edf:plex strategy · edf:plex strategy presentation of the methodology jean-paul chatry nnr 1st...

EDF:PLEX strategy

PRESENTATION OF THE

METHODOLOGY

Jean-Paul Chatry

NNR 1st Nuclear Information Conference

Jo’burg 5-7 october 2016

2

World general approaches

• maintain the level of safety – Most countries have adopted this approach

(Germany, Spain, USA, Belgium, Sweden, Japan) • Check the installations are conform

• Process the deficiencies of the initial rules

• Develop a safety culture

• Advantage: Ensure the clarity of the rules

• systematically decrease the risks – France, Finland

• Perform all the previous actions

• + Constant improvement of the nuclear safety level

• drawbacks: Higher costs (studies and modifications), less clarity of the rules

3

The French NuclearFleet

Gravelines

Chooz

Cattenom

Fessenheim

Bugey

St Alban

Cruas

Tricastin

Penly

PaluelFlamanville

St Laurent Dampierre

BellevilleChinon

Civaux

Blayais

Golfech

900 MW 1 300 MW 1 500 MW

Nogent Seine

Gravelines

Chooz

Cattenom

Fessenheim

Bugey

St Alban

Cruas

Tricastin

Penly

PaluelFlamanville

St Laurent Dampierre

BellevilleChinon

Civaux

Blayais

Golfech

900 MW 1 300 MW 1 500 MW

Nogent Seine

The most important fleet in Europe

(63,13 GW), homogenous and

concentrated

- 58 reactors PWR, 3 technologies, 19 sites:

900 MW : 34 units, 31 GW

1300 MW : 20 units, 26 GW

1500 MW : 4 units, 6 GW

- 44 GW commissioned between 1980 &

1990,

- Average age 30 years (14 to 40)

- VD3 for the 1300 and VD4 in preparation

for the 900

- Nearing 2000 reactor years of experience

one EPR Gen 3 reactor under

construction in Flamanville

Decommissioning Programme : 9

reactors (6 UNGG, Brennilis, Creys Malville,

Chooz A)

The French Dilemna

• Q:How to deal with 58 aging gen. II units in operation and 1 new ultra safe gen. III unit

• A1: Bring & keep the whole fleet to a similar level of safety

• A2: An authorisation to operate for 10 years, prolonged after a thorough safety reassessment which covers: – A verification of the conformity of the plant to its licence requirement

– A demonstration that any new knowledge gained since last reassessment has been integrated

– A commitment that safety improvements have been integrated to keep the plant on par with the safety requirements of new reactors (radioactive release levels, Hazards levels, …)

4

Safety referential evolution

5

EDF Engineering departments

REX:

international

EDF

EDF New Designs

EDF Plants under

construction

EDF Plants in operation

Koeberg

CGNPC Sizewell B

Conformity

reassessment

VERIFICATION OF ADEQUACY TO SAFETY

REFERENTIAL / REASSESSMENT OF

KNOWLEDGE

Normal ops incident accident Hazards

Reassessment

Systems Perf

improvements

BDB ops seismic

Structures Walk downs

Aging: Seaside containment

Anchors

Seismic

Flooding

Environment

evolution…

Components Walk downs

Aging

Obsolescence

qualification qualification

T 8

CONTEXT OF THE VERIFICATION OF

CONFORMITY

Part of the safety reassessment. Objective : ensure the installation is conform with the current Safety Referential.

Not a comprehensive programme but addresses only selected topics.

Based on :

Current Safety Referential (ie from the last 10 yearly reevaluation)

Conformity examination feedback

Feedback between two safety reassessments (deviations)

Sampling inspection of topics not covered by the previous assessment

T 9

VD2 VERIFICATION OF CONFORMITY

Civil and internal flooding : Initiated from operating feedback. Control after repair.

Seism as an event : Non impact on IPS equipment from non IPS equipment verification Fire protection : Fire areas mastering + calorific potentials management + operating documentation for fire protection Arrangements for extreme cold : Modification implementation and operating procedures operability

T 10

VD3 VERIFICATION OF CONFORMITY

walk downs :

Anchoring : Consistence between design, actual condition and maintenance documentation for a selection of IPS equipment (about 200-300)

Cable tray supporting : Assessment of robustness of actual supports and civil

Containment and ventilation : Control of vent duct and dynamic venting performance

3 topics based on document examination :

Seism as an event : Completion of previous exercise focused on implementation of local modification and associated organization (sampling controls of before VD2 – NSA requirement - and after VD2 modifications implemented near equipment with seismic requirement)

Operability for equipment used for mitigation of accident(performed in VD2 1300) : Mainly for mobile equipment (organisation for implementation and availability of equipment)

Criticity : Consistence with requirements from criticity referential

T 11

VD3 TOPICS

4 topics without specific control on site : External flooding :

Checking the implementation of modifications and the conformity with design

Fire protection : Checking of the implementation of the full program (modification, operating documentation, organization ...)

Civil works : Completion of previous exercise such as BONNA pipes + SEC tunnel + pumping station + heat sink civil works + ASG tank + Diesel + external flooding civil protections (non visited locations during VD2 conformity reassessment and taking account of the new version of the civil work preventive maintenance basic program)

Seismic resistance of transfer tube : Conformity with design by checking the actual differential settlings

T 12

5. RESULTS

No major deviation Deviations repaired before startup

AGEING

T 14

EDF AGING PREVIOUS ORGANISATION

Before VD3 project the process relies on :

Routine maintenance to maintain equipment reliability

Exceptional maintenance concerning primary equipment

10 year inspection for compliance with aging mechanism knowledge, the state of materials and maintenance programs

Life management programs - Capitalisation of data for life time - Technical/economical methodology to estimate technical end of life for components - Technological watch

T 15

EXPECTATIONS OF THE SAFETY AUTHORITY

NSA demands :

« A basic strategy with respect to aging-related issues »

« A Work Program for aging management to be evaluated by an Ageing GP at the

beginning of 2003 »

A list of components the aging of which may affect the reactor safety and which

require particular monitoring, specific checks or routine or exceptional maintenance

actions

An analysis of experience feedback, specifically on monitoring, maintenance,

R&D for better understanding of kinetic and ageing phenomena

Strategies for structure or components repair or replacement

approach for maintaining skills.

UNDERSTANDING AGING MECHANISM

R&D: the Material Ageing Institute created in 2008 in les

Renardières in order to

understand, model, predict and anticipate the ageing of materials used in the electricity generating

plants, whether nuclear, fossil fuel or hydroelectric

develop aging mitigating techniques and processes

develop knowledge about the behaviour of materials which may be used in the future generation of

plants in order to make recommendations to the participants of the MAI

capitalize on shared resources, maintain and share knowledge and skills in order to help plant owners

and operators throughout the world to safely operate their facilities and to reinforce the collaboration

among stakeholders

contribute to the training of students and engineers working in the nuclear industries in the field of

material ageing.

MAI RECENT PROGRAMME

T 18

METHODOLOGY FOR DEFINITION OF AGEING

SENSITIVE EQUIPMENT

DAPE : continued operability file

Proven aging mechanism Potential aging mechanism

Routine

maintenance/

operation rules

Adapted Adaptable Difficult

to adapt

Adapted Adaptable Difficult to

adapt

Repair or

Replacement

difficult

DAPE DAPE DAPE Nothing

to report

Necessary

additional

instruction

DAPE

Repair or

Replacement

not difficult

Nothing

to report

Necessary

additional

instruction

DAPE Nothing

to report

Necessary

additional

instruction

Necessary

additional

instruction

DAPE: Dossier D’Aptitude à Poursuivre l’Exploitation

(File about the long term fitness for service)

T 19

RESULTS OF THE APPROACH

440 aging analysis sheets drawn up by experts (FAV)

Corresponding to « material - structure / aging mechanism (proven or potential) » combinations analyzed

40 « irrelevant » sheets

260 cases controlled via the standard maintenance provisions or the current operation clauses

30 « sensitive » combinations to be supported by a specific substantiation file

110 for current instruction supplement ( including about thirty « sensitive » materials)

T 20

TOPICS RETAINED FOR DAPE

Reactor vessels and associated internals

Embrittlement through irradiation of shell rings and welded joints of the irradiated area of the reactor vessel

Thermal aging of primary coolant nozzles

Embrittlement of core baffle assembly

Embrittlement under irradiation, fatigue and creep of the ¾" attaching parts of the reactor vessel

Wear of keys and clevis inserts for vessel internals

Steam generator, pressuriser, GMPP

Thermal aging of interfaces between shell rings

Fatigue of the heater wells of the pressuriser

Fatigue of the pressuriser expansion line

Ageing of SG tube bundle

Fatigue of the GMPP impellers

Erosion-Cavitation of GMPP impeller blades

T 21

TOPICS RETAINED FOR DAPE (CONTINUED)

Other CPP/CSP materials

Thermal aging of austeno-ferritic cast steel primary line elbow connections

Thermal aging and fatigue of angled taps on austeno-ferritic cast steel primary lines

Thermal fatigue of the RCV charging and injection lines

Electrical equipment items

Aging of electrical cables at hot points

Aging of control/monitoring systems

Aging of HTA and BT electrical feedthroughs

T 22

TOPICS RETAINED FOR DAPE (CONTINUED)

Civil works

Reactor containment prestressing relaxation

Corrosion of the reactor confinement metal skin

Alcali reaction of concrete of civil works

Soil compaction / impacts on buildings and components

Degradation of non accessible concrete structures: pool, fuel building (FB), …

Deterioration of site works : embankments, …

T 23

DAPE CONTENT

Description of the equipment/structure Description, functions, safety-related and regulatory requirements, rules and assessment of design and production analyses,

operating conditions, experience feedback on in-service behaviour

Section relative to aging mechanism Assessment of scientific knowledge, damage kinetics, consequences on operability, possible countermeasures, in-service follow-up

and inspection means, repairability of concerned areas

Section relative to the Industry problematics repair, replacement, obsolescence, industrial fabric, sustainability of tools and skills

Conclusion : Aging Control Programme

A document capitalizing the present knowledge (training purpose) and ready to be upgraded by new knowledge and experience

OBSOLESCENCE

monitor the capacity of the industry to provide equipment to

have time to react

When obsolescence problem appears

Buy spares necessary for the fleet

Study a replacement solution

Improvement of safety

referential

TECHNICAL SCOPE OF VD4 900 SAFETY

REVIEW

4 main orientations:

reduction of the radiological releases from design-basis accidents.

prevention and mitigation of severe accidents (use of the post FKS "hard core")

better incorporation of external hazards

strengthening of the Fuel Building.

Broken down into 7 topics in the Safety Review programme of work:

Compliance of facilities.

Studies of operating conditions and radiological consequences.

Prevention and Mitigation of severe accidents

Probabilistic Safety Studies

System design.

Internal and external hazards.

Improvement of operating conditions in terms of human and organisational factors

(HOF).

EXAMPLE: ASSESSMENT OF HAZARD-

RELATED RISK PREVENTION PROVISIONS

Structuring hypotheses:

• Incorporation of changes relating to the Basic Nuclear Installation (INB)

order (new hazards) and to WENRA (aggravating factor and operator

response time).

• Seismic re-assessment based on basic safety rule RFS 2001.01.

• Inclusion of Tornado and additions to the Extreme Heat instruction.

Potential changes:

• Reinforcement to withstand seismic margin earthquake (SME) in a limited

volume (in addition to "hard core" design-basis earthquake reinforcement).

• The tornado reference framework leads to reinforcement by protection of the

equipment or structural reinforcement.

• Modifications to Extreme heat/Extreme cold/Explosion/Fire/Internal flooding

hazards to meet new WENRA requirements.

CONCLUSION

Time life extension is made possible through all the efforts made

to keep the plant in conformity with the licence and to integrate all

possible improvements to keep aging plants on par with new

models.

BACK UP

CONCLUSION

Life time extension of the French fleet is a real challenge to keep

the aging fleet safety level on par with the safety level of Gen 3

reactors.

CONTENTS

1. PROJECT OBJECTIVES

2. REVIEW PACKAGE

3. PERFORMANCE PACKAGE

4. PACKAGE E2C

5. MAINTAINING QUALIFICATION PACKAGE

6. OTHER PACKAGES

SAFETY REVIEW PACKAGE (1/6)

Technical, scope of VD4 900 Safety Review:

4 main orientations:

- reduction of the radiological releases from design-basis accidents.

- prevention and mitigation of severe accidents (use of the postFKS "hard core")

better incorporation of external hazards

- strengthening of the Fuel Building.

Broken down into 7 topics in the Safety Review programme of work:

- Compliance of facilities.

- Studies of operating conditions and radiological consequences.

- Prevention and Mitigation of severe accidents

- Probabilistic Safety Studies

- System design.

- Internal and external hazards.

- Improvement of operating conditions in terms of human and organisational factors

(HOF).


Topic: Demonstration of compliance of facilities

- Structuring hypotheses

• Scope of the unit compliance review (ECOT) and additional investigation

programme (PIC) carried over from VD3 1300.

• All compliance gaps eliminated (possible coordination by other projects).

- Potential changes:

• Modifications to eliminate compliance gaps in VD4 900 at the latest:

- RCV [CVCS] boron meter

- Operation of HHSIS pumps in parallel.

- Points under examination

• Scope of unit compliance review (ECOT) or the extended additional

investigation programme (PIC).

• Follow-up of system reviews

• Implementation of waste auxiliary building (BAC)/effluent treatment building

(ETB) safety reference framework.


Topic: Studies of operating conditions and radiological consequences


• Operator response time maintained at 20 minutes, study of sensitivity to

EPR response times

and EPR PCCs (if transposable to the fleet).

• New LOCA safety reference framework taken into account.

• Target Radiological Consequences compatible with the service life (DDF)

objective.

• Volume of repeat accident studies notably higher than VD3 1300 but with 3

fuel management schemes (CYCLADE – GARANCE – PMOX).

• New approach for the risk reduction category A (RRC-A).


• Modification of SGTB 4: automatic isolation ASG [ EFWS] + additional ARE

[MFWS]

Possible addition: doubling of GCTa [MSRT] or automatic cooling.

• Modification of LOCA4 CP0: doubling of Reactor Trip breaker logic.

- Points under examination

• Changes to the LOCA safety reference framework following Advisory

Committee for Reactors (GPR) meeting of April 2014.


Topic: Prevention and mitigation of accidents with meltdown

- Structuring hypotheses:

• Transposition of modifications from VD3 1300/VD2 N4.

• Severe accident (SA) prevention modifications managed by the postFKS

project (UDG, Pump U3, ASG-U, APU, SEBIM).

• SA mitigation modifications managed by the post FKS project (EAS-U,

foundation raft strategy).


• Modification of re-injection of safety injection and containment spray effluent

by RPE.

- Points under examination:

• Adequacy of solutions proposed to prevent and mitigate SA.

SAFETY REVIEW PACKAGE (5/6) Topic: Assessment of hazard-related risk prevention provisions

- Structuring hypotheses:

• Incorporation of changes relating to the Basic Nuclear Installation (INB)

order (new hazards) and to WENRA (aggravating factor and operator

response time).

• Seismic re-assessment based on basic safety rule RFS 2001.01.

• Rollout of External flooding guide (potentially not fully covered by FKS

requirements).

• Inclusion of Tornado and additions to the Extreme Heat instruction.


• Reinforcement to withstand seismic margin earthquake (SME) in a limited

volume (in addition to "hard core" design-basis earthquake reinforcement).

• Implementation of the flooding guide may require additional changes relative

to the postFKS modifications.

• The tornado reference framework leads to reinforcement by protection of the

equipment or structural reinforcement.

• Modifications to Extreme heat/Extreme cold/Explosion/Fire/Internal flooding

hazards to meet new WENRA requirements.


Topic: Probabilistic Safety Assessment


• PSA N1 and N2 implementing the recommendations of the Advisory

Committee on PSA (GP EPS) for VD3 1300.

• Development of Hazard PSAs (earthquake, fire, internal flooding).


• Robustness of ventilation system architecture.

Topic: System design


• Fuel Building plan of action deployed in VD4 900.


• Development of an alternative PTR capable of ensuring return to cooling in all

situations.


• Saturation of electricity distribution and I&C diesel generators.

Topic: HOF (simplification of operation): use of E2C modifications and performances.

CONTENTS


2. REVIEW PACKAGE


4. PACKAGE E2C

5. QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE PACKAGE

6. OTHER PACKAGES

PERFORMANCE PACKAGE (1/2)

Following a process of optimisation of requirements, 7 specific requirements are examined in VD4 900.

Improve reliability of dilution and boration operations.

• Ergonomic improvement of REA panel

• Management of the obsolescence of the parts concerned.

Simplification of the management of S4 type administrative lockouts.

• Optimisation of the actuators (Radiation Protection or Operational criterion).

• Retransmission of valve positions to control room (together with an alarm for

certain components).

• Motorisation of certain actuators.

Installation of new alarms and warnings.

• Addition of alarm and warnings based on certain OTS criteria or DOS alarm.

Ergonomic improvement of GCTc panel HMI of the CPY

• Review the ergonomics of the GCT [MSB] in order to reduce the sensitivity of the

set point controller and thus obtain less sudden transients.

PERFORMANCE PACKAGE (2/2)

The following 3 requirements are fed back into the E2C package:

Improve ergonomics.

• Provide controls, physical parameters and associated alarms within a same area

of the control room for managing transients or emergency situations.

• Study conducted as part of the Control room PSA.

Elimination of special operating devices and equipment (DMP).

• Description: Firstly eliminate 8 operating DMPs that are required for controlling

the unit under shutdown conditions and which are most frequently installed.

• Study carried out in the upgrade PSAs of the corresponding systems (RPR

[PS]/RPN [NIS]/SIP [PIS]/ARE [MFWS]).

Improve the information provided to the operator for moving up the reactor operating range.

• Improve the reliability of ascending and descending operations within the

Pressure-Temperature diagram.

• Study findings fed back into the postFKS project (core outlet temperature sensor

upgrade).

Other requirements from the Operators are incorporated within the re-engineering/upgrade studies of the relevant systems.

CONTENTS


2. REVIEW PACKAGE


4. PACKAGE E2C


6. OTHER PACKAGES

T 42

The equipment upgrade strategy must address the following issues:

- Qualification for VD4 requirements (safety, qualification maintenance, post ANSSI

computer security requirements).

- Certain or anticipated obsolescence before VD5.

-- Accommodation of modifications envisaged up to VD5 (in particular those of the

VD4 Safety Review + FKS, VD4 and non-VD4 operating improvement modifications).

Target: preserve / upgrade the equipment to strictly meet the requirements for up

to 50 years' operation.

PACKAGE E2C: TECHNICAL FRAMEWORK (1/5)

• CPY RPN [NIS]:

Switch to digital while retaining the current layout

• CP0 type digital architecture with geographical location unchanged

• Interfaces with other protection systems retained without change

• A number of functional changes to meet the requirements of the Nuclear Power Generation Division : Periodic test tester, maintenance assistance HMI, low flux alarm.

• CP0 RPN [NIS]:

• Retention of existing (digital) equipment

• Creation of "low flux" alarm / modification of control section of digital cabinets

• Management of obsolescence.

• RGL [CRDM] power:

• Replacement of CPY power cabinets with a digital system

• Replacement of step counters.

43

PACKAGE E2C: RPN [NIS] AND RGL [CRDM] UPGRADE

• Retention of existing equipment with:

• strengthened EMC immunity (CPY)

• integration of CT 4 fils

• according to the needs of the safety review, integration of the new densified isolation

module.

• Upgrade of tester, patch cords and connectors in the cabinets

• Performance of actions following I&C ageing observatory (OVCC) review (re-stocking of

necessary components, extension of permanent contract)

• Immediate launch of an equipment re-manufacturing contract for BUG2 and TRI1 using

factory wired and tested 1300 cabinets, strengthened EMC immunity, integration of the CT 4

fils and the integration of a new densified isolation module.

44

PACKAGE E2C: SIP-P UPGRADE (3/5)

T 45

• Retention of relay cabinets, boxes and panels with:

• Densification of relays according to the requirements arising from the safety review

(approx. maximum 30% margin increase)

• Automatic cooling function of SGTB4 can be integrated in the SIP-P by adapting the

existing GCTa [MSRT] valve control system, and other modifications associated with

SGTB4: control logic can be integrated in the RPR [PS]

• Modification of the RCP shutdown control logic on CP0 can be integrated in the RPR

[PS]

• Upgrade of RPR [PS] tester and current periodic test principle retained

• Obsolescence management feasible during the course of VD4: reliability improvement of

certain equipment items during the course of VD4 (replacement of breaker module and

Non-latching relays)

• Launch in 2015 of an RPR [PS] equipment re-manufacturing contract for BUG2 and

TRI1 (including cabinets) using similar relay technology and densified panels.

45

PACKAGE E2C: RPR [PS] UPGRADE (4/5)

T 46

Non-protection On-Off and analogue systems

• Strategy: retention of equipment with partial densification to incorporate the

modification requirements of the other packages.

• Point under examination: maintenance of qualification

Level 2

• Upgrade of main control room system (KSC) (Control room – inter-unit – console and panels) with implementation of digital supervision.

SECONDARY

• Feasibility studies in progress for retaining the I&C of the following systems: ARE

[MFWS], APP, GRE/GSS, GTA, Turbine auxiliary system.

.

PACKAGE E2C: OTHER SYSTEMS (5/5)

CONTENTS


2. REVIEW PACKAGE


4. PACKAGE E2C


6. OTHER PACKAGES

QUALIFICATION MAINTENANCE PACKAGE:

FRAMEWORK (1/3)

Qualification package:

Purpose of the package: to produce the qualification assessment of all items of equipment

including those that have been installed since the beginning and will be retained at VD4 for

10, possibly 20 more years (initial qualification was granted for 40 years).

Method: Implementation of the on-going qualification approach for extending beyond 40

years.

Scope: all class K1/K2/K3 equipment subject qualification for accident conditions that will be

over 30 years old at the time of VD4 (exclusion of those equipment items upgraded prior to

VD4 or those of which the sensitive components are regularly replaced: ie pumps and

valves)

Context

Initial qualification established on the basis of an assumed service life of 40 years

Generally implicit in the Qualification Summary Manual (NSQ).

The service life is a hypothesis of the qualification process but it is not an output data

item for the fleet in operation.

There is no formally specified qualified service life requiring the replacement of

equipment items qualified for accident conditions upon achieving it. However,

justification is required if it is to be exceeded demonstration to be provided to

justify maintaining the qualification beyond the hypothetical service life.

Documentary compliance: compulsory revision of the NSQ.

Methods to extend the qualification of equipment qualified for accident conditions:

Method 1: analysis of the conservatism of the initial qualification

Method 2: comparison of loadings and ambient conditions in operation with those used for

qualification. Measurement campaigns were conducted of the ambient conditions at TRI2 and

NOG1.

Method 3: monitoring of equipment state parameters (end of qualified state indicator): Periodic

measurements on the equipment (3a) / Assessment of equipment (3b).

Method 4: modification of the effects of ambient conditions.

The ambient conditions themselves (4a) / Protection or re-location of equipment situated at a hot

spot (4b)

Method 5: extension of qualification by testing based on a assumed extended service life

Redundant items of equipment (5a) / Equipment taken from site (5b) / New equipment with an

assumed service life exceeding 40 years (5c)

Method 6: replacement (6a) or upgrade (6b) of all or some of the equipment qualified for accident

conditions, with identical items of equipment or components that are less sensitive to ageing


ON-GOING QUALIFICATION STRATEGY (2/3)

Timetable of implementation:

• 2013- mid 2015: On-going Qualification Strategy Reports (NSQP) finalised for all

equipment items subject to the analysis.

For each family of equipment concerned: choice of method and definition of assessment or

test programme.

• July 2017: statement to the ASN of the modifications necessary to strengthen or replace

the items of equipment not cleared by assessment or testing.

• Mid 2017/ late 2018: drafting of Qualification summary manuals (NSQ)/Qualification

maintenance sheets (FMQ), update of the qualification assessment and translation into

operating documents (RPMQ)


TIMETABLE (3/3)

CONTENTS


2. REVIEW PACKAGE


4. PACKAGE E2C

5. OTHER PACKAGES

OTHER PACKAGES (1/2)

Environment package : Purpose of the package: to cover the "environment" part of the Basic Nuclear Installations

(INB) order by the time of the VD4 inspections. Scope: Under production (the "environment" safety review preparation file will complete the

"Safety" review preparation file between now and 2015). The process of assessment and rollout of potential modifications is also in the process of

being agreed with the ASN.

Operating documentation package conventional scope with extension to new General

Operating Rules (RGE).

OTHER PACKAGES (2/2)

DRR package Purpose of the package: To update the Regulatory Reference Files in application of article 5

of the CPP/CSP [MPS/MSS] order of 10/11/99. "Conventional" scope but aim at incorporating resulting modifications in the first nuclear plant

(TTS).

54

Context of the French nuclear programme

VD4 900 PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Project objectives: obtain the operating license for the 28 CPY-series and 6 CP0-series

plants between 40 and 50 years of age with a view to extending the operating period of

these plants to 60 years.

set out the safety objectives associated with extending the operating period of the

plants significantly beyond 40 years.

control the operability of equipment beyond 40 years

ensure the acceptability of operating plants beyond 40 years and improve operating

performance.

Technical context:

pre-strategic scoping established on the basis of the technical guidelines defined by

the GPO DDF (Advisory committee on operating time guidelines) in January 2012.

additional information by the ASN via the follow-up letter of the GPO DDF (June 2013).

strong interface with the post FKS project.

Budgetary context: the large volume of modifications must be compatible with the project

financial model.

T 56

2. VD2 TOPICS (1/2)

Safety classification for IPS equipment : Conformity between design and site and application of associated requirement. Extension to local modification.

Equipment Qualification for accidental conditions : Consistence between maintenance documentation and qualification requirements. Specific control for electro-mechanical

channels and test valves for penetration.

Electrical protection setting : Electrical Separation A/B channels + consistence between design and site for settings . Extension to outgoing feeders for

IPS 380V equipment.

Electrical and mechanical equipment support : Pipes, tanks and HEPR devices and civil rods controls.

Main project milestones:

Design Implementation phase (mid 2015 – 2018): detailed design of VD4 900

modifications and preparation of rollout.

- Detail design; 2015 / March 2018 (e-modification file at D – 9 months).

- ASN statement (Modifications + Final safety analysis report (FSAR) + General -

Operating Rules (RGE) + detailed adequacy report)= mid 2017 for CPY / late 2017 for

CP0.

Experts Group validating the adequacy of the Review= early 2018.

Rollout phase (2019 – 2030): .

- First nuclear plant (TTS) (date project with margin) = 1st January 2019 for CPY and 1st

July 2019 for CP0.

- Generalisation = 2020 – 2030.

VD4 900 SCHEDULE

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