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Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine VTC School of Medicine

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Page 1: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Economics of Heart DiseaseCost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand

Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBAAssistant Professor of Medicine

VTC School of Medicine

Page 2: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Objectives

• Receive a brief introduction to the basics of health economics

• Understand the concept of cost-effectiveness and learn some cardiac-related examples

• Understand the concept of price elasticity of demand and how it affects the consumption of health products and services

• Understand the economic concept of moral hazard and ways to avoid it in performing tests/procedures

Page 3: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

How much do we spend?

Page 4: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

How do we compare?

Page 5: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

One Perspective

Page 6: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

What do we get for this?

Page 7: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

What do we get for this?

Page 8: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

On the other hand…

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Page 9: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Cost of Cardiovascular Disease

• $444 billion spent in 2010 for– Heart conditions– Stroke– Peripheral artery disease– Hypertension

• This accounts of 1/6th of all medical expenditures in the US

Page 10: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Cost of Cardiovascular Disease

• Spending increases at CAGR of 5.7%• At the same time, diabetes and cancer have

increased at 8.5% and 7.3%• Spending on research represents only 1% of

total costs

Page 11: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine
Page 12: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine
Page 13: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Why so much?

• Free(ish) market system allows patient to choose primary/preventative care.

• Federal law (EMTALA) forbids healthcare organizations from turning away patients based on inability to pay.

• Price inelasticity allows providers to set prices as high as possible. (Reimbursements are another story)

Page 14: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Who pays for this?

• Private insurers• Medicare (Patients > 65 years or on disability)• Medicaid (financially disadvantaged)• Individuals (for uncovered expenses, copays,

co-insurance and those who are uninsured)• Health care providers

Page 15: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Who really pays for this?

You Do!!!

Page 16: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Demand for Cardiology Services

• Projected to grow 20% by 2025• WHY?

– Every day for the next 19 years, 10,000 baby boomers will reach age 65 (Pew)

– People are surviving heart attacks at much higher rates and living longer with congestive heart failure

– Not only is incidence going up, so is prevalence

Page 17: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Supply of Cardiologists

• 10% of cardiologists will retire in the next 10 years (MedAxiom)

• Fellowship training programs are more expensive as new ones are not federally subsidized

• In the 90’s it was felt that there were too many specialists and training spots decreased

• There are currently about 4,200 open positions for cardiologists

Page 18: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Cost Effectiveness of Healthcare

• What do you get per $ spent?

Page 19: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

The Numerator: Cost

• Direct costs:– Medicines– Staff– Transport

• Productivity costs:– Loss of productivity

• Intangible costs:– Pain, suffering

• Opportunity cost:– Inability to use resources for another need

Page 20: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

The Denominator: QALY

• QALY = Quality adjusted life-year• 1 QALY = (1 year of life x 1 Utility Value)• i.e., 1 year of life saved but bedridden may be

worth 0.5 QALY’s

Page 21: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Determining QALY Weighting

• “Time trade off” – remaining in a state of ill health for a long period of time or living in perfect health for a shorter period of time

• “Standard Gamble” choice between remaining in ill health for a period of time or undergoing an intervention that could kill patient

• “Visual analogue scale” rank health from 1-100

Page 22: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Debate about QALY

• Assigns a dollar value to a year of human life• Underlying assumptions are not universally

recognized– QOL should be measured consistently– Life years and QOL should be considered

independently

Page 23: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Example: Cost-effectiveness of ICD

• Multiple trials (MADIT, SCD-HeFT) have shown that patients with LVEF < 40% live longer with ICD placement than without

Page 24: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine
Page 25: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Another Example: Statins

Circulation.2011; 124: 146-153

Page 26: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Another Example: Drug Eluting Stents

Page 27: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Moral Hazard

• A situation where one party is more likely to take financial risk because the resulting cost will not be born by the party taking the risk

Page 28: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Moral Hazard Example:The Patient

John Smith is employed and has excellent health care coverage. He does not go to the doctor regularly or pay particular attention to his health. He figures that if something goes wrong, he will deal with it at that time. Besides, there is no cost for him to go to the doctor or Emergency room whenever he needs to

Page 29: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Moral Hazard Example:The Doctor

Dr. Jones is a cardiologist who is seeing a young woman with chest pain. The chest pain does not seem even remotely cardiac in origin. However, he orders a stress test and an echocardiogram because he “wants to be complete” and protect himself from legal action. Besides, he will make quite a bit of money from these two procedures.

Page 30: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Moral Hazard Ex

Page 31: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Price Elasticity of Demand

Page 32: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Examples

Elastic Demand• Apples• Rice• Movie tickets

Inelastic Demand• Gasoline• Electricity

Page 33: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Elasticity and its Relationship to Healthcare

• Primary/Preventative services and pharmacy benefits tend to be more elastic because there is no immediate perceived benefit and there is an immediate loss of money.

• Emergency services tend to be more inelastic because the need is urgent, the perceived benefit is immediate and the loss of money is usually transferred (at least in part) to a third party

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1355.pdf

Page 34: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Effect of Insurance

• Theoretically, a fully insured individual should demonstrate a low price elasticity of demand. This has been demonstrated in VA studies

• However, with co-pays and co-insurances, this price elasticity should increase.

Page 35: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1355.pdf

Page 36: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Price Elasticity of Cardiac Services

• There is almost no information available about this.

• As heart issues are deemed to be potentially life threatening, it is assumed that demand for cardiac services is almost completely inelastic.

• However taking a cholesterol pill may be different than getting a heart transplant.

Page 37: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Case Studies

• Analyze the following vignettes and discuss if and how cost effectiveness, moral hazard and price elasticity of demand come into play.

Page 38: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Case Study #1

• Mr B is a 74 year old who had a heart attack when he was 70 years old and now has mild congestive heart failure. He also has stage III colon cancer that has undergone treatment and now appears to be in remission.

• His ejection fraction (EF) is found to be 30% and his cardiologist recommended the implantation of an ICD

• He underwent the procedure successfully without complication

Page 39: Economics of Heart Disease Cost-Effectiveness, Moral Hazard and Price Elasticity of Demand Matthew Schumaecker, MD, MBA Assistant Professor of Medicine

Case Study #2

• Ms. L is a 28 year old who works at a fast food restaurant. She had had health insurance but when premiums went up by $100, she dropped her coverage.

• She smokes cigarettes and is moderately obese• One night she woke up with terrible chest pain and went to

the ED.• She was admitted to the chest pain center. Lab tests were

drawn for heart attack, and she underwent stress testing the next day

• Everything turned out okay• 4 weeks later, Ms. L gets a bill from the hospital for $17,600