economics 216: the macroeconomics of development
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Economics 216: The Macroeconomics of Development. Lawrence J. Lau, Ph. D., D. Soc. Sc. (hon.) Kwoh-Ting Li Professor of Economic Development Department of Economics Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A. Spring 2000-2001 - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Economics 216:The Macroeconomics of Development
Lawrence J. Lau, Ph. D., D. Soc. Sc. (hon.)Kwoh-Ting Li Professor of Economic Development
Department of EconomicsStanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A.
Spring 2000-2001
Email: [email protected]; WebPages: http://www.stanford.edu/~ljlau
Lecture 12Strategies for Transition
from a Planned to a Market Economy
Lawrence J. Lau, Ph. D., D. Soc. Sc. (hon.)Kwoh-Ting Li Professor of Economic Development
Department of EconomicsStanford University
Stanford, CA 94305-6072, U.S.A.
Spring 2000-2001
Email: [email protected]; WebPages: http://www.stanford.edu/~ljlau
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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The Transition from a Centrally Planned Economy to a Market Economy The meaning of transition
Replacement of administrative allocation by market allocation Replacement of administered prices by market prices
Can a transition be achieved without creating losers?
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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A Centrally Planned Economy Enterprises and households are assigned rights to and
obligations for fixed quantities of commodities at fixed plan prices
The rights and obligations are enterprise- and household-specific
There are governmental sanctions for failure to fulfil the obligations under the plan
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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The Dual-Track ApproachAdopted in the Chinese Transition (1) The “Plan Track”--the pre-existing central plan remains
and its rights and obligations continue to be enforced by the government
The “Market Track”--all markets are instantaneously open, with prices determined by supply and demand
Producers are given autonomy and incentive to plan their production and participate in the market, provided obligations under the plan are fulfilled
Consumers are completely free to plan their consumption and participate in the market, given allocated consumption goods and fulfillment of labor obligations
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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The Dual-Track ApproachAdopted in the Chinese Transition (2) Planned profits and losses (taxes and subsidies) of
enterprises remain the same Differences between plan and market prices make feasible
lumpsum transfers Continued planned consumer goods deliveries enable the
maintenance of the pre-reform standard of living as a floor
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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The Political Economy of the Dual-Track Approach No one is worse off--“Reform without Losers” “Grandfathering” of “Vested Interests” Autonomy and incentive on the margin Creation of new, reform-oriented “Vested Interests” Minimizing opposition and maximizing support But: CAN IT BE EFFICIENT?
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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A Preview Theoretical Analysis--under what conditions can the
“Dual-Track” approach achieve both efficiency and Pareto-improvement simultaneously? Partial Equilibrium General Equilibrium
Empirical Evidence--the Chinese experience
Theoretical Analysis:Partial Equilibrium
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Two Types of Market Liberalization Limited Market Liberalization (price PM and quantity
QM) Market resales of plan-allocated goods by either enterprises or
households are not permitted Market purchases by planned suppliers for fulfilling plan-
mandated delivery quotas (e.g. sub-contracting) are not permitted Full Market Liberalization (price PE and quantity QE)
Market resales and market purchases for redelivery are all allowed by a planned supplier or a rationed user, as long as the rights and obligations under the plan are all fulfilled
QP = plan quantity; PP1 = plan price (below PE); and PP2 = plan price (above PE)
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Interpretation of the Plan-Allocated Delivery Quotas under Full Market Liberalization A put option on the part of the planned supplier to sell
fixed quantities at the plan price to the rationed users A call option on the part of the rationed user to buy fixed
quantities at the plan price from the planned suppliers Since both options are exercisable at the same fixed plan
price, at most one of the options can have positive value at market equilibrium
These options can be “bought and sold” in lieu of the physical deliveries
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Assumptions of the Model A closed economy Feasibility of the original plan Continued enforcement of the plan track Profit and utility maximization by the economic agents Full liberalization of the market track
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Two Cases QP, the plan quantity, is less than QE, the market
equilibrium quantity QP, the plan quantity, is greater than QE, the market
equilibrium quantity
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Efficiency in Demand Rationing and Supply Planning Efficient demand rationing implies that the rationed goods
are allocated to the most deserving users, that is, those whose willingness to pay is the highest (marginal utility or marginal productivity is the highest)
The demand curve is the aggregation of the willingness to pay of the potential users
Efficient supply planning implies that the production is assigned to the most efficient producers, that is, those whose marginal costs are the lowest
The supply curve is the aggregation of the marginal costs of the potential producers
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Efficient Rationed Demand andEfficient Planned Supply
Figure 1: Efficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B, H
D, I
C
C'
E
G
G'
F
QP Q
E
PE
PP1
PP2
Rationed Demand
Planned Supply
Total Demand
Total Supply
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand andEfficient Planned Supply
Figure 2: Inefficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B
D, I
C
C'
E
G
G'
F
QP
QE
PE
PP1
PP2
Rationed Demand
Planned Supply
Total Demand
Total Supply
H
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Planned Supply: Limited Market Liberalization
Figure 3: Residual Demand and Supply:Inefficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce
QM
PM
Residual Demand
Residual Supply
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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QP + QM> QE:Over-Production under Limited Liberalization If PM<PE, then every potential user with a willingness to
pay greater than or equal to PE is an actual user There may be actual users whose willingness to pay is less
than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE If PM>PE, then every potential supplier with a marginal
cost less than or equal to PE is an actual supplier There may be actual suppliers whose marginal costs are
greater than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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PM> PE under Efficient Planned Supply Under efficient planned supply, the actual total supply in
the economy will be produced by the suppliers with the lowest marginal costs
Thus, QP + QM> QE implies PM> PE
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Efficient Rationed Demand andInefficient Planned Supply
Figure 4: Efficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B, H
D
C
C'
E
G
G'
F
QP
QE
PE
PP1
PP2
Rationed Demand
Planned Supply
Total Demand
Total Supply
I
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Efficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply: Limited Market Liberalization
Figure 5: Residual Demand and Supply:Efficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce
QM
PM
Residual Demand
Residual Supply
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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QP + QM> QE:Over-Production under Limited Liberalization If PM<PE, then every potential user with a willingness to
pay greater than or equal to PE is an actual user There may be actual users whose willingness to pay is less
than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE If PM>PE, then every potential supplier with a marginal
cost less than or equal to PE is an actual supplier There may be actual suppliers whose marginal costs are
greater than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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PM< PE under Efficient Rationed Demand Under efficient rationed demand, the actual total demand
in the economy will be used by the users with the highest willingness to pay
Thus, QP + QM> QE implies PM< PE
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply
Figure 6: Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B
D
C
C'
E
G
G'
F
QP
QE
PE
PP1
PP2
Rationed Demand
Planned Supply
Total Demand
Total Supply
I
H
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply: Limited Market Liberalization
Figure 7: Residual Demand and Supply:Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply
Quantity
Pri
ce
QM
PM
Residual Demand
Residual Supply
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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QP + QM> QE:Over-Production under Limited Liberalization If PM<PE, then every potential user with a willingness to
pay greater than or equal to PE is an actual user There may be actual users whose willingness to pay is less
than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE If PM>PE, then every potential supplier with a marginal
cost less than or equal to PE is an actual supplier There may be actual suppliers whose marginal costs are
greater than PE Thus, QP + QM> QE
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Plan Quantity < Market Equilibrium Quantity Proposition 1: (1) The combined output of the plan and market tracks
under limited liberalization of the market track is greater than or equal to the fully liberalized market equilibrium quantity; and
(2) The market equilibrium price under limited liberalization is greater (respectively, less) than or equal to the market equilibrium price under full liberalization of the market track if planned supply (respectively, rationed demand) is efficient.
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Plan Quantity < Market Equilibrium Quantity Proposition 2: Independently of the initial conditions concerning the plan
price and the degree of efficiency of rationed demand and planned supply:
(1) The dual-track approach with either limited or full liberalization of the market track is Pareto-improving; and
(2) The dual-track approach with full liberalization of the market track achieves full economic efficiency.
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply:PlanQuantity>MarketQuantity
Figure 8: Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply:The Case of Plan Quantity Greater Than Market Equilibrium Quantity
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B
D
E
G
G'
F
QP
QE
PE
PP1
PP2
Total Demand
Total Supply
I
H
C
C'
Planned Supply
Rationed Demand
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Inefficient Rationed Demand and Inefficient Planned Supply:PlanQuantity>MarketQuantity
Figure 9: Residual Demand and Supply:The Case of Plan Quantity Greater Than Market Equilibrium Quantity
Quantity
Pri
ce
Residual Demand
Residual Supply
QM
PM
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Efficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Plan-ned Supply: Plan Quantity>Market Quantity
Figure 10: Efficient Rationed Demand and Efficient Planned Supply:The Case of Plan Quantity Greater Than Market Equilibrium Quantity
Quantity
Pri
ce A
B, H
D, I
E
G
G'
F
QP
QE
PE
PP1
PP2
Total Demand
Total Supply
C
C'
Rationed Demand
Planned Supply
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Plan Quantity > Market Equilibrium Quantity Proposition 3: Independently of the initial conditions concerning the plan
prices and the degree of efficiency of rationed demand and planned supply:
(1) The dual-track approach with limited or full liberalization is always Pareto-improving; and
(2) The dual-track approach with full liberalization achieves efficiency if the rights and obligations under the plan are enforced in terms of the rents.
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Plan Quantity > Market Equilibrium Quantity: Efficiency Achieved through Payment of Rents If PP1 is less than PE, then all planned suppliers with marginal costs
above PE will have an incentive to pay off rationed users with willingness to pay below PE with a payment equal to PE-PP1 The potential loss to these planned suppliers from physical delivery exceeds
PE-PP1 The potential gain to these rationed users from accepting physical delivery is
less than PE-PP1 Thus, the planned suppliers with marginal cost above PE should try
to purchase the call options in the market at price PE-PP1; the rationed users with willingness to pay below PE should try to sell their call options in the market at price PE-PP1
Both groups are better off then if physical delivery is effected
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Feasibility of the Original Plan (1) The production plan for each producer is feasible; (2) The consumption plan for each consumer is feasible; (3) Material balance holds for the economy as a whole; and (4) The consumption plan for each consumer is affordable
at the plan prices.
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Continued Enforcement of the Plan Track No different from contract enforcement in a market
economy Focus of enforcement shifted from total physical
production to inter-enterprise deliveries Pre-existing rents can be protected without the
enforcement of physical deliveries Enforcement against consumers may be difficult Credibility of state enforcement is crucial
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Full Market Liberalization is Necessary for Full Economic Efficiency Under the “Dual-Track” approach, full market
liberalization is necessary at the outset to assure both Pareto-improvement and efficiency
A sequential approach of implementing first limited market liberalization and then full market liberalization does not possess the Pareto-improvement property
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Applicability to the Chinese Economy Feasibility of the original plan Credibility of continued enforcement “Contract responsibility system” Full market liberalization
Theoretical Analysis:General Equilibrium
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The Model l goods m producers with production set Yi n consumers with consumption set Xj lth good is leisure; consumers have only leisure
endowment
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The Status Quo a national production plan v = (v1, ..., vm) a national consumption plan c = (c1, ..., cn) q=(q1, ..., ql) the plan price An economy under central planning is characterized by (v,
c, q)
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Feasibility of the Original Plan (i) The production plan for each producer is feasible (ii) The consumption plan for each consumer is feasible (iii) Material balance holds in the aggregate; and (iv) The consumption plan for each consumer is affordable
at the plan prices
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The Big-Bang Strategy The central plan is abolished All markets are instantaneously open Producers are completely free to plan their production Consumers are completely free to plan their consumption
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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The Openness of All Markets Both the Big-Bang and the Dual-Track strategies require
that all markets are open for economic efficiency In particular, market resales of plan-allocated inputs and
consumption goods, and market purchases of outputs for re-delivery are allowed
There are two prices for each good, PP, the plan price and PE, the market price
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Efficiency of a Dual-Track Equilibrium A Dual-Track Competitive Equilibrium is Efficient
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Physical Implementability What happens if the equilibrium aggregate gross output is
less than the plan aggregate gross output for at least one good?
Simultaneous physical delivery then becomes impossible Recycling through the market with (infinite) subdivisions
of the plan period provides a solution
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Pareto-Superiority of a Dual-Track Equilibrium A Dual-Track Competitive Equilibrium is Pareto-
Improving, by construction
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The Dual-Track Strategy Combines plan and market “Contract Responsibility” system Autonomy and incentive on the margin Efficiency achieved immediately Reliance on existing institutions and Information
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Is Chinese Economic Reform Gradualist? No! Efficiency is instantaneously achieved as if under a
“Big Bang” reform Efficiency is achieved because both the prices and
quantities of goods allocated within the plan are fixed Chinese economic reform appears gradualist because the
population is protected from shock (pain)
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The Importance of the Physical Implementability Constraint A “shortage” economy under the Plan implies that
equilibrium aggregate gross output is likely to exceed plan aggregate gross output
Economic growth is also likely to increase the equilibrium aggregate gross output through its effects on the intermediate and consumption demands over time
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The Role of State Power Enforcement of contracts Credibility of the state, and expectations thereof, affect
enterprise (and household) behavior, and hence compliance with the State Plan (post reform)
Multiple equilibria (outcomes) possible, depending on credibility of the state
Lawrence J. Lau, Stanford University
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Desirable Features of the “Dual-Track” Approach: Pareto-Improvement The “Dual-Track” approach minimizes political opposition
to reform ex ante and maximizes political opposition to reversal of reform ex post
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Desirable Features: Minimal Additional Informational and Institutional Requirements The “Dual-Track” approach utilizes the existing
information contained in the original plan and does not require new information for the implementation of the implicit compensatory scheme
The “Dual-Track” approach can be implemented by enforcing the original plan through existing institutions (e.g., the state planning commission). No new institutions (e.g., a national revenue service, or a social welfare agency) are necessary
The Chinese Experience
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The Chinese Economy Today (1) East Asia is the fastest-growing region in the world over the past two
decades, the East Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998 notwithstanding China is the fastest growing country in East Asia—10% p.a. since
beginning of economic reform (1979) China survived the East Asian currency crisis relatively unscathed China is one of the very few socialist countries that have made a
successful economic transition from a centrally planned to a market economy--the rate of interest (the price of money) and the exchange rate are the only prices that are still administratively determined
The private (non-state) sector accounts for more than 60% of GDP in 2000
China is no longer a “shortage” economy--insufficient aggregate demand is a real possibility
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The Chinese Economy Today (2)
1979 2000US$ (2000 prices)
Real GDP 176 bill. 1.08 trill.
Real GDP per capita 182860
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The Chinese Economy Today (3)
U.S. ChinaUS$ (current prices)
2000 GDP 9.962 trill. 1.08 trill.
2000 GDP per capita 36,165 860
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The Chinese Economic Reform(1979-the present) The Open Door
International Trade Foreign Direct Investment
Marketization Goods Market Labor Market Foreign Exchange Market Housing Market Capital Market
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The Chinese Economic Reform(1979-the present) Devolution of Economic Decision-Making Power (The
Contract Responsibility System) Empowering Provincial and Local Governments Professional Management of Enterprises Autonomy and Incentive
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The Chinese Economic Reform(1979-the present) Creation of New, Non-State-Owned Modes of
Organization for Production Agriculture--Abolition of communes; return to a system of
individual cultivators with fixed rents and taxes Industry--Emergence of “Township and Village” (T&V)
enterprises; (foreign) joint-venture, foreign and private enterprises
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Economic Performance:Pre- and Post-Reform
1952-1979 1979-1998
Pre-Reform Reform
Real GDP 6.20 9.82
Real GDP/Capita 4.14 8.39
Real Gross Value of:
Agricultural Production 4.33 8.05
Light Industry 7.83 11.30
Heavy Industry 11.37 11.34
Real Personal Consumption 4.99 8.91
Real Consumption/Capita 2.96 7.51
Real Gross Fixed Capital Formation 11.43 11.10
Capital Stock 5.93 9.77
Employment 2.52 2.91
GDP Deflator 0.59 6.51
Retail Price Index 0.80 7.03
Exports (in current US Dollars) 10.98 14.66
Imports (in current US Dollars) 10.27 12.22
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Selected Economic Indicators (%)
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Marketization:Domestic Prices The prices of all consumer goods and more than 99% of
the producer goods are determined in the market (with the exception of within plan outputs of coal, natural gas, and steel)
Only three agricultural commodities--grains, cotton, and tobacco--remain under the central plan
The price of low-grade grain is controlled (subsidized) The price of energy is at world market levels
The prices of oil and gasoline are freely determined in the market China has been taken off the “non-market economies” list
of the European Union (12/97)
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Marketization:Foreign Exchange Unified exchange rate since 1/94 Interbank market in foreign exchange established 4/94 Current account convertibility since 12/96 Exporters permitted to retain 15% of foreign exchange
proceeds as of 10/97 However, full capital account convertibility unlikely in the
near future
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The Growth of the Non-State Sector-Industry
Distribution of Gross Value of Industrial Production by Ownership1979
State-owned 78%
Collective22%
1999
Collective33%
State-owned 26%
Individual 17%
Other Types24%
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The Growth of Industrial Output by Sector of Ownership
The Rate of Growth of Industrial Output by Sector of Ownership
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999
Total Industrial Output
State-Owned Enterprises
Non-State Owned Enterprises
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The Growth of Industrial Output of the Non-State Sector
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Per
cent
age
Non-state Owned Enterprises
Township and Village Enterprises
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The Growth of the Non-State Sector (2)-Retail
The Distribution of Retail Sales by Ownership1979Joint-Owned
0.0%Individual0.2%
Collective-Owned43.1% State-Owned
54.0%
Others2.6% 1998
Joint-Owned0.6%
Individual37.1%
Others25.2%
Collective-Owned16.6%
State-Owned20.7%
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Efficient Utilization ofNew Resources New enterprises and new activities are responsible for the
phenomenal economic growth of China Little or no privatization of existing enterprises Little or no successful restructuring of existing enterprises
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The Dual Tracks in the Grain Markets
Table 1. The Dual Tracks in the Grain Market (million tons)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
State procurement at plan price
47.8 54.0 50.2 52.1 56.2 91.2 102.4 59.6 53.3 56.9 50.5
State procurement at market price
10.6 17.5 7.6 9.3 19.6 32.3 42.3 43.8
Domestic production
304.8 332.1 320.6 325.0 354.5 387.3 407.3 379.1 391.5 403.0 394.1
Plan procurement/Production
0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.25 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.13
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The Dual Tracksin Agricultural Goods Markets
Table 2. The Dual Tracks in Agricultural Goods Markets (% of output value)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Transactions atplan prices
94.4 37.0 35.0 29.4 24.0 35.5 31.0
Transactions atmarket prices
5.6 63.0 65.0 70.6 76.0 64.5 69.0
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The Dual Tracks in Industrial Goods Markets
Table 3. The Dual Tracks in Industrial Goods Markets(% of output value)
1978 1985 1990
Transactions atplan prices
100.0 64.0 44.6
Transactions atmarket prices
0.0 36.0 55.4
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The Dual Tracks in Retail Sales
Table 4. The Dual Tracks in Retail Sales (% of sales)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Transactions atplan prices
97.0 47.0 35.0 33.7 28.9 31.3 30.0
Transactions atmarket prices
3.0 53.0 65.0 66.3 71.1 69.7 70.0
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The Dual Tracks in the Labor Market
Table 5. The Dual Tracks in Non-Farm Employment in the State and Non-state Sectors(million employees)
1978 1983 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
State 74.51 87.71 89.90 99.84 101.08 103.46 106.64 108.89 109.20 112.14
Permanent 74.51 87.14 86.58 89.76 89.18 89.74 90.75 88.31 85.24 83.61
Contract 0.00 0.57 3.32 10.08 11.90 13.72 15.89 20.58 23.96 28.53
Non-State 48.90 62.10 107.97 138.28 136.49 152.53 159.49 172.28 195.87 204.85
Urban 20.63 29.75 38.18 42.83 42.82 43.84 46.04 47.41 50.45 56.01
Rural 28.27 32.35 69.79 95.45 93.67 108.69 113.45 124.87 145.42 148.84
StatePermanent/Total
0.60 0.58 0.44 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.26
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Examples from the Chinese Experience (1) The agricultural reform (2) The industrial reform (3) The dual-track price system in urban consumer
goods and services (4) The foreign exchange reform
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Examples from the Chinese Experience (5) Growth of economic activities outside the “Plan” (6) Special economic zones and foreign direct
investment (7) The tax reforms (8) The rate of interest on household bank deposits
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The Effect of Economic Growth Growing out of the “Plan” New resources from high saving rates of between 35 and
40% The rise of new enterprises
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Phasing Out the Plan Track-Agriculture
Table 1. Phasing Out the Plan-Track: Agricultural Products (% of output value)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
plan price 94.4 37.0 35.0 29.4 24.0 35.5 31.0 22.2 12.5 10.4
guide price 0.0 23.0 21.0 16.8 19.0 24.3 27.0 20.0 5.7 2.1
market price 5.6 40.0 43.7 53.8 57.0 40.4 42.0 57.8 81.8 87.5
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Phasing Out the Plan Track-Industry
Table 3. Phasing Out the Plan-Track: Industrial Goods (% of output value)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
planprice
100.0 64.0 60.0 44.6 36.0 18.7 13.8
guideprice
0.0 23.0 19.0 18.3 7.5 5.1
marketprice
0.0 13.0 40.0 36.4 45.7 73.8 81.1
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Phasing Out the Plan Track-Retail
Table 5. Phasing Out the Plan-Track: Total Retail Sales (% of sales)
1978 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993planprice
97.0 47.0 35.0 33.7 28.9 31.3 30.0 20.9 5.9 4.8
guideprice
0.0 19.0 25.0 28.0 21.8 23.2 25.0 10.3 1.1 1.4
marketprice
3.0 34.0 40.0 38.3 49.3 45.5 45.0 68.8 93.0 93.8
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Related Literature Byrd (1987, 1989) Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) McMillan and Naughton (1992) and Naughton (1995)
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Conclusion:There Can Be Reform Without Losers! Reform is distinct from redistribution--new value is
created--a positive sum rather than a zero sum game Economic reforms without losers are possible--The “Dual-
Track” approach allows both economic efficiency and Pareto-improvement to be simultaneously attained
Efficiency and equity are compatible Feasibility of the original plan and credibility of state
enforcement are essential