Where are we and which way forward?

Isabelle Ramdoo

12 November 2013, Helsinski

Economic Partnership Agreements

1. Setting the scene

2. Some key facts

3. Where are we now? Some figures and the state of play of the negotiations

4. Challenges ahead

5. What are the risks?

6. Which way forward?

Structure of presentation

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• Prior to 2008: Lome to Cotonou Preferences: unilateral, non-reciprocal preferential market access BUT not compatible with WTO

• Difficult, uncertain and costly WTO waivers between 2000-07

• Art 36 Cotonou Agreement: parties committed to start EPA negotiation to address WTO compatibility

• Since 2008 – Trade outside of Cotonou agreement. EPAs are stand-alone agreements;

• However: many unfinished negotiations – to avoid trade disruption, EC Reg. 1528/2007 – provisional application of EPAs for countries that had at least initialed an EPA (although interim)

• Deadline to finalise all unfinished business: 1st October 2014

1. Setting the scene: Key milestones

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• Stage I 09/2002 – 09/2003: All ACP negotiations

• Stage II 10/2003 – 2007: Regional negotiationsWest Africa: 16 countries (ECOWAS + Mauritania)Central Africa: 8 countriesEast and Southern Africa: 11 countries (COMESA minus) East African Community: 5 countries (full region)Southern Africa – 6 countries + SA joined later (SADC minus)Caribbean region – 15 countriesPacific: Pacific Forum – 14 countries

• Since then:• Only 1 full EPA (CARIFORUM) signed in 2008;• 1 African region ESA (4 countries) signed in 2009 – all

countries ratified.• The remaining 17 countries (have agreements that are

legally challenging • Africa: CA (Cameroun signed in 2009, not ratified)• West Africa: Ivory Coast and Ghana

2. Refresher: Key facts

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3.a Where are we now?

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3.b Countries concerned by deadline and regime applied in 2014

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Source: Bartels L & Goodison P (2011): EU Proposal to end preferences for 18 African and Pacific States : An Assessment – Trade Hot Topics, Commonwealth Secretariat – Figures are from 2009

3.c Who will be affected and by how much?

• Biggest losers:• Fiji (97.4% exports)• Swaziland (96.3%)Both sugar exporters

(€339/tonne)

Kenya and Namibia also likely to suffer

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1. ECOWAS: 2 main issues1. Market access offer 2. Development chapter (PAPED – additional resources)3. Other contentious issues: MFN Clause; EU Domestic

subsidies and support to agriculture; Obligations to negotiate FTAs with countries where EU has CU (Turkey, San Marino, Andorra)

2. EAC: Mainly contentious issues4.Export taxes; MFN, 5.RoO; 6.Agriculture; 7.non-execution clause (ICC/Kenya)

3. State of Play of current negotiations

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3. SADC: 1. Export taxes, MFN2. South Africa/SACU market access both on agriculture and NAMA;

RoO cumulation with SA; 3. infant/distress industries;

4. Central Africa:4. Slow negotiations. 5. Key remaining issues include MA offer; MFN, Export taxes

development

5. Pacific:Recently agreed to freeze negotiations because of fisheries

6. ESA: 1 outstanding issue: customs cooperation agreement but not an issue with deadline

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• Deadline 1st Oct. 2014

• So far, on contention issues, little flexibility on both sides

• Timeline towards deadline: given pace of negotiations, even if negotiations are completed there might be problems with implementation

• Risk of failure: Some countries might be left without preferences; likely implications for regional integration (Kenya? Ivory Coast? Cameroun? Swaziland?)

4. Challenges ahead

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• If agreements are concluded: Timeline is unrealistic Risk of trade disruption pending ratification: economically challenging and politically unacceptable

• If trade talk collapse: some countries may sign for fear of market disruption;big risk for regional (dis)integration; multiple trade regimes applicable to exports to EU with negative impacts on RIDiplomatic and political challenges : EU-Africa Summit – risk of derailing strategic discussions; mistrust at level of countries/regions; More broadly: geostrategic implications – partners might turn elsewhere

5. Risks ahead

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• 10 years on, all technical possibilities have been explored; but yet no agreement

• Becoming evident that EPA has negative impact on the overall Europe-Africa relationship;

• Increasingly urgent to promote positive and constructive atmosphere to maintain the broader strategic relations between Europe and Africa

• Needs pragmatic and realistic solutions on both sides: outcome most likely to be resolved at political level

• Important to weigh the political cost of a possible failure/ undesirable outcome within the broader EU-Africa relationship;

6. Which way forward?

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• Best way is to prepare for the worst! But are we prepared for a failure? What “extra-mile” are we ready to go or can we afford to go?

• Prepare for “smooth landing” if/when negotiations fail: agree to disagree and anticipate how to continue to engage constructively should that happen.

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Thank youwww.ecdpm.org

Isabelle Ramdoo (ir@ecdpm.org)

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