economic sanctions against iraq: human and economic costs

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Economic sanctions againstIraq: Human and economiccostsAhmed Shehabaldin a & William M. Laughlin Jr ba Professor of Business Administration ,b Associate Professor of Economics , FairmontState College , West VirginiaPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

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Economic Sanctions Against Iraq:Human and Economic Costs

AHMED SHEHABALDIN andWILLIAM M. LAUGHLIN JR

Economic sanctions are an instrumental policy used to deter a country frominternationally unacceptable behaviour. In the case of Iraq, the sanctions were inreaction to Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. The purpose of the sanctions was toforce the Iraqi invaders to withdraw from Kuwait. It was also expected that tighteconomic sanctions would reduce the welfare of the country and consequentlytrigger the affected masses to overthrow Saddam Hussein's government. Theeconomic consequences have been terrible, inflation skyrocketed, personalincome reached the lowest in the world, while unemployment hit a record high.The Iraqi army did not withdraw from Kuwait peacefully, however, nor wasSaddam overthrown. In this article, we will discuss the consequence of theeconomic sanctions and why they punished the people more than thegovernment.

The Iraqi economic sanctions are the most effective of all economicsanctions in this century. The reasons are that Iraq is a small country,dependent on the export of one commodity (oil) and surrounded byunfriendly neighbours. These elements, and others, make sanctions veryeffective but at terrible cost of human misery and death.

Why should the Iraqi population have to suffer from theirgovernment's action in Kuwait? Why have they not they overthrownSaddam's regime? Critics claim it is the rally-around-the-flag that keepsthe Iraqis, regardless of their differences, supporting the government. Webelieve that there are many elements working together that make theIraqis quiet. In this article we will discuss the consequence of theeconomic sanctions and why they punished the people more than thegovernment. We will pinpoint the internal and external factors thatcontribute to make the sanctions more effective, yet unsuccessful.Finally, we will discuss why comprehensive sanctions on a regime likeIraq are hurting those persons most removed from the wrongdoing oftheir nation's leaders and least able to bring about change.

Ahmed Shehabaldin, Professor of Business Administration and William M. Laughlin Jr,Associate Professor of Economics, Fairmont State College, West Virginia.

The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol.3, No.4 (Winter 1999) pp.1-18PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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2 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

SANCTIONS IN THEORY

The Heckscher-Ohlin theory argued that international differentials inthe supply of the factors of production explain the direction ofinternational trade. In particular, it highlights the role of a nation'sresource endowments as the key determinant of comparative advantage.According to this theory, price varies among nations based on therelationship of two factors: (1) differences in relative endowments of thefactors of production that exist among countries; (2) differences in theintensity of factor usage in the production of different commodities.Given these conditions, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory states that eachcountry should export those commodities that use its abundant factormost intensively and import goods that use its scarce factor intensively(Carbaugh, 1998).

Oil is the most abundant commodity in Iraq. Its oil reserves wereestimated at 120 billion barrels - only second to Saudi Arabia, the largestoil producer in the world. Iraq's oil reserves are expected to last 120years at the rate of production of 3 million barrels a day, the pre warproduction rate. About 95 per cent of Iraq's oil production was forexports and 5 per cent was for domestic consumption (Khalil, 1988).

The oil sector is the dominant sector in Iraq's economy. In 1990, theoil sector contributed 61 per cent of the total gross domestic product.Oil revenues supplied more than 65 per cent of government revenuesand about 98 per cent of foreign exchange. The oil sector's share infinancing economic development averages more than 90 per cent.

Iraq has had a favourable balance of trade position since 1960. In thatyear the surplus amounted to 90.7 million Iraqi dinar (ID). In 1970 thesurplus was ID219.9 million, in 1975, ID593.6 million, and in 1980,ID3,215.7 million. Iraq could not have achieved a favourable balance oftrade without its oil exports. In fact, oil exporting has been a criticalfactor in helping to expand Iraqi imports of goods and services. Forexample, Iraqi non-oil exports would have financed 7.7 per cent of thetotal imports in 1960, 13.5 per cent in 1970, and only 2.7 per cent in1980 (Khalil, 1988).

Thus, a labour strike in the oil sector, sabotage of oil facilities, orboycott of oil exports could cut the life line of the Iraqi economy. Theinternational economic sanctions against Iraq, however, are not onlydepressing the national income but also badly depressing the welfare ofthe entire population, which makes sanctions not an ideal instrumentalpolicy to deter an aggressive country led by a dictator.

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COSTS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ 3

THE SANCTION'S IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY

The immediate cost of the Gulf war was estimated at US$270.2 billion,which is more than five times the 1990 Iraqi's gross domestic product(Kaslow, 1991). Almost the entire infrastructure of the country waseither destroyed or damaged. In the first two months after the war, Iraqicities including Baghdad, the capital, had to live in 'Dark Age'conditions. There was no electricity, no drinking water, and no medicine(Ahtisaari, 1991). In some cities in the South, electricity and drinkingwater are still in short supply.

The sanctions damaged the rest of the country. The banning of thesale of oil has reduced the country's foreign exchange and its capacity toimport to a minimum which drove the domestic prices of basicfoodstuffs sky-high. The estimated annual rate of inflation was morethan 8,000 per cent a year, making most goods and services beyond thereach of ordinary people. For example, in January 1998 one kilogram ofbeef costs 2,250 dinars; sugar, 450 dinars; a set of 30 eggs, 3,000 dinars;loaf of bread, 50 dinars ; tea, 2,000 dinars; cooking oil, 750 dinars; anda kilogram of flour, 325 dinars (see Table 1). These prices cannot fit thebudget of the highest paid professions, including physicians. The averagemonthly income of a physician is ID4,000, an income enough to buy 30eggs, and 20 loaves of bread for the entire month (Alnasrawi, 1994).

Rewarding jobs have diminished for the Iraqis and non-Iraqis.Foreign and Arabs labourers, who used to be all over the cities, havedisappeared, while many skilled Iraqis are leaving the country for betterliving conditions. There are over three million Iraqis scattered all overthe world (Pearl, 1998). They could be found in Europe, the US, Africa,and other Arab countries. Some had to leave their families behind towork in unrelated occupations at minimum wages. Inside Iraq, manyeducators and professionals are working in unrelated occupations. Forexample, it is not uncommon to see a surgeon or physician working in aretailing sector or as a taxi driver. This story applies to teachers,engineers, economists, accountants, and many others (Glain, 1999).

Phenomenally high rates of inflation forced most women out of jobs.They chose to stay home because it is more economical than continuingat a job where monthly incomes cannot cover their daily transportationcosts. School children are quitting schools for simple jobs to helpparents. In Baghdad, one classroom of 35 students has only two studentsremaining, the rest have dropped out (Al-Ashtriki,1998).

Government employees are hit hard by the inflation. Their fixedincomes can cover only a few days of their daily needs. They have to findadditional sources of income by having second jobs. Ordinary young

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THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

TABLE 1FOOD PRICES INCREASES IN IRAQ SINCE SANCTIONS BEGAN

Food Items

Wheat-flourMilk (powdered)Bread(per piece)Baby milk(450g tin)SugarCooking oilRiceTeaTomatoChick peasPotatoesEggs(carton of 30)OnionsDatesMeat(lamb)Meat(beef)

All items

Price per

Aug 1990

0.050.750.010.450.200.480.231.700.270.650.453.830.370.527.006.83

23.79

Average percentage increase of all itemsAnnual average increase

Unit (Iraqi Dinars)

Jan 1998

325.001500.00

50.00450.00450.00750.00400.00

2000.00150.00600.00175.00

3000.00300.00350.00

2500.002250.00

15,250.00

over the 8 years

% increaseOver 8 years

650,000200,000500,000100,000225,000156,000173,913117,64755,55592,30738,88978,32981,08167,30735,71432,943

2,604,935

64,1038,013

Note: The commodity unit is 1 kg unless stated otherwise.

Source: Prices per unit as of August 1990 are adopted from Table 6 of Abbas Alnasrawi,'Economic Development, Underdevelopment, and Outlook', in Fran Hazelton (ed.), IraqSince the Gulf; Prospects for Democracy (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994).All other figures were collected and analysed by the authors.

men and women cannot get married without the assistance of theirparents. Neither can they afford to buy furniture, nor rent a house withtheir incomes. The lucky groom is the one whose parent's house has anextra bedroom. Even in Baghdad, you see many houses shared by two orthree married couples using one bathroom and one kitchen. In recentyears, flea markets have become common all over Iraq, where people selltheir furniture for food or medicine. Barbara Crossette (1997) of theNew York Times wrote 'along the roadsides, impromptu markets havesprung up where people are trying to maintain their dignity came to selltheir clothes, chandelier, and household furniture'. McGeary (1998) ofTime magazine reported 'grim and desolate: that's both Iraq's landscapeand its state of mind. The once proud city of Baghdad wears the rags ofpoverty: marble chipping off the extravagant examples of modernarchitecture built in an era of prosperity, doors and window glass for sale

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from middle-class villas, grime and time eating away the old tenementsof the poor. You see few smiling faces, and only the black-marketprofiteers and smugglers are well dressed.'

The Efficiency of SanctionsWhat makes sanctions more effective? Kimberly Anne Elliott (1995)offers her analysis on 104 sanction episodes from the beginning of thefirst World War and continuing through 1989. She found that sanctionsare most effective when: significant international co-operation isachieved; the target country is small, economically dependent, andpolitically unstable; the target country is economically tied with thesender countries; the sanctions are imposed quickly and decisively; andthe cost of the sanctions to the senders is low. Doxey (1980 ) suggestedamong other things, the economic size of the sender and the tradeconcentrations of the target. Losman (1979) added cultural factors in thetarget nations as another factor that contributes to the effectiveness ofeconomic sanctions. Smeets (1990) listed three more factors: thedetermination of the sanctioning country to achieve its goal; the meansto make the sanction a success; the determination of the target to resistor break the sanctions. In the case of Iraq, more factors are workingtogether to yield devastating results:1. Iraqi economy is vulnerable to sanctions. Iraq is a third world country,

whose economy in 1990 was only 0.8 of one per cent of the UnitedStates and 25 per cent of Belgium (World Bank, 1995). Oilproduction and export are the backbone of its economy. Oil exportrevenues have enabled Iraq to spend on a variety of domesticprojects, such as roads, dams, hospitals, housing, as well as to investin agricultural and manufacturing projects. Iraq never faced theserious balance of trade problems that are facing most less-developedcountries. During most periods before the sanctions, the balance oftrade was in favour of Iraq, a position which has helped Iraq to fulfilinternational obligations and to maintain its import programmewithout borrowing from international agencies. Thus, it is no wonderthat when oil exports stopped, every economic aspect of the countrywas affected including gross domestic product, allocations foreconomic development plans, government consumption, nationalsaving, balance of trade, and cash reserves.

2. Domestic consumption and investment are highly dependent onimports. Agricultural and manufacturing sectors never met thenational demands without imports. Food imports were estimated at70 per cent of Iraqi needs, capital goods 100 per cent andconsumption goods about 50 per cent. Thus, a ban on imports will

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create an imbalance between aggregate demand and aggregate supplywhich in turn creates strong inflationary pressure.

3. Iraq traded with a few counties, mainly the United States, Japan, andWestern Europe (Europa, 1997). These countries' total trades withIraq were very small relative to their total trade with the rest of theworld. Thus, the sanctions against Iraq will have a minimum impacton their level of employment and domestic prices.

4. The Iraqi sanctions are fairly easy to monitor and control. Iraq has nofriendly neighbours and only one small sea outlet. During 1980-88Iraq engaged in a devastating war with Iran. Syria sided with Iran,while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan sided with Iraq. Turkeyremained neutral. However, all countries, except Jordan, had to cuttheir diplomatic relationship with Iraq and close their borders inresponse to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, Saudi Arabia, Syriaand Turkey were participating in the allied war against Iraq. Thus,goods under the UN sanctions are not allowed to reach the Iraqiborders by the neighbouring countries, while at sea the passage ofgoods is monitored by the UN patrol boats. Iraqi oil terminals locatedin Turkey and the Gulf are both blocked. If Iraq had friendlyrelationships with its neighbours and a commodity other than oil, thesanctions would be hard and costly to monitor.

5. The sanctions were quick and decisive. The day Iraq invaded Kuwait,the United Nations Security Council, UNSC, unanimously (exceptYemen) passed Resolution 660 which called for Iraq to withdrawfrom Kuwait. Four days later the UNSC passed Resolution 661 callingfor the international community to bar all exports from Iraq andKuwait. Twenty days later, the UNSC resolution 665 called for amaritime interception force to enforce the economic sanctionimposed by Resolution 661. In total, 12 resolutions were passed bythe UNSC during the four months between 2 August and 29November, an average of three resolutions a month. The latestresolution before the war was Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990.This resolution authorised UN members to use all necessary means tobring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by 15 January 1991 (seeTable 2).

6. The economic cost of the sanctions to the West and the rest of theworld was minimal. The shut down of oil production in Iraq andKuwait was fast compensated by Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Pricesof oil remained relatively low and stable during and after the war,with the exception of a brief period of time. Countries affected bysanctions were either compensated (Egypt and Turkey) or givenexpanded loans (Romania). Even the $57 billion of the war costs

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were shared by the USA, Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, andthe United Arab Emirates.

7. The sanction is eight years old and continuing. As of the spring of1998, chief United Nations weapons inspector, Richard Buttlerclaimed that the Iraqis are still hiding biological and chemicalweapons in some sensitive sites while the Iraqi government denies theclaim. Both the United States and the United Kingdom aredetermined to maintain the sanctions until they receive a clean billfrom the United Nations inspectors. Iraq has to satisfy all thepermanent members of the Security Council in order to be freed fromthe sanctions. Any unsatisfied member may maintain the sanctionregime for as long as it believes necessary. The recent hostilitiesbetween Iraq and the United States reduce the chances of thesanctions being lifted in the near future.

TABLE 2UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS FROM 2 AUGUST TO 29 NOVEMBER 1990

ResolutionNumber Date Reading

660661662664

665

666661

670

674

677

678

2 August 19906 August 19909 August 19908 August 1990

25 August 1990

13 September 199016 September 1990

25 September 1990

29 October 1990

28 November 1990

29 November 1990

Called Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.Ban on all kind of commerce with Kuwait and Iraq.Iraq rescind its action purporting to annex Kuwait.Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departurefrom Kuwait and Iraq of third- state nationals.Called for a maritime interception force to enforceResolution 661.Exempt humanitarian needs from sanctions.Condemns Iraq of its violations of diplomaticpremises in Kuwait.Confirmed that the embargo structures of Resolution661 also applied to aviation and shipping.Condemning the actions by the Iraqi authorities andoccupying forces to take Third-State nationalshostage and to mistreat and oppress Kuwaiti andThird- State nationals.Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter thedemographic composition of Kuwait.Authorises UN members to use all necessary means tobring about Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait by 15January 1991.

Source: Annual Review of United Nations Affairs 1991, Vol.1 Kumiko Matsaura, JoachimW Muller, and Karl P. Sauvant (eds.) (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications Inc., 1993).

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Why Sanctions Have Failed to Weaken Saddam's Grip on Power

It was assumed that sanctions would increase economic hardships andmotivate the Iraqis to protest Saddam's policy and, if necessary,overthrow the regime. This did not happen. The regime is still alive andwell. The Iraqi people have to spend more time at work and less time forpolitics in order to survive the economic hardships. In other words,people have no time to think politics. Furthermore, the exodus of morethan three million professionals and intellectuals has reduced the chanceof forming an independent political movement in Iraq.

The major political parties are the Democratic Party of Kurdistan(DPK), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Supreme Councilfor the Islamic Revolution (SCIRI).The first and the second are operatingin the north of Iraq, while the third is based in the central and southparts of the country. Other small parties are not effective and based inSyria, Jordan, and Europe. The Iraqis consider SCIRI, led byMuhammad Baqir Hakim, as a serious movement which could lead thecountry toward political stability and economic prosperity. The partyrepresents at least 60 per cent of the Iraqi population (Wiley, 1992).Furthermore, the movement is respected by many Iraqis, inside andoutside the country. However, the movement is not trusted by manypolicy makers in Washington and the Western capitals fearing that thesuccess of this party might bring Iranian style government to Iraq(Shenon, 1999). The lack of international support for Hakim is seen bythe Iraqis as a sign of accepting Saddam's government as the onlypractical government for Iraq.

International support can encourage the masses to demand that theirgovernment comply with the demands of the international community forseveral reasons. First, the sanctioning countries can provide informationabout the impact of sanctions on the economy and its people moreaccurately than the government. Second, international supportencourages local people to work hard and devote more effort to organisecollective action. Third, international support informs the local peoplethat other countries are not pleased with their government's policy.

Nevertheless, the government of Iraq has strengthened its politicaleffectiveness. This is done through effective use of false informationinside the country. Second, through well-known reward and punishmentsystem, the government was able to create a layer of domestic supportersthat is hard to ignore. Third, the absence of effective opposition groupsinside the country left the masses with no alternative but to listen togovernment propaganda. Television, radio, and newspapers arecontrolled by the government and by the Baath party. A person listening

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to foreign media in public is subjected to prosecution. Fourth, the skyrocketing inflation makes essential food beyond the reach of ordinarypeople and they have to rely on government rationing. The rationingadds greater authority to the government choosing who receives what,where, and when. The rationing book became an important tool ofcontrolling the population movement. Daniel Pearl (1998), describingthe last presidential election in Iraq, wrote:

The days preceding the vote, Baath party workers combed everyneighborhood, going door to door to ask if the household hadration cards, a subtle message that the family's subsidised foodmight be in jeopardy if adults failed to vote. Rumors weredeliberately circulated about the sophisticated methods thegovernment had for detecting negative ballots, even if cast insecret.

The Government AtrocitiesWhy didn't the Iraqi population revolt against their government? Whydid they have to endure the toughest economic sanctions in this century?These questions are usually raised by outsiders and are difficult toanswer without understanding the Baath party security structure.

There are four different security forces beside Saddam Hussein's Jihasal- Himmaya al-Khas (Special Protection Apparatus) and the Baath Partymass organisations, which all function as surveillance systems (Al-Khafaji,1994). There are: Jihazal-Mukhabarate al-Amma (GeneralIntelligence Apparatus) Al-Istikhbarat al-Askariya (Military Intelligence),Mudiriyat al-Amn al- Amma (General Security Directorate), and Maktabal-Amn al-Qawmi (Bureau of National Security). Their goals are tosecure the life of president Saddam Hussein, his family, and the Baathregime. Typically, the security personnel are from the tribes of Tikrit, thehome town of Saddam, and the cities around it. Most of his personnelare high school drop-outs or high school graduates of low incomefamilies. Some of them have never been to Baghdad or any major cities.They are not accustomed to city life. However, their monthly incomesexceed those of both university professors and medical doctors, they livein free government housing and buy government price- supported food.

These personnel are trained to terrorise the population. They placeno value on human life and pay no respect to any of the Iraqi traditions.During the past 30 years the regime killed the best men and women ofthe country, sometimes in particularly violent ways. In many cases, thewhole family including the children will be executed if only one memberof a family is opposed to Saddam's government. During the 1980s a

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person would be executed if he or she failed to inform the governmentabout any person suspected of anti-government actions, be they a father,a brother, another relative, or neighbours.

Fathers cannot criticise government policy at home to their childrenfearing that the young people will reiterate the same opinions outside thehouse. Adults can criticise the government only behind closed doorsfearing any open ears. Even family members cannot trust one another.Indeed, there are many stories about husband and wife distrust. Peopleare expected to be off the street before midnight. Any violators of thiscurfew will be subject to secret security interrogation. Gatherings are notallowed unless they are organised by the Baath party. In many cities evengathering for prayer is impossible due to fears of government arrest.

Secret security forces are found at almost every corner in the country.They are in the schools and universities, government offices, alleys andstreets, markets, residential areas, cafes and restaurants, mosques andholy sites, as well as military sites. Non-members of the Baath party aresubject to constant secret security interrogation. They look at them as anenemy even though they are not members of any other parties. Be it amedical doctor, scientist, or janitor, everyone is subject to secret securityinterrogation, harassment, and beatings. High school students cannotapply for university admission unless they are party members. Non-partymembers are denied university education and government jobs.University students have to report other students' activities every week.Even at the marketplace, some sellers have to report about everythingthey hear in the market be it from customers or from fellowbusinessmen.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND IRAQI SANCTIONS

The human tragedy and economic deprivation caused by the economicsanctions are contradicting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.The Declaration called for preserving human life and dignity. Article 1stated that 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity andrights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should acttowards one another in a spirit of brotherhood,' while Article 5 statedthat 'No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman ordegrading treatment or punishment.'

The statistics provided by the United Nations speak for themselvesabout the size of the tragedy befallen on the Iraqis. It shows that as manyas one million Iraqis, half of which are children may have died by the endof 1995 because of the sanctions. By the fall of 1996, at least 4,500 Iraqichildren died each month, an average of 150 children a day. The January

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1998 figures showed that 14,040 children had died, about half of thesechildren were less than five years old.

Scientists related the rising number of dead children to the rising rateof malnutrition cases among pregnant women and children. Before thesanctions, the average consumption of powdered milk per baby was 3.3kilograms a month, it dropped to only 1.5 kilograms after the sanctions.The rationed food provided by the government cover only 10 per centof an adult's needs. The rest of the needed food would be bought fromthe market at much higher prices. The result is that 23 per cent of allnewborn babies are under the normal weight of 2.5 kilograms. Acomparative figure was only 4.5 per cent before the sanctions.

Most of the young children are dying from treatable diseases such asgastroenteritis, diarrhoea, pneumonia and other contagious diseases. Theshortage in preventive medicine increased the number of cases ofbronchitis, vitiligo, cholera, poliomyelitis, hepatitis, diphtheria, measles,and malaria. A doctor at Saddam Hospital lost about 75 children duringa two-week epidemic of chest infections and gastroenteritis. He believedevery one of them could have been saved with antibiotics which arecommonly available in neighbouring countries (Kinzer, 1998).

In 1996, cholera cases increased by 831 per cent compared with the1989, and skin diseases by 146 per cent. The number of typhoid casesincreased from 1,800 cases in 1989 to 15,000 cases in 1997, dysenteryfrom 20,000 cases to 550,000 cases, and nephritis from 1,800 cases to30,000 cases (Al-Ashtriki,1998).

These figures are taken from a country which used to have aphysically healthy population relative to many less developed countriesin Asia, Africa, and South America. Iraq used to have better drinkingwater, modern sewage systems, better average number of hospital beds,higher life expectancy, and higher calorie consumption (United Nations,1992).

According to Jack T. Patterson (1995) of American Friends ServiceCommittee the sanctions now in place are equal to military war oncivilian population. He stated that 'economic sanctions were not ahumane alternative to war, but had many of the same effects ofincreasing human suffering of the civilian population as smart bombsdropped from the air'.

The Gulf war proved that smart bombs were not smart, they missedmany targets inside Iraq. However, the economic sanctions are missingnone, including those who are most remote from the wrongdoing andless capable to bring a change in Iraqi leadership. Those are the poor, theaged, the children, the infirm, and people who, in war are regarded mostclearly as noncombatants.

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OIL-FOR-FOOD PROGRAMME IS TOO LITTLE TOO LATE

Responding to the critical shortage of food and medicine, the UnitedNations, under the Oil-for-Food programme, allowed Iraq to resume itsoil export. The programme (Security Council Resolution 706 of August1991) allowed Iraq to sell as much as $1.6 billion (the limit was laterincreased to $5.25 billion) of oil for a six-month period to make certainspecific payments and buy both food and medicine. The money is placedin the UN escrow account to prevent the Iraqi government from usingthe funds for other purposes, especially buying weapons.

The sales of oil have helped improve the Iraqi dinar value relative tothe values of the major international currencies. An unofficial exchangerate of one US dollar was in the range of 4,000 to 5,000 dinars. After theimplementation of the Oil-for-Food programme the dollar exchangedfor 1,000 to 1,500 dinars. The programme allowed the Iraqis to spendmore money on foodstuffs, medical equipment and supplies, as well ashealth-related projects. Nevertheless the fund provided by theprogramme is far less that Iraqi needs and expectations.

In an interview, Denis Halliday, the head of the United Nations Oil-for-Food programme in Iraq stated that 'the funds available did not provide abalance diet. We have been providing, under the Security Council a totallyinadequate food basket for the Iraqi people' (Rothschild, 1999).

The programme failed to satisfy the Iraqis for several reasons. First,Iraq pumps about 2.5 million barrels a day, with about 1.8 millionbarrels a day being exported under the Oil-for-Food programme.However, the restraint on its production and the weak oil prices keep thefund well below the currently permitted ceiling. Second, The resolutionallows substantial deductions from the sales of oil to compensate Kuwaitand other Middle Eastern countries, cover the UN administrative costfor Oil-for-Food programme and the costs for weapons inspectors. Intotal 34 per cent of the oil revenues will not be received. Third, there arestill substantial delays in processing Iraqi purchase contracts. Fourth, theOil-for-Food programme falls short of providing enough funds torebuild Iraq's infrastructure.

An international effort is required to rebuild Iraq, however, this is notpossible with the present government in power. Iraq needs to be liberatedfrom the economic sanctions and from its political regime in Baghdad.

THE LONG-RUN IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTION

It is difficult to assess the long run effect of the sanctions on the Iraqisociety for at least two reasons. First, the Iraqi economic sanctions areunique among all sanctions in this century. No sanctioned country has

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experienced such a lengthy and comprehensive one. Thus, comparativefigures are not available to help us compare the Iraqi experience withother countries' experiences. Second, even if comparative figures areavailable, the benefits will be limited. Countries are differenteconomically, politically, socially, and culturally.

Nevertheless, we can rely on the theories provided by thepsychologists to project the long run effects of sanctions on the Iraqipeople, especially the children. According to B.F. Skinner (1953), the'outside' causes of behaviour are most important; the environmentdetermines the individual. He argued that parents and teachers decidewhat sorts of behaviour they wanted to encourage in children and thenmake a systematic effort to shape it. James V McConnell (1970) agreedwith Skinner's conclusion that the environment determines behaviour. Hewrote: 'No one owns his own personality. Your ego, or individuality, wasforced on you by your genetic constitution and by the society into whichyou were born.' Thus, it is safe to say that 'outside' forces such as socialrelations, the state of culture, and political and economic conditions ofthe country, could have profound impact on the future development andactivities of the young children. For example, a child born to a financiallypoor family is at risk of being poor too, and a child born in a war-likeenvironment is at risk of being an aggressive adult who is uncaring forothers. Furthermore, a decline in the state of culture of a society is highlylikely to produce uneducated and unproductive populous.

The executive director of UNICEF declared that 20 per cent of allIraqi children dropped out of their schools for economic reasons. Thismeans that 20 per cent of the next generation will be illiterate and lessproductive. It also means that one in every five individuals is workingmerely to survive, often they will get married to poor and uneducatedspouses, and because their incomes cannot cover the monthly rental rateof a house, they will be forced to live in a house shared with otherfamilies using one kitchen and one bathroom. Their children will not bebetter off than the parents. They will spend their first seven years in thestreet, not in the kindergarten. Some may finish high school or evencollege. Others will follow their dad's footsteps, working at minimumwages. However, many of the children will choose the wrong ways,gambling, theft, killing, alcoholism or mental hospitals. R.C. Chapin(1909) of Boloit College predicted the situation correctly when he statedthat, 'when the father's earning have to be supplemented by the earningsof others, or by taking lodgers, the standard of living is lowered and theintegrity of the family is imperilled.'

The above analysis is also applied to a father who lost his job and sellsthe family house for food and medicine. It is applied to the 900,000

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widows who lost their husbands in the first or the second Gulf War. Thereare more than one million orphans in the country. Some of them live withtheir moms, stepfathers, or other relatives. However, these children willnever have the security of their fathers, a situation that makes the childrento have 'difficulties in relationships with adults and peers, in learning, infrustration, tolerance, and self control, apathy, truancy, stealing, accidentproneness, and self-injury' (Furman, 1974). In addition, they may scorelower than average on tests of intellectual performance (Carlsmith, 1964).This is in fact the future of the majority of children in Iraq especially thosechildren whose fathers are working two jobs a day, and whose mothersroam the markets to find a suitable ingredients of their daily meals.

The next generation may also suffer from low standard moral values.Problems of theft, begging, and prostitution are growing fast in all cities.Government employees of all levels will not finish a job without bribes.A person who cannot pay the bribe will not get what he wants. For somegovernment employees, bribes become an important source of income,without it they cannot survive the runaway inflation that is hitting thecountry.

Economic crisis also keeps working class people away from socialinteractions and religious activities. Charity, one of the five pillars inIslam, is no longer practised by many faithful Iraqi muslims. Before thesanctions, faithful muslims used to pay charity to relatives, friends,neighbours, the religious, and religious activities. Even weekends, officialand religious holidays which used to be occasions for social interactionsare reduced to another working day. In short, Iraqi society will sufferfrom increasing rates of illiteracy, technological gaps, decline inproductivity, and most important, declining moral values which may leadto disbelief, hate and surrender.

POLICY RECOMMENDATION

Economic sanctions should not be the only prescription for allunacceptable government behaviour. Economic sanctions that giveresults in one country may not work in other countries. Economicsanctions on Haiti and Serbia did not work, while economic sanctions onSouth Africa did work. In South Africa, economic sanctions workedbecause the political system allowed internal opposition groups todemand the government's compliance with the United Nationsresolutions for ending the apartheid policy. In Haiti and Serbia,economic sanctions did not work because both countries are notdemocratic, internal opposition groups are weak, and they have nosignificant impact on their national economies.

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A non-democratic country, controlled by a feared secret police, witha long history of human rights abuses, a very brutal head of government,and most of its economic resources in the hand of the government,should not be treated like a democratic government, that respects humanlife and has economic power in the hands of its people. In the first case,the people, not the regime, will be hurt by the sanctions. While in thesecond case both, the people and government, will be hurt. In the secondcase, people have to pay high prices (because of sanctions) for the goodsand services they buy while the government will be hurt by a decline inincome tax and popularity of the voters. In a non-democratic regimepeople cannot protest the unacceptable government policy, while in ademocratic country people can force their government to comply withthe demands of the sanctioning countries. In a non-democratic country,a comprehensive economic sanction hurts the citizen not the leaders,thus a symbolic sanction may make the economic hardship on the targetcountry's people a lot easier. This is the reason why Ivan Eland (1995)recommended symbolic not comprehensive sanctions on a governmentthat has absolute totalitarian control over society, especially over themedia and the formation of political opposition. He concluded that'Sanctions against ruthless dictatorships, such as Saddam's Iraq, shouldhave symbolic goals only'.

The problem with symbolic sanctions, however, is that the targetcountry may get away with its wrongdoing. The tense internationalcompetition for markets makes it easy for the target country to switchbuyers and sellers. For example, the grain embargo against the SovietUnion did not force the Soviet army out of Afghanistan and did notstarve the Russians. The Soviet government found another grainsupplier, Argentina. The only means that drove the Soviet army fromAfghanistan were the actions of its citizens and the assistance providedto them by the West such as media, supplies, and weapons.

Of course, getting rid of Saddam Hussein is not the United Nation'sobjective. Nevertheless, his departure may make the world safer for thefollowing reasons: First, Saddam is the trouble in Iraq and in the region.Second, Saddam will not give up his chemical and biological weaponsprograms. Third, Saddam will continue his policy of intimidating Iraqineighbours. Fourth, Saddam will continue his dastardly deeds towardsthe human rights of Iraqis. Fifth, the presence of the huge amount of oilreserves in the country could easily disturb the world oil supply.

The policy of continually bombing Iraq is a failure, becausedismantling one building or all buildings in the country will not driveSaddam from power. Bombing Iraq only prevents the Iraqi people frompractising any significant economic activity, besides the human toll and

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the killing and wounding of hundreds or possibly thousands of civilians.This action will hurt and devastate the already suffering Iraqi peoplewhile most likely leaving Saddam's regime in a stronger position.

Driving Saddam Hussein from power is not going to be easy andwithout loss of life. A plan of removing Saddam from power establishedby Iraqi opposition leaders in exile seems sound. The plan calls for usingthe Iraqi frozen assets to buy weapons. At the same, time lifting theeconomic sanctions from the liberated areas in the south and north whilekeeping the sanctions on unliberated areas until the departure ofSaddam.

Maintaining the sanctions for a longer period of time without atimetable to end may dissipate international support. Indeed, theinternational support is already dwindling. The December of 1998bombing was a joint effort only by the United Kingdom and UnitedStates. The other three permanent members of the Security Council wereeither displeased or criticised the actions. The bombing also encouragedseveral Arabs states to demand the removal of the sanctions. Such actionsmay undermine the United Nation's authority and it may find it difficultto maintain international support, should a new situation similar to theIraqi action in Kuwait develop in the future

CONCLUSION

The economic sanctions against Iraq did not accomplish any of itsdeclared objectives. The sanctions did not drive Saddam's army out ofKuwait and did not weaken Saddam's regime, indeed, the regime isstronger than ever. However, the Iraqi people have to pay dearly for itsgovernment's behaviour. They suffer the hyperinflation, enormousunemployment, and the almost complete devaluation of the dinar, thenational currency.

Sanctions should not be standardised, one for all situations. Sanctionsshould be tailored according to the target country's political andeconomic system. Because the impact of sanctions on civilians dependson the type of sanctions imposed, the extent to which sanctions are beingenforced, the degree to which the target country is self- sufficient in theproduction of basic commodities, and the political environment in thetarget country.

The present economic sanctions are violating human rights in Iraq inmany ways. The sanctions are responsible for depriving the Iraqiseconomically, reducing the health standards and killing thousands ofIraqis each year. Certainly these are not the written objectives ofsanctions. According to Jack T. Patterson (1995) 'While economic

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sanctions involve hardships, even suffering, they should not and cannotbe justified when they threaten or lead to the loss of life itself.'

Maintaining the sanctions for a longer period would be wrong, whilemilitary actions against some targets inside Iraq would be wrong as well.People see the sanctions or outside attacks as a disrespect to their countryand their life, however, the people of Iraq, as the event showed, arewilling to accept outside help to drive Saddam out of power in order tolive in peace.

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economic sanctions against iraq: human and economic costs

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