paper. First, Suarez does

^Suarez, p. 28.

20Ibid.. pp. 40-61.



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not attempt an historical analysis of theories of distinction. He refers

to the history of such theories and to particular earlier philosophers

only in the discussion concerning the possibility of an intermediate dis

tinction, although he frequently cites his predecessors elsewhere on cer

tain points. He makes no attempt to present the theoretical descriptions,

classifications, and conditions given by a philosopher like Aquinas, nor

does he often compare one such theory with another. Second, Suarez's

goal throughout his treatise is to develop his own theory of distinctions,

and any discussions or criticisms of other philosophers' theories are

incidental to this purpose.

In this paper, analyses of various medieval philosophers' theories

are of primary importance. Furthermore, these theories are «amined in re

lation to the metaphysical theory of each philosopher.

roduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction p rohibited without permission.


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CHAPTER I

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

(1225-1274)

1. General Survey

Aquinas says that the notion or ratio of distinction contains

negation, "for those are distinct one of which is not the other" (1,2).

There are several ways in which one entity can be distinct from another.

Every corporeal substance, for example, although one and indistinct

in itself, is distinct from all other substances in its matter and

form and act of being (3). But it is still true that such substances

are often identical with one another in certain other respects. If

two things x and y agree in some respect and are nonidentical in some

other respect, they are said to be "different." For example, two men

differ in that the matter of each exists under different dimensions,

but they are the same insofar as each has a human form. Where "x" and

"y" signify things, and "F" and "G" signify properties of things,

difference may be described as follows: (x)(y)£x differs from ŷ -fr

( 3 F) (Fx & Fy) & 0^5x & -Gy) v (Gy & -Gx)]Q . Both x and y have the

property F, but either x has the property G while y does not have G,

or y has G while x does not have G. Because both x and y have F and

not both have G, such things must be composite: "It is necessary that

what differ be composite in some way, since they differ in something

and agree in something else"(4,5). Simple entities or principles,

however, are said to be diverse rather than different because they

30



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are nonidentical of themselves and agree in no respect (24). If x

and y are diverse, there is no univocal predicate "F" which is true

of both, or (x)(y) Qx is diverse from y 4 r f -(3 F)(Fx & Fy)Q .

Diversity is an absolute notion, because if x and y are

diverse, then they are simply nonidentical and not nonidentical only

with respect to some property F. Difference, however, is relative to

some respect or respects in which two entities are nonidentical. Two

things may be the same in both being squares, for example, but differ

in color, for "all that differ differ in something" (5,4). Whether

they are diverse or merely different, two things may be distinguished.

Host entities are different from one another, not diverse, and

this is due to the fact that they are composed of intrinsic principles

which are telated to each other as potency is related to act, e.g. the

principles matter and form, essence and existence, substance and

accident. It is by means of such principles that these entities both

agree with, and differ from, one another. Aquinas says that the

principles themselves are diverse because they provide the ultimate

foundations for most differences. They cannot themselves be different

from one another because they are simple, not composite. Substantial

difference dividing a pecies, and God and prime matter are also said

to be diverse:

It must be said that simple things do not differby some other differences, for this is true ofcomposites. For a man and a horse differ bydifferences of rationality and irrationality,which differences indeed do not differ more fromeach other by still other differences. Hence. . . they are not properly said to differ butto be diverse. Whence, according to the Philosopher, . . . "diversity is said absolutely, butall that differ differ by something." (5)



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Substantial differences, as that by which members of different species

of a genus differ, are ultimate and do not owe their nonidentity to

something further, e.g. a form, in eabh of them. God and prime matter

are diverse in the God is pure act, prime matter pure potency, and

act and potency are diverse of themselves.

Two basic kinds of unity and plurality (or indivision and

division) are associated with the notion of difference. In the first

place, things may be many and different in being although they are one

in some respect such as Peter and Paul who are numerically different

individuals although they are one insofar as both are men. In the

second place, there may be one thing which the intellect treats as

many in order to grasp some relationship, as when Peter, who is one

individual, is regarded both as this man and as the richest man in

town(6). Aquinas says that in the first case, Peter and Paul are

"simply11 many and one only "after a fashion" (secundum quid); in the

second case he says that this man and the richest man in town are

"simply" one and many only "after a fashion" (79).

This account of unity and multiplicity provides two ways of

considering sameness and difference. Since unity and multiplicity,

and sameness and difference, are closely related pairs of notions, an

alternative way of expressing what Aquinas has said concerning unity

would be to say that many individuals or beings can be really differ

ent but conceptually the same when they can be subsumed under the same

concept, and that an individual which is really one can be considered

as "falling under" several differing concepts. In this way Aquinas

implicitly (i.e. without using the terms "real difference," "rational



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difference," etc.) introduces the division of difference (and sameness

also) into real and rational types. A real .difference is a difference

of things which are many in being, or of principles of such things. A

rational difference is a difference between a being considered under

one concept and the same being considered under another concept. Real

sameness is sameness in subject (numerical sameness), while rational

sameness is sameness in concept.

Aquinas also introduces the two types of difference by con

trasting one with the other as when he points out that the difference

between a subject and its essence which is real in a creature can be

only rational in God.

Occasionally Aquinas uses Aristotle’s division of sameness and

difference into numerical, specific, generic, and analogical types.

Numerical difference is the difference between two beings whose

material elements differ, while numerical sameness is sameness in

matter or subject. Specific difference is the difference between

beings belonging to different species (their definitions differ'where

they have definitions), while specific sameness is the sameness of two

numerically different individuals falling under the same concept (and

having the same definition of essence). Generic difference is the

difference between beings belonging to two genera or categories of

being, while generic sameness is the sameness of two specifically

different entities which fall under the same generic concept. Finally,

analogical sameness is the sameness of two beings which differ

generical

edwards medieval theories of distinctions

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