east asian integration, edited by lili yan ing

East Asian Integration

edited by

Lili Yan Ing

August 2015

© Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, 2015

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, its Governing Board, Academic Advisory Council, or the Institutions and governments they represent. All rights reserved. Material in this publication may be freely quoted or reprinted with proper acknowledgement.

Cover Art by Artmosphere Book design by Fadriani Trianingsih ERIA Research Project FY2014 No.6 First Edition Published August 2015

iii

Foreword

This study entitled ‘East Asian Integration’ is one of the flagship reports of the

Economic Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA). The East Asia Summit held on

10 October 2013, through Article 34 of the Chairman’s Statement, mandates that ERIA

provide analytic support in sharpening the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP) process to ensure a successful and mutually beneficial end for all parties, and

enhance overall East Asian Integration. RCEP is a critical element in regional integration in

East Asia and Pacific.

RCEP takes initiatives on regional economic integration in East Asia to a higher

level. First, in contrast to the ASEAN+1 FTAs where individual ASEAN member states

(AMSs) had essentially bilateral commitments with the ASEAN+1 dialogue partners, AMSs

would likely need to have common commitments with the partners (perhaps with a few

exceptions) under RCEP. Second, the commitments of the dialogue partners need to be

common commitments congruent with those of the AMSs. Third, the commitments under

RCEP are considered substantially higher than those under the ASEAN+1 FTAs. RCEP is

expected to be not merely a consolidation of the ASEAN+1 FTAs. RCEP, or any form of East

Asia integration, would need to be a better quality agreement than the existing ones for it

to be credible and worthy of the resources and ensure a more meaningful integration.

This report would not have been realised without the strategic guidance from our

government counterparts, particularly the ASEAN Senior Officials, and the ASEAN

Secretariat team, whom we gratefully acknowledge. We also thank the opportunity given

to ERIA to be engaged and share the findings at the RCEP Trade Negotiation Committee

Lead Meeting in June 2013, ASEAN Senior Economic Officials Meeting in April 2014, East

Asia Policy Dialogue with H.E. Pascal Lamy in April 2015, and a number of capacity

building symposia on the RCEP in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam.

This report is carefully crafted by distinguished scholars in international trade and

investment: Lili Yan Ing, Shujiro Urata, Ken Itakura, Misa Okabe, Inkyo Cheong, Erlinda

Medalla, Olivier Cadot, Hikari Ishido, Shandre Thangavelu, Junianto James Losari, and

Nanda Nurridzki.

It consists of three main topics: trade in goods, trade in services, and investment.

iv

Chapter 1 provides insights on the impacts of different scenarios describing different

levels of liberalisation in trade in goods, trade in services, and investment on East Asia’s

trade, income, and overall welfare. Chapter 2 explains the impacts of the existing FTAs on

East Asia’s trade. Chapter 3 provides insights on how to improve the use of FTAs, lessons

learned from Korea. Chapter 4 details the rules of origin (ROO) of the existing ASEAN Free

Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN+1 FTAs: ASEAN–China, ASEAN–India, ASEAN–Japan,

ASEAN–Korea, and ASEAN–Australia and New Zealand FTAs. Chapter 5 provides evidence

on the cost of compliance of ROO of ASEAN’s FTAs. Chapter 6 conducts mapping exercises

on commitment of liberalisation in the services sector of existing FTAs in the region.

Chapter 7 outlines the impacts of trade expansion on labour productivity in the services

sector, and the linkage between services and manufacturing sectors. Chapter 8 reviews

investment protection of investment agreements, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment

Agreement, and the ASEAN–Australia New Zealand, the ASEAN–China, and the

ASEAN-Korea Investment Agreements. Chapter 9 provides reviews of clauses of

liberalisation of the existing investment agreements in the region.

For policymakers, business associations, and academia, the report will be an

important base on key areas of regional and multilateral integration, as we all hope that

regional integration could be a building block of multilateral integration.

We hope that the findings of this study can provide insights on overall East Asian

integration and be useful as benchmark exercises to accelerate to the growth of trade in

goods, trade in services, and investment in region.

Professor Hidetoshi Nishimura

President of ERIA

Jakarta, August 2015

v

Foreword

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) presents a historic

opportunity for East Asia to deepen cooperative commitment to the reforms that are

needed to secure its future as a dynamic centre of higher than average global growth and

regional prosperity in an open international economy. This ambition is important to all

regional economies. RCEP policy leaders can move boldly—and expeditiously—to form an

agreement that entrenches and substantially deepens the openness of their economies

that has historically underpinned economic growth in the region. This is a time for

leadership at all levels and strategies that are focused on the potential of economic

cooperation to lift growth, not from defensive negotiating positions seeking to maintain

the status quo that will serve only to undermine the welfare of future generations.

The conception of RCEP is a process rooted in the ASEAN Economic Community

(AEC), and ASEAN’s regional and global ambition can drive RCEP towards an ambitious set

of commitments in trade and investments. RCEP success is an essential element in

building ASEAN centrality.

The Guiding Principles for the RCEP provide the foundation upon which to

construct an agreement: consistency with rules of the General Agreement on Tariff and

Trade and the World Trade Organization; significant improvement on the ASEAN+1

agreements (which will continue to apply); facilitation of trade and investment; flexibility

for developing and least-developed countries; open accession clause to enable

participation by other economic partners; technical assistance and capacity building

through economic cooperation; and parallel negotiations in goods, services, investment,

and other areas.

This book represents a first important step in the analysis of a number of the

issues that confront the shaping of cooperative policies that will be needed to underpin

future East Asia economic integration.

The book begins with an estimation of the effects of RCEP, although these

estimations focus on the narrower trade liberalisation dimension of the proposed

agreement rather than its important economic cooperation dimensions. It compares the

experience of liberalisation under free trade agreements elsewhere in the region with the

vi

challenge facing RCEP countries, and draws attention to the problem of restrictive

arrangements for rules of origin (ROOs) for realising the benefits of regional engagement

in value-adding production networks.

In this context, building the capacity for open engagement in commodity trade is

only part of the story. In value chain the link between services trade and openness to

foreign investment is crucial, as the argument in the book suggests.

To deepen East Asia integration and promote regional growth, RCEP will have to

set an ambitious benchmark for liberalisation and market access. There is no point in

concluding an unambitious agreement that does not address existing barriers to regional

trade and adds real value to the existing ASEAN+1 agreements, simply for the sake of

concluding an agreement. That would damage the region economically and undermine its

political credibility. A comprehensive target for goods liberalisation—with a particular

focus on areas where barriers to trade remain relatively high—must underpin the

agreement. All RCEP economies can, for example, agree to eliminate tariffs on tariff lines

covering 95 percent of current trade. While RCEP can make allowances for different levels

of economic development among the participating countries, this can take the form of

longer implementation times for developing and least-developed countries over a period

of no more than 10 years for all countries other than the three least-developed countries

which should have a longer period of up to 15 years: it would not mean less ambitious

final targets for goods liberalisation.

This is one dimension of the East Asian integration strategy that makes the RCEP

endeavour different from so-called mega-regional trade deals. Immediate commitments

consistent with the ambitions of the Guiding Principles that underpin the ASEAN

conception of RCEP can credibly offer significant improvement. Market access

commitments can be anchored by common tariff concessions, with tariff elimination

covering at least 95 percent of all tariff lines. While non-ASEAN countries could depart

from 95 percent tariff line coverage in their initial offers to non-ASEAN partners, the goal

must be for a common tariff commitment schedule with minimum deviations at the end

of negotiations.

The gains to growth that can be leveraged from ambitious goods liberalisation are

substantial, but the ability to realise these gains through effective participation in regional

vii

value chain production depends importantly on appropriate ROOs. ROOs are an

unavoidable part of preferential trade agreements; but strict and cumbersome ROOs will

limit and divert trade, raise costs for firms, and impede the establishment and smooth

functioning of regional value chains. If RCEP does not adopt steps to rectify the often

overly complicated ROOs present in the ASEAN+1 agreements, it will dissipate the gains

from any additional market access that derives from the commitment to liberalisation. For

this reason, RCEP will need to commit to common ROOs that are simple, provide for full

cumulation, and involve documentation requirements that are harmonised, as well as

easy and inexpensive to comply with.

Regional supply chains also rely heavily on the free flow of capital. RCEP will

therefore need to embrace wide-ranging liberalisation of foreign investment regimes. A

negative list approach and coverage of the pre-establishment national treatment is the

best way to accomplish this. While countries may have legitimate national interest

reasons to limit investment into certain sectors, the overarching principle must be the

free flow of foreign investment to stoke economic growth and facilitate technological

transfer and the limitation of restrictions to specified sectors.

An equally ambitious approach is required on services liberalization. RCEP will

have to provide a clear pathway to a negative-list approach in services liberalization.

Services liberalization in RCEP therefore will have to be especially far-reaching in areas

that are critical to the formation and deepening of global value chains.

East Asia integration cannot, in other words, be advanced successfully by an

old-fashioned 20th century preferential trade agreement: rather, in its basic structure,

RCEP will have to lead globally as a mechanism for enduring economic cooperation

between member countries and non-members who are later prepared to sign on or

partner. The RCEP membership represents global diversity and can set new global

benchmarks. An overarching cooperation framework that encompasses all ASEAN+1

agreements and actively draws in other stakeholders, including business and researchers,

will help integrate the region within itself and with the global economy at large.

RCEP can become the Asian economic cooperation forum to mobilise support for

growth-promoting structural reform at the national level. Consistent with its Guiding

Principles, RCEP needs to incorporate wide-ranging technical assistance for

viii

least-developed and developing countries and economic cooperation among members.

The cooperation agenda must be permanent and open to expansion, building on the

experience in ASEAN+1 agreements. RCEP can agree to create abiding and sustainable

mechanisms for cooperation between national policy institutions (for example, fiscal

authorities, competition regulators, infrastructure authorities, investment authorities, and

customs authorities). These links will facilitate an ongoing agenda of reforms aimed at

regional regulatory cooperation that will form part of RCEP’s work agenda. They will also

help policymakers learn from experience around the region as they frame policies suitable

to the circumstances of their own country. A strong agenda of domestic structural reform

to promote competition, allocative efficiency, and growth can form an integral part of the

RCEP agenda if the gains from cooperation are to be fully leveraged. Reform

commitments made at an international level will help mobilise domestic engagement for

policy change.

The principles for a basic agreement among RCEP members that includes

commitments on goods, services, and investments and an agreed path for the

implementation of RCEP and framework for economic cooperation are increasingly clear.

Concluding an RCEP basic agreement at the end of 2015 that entrenches ambitious

commitments is both feasible and would give RCEP momentum and credibility as a

tangible step towards the high standard agreement that the region needs for the next

stage of its growth.

The research which is at the core of this book and projects going forward that

contribute to the effective implementation of the RCEP agenda will be crucial to the

success and benefits of East Asian integration over the years ahead.

Professor Peter Drysdale

The Australian National University

Canberra, 9 August 2015

ix

Acknowledgement

The editor expresses her appreciation and gratitude to the authors of the chapters

of this study: Olivier Cadot, Ken Itakura, Inkyo Cheong, Erlinda Medalla, Misa Okabe,

Hikari Ishido, Shandre Thangavelu, James Losari, and Nanda Nurridzki. Thank for your

sharing your insights on East Asian Integration.

The report consists of analyses which are broken down into three sections: Trade

in Goods, Trade in Services, and Investment. This study benefited from the valuable

comments of Peter Drysdale, the Australian National University; Hank Lim, Singapore

Institute of International Affairs; Shiro Armstrong, the Australian National University;

Djisman Simanjuntak, Prasetya Mulya; Cristian Ugerte, Université de Lausanne; Ikumo

Isono, IDE-JETRO; Yoshifumi Fukunaga and Anita Prakash, ERIA. Muhammad Rizqy and

Rully Prassetya provided useful research assistance. Fukunari Kimura of ERIA and Keio

University, Shujiro Urata of ERIA and Waseda University, and Ponciano Intal of ERIA

provided key comments.

Insightful comments from our government counterparts and the ASEAN

Secretariat are gratefully acknowledged. Parts of studies were presented at the ASEAN

Senior Economic Officials’ Meeting in April 2014 and the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership (RCEP) Trade Negotiation Committee (TNC) Leads Negotiation

Meeting in Singapore in June 2014. Several papers of this study were presented in a

number of conferences including the Asian Economic Panel Meeting, ERIA workshops, a

series of capacity building symposia on RCEP in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet

Nam in 2014, and a number workshops in Southeast Asia.

Special thanks also go to Maria Priscila del Rosario, Fadriani Trianingsih, Chrestella

Budyanto, and Stefan Wesiak for the final editing and design production. Elisa Ayu

provided excellent assistance in the overall administration of the RCEP project.

x

List of Project Members

Project Coordinators

Lili Yan Ing (Project Leader): Economist, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East

Asia, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Shujiro Urata (Project Advisor): Senior Research Advisor to Executive Director, Economic

Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta

Project Members

Ken Itakura: Professor, Faculty of Economics, Nagoya City University, Japan

Misa Okabe: Professor, Wakayama University, Japan

Inkyo Cheong: Director of Centre on FTA Studies, Inha University, Korea

Erlinda Medalla: Senior Research Fellow, Philippines Institute for Development Studies,

Philippines

Olivier Cadot: Professor, University of Lausanne, CEPR and FERDI

Hikari Ishido: Professor, Faculty of Law and Economics, Chiba University, Japan

Shandre Thangavelu: Associate Professor, Adelaide University, Australia

Junianto James Losari: Research Associate, Center for International Law, Singapore

Nanda Nurridzki: Lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia, and

Consultant, The World Bank, Indonesia

xi

Contents

List of Figures xii List of Tables xiv List of Abbreviation xviii

Chapter 1 Assessing the Economic Effects of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on ASEAN Member States

1

Ken Itakura I Trade in Goods: beyond tariff elimination

Chapter 2 The Impact of ASEAN +1 FTAs on ASEAN’s Trade 27 Misa Okabe Chapter 3 To Improve the Use of FTA: Lessons learned from Korea 67 Inkyo Cheong Chapter 4 Towards an Enabling Set of Rules of Origin for the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership 93

Erlinda M. Medalla Chapter 5 How Restrictive Are ASEAN’s Rules of Origin? 121 Olivier Cadot and Lili Yan Ing

II Trade in Services: beyond the list

Chapter 6 Liberalisation of Trade in Services under ASEAN+1 FTAs: A Mapping Exercise

157

Hikari Ishido Chapter 7 Services Productivity and Trade Openness:

Case of ASEAN 195

Shandre Mugan Thangavelu, Lili Yan Ing, and Shujiro Urata

III Investment: beyond protection

Chapter 8 Searching for an Ideal International Investment Protection Regime for ASEAN+ Dialogue Partners (RCEP): Where Do We Begin?

225

Junianto James Losari Chapter 9 Learning from the ASEAN+1 Model and the ACIA 261

Nanda Nurridzki

xii

List of Figures

Figure 1.1 Assumption of Tariff Reduction Schedule, 2007-2030 7 Figure 1.2 Savings and Investment in the Model 11 Figure 1.3 Cambodia’s Real GDP Growth Rate, 2007-2030

(year-on-year, %) 15

Figure 1.4 Cambodia’s Real GDP, 2007-2030 (2007=1.0) 15 Figure 2.1 Number of RTAs among East Asian Countries 29 Figure 2.2 Regional Trade in ASEAN+6 Countries 30 Figure 3.1 Korea’s FTA Network 70 Figure 3.2 Perception of Implemented FTAs (%) 73 Figure 3.3 Impediments to FTA Use (%) 74 Figure 3.4 Awareness of ROOs 77 Figure 3.5 FTA Business Portal by the FTAPPAA (www.ftahub.go.kr) 82 Figure 3.6 Integrated Portal for Preferential Tariff Rates under Korean

FTAs 83

Figure 3.7 Integrated Portal for FTA Rules of Origin (ROO) 84 Figure 3.8 FTA Call Center 85 Figure 3.9 Tariff Elimination Ratios in Korea’s Major FTAs 91 Figure 5.1 Types of Product-specific RoOs 126 Figure 5.2 A Representative Value Chain with Cumulation 128 Figure 5.3 ASEAN Members MFN and Preferential Average Tariffs, 2010 132 Figure 5.4 RoO Frequency Ratios, by Agreement and Type of Rule 134 Figure 5.5 ASEAN Imports of Goods from Its Various Preferential Zones,

in Percentage (2013) 135

Figure 5.6 Foreign Content of Exports, by Exporting Country 137 Figure 5.7 Ad-valorem Equivalents of RoOs, All Sample 146 Figure 5.8 Ad-valorem Equivalents of RoOs (%), Selected Sectors 148 Figure 6.1 Comparison of N-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs

(by 11 sectors) 168

Figure 6.2 Comparison of L-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (by 11 sectors)

168

Figure 6.3 Comparison of U-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (by 11 sectors)

169

Figure 6.4 Comparison of N-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (by 11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)

182

Figure 6.5 Comparison of L-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (by 11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)

182

Figure 6.6 Comparison of U-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (by 11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)

183

Figure 7.1 Real GDP Growth Rate of Selected Asian Countries, 2005–2013

199

xiii

Figure 7.2 Exports and Imports of Services for ASEAN: 2005–2011 (US$ billion)

202

Figure 7.3 Share of Services Exports to Value-Added of Services Sector for Selected Asian Countries, 1990–2009

203

Figure 7.4 FDI Inflows into ASEAN (1995–2009 204 Figure 7.5 Share of FDI Inflows by ASEAN Countries (%), 2000–2009 205

Figure 7.6 FDI Inflows into ASEAN (%) by Sectors, 2000–2009 206 Figure 7.7 Labour Productivity Growth of Selected Asian Countries,

1995–2005 207

Figure 7.8 Labour Productivity Growth by Service Sector for Selected Asian 1990–2005

208

Figure 7.9 Input and Output Relationships for Imports by Sector for Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Viet Nam

209

Figure 7.10a Input and Output Relationships for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam

210

Figure 7.10b Input and Output Relationships for Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam

211

Figure 9.1 FDI Inflows, in million US$ 264 Figure 9.2 Inward Direct Investment to ASEAN 265

xiv

List of Tables

Table 1.1. List of Countries / Region 4 Table 1.2 Sectoral Aggregation 5 Table 1.3 FTAs in the Baseline 7 Table 1.4 Average Applied Tariff Rate for ASEAN, 2007, 2011, 2015 (%) 8 Table 1.5 Sectoral Average Applied Tariff Rate for ASEAN, 2015 (%) 9 Table 1.6 Time Saving from Logistic Improvements on Imports

(in number of days) 10

Table 1.7 Results on GDP, 2030 (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

14

Table 1.8 Results on Export Volume, 2030 (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

17

Table 1.9 Results on Import Volume, 2030 (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

18

Table 1.10 Results on Investment (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

19

Table 1.11 Results on Foreign Ownership of Capital, 2030 (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

20

Table 1.12 Results on Welfare, 2030 (cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

21

Table 2.1 Results of Studies on the Impact Effect of ASEAN or AFTA 35 Table 2.2.1 Estimation Results on Export by Sector, Pooled Data 48 Table 2.2.2 Estimation Results on Import by Sector, Pooled Data 50 Table 2.3.1 Estimation Result for BEC41 &42 52 Table 2.3.2 Estimation Result for BEC51 &53 53 Table 2.4.1 Estimation Result on export by country & sector, ASEAN

members 54

Table 2.4.2 Estimation Result on Export by Country & Sector, 6 Dialogue Countries

56

Table 2.4.3 Estimation Result on import by Country & Sector, ASEAN Members

57

Table 2.4.4 Estimation Result on import by Country & Sector, 6 Dialogue Countries

59

Table 2.A.1 Sample Countries 65 Table 2.A.2 Date in Effect of Each Member of ASEAN+1 FTA 66 Table 3.1 Korea’s FTA Performance 71 Table 3.2 Barriers to Korean businesses’ FTA Utilization 74 Table 3.3 Major Components of Korea’s FTA Support 80 Table 3.4 Major Roles of National FTAUC 81 Table 3.5 Targets for Providing FTA Business Consulting 82 Table 3.6 Trend of FTA Utilization Ratio 87 Table 3.7 FTA Utilization Ratio by Industry (Korea–US FTA) 88

xv

Table 3.8 SMEs with FTA Utilization and Non-utilization by Scale of Export

89

Table 4.1 Main ROOs for Chapters 1 to 15 in ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs 99 Table 4.2 ROO for Automotive Products (Chapter 87) in ATIGA and the

ASEAN+1 FTAs 101

Table 4.3 Frequency by Type of ROOs Used in ASEAN + 1 FTAs 104 Table 4.4 ROO Convergence Incidence (excludes ASEAN–India FTA) 106 Table 4.5.a ROOs for Chapters 25 to 39 109 Table 4.5.b Summary for ROOs in Chapters 25 to 39 111 Table 4.6 Examples of Different ROOs Used in Chapters 50 to 63:

Textile and Garments 112

Table 4.7 Incidence of ROO Convergence in the ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs for Chapters 50 to 53: Textile and Garments

112

Table 5.1 ASEAN’s Average MFN Tariffs by HS Section 133 Table 5.2 Gravity Regression Results, Non-commodity Trade: Control

Variables 143

Table 5.3 Average AVEs for All ROO Instruments, by Section 147 Table 5.A.1 ROO Types 153 Table 6.1 List of the Coverage Index Calculations at the 55-Sector level 162 Table 6.2 List of the Coverage Index Calculations at the 11 Sector level 167 Table 6.3 Correlation Coefficient between all the Pairs of the ASEAN+1

FTAs 170

Table 6.4 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 1 171 Table 6.5 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 2 172 Table 6.6 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 3 173 Table 6.7 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 4 174 Table 6.8 Correlation Coefficient of the Coverage Index among the

ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 1) 175

Table 6.9 Correlation Coefficient of coverage-indices among the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 2)

175


176


176

Table 6.12 List of the Coverage Index Calculations at the 55 Sector Level (focus on the ASEAN countries only)

178

Table 6.13 List of the Coverage Index calculations at the 11 Sector Level (focus on the ASEAN countries only)

181

Table 6.14 Correlation Coefficient between All the Pairs of the ASEAN+1 FTAs

183

Table 6.15 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 1 185 Table 6.16 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 2 186 Table 6.17 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 3 187 Table 6.18 Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 4 188

xvi

Table 6.19 Correlation Coefficient of the Coverage Index among the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 1, ASEAN countries only)

189

Table 6.20 Correlation Coefficient of Coverage-indices among the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 2, ASEAN countries only)

189


189


190

Table 6.23 GATS-based Coverage Index (excluding Lao PDR) 190 Table 7.1 Share of Agriculture, Industry, and Services Sectors to GDP

for Selected Asian Countries, 2000–2013 200

Table 7.2 Share of Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to GDP for Selected Asian Countries: 1990–2013

201

Table 7.3 Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity in Key Services Sector for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

213

Table 7.4 Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

215

Table 7.5 Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

216

Table 7.A.1 Real GDP Growth of Selected Asian Countries, 2005-2013 220 Table 7.A.2 Share of Agriculture, Industry, and Services to Total

Value-Added for Selected Asian Countries, 2000-2013

221

Table 8.1 FTAs with Investment Chapter/ IIAs among ASEAN Member States + Dialogue Partners [Reviewed IIAs]

229

Table 8.2 2014 Corruption Perception Index Ranking of RCEP Countries

232

Table 8.3 Snapshot Comparison of Investment Protection Provisions in Investment Chapters of ASEAN Member States+ Dialogue Partners’ FTAs and Other Regional Investment Agreements

234

Table 9.1 Summary of Objectives of Some ASEAN+1 FTAs 270

xvii

List of Abbreviations

AANZFTA ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand FTA

ACFTA ASEAN–China Free Trade Area

ACIA ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement

AFAS ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services

AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area

AIA ASEAN Investment Agreement

AIFTA ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement

AJCEP ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership

AKFTA ASEAN–Korea Free Trade Agreement

AMS ASEAN Member States

APTA Asia Pacific Trade Agreement

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ATIGA ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement

BIT bilateral investment treaty

CETA Canada–European Union Free Trade Agreement

CGE computable general equilibrium

CIL customary international law

COO Certificate(s) of Origin

CTC change in tariff classification

CTH change in tariff heading

EAP East Asia and the Pacific

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EU European Union

FDI foreign direct investment

FET Fair and Equitable Treatment

FTA free trade agreement

FTAPPAA FTA Promotion and Policy Adjustment Authority

GATS General Agreement on Trade in Services

GDP gross domestic product

GGDC Groningen Growth Developing Centre

GSTP Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries

GVC global value chain

ICT information and communications technology

IGA Investment Guarantee Agreement

IIA international investment agreement

ITA Information Technology Agreement

MFN Most-Favoured Nation

MOSF Ministry of Strategy and Finance

xviii

NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement

NT National treatment

NTBs non-tariff barriers

NTM non-tariff measure

NTMs non-tariff measures

PSRs Product Specific Rules

PTA preferential trade agreement

RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

ROO rule(s) of origin

RTA regional trade agreement

RVC Regional Value Content

SMEs small and medium enterprises

SPR specified process rule

US United States

WO wholly obtained

WTO World Trade Organization

1

Chapter 1

Assessing the Economic Effects of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on

ASEAN Member States

Ken Itakura

Nagoya City University

By applying a recursively dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of

global trade, supplemented with the recent database, we conducted a set of policy

simulations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), focusing on

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMSs). Simulation results

revealed that all of the member countries gain in terms of real gross domestic product (GDP)

from participating in the RCEP by liberalising their trade and fostering investment. Once the

investment commitment by the member countries leads to lowering country-specific risk,

the gain in real GDP is bolstered further. Investment in all member countries rises as the

RCEP is implemented and as more capital from abroad is attracted. Trade volumes expand

as the participating countries commit to deeper tariff reductions. Economic welfare also

improves for most RCEP member countries.


2

1. Introduction

This paper aims to evaluate the potential economic impact of the Regional

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement on Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) member states (AMSs). The RCEP is a regional trade agreement that

involves 16 participating countries – the AMSs, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and

New Zealand. Since ASEAN has already established bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)

with the six partner counties, establishing the RCEP is an attempt to merge the existing FTAs

into an integrated market across the region. This integration may go beyond the

conventional trade liberalisation of tariff reduction and/or elimination; it would liberalise

trade in services, facilitate trade, and promote investment in the region.

To evaluate the economic effects of the RCEP, we conduct a set of simulations by

using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global trade. In the simulations, we

explore potential economic gains from liberalisation of goods and services trade, logistic

improvements, and investment commitments under the RCEP. To make the simulation

setting realistic, we collect and utilise recent data inputs from various national and

international organisations to set up the baseline scenario in which the hypothetical

simulations of the RCEP are examined.

Our simulation results indicate that for the AMSs, in general, implementation of the

RCEP leads to higher real gross domestic product (GDP), and more trade volume and

investment. The six partner countries also gain economically from the RCEP.

In the next section, we describe the database and the CGE model, as well as the

simulation design for this study. Section 3 reports the simulation results, followed by a

summary discussion.

2. Methodology

Our objective is to obtain quantitative measures that can capture the potential

economic effects of the RCEP. For this purpose, we conduct a set of hypothetical

simulations with a recursively dynamic CGE model of global trade. Since the RCEP will have

economy-wide effects on the economic activities in the participating economies of the

Chapter 1

3

AMSs, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, it is reasonable to use the

global CGE model for evaluating the repercussions arising from the multi-sector and the

multi-region interactions induced by the RCEP implementation. In this section, we describe

the database, the CGE model, and the simulation design.

2.1. Data Bases

To reflect the current and prospective states of the global economy in our

simulation analysis, we rely on the GTAP Data Base version 8.1 (Narayanan, Aguiar, and

McDougall, 2012) and economic forecasts from international organisations. The GTAP Data

Base records the entire global economy with detailed information about 57 industrial

sectors for 134 regions. With this database, we are able to observe the economic structure

of production, international trade and protection, and consumption, benchmarked at the

year 2007. The GTAP Data Base is supplemented with international factor income flows due

to domestic and foreign assets holdings. To reduce computational burden, we aggregated

the GTAP Data Base to 27 countries/regions and 25 sectors, and the mappings from the

original disaggregated data are reported in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The GTAP Data Base covers

eight AMSs – Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and

Viet Nam. Because of the limited data, Brunei Darussalam and Myanmar are lumped into

the ‘Rest of Southeast Asia’ (RoSEAsia) along with Timor–Leste.


4

Table 1.1: List of Countries/Regions

No. Country/Region No. Country/Region

1 Cambodia 14 Australia

2 Indonesia 15 New Zealand

3 Lao PDR 16 Hong Kong

4 Malaysia 17 Taiwan

5 Philippines 18 USA

6 Singapore 19 Canada

7 Thailand 20 Mexico

8 Viet Nam 21 Brazil

9 RoSEAsia 22 Chile

10 Japan 23 Argentina

11 China 24 UK

12 Korea 25 Germany

13 India 26 UAE

27 RestofWorld

Source: GTAP Data Base version 8.1.

Chapter 1

5

Table 1.2: Sectoral Aggregation

No Name GTAP 57 sectors

1 Primary

Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables, fruit, nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar cane, sugar beet; Plant-based fibers; Crops nec; Cattle, sheep, goats, horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; Wool, silkworm cocoons; Forestry; Fishing; Minerals nec; Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse; Meat products nec; Vegetable oils and fats; Dairy products; Processed rice; Sugar; Food products nec.

2 Energy Coal; Oil; Gas

3 BvrgTbcc Beverages and tobacco products

4 Textile Textiles

5 Apparel Wearing apparel

6 Leather Leather products

7 Wood Wood products

8 Paper Paper products, publishing

9 PetCoProduct Petroleum, coal products

10 Chemical Chemical, rubber, plastic products

11 Minerals Mineral products nec.

12 FerrousMetal Ferrous metals

13 OtherMetal Metals nec.

14 MetalProduct Metal products

15 Motorvehicle Motor vehicles and parts

16 TrnsprtEquip Transport equipment nec.

17 ElecEquip Electronic equipment

18 Machinery Machinery and equipment nec.

19 OthMnfct Manufactures nec.

20 Utilities Electricity; Gas manufacture, distribution; Water

21 Construction Construction

22 Trade Trade

23 TransComm Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; Communication

24 FinsBusi Financial services nec; Insurance; Business services nec.

25 OthSrvc Recreation and other services; PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat; Dwellings Source: GTAP Data Base version 8.1.

Our first task is to construct a baseline scenario, which is a hypothetical future state

of the global economy and forms a basis of comparison against the RCEP policy simulations.

We rely on the projections of total population, working-age population (age 15–64), and

real GDP. Projections of total and working-age population growth rates are computed from

those of the United Nations (UN) (2013) and mapped for our 27 regional aggregation.

Projections of real GDP growth rates are from the International Monetary Fund (2014).

As the AMSs have been progressing toward the establishment of the ASEAN


6

Economic Community by 2015, our hypothetical simulation analysis is designed to focus on

the period 2015–2030. However, the trade liberalisation of the ASEAN Economic

Community and each ASEAN+1 FTA that was implemented prior to the RCEP seems to be

in progress, lowering trade barriers towards the target level each FTA has committed to. In

this study, we take into account this progressing nature by introducing two sets of targets

of bilateral tariffs into the baseline scenario.

Figure 1.1 illustrates these two targets. The first target is specified by the year 2011.

The pre-release of the GTAP Data Base version 9 provides us with the estimates of bilateral

tariffs for 2011. For all 25 sectoral trade flows of the 27 regions, we make sure that the

baseline simulation passes through the bilateral tariffs of the 2011 target (Target 1 in Figure

1.1). The second target is specified as the year 2015 (Target 2). The ASEAN Economic

Community and the ASEAN+1 FTAs, listed in Table 1.3, are subject to this second bilateral

tariff targets, assuming a gradual reduction from the first target. Among the AMSs

participating in the FTAs listed in Table 1.3, there are different completion years for the

ASEAN+1 FTAs. According to Fukunaga and Isono (2013), delayed target years are set for

the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam) countries compared with other

AMSs. From the aggregated GTAP Data Base, combined with the two targets, we can

compute average applied tariff rate for AMSs for 2007, 2011, and 2015. Table 1.4 reports

the results. For example, Cambodia’s average applied tariff rate was 9.4 percent in 2007,

10 percent in 2011, and 4.4 percent in 2015. In general, average applied tariff rates in the

AMSs are falling over the baseline as computed with the two targets.

Chapter 1

7

Figure 1.1: Assumptions of Tariff Reduction Schedule, 2007–2030

Source: Author.

Table 1.3: FTAs in the Baseline

ASEAN6 CLMV Partner

ASEAN–FTA 2015 2015 ..

ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand 2020 2020 2020

ASEAN–China 2010 2018 2010

ASEAN–India 2017 2022 2017

ASEAN–Japan 2018 2023 2018

ASEAN–Korea 2012 2018 2010

Note: ASEAN6 (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand), CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam). Source: Author’s assumptions based on Fukunaga and Isono (2013).


8

Table 1.4: Average Applied Tariff Rate for ASEAN, 2007, 2011, 2015 (%)

2007 2011 2015

Cambodia 9.4 10.0 4.4

Indonesia 2.8 2.5 1.6

Lao PDR 7.2 7.4 3.0

Malaysia 3.1 3.3 2.4

Philippines 3.0 2.0 1.4

Singapore 0.0 0.0 0.0

Thailand 4.4 4.5 2.8

Viet Nam 8.2 5.7 3.8

RoSEAsia 3.2 3.4 2.0

Source: Computed from GTAP Data Base version 8.1, and the baseline result.

Sectoral average applied tariff rates for merchandise trade and estimates of tariff

equivalents of service trade barriers by Wang, Mohan, and Rosen (2009) are reported in

Table 1.5. Since construction is used as a benchmark sector in their estimates, we dropped

it from Table 1.5. Applying the sector-specific gravity model, Wang, Mohan, and Rosen

(2009) estimated the tariff equivalents of service trade barriers. Their estimating equation

is as follows:

𝑀𝑖,𝑗 = a𝑖 + a𝑗 + a1 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + a2 ln 𝑃𝐶𝐼𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗.

Imports of sector i in country j is regressed upon sector dummy 𝑎𝑖, country dummy

𝑎𝑗, GDP, and per capita income PCI, by using the GTAP Data Base version 7. Then, country

average of trade-cost equivalent (𝑇𝑗) is computed with the import substitution elasticity

parameter (σ) extracted from the GTAP Data Base.

aj =−σlnTj ()

Tj = exp( −aj/σ).

Minor and Hummels (2011) did elaborating estimating work on average costs of

time delays in trade, which are considered as another trade barrier. The World Bank’s Doing

Business 2009 Survey (2010) provides information on logistics time of importing

merchandise goods expressed in number of days for our 2007 benchmark year. Table 1.6

shows, for example, that there would be varying time- savings of at least 7 percent on

importing logistics.

Chapter 1

9

Table 1.5: Sectoral Average Applied Tariff Rate for ASEAN, 2015 (%)

Cambodia Indonesia Lao PDR Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam RoSEAsia

Primary 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.7 4.2 0.0 7.0 4.4 1.8

Energy 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.9

BvrgTbcc 6.4 7.6 5.7 38.5 5.2 1.4 14.1 24.4 12.0

Textile 4.2 1.6 0.8 5.7 1.5 0.0 4.7 6.3 6.9

Apparel 15.3 6.9 2.2 9.2 1.9 0.0 12.7 11.1 4.2

Leather 4.8 2.7 1.8 3.2 4.0 0.0 10.7 6.5 2.6

Wood 9.0 1.3 3.4 2.3 2.5 0.0 5.7 3.7 3.6

Paper 3.3 1.6 1.5 4.2 2.9 0.0 2.5 5.2 1.0

PetCoProduct 3.9 1.0 1.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.8 4.2 0.7

Chemical 2.6 2.4 1.6 2.9 1.7 0.0 4.3 2.1 1.3

Minerals 3.7 3.8 0.8 7.7 1.7 0.0 5.0 7.5 1.1

FerrousMetal 2.1 2.1 0.6 11.3 0.9 0.0 2.3 1.1 0.7

OtherMetal 3.0 1.0 2.9 2.3 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7 1.1

MetalProduct 5.2 2.1 1.4 6.5 2.0 0.0 6.2 5.2 1.2

Motorvehicle 11.8 5.1 8.6 8.2 4.6 0.0 12.3 12.2 6.8

TrnsprtEquip 5.8 1.1 8.5 1.2 3.3 0.0 3.5 7.7 1.7

ElecEquip 8.6 0.2 2.2 0.1 0.6 0.0 1.1 1.0 4.0

Machinery 6.8 2.0 1.8 1.9 0.8 0.0 3.8 2.2 2.7

OthMnfct 4.9 2.7 5.5 4.0 1.1 0.0 5.6 11.5 3.5

Utilities 80.7 178.8 52.9 63.6 138.0 0.0 97.3 152.2 ..

Trade 89.1 185.0 58.9 67.5 143.4 0.0 110.0 157.9 ..

TransComm 78.4 167.4 46.6 54.0 126.6 0.0 96.0 138.4 ..

FinsBusi 77.4 159.9 46.1 53.1 123.2 0.0 93.0 136.7 ..

OthSrvc 87.0 181.0 58.8 63.6 140.2 0.0 107.4 154.6 .. Source: Baseline result and Wang et al. (2009).


10

Table 1.6: Time-Saving from Logistic Improvements on Imports

(in number of days)

Days

Cambodia 2.0

Indonesia 1.9

Lao PDR 2.6

Malaysia 0.7

Philippines 1.1

Singapore 0.3

Thailand 0.9

Viet Nam 1.6

RoSEAsia 1.5

Source: Calculation based on (World Bank, 2010).

2.2. Overview of Dynamic GTAP Model

For all simulations in this paper, we used the Dynamic GTAP model developed by

Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001) and updated by Walmsley et al. (2012). Ianchovichina

and McDougall (2001) extended the comparative static standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997;

McDougall, 2003) by introducing international capital mobility and capital accumulation. In

the standard GTAP model, capital is assumed to be mobile between sectors in a country,

but not across borders.

The Dynamic GTAP model preserves all the main features of the standard GTAP

model – constant return to scale production technology, perfectly competitive markets, and

product differentiation by origin, known as the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969).

The Dynamic GTAP model uses as its core inputs the GTAP Data Base (Narayanan et al.,

2012) augmented with foreign income data from the Balance of Payments Statistics of the

International Monetary Fund to infer international capital ownership and foreign wealth.

Chapter 1

11

Figure 1.2: Savings and Investment in the Model

Source: Author based on Walmsley et al. (2012).

In the Dynamic GTAP model, each region is endowed with fixed physical capital

stock. The physical capital is accumulated over time with new investments. This dynamics

is driven by the net investment, which is sourced from regional households’ savings. Figure

1.2 shows the international linkage of the sources of net investment. Net investment in

region 𝑟 is a composite of domestic investment and foreign investment from ‘global trust’

that is assumed to be the sole financial intermediary for all foreign investments. Regional

households own indirect claims to the physical capital in the form of equity, which are of

two types – equity in domestic firms and equity in foreign firms. The regional household

directly owns the domestic equity but only indirectly the foreign equity by holding shares

in a portfolio of foreign equities provided by the ‘global trust’. The values of the household’s

equity holdings in domestic firms and in the global trust change over time, and the

household allocates savings for investment. Collecting such investment funds from regions,

the global trust reinvests the funds in firms around the world and offers a portfolio of

equities to households. The sum of the household’s equity holdings in the global trust is

equal to the global trust’s equity holdings in firms around the world.

Incentives for investments or equity holdings are governed by rates of return, which

would be equalised across regions if capital is perfectly mobile. However, this equalisation

of rates of return seems impractical, at least in the short run. Further, there are empirical


12

observations of so-called ‘home bias’ in savings and investment, equity holdings by

households, and capital flows. Home bias refers to empirical observations that domestic

markets are preferred to foreign markets. These empirical observations suggest that capital

is not perfectly mobile, leading to varying rates of return across regions. The Dynamic GTAP

model allows inter-regional differences in rates of return in the short run, which will be

eventually equalised in the long run. Differences in rates of return are attributed to the

errors in investors’ expectations about the future rate of returns. However, the errors in

expectation are gradually adjusted to the actual rate of return. Eventually the errors are

eliminated and the unique rate of return across regions can be attained. Therefore, we

assume perfect capital mobility applies only in the long run.

Participating in FTAs could lead to more investment from abroad. Trade

liberalisation often makes prices of goods from a participating country cheaper due to

removal of tariffs, creating increased demand for the goods. Responding to the increased

demand, production of the goods may expand in the exporting country. To increase the

production, more intermediate goods, labour, capital, and other primary factors are

demanded. This increased demand for production inputs raises the corresponding prices,

wage rates, and rental rates. Higher rental rates can be translated into higher rates of return,

attracting more investment from both home and foreign countries. These are part of the

expected repercussions induced by the liberalisation.

2.3. Scenarios for Simulation

Three policy scenarios were designed for our simulation experiments of the RCEP

implementation. The baseline scenario is constructed to reflect the hypothetical future

state of world economy without the RCEP implementation, for the period 2007–2030.

During this period, average applied tariff rates are gradually reduced for the two targets, as

discussed above (see Figure 1.1).

Three policy scenarios for the RCEP are applied over the period 2016–2030. Each

policy scenario is designed to examine the effect of varying degrees of tariff reductions (50

percent and 75 percent) as well as the effect of investment commitment that is assumed

to lower country-specific risk by 0.05 percentage points. Trade liberalisation includes

gradual elimination of tariffs, logistic improvements, and reduction in tariff equivalents of

Chapter 1

13

services trade barriers. Average applied tariffs in the RCEP region after 2015 are gradually

reduced or eliminated by 2020 (see Figure 1.1 for two different tariff reduction schedules

under Policy Simulation). We assume a 7 percent improvement in logistics and a 7 percent

reduction in services trade barriers, following the empirical study by Hayakawa and Kimura

(2014).

Countries participating in the RCEP would commit to promoting investment, and

this commitment can improve the rate of return on capital by reducing country-specific

negative factors. This effect of investment commitment is implemented in the policy

scenarios by lowering country-specific risk by 5 basis points. A summary of the three policy

scenarios is listed below:

Policy Scenario for RCEP implementation:

(S1) Tariff reduction (50 percent) + logistics improvements on merchandise trade and

reduction of barriers to service trade by 7 percent

(S2) S1 with tariff reduction (75 percent)

(S3) S2 + lowering country-specific risk by 5 basis point

3. Simulation Results

All simulation results reported in the following tables are in terms of percent

difference from the baseline scenario, accumulated over the simulation period from 2016

to 2030. In other words, the deviation from the baseline results from the RCEP policy

scenario. There are two major components driving such simulation results – different

degrees of tariff reduction and investment commitment.

Simulation results of the RCEP on real GDP are reported in Table 1.7. All participating

countries in the RCEP gain in real GDP compared with the baseline scenario. Cambodia

stands out, as its increases in real GDP are larger than for other AMSs. The country has

higher tariffs on imports used for forming physical capital, and liberalisation lowers the

price of capital goods. Because of the fall in the price of capital goods, the large increase in

investment in Cambodia contributes to the higher gain in real GDP. On the other hand, non-

participating countries are clearly negatively affected. By increasing the degree of reduction

in tariffs from 50 percent in S1 to 75 percent in S2, the gains in real GDP become larger. By


14

committing to investment promotion as shown in S3, thereby reducing country-specific risk,

all participating countries show the largest gain in real GDP. Taking Cambodia as an example,

Figures 3 and 4 show the time path of simulation results for the baseline scenario and S3.

In Figure 1.3, it can be clearly seen that because of RCEP Cambodian real GDP growth rates

are higher than those in the baseline scenario. These differences in annual growth rates are

accumulated over time, as shown in Figure 1.4 as deviation from the baseline, and by 2030

Cambodia’s real GDP is 8.9 percent higher than the baseline.

Table 1.7: Results on GDP, 2030

(cumulative deviation from the baseline, %)

S1 S2 S3

Cambodia 6.1 8.0 8.9


Lao PDR 1.3 1.3 2.2





Viet Nam 1.8 2.2 2.9


Japan 0.5 0.7 2.2

China 0.7 0.9 1.8

Korea 2.8 3.9 5.0

India 0.8 1.2 2.1

Australia 0.4 0.5 1.9

New Zealand 0.8 0.9 4.1

Hong Kong -0.5 -0.6 -1.3

Taiwan -0.9 -1.3 -2.1

USA -0.1 -0.1 -0.3

Canada 0.0 -0.1 -0.3

Mexico -0.4 -0.6 -1.8

Brazil -0.1 -0.1 -0.6

Chile -0.6 -0.8 -1.8

Argentina -0.1 -0.2 -0.4

UK -0.1 -0.1 -0.6

Germany -0.1 -0.2 -0.6

UAE -1.0 -1.3 -2.5

RestofWorld -0.2 -0.3 -0.9 RoSEAsia = Rest of Southeast Asia, UAE = United Arab Emirates, UK = United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. Source: Author’s simulation results.

Chapter 1

15

Figure 1.3: Cambodia’s Real GDP Growth Rate, 2007–2030

(year-on-year, %)

Source: Author’s simulation results.

Figure 1.4: Cambodia’s Real GDP, 2007–2030 (2007=1.0)



16

The simulation results on export volume are reported in Table 1.8 and those on

import volume in Table 1.9. The potential impact of the RCEP has a similar effect on trade

volumes – the deeper the cuts in bilateral tariffs, the higher the trade volumes for RCEP

members. In a few cases, the results of export volume under S3 fall below the baseline,

indicated by negative results. The reason is that higher export prices induced by competing

demands for factor inputs eventually lead to higher production costs than in the baseline

scenario. This is the case for Lao PDR, Australia, and New Zealand.

The results on investment are reported in Table 1.10. Freer trade in goods and

services and efficient logistics lead to higher investment in all RCEP member countries. As

expected, improvements in the rate of return caused by reducing the country-specific risk

resulted in higher investment, as reported in S3. Table 1.11 reports the impacts on foreign

ownership of capital stock. The results on increased foreign ownership of capital stock

indicate that capital will flow into the regions. Thus, the results in Table 1.11 show that once

the RCEP is implemented, all RCEP participating countries would attract more investment

from abroad.

The overall impact of the RCEP can be summarised in terms of economic welfare,

as reported in Table 12. The RCEP could bring economic benefits to all participating

countries for most of the policy scenarios. Further, economic welfare gains become more

substantial once the RCEP includes investment commitment. However, the Philippines and

India experienced negative welfare results. Such exceptional results are mainly attributed

to changes in the regional households’ holdings of foreign wealth. Because of the larger

investment at home, the regional households accumulated more wealth at home, shifting

away from foreign wealth. Income accrued from foreign wealth becomes smaller than the

baseline over the simulation period, and the reduction in welfare slightly lower than the

baseline for these countries.

Chapter 1

17

Table 1.8: Results on Export Volume, 2030


S1 S2 S3



Lao PDR 0.6 1.1 -0.9





Viet Nam 1.2 2.7 2.9


Japan 1.7 2.4 3.6

China 2.4 3.4 4.6

Korea 3.8 5.9 7.7

India 1.7 2.9 3.8

Australia 1.0 1.5 -0.3

New Zealand 1.2 1.7 -0.1

Hong Kong -0.7 -0.8 -1.1

Taiwan -1.1 -1.4 -1.6

USA -0.3 -0.4 -0.3

Canada -0.4 -0.6 -1.1

Mexico -0.2 -0.3 -0.8

Brazil -0.8 -1.1 -0.9

Chile 0.3 0.6 0.9

Argentina -0.6 -0.9 -2.1

UK -0.3 -0.5 -0.9

Germany -0.3 -0.4 -0.7

UAE -0.8 -1.2 -1.5



18

Table 1.9: Result on Import Volume, 2030


S1 S2 S3



Lao PDR 1.8 2.6 6.2





Viet Nam 1.5 2.7 4.1


Japan 2.9 4.3 6.2

China 3.3 4.6 5.8

Korea 6.1 9.3 10.5

India 2.3 3.9 4.7



Hong Kong -1.0 -1.2 -1.6

Taiwan -2.1 -2.9 -3.8

USA -0.5 -0.7 -1.3

Canada 0.0 0.1 0.1

Mexico -0.8 -1.1 -3.2

Brazil 0.2 0.2 -0.5

Chile -1.1 -1.5 -2.7

Argentina 0.1 0.0 0.3

UK -0.2 -0.3 -0.8

Germany -0.4 -0.5 -1.3

UAE -1.2 -1.5 -2.4


Chapter 1

19

Table 1.10: Result on Investment


S1 S2 S3

Cambodia 14.8 20.2 23.4


Lao PDR 2.3 2.8 7.1

Malaysia 3.8 4.9 10.2



Thailand 6.0 7.7 13.7

Viet Nam 3.2 4.0 7.7


Japan 2.0 2.8 9.6

China 0.6 0.7 2.6

Korea 15.0 22.4 24.7

India 1.9 2.8 5.8



Hong Kong -1.0 -1.1 -2.0

Taiwan -4.2 -5.7 -9.5

USA -0.2 -0.3 -1.2

Canada 0.2 0.3 0.0

Mexico -0.9 -1.3 -4.2

Brazil 0.2 0.2 -0.9

Chile -1.7 -2.5 -4.8


UK -0.2 -0.2 -1.5

Germany -0.2 -0.3 -1.6

UAE -1.7 -2.2 -4.4

RestofWorld -0.3 -0.5 -2.1

RoSEAsia = Rest of Southeast Asia, UAE = United Arab Emirates, UK = United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. Source: Author’s simulation results.


20

Table 1.11: Results on Foreign Ownership of Capital, 2030


S1 S2 S3

Cambodia 10.4 14.4 17.6


Lao PDR 2.8 3.4 10.9

Malaysia 5.1 6.8 16.2



Thailand 13.7 18.8 37.7

Viet Nam 4.5 6.0 10.7


Japan 4.2 6.1 18.0

China 2.0 2.6 9.9

Korea 17.9 27.4 37.4

India 7.5 12.4 34.3



Hong Kong -1.4 -1.6 -3.1

Taiwan -4.0 -5.5 -8.8

USA -0.5 -0.7 -2.2

Canada -0.1 -0.1 -1.0

Mexico -1.0 -1.4 -4.6

Brazil -0.2 -0.3 -2.7

Chile -1.8 -2.5 -4.7

Argentina -0.2 -0.6 -1.7

UK -0.3 -0.4 -1.8

Germany -0.5 -0.7 -2.6

UAE -1.6 -2.0 -3.7

RestofWorld -0.5 -0.6 -2.6

RoSEAsia = Rest of Southeast Asia, UAE = United Arab Emirates, UK = United Kingdom, USA = United States of America. Source: Author’s simulation results.

Chapter 1

21

Table 1.12: Results on Welfare, 2030


S1 S2 S3



Lao PDR 1.3 1.3 2.9


Philippines 0.3 -0.3 1.4



Viet Nam 1.6 1.7 2.6


Japan 0.5 0.6 0.7

China 0.3 0.3 0.2

Korea 2.2 2.8 2.3

India 0.1 0.0 -0.4



Hong Kong -0.4 -0.5 -0.7

Taiwan -1.3 -1.8 -2.7

USA -0.1 -0.1 -0.3

Canada 0.1 0.1 0.3

Mexico -0.3 -0.4 -1.0

Brazil 0.0 0.0 -0.2

Chile -0.8 -1.2 -2.0


UK 0.0 -0.1 -0.2

Germany -0.1 -0.2 -0.4

UAE -0.1 -0.1 0.1

RestofWorld 0.0 0.0 0.0

RoSEAsia = Rest of Southeast Asia, UAE = United Arab Emirates, UK = United Kingdom, USA = United States of America.



22

4. Summary

By applying the Dynamic GTAP model with the recent database, we conducted a set

of policy simulations of the RCEP, focusing on the AMSs. Simulation results reveal that all

participating countries in the RCEP gained in terms of real GDP by liberalising their trade

and promoting investment. Once investment commitment led to a reduction in country-

specific risk, the increase in real GDP was bolstered further. Investment in all member

countries rose as the RCEP was implemented; more foreign capital was likewise attracted

to the RCEP region by higher rates of return. Trade volume expanded as the participating

countries implemented deeper tariff reductions. Economic welfare also improved for most

RCEP member countries.

This study has some limitations that can be addressed with additional information

and updated data. We assumed full utilisation of the RCEP, but in reality many producers

and consumers did not use the preferential treatments made available by existing FTAs.

Utilisation rates can be incorporated into the simulation setting to reflect the under-

utilisation of FTAs. Movement of labour across the participating countries is not considered

because of the current model’s limitation. Although it is not easy, the model can be

extended to capture international labour movement, based on pioneering work found in

the literature, for example Walmsley, Winters and Ahmed (2007).

References

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IMF Staff Papers 16, pp.159–76, Washington, DC: IMF.

Fukunaga, Y. and I. Isono (2013), 'Taking ASEAN+ 1 FTAs towards the RCEP: A Mapping Study', ERIA Discussion Paper 2013–02, Jakarta: ERIA.

Hayakawa, K. and F. Kimura (2014), 'How Much Do Free Trade Agreements Reduce Impediments To Trade?', Open Economies Review, DOI 10.1007/s11079-014-9332-x.

Hertel, T.W. (Ed.) (1997), Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Ianchovichina, E.I. and R. McDougall (2001), 'Theoretical Structure of Dynamic GTAP', GTAP Technical Paper, pp.1–74, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.

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Narayanan, B.G., A. Aguiar and R. McDougall (Eds.) (2012), Global Trade, Assistance, and Production: the GTAP 8 Data Base. West Lafayette, IN: Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.

United Nations (2013). World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision. New York, NY: UN

Walmsley, T.L. and E. Ianchovichina (Eds.) (2012), Dynamic Modeling and Applications for Global Economic Analysis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Walmsley, T.L., A. Winters and S.A. Ahmed (2007), 'Measuring the Impact of the Movement of Labour Using a Model of Bilateral Migration FLows', GTAP Technical Paper 28, pp.1-51, West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University.

Wang, Z., S. Mohan and D. Rosen (2009), Methodology for Estimating Services Trade Barriers. Washington, DC: Rhodium Group and Peterson Institute for International Economics.

World Bank (2010), Doing Business 2009 Survey. Washington DC: World Bank.

SECTION I

Trade in Goods: Beyond Tariff Elimination

27

Chapter 2

Impact of Free Trade Agreements

on Trade in East Asia

Misa Okabe Faculty of Economics, Wakayama University

With the number of free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia having increased

rapidly since the beginning of this century, a large number of studies have attempted to

assess the impact of FTAs in the region. In the first half of this paper we review empirical

studies of ex-post evaluation of FTAs in East Asia. Although few studies found robust trade

creation effects of AFTA in the 1990s, recent studies indicated that tariff elimination under

AFTA promoted regional trade amongst Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

countries. Likewise, with regard to bilateral FTAs in East Asia, some ex-post evaluation

studies show that these FTAs have had some positive impact on trade, not only as a result

of tariff elimination under the FTAs but also due to other liberalisation measures. In the

second half of this paper we conduct an empirical analysis on the impact of ASEAN FTAs.

We found that trade creation effects of imports under the ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA) and

the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA) appear in industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumption

goods between members. The impact of the ASEAN–Japan FTA (AJCEP) remains unclear in

many cases. These results suggest that these regional FTAs facilitate trade when production

and sales networks amongst members have already been developed. However, the newer

FTAs, the members of which are the same as precedent FTAs, have had little impact on trade

amongst members. To be effective, a region-wide FTA, such as the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership, needs to have a higher level of liberalisation and lower utilisation

costs than the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs in the East Asia.


28

1. Introduction

According to the regional trade agreement (RTA) database of the World Trade

Organization (WTO), the number of RTAs notified to the WTO has increased rapidly since

the early 1990s, with 612 RTAs notified as of April 2015. One reason for the surge in RTAs

is that global trade liberalisation under the WTO system has not proceeded smoothly with

the increasing number of member countries. Many countries have pursued trade

liberalisation by forming bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements to gain various economic

benefits.1 As regards free trade agreements (FTAs) in East Asia, bilateral and regional FTAs

have increased rapidly since 2000 in line with the global trend of RTA formation. Table 1

shows the number of RTAs in East Asia. Until the 1990s, few countries had joined regional

or inter-regional agreements of trade preference schemes such as the Asia Pacific Trade

Agreement (APTA) and the Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing

Countries (GSTP). Although East Asia established the first regional FTA in the region – the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992 – it had

lagged other regions in the world in terms of the formation of regional FTAs. For this reason,

until the early 2000s, East Asia was referred to as an ‘FTA vacuum’. But since the second

half of the 2000s, bilateral FTAs in the region have rapidly increased, and five region-wide

FTAs were established – the ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA), the ASEAN–Japan EPA (AJCEP), the

ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA), the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA), and the

ASEAN–India FTA (AIFTA). By the end of 2014, East Asian countries had formed more than

40 FTAs and a wider regional FTA, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

(RCEP), has been under negotiation.

1 Such benefits result from a trade creation and market expansion effect through elimination of trade barriers

and various dynamic effects such as capital accumulation and productivity improvement brought about by liberalisation of foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer amongst member countries. Viner (1950) was the first study to discuss the static effects of regional trade integration in terms of trade creation and diversion. The dynamic theory of regional economic integration by Balassa (1961) is the first attempt to introduce the dynamic effects of economic integration such as scale economy, technology change, and impact on competition. Up to the present, a number of theoretical studies have indicated that the dynamic effects of economic integration benefit member countries more than static effects.

Chapter 2

29

Figure 2.1: Number of RTAs amongst East Asian Countries

Note: Calculated based on WTO RTA database. Figures represent the number of FTAs established by ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.

Intra-regional trade in East Asia has been increasing since the 2000s with the

increase of FTAs in the region. Figure 2.2 shows the share and value of intra-regional trade

of the ASEAN countries, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. Intra-

regional trade volumes have been rapidly increasing since the Asian currency crises of 1997,

and the share of intra-regional trade has consistently exceeded 40% since the early 2000s.

This rapidly increasing trend of regional trade reflects rapidly growing regional production

in manufacturing sectors supported by extra-regional foreign direct investment (FDI). The

upsurge of regional FTAs in the region seems to be an important factor to attract FDI and

of productivity improvement. Detailed studies on the impact of FTAs on trade are

indispensable for all of the countries in the region where new FTAs have been established

or are being negotiated.

In the first half of this paper we review studies on the impact of FTAs on trade in

goods in East Asia.


30

Figure 2.2: Regional Trade in ASEAN+6 Countries

Notes: 1) ASEAN+6 countries comprise the 10 ASEAN members, Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand. 2) Regional trade share is the share of regional trade value amongst the ASEAN+6 countries in the total trade value of the world. Source: The United Nations COMTRADE statistics.

Two types of analysis are used to assess the impact of FTAs on trade in goods – ex-

ante and ex-post analysis. Ex-ante analysis is useful for estimating the impact of an FTA

before it is enforced. A typical ex-ante analysis is a simulation analysis using a computable

general equilibrium (CGE) model, which enables us to investigate the impact of an FTA on

various aspects of the economy such as trade value, production, and economic welfare by

sector or country. We can estimate both the direct and indirect impact of different FTA

types on various aspects of the economy by using CGE model analysis.

Most ex-post analysis is in the form of empirical studies applying a gravity model to

trade data. The gravity model, originally developed by Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen

(1963), has been used extensively for over 50 years to explain trade patterns. The

theoretical background of the gravity model has been developed since the late 1970s in

line with the development of trade theory, from traditional trade theory to the ‘New–new’

trade theory. Estimation methodologies have also been improved since the 1990s, and

there have been various studies of methods to cope with endogeneity and zero-trade flow

Chapter 2

31

problems.

We reviewed mainly ex-post studies on the impact of regional FTAs in East Asia in

section 2. Section 2.1 gives an overview of empirical analyses on the general impact of tariff

reductions as part of FTAs on trade in goods. Sections 2.1.1 to 2.1.3 focus on studies related

to AFTA, and regional and bilateral FTAs in East Asia. Section 2.2 discusses studies of other

trade liberalisation measures related to FTAs and channels of impact of FTAs. Section 2.3

provides an overview of the findings of studies on the utilisation of FTAs in East Asia.

We conduct an empirical analysis on the impact of five ASEAN+1 FTAs on trade in

goods by using the gravity model in Sections 3 to 5. Ex-post evaluation of these recent

regional FTAs is important to predict the future impact of the RCEP currently being

negotiated and to design policies to facilitate economic development in the region under

the region-wide FTA. Despite the importance of ex-post investigation of these ASEAN+1

FTAs, there have so far been only a few studies on their impact. Based on recent

developments in empirical methodology, we apply gravity equations with FTA dummies to

trade flows in each sector and county. Section 3 describes the process of the formation of

each FTA. Section 4 explains estimation the methodology and data used. Section 5 discusses

the estimated results and Section 6 summarises the results and policy implications for a

region-wide FTA, the RCEP.

2. Literature Review on FTA’s Impact on Trade in Goods in East Asia

2.1. Impact of FTAs on Trade in Goods in East Asia: Ex-post Evaluation

2.1.1. ASEAN Free Trade Area

AFTA was signed in 1992. The key objective of AFTA is trade liberalisation under the

Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme to eliminate tariffs on intra-ASEAN

trade, which have been in effect since January 1993. AFTA was scheduled to reduce tariff

rates on products in the Inclusion List to a level between zero and 5 percent by 2008 at first,

then the target date was moved to 2002. Moreover, the ASEAN–CEPT agreement was

revised significantly by the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement in 2008. The tariff rates of the

products in the Inclusion List were scheduled to be entirely abolished by 2010 for the six

ASEAN countries and by 2015 for the remaining four countries. By 2010, the share of tariff

lines with the zero percent tariff rate was about 99 percent for the six countries, and the


32

share of tariff lines with zero to 5 percent tariff rate was more than 95 percent for the

remaining four countries. Over the last 20 years, tariff elimination under the AFTA has

almost been completed.

At the start of AFTA, according to Frankel (1997), many studies presumed that trade

creation by AFTA would be small. For example, DeRosa (1995) used a CGE model to find

that Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff liberalisation of ASEAN members would increase

trade more than trade liberalisation by AFTA. Frankel and Wei (1995) examined the impact

of ASEAN’s regional trading bloc by using a gravity model with ASEAN dummies. Although

the coefficient of ASEAN dummy was significant and had positive values, they found that

this ASEAN bloc effect disappeared completely when the East Asian bloc effect dummy was

added to the estimated equation simultaneously with the ASEAN dummy. They concluded

that ASEAN trade relations with outside industrialised countries are more important than

intra-ASEAN trade relations. Endoh (1999) introduced two types of RTA dummies, which

capture trade creation and diversion effect to a gravity model. Based on the estimated

results, he found that ASEAN had no effect in boosting trade amongst its member countries

during sample periods from 1960 to 1994. He presumed that this result reflects the fact

that the share of intra-ASEAN trade in total trade of each ASEAN country is still low.

As described in the previous section, the methodology to estimate the gravity

model has been developed since the 2000s. Furthermore, data coverage has been

expanded. Soloaga and Winters (2001) used a Tobit model for estimation with

consideration of zero trade flows. They quantified the impact of major preferential trade

agreements on trade. The coefficient of the intra-bloc trade of ASEAN was negative but

insignificant. Likewise in previous studies, ASEAN countries’ trade with outside regions

were significantly facilitated. Given that country-pair effects are unobservable, Carrère

(2006) applied the instrumental variable method proposed by Hausman and Taylor (1981).

Comparing the estimation results by panel and cross-sectional data, she found that most

RTAs resulted in an increase in intra-regional trade whilst reducing imports from the rest of

the world. As for ASEAN, a trade creation effect was seen over the sample periods.

With increasing interest in the growing intra-regional trade of ASEAN members

since the 1990s, the number of studies focusing on the impact of AFTA has been rising.

Elliot and Ikemoto (2004) applied a modified gravity model to examine trade creation and

diversion effects by AFTA. Comparing the estimated coefficient of AFTA dummies before

Chapter 2

33

and after the AFTA process started, they found that both trade creation and trade diversion

effects are significantly positive. Their findings indicate that AFTA increased not only intra-

regional trade amongst its members, but also trade with non-members. Kien (2009)

employed the Hausman–Taylor estimation for panel data from 1988 to 2002 to estimate

several RTAs. By using AFTA dummy, which takes the value of one after 1993, he

investigated the effect of AFTA as an institutional framework rather than as a regional

trading bloc. Similar to Elliot and Ikemoto (2004), the result indicates that AFTA gives rise

to a trade creation effect; at the same time, the effect of AFTA on trade between members

and non-members was positive. Controlling unobserved heterogeneity by a using country-

pair specific time trend, Bun et al. (2009) applied two types of AFTA dummies – an AFTA

dummy that takes the value of one between members after the year 1992, and an AFTA

dummy multiplied by a time trend which captures the effect of gradual tariff reduction

under AFTA. They found that AFTA positively affected trade during the sample periods, and

suggested that careful control for unobserved explanatory variables of the trend in trade is

necessary for testing the impact of AFTA.

Although many studies had concluded that ASEAN regional trade blocs had little

impact at the beginning of AFTA, several recent studies have found that as AFTA progressed,

it made a significant and positive impact on trade. This transition of research findings is also

caused by improved data availability and estimation methodology. These studies lead us to

the temporary finding that the institutional framework of AFTA has facilitated intra-regional

trade to a varying degree. In addition, trade liberalisation under RTAs is usually

implemented through several measures along with tariff elimination. To understand the

impact of FTAs more fully, it is necessary to investigate the effect of these measures directly.

Several studies have attempted to estimate the impact of the tariff elimination

process under the CEPT scheme of AFTA by using tariff data. Manchin and Pelkmans–

Balaoing (2007) applied a gravity model with time-varying country fixed effects as

multilateral trade resistance (MTR) terms for aggregated and disaggregated trade data to

estimate the effects of preferential AFTA tariffs on trade flows of AFTA members. Although

their data set is limited to four ASEAN members in 2001–2003, they carefully investigated

the impact of different preferential margins on trade. The result shows that the tariff

reduction effect of AFTA basically has no or little impact on intra-ASEAN trade. However,

they found that positive tariff reduction effects of AFTA are significant in a limited range of


34

products where the preferential margin is higher than 25 percent. Interestingly, their result

implies that the cost of using AFTA is higher than the benefit from obtaining the preferential

treatment when the difference between the MFN tariff rate and the preferential AFTA tariff

rate is small. Similar to Manchin and Pelkmans–Balaoing (2007), Okabe and Urata (2014)

utilised preferential margin, defined as the difference between the MFN rates and

preferential tariff rate under the CEPT scheme as an explanatory variable of the gravity

model. They investigated the effects of tariff reduction under the CEPT scheme in each

ASEAN member in 1980–2010. They found positive and significant trade creation effects

from tariff reduction for a wide range of products; the elasticity of tariff reduction on

imports tends to be much larger than that on exports.

Although there are very few studies on the impact of tariff reduction under AFTA, it

could be argued that tariff reduction under AFTA has a positive impact on regional trade in

products where the difference between the MFN tariff rate and AFTA tariff rate is big, and

on regional trade between countries trading in relatively large volumes. However, the

impact on trade flow is basically not so strong. Also, the effect of tariff reduction under

AFTA on newer members is limited. Based on these results, tariff reduction under AFTA is

not necessarily the most important measure to promote region-wide trade. To promote

region-wide trade in ASEAN and to make AFTA contribute to raising the economic welfare

of all member countries, other measures such as trade facilitation, reduction of non-tariff

measures (NTMs), and coordination of rules of origin (ROO) as well as improvement of AFTA

utilisation should be examined carefully. We will review studies on other measures in the

following sections.

Chapter 2

35

Table 2.1: Results of Studies on the Impact of ASEAN or AFTA

Authors (year) Methodology Data

Trade Creation,

Estimated Coefficient

(elasticity)

Endoh (1999) ASEAN

dummy

Cross-section analysis, by

pooled data

80 countries,

1960–1994

0.589–0.778 (80%–

117%)

Carrère (2006) ASEAN

dummy GL and Hausman–Taylor

estimation, panel data

130

countries,

1962–1996

0.64–2.02 (90%–653%)

Elliot and Ikemoto (2004) AFTA dummy Cross-section analysis by

pooled data

34 countries,

1983–1999

0.35–2.03 (42%–661%)

Kien (2009) AFTA dummy Hausman–Taylor

estimation with two-way

components

39 countries,

1988–2002

0.626 (87%)

Bun, Klaasen, and Tan

(2009)

AFTA dummy

*time trend

Panel data approach with

country-pair specific time

trends

217

countries,

1948–1997

0%–9% annually in

average

Manchin and

Pelkmans–Balaoing

(2007)

AFTA Tariff

rate

Panel data with

time-varying country fixed

effects

217

countries,

2001–2003

0.19–0.96% change

when preferential

margins are from 25% to

60%

Okabe and Urata (2013) AFTA tariff

rate

Hausman Taylor estimation

52 sectors,

193

countries

1980–2010

0.36% for export,

0.38% for import

Note: Elasticity of AFTA dummy with trade is calculated by (EXP (estimated value) -1)*100.

2.1.1. ASEAN+1 FTAs

More recently, several studies attempted to examine the impact of ASEAN+1 FTAs

by using some trade indices or by estimation using trade data. Sheng et al. (2014) estimated

a gravity model using intra-industry trade flow data in parts and components during 1980–

2008, and the predicted trade creation effect on intra-industry trade under ACFTA based

on actual 2008 data. They found that ACFTA will have a substantially larger impact on trade

flows between members, particularly based on close international production linkages,

whilst the positive impact will be spread unevenly amongst ASEAN countries. Likewise, Yang

and Mattinez–Zarzoso (2014) examined the impact of ACFTA by applying a gravity model

by using aggregated and disaggregated data. They found that ACFTA has a trade creation

effect in total trade and trade in manufacturing and chemical products. By using trade

indices, such as trade intensities and trade potential index, several studies attempted to

estimate adequacy and predicted impact by sector. Chandran (2012) assessed the impact

of the India–ASEAN FTA (AIFTA), focusing on India’s fishery sector by using trade indices and

a comparative advantage index. Based on sector analysis, he concluded that India could


36

improve trade by tariff elimination under AIFTA with some ASEAN countries, particularly

less-developed members.

So far there have only been few ex-post evaluations of ASEAN+1 FTAs, as not much

time has elapsed since the start of these FTAs. Considering the results of previous ex-ante

studies, investigating the impact of various measures along with tariff elimination under

ASEAN+1 FTAs should provide interesting findings. And, as demonstrated by Sheng et al.

(2012) and Chandran (2012), examining the impact of ASEAN+1 FTAs on the growth gap

amongst member countries and on trade flows by the industrial sector in the long term is

another interesting research topic.

2.1.2. Bilateral FTAs in East Asia

Likewise, regarding ASEAN+1 FTAs, there have been few ex-post studies on bilateral

FTAs in East Asia due to the limited availability of data. Ando (2007) examined the impact

of the Japan–Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the Japan–Mexico EPA

by applying a gravity model to trade data at the commodity level. Comparing actual values

to fitted values before and after the EPA’s implementation, she found that the Japan–

Singapore EPA has had little impact on trade, whereas the Japan–Mexico EPA has had a

positive impact on trade, particularly on exports. She reasoned that the actual reduction of

tariffs by the Japan–Singapore EPA is quite limited. Also, considering additional analysis of

various situations beyond trade liberalisation, she indicates that conditions beyond tariff

elimination, such as business environment and EPA utilisation, are important factors to be

taken into account when designing an effective EPA for trade liberalisation. Athukorala and

Kohpaiboon (2011) examined the impact of the Thailand–Australia FTA (TAFTA), paying

attention to the implications of ROO and the utilisation of tariff preferences. By linking a

data set of utilisation of tariff preferences by traders to bilateral trade volumes between

Australia and Thailand, they found that trade expanded faster after TAFTA came into effect,

but the impact was heavily concentrated on a few product lines in Australian imports from

Thailand. They pointed out that the reason for the limited impact can be attributed to the

rate of FTA utilisation. Hence, their results suggest that enhancing FTA utilisation is also

necessary to strengthen the positive impact of FTAs. To sum up so far, similar to the result

of studies on AFTA and other FTAs in East Asia, ex-post studies on bilateral FTAs also show

Chapter 2

37

that bilateral FTAs positively impact trade. To some extent, however, the positive impact is

brought about by tariff elimination under FTAs and by other necessary conditions for trade

liberalisation such as greater utilisation of preferential tariffs.

2.2. Measures other than Tariff Elimination and Channels of FTA Effects

With the elimination of tariffs under FTAs progressing, the importance of reducing

Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), harmonising ROO under several cumulative FTAs in East Asia,

and implementing other measures, such as trade facilitation and improvement of transport

infrastructure, has been increasingly recognised. For example, ASEAN prescribes that NTBs

be eliminated gradually within five years after the concessions applicable to the products.

Also, ASEAN+1 FTAs – for example, AANZFTA and AKFTA – include detailed guidelines on

the elimination of Non-tariff measures (NTMs).

A major cost of FTA utilisation at the firm level arises due to certificates of origin2.

Therefore, efficient administration of ROO is an important factor in facilitating trade

creation under FTAs by increasing utilisation of FTAs3. Medalla and Balboa (2009) examined

the various design and implementation practices in ROO regimes, focusing on RTAs where

ASEAN is involved. Likewise, Medalla (2011) compiled a database on the ROO of AFTA,

ASEAN+1 FTAs, and bilateral FTAs forged by Japan with ASEAN members. Hayakawa and

Laksanapanyakul (2013b) constructed a list of ROO in Thailand of ACFTA, AKFTA, and AJCEP

to calculate a new measure of FTA liberalisation. Based on their list, most preference

products follow a regional value contents (RVC) in the case of ACFTA and AKFTA, whereas

AJCEP sets many product-specific rules and a relatively large number of products follows

‘change heading or RVC’ (CH/RVC) or ‘change in chapter’ (CC). Judging from these recent

studies, there is a significant divergence in types of ROO of cumulative regional FTAs in the

region. Also, the restrictiveness of ROO varies significantly depending on products and each

ASEAN+1 FTA.

2 Medalla and Balboa (2009) pointed out that the cost of ROO immediately impacts FTA utilisation.

3 Cadot, de Melo, and Portugal–Perez (2006) found that a 10-percentage point reduction of the local value

content requirement increases the utilisation rate by between 2.5 and 8.2 percentage points by using data on trade between the European Union and the Generalized System of Preferences and the Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific partners. Also, Carrère and de Melo (2004) identified the difference of compliance cost of ROO by using Mexican exports to the United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and found that the highest compliance cost is caused by technical requirements, followed by regional value content, and by a change in tariff classification.


38

To enhance trade creation effects under FTAs by reducing FTA utilisation costs, ROO

should be simpler and less restrictive4. In addition, convergence of all ROO under FTAs in

East Asia where six multilateral regional FTAs and many bilateral FTAs coexist is necessary

to increase utilisation of both existing FTAs and the region-wide FTA being formed.

Hayakawa and Lakusanapanyakul (2013a) examined the impact of ROO on FTA utilisation

by using Thai export data under ACFTA and AKFTA. They found that the harmonisation to

‘change in tariff classification (CTC) or RVC’ amongst FTAs has a significantly positive effect

on utilisation of multiple FTAs. Furthermore, using data on Thai exports to Japan under

JTEPA and AJCEP, Hayakawa (2012) compared the impact of ROO under a bilateral FTA with

a multilateral FTA. He found that a multilateral FTA – diagonal cumulation – brings about 4

percent trade creation effects. Cadot and Ing (2014) examined the effect of ASEAN’s ROO

on regional trade by applying a disaggregated gravity model. They found a fairly high ad-

valorem equivalent of ROO in ASEAN in some sectors in which some rules appear more

restrictive than others.

The relationship between ROO and trade flows is more complicated than that

between elimination of tariff measures and trade flows. The latest studies referred to above

have gradually unveiled the impact of ROO on trade. Their investigation clearly shows that

harmonising and conforming to unrestrictive ROO amongst FTAs is necessary to facilitate

trade of goods in the region.

Whereas the importance of removal of NTBs is recognised and most FTAs in East

Asia include provisions on NTBs, there is no standard measure of NTBs amongst these FTAs.

Several methodologies to measure NTBs are available, and each methodology has merits

and demerits. Also, NTBs vary widely in scope, ranging from direct trade measures to

indirect measures. As Deardorff and Stern (1997) observed, ‘NTBs are defined by what they

are not, that is NTBs consist of all barriers to trade that are not tariff.’ Hence, construction

of quantitative data on NTBs under FTAs for empirical analysis is not an easy task.

Carrère and Melo (2011) reviewed studies on the impact of NTMs on trade flows

mainly between European Union (EU) members or Organisation for Economic Co-operation

and Development (OECD) countries. She found that (1) NTBs have a negative effect on the

4 Hayakawa, Laksanapanyakul, and Urata (2015) estimated the costs for utilisation of FTA by using custom data on Thai imports. They found that the median costs are around two thousand US dollars in the case of exporting from China, and around one thousand US dollars in the case of exporting from Korea.

Chapter 2

39

volume of bilateral trade, (2) core NTBs are more restrictive than existing tariffs, and (3)

these core NTMs limit market access more for low-income countries. In contrast, Hayakawa,

Ito, and Kimura (2015) decomposed trade creation effect of RTAs into those due to tariff

reduction, on the one hand, and those due to removal of NTBs, on the other, by applying a

gravity model to disaggregated tariff-line level trade data. They found significantly positive

trade creation effects due to tariff reduction, whereas NTB removal has a weak effect.

Although ASEAN provides the NTM database of each member country at HS 9-digit

level, the data is qualitative, not quantitative, and the classification of commodities is not

completely standardised amongst member countries. Therefore, it is not easy to utilise the

database to conduct an empirical analysis5. Due to the limitation of NTM data, only few

studies have been conducted on the impact of NTBs on trade under FTAs in East Asia. Taking

into account the previous studies on NTBs in the world, the impact of NTBs on regional

trade in East Asia also needs to be examined. A comparable and quantitative database of

NTMs of each member country of FTAs in the East Asia region is necessary for a detailed

analysis on the impact of NTMs.

2.3. Utilisation of FTAs

As discussed above, utilisation of FTAs is an important factor in realising trade

liberalisation under FTAs. As Athukorala and Kohpaiboon (2011) demonstrated, improving

the utilisation of FTAs by exporters could significantly increase the positive impact of FTAs

on trade between members. Several studies estimated the utilisation rate of FTAs in East

Asia. Hayakawa et al. (2013) analysed the reasons for the low utilisation rates in East Asia

by using survey data on Japanese affiliates in ASEAN. They identified two major reasons for

the low utilisation rate in ASEAN. One is high fixed costs such administrative cost, and the

other is low general tariff rates in electric parts and components, which are major traded

goods in ASEAN. Kohpaiboon (2010) demonstrated that FTA utilisation rates in Thailand for

its exports to four ASEAN members in 2008 ranged from 16.7 percent to 27.4 percent. Also,

according to Sukekawa (2009), who calculated the utilisation rate of AFTA by Thailand using

statistics of export values through AFTA issued by the government, the utilisation rate in

Thailand was 26.8 percent in 2008. According to Wignaraja et al. (2010), whilst the

5 Ando and Obashi (2010) constructed a comparative and quantitative NTM database based on the ASEAN NTM database. Cadot, Munadi, and Ing (2013) compared NTMs in ASEAN with other regions.


40

utilisation rate in Thailand is low (25 percent of respondents), it seems set to rise gradually.

Besides, Hayakawa et al. (2013) pointed out that firms may use an FTA even if the

preferential tariff rate is not lower than the MFN tariff rate in the case of ASEAN+1 FTAs,

due to its diagonal cumulation rule.

Looking at FTAs other than the AFTA, Cheong et al. (2010) compared the utilisation

rate of each Korean FTA. Their major findings are that the utilisation rate of the Korea–Chile

FTA was very high, above 90 percent for the four years following implementation of the FTA,

whereas that of the Korea–Singapore FTA, the Korea–EFTA, and AKFTA was relatively low,

ranging from 29.8 percent to 43.3 percent. They concluded that the major reason for the

high utilisation rate of the Korea–Chile FTA is the active utilisation by staple products groups

whilst the relatively low rate of the Korea–Singapore FTA is attributed to the fact that

products imported to Korea from Singapore are not likely to meet the ROO since Singapore

is a transit-trading country. Takahashi and Urata (2010), based on a survey of Japanese firms,

found that lack of knowledge about the FTAs and difficulties in obtaining certificates of

origin are the two most serious obstacles to increasing the use of FTAs. Likewise, Wignaraja

et al. (2010) found that more than one quarter of firms felt that dealing with multiple ROO

significantly raises business costs.

The above studies on utilisation of FTAs reveal that FTA utilisation tends to be low

at the early stages of an FTA, but that in many cases of FTAs in East Asia it gradually rises.

The use of FTAs, however, entails high costs for firms, in particular for smaller companies.

Further research is needed on what factors are important in decreasing the costs of FTA

use, so that FTAs will have a positive impact on all sectors and companies. Moreover, the

measuring method of the FTA utilisation rate is still at the development stage. Hamanaka

(2013) pointed out the confusion on the use of FTAs due to a lack of consensus on the

meaning of the utilisation rate and a lack of knowledge on biases due to various problems,

such as indicator selection, time lag of FTA implementation, and specification of trade flows.

He warned that the use of FTAs measured by certificate of origin data has a time-growing

upward bias, hence the utilisation rate based on such data shows an increasing trend even

though the utilisation rate has not necessarily improved. Also, he pointed out that firm

surveys suffer from several methodological problems that cause an upward bias. It is

fundamentally important to assess the situation of FTA use accurately for research on the

effects of FTAs on trade. Consensus on the measurement of FTA utilisation rates based on

Chapter 2

41

constructing appropriate data and accumulation of research is necessary to be able to reach

sound conclusions and assess policy implications.

More detailed studies on both ROO and utilisation rates of each FTA is necessary to

investigate the opportunity cost of utilising particular FTAs. Such studies are also useful for

clarifying the impact of ROO design on trade under FTAs. Investigating the impact of various

measures other than tariff reduction under an FTA is not easy, but necessary for a deeper

understanding of the impact of FTAs in the East Asia region.

3. Empirical Investigation on the Impact of Five ASEAN+1 FTAs

ASEAN’s six dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New

Zealand – have formed bilateral FTAs with ASEAN members since the middle of the 2000s.

For example, Japan has formed seven bilateral FTAs with other ASEAN members, starting

with Singapore in 2002. Singapore has actively arranged bilateral FTAs with all these

dialogue partners. Thailand and Malaysia also have arranged bilateral FTAs with Australia,

New Zealand, and India since the late 2000s. As the active FTA proponent in the region,

ASEAN, where regional economic integration amongst member countries started in the

1990s, has taken on the role of a hub of regional FTA networks in East Asia. After the ACFTA

came into force in 2005, four more ASEAN+1 FTAs – AKFTA, AJCEP, AANZFTA, and AIFTA –

were formed in the region6.

Production and sales networks accompanied by industrial agglomeration revolving

around ASEAN have been developed in East Asia since the 1990s. Regional FTAs in the

region are more important than bilateral FTAs, as regional FTAs enable multinational

enterprises (MNEs) to effectively use the expanding regional production and sales networks

as a means of increasing their productivity by reducing transport and transaction costs

across countries. Furthermore, a wider regional FTA, the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership (RCEP), covering AFTA and five ASEAN+1 FTAs, is in the process of

negotiation. RCEP is expected to play the role of the regional FTA to coordinate five

segmented regional ASEAN+1 FTAs.

6 These FTAs are plurilateral. The date on which the FTA came into effect differs by bilateral agreement. See Appendix Table 2 for the effectivity date by country for each FTA.


42

Below we conduct an ex-post evaluation of ASEAN+1 FTAs by using the gravity

model. We examine whether each ASEAN+1 FTA has a trade creation or trade diversion

effect on each sector to be able to establish the necessary conditions for the RCEP to be an

effective region-wide FTA.

3.1. Estimation Methodology and Data

We used the gravity model to estimate the impact of five ASEAN+1 FTAs on trade in

goods by sector. To examine the impact of each FTA on individual member countries, we

used both import and export data of each ASEAN member, Australia, China, India, Japan,

Korea, and New Zealand from 176 countries in the world at BEC (broad economic

categories) 1-digit level. Sample periods are from 2000 to 2013. We applied the most-often-

formulated gravity model as the following:

(1)

where is constant; and are real gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per

capita, respectively; is the geographical distance between the largest city of country

and ; and is a proxy variable representing the effect of implementation of

each FTA. We used three types of FTA dummy variable. To capture the trade creation effect,

two types dummies are used. One is a binary dummy denoting one when a trade partner

is a member of the FTA after the year in which it came into effect, and the other is a

progressively increasing dummy variable, which increases its variable value by 20%

annually to capture the effect of a gradual reduction of tariffs under the FTA. Another one

is a dummy variable denoting one when a trade partner is not a member after the year in

which the FTA came into effect to capture the trade diversion effect. The dates of coming

into effect of each ASEAN+1 FTA differ by country-pair, as shown in Appendix Table 2A7. As

for the FTA proxy variables for all bilateral and plurilateral FTAs other than ASEAN+1 FTAs,

they are also included in the estimation equation. We use the following basic estimation

equation:

7 Information on the date on which each ASEAN+1 FTA came into effect of each country is obtained from several reports by FTA-related ministries in member countries.

0A Y y

ijD

i j ijtFTA

ijtijjtitjtitijt FTADyyYYAX

exp54321

0

Chapter 2

43

(2)

where and are FTA proxy variables of ASEAN+1 FTA and other FTAs,

respectively. is a year dummy. To use all bilateral trade data including zero trade flows,

the PPML estimator is applied to the equation above. The list of countries used for

estimations is shown in Appendix Table 1.

Regarding the data for our estimations, we use the trade values of ASEAN members

and six ASEAN dialogue partner countries. Import and export values in US dollars at the

bottom BEC 1-digit level are from Comtrade statistics of the United Nations. As for real GDP,

real GDP per capita figures are from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank.

Geographical distance is from the GeoDist database provided by CEPII8. Information on the

dates when tariff elimination starts under bilateral and plurilateral FTAs are from the WTO’s

RTA database.

4. Results

4.1. Results by Sector

First, we estimate equation (2) by using pooled data of seven ASEAN members and

six dialogue partners. Table 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 shows results for exports and imports of each

sector. Coefficient of AFTA on both exports and imports under AFTA are significantly

positive in all sectors. As previous studies indicated, the results reflect that AFTA has been

effective in promoting regional trade since 2000. Looking at other ASEAN+1 FTAs, exports

of fuels and transport equipment are facilitated under all ASEAN+1 FTAs except AJCEP, and

imports of food and consumption goods are increased under all ASEAN+1 FTAs, except

AJCEP and AIFTA. As for export in fuels, geographical distance is the more important factor

as shown by a negative and bigger coefficient of the distance variable. The regional export

share of fuels is high than that of other sectors – 79% in 2013. Also, regional trade in

8 CEPII (Research and Expertise on the World Economy) provides the GepDist database, which includes several geographical variables for 225 countries. For details, see Mayer and Zignago (2011).

))ln(

)ln()ln()ln()ln(exp(),,,,|(

∑∑∑2012

2000,15

432100

tttijtNNijtij

jtitjtittijjtjtijt

TBFTAFTAD

yyYYATDyYAxE

ijtFTA ijtBFTA

tT


44

consumption goods is facilitated by imports from higher-income countries in the region, as

shown by a positive and bigger coefficient of GDP per capita. The regional import share of

consumption goods is 60% in 2013 and higher than that of other sectors. Regional trade-

oriented goods due to high transport costs such as fuels and already established regional

supply chains such as consumption goods are more likely to be positively affected by

regional FTAs.

With regard to each ASEAN+1 FTA, trade creation effects are found in almost all

sectors under ACFTA, except for imports of fuels. One possible reason for trade creation

effects under ACFTA is that ACFTA was launched earlier than other ASEAN+1 FTAs. The

coefficient of the trade diversion effect has no significant negative sign under ACFTA.

Increased trade under ACFTA also boosts trade with other regions. It suggests that

increased traded products under ACFTA are complementary goods to traded products with

other regions, such as machinery and its parts.

Given gradual tariff reduction, it takes time for an FTA to generate a trade creation

effect. Coefficients of a gradual trade creation effect are positive and significant in almost

all cases where the binary FTA dummy is positive and significant. Both imports and exports

of food and transport equipment increase over time under AIFTA. Given the higher average

tariff rates in these sectors, it naturally takes time before a trade creation effect occurs.

Estimated coefficients of AJCEP are not significantly positive in all sectors, except

exports of transport equipment and imports of consumption goods. A possible reason

behind of these insignificant coefficients is seven concurrent bilateral FTAs between ASEAN

countries and Japan, which had already been formed before or at the same time as ACJEP.

The utilisation rate of AJCEP is likely to be lower than that for precedent bilateral FTAs at

the beginning of AJCEP since tariff elimination in some sectors is implemented with a

phased approach. The results suggest that the impacts of newer FTAs between the same

members as precedent FTAs are limited.

4.2. Results by Further Classified Data into Final Goods and Parts

Next, we apply equation (2) to sectoral data of final goods and its parts. Tables 3.1–

3.2 show estimation results for capital goods (BEC41) and their parts (BEC42) and passenger

motor cars (BEC51) and their parts (BEC53). Regarding capital goods, both final goods and

Chapter 2

45

parts are facilitated under ACFTA and AKFTA. China and Korea have developed production

and sales networks with ASEAN members. The result in capital goods and their parts shows

regional FTAs facilitate intra-industry trade under developed production and sales networks

in this region.

Regarding trade in BEC51 and BEC53, exports and imports under AIFTA and exports

under AKFTA are facilitated. Not only trade in parts for production in ASEAN members, but

also trade in finished cars is boosted by these FTAs. On the contrary, the trade creation

effect of ACFTA is limited to BEC53. This suggests that factors that promote trade, such as

a large consumer market and a productive production base are important for maximising

trade creation effects of regional FTAs. Judging from the results, regional FTAs tend to boost

trade with growth potential rather than generate new trade between member countries.

4.3. Results by Country

Lastly, we estimate equation (2) by country and sector. Tables 4.1–4.4 show

estimation results for each country and sector.

With regard to imports of ASEAN members, ACFTA increases imports in capital

goods, industrial supplies, and consumption goods of almost all ASEAN members. Likewise,

AKFTA has trade creation effect on imports in capital goods of all ASEAN members except

Lao PDR. This implies that a regional FTA between countries where intra-regional

production and sales networks have been formed actively stimulates intra-regional trade

through reduction of the costs of cross-border production sharing9. In contrast, despite

developed production and sales networks, trade between ASEAN members and Japan is

not significantly boosted under JACEP. As discussed above, the trade creation effects under

JACEP are less visible since Japan and seven ASEAN members had already formed bilateral

FTAs before or around the same time JACEP came into effect. A newer regional FTA should

go further in terms of tariff elimination schedule when concurrent FTAs are already in place

between the same members.

Looking at trade creation effects under ACFTA, estimated coefficients for imports of

industrial supplies and capital goods, and exports of industrial supplies of Cambodia, Lao

9 Intra-regional production networks between China or Korea and ASEAN countries have been developing since the 2000s. For example, trade in industrial intermediate goods between China or Korea and ASEAN countries has increased rapidly. Viet Nam’s import of industrial supplies from China has grown 20-fold over the past 10 years whilst total import increased 17-fold.


46

PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam are relatively high compared with other ASEAN members.

Likewise, estimated coefficients of AKFTA for imports of industrial supplies of Viet Nam and

Myanmar, and exports of industrial supplies of Lao PDR are relatively high. Moreover,

Cambodia’s export elasticity in industrial supplies and import elasticity in capital goods

under AIFTA are also relatively high. Similar to ACFTA and AKFTA, this implies that a regional

FTA takes the role of boosting the trade of emerging countries through their companies’

search for new market opportunities in the region.

The first regional FTA in East Asia, AFTA, has had a significant impact on the region.

AFTA has trade creation effects on imports of food, transport equipment, and capital goods

in almost all ASEAN members. The precedent ASEAN members, Indonesia, Malaysia,

Philippines, and Thailand, increase their imports and exports of capital goods and transport

equipment under AFTA. Moreover, exports of consumption goods of Cambodia, Myanmar,

and Viet Nam, and exports of food and industrial supplies of Lao PDR are facilitated under

AFTA. Trade liberalisation under AFTA promotes regional trade based on regional

production and sales networks amongst the precedent ASEAN members. At the same time,

the emerging countries of ASEAN have also boosted their trade with other members under

AFTA.

With regard to AANZFTA, trade creation effects are found in many countries in

imports of food. Australia has started bilateral FTAs with Singapore and Thailand before

AANZFTA came into effect. Therefore, trade in the manufacturing sectors amongst bilateral

FTA members is possibly boosted by these precedent FTAs. Intra-regional trade in

agricultural products amongst non-members of the precedent bilateral FTAs appears to

have significantly increased due to AANZFTA.

To sum up the major findings of our estimations, trade creation effects are found in

a wide range of sectors in most member countries due to regional FTAs under which

production and sales networks had already been formed, such as ACFTA and AKFTA. A

regional FTA that increases trade between members in which production and sales

networks have been developed can boost the productivity of firms by reducing service link

costs. Besides, we found that some ASEAN+1 FTAs, such as ACFTA, AKFTA, and AIFTA,

facilitate trade in the region, by emerging countries in particular. The region-wide FTA is

expected to boost trade especially of emerging countries and to narrow the development

gap. ASEAN+1 FTAs have greater possibility to facilitate trade of emerging countries in

Chapter 2

47

developing and deepening production and sales networks in the region than existing

bilateral FTAs. Also, as in AANZFTA, even though bilateral FTAs have already been formed

amongst the same members, a newer regional FTA could potentially facilitate regional trade.

To develop and expand production and sales networks in the East Asia region, region-wide

FTAs are necessary to further facilitate regional trade amongst members.


48

Table 2.2.1: Estimation Results on Exports by Sector, Pooled Data

Note: Figures in parentheses are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect. Cells coloured blue are

significant and negative coefficients of trade diversion effect, that is, an FTA decreases exports to non-member countries after the FTA has come into force.

ln (GDP) i 0.217 (14.4) 0.279 (20.3) 0.675 (42.2) 0.728 (44.9) 0.176 (7.0) 0.251 (10.9)

ln (GDP) j 0.742 (64.8) 0.730 (55.3) 0.820 (53.9) 0.812 (51.9) 0.688 (30.1) 0.675 (30.1)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.031 (2.0) -0.083 (5.4) 0.049 (3.5) -0.053 (3.6) 0.304 (9.1) 0.175 (5.8)

ln (GDP per capita) j -0.031 (2.2) -0.018 (1.2) -0.173 (10.0) -0.163 (8.9) 0.120 (4.6) 0.131 (4.8)

ln (Distance) ij -0.758 (26.4) -0.665 (17.9) -0.892 (33.4) -0.869 (32.2) -1.130 (32.0) -1.083 (29.5)

ASEAN-China FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.197 (11.5) 0.813 (10.2) 0.984 (7.3)

ASEAN-China FTA Diversion Effect 0.684 (14.3) 0.351 (6.3) -0.036 (0.4)

ASEAN-China FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 0.776 (6.2) 0.653 (7.4) 0.946 (5.4)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.803 (7.3) 0.755 (7.5) 1.515 (9.1)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect -0.819 (14.4) -0.323 (4.5) -0.355 (3.4)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.129 (1.1) 1.108 (10.5) 1.956 (9.2)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.710 (6.0) -0.302 (2.5) -0.334 (1.4)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect -0.868 (14.9) -0.504 (6.8) -1.110 (10.0)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.173 (1.3) -0.196 (1.5) 0.432 (1.6)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.332 (8.6) 0.399 (3.8) 0.939 (3.2)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect 0.698 (11.1) 0.317 (2.1) 0.111 (0.7)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 1.171 (4.7) 0.404 (2.1) 1.330 (3.4)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.801 (3.4) 0.094 (0.7) 1.378 (4.0)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect 0.382 (5.8) -0.044 (0.5) 0.866 (6.4)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 1.040 (2.2) 0.132 (0.8) 1.245 (1.8)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 0.572 (7.9) 0.761 (9.1) 0.887 (13.0) 0.945 (14.1) 1.280 (9.5) 1.220 (10.1)

Number of other FTAs dummies

Year dummies

Number of observations

% of zero trade flows

R-squared:

59.0%21.8% 21.8% 14.8% 14.8% 59.0%

5050 50 50 50 50

0.441007120.65348757 0.54136359 0.72645372 0.73345934 0.4947177

31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850

yesyes yes yes yes yes

BEC 01 BEC 02 BEC 03

Food and Beverages Industrial supplies Fuels and lubricants

Chapter 2

49

Table 2.2.1: (continued): Estimation Results on Exports by Sector, Pooled Data

Note: Figures in parentheses are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect. Cells coloured blue are

significant and negative coefficients of trade diversion effect, that is, an FTA decreases exports to non-member countries.

ln (GDP) i 0.694 (25.7) 0.730 (23.6) 1.274 (39.7) 1.056 (43.9) 0.859 (35.1) 1.020 (32.0)

ln (GDP) j 0.837 (36.5) 0.837 (31.9) 0.705 (26.3) 0.705 (25.5) 0.876 (46.1) 0.876 (32.7)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.306 (12.7) 0.092 (3.7) 0.235 (13.2) 0.277 (18.6) -0.362 (17.1) -0.533 (26.4)

ln (GDP per capita) j 0.071 (3.5) 0.086 (4.2) 0.043 (2.8) 0.047 (3.1) 0.132 (7.3) 0.165 (7.7)

ln (Distance) ij -0.813 (20.1) -0.830 (19.8) -0.095 (2.4) -0.174 (4.2) -0.348 (8.4) -0.349 (8.2)


ASEAN-China FTA Diversion Effect 1.262 (15.8) 0.061 (1.2) 1.559 (24.9)


ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.670 (4.4) 1.053 (8.4) -0.475 (2.6)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect 0.076 (0.8) 1.284 (16.4) -0.504 (6.1)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 0.603 (3.5) 0.525 (3.4) 0.252 (1.2)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.071 (0.4) 0.259 (3.3) 0.118 (1.2)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect 0.017 (0.2) 0.139 (1.7) 0.071 (1.0)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.313 (2.2) 0.193 (1.4) -0.038 (0.2)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.330 (3.1) -0.042 (0.2) 0.197 (1.2)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect -0.462 (6.4) -0.557 (7.5) -0.023 (0.3)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.260 (1.0) 0.702 (1.2) 0.398 (1.6)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.271 (2.0) 0.543 (2.7) -0.713 (4.7)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect -0.305 (3.5) -0.059 (0.8) -0.028 (0.3)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.850 (3.3) 0.776 (2.5) -1.721 (4.7)



Year dummies



R-squared:

12.9% 12.9%16.7% 16.7% 24.2% 24.2%

50 50 50 5050 50

0.86586125 0.755414680.77050684 0.74644332 0.72812132 0.71122004

yes yes

31,85031,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850

yes yes yes yes

BEC 06

Capital goods and parts &

accessories

Transport equipment, and

parts & accessoriesConsumption goods

BEC 05BEC 04


50

Table 2.2.2: Estimation Results on Import by Sector, Pooled Data

ln (GDP) i 0.956 (44.5) 0.934 (34.0) 0.741 (56.5) 0.778 (54.1) 0.728 (21.5) 0.723 (23.2)

ln (GDP) j 0.900 (49.7) 0.896 (46.1) 0.810 (87.4) 0.808 (82.6) 0.365 (24.0) 0.363 (23.2)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.157 (8.0) 0.060 (2.3) -0.100 (8.4) -0.179 (14.2) 0.199 (6.1) 0.116 (3.8)

ln (GDP per capita) j -0.213 (6.6) -0.205 (6.4) -0.022 (1.4) -0.015 (0.9) 0.146 (4.8) 0.147 (4.8)

ln (Distance) ij 0.032 (0.5) 0.013 (0.2) -0.801 (33.8) -0.805 (35.6) -0.709 (16.0) -0.737 (17.0)




ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.290 (10.2) 0.946 (11.0) 0.935 (5.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect 0.316 (4.3) -0.071 (1.4) 0.194 (1.5)


ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.017 (0.1) -0.214 (3.2) 0.020 (0.1)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect 0.139 (2.0) -0.251 (4.9) -0.161 (1.3)



ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect -0.271 (3.6) -0.107 (1.9) -0.623 (5.3)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 2.503 (6.4) 0.386 (1.7) 0.206 (0.6)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.855 (3.6) 0.230 (1.7) 0.259 (0.9)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect -0.180 (2.1) 0.084 (1.0) 0.488 (3.4)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 1.402 (4.0) 0.270 (1.4) -0.070 (0.1)



Year dummies



R-squared: 0.61473714 0.58207739 0.73015039 0.72540482 0.0994959 0.44100712

31,84731,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,847

yes yes yes yes yes yes

4950 50 50 50 49

Food and Beverages Industrial supplies Fuels and lubricants

BEC 01 BEC 02 BEC 03

65.5% 65.5%36.8% 36.8% 19.7% 19.7%

Chapter 2

51

Table 2.2.2: (continued): Estimation Results on Imports by Sector, Pooled Data

Note: Figures in parentheses are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficient of trade creation effect. Cells coloured blue are significant and negative coefficients of trade diversion effect, that is, an FTA decreases imports from non-member countries.

ln (GDP) i 0.517 (24.3) 0.652 (30.0) 0.506 (21.8) 0.618 (21.2) 0.592 (19.8) 0.675 (24.4)

ln (GDP) j 0.962 (65.2) 0.942 (58.6) 1.134 (75.9) 1.118 (69.8) 1.077 (49.6) 1.070 (44.3)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.163 (8.4) -0.015 (0.8) 0.245 (9.9) 0.052 (2.0) 0.475 (23.9) 0.433 (23.5)

ln (GDP per capita) j 0.147 (6.8) 0.154 (7.2) 0.222 (12.6) 0.238 (11.3) -0.269 (8.4) -0.284 (8.1)

ln (Distance) ij -1.168 (41.0) -1.152 (32.2) -0.599 (19.3) -0.564 (14.0) -0.913 (24.3) -0.812 (19.9)




ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.598 (4.8) 0.040 (0.3) 0.327 (1.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect -0.703 (9.7) -0.718 (9.9) -0.911 (10.6)


ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.110 (1.1) -0.218 (1.7) 0.238 (2.1)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect -0.304 (3.9) -0.584 (7.6) -0.033 (0.4)



ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect -0.003 (0.0) 0.272 (2.8) 0.364 (2.9)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual tariff reduction) 0.185 (0.5) -0.704 (0.9) 1.067 (3.0)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.033 (0.2) 0.705 (3.1) 0.055 (0.3)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect 0.022 (0.2) -0.110 (1.1) 0.200 (1.7)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual tariff reduction) -0.301 (1.0) 0.746 (2.0) -0.189 (0.5)



Year dummies



R-squared:

31,850 31,850

0.7905549 0.71971919 0.69095041 0.5886423 0.83083115 0.76688945

31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850

50 50


50 50 50 50

BEC 05 BEC 06

Capital goods and parts &

accessories

Transport equipment, and

parts & accessoriesConsumption goods

BEC 04

30.3% 30.3%27.6% 27.6% 49.5% 49.5%


52

Table 2.3.1: Estimation Result for BEC 41 & 42

Note: Figures in parentheses are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect. Cells coloured blue are significant and negative coefficients of trade diversion effect.

ln (GDP) i 0.898 (32.1) 0.948 (30.8) 0.497 (17.3) 0.506 (15.5) 0.599 (29.4) 0.713 (37.0) 0.466 (18.8) 0.599 (22.3)

ln (GDP) j 0.904 (42.5) 0.906 (33.6) 0.747 (31.5) 0.743 (30.0) 1.047 (70.1) 1.027 (71.9) 0.893 (52.5) 0.872 (42.9)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.145 (6.2) -0.076 (3.2) 0.454 (16.2) 0.291 (11.5) 0.100 (4.9) -0.034 (1.8) 0.207 (9.8) 0.000 (0.0)

ln (GDP per capita) j 0.006 (0.4) 0.023 (1.3) 0.143 (5.7) 0.151 (6.1) 0.056 (2.3) 0.062 (2.6) 0.220 (9.7) 0.227 (9.9)

ln (Distance) ij -0.564 (14.0) -0.587 (14.1) -1.088 (26.4) -1.093 (25.5) -1.086 (40.8) -1.053 (35.2) -1.236 (37.1) -1.235 (28.2)

ASEAN-China FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.774 (17.8) 2.020 (17.7) 1.803 (16.2) 2.852 (17.6)

ASEAN-China FTA Diversion Effect 1.239 (17.8) 1.115 (12.1) 0.428 (6.8) 1.074 (16.9)

ASEAN-China FTA (gradual) 0.984 (9.3) 1.304 (9.7) 1.505 (12.5) 2.144 (10.1)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.771 (5.6) 0.679 (4.0) 0.361 (3.5) 0.785 (5.2)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect 0.288 (3.0) -0.028 (0.3) -0.692 (9.6) -0.663 (8.1)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (gradual) 0.643 (4.0) 0.677 (3.6) 0.887 (7.7) 1.335 (7.1)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.122 (0.6) 0.087 (0.4) -0.238 (2.2) 0.008 (0.1)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect -0.057 (0.9) 0.134 (1.7) -0.403 (4.4) -0.200 (2.8)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (gradual) -0.282 (2.0) -0.245 (1.5) -0.061 (0.5) -0.077 (0.6)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.078 (0.6) -0.698 (6.0) 0.514 (2.2) -0.240 (1.2)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect -0.327 (4.5) -0.582 (7.4) 0.273 (2.6) -0.238 (2.7)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual) 0.267 (1.0) -0.757 (2.6) 0.526 (1.2) -0.309 (0.9)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.298 (1.7) -0.228 (1.8) -0.020 (0.1) -0.148 (0.7)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect -0.551 (6.7) -0.074 (0.8) 0.031 (0.3) 0.021 (0.2)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual) -0.730 (2.5) -0.870 (3.8) -0.144 (0.4) -0.630 (2.5)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 1.622 (13.6) 1.951 (13.3) 0.948 (5.5) 1.250 (7.6) 1.171 (14.0) 1.229 (13.9) 1.243 (11.0) 1.416 (11.0)


Year dummies



R-squared:

Export Import

BEC 41 BEC 42 BEC 41 BEC 42

Capital goods (except transport

equipment)

Parts and accessories of capital

goods

Capital goods (except transport

equipment)Parts and accessories of capital goods

yes yes yes yes

50 50

yes yes

0.80571775 0.75042227 0.74784124 0.7259034 0.79905335 0.77685474

31,850 31,850

0.73589233 0.61690567

31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850 31,850

36.9% 35.4% 35.4%20.6% 20.6% 23.0% 23.0% 36.9%

50 50 50 50 50 50

yes yes

Chapter 2

53

Table 2.3.2: Estimation Result for BEC 51 & 53

Note: Figures in parentheses are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficient of trade creation effect. Cells coloured blue are significant and negative coefficients of trade diversion effect.

ln (GDP) i 1.348 (23.3) 1.116 (32.0) 1.145 (49.9) 1.004 (49.6) 0.523 (10.1) 0.714 (11.6) 0.556 (22.2) 0.654 (23.4)

ln (GDP) j 0.932 (36.5) 0.935 (35.3) 0.963 (65.2) 0.969 (60.2) 1.006 (30.9) 0.989 (28.3) 1.156 (73.4) 1.144 (80.0)

ln (GDP per capita) i 0.506 (15.7) 0.735 (24.0) 0.200 (12.5) 0.150 (10.6) 0.573 (10.4) 0.168 (2.8) 0.190 (7.9) 0.000 (0.0)

ln (GDP per capita) j 0.090 (3.3) 0.105 (3.9) -0.150 (10.3) -0.138 (9.4) 0.503 (13.3) 0.485 (11.4) 0.170 (9.5) 0.200 (9.8)

ln (Distance) ij 0.261 (5.5) 0.112 (2.4) -0.324 (11.9) -0.369 (12.3) -0.451 (7.7) -0.381 (5.3) -0.850 (25.9) -0.826 (20.8)

ASEAN-China FTA (0/1 dummy) -1.766 (8.7) 0.754 (6.6) -0.785 (3.1) 0.878 (8.9)

ASEAN-China FTA Diversion Effect -1.385 (13.1) 0.520 (10.2) 1.379 (9.2) 0.825 (10.4)

ASEAN-China FTA (gradual) -1.325 (5.5) 0.472 (3.8) -2.381 (8.0) 0.290 (2.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.693 (8.4) 0.885 (6.7) -0.149 (0.7) -0.050 (0.3)

ASEAN-Korea FTA Diversion Effect 1.602 (12.7) 0.846 (12.2) -1.395 (8.2) -0.593 (8.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA (gradual) 1.150 (5.0) 0.461 (2.8) 0.126 (0.5) 0.575 (3.3)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (0/1 dummy) 0.318 (1.4) 0.221 (1.4) -0.332 (1.3) -0.037 (0.3)

ASEAN-Japan FTA Diversion Effect 0.305 (2.6) 0.223 (4.1) -1.222 (5.3) -0.282 (4.7)

ASEAN-Japan FTA (gradual) 0.056 (0.2) 0.015 (0.1) -1.129 (3.5) 0.243 (1.7)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (0/1 dummy) -0.122 (0.2) -0.154 (1.5) 0.134 (0.3) -0.026 (0.1)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA Diversion Effect -0.940 (5.9) -0.454 (6.6) 0.342 (1.5) 0.097 (1.3)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (gradual) 0.582 (0.6) 0.261 (0.8) -1.108 (1.1) -0.379 (0.8)

ASEAN-India FTA (0/1 dummy) 1.500 (3.3) 0.435 (2.0) 0.802 (2.5) 1.009 (3.5)

ASEAN-India FTA Diversion Effect 0.818 (5.4) -0.061 (0.9) -0.545 (2.6) 0.181 (2.1)

ASEAN-India FTA (gradual) 1.553 (2.6) 0.618 (1.7) -0.118 (0.2) 1.346 (2.9)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 4.326 (21.1) 3.678 (16.6) 2.687 (26.0) 2.896 (25.5) 2.944 (11.3) 2.601 (9.5) 1.905 (14.1) 2.165 (16.7)


Year dummies



R-squared:

yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

31,847 31,847 31,850 31,850 31,770 31,770 31,850 31,850

37 50 5049 49 50 50 37

0.74196991

57.6% 57.6% 27.6% 27.6% 81.0% 81.0% 53.3% 53.3%

0.846787470.84825484 0.84745222 0.86587021 0.36570108 0.18226791 0.78942384

Parts and accessories of transport

equipment

Export

BEC 51 BEC 53

Import

BEC 51 BEC 53

Transport equipment, passenger

motor cars

Parts and accessories of transport

equipment

Transport equipment, passenger

motor cars


54

Table 2.4.1: Estimation Result on Exports by Country and Sector, ASEAN Members

BEC01: Food and Beverages

ln (GDP) 0.6686 (8.3) 0.9479 (34.8) 0.6636 (20.1) 1.1155 (34.7) 0.5549 (21.0) 0.8083 (29.9) 0.8617 (41.6) 0.9480 (10.2) 0.8769 (14.9) 1.1185 (16.0)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.2264 (3.3) -0.3359 (12.3) -0.2091 (8.0) 0.2970 (9.0) -0.0019 (0.1) -0.0721 (2.4) -0.0906 (3.0) -0.7000 (4.9) 0.0909 (1.4) -0.5536 (7.6)

ln (Distance) -0.6750 (5.2) -1.2626 (16.8) -1.1796 (17.6) -1.0808 (20.8) -1.0732 (13.5) -0.5895 (6.5) -0.5498 (7.5) 0.5474 (1.9) -1.1720 (7.4) -1.5224 (16.1)

ASEAN-China FTA -0.0457 (0.1) -0.7192 (5.6) 0.5393 (3.7) -1.5374 (9.2) 1.0179 (7.2) -0.3409 (2.3) -0.1354 (0.8) -0.3945 (0.4) -0.0176 (0.1) -1.0514 (3.8)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -2.9449 (5.2) -0.9526 (11.6) -0.2334 (2.4) -0.2511 (1.9) 0.3502 (3.5) -0.3337 (2.8) 0.3656 (4.4) 0.2372 (0.4) -2.8186 (6.3) 0.0918 (0.3)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -2.9294 (5.5) 0.0496 (0.6) 0.0136 (0.1) -0.1691 (2.2) 0.1336 (1.4) 0.0482 (0.3) 2.7148 (2.4) 0.1426 (0.4) 0.4382 (2.3)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.7349 (5.0) -0.8702 (10.7) 0.6448 (6.1) -0.2312 (1.0) 0.4307 (3.1) 0.0744 (1.0) 0.2621 (3.6) 0.2169 (0.9) 1.0211 (5.2)

ASEAN-India FTA -2.8745 (4.8) -0.5812 (3.2) -1.0586 (6.4) -3.4444 (23.7) 0.8307 (4.1) -2.5055 (6.2) -1.5639 (13.3) -4.2592 (3.6) 0.6144 (2.6)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 0.6793 (1.6) -0.2671 (1.7) -0.6614 (4.0) 1.4407 (12.6) 0.6380 (2.7) 0.8352 (5.7) 0.7281 (3.6) 1.3529 (2.0) 0.6001 (2.5) -0.2871 (1.7)


Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC02: Industrial supplies

ln (GDP) 1.3914 (7.9) 0.9851 (56.1) 0.8658 (68.8) 1.0487 (37.4) 0.9029 (29.0) 0.8558 (41.5) 0.9495 (29.4) 0.8961 (6.1) 1.6835 (11.2) 1.2026 (18.3)

ln (GDP per capita) 2.8508 (11.7) -0.1092 (5.6) -0.0813 (4.9) 0.1990 (5.6) 0.0296 (0.8) 0.1211 (4.0) -0.0022 (0.1) 0.1138 (0.5) -0.0501 (0.8) -0.3897 (5.6)

ln (Distance) -6.3895 (10.6) -1.6309 (32.3) -1.2735 (28.3) -1.3015 (23.2) -1.1397 (14.4) -1.7380 (19.5) -1.6771 (20.7) -0.9989 (1.4) -3.4413 (15.4) -1.9785 (17.7)

ASEAN-China FTA 3.3892 (5.4) -0.4894 (5.2) 0.2165 (3.2) -0.5090 (3.7) 0.2982 (2.1) 0.1703 (1.8) -0.1072 (0.7) 0.5202 (0.3) 1.3838 (5.3) 0.9908 (3.7)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -0.6666 (1.4) 0.3796 (5.4) 0.4196 (7.0) 0.3857 (3.0) 0.1991 (1.4) -0.5251 (5.1) 0.3070 (3.0) 1.4750 (1.6) 1.3769 (2.7) -0.4091 (2.5)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -2.8871 (3.8) -0.0503 (0.7) 0.2644 (2.0) -0.0773 (0.9) -0.0909 (1.1) 0.2854 (2.2) 3.9135 (8.1) -0.7060 (2.2) -1.0858 (5.8)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 0.5072 (0.6) 0.3035 (3.1) 1.0317 (9.1) -0.0034 (0.0) -0.1435 (1.3) -0.1967 (0.8) -0.2143 (2.0) -1.8591 (2.9) 4.3489 (5.6) -1.2978 (3.6)

ASEAN-India FTA 6.9892 (6.1) 0.2548 (2.5) 0.1671 (2.0) -0.8837 (3.6) 0.0634 (0.6) -0.2801 (3.2) -0.6405 (5.3) -0.1774 (0.1) 1.5243 (4.8) 0.8002 (3.0)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) -3.2878 (14.8) -0.2707 (3.1) -0.1197 (1.0) 1.2656 (11.3) 0.5353 (2.4) -0.1335 (0.9) -0.6274 (3.8) 1.8566 (1.1) 1.4314 (4.5) -0.0618 (0.3)


Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC03: Fuels and lubricants

ln (GDP) - 1.4090 (28.0) 1.1289 (20.8) 0.8434 (12.4) 0.6706 (15.9) 0.9520 (12.88) 0.9364 (13.4) 1.2829 (12.1) - -

ln (GDP per capita) - 0.0726 (1.4) -0.2002 (5.3) 0.7047 (8.7) -0.1454 (2.2) 0.3919 (7.86) 0.3453 (4.6) -0.0317 (0.5) - -

ln (Distance) - -3.3337 (20.9) -2.2195 (23.9) -1.8088 (12.8) -1.9461 (13.3) -2.1406 (13.54) -1.7889 (13.5) -2.5548 (15.8) - -

ASEAN-China FTA - -0.8620 (5.3) -1.5053 (6.8) 1.1472 (3.5) -0.4597 (1.9) 0.9770 (3.15) 0.8397 (2.8) -1.7497 (5.7) - -

ASEAN-Korea FTA - 1.5708 (14.3) 1.7099 (12.9) 1.9585 (6.5) 1.2457 (3.8) 0.5513 (2.89) 0.8820 (2.6) 1.5252 (6.8) - -

ASEAN-Japan FTA - 0.6412 (4.3) 0.6151 (1.4) -0.8310 (2.8) -0.9269 (4.73) 0.4907 (1.1) 0.5938 (1.7) - -

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA - 0.3681 (3.3) 3.0061 (23.2) -0.5353 (1.6) -0.0623 (0.4) -1.0556 (2.78) 3.0012 (12.1) 2.6305 (9.4) - -

ASEAN-India FTA - 0.4502 (2.3) -0.1425 (0.9) 0.8097 (2.3) -0.4185 (1.2) -1.6559 (2.24) -0.8803 (1.9) 0.9334 (3.6) - -

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) - -2.3332 (6.3) -1.3979 (5.8) 2.8451 (11.1) -1.5464 (3.3) 1.8450 (8.25) 0.4304 (1.5) -0.5720 (2.0) - -


Year dummies



R-squared:

92.7% 96.9% 96.7%

0.90474841 0.99930309

1 1 0

yes yes yes

2,450 2,269 2,450

2,275 2,450

79.6% 63.5%

0.96367756 0.89039123

Brunei Lao PDR Myanmar

Lao PDR

1

yes

2,273

88.3%

0.6201776

Myanmar

0

yes

2,450

65.0%

0.82970093

Lao PDR Myanmar

1 0

yes yes

Brunei

1

yes

2,450

74.7%

0.41997463

2,446

89.0%

0.1268614

Brunei

1

yes

0.533851670.9784002 0.93712486 0.92563858 0.71715409 0.7490195 0.81671699

2,450

99.2% 60.2% 62.3% 79.3% 47.3% 55.5% 71.3%

1,905 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450

yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

0 1 5 1 12 4

Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam

22.0%

0.95039843 0.93936019 0.92031715 0.94719358 0.8622208 0.90669738 0.92598662

73.3% 2.9% 7.5% 26.5% 21.1% 2.7%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Viet Nam

0 1 5 1 12 4 1

Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand

22.7%

0.843574750.90831245 0.88861804 0.831708690.30262425 0.84151169 0.84615264

82.2% 10.9% 9.2%

Viet Nam

1

yes

2,4502,450 2,450 2,450

31.7% 24.6% 4.8%

1 12 4

yes yes yes

ThailandCambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore

2,450 2,450 2,450

yes yes yes

0 1 5

Chapter 2

55

Table 2.4.1 (Continued): Estimation Results on Exports by Country and Sector, ASEAN Members

Note: Figures in parenthesis are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect. Data for Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar is constructed by their trade partners on the assumption that exports of Brunei to county j equals imports of country j from Brunei. Estimation results are omitted when more than 90% of all samples arezero. trade.

BEC04: Capital goods and parts &

accessories

ln (GDP) 0.6771 (3.0) 0.9349 (38.5) 1.0511 (25.9) 0.8950 (19.1) 0.8389 (20.8) 0.9562 (34.0) 0.8871 (19.6) 0.6271 (10.0) 0.6366 (14.4) 0.7750 (11.5)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.0697 (0.5) 0.3958 (12.1) 0.3235 (11.0) 0.7166 (15.1) 0.2571 (6.8) 0.4293 (13.4) 0.2674 (5.6) 0.7722 (6.5) 0.1787 (2.4) 0.7447 (6.1)

ln (Distance) -1.2065 (3.6) -1.5703 (16.9) -1.2754 (8.5) -1.3810 (11.7) -1.7428 (8.9) -1.6342 (12.9) -1.2589 (21.5) -1.0309 -(2.5) -1.3921 (8.0) -1.6804 (6.5)

ASEAN-China FTA 0.2121 (0.3) -0.2197 (1.3) 0.5185 (2.3) 0.9042 (3.6) 0.3812 (2.1) 0.2355 (1.3) -0.5823 (3.5) -1.7450 (2.0) -0.9414 (2.9) 2.7147 (7.8)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 0.3775 (0.7) -0.3010 (2.7) -0.4911 (2.7) -0.2856 (1.6) 0.2780 (1.8) -0.8538 (6.2) -1.0771 (10.8) -1.6068 (2.1) -3.7992 (9.5) -1.8777 (3.9)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -0.9487 (1.3) 0.2041 (1.5) 0.0784 (0.5) 0.2322 (2.0) -0.0621 (0.6) 0.1755 (1.1) -0.4174 (0.5) -3.9860 (7.7) 0.4914 (1.9)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.2614 (0.4) 0.2979 (2.0) -0.0781 (0.5) -1.7262 (10.3) 0.1266 (0.9) 0.1313 (1.4) -0.1386 (1.1) 0.0014 (0.0) 1.9817 (3.7) -2.9068 (4.3)

ASEAN-India FTA -1.2410 (1.0) 0.3233 (1.8) -0.0995 (0.4) 0.7564 (3.7) -0.1366 (0.9) -0.2299 (1.5) 0.1432 (0.8) 0.6711 (1.3) 0.8580 (3.6) 3.5854 (5.4)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 1.5740 (2.7) 0.9293 (3.8) 0.2213 (0.4) 1.7540 (9.4) -1.1766 (1.9) 0.4347 (1.9) -0.2304 (1.2) 2.5928 (4.6) 0.1560 (0.6) 1.9472 (3.5)


Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC05:Transport equipment, and parts &

accessories

ln (GDP) 0.8902 (9.1) 0.8471 (37.4) 0.8901 (50.1) 0.9149 (12.3) 0.8519 (21.8) 0.6801 (51.1) 0.7363 (15.1) 0.7390 (6.5) - 0.7674 (9.1)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.4154 (3.6) -0.0485 (1.8) 0.1439 (6.9) 0.1402 (3.3) 0.0490 (1.1) -0.0643 (3.2) -0.0253 (0.6) 0.1365 (0.7) - 0.0751 (0.3)

ln (Distance) -1.1121 (5.8) -0.7609 (8.0) -1.0004 (16.7) -0.8174 (7.8) -1.0411 (8.8) -0.1644 (2.7) -0.4320 (3.0) -1.8439 (3.6) - -0.8220 (4.3)

ASEAN-China FTA -3.8268 (6.9) -1.9018 (8.3) -0.5006 (4.1) -1.5603 (6.1) -0.0128 (0.1) -1.2098 (9.5) -0.5253 (1.8) -5.3888 (4.4) - -4.6025 (3.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -3.4728 (6.8) -1.5175 (4.8) -1.4417 (8.2) -2.8536 (6.9) 0.7195 (4.6) -1.0072 (6.0) 1.5490 (4.9) -0.0160 (0.0) - 0.5826 (1.3)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -3.5315 (8.5) -0.1464 (1.3) 0.4623 (1.2) 0.0082 (0.1) 0.0162 (0.2) 1.8348 (8.1) -5.7775 (8.8) - -2.7544 (3.5)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.4570 (4.1) 0.4003 (1.7) 0.7197 (9.9) 0.8688 (1.6) -0.0931 (0.9) 0.0507 (0.6) -0.6460 (4.6) 0.2371 (0.5) - -0.7925 (0.9)

ASEAN-India FTA -3.9377 (5.5) -1.3130 (7.2) -0.7278 (5.4) 0.1277 (0.6) -0.4874 (2.4) 0.1610 (1.5) 0.3736 (1.8) -4.6780 (4.6) - 2.0056 (1.9)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 0.5176 (1.1) 1.9064 (7.8) 0.8844 (5.1) 2.0301 (7.9) 0.4191 (1.3) 2.2837 (18.2) 1.4637 (4.8) -1.0524 (1.0) - 1.4350 (2.3)


Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC06: Consumption goods

ln (GDP) 1.0304 (27.9) 0.9644 (41.3) 0.8839 (29.2) 1.2811 (30.2) 0.7380 (25.0) 0.9971 (45.5) 1.0517 (36.4) 1.2380 (20.1) 0.7558 (16.8) 0.9318 (18.3)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.9600 (15.4) 0.2905 (10.1) 0.3716 (14.8) 0.4110 (9.5) 0.2428 (7.0) 0.2607 (10.0) 0.3737 (7.1) 2.6618 (18.0) 0.9472 (15.4) 0.7175 (13.6)

ln (Distance) 1.4408 (7.6) -0.0031 (0.0) -0.7699 (9.7) 0.0761 (0.9) -1.0874 (8.7) -0.6265 (6.6) -0.0210 (0.3) 1.4312 (4.4) -0.1799 (1.1) -0.2923 (1.4)

ASEAN-China FTA 2.0771 (4.9) -1.0252 (7.6) -1.0709 (6.9) -0.6877 (3.4) 0.7597 (5.4) -1.5995 (12.2) -0.5735 (3.0) 2.9821 (3.7) -0.0662 (0.2) 1.5008 (2.9)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 0.8763 (2.9) 0.1350 (1.1) -1.0151 (8.0) 0.7504 (3.6) 0.2615 (1.5) -1.1341 (8.8) 0.6441 (3.5) -1.0021 (1.6) -2.3602 (6.7) 2.9798 (10.0)

ASEAN-Japan FTA 0.3322 (1.4) 0.4350 (3.5) 0.8782 (2.8) 0.1576 (1.3) 0.3362 (4.1) -0.2943 (2.7) -1.3549 (1.7) -0.2992 (1.0) 2.1476 (8.7)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.2371 (1.3) 0.3134 (3.4) 0.8492 (6.3) 0.8059 (4.4) 0.0847 (0.8) 0.4165 (4.7) -0.3166 (3.7) 0.7225 (1.2) -2.0877 (4.6) -1.1659 (5.7)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.8385 (2.1) -0.4693 (2.5) 0.5424 (2.6) 0.4145 (1.0) -0.2993 (1.7) -0.0248 (0.2) -0.6338 (2.7) 4.8583 (4.4) -3.0253 (6.2) -0.4962 (0.9)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 3.7744 (9.1) -0.3760 -(3.9) 0.8713 (2.8) 3.0293 (16.0) 0.3290 (0.9) 1.3448 (7.0) 0.9375 (5.3) 10.056 (12.6) -0.0696 (0.2) 1.3503 (3.6)


Year dummies



R-squared:

66.2% 61.3% 54.5%

0.34220445 0.79470857

1 1 0

yes yes yes

2,450 2,275 2,450

Brunei Lao PDR Myanmar

91.1% 88.2%

0.05394567 0.77364371 0.06512226

0.93579014

Myanmar

1 1 0

yes yes yes

2,446 2,271 2,450

83.9%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450

yes yes yes

17.9%

0.93528627 0.95054187 0.79293149 0.94551043 0.78150707 0.89704051 0.96313287

45.6% 2.5% 5.2% 20.4% 21.1% 2.3%

yes yes yes

Viet Nam

0 1 5 1 12 4 1


40.0%

0.223599 0.79182297 0.87384604 0.48939719 0.76519778 0.89701373 0.80722261

78.2% 17.6% 24.7% 48.1% 24.7% 7.3%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Viet Nam

0 1 5 1 12 4 1


38.8%

0.30690291 0.90244406 0.77189676 0.653723 0.71119098 0.81167006 0.74446363

80.4% 12.5% 9.6% 23.7% 20.2% 4.7%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Viet Nam

0 1 5 1 12 4

Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Brunei Lao PDR Myanmar

1 1 0

yes yes yes

2,450 2,275 2,450

72.6% 79.8% 73.8%

0.79105311 0.9868524 0.55626383

Brunei Lao PDR


56

Table 2.4.2: Estimation Result on Exports by Country and Sector, 6 Dialogue Countries

Note: Figures in parenthesis are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect.


ln (GDP) 0.7209 (44.6) 0.8814 (36.4) 0.6749 (20.6) 0.6772 (9.4) 0.7080 (23.8) 0.6942 (53.0)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.2021 (7.6) -0.0491 (1.3) -0.0888 (2.1) 0.4152 (5.8) 0.3229 (10.8) 0.0728 (2.6)

ln (Distance) -2.5933 (33.6) -0.8984 (27.8) -1.4652 (10.7) -1.3528 (15.1) -1.1889 (25.0) -1.4194 (17.8)

ASEAN-China FTA 1.1596 (10.7)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 1.6145 (11.5)

ASEAN-Japan FTA 0.3317 (1.3)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 0.4896 (4.7) 0.7331 (4.8)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.8689 (2.9)


Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 1.2301 (34.6) 0.8078 (41.9) 0.8495 (31.2) 0.8433 (31.9) 0.7451 (22.0) 0.9509 (64.3)

ln (GDP per capita) -0.3035 (6.7) -0.2286 (12.4) -0.0446 (1.0) 0.0393 (1.7) -0.2696 (7.0) 0.0194 (0.8)

ln (Distance) -2.8647 (17.0) -0.5665 (14.1) -1.4916 (9.2) -1.4093 (43.9) -0.8454 (16.4) -3.0134 (45.9)




ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.7147 (3.6) 0.4582 (3.5)



Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 1.0531 (30.4) 0.5771 (11.2) 0.5179 (11.5) 0.7213 (13.8) 0.7690 (14.0)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.1330 (1.8) 0.0003 (0.0) 0.1221 (1.8) 0.1728 (2.5) 0.0145 (0.3)

ln (Distance) -3.2318 (21.9) -1.0286 (17.1) -1.6121 (7.4) -1.3131 (15.0) -0.9374 (12.2)




ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.6898 (3.5)

ASEAN-India FTA -0.0164 (0.1)


Year dummies



R-squared:


accessories ln (GDP) 0.6169 (26.0) 0.9053 (34.4) 0.7307 (23.9) 0.9263 (29.4) 0.7947 (15.0) 0.8036 (22.3)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.0927 (3.3) 0.0220 (0.7) -0.0552 (1.2) 0.0885 (2.5) -0.1473 (2.4) 0.1858 (4.2)

ln (Distance) -2.2422 (13.5) -0.3115 (6.6) -0.8965 (5.7) -1.0571 (21.3) -0.6640 (8.6) -1.7380 (7.2)




ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.0032 (0.0) -0.3008 (2.1)



Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC05: Transport equipment, and parts &


ln (GDP per capita) 0.3452 (9.9) -0.0546 (1.8) -0.1246 (2.6) 0.0274 (1.1) 0.0694 (1.7) 0.5368 (9.9)

ln (Distance) -1.7308 (9.0) -0.0874 (1.8) -0.6048 (3.4) 0.0378 (0.7) -0.0646 (0.7) -2.6257 (12.8)


ASEAN-Korea FTA -0.3140 (2.0)





Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 0.6189 (22.3) 0.8991 (37.0) 0.8522 (18.6) 0.9568 (25.9) 0.8386 (23.4) 0.6196 (19.3)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.2869 (6.4) 0.0474 (1.6) 0.4110 (5.9) 0.4272 (10.0) 0.0774 (2.7) 0.6877 (20.8)

ln (Distance) -2.0706 (13.2) -0.1954 (5.2) -1.4627 (4.0) -1.0289 (17.2) -0.3562 (8.1) -2.4357 (15.3)




ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 0.0300 (0.2) -0.1135 (1.0)



Year dummies



R-squared:

0.85126539 0.75375171 0.56058901 0.71362389 0.8283565 0.97663155

55.1% 13.2% 40.8% 46.1% 42.5% 80.7%

5 8 9 11 7 7

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

2450 2450 2450 2450 2450 2450

Australia China India Japan Korea New Zealand

0.78654411 0.93211874 0.49992827 0.84388134 0.83930342 0.97993747

12.0% 1.6% 1.9% 4.9% 3.8% 28.9%

5 8 9 11 7 7


2450 2450 2450 2450 2450 2450


0.50594492 0.8402348 0.52332807 0.84255407 0.64699782 0.71266533

18.9% 2.4% 6.9% 0.9% 2.6% 42.7%

5 8 9 11 7 7


2450 2450 2450 2450 2450 2450


0.81307936 0.9402849 0.60981323 0.86388213 0.78464028 0.87061186

4.6% 1.9% 3.1% 1.2% 2.5% 13.9%

5 8 9 11 7 7


2450 2450 2450 2450 2450 2450


0.90245183 0.86958446 0.5856089 0.9390762 0.93179825 0.95765469

7.1% 1.6% 1.9% 2.4% 2.2% 21.7%

5 8 9 11 7 7


2450 2450 2450 2450 2450 2450


0.87531202 0.91977504 0.40045198 0.39748359 0.94619296 0.85473666

15.5% 4.3% 6.9% 36.3% 18.4% 16.0%

5 8 9 11 7 7


2450 2450


2450 2450 2450 2450

Chapter 2

57

Table 2.4.3: Estimation Result on Imports by Country and Sector, ASEAN Members


ln (GDP) 0.978 (23.32) 0.972 (26.56) 0.881 (32.21) 0.901 (18.76) 0.965 (25.23) 0.735 (20.53) 0.774 (21.31) 0.6486 (16.04) 0.8430 (15.41) 1.1891 (17.96)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.347 (8.07) -0.116 (2.03) -0.274 (7.69) -0.108 (1.96) 0.120 (3.12) -0.104 (2.78) -0.092 (2.30) 0.4851 (10.19) 0.7438 (7.00) 0.2168 (3.87)

ln (Distance) -1.320 (16.46) -0.690 (2.79) -0.414 (5.96) -0.274 (2.04) -0.970 (17.20) 0.529 (4.96) -0.298 (2.67) -0.6157 (2.40) -1.8384 (12.02) -1.2775 (14.45)

ASEAN-China FTA 0.474 (2.62) -0.215 (0.82) 0.152 (1.28) -0.115 (0.37) -0.128 (0.77) 1.573 (9.85) 0.240 (1.13) 1.9439 (4.67) 0.7465 (2.32) 1.4863 (5.93)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -0.685 (3.14) -1.568 (5.32) -1.738 (11.77) -0.996 (4.00) 0.132 (0.87) 1.073 (10.37) -0.276 (1.86) -2.0079 (4.41) -2.3445 (5.78) -1.2697 (4.41)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -2.577 (7.03) 0.417 (2.61) 0.074 (0.28) 0.245 (2.50) -0.222 (1.95) -0.852 (4.27) 0.7851 (2.43) -0.7251 (1.26) -4.1323 (5.86)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA 2.113 (15.85) 2.668 (10.20) 2.291 (25.15) 2.612 (8.78) -0.062 (0.58) 0.028 (0.28) 2.511 (20.15) 2.8224 (11.02) 0.7423 (2.29) 3.6654 (15.52)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.966 (2.57) -0.211 (0.71) 0.498 (3.56) 0.238 (1.05) -0.021 (0.20) 0.926 (5.26) 0.220 (1.06) 3.3173 (8.49) 3.1126 (5.81) 1.8077 (4.56)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 2.133 (10.89) 1.343 (2.38) 1.700 (9.98) 2.464 (13.04) 1.048 (6.20) 2.925 (18.98) 1.898 (8.69) 4.4963 (7.65) 2.8642 (9.11) 4.4722 (13.47)


Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 0.847 (8.37) 0.925 (64.08) 0.952 (42.53) 0.855 (49.69) 1.037 (52.79) 0.871 (27.26) 0.839 (38.37) 0.8467 (12.79) 1.0536 (13.95) 1.1331 (12.78)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.548 (6.77) -0.028 (1.51) -0.017 (0.91) 0.086 (3.87) 0.145 (6.69) 0.187 (5.12) 0.042 (1.44) 0.8808 (13.17) -0.0785 (1.41) 0.0148 (0.11)

ln (Distance) -2.598 (18.11) -1.374 (20.46) -1.037 (18.57) -1.104 (22.65) -1.294 (27.85) -1.100 (15.58) -1.269 (19.45) -0.6236 (3.35) -2.1297 (15.14) -1.7196 (21.42)

ASEAN-China FTA 1.563 (3.63) 0.228 (3.72) 0.261 (2.84) 0.017 (0.19) 0.362 (3.84) 0.503 (4.35) 0.914 (8.12) 2.7961 (5.06) 0.7332 (3.69) 2.3350 (5.64)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 0.357 (1.45) 0.964 (14.52) 0.873 (11.76) 0.681 (10.61) 0.083 (1.10) 0.705 (8.30) 1.632 (16.96) 0.2777 (0.45) -0.4849 (2.17) 2.6521 (10.61)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -2.633 (6.60) -0.110 (1.58) -0.081 (0.91) -0.100 (1.50) -0.008 (0.09) 0.170 (1.43) -0.1397 (0.33) -1.1422 (6.79) -0.3404 (1.96)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.938 (4.87) 0.445 (5.29) 1.305 (10.91) 0.984 (14.92) -0.470 (4.18) -0.060 (0.47) 0.685 (7.11) -1.9541 (3.20) 1.1849 (5.12) 0.4984 (1.66)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.257 (0.54) -0.219 (2.50) -0.301 (2.67) -0.157 (1.40) -0.768 (4.92) -0.115 (1.09) 0.333 (2.98) 1.4416 (2.38) -1.3824 (7.14) 0.7585 (1.59)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) -2.223 (7.55) 0.181 (1.17) 0.587 (3.83) 1.385 (15.96) -0.022 (0.13) 0.534 (5.23) 0.130 (1.00) 3.6945 (7.80) 0.6922 (3.76) 1.8326 (6.22)


Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 1.337 (8.11) 0.503 (13.91) 0.527 (14.68) 0.464 (14.20) 0.495 (10.98) 0.37379 (10.58) 0.798 (9.80) 0.5556 (4.14) 1.0484 (13.48)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.809 (4.41) 0.154 (3.60) 0.111 (3.07) 0.298 (5.01) 0.332 (5.14) 0.35586 (5.50) 1.005 (15.73) 0.6577 (5.44) 1.3529 (13.48)

ln (Distance) -3.267 (7.30) -2.209 (19.81) -1.570 (20.14) -0.777 (8.98) -1.209 (10.40) -1.4013 (11.41) -1.828 (10.16) -1.2971 (1.84) -2.2229 (10.96)

ASEAN-China FTA 1.430 (3.19) -0.846 (2.22) -1.585 (5.10) -0.317 (0.86) -0.111 (0.29) -2.7414 (6.80) 3.707 (9.99) 0.4246 (0.31) 4.7901 (10.33)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -0.303 (0.66) 1.112 (4.86) -0.156 (0.33) 0.924 (3.15) 0.902 (3.02) -2.3299 (7.81) 2.657 (11.58) 0.0017 (0.00) 0.8648 (1.24)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -1.325 (3.27) 1.007 (2.37) -0.775 (1.20) 1.869 (3.81) 0.15047 (0.37) -0.006 (0.02) 0.5865 (0.80) -3.2039 (4.92)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.834 (1.89) -1.507 (6.07) 0.859 (4.53) -2.310 (5.10) -0.650 (2.70) 0.09969 (0.28) 1.109 (4.08) -3.8315 (4.32) -2.3323 (4.00)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.824 (0.72) -0.989 (2.40) -1.050 (4.12) -2.979 (4.31) 0.182 (0.82) -2.5238 (5.79) 1.724 (3.21) -2.3158 (1.70) 2.8285 (5.23)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 4.152 (9.08) -0.712 (2.74) -0.456 (1.74) 1.312 (4.98) -0.622 (1.56) -0.7217 (2.22) 2.562 (7.57) 4.2796 (2.71) 5.0131 (7.22)


Year dummies



R-squared:

89.8%

0.9556987 0.83943783 0.86969547 0.15468506 0.42922428 0.06026706 0.91904296 0.62817815 0.99948203 0.90181371

90.1% 70.0% 68.5% 78.2% 58.2% 60.7% 75.1% 90.4% 94.2%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,464

yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes

Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4 1 1 0

Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Viet Nam Brunei Lao PDR

69.3%

0.85071143 0.94659315 0.90915064 0.93278527 0.93994697 0.89644984 0.95770853 0.42658535 0.98223377 0.95312326

57.6% 12.2% 19.6% 34.6% 26.2% 7.2% 26.8% 69.6% 73.2%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,464


Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4 1 1 1 0


79.1%

0.82884537 0.59264545 0.8061224 0.49368441 0.79842532 0.82545592 0.73004075 0.66100177 0.98535043 0.92185047

75.6% 43.4% 36.2% 54.1% 33.0% 27.3% 50.3% 77.3% 83.5%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Viet Nam Brunei Lao PDR Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4


1 1 1 0


58

Table 2.4.3 (Continued): Estimation Result on Imports by Country & Sector, ASEAN Members

Note: Figures in parenthesis are 1-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect. Data for Brunei, Lao PDR, and Myanmar is constructed by their trade partners on the assumption that imports of Brunei from county j equals exports of country j to Brunei. Estimation results are omitted when more than 90% of all samples are zero trade.


accessories

ln (GDP) 0.958 (21.30) 1.079 (37.29) 1.171 (29.78) 1.189 (28.57) 0.982 (19.91) 1.342 (46.22) 1.075 (31.32) 1.0217 (24.31) 1.0566 (10.74) 1.0290 (20.45)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.625 (11.38) 0.279 (6.80) 0.216 (5.08) 0.760 (20.77) 0.329 (3.69) 0.350 (11.38) 0.547 (11.38) 1.2674 (20.38) 0.1283 (1.09) 0.6082 (3.31)

ln (Distance) -2.013 (20.85) -1.593 (15.31) -1.131 (8.79) -1.262 (14.17) -1.044 (7.08) -1.924 (26.10) -1.688 (17.54) -0.2645 (1.39) -1.5319 (9.82) -1.6514 (16.49)

ASEAN-China FTA 2.127 (10.47) 1.258 (9.13) 0.978 (4.53) 0.668 (3.71) 1.753 (4.59) 0.717 (6.60) 1.944 (10.53) 4.4335 (10.78) 2.0093 (4.21) 3.4592 (6.46)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 0.256 (1.76) 0.662 (6.49) 1.014 (7.43) 0.633 (4.04) 0.273 (2.82) 0.570 (7.19) 1.873 (9.17) 1.1574 (2.28) -0.4944 (2.27) 1.5100 (7.45)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -0.219 (1.28) 0.169 (1.76) 0.124 (1.20) 0.104 (1.44) 0.225 (3.42) 0.439 (2.48) -0.6970 (1.66) -0.3774 (1.20) 0.0809 (0.42)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -0.718 (2.16) -0.809 (4.56) -1.104 (8.31) -1.299 (6.60) 0.450 (3.64) 0.107 (1.14) -1.159 (4.68) 0.4234 (1.67) 1.6233 (8.83) -1.7207 (8.63)

ASEAN-India FTA 1.092 (3.35) 0.008 (0.05) -1.180 (4.75) 0.738 (3.56) -0.254 (1.71) -1.014 (7.66) 0.092 (0.38) 7.8869 (11.17) -0.9652 (1.62) 1.8945 (2.66)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) -0.010 (0.05) 0.510 (2.00) 0.871 (2.21) 2.810 (15.64) 1.568 (3.04) 1.318 (11.51) 0.470 (2.09) 6.0399 (15.17) 0.2301 (0.68) 2.2586 (5.26)


Year dummies



R-squared:

BEC05:Transport equipment, and parts &

accessories

ln (GDP) 1.955 (16.60) 1.354 (21.06) 1.266 (22.23) 1.325 (23.87) 1.532 (48.52) 1.390 (18.93) 1.116 (20.06) 1.2883 (17.88) 1.2831 (15.56) 1.2558 (13.45)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.388 (4.45) -0.019 (0.32) 0.041 (0.84) 0.074 (1.56) 0.623 (14.53) 0.157 (2.69) 0.025 (0.51) 0.7756 (12.28) -0.0435 (0.49) 0.1816 (1.19)

ln (Distance) -2.422 (16.33) -0.780 (3.05) -0.753 (4.15) -1.519 (13.43) -0.974 (9.53) -1.475 (6.47) -1.384 (11.78) -1.7741 (8.43) -1.8025 (9.77) -2.0885 (18.20)

ASEAN-China FTA -0.519 (1.28) -0.288 (0.87) -0.379 (1.37) -1.895 (8.88) 0.472 (2.51) -0.947 (3.46) -0.239 (1.00) 0.7086 (2.43) 0.3887 (1.40) 2.2499 (4.93)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 2.075 (9.16) 0.190 (0.78) 0.594 (2.32) 0.053 (0.33) 0.870 (3.93) -0.035 (0.17) 1.395 (8.02) 2.1285 (4.30) 2.2589 (9.05) 0.8065 (3.21)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -0.124 (0.54) 0.057 (0.26) -0.037 (0.12) -0.582 (4.42) -0.120 (0.72) -0.135 (0.77) -0.7463 (2.32) 0.1530 (0.54) 1.8768 (6.06)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.518 (4.65) -0.732 (2.61) -1.384 (4.57) -1.809 (6.39) -0.386 (3.82) -0.536 (2.39) -3.372 (11.71) -2.6774 (11.42) -1.6634 (4.24) -2.0706 (3.74)

ASEAN-India FTA -0.797 (1.70) 0.167 (0.51) -1.864 (5.90) 0.461 (1.89) 0.229 (0.83) -0.476 (1.99) -1.325 (5.46) 2.1011 (5.86) -0.9952 (1.80) -0.1339 (0.25)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 1.446 (3.06) 3.002 (5.22) 1.747 (3.41) 2.618 (12.74) 1.418 (4.12) 1.256 (3.90) 0.279 (1.28) 2.3513 (6.94) -0.0780 (0.29) 1.1986 (3.55)


Year dummies



R-squared:


ln (GDP) 0.876 (13.11) 1.081 (28.78) 1.033 (35.40) 0.875 (28.43) 1.107 (26.11) 1.120 (35.48) 1.010 (34.23) 0.8554 (15.66) 0.9661 (9.78) 1.0729 (12.53)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.101 (0.79) -0.050 (1.08) 0.024 (0.67) 0.243 (8.84) 0.195 (4.54) 0.438 (11.69) 0.245 (6.05) 0.9887 (14.86) 0.1873 (1.69) 0.0876 (0.68)

ln (Distance) -1.197 (4.46) -1.408 (9.26) -1.221 (11.33) -1.312 (16.54) -1.722 (18.37) -1.647 (23.33) -1.709 (21.51) -0.1725 (0.73) -1.9929 (14.85) -1.8548 (24.47)

ASEAN-China FTA 0.521 (2.50) 1.045 (5.06) 0.622 (3.59) 0.368 (2.38) 0.611 (3.21) 0.960 (6.11) 0.398 (2.70) 5.8854 (15.15) 2.7047 (6.11) 1.9287 (4.42)

ASEAN-Korea FTA 0.309 (1.10) 0.538 (4.06) -0.313 (2.59) -0.960 (8.83) -0.148 (1.48) -0.578 (7.64) 0.820 (8.51) -0.7027 (2.35) 0.4509 (1.65) 1.4044 (10.39)

ASEAN-Japan FTA -1.468 (2.23) -0.507 (3.19) -0.005 (0.05) -0.052 (0.69) 0.127 (1.32) -0.205 (1.43) 0.1100 (0.21) -1.4246 (6.06) -1.6239 (9.74)

ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA -1.329 (5.54) -0.450 (3.08) 0.252 (1.90) 0.278 (2.94) 0.092 (0.92) -0.213 (1.50) -0.364 (3.90) -0.3502 (1.23) 1.6096 (7.82) -0.8907 (2.81)

ASEAN-India FTA 0.488 (1.82) -1.154 (5.17) -1.110 (5.36) 0.792 (7.95) -0.051 (0.50) -0.140 (0.82) 0.644 (4.39) 2.2675 (6.30) 0.3029 (0.61) 1.3489 (2.73)

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 1.030 (1.46) 1.263 (3.35) 0.319 (0.99) 1.803 (15.76) -0.681 (2.36) 1.348 (11.21) -0.006 (0.03) 5.3310 (11.28) 1.4111 (4.37) 1.5908 (5.61)


Year dummies



R-squared: 0.89515825 0.85932816 0.92207952

65.6% 35.0% 40.1% 42.3% 28.7% 16.0%

0.94402684

49.3% 71.3% 75.8% 73.3%

0.46235331 0.93749042 0.87914009 0.8409638 0.87933307 0.95155658

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4 1 1 1 0


81.9%

0.74618528 0.74126625 0.63366567 0.66562333 0.95120533 0.90708701 0.70172803 0.64089689 0.95911289 0.8829668

80.8% 48.1% 54.7% 61.6% 43.8% 41.4% 65.4% 80.6% 83.3%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4 1 1 1 0


73.7%

0.88364588 0.9655577 0.92370551 0.86186802 0.93097417 0.97842248 0.96165508 0.84561952 0.88815037 0.93976944

67.9% 10.1% 27.4% 38.4% 26.3% 15.2% 44.8% 72.4% 76.2%

yes

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


Myanmar

0 1 5 1 12 4 1 1 1 0


Chapter 2

59

Table 2.4.4: Estimation Result on Imports by Country and Sector, 6 Dialogue Countries

Note: Figures in parenthesis are z-values. Cells coloured orange are significantly positive coefficients of trade creation effect.


ln (GDP) 0.691 (30.12) 0.982 (25.61) 0.710 (24.75) 0.899 (44.89) 0.949 (28.04) 0.681 (26.27)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.056 (1.42) -0.259 (3.75) -0.531 (9.80) -0.118 (3.59) -0.218 (3.76) 0.070 (2.32)

ln (Distance) -0.743 (4.46) 2.415 (8.04) 0.615 (4.16) -0.400 (9.89) -0.141 (2.49) -1.343 (7.63)






Number of other FTAs dummiesYear dummiesNumber of observations% of zero trade flowsR-squared:


ln (GDP) 0.799 (21.89) 0.813 (34.65) 0.732 (18.43) 0.893 (55.76) 0.910 (53.32) 0.821 (41.00)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.031 (0.75) -0.114 (2.72) 0.177 (2.54) -0.142 (4.67) -0.019 (0.76) 0.039 (0.97)

ln (Distance) -2.108 (10.71) -0.707 (17.76) -1.379 (8.49) -0.532 (12.77) -0.672 (23.98) -1.026 (7.11)



ASEAN-Japan FTA -0.020 (0.20)





ln (GDP) 0.493 (17.00) 0.484 (14.96) 0.603 (12.43) 0.326 (8.76) 0.353 (9.49) 0.301 (6.52)

ln (GDP per capita) 0.050 (0.70) -0.240 (4.76) -0.154 (2.06) 0.397 (5.15) 0.375 (4.69) 0.622 (5.12)

ln (Distance) -2.770 (19.22) -0.384 (5.04) -2.002 (7.88) -0.577 (8.10) -0.167 (1.84) -1.681 (12.52)

ASEAN-China FTA -0.203 (1.08)






BEC04: Capital goods and parts & accessories

ln (GDP) 1.122 (24.23) 0.843 (34.42) 1.339 (37.25) 1.199 (34.63) 1.063 (28.45) 0.938 (23.08)

ln (GDP per capita) -0.059 (0.98) 0.447 (9.05) -0.210 (5.04) -0.152 (5.35) 0.049 (1.72) 0.178 (1.97)

ln (Distance) -1.362 (8.09) -1.240 (28.85) -1.826 (16.31) -1.232 (33.13) -0.869 (25.84) -1.054 (7.87)



ASEAN-Japan FTA -0.069 (0.88)



Number of other FTAs dummiesYear dummiesNumber of observations% of zero trade flowsR-squared: BEC05: Transport equipment, and parts &


ln (GDP per capita) 0.519 (24.32) 0.497 (8.15) 0.040 (0.76) 0.104 (2.89) 0.168 (7.24) 0.750 (18.81)

ln (Distance) -1.905 (18.94) -0.649 (11.39) -0.981 (6.50) -0.459 (10.14) -0.516 (19.16) -2.334 (14.69)

ASEAN-China FTA -0.318 (2.10)

ASEAN-Korea FTA -0.006 (0.03)






ln (GDP) 1.165 (24.15) 0.754 (27.68) 1.176 (20.54) 1.213 (38.03) 1.105 (41.78) 1.077 (18.21)

ln (GDP per capita) -0.318 (4.59) 0.664 (11.38) -0.053 (0.58) -0.405 (8.82) -0.269 (7.03) -0.406 (4.76)

ln (Distance) -1.052 (5.05) -0.614 (15.33) -2.101 (5.83) -1.096 (16.05) -0.756 (18.61) -0.757 (3.38)









25.0% 25.8% 36.9% 13.6% 22.9% 34.5%2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450

2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

0.70187705 0.7203842 0.408931 0.84253917 0.93480716 0.9513606215.6% 7.4% 7.4% 10.5% 8.7% 22.9%



65.0% 49.4% 54.2% 59.9% 51.3% 70.1%2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


0.77959557 0.86982635 0.87630687 0.95525228 0.93441774 0.8886437316.5% 15.6% 21.9% 21.0% 11.4% 26.2%



38.6% 41.7% 43.3% 47.6% 36.4% 42.7%2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450 2,450


0.73215405 0.78740942 0.66374595 0.96041945 0.9098462 0.8721648814.2% 21.6% 28.6% 17.4% 15.3% 20.0%

5 8 8 11 7 7

5 8 8 11 7 7


0.82845877 0.776735 0.44539861 0.79884217 0.73652936 0.97039159

5 8 8 11 7 7

5 8 8 11 7 7


0.66125968 0.09532459 0.26986448 0.10346014 0.08633746 0.52672556

5 8 8 11 7 7

5 8 8 11 7 7


0.95595158 0.68925999 0.73396825 0.8705487 0.86588838 0.86647853


60

5. Conclusion

By estimating the impact of ASEAN+1 FTAs using sectoral trade data in 2002–

2013, we found several characteristics of these regional FTAs. The results indicate that

five ASEAN+1 FTAs have a positive impact on regional trade in many sectors even

during their early phase. This trade creation effect seems to be based on existing

production and sales networks in East Asia. Our results on ACFTA and AKFTA suggest

a regional FTA stimulates intra-regional trade by developing production and sales

networks in the region. Moreover, ACFTA, AKFTA, and AIFTA have the potential to

boost trade in industrial supplies and capital goods of emerging ASEAN members. A

region-wide FTA in this region can take the role of expanding the existing production

and sales networks to newer developing members.

Trade creation effects under AJCEP cannot be observed in ASEAN members in

many sectors, even though wide and deep production and sales networks between

Japan and ASEAN countries have already been formed. A possible reason is that

existing bilateral FTAs between Japan and seven ASEAN countries are utilised more

than AJCEP. This implies that a newer region-wide FTA formed between the same

members of precedent FTAs should be more liberalised and/or have lower utilisation

costs than the precedent FTAs.

RCEP, which is going to be formed by coordinating five ASEAN+1 FTAs and AFTA,

needs to be constructed with a view to enhancing the strengths and eliminating the

weaknesses of these existing regional FTAs. The necessary conditions for RCEP to be

a substantially effective region-wide FTA are: higher-level liberalisation, lower cost of

utilisation compared with the precedent bilateral and plurilateral FTAs in the region,

the early implementation of tariff reduction/elimination in sectors already liberalised

under the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs, and more comprehensive liberalisation to increase

productivity and narrow the development gap in the region.

As our estimation results indicate, all ASEAN+1 FTAs have trade diversion

effects in several sectors. RCEP is expected to be conducive to extending the existing

production and sales networks between ASEAN and its dialogue partners to region-

Chapter 2

61

wide networks. Therefore, RCEP need to be implemented simultaneously in all

member countries to avoid trade diversion effects.

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65

Appendix Table 2.A.1: Sample Countries

Albania Dominican Republic Liberia Senegal

Algeria Ecuador Libya Serbia

Angola Egypt, Arab Rep. of Lithuania Seychelles

Antigua and Barbuda El Salvador Luxembourg Sierra Leone

Argentina Equatorial Guinea Macao SAR, China Singapore

Armenia Eritrea Macedonia, FYR Slovak Republic

Australia Estonia Madagascar Slovenia

Austria Ethiopia Malawi Solomon Islands

Azerbaijan Fiji Malaysia South Africa

Bahamas, The Finland Mali Spain

Bahrain France Malta Sri Lanka

Bangladesh Gabon Marshall Islands St. Kitts and Nevis

Belarus Gambia, The Mauritania St. Lucia

Belgium Georgia Mauritius St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Belize Germany Mexico Sudan

Benin Ghana Moldova Suriname

Bhutan Greece Mongolia Swaziland

Bolivia Grenada Montenegro Sweden

Bosnia and Herzegovina Guatemala Morocco Switzerland

Botswana Guinea Mozambique Tajikistan

Brazil Guinea-Bissau Myanmar Tanzania

Brunei Darussalam Guyana Namibia Thailand

Bulgaria Haiti Nepal Togo

Burkina Faso Honduras Netherlands Tonga

Burundi Hong Kong, China New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago

Cabo Verde Hungary Nicaragua Tunisia

Cambodia Iceland Niger Turkey

Cameroon India Nigeria Turkmenistan

Canada Indonesia Norway Tuvalu

Central African Republic Iran, Islamic Rep. Pakistan Uganda

Chad Iraq Palau Ukraine

Chile Ireland Panama United Arab Emirates

China Israel Papua New Guinea United Kingdom

Colombia Italy Paraguay United States

Comoros Japan Peru Uruguay

Congo, Dem. Rep. Jordan Philippines Uzbekistan

Congo, Rep. Kazakhstan Poland Vanuatu

Costa Rica Kenya Portugal Venezuela

Cote d'Ivoire Kiribati Qatar Viet Nam

Croatia Korea, Rep. of Romania Yemen

Cyprus Kyrgyz Republic Russian Federation Zambia

Czech Republic Lao PDR Rwanda Zimbabwe

Denmark Latvia Samoa

Djibouti Lebanon Sao Tome and Principe

Dominica Lesotho Saudi Arabia


66

Appendix Table 2.A.2: Date in effect of Each Member of ASEAN+1 FTA

Source: Information on FTA/EPA provided by Japan External Trade Organization.

67

Chapter 3

To Improve the Use of FTA: Lessons learned from Korea

Inkyo Cheong Professor, Economics, Inha University

Although Korea has been successful in concluding free trade agreements (FTAs), it

has faced difficulties in increasing FTA utilisation by small and medium enterprises. Since

there has been substantial progress in building institutional infrastructure as part of the

Korean government’s active policy of FTA utilisation assistance, FTA utilisation ratios are

as high as those of advanced countries. Several policy implications can be drawn from

Korea’s experience in assisting businesses with FTA utilisation. (i) One of the most urgent

and important tasks in assisting FTA utilisation is to identify the barriers that prevent

companies from utilising FTAs. Critical barriers may differ from country to country. (ii)

Coordination amongst national agencies is critical in increasing the efficiency of the

infrastructure assisting FTA utilisation. (iii) Governments should promote FTAs with large

economies, which are expected to bring big economic gains. (iv) Authorities of trade and

industry should understand the importance of the quality of FTAs. (v) FTA member

countries should take advantage of various levels of committees institutionalised in FTAs.


68

1. Background

Korea has established a very wide free trade agreement (FTA) network by

implementing 15 FTAs with 50 countries, and the utilisation ratios of these FTAs are fairly

high, ranging from 40 percent to 80 percent as of December 2013, although the rates

differ depending on the method of measurement, and some FTAs record poor

performance in terms of FTA utilisation. Korean companies’ utilisation ratios of FTAs were

quite low five years ago, and some suspicions regarding the benefits of FTAs were raised,

despite their active promotion by the government.

Today’s good performance has been achieved thanks to the strategic approach

and diverse support mechanisms initiated by the government of Korea since 2010. This

goes back to the period of 2007–2009. When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN)–Korea FTA was implemented in June 2007, Korean companies had high concerns

over the FTA with ASEAN, which is geographically close and Korea’s fifth to sixth largest

trading partner. However, it was reported that only few companies were utilising the FTA

in exporting their products to ASEAN countries. Despite the official announcement by the

government of Korea on the implementation of the ASEAN–Korea FTA, only five ASEAN

member countries officially effectuated the ASEAN–Korea FTA, and some countries were

not ready to implement the agreement.1 Moreover, the tariff rates were only partially

liberalised, and the tariff schedules of the FTA were fairly complex. It was difficult for

Korean businessmen to comprehend the tariff schedules given in the FTA without a high

level of knowledge of FTAs.

Surveys revealed that utilisation rates for Korea and Japan were 21 percent and 29

percent, respectively. The surveys by KOTRA (2008), KITA (2009), and Cheong (2008,

2009) had similar findings. Most of the FTAs that Korea implemented this time were

concluded with small and medium-sized developing countries. Moreover, in these FTAs,

the preferential margin of tariffs is not big; as such, only one out of five enterprises was

found to be utilising FTAs in Korea. On the other hand, half of the enterprises that had

been surveyed responded that they intended to utilise FTAs in the future. These Korean

enterprises are thought to have responded with the implementation of the Korea–US FTA

1 Those five ASEAN countries were Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, and Viet Nam.

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69

in mind, and most of the enterprises were expecting its early implementation.

Korea was embroiled in a controversy over the negotiation of the Korea–US FTA

when the ASEAN–Korea FTA became effective. Anti-FTA groups advocated the

cancellation of the FTA with the US, and the government of Korea was criticised for its

handling of various aspects of the deal. The poor utilisation rates of the FTA with ASEAN

were used as one of the arguments against the Korea–US FTA. That is, even though the

government promoted the economic gains of FTAs to the general public, low utilisation

rates meant a contrary outcome; a similar argument could apply regarding the Korea–US

FTA. The controversy over the Korea–US FTA continued in 2008 and 2009 – more

sensitive issues were raised over various areas such as the investor–state dispute

settlement mechanism (ISD) and mistranslations of the agreement into Korean.

For the FTA with the US to be implemented, it had to be ratified by the National

Assembly (congress), and the government planned to ratify the FTA in 2009. However,

with the exception of the FTA with Chile, Korea’s low utilisation of its FTAs did not

improve, and along with other issues could be regarded as a critical pretext for rejecting

the agreement. Therefore, improving the utilisation rates of existing FTAs became one of

the most urgent tasks for the trade authority in 2009–2010. A more serious issue was the

fact that most small and medium enterprises (SMEs) did not utilise FTAs, and were losing

interest in the government’s FTA policy, as it seemed FTAs are beneficial to large

companies, whereas most of SMEs suffer as a result of trade liberalisation under FTAs.

The Korean enterprises, on the whole, consist of a small number of big

corporations (one percent of the total number of companies in Korea) and a large

number of SMEs. Most of the 30 largest Korean corporations are classified as

multinational corporations, whose exports account for roughly 70 percent of Korea’s total

exports. These corporations are not only favourably inclined towards the government’s

FTA policies, but are also actively utilising the existing FTAs for their respective businesses.

It is not difficult for them to utilise the existing FTAs as they have considerable manpower

that can be dedicated to the task. However, most SMEs did not fully recognise the roles

of FTAs in expanding their international businesses, and have not secured the dedicated

manpower for international trade in utilising FTAs (Cheong and Cho 2009b).


70

2. Korea’s FTA Performance

Korea’s participation in the global trend of regionalism started with the

implementation of its FTA with Chile in April 2004. Ten years later, Korea had established

one of the widest FTA networks in the world. Korea’s FTA partners are the US, the

European Union (EU), China, Canada, Australia, India, ASEAN, Turkey, Colombia, Peru, and

Chile. Korea has established free trade infrastructure with 50 countries through the

conclusion of 12 FTAs, covering about 60 percent of world economy.

Figure 3.1: Korea’s FTA Network

Source: Prepared by the author based on Cheong (2013).

Korea signed an FTA with China in February 2015, expecting the implementation

of the FTA in 2016. It also started negotiations on a China–Japan–Korea (CJK) FTA and the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement in the first half of 2013.

FTAs with Japan, Mexico, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are progressing slowly,

compared with currently effective (concluded) FTAs. Korea is in discussions about FTAs

with the Russian Federation, the Trans–Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the South American

Common Market (MERCOSUR).

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Table 3.1: Korea’s FTA Performance

Country and Region (Key time)

FTAs implemented (concluded)

Chile (implemented in April 2004) Singapore (March 2006) EFTA (September 2006) ASEAN (June 2007) India (January 2007) EU (July 2009) US (March 2007) Turkey (May 2013) Colombia (to be implemented in 2015 after ratification) Australia (December 2014) Canada (January 2015) China (to be implemented in 2016)

FTA partners under official negotiation

Japan, China–Japan–Korea Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Mexico, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), New Zealand

FTAs under consideration

Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Russian Federation, South American Common Market (MERCOSUR)

Source: Compiled from various sources.

It can be said that Korea has been one of most successful countries in concluding

FTAs with major trading partners in the world during the last decade. In addition to the

high number of FTAs Korea implemented and concluded, Korea’s FTA policy has been

developed step by step in terms of quality, and its recent FTAs with developed economies

are very broad in terms of market access and comprehensive in coverage. That is, Korea

has concluded ‘deep and comprehensive’ FTAs. Especially, the Korea–US (KORUS) FTA is

likely to be the world's most exemplary, the most advanced FTA in existence today.

In spite of establishing a wide FTA network, the government of Korea has been

criticised because of low FTA utilisation ratios. Although the country has provided several

FTA support programmes for companies since 2007, most companies had difficulties in

utilising FTAs. In 2009–2010, Korea introduced a comprehensive package for supporting

companies in terms of FTA business information, various programmes for staffs of trade

companies, graduate courses for FTA experts, FTA business models for beginners, and a

‘toll-free’ phone number for free consulting on how to use FTAs. Korea has also been

trying to improve the efficiency of the package from a company perspective. FTAs have

become a basic part of the infrastructure for most trading companies.


72

3. Barriers against FTA Utilisation

The Korean trade authority reviewed the status of FTA utilisation and made a

commitment to prepare a government-level policy package for FTA utilisation by private

companies in 2010. At this time, the pros and cons of the US–Korea FTA were being

fiercely debated in Korea, and the government at the time needed to increase the level of

support for the FTA in the business sector. The low utilisation ratio of existing FTAs was

an appealing logic against the ratification of the US–Korea FTA, as it suggested that the

economic gains from the implementation of the FTA would be smaller than the

government’s estimates.

Low utilisation of FTAs was reproved in governmental survey for manufacturing

companies and trading ones. Before the policy package for FTA utilisation was created,

extensive research on the FTA utilisation ratios for each FTA, and major factors

discouraging the utilisation of FTAs were identified. It became apparent that most

companies were in the misunderstanding that the implementation of FTAs would

automatically bring them economic gains, without the need for any action on their part.

Private companies argued that the government had promoted a similar message to gain

the support of the Korean people.

Korea was able to conclude negotiations for bilateral FTAs with Singapore, the

European Free Trade Association (EFTA), ASEAN, India, the US, and the EU in the five-year

period from 2004 to 2008 due to the high trade performance of its first FTA with Chile,

which had been implemented in April 2004. However, similar performances failed to

materialise for subsequent FTAs. Several surveys at that time showed that most

companies did not take advantage of the FTAs being implemented. The finding that most

of the companies surveyed were not properly utilising the FTA preferential tariffs was

also substantiated by the results of the KOTRA (2008) survey, which showed that only 19

percent of all respondent firms were utilising FTA preferential tariffs. A survey by Cheong

(2008) provided a similar result – only 21 percent of firms utilised FTAs in their business in

applying preferential tariffs.

Cheong (2009) reported that the majority of Korean businessmen were unaware

of the implementation of FTAs, and their perception was not very favourable regarding

FTAs, despite the government of Korea promoting the message that FTAs would provide

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73

lucrative business opportunities for Korean companies. Over the past several years,

Korea’s foreign-trade authorities have extensively publicised the promotion of FTAs

amongst the Korean people, with the aim of increasing political support for its FTA policy

and enhancing the policy environment for more active promotion of FTAs.

Survey results of 2008–2010

The survey was carried out in relation to three FTAs – with Chile, ASEAN, and the

European Free Trade Association (EFTA) – which were implemented in 2009.2 The

enterprises that responded to the survey included 221 SMEs that manufacture

automotive parts, electrical goods and parts, machinery, petrochemicals, textiles, steel

and metal products, and sundries. These companies were selected from across the

country to minimise bias resulting from data selection.

The survey result showed wide differences in the perception that the Korean

enterprises recognise the implementation of FTAs. The enterprises’ degree of recognition

of the countries in which FTAs have become effective was highest for the FTA with Chile –

88 percent of responding companies knew of the implementation of the FTA with Chile,

followed by the FTA with ASEAN (62 percent), and that with EFTA (38 percent), according

to the survey by Cheong and Cho (2009a).

Figure 3.2: Perception of Implemented FTAs (%)

12.5

38.3

62.5

88

62

38

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

Chile ASEAN EFTA

Know Don't Know

Source: Cheong and Cho (2009), ‘Barriers in Korean Businesses’ FTA Utilization’.

2 The Korea–Singapore FTA was under implementation at the time of the survey, but this was not included in the survey since its most-favoured nation (MFN) tariff rate is low or near zero.


74

Several impediments were identified by the survey. Contrary to initial

expectations, small tariff preference, that is, low incentive for utilising FTAs, was the most

frequently cited reason for not utilising FTAs, followed by lack of information, difficulties

related to rules of origin (ROO), and other administrative costs.

Figure 3.3: Impediments to FTA Use (%)

35.83

4.17

34.17

10.8315.00

0

10

20

30

40

Low tar iff

preference

Lack of

information

ROO-related

costs

Other

administrative

costs

Remaining

NTBs

Source: Cheong and Cho (2009), ‘Barriers to Korean businesses’ FTA utilization’.

Table 3.2: Barriers to Korean Businesses’ FTA Utilisation

1st 2nd 3rd 4th

Imports Lack of FTA

information

Problems with

ROO

Low tariff

margins Other

Exports

Survey 1 Lack of FTA

information

Problems with

ROO

Importers’

intention for

using FTAs

Other

institutional

barriers

Survey 2 Low tariff

margins

Lack of FTA

information

Importers’

business

mind

Customs

clearance

Source: Cheong and Cho (2010), ‘Barriers in Korean businesses’ FTA utilisation’.

Whilst the barriers to Korean businesses’ FTA utilisation that had been identified

were slightly different for imports and exports, the most significant barriers were a lack of

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75

FTA business information, difficulties in satisfying ROO, low tariff preferential margins,

and a lack of importers’ business mind in utilising FTAs in partner countries. These

barriers could not be alleviated within a short period of time, as it requires a lot of

resources and efforts to institutionalise an infrastructure for providing FTA business

information. Some tasks such as raising low tariff margins and improving importers’ FTA

business mind could not be achieved without co-operating with the governments of FTA

partner countries.

Low tariff preference was closely related to the FTA with ASEAN, which was

implemented in June 2007. During the negotiation period of the ASEAN–Korea FTA, its

effects were expected to be great since ASEAN is not only geographically close to Korea

but is also Korea’s fifth or sixth-largest trading partner in 2006. But the ASEAN–Korea FTA

has not yet produced substantial trade effects. According to the FTA’s market access

provisions, both parties were supposed to abolish tariffs on 90 percent of their mutual

imports (based on tariff lines) by 2010, and should lower tariffs on 7 percent of imports

of sensitive items from 0 to 5 percent by 2016. For the remaining three percent of

imports, which are ultra-sensitive items, various protective measures such as import

permits, long-term tariff reduction, and the setting up of a tariff quota were put in place.

The problem is that Korea’s main export items are included in the remaining three

percent ultra-sensitive items category. Consequently, ASEAN’s tariffs on such items,

exports of which Korea had expected to increase sharply at the time of the FTA

negotiations, were not lowered.3

In particular, the difference between the Korea–ASEAN preferential tariff and the

MFN tariff is close to 1 percent, and the FTA preferential level felt by the enterprises is

low. Moreover, the expenses that must be incurred to meet the ROO are also burdens on

the companies that utilise FTAs. As Korean companies did not see enough economic

incentives to utilise the then-effective FTAs, they were certainly not willing to bear the

burdens associated with the ROO. This implied that companies were losing opportunities

to prepare themselves for organising FTA utilisation. Depending on the survey, a majority

3 A number of ASEAN member countries – Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Viet Nam –

effectuated their FTAs with Korea only in June 2007. Korea’s regional FTA with the Philippines came into effect only in January 2008, and its FTAs with Brunei Darussalam, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and Cambodia came into effect only in July, October, and November 2008, respectively. Thailand only acceded to the ASEAN–Korea FTA in February 2009.


76

of respondents identified the biggest barrier to utilising FTAs as ‘Korean FTA has no

substantial tariff preference or no actual benefits from FTA utilisation’ and ‘lack of

information about the business factors of the existing FTAs or about how to utilise them’.

Since the trade authorities and related agencies had tried to provide the information on

FTAs via websites and various publications, this result was another surprise for the

Korean trade authority. This was interpreted to imply that Korean companies wanted

manuals for utilising FTAs and descriptive summaries that were suitable for

entrepreneurs, rather than simply providing the texts of FTAs, which were available on

the websites. The texts of FTAs are written in legal format, rather than in a descriptive

style. This also highlighted the need for training courses for education about utilising FTAs

and interpreting the texts of FTAs.

Of the many parts of FTAs, ROO were cited as the most burdensome element in

terms of utilising FTAs. Although non-preferential ROO have been applied to Korean

products regardless of FTAs, preferential ROO was a new concept for Korean companies

in the early days of FTA implementation. Korean companies were not willing to change

production processes to satisfy the product-specific preferential ROO of FTAs under

implementation. According to the survey by Cheong and Cho (2009), only 19.5 percent of

respondents replied that they understood the concept of the ROO in detail, and 32.1

percent understood the general issues surrounding ROO. About half of respondents did

not know that satisfaction of the ROO is a requirement for applying for the preferential

tariff margins provided for in the FTAs. Korea Customs Services (2009) reported that 89

percent of domestic companies did not know the ROO for their products, and in local

areas the share of SMEs/companies that did not know was even higher.

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77

Figure 3.4: Awareness of Rules of Origin

(unit: %)

19.5

32.1

48.4

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

In details General issues No idea

Source: Cheong and Cho (2009).

4. Governmental Package for Enhancing FTA Utilisation

4.1. The FTA Promotion and Policy Adjustment Authority (FTAPPAA)

In June 2007, the government of Korea established the FTA Committee for

Domestic Measures (FTA Committee hereafter). When the Korea–US FTA was supposed

to be signed by both parties, the FTA Committee was organised as a governing institution

for the Support Committee for the Negotiation of the Korea–US FTA, which was formed in

early 2006, when Korea was about to start negotiations on the FTA. One purpose of

establishing the FTA Committee was to support the utilisation of FTAs, particularly for

SMEs. At the same time, trade-related governmental agencies began to provide several

programmes to support FTA utilisation by SMEs.

Although the committee established several programmes to support FTA

utilisation, such as providing FTA information and education for the private sector, the

role of the committee shifted to publicising the Korea–US FTA to attract public support

for it. One mistake made by the committee was that it exaggerated the benefits of FTA

implementation. That is, rather than making it clear companies should understand how to

utilise the FTA once it had been implemented, and how to satisfy the ROO for their

products as specified in the FTA, the committee gave the impression that companies’


78

exports to partner countries would naturally increase following the implementation of

FTAs. Although the government was able to gather support for the Korea–US FTA,

companies did not realise the importance of strengthening their capacity and make

structural adjustments to be able to benefit from FTAs.

The supporting programmes for businesses included education courses for

companies and consulting workshops to explain the FTAs and provide information on

FTAs, build FTA portals, and organise FTA expos in foreign countries. Although these

programmes seemed to be helpful to the business sector, their contents were very poor,

and many were implemented as part of efforts to improve the sentiment towards FTAs of

the general public in Korea. As a result, the strengthening of companies’ capacity to

utilise FTAs was very limited, and a ‘FTA fatigue’ phenomenon emerged, referring to a

perception that FTAs were useless. Some companies complained that they suffered an

extra burden as a consequence of the implementation of FTAs, without receiving any

economic gain, and businesses that had previously been supporters of FTA policy

changed their position regarding FTAs.

4.2. Evaluation of the mechanism for supporting FTA utilisation (2010)

When it adopted a comprehensive package supporting FTA utilisation in 2010, the

government of Korea set the goal of achieving a 60 percent FTA utilisation ratio over the

next three years. As a first step toward achieving that goal, the government decided to

review the effectiveness of existing FTA support programmes in detail, recognising that

establishing a national infrastructure for utilising FTAs would be key to a successful FTA

policy. Without such infrastructure, the economic gains from FTAs would be small – even

though Korea implemented many FTAs with major trading partners – and the political

environment for promoting FTAs would worsen in the short term. A series of trilateral

meetings of trade experts, industrial representatives, and policy makers was held in first

half of 2010 to check the ongoing support programmes at that time and evaluate their

effectiveness. Numerous criticisms were made, including the following:

- Support programmes were designed from the perspective of governmental

authorities, and failed to consider the needs of business sectors.

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79

- The positive points of FTAs were emphasised, but the basic conditions for utilising

FTAs, such as satisfaction of ROO, were ignored.

- Major portions of information on FTAs were for public advertisement for FTA

promotion, to attract political support for FTA policy. That is, general information on

FTAs, not useful for the business sector, was provided.

- Several governmental agencies implemented almost the same programmes with

similar contents and lacking a coordinated approach, without sectoral specific

contents, leading to low efficiency and waste of administrative capacity.

- The necessity of setting up a ‘control tower’ and providing a comprehensive package

to improve the efficiency of FTA programmes was recognised. All public programmes

for FTA utilisation should be completely substantiated, coordinated, and

systemically managed by the FTA Committee to improve their efficiency in terms of

budget spending, contents, and the satisfaction of business sectors.

4.3. Major structure of Comprehensive Package for Supporting FTA Utilisation

Based on various surveys about the problems of and institutional barriers to

Korean companies’ FTA utilisation, the government of Korea, led by the Ministry of

Strategy and Finance (MOSF), prepared a comprehensive business support mechanism

titled ‘Plan for Enhancing FTA Utilization’. Governmental concerns about increasing the

FTA utilisation ratio and supporting business sectors were first addressed by introducing

the FTA Promotion and Policy Adjustment Authority (FTAPPAA) in June 2007. Korea

assigned the FTAPPAA to the MOSF for more efficient allocation of resources across all

ministries in Korea. In early 2010, Korea adjusted the main role of the FTAPPAA from

dealing with domestic issues to supporting the business sector in utilising FTAs. The

FTAPPAA and the MOSF, a leading ministry regarding trade and industrial policies,

arranged a national package of FTA information on policy, preferential tariffs, and ROO,

FTA experts, FTA consulting, local FTA assistance centres, and an FTA call centre, as

summarised in Table 3.3.


80

Table 3.3: Major Components of Korea’s FTA Support

Business Demand Survey

FTA Business Information

FTA Expert, Consulting

Direct Assistance

for Business

FTA System Maintenance

Major Contents

Regular and special meetings and surveys for industrial agencies, representative companies

- FTA homepages for tariffs, ROO - Seminars, workshops - Guide books, pocket books, brochures

- Cyber-learning system on FTAs - FTA class in universities and graduate schools - Courses for FTA consultants and experts

- FTA business consulting - FTA call centre - Local FTA assistance centres

- Integrated Business ROO centre - Integrated FTA info centre

Government Agency

FTAPPAA and national related agencies New: National FTA Utilisation Center

FTAPPAA and related agencies

FTAPPAA and related agencies, universities, business forum, academic associations

Related national agencies, customs brokers, FTAPPAA

Korea Customs Services, centre for ROO, Chamber of Commerce, KITA, etc.

Source: Author’s summary.

Officials and staff of the FTAPPAA were reinforced in terms of numbers and FTA

expertise in dealing with FTA business support issues early 2010. Also, the FTAPPAA was

given the authority to promote all FTA assistance tools and related resources in the

comprehensive package, and the National FTA Utilization Center (FTAUC) was newly

organised in the FTAPPAA and regional (local) FTA assistance centres. That is, the

FTAPPAA plans major policies, sets goals, and designs roadmaps on a yearly basis and the

National FTAUC implements related details for achieving policy goals set by the FTAPPAA.

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81

Table 3.4: Major Roles of National FTAUC

Major Role Details for Business Assistance

Cooperation, coordination

Coordination of roles on FTA assistance by ministries, agencies, and organisations (across, between)

Survey, Management

FTA utilisation ratios, barriers to utilising FTAs Managing FTA business assistance programmes, etc.

FTA info Internet portals, books, brochures, booklets, etc.

Consulting Consulting on tariffs, ROO, overseas marketing by experts

Education, training Cyber-learning system on FTA info FTA class in universities and graduate schools Courses for FTA consultants and experts

Seminar, workshop Various events for educating business sector (national, local,

FTA partner countries)

Source: Author’s summary.

4.4. Examples of Comprehensive Package for Supporting FTA Utilisation

One of the programmes initiated by the FTAUC was to provide FTA consulting to

approximately 10,000 companies over four years starting in 2010. At this time, consulting

was considered to be the most efficient means of enhancing FTA utilisation. Financial

support was given to trade agencies such as the Small & Medium Business Corporation

(SBC), Korea International Trade Association (KITA), and Korea Trade-Investment

Promotion Agency (KOTRA) to cover their FTA business consulting costs. The companies

that received FTA consulting were targeted to be those that trade with FTA partners. As

of 2009, there were about 80,000 trading SMEs, and 37,000 companies were trading with

Korea’s FTA partner countries. The FTAUC has reached most of the FTA consulting targets

so far.


82

Table 3.5: Targets for Providing FTA Business Consulting

‘10 ‘11 ‘12 ‘13 Total

No. of SMEs 600 2,000 3,000 5,000 10,600

Source: Internal report prepared by Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF).

FTAPPAA opened the FTA Business Portal, which provides important information

for FTA business utilisation in 2011. FTA information was organised in such a way that it

can be updated on a daily basis, and the portal has been upgraded several times to make

the format more user-friendly. The site was designed to provide a single-window portal,

consolidating the various FTA information provided by trade ministries and agencies.

Recently, areas such as FTA business models and success cases of FTA utilisation were

added into the FTA portal, and more systematic analysis mechanisms for searching tariffs

and product-specific ROO were installed into the portal.

Figure 3.5: FTA Business Portal by the FTAPPAA

Source: www.ftahub.go.kr

Since preferential tariff rates and product-specific ROO are basic elements in

utilising FTAs, Korea Customs Service installed integrated portals on preferential tariff

http://www.ftahub.go.kr/

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83

rates and FTA ROO. The FTAPPAA linked these portals in its portal for Korean SMEs. FTA

tariffs and related ROO can be viewed by HS digit and by FTA partner. This system allows

Korean companies to check relevant information without referring to the Appendix or

Annex of FTA agreements. FTAPPAA also offered a series of seminars and workshops for

businesses regarding this system.

Figure 3.6: Integrated Portal for Preferential Tariff Rates under Korean FTAs

Source: http://www.customs.go.kr/


84

Figure 3.7: Integrated Portal for FTA Rules of Origin

Source: http://www.customs.go.kr/

The FTA call centre was established in June 2014, and provides consulting services

to callers seven days a week. This centre was not easy to establish and it took two years

to arrange professional FTA consultants. It received more than 1,000 calls per month in

the five months after it opened. Immediate consulting is provided based on the questions

raised by callers, and then follow-up on-site consulting is provided for the companies in

question.

http://www.customs.go.kr/

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85

Figure 3.8: FTA Call Centre

Ask whatever on

FTA utilisation

FTA call centre

Number 1380

anywhere in Korea

Source: www.ftahub.go.kr

Various issues related to satisfying ROO have been identified as barriers to FTA

utilisation in most of the surveys since establishment of the FTAPPAA. That is, satisfying

ROO requires that many elements of a company are reviewed, such as cost structure,

production procedure and specification, sourcing structure, and account books. This

process may necessarily involve accessing classified business information including

technology and unit cost of products, which made most companies unwilling to receive

consulting for FTA utilisation. Although professional consulting companies mention their

obligation to handle their clients’ information confidentially, it was difficult for Korean

SMEs to trust the consulting companies and consultants. Therefore, the FTAPPAA had

self-test software developed to enable companies to determine whether they could

satisfy ROO without providing internal information on production and costs. As

companies practiced testing ROO, they gradually came to trust the consulting companies

and consultants.

http://www.ftahub.go.kr/


86

5. Recent FTA Utilisation

In spite of the delayed recovery of the global economy and the slump in global

trade volumes, Korea’s trade with most of its FTA partners has continuously expanded.

FTA utilisation ratios are recorded to be higher than 60 percent in Korea’s bilateral trade

with many of its FTA partners, which was the goal that had been set by the government

of Korea in 2010. Korea recorded FTA utilisation ratios above 70 percent for the Korea–US

FTA and the EU–Korea FTA, whereas the utilisation ratios for the FTAs with ASEAN and

India remained low despite national efforts to improve FTA utilisation ratios.4

Although the importance of government support for businesses in utilising FTAs

should be recognised, the quality of FTAs in terms of improving market access is a key

determinant for the extent of FTA utilisation. That is, one of the major reasons for the

slow increase in FTA utilisation in FTAs with ASEAN and India is that Korean businesses do

not consider tariff margins to be high enough to pay the cost of allocating personal and

physical resources. But utilisation ratios for these FTAs have slowly increased due to

various forms of governmental support for businesses. As of 2013, the FTA utilisation

ratio for the bilateral FTA with ASEAN was 38 percent and that with India 43 percent.

4 FTA utilisation ratio is measured by dividing exports/imports using FTA tariff preference margins with total

exports/imports into/from FTA partner country. Denominators can be discretely chosen total exports/imports depending on the consideration of tariff preference margins.

Chapter 3

87

Table 3.6: Trend of FTA Utilisation Ratios

(unit: percent)

FTA partner As of End-2012 As of November 2013

Exports Imports Exports Imports

Chile 75.2 97.9 78.4 98.3 EFTA 79.8 61.9 80.5 42.0 ASEAN 37.7 73.8 38.5 80.1 India 36.2 52.7 43.0 62.3 EU 81.4 66.8 80.9 67.6 Peru 78.0 92.0 92.0 98.4

US 68.9 61.0 76.4 67.3

Simple average 65.31 72.30 69.96 73.71

Source: Korea Customs Service (2013) ‘FTA Utilisation Ratios for Korea’ Trade’.

Based on the FTA utilisation performance summarised in Table 3.5, Korea’s FTA

support policy can be considered a success in terms of achieving policy goals and

improving FTA utilisation ratios. When the government of Korea was considering a

national FTA support policy in 2010, the average FTA utilisation ratio was about 20

percent, and as low as 4–5 percent in exports for some FTAs. The original goal was to

achieve a 40 percent FTA utilisation ratio in 2012, a 60 percent FTA utilisation ratio in

2013, and to increase those to about 80 percent, which is as high as the FTA utilisation

ratio in advanced economies such as the EU and the US.

Several observations from Korea’s FTA support experience to raise FTA utilisation

merit highlighting. One is that the FTA utilisation ratios in Korea’s exports increased

substantially during the last three years of the FTA support policy, although they were

lower than for imports. Utilising FTAs for importing goods from FTA partners is relatively

easy, compared with exporting, since exporting requires marketing by FTA partners.

Another observation is the gradual improvement of Korean SMEs’ FTA utilisation ratios,

although those ratios remained lower than the ratios achieved by large companies. The

initial motivation behind Korea’s FTA support policy was poor FTA utilisation by SMEs. For

the EU–Korea FTA, large companies’ FTA utilisation ratio was 84.3 percent and that for

SMEs 76.4 percent in 2013 (in terms of value). And 69.2 percent of Korean SMEs’ exports

used FTA tariff preference provided by the Korea–US FTA.


88

FTAs are widely utilised in most industrial sectors, and there has been progress in

sectoral FTA utilisation in 2013. A utilisation ratio above 80 percent has been recorded in

several sectors, such as mining, machinery, and the plastic/rubber industry. And a

substantial increase in Korea–US FTA utilisation was achieved in mining, home items,

electrical goods, and steel products from 2012 to 2013.

Table 3.7: FTA Utilisation Ratio by Industry (Korea–US FTA)

(unit: %)

Korea–US FTA

As of the end of 2012 As of November 2013 Yearly change (%)

Mining 66.4 80.2 13.8 Machinery 74.4 81.1 6.7 Agriculture 45.4 52.1 6.8 Household goods 52.5 66.9 14.4 Textiles 69.6 71.5 2.0 Electrical goods 49.4 61.1 11.7 Steel, products 68.0 78.4 10.4 Plastic, rubber 82.9 83.2 0.3 Chemicals 66.0 70.7 4.6 Other goods 66.0 68.4 2.4

EU–Korea FTA

Mining 69.3 53.4 △15.9 Machinery 88.2 89.6 1.5 Agriculture 47.4 52.1 4.7 Household goods 67.8 84.9 17.1 Textiles 82.7 86.5 3.8 Electrical goods 71.3 77.0 5.7 Steel products 67.4 72.3 4.9 Plastic, rubber 88.4 90.6 2.2 Chemicals 78.7 74.3 △4.3 Other goods 56.9 77.9 21.0

Source: Korea Customs Services (2013).

Finally, the FTA utilisation ratio of small exporting companies (in terms of export

value) remained low, although the overall utilisation ratio increased substantially.

However, as the scale of exports increases, the FTA utilisation ratio rises. This seems

reasonable, in that large companies have a better internal infrastructure for utilising FTAs

with higher incentives. Table 3.8 shows that only 4,340 small companies applied

preferential tariffs out of 28,762 companies that had exports worth less than 0.1 million

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89

dollars a year. The FTA utilisation ratio for these companies was about 15 percent. This is

a significant contrast with the 64 percent utilisation ratio for companies with exports of

over one million dollars. This implies that the government of Korea needs to strengthen

FTA utilisation for small companies.

Table 3.8: SMEs with FTA Utilisation and Non-utilisation by Scale of Exports

(unit: number of SMEs)

Scale of Exports (million $)

(A) <0.1

0.1M< (B) <0.5

0.5< (C) < 1

(D) > 1 (B+C+D) >0.1

Total

Number of Companies

No FTA utilisation

24,422 6,702 1,799 2,637 11,138 35,560

FTA utilisation

(F)

4,340 3,812 1,700 4,656 10,168 14,508

Total (T) 28,762 10,514 3,499 7,293 21,306 50,068

Ratio (F/T,

percent) 15.09 36.26 48.59 63.84 47.72 28.98

Source: Calculated based on data from KCS.

6. Conclusion and Implications

Although countries promote FTAs to achieve various policy goals, achieving

economic gains is one of the most important. FTAs are concluded by governments, but

private companies utilise FTAs to realise economic gains. When companies make

decisions related to FTA utilisation, they will compare the economic incentives with the

various costs related to satisfying ROO and collecting information on FTA tariffs and ROO.

It is important the perception of CEOs of SMEs on FTA utilisation is changed. Unlike large

companies, SMEs do not have enough staff to handle FTA business, and lack the

professional expertise in trade practice and business activities. Unless CEOs have a strong

intention to utilise FTAs, staff of SMEs are unlikely to allocate their time to explore the

possibility of new businesses based on FTA contents.

Due to substantial progress in building institutional infrastructure as a result of

the Korean government’s active policy on FTA utilisation assistance, FTA utilisation ratios

are now as high as those of advanced countries. For more companies to use the FTAs,


90

companies need to comprehend the contents of the FTAs and be inclined to use them.

FTA utilisation is possible when exporters (manufacturers) issue the certificate of ROO

and importers submit it to the customs authority of the importing country. Otherwise,

importers face a serious problem regarding the origin verification by the customs

authority. This implies that exporters and importers must share the intention and

information related to FTA utilisation.

Several policy implications can be drawn from Korea’s experience in assisting

businesses with FTA utilisation. First of all, one of the most urgent and important tasks in

assisting FTA utilisation is to identify the barriers that prevent companies from utilising

FTAs. Critical barriers may differ from country to country. Based on the significance of the

barriers and the possibility for improvement through governmental actions, the

government should make a road map for building infrastructure and assisting businesses

in utilising FTAs.

Second, coordination amongst national agencies is critical in increasing the

efficiency of the infrastructure assisting FTA utilisation. In the absence of such

coordination, several agencies tend to provide similar services with poor contents to

business sectors. Korea had this experience in 2008–2009, and companies evaluated this

to be ‘not useful’ in designing business plans for utilising FTAs.

Third, governments should promote FTAs with large economies, which can be

expected to bring high overall economic gains. This will give businesses large incentives to

look for opportunities to utilise FTAs. In this regard, special considerations must be given

to small exporting companies that lack the staff and expertise for international trading

and marketing. Assistance in marketing, branding, and logistics will be useful for small

companies in utilising FTAs. In the case of Korea, there is room for improving the FTA

utilisation ratio for small companies, and the government must make this a priority for

domestic FTA policy.

Fourth, authorities of trade and industry should understand the importance of the

quality of FTAs. When tariffs are eliminated in a short period of time and the agreement

is comprehensive in its coverage, companies will have an incentive to utilise the FTA in

their business activities. As seen in Figure 3.9, Korea achieved 97–100 percent ratios for

tariff elimination in its many FTAs, but the Korea–Turkey FTA has 92.2 percent of tariff

elimination for Korea and 89.5 percent for Turkey. This becomes a serious problem for

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91

businessmen, since the EU–Korea FTA offers more favourable treatment than the Korea–

Turkey FTA. Both countries need to upgrade existing market access in the FTA in addition

to finishing their negotiations on services and investment to provide greater incentives

for FTA utilisation by businesses and to have a more comprehensive FTA.

Figure 3.9: Tariff Elimination Ratios in Korea’s Major FTAs

Source: Authors’ calculation based on the tariff schedules of Korea’s FTAs.

Fifth, FTA member countries should take advantage of various levels of

committees institutionalised in FTAs. Most FTAs install trade ministers’ meetings, FTA

committees, and several subcommittees for customs clearance, ROO, Sanitary and

Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). Even though FTAs

are implemented, many non-tariff barriers (NTBs) continue to distort bilateral trade.

Depending on the position of member countries, these NTBs could be eased and/or

eliminated. Complicated ROO are amongst the most serious hurdles in utilising FTAs,

hence member countries should discuss the simplification of ROO.

Last, FTA member countries need to co-operate on implementing FTAs properly

and providing information related to FTA utilisation. FTAs establish several committees to

facilitate the implementation of FTAs. Since FTA implementation means the adoption of

common trade and economic systems defined in the agreement, problems due to

institutional differences between member countries arise, which in many cases become

https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm


92

barriers to FTA utilisation. Also, member countries should discuss the tasks set in the

agreements such as the acceleration of tariff elimination. Harmonisation of FTAs should

be pursued. As the number of FTAs increases, the differences across FTAs become an

issue for trade policy makers. From the viewpoint of business sectors, the contents

should be harmonised across FTAs, and should be upgraded for easy utilisation of FTAs.

References:

Cheong, I. (2006), ‘Korea’s FTA Strategy and Roadmap’. Paper presented at the Forum for Barun FTAs, Seoul, 8 May, (in Korean).

Cheong, I. (2007), Manual for KORUS FTA. Seoul: KITA, (in Korean).

Cheong, I. (2008), Economic Growth of Korea and Korea–US Relations. Seoul: Korea Chamber of Commerce, (in Korean).

Cheong, I. (2009), ‘Evaluation of Korean FTAs and Implications for Future FTAs’. Paper presented at the annual conference organised by Korea’s Association for Researchers of International Trade, Seoul, 19 February, (in Korean).

Cheong, I. (2013), ‘The Prospects for Korea’s Participation for Mega FTAs in the Asia-Pacific Region’. JRI mimeo. Internal report.

Cheong, I. and J. Cho (2008), ‘Survey on Korean Companies on the Utilization of FTAs’. Presented at the seminar by Korea Association of International Trade and Industries, Suwon, 28 November, (in Korean).

Cheong, I. and J. Cho (2009a), ‘The Impact of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) on Business in the Republic of Korea’, ADBI Working Paper No. 156, Tokyo: ADBI.

Cheong, I. and J. Cho (2009b), ‘An Empirical Study on the Utilization Ratio of FTAs by Korean Firms’, Journal of Korea Trade, 13(2), pp.109–26.

Cheong, I. and J. Cho (2010), ‘Barriers in Korean businesses’ FTA utilization’. JRI internal paper, (in Korean.

Choi, W. (2008), ‘Korea’s FTA Progress and Its Implications’. Negotiation and Korea, 1(1), pp.40–41. Seoul: Korean Association of Negotiation Studies, July, (in Korean).

Hyun, O. (2008), ‘Tasks for Improving Business Environment in Korea’. Presented at the 31st year anniversary seminar by Korea Society for International Trade, Seoul, 13 June, (in Korean).

Kawai, M. and G. Wignaraja (eds.) (2011), Asia’s Free Trade Agreements: How is Business Responding? Tokyo: ADBI.

Korea Institute for International Trade (2008), Firms’ Preference Over FTAs. Seoul: Korea International Traders Association (in Korean).

Korea Small Business Institute (2007), KORUS FTA and SMEs. Seoul: Korea Small Business Institute (in Korean).

KOTRA (2008), ‘Impact of FTAs on Trade: Joint Survey by KOTRA–KITA’, Global Business Report 08–033, pp. 1–21, (in Korean).

Lee, K. (2008), ‘Korea’s FTA Policy in the Context of World Trade’. Presented at the 31st anniversary seminar by Korea Society for International Trade, Seoul, 13 June, (in Korean).

Ministry of Trade, Republic of Korea (2004). Overview of Korea’s FTA Promotion and Policy Directions. Seoul: Ministry of Trade (in Korean).

93

Chapter 4

Towards an Enabling Set of Rules of Origin

for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Erlinda M. Medalla Senior Research Fellow, PIDS

With overlapping, multiple free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the case of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the various ASEAN+1 FTAs,

complications could arise that run counter to the economic integration objectives of the

East Asian Region. Forging the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

amongst ASEAN and its FTA partners is a next logical step. How facilitative the rules of

origin (ROO) provisions are could prove crucial in maximising the potential benefits. This

chapter revisits the nature of ROO in ASEAN and the various ASEAN+1 FTAs to examine the

surrounding constraints and issues as well as to provide recommendations on a beneficial

set of ROO for the RCEP, and serve as input for policy makers and negotiators.


94

1. Introduction

The global arena in recent decades has witnessed a rise in regional and bilateral

free trade agreements (FTAs). Asia came in late but has now become very active in FTA

engagement, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the hub of most

of the FTA activity. (Kawai and Wignaraja, 2010) This Asian trend arose from a combination

of factors, including, amongst others: (1) the growing FTA alliances in other parts of the

globe, (2) the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and (3) the protracted World Trade Organization

(WTO) impasse. The first brought about the need for ASEAN FTAs in the region as a

defensive mechanism. The second highlighted the need for regional cooperation. The WTO

impasse created a need for an alternative mechanism more abreast with the pace of

globalisation and the dynamism of the East Asian region. Perhaps the more proactive and

compelling motivation, which is related to the last point, is the growing importance of

production networks in the region (Urata, 2004). It was only a matter of time before

market-driven regionalisation took the more formal route of forging regional agreements.

Currently, there are six major FTAs involving ASEAN and the other East Asian countries:

ASEAN, the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA), the ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA), the ASEAN–Japan

Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP), the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA

(AANZFTA), and the ASEAN–India Free Trade Agreement (AIFTA).

The formation of these agreements could be viewed as a feasible step towards

deepening East Asian integration, especially with ASEAN as a hub. However, having

separate ASEAN+1 FTAs could create problems of its own, such as the oft-cited

complication of a noodle bowl effect. This side effect could ultimately run counter to the

underlying objectives of these FTAs, which include creating a more integrated market and

production base, leveraging on each other’s strength, and lowering the cost of doing

business. Indeed, the more FTAs a country or region is engaged in, the more complex the

web it creates that could add to the cost of doing business. This concern has particular

bearing on the overlapping rules of origin (ROO) utilised by respective FTAs. Forging the

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) amongst ASEAN and its FTA

partners is a next logical step. And the ROO regime the RCEP adopts could prove crucial in

maximising the potential benefits and attaining the objectives of East Asian regional

integration.

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In this chapter we aim to provide inputs for policy makers and negotiators, and

recommendations on the beneficial set of ROO for the RCEP. Towards this end, we start in

the next section with the underlying principles and objectives of the RCEP to provide the

context of the discussion and formulation of the recommendations. In Section 3 some

background on the basic ROO used in FTAs and the nature of ROO in ASEAN and the various

ASEAN+1 FTAs is discussed. This section uses the findings and datasets from previous ERIA

studies by the author on ROO in the East Asian region. In Section 4 we provide the analysis

of the constraints and issues in formulating the best practice ROO for the RCEP, leading to

our recommendations.

The study also benefitted from interviews and/or surveys of key people from both

industry and government to validate the findings and recommendations. These provided

further insights, suggestions, and better understanding of the difficulties and problems

currently faced in dealing with ROO.

2. Underlying Principles and Objectives

In negotiating the RCEP, the central objective of the parties, as stated in the RCEP

negotiation framework, is ‘to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually

beneficial economic partnership agreement amongst the ASEAN Member States (AMS) and

ASEAN’s FTA Partners’. Along these lines, the guiding principles include the following:

The RCEP will have broader and deeper engagement with significant improvements

over the existing ASEAN+1 FTAS, while recognising the individual and diverse

circumstances of the participating countries.

The RCEP will include provisions to facilitate trade and investment and to enhance

transparency in trade and investment relations between the participating countries

as well as to facilitate the participating countries’ engagement in global and

regional supply chains.

ROO are integral to any FTA. Any FTA would have a (negotiated) set of ROO to

ensure that trade preferences from the agreement are enjoyed primarily by the contracting

parties. Only goods that comply with the agreed-upon ROO can enjoy duty-free preference


96

provided by the FTA. While there should be rules to distinguish members from non-

members, these ROO could act as trade barriers themselves. The more restrictive the ROO

are, the greater the trade barrier, conceivably to the extent of eroding the preferential

benefits from the FTAs. The problem becomes more complex when there are overlapping,

multiple FTAs, such as in the case of the ASEAN and the various ASEAN+1 FTAs. Setting the

ROO should thus not be just about trade deflection.1 Perhaps even more so, it should be

trade facilitating as well. In addition, considering global developments and the current

regional context, there is less need for restrictive ROO. Sustained global trade liberalisation

made possible under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO has already

substantially brought down most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs. Moreover, the RCEP is a

big group of countries with intraregional trade comprising more than half of its total trade.

As such, ROO in the RCEP should be more concerned about trade facilitation, in line with

its objectives.

3. ROO in the ASEAN and the ASEAN+1 FTAs

The issue of determining origin was not given much attention under the GATT/WTO

in the early stages, leaving individual country with the right to determine their own rules

for the purpose of applying non-preferential MFN tariffs. This right to determine the

applicable ROO is even more strongly argued for in the Generalised System of Preference

(GSP) by donor countries as the preferences are unilaterally granted. The same practice

applies to ROO in preferential trade agreements.

With the rise in international production sharing and technological innovation in

transportation and telecommunications, origin determination has become increasingly

difficult. Very few products today can claim to be solely produced in one country. This has

made ROO a key concern in FTA negotiations.

1. Trade deflection occurs when a non-FTA member is able to enjoy the preferential tariffs that supposedly only FTA members are eligible for. Without restricting ROO, this could happen through trans-shipment of products from a non-FTA member to high-tariff FTA member through a low-tariff FTA member. Even if the tariff for a product is relatively high for all the FTA members, trade deflection could still occur if the product enjoys duty-free importation (or duty-drawback) under some manufacturing incentives programme.

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3.1. The Basic ROO used in FTAs

Discussions were held in GATT/WTO about harmonising the non-preferential ROO,

but no multilateral discipline was agreed upon, mainly because of the clause ‘equally for

all purposes’ in the proposed Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO).2 Nonetheless, the Kyoto

Convention (originally adopted in 1973 and revised in 2000) provided general concepts for

determining origin, used also as guidelines for ROO in most trading arrangements. First,

goods can be categorised as either wholly obtained (produced) or non-wholly obtained

(produced). This yields the first basic ROO – the ‘wholly obtained’ (WO) criteria. WO would

apply to goods that are produced or ‘obtained’ domestically and is thus a clear basis for

conferring origin.

For non-wholly obtained goods, determination takes into account whether a

minimal operation was carried out or if the process involved substantial transformation.

Minimal operation refers to simple processing that is negligible enough for the goods to

still merit originating status. Packaging, for example, would not change the status of origin

of the product. Rules of origin for non-wholly obtained goods are based on substantial

transformation criteria.

Three basic approaches are used to determine whether substantial transformation

has occurred to merit originating status. The first is the value-added criterion (VA), which

requires a (minimum) percentage of value added created at the last place of the production

process. The second is the tariff-heading criterion, also referred to as change in tariff

classification (CTC), which requires that processing in the exporting country results in a

product classified under a different heading in the customs tariff classification of the

Harmonized System of Tariff Nomenclatures than its intermediate inputs. The third is the

specified process rule (SPR) or technical test, which determines, on a case-by-case basis,

specific production activities or specific processing operations that may confer originating

status. This could be a ‘positive test’, which would confer originating status if certain

production or sourcing processes are complied with, or a ‘negative test’ which specifies

that certain production or sourcing processes would not confer originating status

2. Balestrieri, 2014.


98

(UNCTAD, 2002). A prime example of the SPR is the so-called yarn forward (sometimes

from fiber to fabric) or a two-step rule for textile and garment products.

3.2. Wholly obtained (WO)

The WO as ROO is obviously very restrictive if applied to mean 100 percent VA

(regional or local) in products at higher levels of processing (stages of production).

However, following the Kyoto Convention, with listing of wholly obtained products (usually

in Chapters 1 to 15 of the HS code) and in waste and scraps, some FTAs identify in their

Product Specific Rules (PSRs) the HS lines that are WO, which almost makes conferring

origin of these goods automatic when classified under these HS codes. For some FTAs,

specifically the AJCEP, the concept behind WO is operationalised as CTC.3 Hence, WO and

CTC for Chapters 1 to 15 could be equivalent in practice (with regards to ease/cost of

compliance).

Table 4.1 shows the main ROO for Chapters 1 to 15. There is convergence for the

ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA), the ASEAN–Korea Free Trade Agreement

(AKFTA), and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), using

generally WO while AJCEP uses Change in Chapter (two-digit classification). In contrast, the

ACFTA still applies the general rule of RVC(40). From the point of view of manufacturers,

for these chapters, these rules would most likely result in the same eligibility for

compliance. As such, what type of ROO the RCEP should adopt should not be the issue as

long as it takes into account what is most efficient and easiest to administer.

3. In most cases, for ROO a change in chapter (CC) is required (sometimes with limitation as to where change is coming from) and in other cases, simply a change in tariff heading (CTH).

Chapter 4

99

Table 4.1: Main ROO for Chapters 1 to 15 in ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs

Chapter Heading Product

Description ATIGA AKFTA ACFTA AJCEP AANZFTA

1 live animals WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

2 meat of

animals RVC(40) or CC

WO RVC(40) CC excfrch1*

CC

3 fish, live,

chilled frozen WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

4

milk, cream, butter, cheese

RVC(40) or CTSH

WO RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CTSH

407 eggs in shell WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

410 honey WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

5 501 human hair,

unworked WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

6

other live plants and flowers – live, cut, foliage, parts

RVC(40) or CTSH

WO RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CTSH

7 Vegetables –

fresh, chilled WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

8

801 coconuts – desiccated

RVC(40) or CC

WO RVC(40) CC RVC (40) or CC

802 other nuts, in shell

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

803 Bananas, including plantains, fresh or dried

RVC(40) or CC

WO from any AKFTA Party

RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CC

804–

810 other fruits and nuts, fresh

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

9

coffee, tea RVC(40) or CC

WO RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CC

RVC(40) or CTSH

RVC(45) RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CTSH

spices RVC(40) or CC


10 wheat, rice,

other cereals WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

11

flour, groat, pellets, etc.

RVC(40) or CC



100

RVC(40) or CC

WO from any AKFTA Party


starches RVC(40) or CC

CC or RVC(40)


12

soya beans, ground nuts, oil seeds, etc.

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

flour and meals of seeds

RVC(40) or CTH

WO RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CTH

seeds for sowing

RVC(40) or CC


plants & parts primarily for perfumery, pharmacy, insecticide

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

13

vegetable gums, resins

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

saps and extracts

RVC(40) or CC


14

bamboos, rattan, etc. for plaiting

WO WO RVC(40) CC WO

for stuffing RVC(40) or CC


15

fats and oils from plants and animals

RVC(40) or CC or SPR by refining

CTH or RVC(40)

RVC(40) CC RVC(40) or CC or SPR by refining

Note: * excluding change from Chapter 1. Source: Author’s tabulation.

3.3. Regional Value Content (RVC)

A major advantage of the RVC is that, in essence, it is a direct measure of substantial

transformation. Nonetheless, the problems with the use of RVC are well known. Most often

cited is that it is subject to exchange rate and price fluctuation, which leads to uncertainties

and adds to compliance and administration costs. Another major difficulty is that firms are

hesitant to disclose price and cost data and other required information. Even for large

Chapter 4

101

firms, this could entail substantial costs, especially for those with multiple products. There

could, for example, be a need for separate accounting and extra personnel to take care of

proving origin. There are even greater difficulties for small and medium enterprises (SMEs).

Most SMEs, especially in least developed countries (LDCs), lack sophistication and know-

how in accounting and finance as well as a formal organisation with a readily available flow

chart. Required documentation for export and origin determination may not be easily

produced.

Other rules, however, might not make some products eligible for the FTA

preference. In addition, there is an advantage of RVC for goods using numerous inputs or

components.

The RVC is most commonly used as ROO in ATIGA and the ASEAN+1 FTAs for

electronic and automotive products. As an illustration, table 4.2 presents the ROO for

Chapter 87 (automotive products) in ATIGA and the ASEAN+1 FTAs.

Table 4.2: ROO for Automotive Products (Chapter 87) in ATIGA and the ASEAN+1 FTAs

ATIGA HS lines

RVC(40) or CTH 9

RVC(40) 66

RVC(40) or CTH or Specific Rule 1

AKFTA HS lines

CTH or RVC(40) 51

RVC(45) 25

ACFTA HS lines

RVC(40) 76

AJCEP HS lines

RVC(40) 47

RVC(40) or CTH 29

AANZFTA HS lines

RVC(40) or CTH 22

RVC(40) 50

RVC(40) + CTSH 3

RVC(40) or CC 1

HS 87 group total HS lines 76 Source: Medalla (2011).


102

3.4. Change in Tariff Classification (CTC)

With difficulties faced in the use of RVC, many FTAs also make use of CTC as a rule

for determining origin. Again, the advantages are well known. These include the simplicity

in application and verification as well as the clarity and predictability of the method. The

main disadvantage is that it relies on the use of the Harmonized System, which is not

designed to reflect degree of substantial transformation. Many products with enough

originating materials may not qualify because the level of classification between inputs and

outputs remains the same. It could also be a disadvantage to firms using numerous inputs.

In addition, the HS code used could sometimes be interpreted differently across countries.

This interpretation can sometimes be people dependent, that is, it would depend on the

customs official receiving the goods. Any such problems could of course be resolved in due

course, but they would already have entailed losses for the importer/exporter.

3.5. Specific Process Rule

Bearing in mind the objectives of the RCEP, it should ideally be used only as a

supplemental test of origin because of its rigidity and the difficulty of defining a process

test for the enormous array of products. Moreover, with technological change occurring

more and more rapidly, such rules should be continuously updated to accommodate

changes in production methods and promote deeper regional integration, with freer flow

of products and factors of production. The negotiation process to come up with SPRs could

also be more susceptible to industry lobby groups dictating outcomes in their favour,

because drafters and administrators would have to rely upon the industry for technical

information (La Nasa, 1995). SPR should be used sparingly for these reasons, but most FTAs

have commonly used SPRs for certain products, notably textiles and garments.

On the whole, that there are advantages and disadvantages to the various criteria

points to the need to provide exporters with some options.

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103

4. Profile of ROO in the ASEAN and the ASEAN+1 FTAs

ATIGA and ASEAN+1 FTAs use a General Rule (GR) for ROO. ATIGA, AANZFTA,

AKFTA, and AJCEP share the same GR of coequal rule of RVC or change in tariff heading

(CTH). Product-specific rules are refinements of the GR resulting from the ROO

negotiations. An interview with a government official describes the process for some FTAs

as a series of steps. The initial step entails going through the entire list of products from

which first of all the GR is determined and agreed on and a second step involves negotiating

PSRs, which are a result of more in-depth negotiations.

In the case of ASEAN, at its early stage, the AFTA ROO adopted RVC(40) as the

general rule. However, studies found low utilisation of AFTA and identified difficulties in

the RVC criterion as one of the reasons for it. Hence, subsequent reforms were sought and

implemented, amongst them the introduction of CTC as a coequal rule. In ATIGA, which

was implemented in 2009, the general rule adopted is the coequal rule of RVC(40) or CTH,

substantially relaxing its ROO regime.

Nonetheless, PSR negotiations could lead to either more restrictive ROO

(protection) or more liberal ROO (exporter-led). Usually, if this leads to the adoption of

additional specific requirements (e. g., about a specific process or where inputs/materials

come from), they become more restrictive.

Medalla (2011) provides a mapping of the ROO of ATIGA, ASEAN–China FTA

(ACFTA), AKFTA, AJCEP, and AANZFTA. On the whole, the study finds numerous types of

ROO used across ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs, even after grouping together similar types in

one category. As such, there could be more variation within each grouping. (See Table 4.3.)

The variation arises within and amongst FTAs because of the differences in the

application of the basic ROO discussed above. In general, the variation is due to the

following:

The basic ROO could be used in some combination. This could be of two types:

either in a more liberal manner as options (the so-called coequal rules) or in a more

restrictive manner as ‘plus’ rules where two or more rules need to be complied

with.

For SPR, there would different specific processes required for different products

across different FTAs. This usually happens in the case of textiles and garments.


104

For RVC, there could be a variation in the cut-off level used. For example, RVC(40)

– regional value content of no less than 40 percent or RVC(35) –regional value

content of no less than 35 percent.

For CTC, there would be variation in the level of classification where change is

required. For example, a change in chapter (CC), a change in tariff heading (CTH),

or a change in tariff subheading (CTSH) across products and across different FTAs.

On top of these, there could be additional specific requirements specified for

different products for different FTAs. For example, CTSH ‘except change coming

from some classification or provided the materials are sourced’ accordingly, etc.

Table 4.3: Frequency by Type of ROO Used in ASEAN+1 FTAs

ROO Type ATIGA AKFTA ACFTA AJCEP AANZFTA

Single Rule

WO 185 458 8 3 294

CC 61 1 735 248 CTH 4 137 107 CTSH 8 RVC(<40) 36

RVC(40) 147 22 4659 219 68

RVC(>40) 6

CC with exception* 258 3 CTH with exception* 20 10 Various** 3 43

Liberal Coequal Rule

RVC(40) or CTH 2782 4076 122 3057 2204

RVC(40) or CTH or SPR 24

RCV(40) or CTSH 706 61 33 1072

RVC(40) or CTH or RVC(35) + CTSH 125 195

RVC(40) or CTH or Textile Rule 340 6

RVC(40) or CC or Textile Rule 453

Subtotal 4406 4137 122 3090 3501

% share in total 84.3% 79.2% 2.3% 59.2% 67.0% Less Liberal Coequal Rule

RVC(40) or CC 437 487 7 126 583

Various** 49 10 427 628 367 Total # of 6-digit HS(2002) Lines 5224 5224 5224 5224 5224

Source: Medalla (2011).

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As expected, ACFTA uses RVC most extensively as it uses RVC(40) as the general

rule. There have been some concessions for some products (mainly in textile and garments)

where reforms were introduced in these PSRs that make use of other options. In contrast,

AJCEP relies more on CTC. This follows the principle that CTC is simpler and likely to be

easier to apply and comply with. However, AJCEP uses a lot of exceptions either in terms

of specifying where change can (or cannot) come from and where certain sources of inputs

should come from.

As mentioned above, ATIGA has been undertaking ROO reforms, which came up

with PSRs that are generally intended to encourage better utilisation of the FTA. As a result,

ATIGA has more HS lines with coequal rule using ‘RVC(40) or CTSH,’ which are more liberal

than the general rule [RVC(40) or CTH]. AANZFTA, which was concluded later, provided for

even more HS lines with the more liberal coequal rule of ‘RVC(40) or CTSH.’

5. Analysis and Recommendations

Medalla (2011) found significant convergence amongst four of the five East Asian

FTAs covered in the study (ATIGA, AKFTA, ACFTA, AJCEP, and AANZFTA).4 This is indicated

by the share of (6-digit) HS lines with the same, or nearly the same, ROO. In particular, 28

percent of HS lines have the same ROO for four out of the five FTAs. Moreover, for almost

the same number of HS lines, there is near convergence with three FTAs having the same

ROO and one or two FTAs having more liberal options (usually using CTSH instead of CTH).

In total, there is near convergence in more than half (55 percent) of the HS lines for four

out of the five FTAs. This arises mainly from their use of the common general rule – RVC(40)

or CTH. (See Table 4.4.)

4. The discussion excludes the ASEAN–India FTA, which at the time of writing still only used the general rule

of CTSH+RVC35.


106

Table4.4: ROO Convergence Incidence (excludes ASEAN–India FTA)

Level of convergence # of 6-digit HS lines % of Total

For all 5 FTAs 181 3.5%

Near Convergence (with more liberal options in some cases) 137

Same ROO for 5 FTAs 44

For 4 FTAs 2,871 55.0%

Near Convergence (with more liberal options in some cases) 1,407

Same ROO for 4 FTAs 1,464 28.0%

For 3 FTAs 630 12.1%



For 2 FTAs 1,027 19.7%



Different ROO across FTAs 515 9.9%

Total # of HS Lines (6-digit) 5,224 100.0% Source: Medalla (2011).

1. Implications for the RCEP

Multiple FTAs (e.g. bilateral FTAs, ASEAN, ASEAN+1) and corresponding multiple

ROO create many problems. For one, it could create confusion for exporters about which

FTA and ROO to use. Even for large companies with the competence to cope with ROO, this

could increase costs if they have to deal with multiple countries in ASEAN (both as exporter

and importer). These companies would need to have more complicated accounting

methods, more detailed information, and a more comprehensive database5 and would

usually need to deploy a designated team or employ a third party to manage the additional

requirements. On the part of the authority that issues the Certificate of Origin (COO), it

could make the process of issuance of the COO more complex, requiring greater

competence to examine, verify, and issue COO. Hence, multiple, non-uniform ROO across

5 The firm would need proper attribution of which inputs go to what outputs and markets, which is difficult given multiple products and joint production processes.

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multiple FTAs could result in increased costs. Indeed, according to the survey of firms

carried out for this study,6 firms considered the harmonisation of ROO to be very useful.

For the RCEP, however, it is not only harmonisation that matters. In particular,

harmonisation upwards of the various ASEAN+1 FTAs is critical.

The case of Japan could be instructive for the RCEP. Japan has bilateral FTAs with

most ASEAN countries. At the same time, it has a regional FTA with ASEAN–AJCEP. Thus,

an ASEAN country exporting to Japan has two options for using trade preference – AJCEP

or the Japan Bilateral EPA (JBEPA). The exporter, if given the right information, would

choose whichever would yield larger benefits. This would depend on two factors:

• the difference in the margin of preference (MOP) between AJCEP and JBEPA;

• the ease/cost of complying with the respective applicable ROO.

Currently, there is very little utilisation of AJCEP in ASEAN countries that have a

bilateral FTA (JBEPA) with Japan. The main reason is the faster reduction in tariffs for the

bilateral FTA and thus a larger MOP, but this is also possibly due to a more liberal ROO in

the JBEPA (Medalla, 2011). Eventually, for both AJCEP and JBEPA, there would be zero

difference in the MOP when tariff reduction schedules are both completed (assuming that

they have the same tariff coverage for tariff reduction). Thus, when that time comes, only

the ROO with the same MOP would matter. The FTA with the best (i.e. more liberal and

easier to comply with) ROO would prevail. If the ROO for the bilateral FTA (JBEPA) are more

liberal on the whole, AJCEP will become, in effect, only nominal. Of course, it could be

mixed. Some products could have a more liberal ROO in JBEPA than AJCEP and vice versa

for other products. The result, in any case, is that AJCEP added another layer of ROO, and

no harmonisation is effected. Thus, for AJCEP to be more than nominal, it should harmonise

the ROO of its bilateral FTAs at the most liberal ROO. This does not mean a uniform ROO

across products since different products have different characteristics and sensitivities.

In parallel, there are the various ASEAN+1 FTAs and the proposed RCEP amongst

the same countries. Hence, there could be similar implications for the RCEP and ASEAN+1

6 A report on the survey/interviews is found in the Annex of this chapter. Our findings are consistent with the results of a survey of firms carried out by JETRO on FTA utilisation of Japanese firms.


108

FTAs. If the RCEP harmonised the ROO of the various ASEAN+1FTAs at less liberal ROO, the

result could be either:

the RCEP adds another layer of ROO (and FTAs); or

the RCEP is only nominal, at least from the perspective of ASEAN, which already has

an FTA with all the negotiating parties of the RCEP.

For the dialogue partners, there could still be additional advantages from the RCEP

even with less liberal ROO, because there are no existing bilateral FTAs amongst them

(except for Japan–India). Even then, the benefits for these countries are fewer as

cumulation is limited with restrictive ROO.

Hence, the bottom line is that ideally, the RCEP should adopt the most liberal ROO per

product amongst ATIGA and the various ASEAN+1 FTAs.

There are, of course, the usual difficulties in harmonisation upwards (seeking the

most liberal ROO amongst the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement [ATIGA] and ASEAN+1

FTAs). The protectionist pressures for some products could be strong. Some products could

be more difficult than others in terms of finding a common, liberal ROO. The choice of

which is the optimal ROO will also be more difficult if there is a wide divergence in the ROO

of the different ASEAN+1 FTAs. There are also technical and administrative concerns to

consider.

Nonetheless, harmonisation upwards should not be a problem for ASEAN. Indeed,

it is in its interest that the RCEP should harmonise to the most liberal ROO, as discussed

above. The difficulties might lie with ASEAN’s dialogue partners – in particular China, Korea,

and Japan – which have no FTA amongst them and tend to lean more towards less liberal

ROOs than ASEAN. Will the dialogue partners be willing to accord liberal ROO to ASEAN (as

this could imply a more liberal ROO than provided under the respective ASEAN+1 FTA) and

to each other? Australia and New Zealand had been generally leaning towards liberal ROO

in partnership with ASEAN countries. The results of email interviews conducted with New

Zealand policy makers are consistent with this observation (i.e. that New Zealand would

seek the most liberal ROO regime for the RCEP). Australia would most likely be similarly

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inclined. How amenable will the other ASEAN dialogue partners be to relaxing the ROO for

contentious products?

Some product groups are more difficult than others (e.g. textile and garments) in

terms of harmonising to the most liberal ROO in the RCEP. Some dialogue partners might

find it more difficult than others, especially India and China.

Table 4.5a: ROO for Chapters 25 to 39

Chapter Product description

ATIGA AKFTA ACFTA AJCEP AANZFTA

# of HS lines w/ these ROO

Total # of HS lines in category

25 iron pyrites, graphites, quartz, calcium phosphates, etc.

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH

68 70

26 iron, other meta, ores, and concentrates

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTH (GR)

24 36

– slag, dross, scaling, and other wastes from metal manufacturing

WO RVC(40) or CTH


Origin shall be conferred to a good of this subheading that is derived from prod’n or consumption in a Party

12

27 coal, lignite, petroleum oils, gas, etc.

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTH

41 43

– waste oil RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


Origin shall be conferred to a good of this subheading derived from prod’n or consumption in a Party

2

28 Inorganic compounds

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

171 181


110

29 Organic compounds

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

293 300

30 glands, blood, medicaments, other pharmaceuticals

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

29 29

31 fertilizers RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

25 25

32 tanning, dyes, coloring substances, essential oils

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

40 46

33–34

Cosmetics and other beauty products

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTH

34 53

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTSH

19

35–38 Casein, albumins, gelatins, peptides, rosin and resin acids, insecticides, fungicides, pickling preparations, etc.

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) GR /CC exc CH4/ CTH

RVC(40) or CTSH

44 129

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) CTH RVC(40) or CTH

76

Heading 3825 – wastes, sludge

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH



9

39 Polymers, silicones, etc., in primary forms

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH


RVC(40) or CTH

58 62

Wastes, parings, and scraps

RVC(40) or CTH

RVC(40) or CTH



4

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Table 4.5b: Summary for ROO in Chapters 25 to 39

# of HS lines w/

these ROO

Total # of HS lines in

category

# of HS lines in selected chapters 949 974

% share in total HS lines – all products (5,224 lines) 18.2% 18.6%

# of HS lines with convergence for 4 ASEAN+1 FTAs at RVC40 or CTH (GR)

629

% share in total HS lines of product group 64.6%

# of HS lines with near convergence for 4 ASEAN+1 FTAs, with AANZFTA more liberal at RVC40 or CTSH

922

% share in total HS lines of product group 97.1% Source: Author’s tabulation.

In Chapters 25 to 39, for example, ATIGA, AJCEP, AKFTA, and AANZFTA already have

the same ROO for 64.6 percent of tariff lines. (See Table 4.5a and Table 4.5b.) It is different

only for AANZFTA as it adopts a more liberal coequal rule of RVC(40) or CTSH. Hence, there

is already some convergence for more than 97 percent of the HS lines in these chapters. It

would be ideal if all adopt the AANZFTA ROO. This would be a point for negotiation. ASEAN

should join Australia and New Zealand in pushing for the AANZFTA ROO in these HS lines.

Note also that these chapters already comprise more than 18 percent of the total number

of HS lines.

The same could be said for Chapters 1 to 15. (Refer back to Table 4.1.) The ROO

used are mainly WO. AJCEP and ACFTA differ. In the case of AJCEP, the ROO used is CC (or

CTH in a few cases), but as previously noted, WO and CC are not different in substance for

these chapters. ACFTA uses RVC(40), which is theoretically more liberal than WO or CC. In

practice, however, for these chapters which cover mainly primary products, the RVC(40)

may be similar to WO or CC in terms of ease of compliance. Hence, the possibilities are to

choose either WO or CC or adopt a coequal rule between the two.

The textile and garments sector is amongst the most contentious. It employs many

different ROO across FTAs, using two-step rules in many cases.


112

Table 4.6: Examples of Different ROO used in Chapters 50 to 63: Textile and Garments

GR or Textile Rule

GR

RVC(40) or Textile Rule

CC+SPR

CC

CTH except from specified subheadings + SPR

GR or Textile Rule requiring 2 processes

CTH except from specific subheadings + SPR or other SPR

CTH or Textile Rule requiring 2 subsequent processes

CC or RVC(40)

RVC(40) or Textile Rule or CC

RVC(40) or Textile Rule or CC with SPR

CC with specific limitations, or RVC(40)

RVC(40) or Textile Rule

Manufacture from yarns, provided that the necessary process stipulated in the appendix is undertaken Source: Medalla (2011).

This is also indicated by the lack of convergence in ROO for textile and garments in ASEAN

and ASEAN+1 FTAs. (See table 4.7.)

Table 4.7: Incidence of ROO Convergence in ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs

for Chapters 50 to 53: Textile and Garments

Chapters 50–63: Textile and Garments # of 6-digit HS lines % share

Convergence for 3 ASEAN+1 FTAs 98 11.6%

Near Convergence at RVC(40) or CTH for ATIGA, AKFTA, and AANZFTA, with additional coequal Textile Rule option for ATIGA

95

Convergent at WO for ATIGA, AKFTA, and AJCEP 3

Convergence for 2 ASEAN+1 FTAs 728 85.8%

Near Convergence at RVC or CC for ATIGA & AKFTA, with additional coequal Textile Rule option for ATIGA

183

Convergent at RVC or Textile Rule For ATIGA & ACFTA (in some with additional option for ATIGA)

290

Convergent at RVC(40) or CC for AKFTA & AANZFTA (GR for ATIGA)

15

Near Convergence at RVC or CTH for ATIGA and AKFTA, with additional co-equal Textile Rule option for ATIGA

240

Different ROO across FTAs 22 2.6%

Total # of HS lines 848 Source: Medalla (2011).

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However, there are some positive developments that could help. For example, the

trend in new FTAs indicates that ROO regimes are becoming more liberal as exemplified by

ATIGA and AANZFTA. There is also some convergence in origin certification procedures

(OCPs) across the RCEP countries. The COO forms used are identical, and the procedures

for verification requirements for COO issuance are similar (Medalla, 2011). In addition, as

noted in the discussion, there is significant convergence amongst ATIGA, AANZFTA, AKFTA,

and AJCEP. Most notably, a majority of the ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs already use the same

GR. ACFTA and AIFTA are the exceptions. Moreover, in the working groups of ASEAN, there

are ongoing efforts to simplify and harmonise OCPs. Finally, firms have been gaining more

experience in ROO and FTAs.

To summarise the main points from the discussion:

Harmonisation matters. Multiple, non-uniform ROO across multiple FTAs could

result in increased costs. Indeed, in the survey of firms done for this study, firms

consider the harmonisation of ROO to be very useful.

For the RCEP, however, it is not only harmonisation that matters. In particular,

harmonisation upwards of the ROO of the various ASEAN FTAs is critical.

There are difficulties in harmonisation upwards. Amongst the factors to consider

are the technical and administrative concerns (question of implementability), the

protectionist pressures against liberal rules, and the fact that some products are

more difficult than others.

However, there are positive developments that help:

o The trend in ROO becoming more liberal as exemplified by ATIGA and

AANZFTA (Medalla, 2011)

o Firms gaining more experience in ROO and FTAs

o Convergence in origin certification procedures across the RCEP countries

(Medalla, 2011)

o Use of same GR in all of the ASEAN FTAs, except ACFTA and AIFTA

o Significant convergence amongst ATIGA, AANZFTA, AKFTA, and AJCEP

o Ongoing efforts to simplify and harmonise the origin certification

procedures


114

Finally, we go back to the central objective of the RCEP, which is ‘to achieve a

modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial economic partnership

agreement amongst the ASEAN Member States (AMS) and ASEAN’s FTA partners’.

Accordingly, ROO in the RCEP should be more concerned about trade facilitation than trade

deflection.

2. Recommendations7

A key recommendation for the RCEP is to use as its GR the coequal ROO of RVC(40)

or CTH. It is already the GR for ATIGA, AJCEP, AKFTA, and AANZFTA. Starting with a GR is

similar to adopting a negative list approach. Whereas for the past FTAs there was probably

a need to go over all the product lines intensively before adopting the coequal rule of

RVC(40) or CTH, which is considered fairly liberal, the same bottoms-up approach is not as

necessary for the RCEP, as these countries would already have learned lessons from these

previous FTAs. Choosing the GR already commonly used by the majority of the ASEAN FTAs

provides a practical approach towards a liberal set of ROO. India and China will have to

make the biggest adjustment, but this is where harmonisation upwards would have the

biggest impact. Adopting this GR is supported by industry, especially exporters who are the

users of the FTAs. (See annex 1 of the study.)

Going down to the PSRs, the general guideline for negotiation is along the same

lines: lean towards more liberal rules. There are two general approaches that could be used

to this end. Medalla (2011) found the ROO of ATIGA and AANZFTA to be the least

restrictive. One possibility is to use either ATIGA ROO or AANZFTA ROO as a template.

Another is to pick and choose the best (least restrictive) ROO amongst the ASEAN FTAs by

HS line. This is what would be ideal to bring about harmonisation upwards. If a particular

choice for the best ROO is not clear (or difficult to agree on), another option would be to

make the PSRs for the particular HS line of the respective ASEAN+1 FTA coequal. Hence, if

the PSR for a particular HS code is WO for three of the ASEAN FTAs, CC for one, and RVC(40)

for another, the proposed ROO for the RCEP could be WO or CC or RVC(40) for this HS line.

7. This part greatly benefits from interviews and a survey undertaken by the author.

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Either option could be difficult to adopt. Some products could be very contentious.

To address this concern, a first step could be to trim down the list of contentious products

where more in-depth assessment could be undertaken. Usually, the use of specific

requirements in the ROO would be the source of contention. As much as possible, the

RCEP–ROO should avoid the use of additional specific requirements.

The advantage of a large grouping of countries, such as the RCEP, is that cumulation

becomes inherent as a basis for conferring origin. Originating products could now come

from anywhere in the member parties. Cumulation could be impeded, however, if certain

ROO provisions specifically add limitations (e.g. source of certain raw materials). To avoid

this, the cumulation principle should be made explicit in the RCEP. Indeed, interviews with

firms and policy makers have consistently brought out the importance of cumulation.

The FTAs provide for a minimum value of imports that would not require a CO. This

is US$200 for the ASEAN+1 FTAs. Raising the minimum value could be a very important

provision with a potentially substantial impact, especially for SMEs.

Similarly, a waiver of CO (ROO) for products with MFN tariffs below 5 percent is

another measure to consider. Medalla (2011) pointed out that for the majority of countries

in East Asia, more than 70 percent of tariff lines for nonagricultural products are already

below 5 percent. This could have a huge potential impact on intraregional trade in general.

SMEs, in particular, would benefit from the reduction in the costs to utilise the FTA for

exporting and importing.

The difficulty in complying with the applicable ROO (and the degree of

restrictiveness) depends not only on the type of ROO used but also on the OCP being

followed. In this regard, a significant degree of harmonisation has been implemented

amongst the ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs with reform efforts to streamline procedures. First,

they use almost identical CO forms 8 with the same cells and format for required

information. All require COO on a per-shipment basis. The requirements on pre-export

verification are also similar (Medalla and Rosellon, 2011). However, implementation across

countries differs in a key element – the Certification Issuing Authority.

For ASEAN, China, and India, the CO-issuing authority is a designated government

agency. On the other hand, Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand have given the

8 ATIGA uses form D; ACFTA, form E; AKFTA, form AK; AJCEP, form AJ; and AANZFTA, form AANZ.


116

authority for issuing the CO to their designated private chambers of commerce and

industry. For Japan and Korea, the government (the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and

Industry or METI for Japan and Customs for Korea) can also issue COO. With its huge trade

volume, Japan especially sees the need to use the large network of the Japan Chamber of

Commerce and Industry (JCCI).9 This makes for greater visibility and availability of the

service to industries. The same rationale holds for Korea. It would be very useful, therefore,

to include this provision in the RCEP.

In the firm survey carried out for the Philippines, the majority of firms covered

preferred the COO to be issued by a government agency. There is reliance on the official

channel to provide credibility and trust. The COO are thus more readily accepted. Firms

also receive assistance from government in meeting or fulfilling the documentation

requirements of the CO. As part of its reforms, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) official

interviewed mentioned that the bureau is looking at transferring the authority to another

agency (e.g. the Philippine Tariff Commission) to lessen its workload. The Tariff Commission

has the expertise in HS tariff classification and industry operations. The BOC official

indicated that it has not considered transferring the CO-issuing authority to the industry

chamber. On the other hand, the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI)

does not appear to be keen either to take over the function as this requires new capacity

and some familiarity with the functions and responsibility. Nonetheless, this third party

certification should be an option in the RCEP as is the current practice.

A major recommendation that has been put forward to further improve the ROO

process, and consequently FTA utilisation, is self-certification.

Using the self-certification method has advantages and disadvantages. The first

advantage is a reduction in the cost of complying with third party certification (CO issuer)

in terms of man-hours needed. A second advantage is the time factor. The elimination of

third party certification saves time in the application process for CO issuance itself. In

addition, there is potential time-saving from possible interruption if there are questions on

the CO in the destination country. With third party certification, the response time would

be subject to the third party issuer’s office hours, which in turn could lead to substantial

delays. One of the respondents in our interviews, for example, explained that this

9 Twenty-two chamber chapters all over Japan have the capacity and authority to issue COO.

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happened to their early shipments when the CO was questioned in the receiving country.

It proved costly because there was no office in the country of CO issuance when the

shipment arrived. From that time onwards, they rescheduled the shipping date to avoid

the same problem. If self-certification is allowed, there would be greater flexibility since

questions on the CO can be responded to immediately.

However, there could also be disadvantages in the use of self-certification. There is

the issue of trust and credibility. In this regard, measures must be put in place to ensure

the veracity of the CO. Complying with these requirements could entail additional costs for

the exporter.

There are generally two stages in the OCP: pre-export verification and CO issuance.

The first stage usually has two steps (the pre-export verification process). In sum, there are

three steps in the OCP:

1. Firm registration (requirements specified by country, subject to verification)

2. Origin verification (by product)

3. CO issuance

In the ATIGA and the various ASEAN +1 FTAs, the system adopted is third party

certification (by the CO authority, either the authorised government agency itself or the

authorised chamber/industry association). The CO-issuing authority is involved in all of the

three steps.

At the high end of the spectrum, self-certification would be fully allowed or

accepted as in the case of the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA). In NAFTA, there is

no authority to check the authenticity of the declaration. It is purely based on the

exporters’ declaration. As a result, NAFTA employs rigid ex-post checks and verification.

This could be one source of difficulty for both the exporter and the receiving country of

export destination. As such, some FTAs adopt a ‘hybrid’ self-certification process. In this

regard, the common practice is to involve a ‘third party’ (i.e. the assigned CO authority) to

be involved in the first step. This is the case, for example, in Japan’s self-certification in its

FTA with Switzerland. Exporters should first register, subject to verification and approval

by a ‘third party.’ In the case of the Singapore–Australia FTA and the pilot self-certification

for ATIGA, a third party is involved in both steps 1 and 2. Once steps 1 and 2 are complied


118

with, the exporter could issue its own CO (step 3). This approach has the advantage of being

more credible to receiving countries, as it involves some third party verification prior to

exportation. At the same time, it provides less cumbersome procedures (lower cost) for

exporters since COO from a third party are no longer needed for every shipment.

Officials in Japan and New Zealand also expressed that they have no problem

receiving self-certified COO because they have a working risk assessment system.

In addition, there is always the post-audit verification system. This is one possible

area where problems could arise for exporters. Even one instance of post-audit verification

could be very costly, especially if done indiscriminately. As such, the Japan Automotive

Manufacturers Association (JAMA) proposes that there should be no direct verification

(with the trader/manufacturer). That is, the verification request should be dealt with

between governments.

Self-certification and third party certification have advantages and disadvantages.

Some problems could be addressed by adopting some form of hybrid self-certification.

Giving firms a choice between this and a third party certification scheme could be adopted

in the RCEP. Indeed, there are ongoing discussions on and there is pilot testing of the use

of self-certification in ASEAN. And dialogue partner countries are already using the system.

One question that has been raised is: should traders be allowed to register for self-

certification? A legitimate point is that the knowledge of origin status lies with the

manufacturer, not the trader. As such, it could be vulnerable to possible abuse. On the

other hand, this could be very advantageous for SMEs. A possible compromise is to allow

traders to be included to a limited extent. For example, there should be a clear, verifiable

relationship between the trader and the manufacturer. In addition, the process could start

with traders with proven track record. Hence, ways to include traders on a very selective

basis should be explored.

Finally, the RCEP–ROO should use the facilitative provisions already found in ATIGA

and the ASEAN+1 FTAs. Based on responses by the firms (and policy makers)

surveyed/interviewed, these provisions are considered to be very useful (See annex 1.)

They are the following provisions in particular:

• More liberal use of de minimis provision, as it pertains to CTC.

A de minimis provision is valuable not only in simplifying administration, but more

importantly, in reducing the cost of compliance in the use of the CTC rule for exporters.

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119

• Third party invoice and back-to-back CO

Enabling provisions for intermediary trade, especially given the importance of global

production networks and supply chains, could be crucial. For example, within a supply

chain, a batch of goods could pass through a number of countries. A simple case is when

a batch of good enters first one member country in the chain and then some portion is

later re-exported to another member country. In this case, a back-to-back CO (a fresh

CO is issued on the basis of the original CO from a member country) would greatly

facilitate the process. Another case could be where the production could involve

several FTA member countries and the goods exported to another FTA member

country. The goods produced and exported qualify as originating using the relevant

FTA–ROO criterion, but the invoice for an input comes from a third party. In this case,

allowing the use of a third party invoice is important.

• Use of Advanced Ruling

On the ground, there could always be cases where there would be different

interpretations of certain rules, often related to the particular person in charge present

and interpreting the rules. For example, in our interviews/survey, a common source of

difference in opinion is the applicable HS code for a product. There was also an

anecdotal case of different interpretations of ‘third party’. A provision for advanced

ruling that would allow the entry of the goods without further unnecessary delay (final

decision upon later review) would be a useful trade-facilitating provision.

References Balestrieri, E. (2014), Rules of Origin in International Trade: A Practical Guide, edited by M. Johnson

and I. Soininen, Surrey, UK: Trade Advocacy Fund.

La Nasa, J. (1995), ‘An Evaluation of the Uses and Importance of Rules of Origin, and the Effectiveness of the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on Rules of Origin in Harmonizing and Regulating Them’, Jean Monnet Working Paper Series No. 1, New York, NY: Jean Monnet Center, NYU School of Law.

Medalla, E.M. (2011), ‘Taking Stock of the ROOs in the ASEAN+1 FTAs: Toward Deepening East Asian Integration’, in C. J. Lee and M. Okabe (eds.), Comprehensive Mapping of FTAs in ASEAN and East Asia, ERIA Research Project Report, 2010–26, pp. 38–83.

Medalla, E.M. and M.A.D. Rosellon (2011), ‘ROOs in ASEAN+1 FTAs and the Value Chain in East Asia’, ERIA forthcoming publication.

Kawai, M. and G. Wignaraja (2010), ‘Asian FTAs: Trends, Prospects, and Challenges’, ADB Economics Working Paper Series, No. 226, Manila: ADB.


120

UNCTAD (2002), The Multilateral Trading System after DOHA. Trade and Development Report. Geneva, Switzerland: UNCTAD.

Urata, S. (2004), ‘Towards an East Asia Free Trade Area’, Policy Insights, Paris: OECD Development Centre.

121

Chapter 5

How Restrictive are ASEAN’s Rules of Origin?

Olivier Cadot University of Lausanne, CEPR and FERDI

Lili Yan ING

Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and University of Indonesia

We use a product-level gravity approach to estimate the effect of the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s product-specific rules of origin (ROO) on regional trade,

using original data on rules applicable at the six-digit level of the harmonized system.

Overall, we find that the average tariff ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of ASEAN’s ROO is 3.40

percent across all instruments and sectors. The trade-weighted average is 2.09 percent.

This moderate estimate is in line with the existing literature. However, we also find fairly

high AVEs for some sectors including leather, textile and apparel, footwear, and

automobiles. We also find that some rules are more restrictive than others; in this regard,

the Textile Rule stands out as a relatively more trade-inhibiting rule than others.


122

1. Introduction

Two major trends characterise the world trading system today. On the one hand, it is

increasingly structured by preferential trade agreements (PTAs), of which there are close

to 300 today, and a new one almost every month (Calvo–Pardo et al., 2009). On the other

hand, international trade has increasingly involved ‘trade in tasks’ within global value

chains (GVCs). Rules of origin (ROO) stand in the middle of these two major trends and

have the potential to make them incompatible, because they constrain the sourcing

choices of multinational firms along regional patterns dictated by existing PTAs, whereas

GVC optimisation may call for different choices. One of the challenges of ‘multilateralising

regionalism’ – an expression coined by Baldwin (2006) – is to prevent ROO from working

at cross-purposes with the rise of GVCs.

The issues are salient in East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), where regionalism is a relatively

recent phenomenon (see Kimura, 2010) but is spreading rapidly. Since the creation of the

ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 1992, the drive for regional trade liberalisation has

accelerated, in particular after the Asian currency crisis of the late 1990s. Although the

tariff-elimination schedule was more progressive in the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) than for instance in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),

it proceeded largely on time, and tariff elimination between the six founding members1

had been largely completed by 2010, i.e. only two years after the scheduled date, and

covered over 90 percent of intra-bloc trade (Calvo–Pardo et al., 2010). ASEAN+1

arrangements with its main trading partners were concluded and in effect in 2010. By

January 2010, ASEAN had five ASEAN+1 FTAs with its main trading partners – the Australia

and New Zealand (AANZFTA), the China (ACFTA), the Japan (AJCEP), the Korea (AKFTA), and

the India (AIFTA). ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 initiatives have gained momentum with their

upgrading to so-called track-1 level (government-to-government).2 Given that Most-

favoured nation (MFN) tariffs are still substantial in at least some of the member countries,

tariff preference margins can make a difference.

1 Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. ASEAN later expanded to Viet Nam, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Cambodia. 2 Simultaneously, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), launched in 2006 by Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore as Pacific-4 has gained considerable momentum and visibility with President Obama’s 2011 announcement that the US

would join (in September 2008, the US had announced it would join the negotiations in early 2009).

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Compared with other regional blocs, particularly in the West, East Asian and trans-

pacific regionalism have several distinguishing features. NAFTA and the European Union

(EU) association/partnership agreements were arguably of a hegemonic nature; for

instance, the EU Association agreements with some of its Mediterranean partners mandate

the harmonisation of non-tariff measures (NTMs) on EU standards; similarly, rules of origin

in both NAFTA and the EU’s Pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin system

(PANEURO) have been largely dictated by the Northern partner (the United States [US] and

EU, respectively). They were also characterised by strong hub-and-spoke trade structures.

By contrast, East Asian/Pacific regionalism brings together a multipolar region with several

economic and political heavyweights, including Japan, China, and the US, and a number of

mid-size but politically sophisticated partners like Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.

Second, and perhaps most importantly, a large chunk of the region’s trade is in

manufactured products (e.g. electronics) characterised by economies of scale and the

prevalence of large firms organised in cross-border value chains. Together, these features

imply that the political economy of ROO is likely to be quite different from that in NAFTA

or EU partnerships.

Many studies (for recent surveys, see Medalla and Balboa, 2009; Kelleher, 2013; Cadot

et al., 2006a and 2006b, and references therein) have looked into the drivers and effects

of ROO in PTAs. In principle, their objective is to prevent trade deflection in the absence of

external-tariff harmonisation. However, the literature has also highlighted their power to

depress preference uptake by forcing inefficient sourcing and by imposing fixed compliance

costs – paperwork and bureaucratic hassle – explaining sometimes low utilisation rates in

spite of high tariff-preference margins, as for textiles in NAFTA. Essentially, the political-

economy mechanism behind restrictive ROO in North–South agreements is double. First,

costly ROO are a way of ‘denying preferences’ granted to Southern producers and hence

of relieving the competitive pressures generated within the bloc by tariff phase-outs.

Second, when the Northern country has a comparative advantage in upstream, capital-

intensive sectors – like weaving in the textile & apparel sector, or the making of engines in

the automobile sector – ROO create a captive market for those intermediates in the

Southern partner where, under bilateral cumulation, assemblers have no choice but to

source those intermediates from the Northern (hegemonic) country.


124

Given the different patterns of economic and political fundamentals in the EAP region,

these political-economy drivers are likely to be weaker, although not necessarily absent.

First, as noted by Kimura (2010), neither Japan nor China, the region’s heavyweights, have

acted as engines of regional integration, as the US and EU did in their respective spheres

of influence. Japan, in particular, has not sought to create a Japan-centered hub-and-spoke

regional trade bloc. In part, this is because part of the motivation for US and EU trade

preferences with Southern partners – Mexico for the US; Central Europe and the

Mediterranean countries for the EU – was to create ‘mini-worlds’ where the gains from

specialisation could be reaped while at the same time maintaining some degree of trade

protection vis-à-vis efficient Asian countries, in particular in the textile & apparel sector

where high MFN tariffs made preferential liberalisation highly relevant.3 This motivation

was much weaker, although not necessarily absent in at least some sectors, for Japan.

Second, although there is no systematic data on firm-level control over GVCs,4 many

of the GVCs in the electronics sector are dominated by large firms, which internalise all

complementarities along it. Those firms have no interest in forcing inefficient sourcing at

any stage of processing. Even in the absence of vertical integration, subcontracting

relationships are rarely arms-length, and economies of scale are so strong that many

components are produced in a handful of companies serving the entire world market. In

such conditions, throwing in ROO to hurt the competitiveness of some of the downstream

assemblers to favour others makes little sense.

Thus, there is a prima facie reason to believe that ROO in the Asia–Pacific region are

less susceptible to distortion by special-interest capture than their equivalents in NAFTA

and PANEURO. However, they could still be trade-restricting because they are

unnecessarily complex or cumbersome to satisfy. Essentially this is an empirical question

that should be settled by statistical analysis. This is what we set out to do in this chapter,

using the variation in trade flows across country pairs and products as the identification

mechanism to detect any trade-inhibiting effect of ROO. Our exploration is guided by the

gravity equation, workhorse of much empirical work in international trade. We run a

disaggregated gravity equation at the product (HS6) level, controlling for the gravity’s usual

3 The idea that trade-diverting PTAs are more appealing politically than trade-creating ones was developed theoretically in Grossman and Helpman (1995). Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. 4 See Dedrick et al., 2008 for an in-depth study of two electronics value chains.

Chapter 5

125

determinants as well as tariffs and a vector of dummies marking the presence of each type

of product-specific RoO.

Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the analysis of ROO (2.1), trade effects of

ROO (2.2), ASEAN’s tariff and ROO (2.3), and trade patterns in the Asia–Pacific region (2.4).

Section 3 describes a theoretical framework, an estimation strategy, data, and data

sources. Section 4 presents empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.

2. Stylised Facts

2.1. Rules of Origin: How Do They Work?

While the legal form of ROO varies, they are essentially local content requirements

imposed on exporters of final goods who want to claim the benefit of preferential tariffs

within a trade bloc. In principle, their objective is twofold. First, it is to prevent arbitraging

of external tariff differences in FTAs. Second, it is to prevent superficial assembly

operations with little or no value added that would, de facto, extend the benefit of

preferential access to non-eligible intermediate producers upstream of those assembly

operations.

There are two broad types of ROO: product-specific rules and regime-wide rules.

Product-specific rules specify the minimum degree of local transformation needed to

qualify for preferential treatment. They typically take a limited number of legal forms, each

of which has advantages and disadvantages for exporters: changes in tariff classification,

regional value contents, or technical requirements (Figure 5.1).


126

Figure 5.1: Types of Product-specific ROO

Changes in tariff classification (CTC) impose a restriction that when a final good is

produced using intermediates imported from outside the bloc, it ought not to belong to

the same category as those intermediates. The tariff classification is typically the

harmonised system (HS), and the change can be specified at either the chapter level (HS2,

with 99 categories), the heading level (HS4, with over 1,000 categories), or sub-heading

(HS6, with over 5,000 categories). In principle, the lower the level (HS2 being the highest

and HS6 the lowest), the less stringent is the rule, as a jump from one subheading to

another may entail relatively minor transformation compared with a jump from one

chapter to another. However, the reality is more complex, as the HS system has narrower

categories for, say, textile & apparel than for machinery and equipment.

Regional value contents (RVCs) can take various forms, including a maximum share

of imported intermediates in total intermediates or a minimum share of local value added

in the product’s price. The definition of local value added (inclusion or not of overheads,

distribution, etc.) varies across agreements and is typically a subject of bargaining, as is the

price definition (ex-works price, i.e. factory-door, wholesale price, etc.). Some rules have

even used weight as the criterion, although this led to so many distortions that weight-

based criteria have largely been eliminated. One extreme case of value content is the

wholly-obtained category which allows no foreign content at all. Most agricultural

products, vegetable or animal, are subject to the wholly-obtained requirement. Finally,

Changes of tariff

classification

Regional value

contents

Technical

requirements

Exceptions

Change of chapter (CC)

Change of Heading (CH)

Change of Sub-Heading (CSH)

Change of Item (CI)

Allowances

THREE BROAD TYPES FOUR SUB-TYPES QUALIFYERS

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127

technical requirements can take as many forms as imagination allows, being sometimes

tailor-made to benefit narrow interests (see Hirsch, 2002; or Chase, 2007).5

Each product-specific ROO can be qualified by either an exception or an allowance.

Exceptions make the rule more stringent. For instance, applied to a change of tariff

subheading, an exception will specify that, if a final product belonging to subheading x is

assembled from imported intermediates, those must come from any subheading other

than x, except z. By contrast, allowances relax the stringency of ROO.

Regime-wide rules – essentially cumulation rules, the others being of secondary

importance – specify the treatment of intermediates imported from other countries in the

same bloc or countries with special status in terms of cumulation. There are three broad

types of cumulation: bilateral, diagonal, and full. Under bilateral cumulation (a clause that

applies only to bilateral FTAs), if an exporter from A exports to B, only intermediates from

A or B count as local. Figure 5.2 presents the value chain. Under diagonal cumulation, in an

FTA between A, B and C, when exporting to B, A can count intermediates from C as local.

Full cumulation is the most complicated, in particular in the case of a multi-stage

production process. Consider an FTA between three countries – A, B, and C – and the

following production process. A firm in A imports $25 of intermediate products from the

rest of the world (ROW) and does a first transformation involving $25 of local value added.

The firm then exports the resulting product, still an intermediate one, to B for a price of

$50. In B, another firm again transforms it, adding $10 more of intermediates imported

from the ROW and $40 of value added. Finally, the product is re-exported to C at a price of

$100. Assume that between the intermediates imported from the ROW to A and the

transformed intermediate exported from A to B, there is no change of tariff classification

(CTC), whereas between the intermediates imported into B and the final good exported

from B to C, there is a CTC.

5 For instance, one of NAFTA’s rules for certain textile products used to specify that intermediates had

to be woven ‘with a loom width of less than 76cm, woven in the United Kingdom in accordance with the

rules and regulations of the Harris Tweed Association, Ltd, and so certified by the Association’.


128

Figure 5.2: A Representative Value Chain with Cumulation

To understand the interplay of product-specific and regime-wide ROO, now

consider two product-specific ROO, a CTC and a 60 percent local content, and two regime-

wide rules, diagonal and full cumulation. Together, these generate four cases.

Suppose first that the product-specific ROO is a CTC. Under diagonal cumulation,

when exported from B to C, the final product would not be eligible, because the first stage

fails to satisfy the CTC requirement. Under full cumulation, by contrast, the entire value of

intermediates imported from A to B would be counted as local; therefore only the CTC at

the second stage would count, and as it is satisfied, the final product exported to C would

satisfy the ROO.

Suppose now that the product-specific ROO is a 60 percent local value content.

Under diagonal cumulation, the eligible local content would be $40 (the last

transformation) out of a sales price of $100, which does not pass the mark. Under full

cumulation, by contrast, the eligible local content would be $40 + $25, or $65, which would

pass the mark. The final product would then be eligible.

Thus, mechanically, full cumulation is less stringent than diagonal cumulation.

However, in practice, proving compliance with full cumulation rules implies complete

traceability of the production process and sourcing of intermediates. This is a heavy burden

for many companies both in terms of paperwork and—more importantly—in terms of

disclosure of sensitive price and supplier information. So some firms prefer not to use full

cumulation, despite its advantages on paper.

First transformation

Non-originating intermediates: 25

Local value added: 25

Second transformation

Non-originating intermediates:10

Local value added: 40

Final market

First export price: 50

Second export price: 100

Rest of the World

A

B

C

No CTC

CTC

FTA

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129

ROO also raise potentially difficult issues in terms of legal liability. If certificates of

origin are issued by officials in the exporting country, there has to be mutual recognition

of those certificates of origin, which is not always the case when customs administrations

distrust each other. Alternatively, the ultimate importing country (C in our example) may

take importer local-content declarations at face value, as they do with product valuation.

But if later on a fraud is uncovered, the importer will be held liable and will be expected to

turn against his own suppliers, at his own expense. As this would involve auctioning foreign

jurisdictions in the export country with uncertain prospects for redress, the importer will

typically not pass on the preferential tariff reduction to his suppliers, either keeping it as

‘legal insurance’ or forsaking altogether the benefit of preferential treatment. In both

cases, the objective of the preferential tariff reduction will be missed.

2.2. The Trade Effects of RoO: What Do We Know?

Assessing the impact of ROO means establishing a causal relationship between a

measure of ROO and a measure of trade performance. All three measuring ROO,

measuring trade performance, and establishing causation involve difficult issues.

The modern analysis of ROO goes back to the measurement work of Estevadeordal

(2000) who coded NAFTA’s product-specific rules and aggregated them into a

restrictiveness index. Index values were assigned on the basis of logic; for instance, changes

of tariff classification were classified as increasingly stringent as one goes up the hierarchy

of HS categories (that is, a change of heading had a higher index value than a change of

sub-heading, and so on). Technical requirements were ranked highest in terms of

restrictiveness, because – as already argued – they are often deliberately cumbersome to

satisfy. Similar indices have been constructed since then by Australia’s Productivity

Commission (2004), Anson et al., (2005), and Harris (2007), involving variants on

Estevadeordal’s index. For instance, Estevadeordal treated the wholly-obtained

requirement as the most stringent, but it is typically applied to agricultural products, for

which it is not binding; so Anson et al., by contrast, coded it as the least stringent. This

difference of treatment illustrates the notion that the stringency of a given ROO depends

on which sector it applies to, an issue we will return to it in Section 4..

As for the dependent variable, ideally one would like to have data on shipments by

regime (MFN vs. preferential). However, preference-utilisation data is sometime treated


130

by governments as confidential and sensitive, although without much rationale. The

performance measure is therefore often taken as relative trade flows – trade flows in a pair

of countries affected by the ROO rather than in a pair not affected, under the assumption

that stiff ROO will not just make the utilisation of preferences redundant, but will also stifle

trade itself, by denying preferences. That is, ceteris paribus, a stringent ROO acts like a

reduction in the tariff-preference margin and thus reduces trade flows.

Given data constraints on the dependent variable, identification is often

roundabout. One would want to equate ROO with a ‘treatment’ and compare treated trade

flows with untreated ones, using standard approaches like difference-in-differences. Part

of the literature has taken that route. Other approaches, in particular when utilisation-rate

data are available, have instead relied on a revealed preference argument. That is, suppose

that firm compliance costs are distributed around some central value corresponding to the

average firm. And suppose that the tariff preference margin for a certain product and

country pair is 5 percent. If the rate of preference utilisation is 100 percent, it must be so

that all firms have ROO compliance costs below 5 percent; then 5 percent can be taken as

an upper bound on the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of the average compliance cost. If the

utilisation rate is 0 percent, it must be so that all firms have compliance costs above 5

percent, so 5 percent gives a lower bound of the compliance cost’s AVE. Finally, if the

utilisation rate is somewhere between zero and one hundred, it must be so that some

firms have more than 5 percent compliance costs while others have less. One can then take

5 percent as the best approximation for the average compliance cost.

Using this revealed-preference approach, Herin (1986) estimated the compliance

costs of EU ROO for Central European countries at 5 percent; Cadot et al., (2005) found 2

percent for NAFTA. Manchin and Pelkmans–Balaoing (2007) noted that the AFTA utilisation

rate was on average only 5 percent and attributed this low uptake to ROO and other

documentation requirements. They also found threshold effects in tariff-preference

margins (only at high levels did they affect trade), again suggestive of compliance costs

offsetting the benefit of tariff reductions. Brenton and Manchin (2000) and others noted

similarly low utilisation rates for EU preferences, but the issue was muddled in the case of

the EU by the large number of overlapping schemes, which depressed uptake for every one

taken in isolation while EU preferences, as a whole, had high combined uptake (see Candau

and Jean, 2005).

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131

Using econometric approaches instead, Francois et al. (2006) estimated compliance

costs at 4 percent and Cadot et al. (2006a) at 6.5 percent. Beyond averages, Cadot et al.

(2006a), Estevadeordal (2000) and Estevadeordal et al. (2008) found that ROO

restrictiveness was typically higher in sectors also characterised by tariff peaks. Portugal–

Perez (2009) decomposed NAFTA’s ROO into a component reflecting traditional trade-

deflection concerns (proxied by the tariff differential between the US and Mexico) and

political-economy interference, and found that the latter raised the compliance costs of

ROO on average by 4.5 percentage points. Most recently, Kelleher (2013) modified Harris’

restrictiveness index to take cumulation rules into account. She proxied the facilitation

effect of cumulation rules by the economic size of the cumulation zone (the share of the

zone’s combined gross domestic products [GDPs] in world GDP), and found a significant

and sizable trade-inhibiting effect associated with higher values of her modified

restrictiveness index, in particular in the textile & apparel sector.

2.3. ASEAN’s Tariffs and ROO

2.3.1. MFN and Preferential Tariffs

ROO can be binding only when tariff-preference margins are substantial, which in

turn requires the presence of sufficiently large MFN tariffs. ASEAN has made rapid progress

in the phasing out of preferential tariffs, except for Cambodia, and, to a lesser extent, Viet

Nam (see Figure 5.3), so tariff-preference margins are essentially MFN rates. These rates

are not negligible, implying that tariff-preference margins are substantial and confer

benefits on exporters justifying the choice of the preferential regime even in the presence

of compliance costs.


132

Figure 5.3: ASEAN Members MFN and Preferential Average Tariffs, 2010

Source: ASEAN Secretariat.

Decomposing MFN tariffs by sector, Table 5.1 shows, on the basis of the limited

availability of tariffs from the multilateral Trade Analysis Information System (TRAINS)

database, that ASEAN member states have substantial MFN tariffs, in particular on

sensitive sectors like food & beverages (section 4), textiles & apparel (Section 11), footwear

(section 12), and vehicles (section 17). These are all sensitive sectors in terms of

employment, but also sectors where cross-border GVCs are most prevalent, and hence

where ROO can substantially constrain firms. Going down one level of disaggregation, the

picture at the level of HS chapters (not shown for brevity) is largely the same. Except for

Singapore and Brunei Darussalam, which have very low MFN tariffs, the number of zero-

rated chapters is relatively low. Out of 98 chapters, Brunei has 68, Indonesia just one, the

Philippines none, Singapore 96, and Viet Nam six.

-

2.00

4.00

6.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

14.00

MFN

AFTA

Chapter 5

133

Table 5.1: ASEAN’s Average MFN Tariffs by HS Section

Section Summary description Brunei Indonesia Philippines Singapore Viet Nam

1 Live animals; animal products - 5.05 10.78 - 13.46

2 Vegetable products - 5.08 9.41 - 15.94

3 Animal or vegetable fats - 4.28 5.91 - 10.61

4 Food and beverages 0.08 6.76 11.57 - 28.78

5 Mineral products - 3.79 2.53 - 4.47

6 Products of the chemical or allied industries

0.46 5.02 3.07 - 2.94

7

Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and

articles thereof 1.71 8.30 7.26 - 9.09

8 Leather and leather products 1.22 5.25 6.53 - 11.33

9 Wood and articles of wood 12.09 3.49 7.72 - 7.98

10 Pulp and paper - 4.00 5.14 - 12.20

11 Textiles and apparel 0.50 10.47 10.44 - 12.00

12 Footwear 5.31 14.61 10.86 - 28.51

13 Cement, glass and stone 0.49 7.88 7.32 - 18.81

14 Precious metals and stones 2.26 6.13 4.91 - 8.79

15 Base metals and articles of base metal 0.05 6.87 5.19 - 7.07

16 Machinery and electrical equipment 9.60 5.45 2.74 - 5.15

17 Vehicles 3.32 9.16 8.92 - 17.57

18 Precision instruments, optics, watchmaking

8.22 5.77 2.85 - 6.20

19

Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof

- 6.05 13.47 - 4.86

20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 2.47 9.80 7.44 - 19.24

21 Works of art, collectors'pieces and antiques

- 6.19 7.86 - 4.29

Note: Data available on WITS from the TRAINS multilateral tariff databases includes only Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam. Source: Author calculations using TRAINS.

2.3.2. Rules of origin

ASEAN’s rules of origin have a relatively simple structure compared with, say,

NAFTA or PANEURO, as they are largely based on a 40 percent regional value content.

Moreover, in many cases, the importer can choose which rule to use amongst two.

However, behind the relatively simple logical structure, there is substantial variation at the

product level.

The most prevalent combination of instruments at the product level is a choice

between a regional value content at 40 percent and a change of tariff heading (HS4). This

concerns 11,764 product lines in all of ASEAN’s trade (internal and bilateral with

preferential partners), or 37.74 percent of the product lines. Another 6 percent of the lines

give the importer the choice between the same regional value content and a change of

tariff sub-heading (HS6).


134

At the level of individual agreements, the use of instruments varies substantially.

Figure 5.4 reports frequency ratios in percentage for each rule and agreement. Frequency

ratios measure the incidence of rules by product without trade-weighting; that is, a

frequency ratio of 0.1 for (rvc + tr) or ctc in AANZFTA means that for 0.1 percent of all HS6

products, the importer claiming the preferential regime in the ASEAN–ANZ agreement can

choose between a change of tariff classification or the combination of a regional value

content and the textile rule. Those products are obviously in section 11 (textile and

apparel).

The ASEAN and ASEAN+1 FTAs provide three main points: (i) a structure that is

dominated by regional value contents and changes of tariff classification, often giving the

importer the choice of rule; (ii) a relatively large palette of instruments on paper, but (iii) a

limited range of instruments actually used if one takes trade values into account.

Figure 5.4: ROO Frequency Ratios, by Agreement and Type of Rule

Note: rvc: regional value content (all thresholds combined except 35 percent); rvc_35: regional value content

at the 35 percent threshold; cc: change of chapter; ctc: change of tariff classification (any aggregation level); cth: change of tariff heading; ctsh: change of tariff subheading; x: exception; tr: textile rule; wo: wholly obtained. AANZFTA: ASEAN–Australia/New Zealand FTA; ACFTA: ASEAN–China FTA; AIFTA: ASEAN–India FTA; AJCEP: ASEAN–Japan Economic Partnership; AKFTA: ASEAN–Korea FTA.

Source: Walz (2014).

0.1

4.7 0.0 14.1 0.1

0.8 5.8 6.0

0.2 11.8 0.4

2.0

2.0 2.5 0.0

1.3 89.2 4.2 1.2 2.9

0.0 0.1

100.0

10.5 0.1 2.4 4.8 7.7

11.3 0.5 0.3 0.4 21.2

40.6 1.9 58.3 76.7 50.3

20.6 0.6 1.2 14.4

8.2 0.0

5.8 0.2 0.1 9.2 3.5wo

rvc_or_tr

rvc_or_ctsh

rvc_or_cth

rvc_or_ctc+x

rvc_or_cc

rvc_35

rvc+ctc

rvc

cth

ctc_or_tr

ctc+x

cc+x

cc

(rvc+tr)_or_ctc

AANZFTA ACFTA AIFTA AJCEP AKFTA ASEANAgreement

Chapter 5

135

2.4. Trade Patterns in the Asia–Pacific Region

To see the importance of ASEAN’s preferential trade as a share of the region’s

overall imports, Figure 5.5 shows the share of ASEAN imports from the world by trade

agreements. The various preferential zones represent a substantial chunk of ASEAN’s

imports, underscoring the potential impact of preferential rules. As already discussed, one

of the key issues raised by the presence of ROO in PTAs is that they mandate a minimum

degree of local transformation to grant tariff preferences, while in many sectors the degree

of local transformation of intermediate products is determined by multinational companies

on the basis of technology and country fundamentals. This is a particularly serious issue for

electronics value chains in the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region where local content can

sometimes represent a very thin slice of the overall value generated along the chain.

Figure 5.5: ASEAN Imports of Goods from its Various Preferential Zones, in % (2013)

Source: Authors’ calculation using COMTRADE Data.

For instance, in producing an iPod, a widely used sample in describing value added,

Dedrick et al., (2008) explains that industrial countries Japan and the US capture the

lion’s share of value added along the chain. While the product retailed in 2008 for $299,

the value added retained in China, the assembly country, was only $3.86, or less than 2

percent. Moreover, the value of imported intermediates, at over $140 (essentially capital-

intensive intermediates including the hard drive and display, all produced in Japan), was

already 35 times the value added in assembly and testing, which represented only 2.7

23.2%

16.5%

9.0%6.3%2.3%

2.1%

40.5%

ASEAN (AFTA) China (ACFTA)Japan (AJCEP) Korea (AKFTA)India (AIFTA) Australia and New Zealand (AANZFTA)The rest of the world


136

percent of the ex-factory price of the product (this without counting the wholesale and

retail distribution margins). In such a situation, any local content rule could only be

violated.

However, in this case, the trade-inhibiting potential of ROO is not as severe as one

might expect. First, global electronics companies lobbied the governments of large

industrial countries in the 1990s to lower tariffs to practically zero on most electronics

products and in particular on components, precisely to make ROO irrelevant, knowing that

they would be incompatible with the organisation of production. This lobbying effort led

to the signing of the World Trade Organization’s Information Technology Agreement (ITA)

by 29 countries at the Singapore Ministerial in 1996 and subsequent phasing out on the

majority of electronics products.6 In the case of ASEAN countries, MFN tariffs are zero-

rated on computers and most electronics products, but some positive rates linger on. The

distribution of MFN tariff rates for chapters 84–86, which comprise all machinery and

electronics products, both industrial and consumer, for the three ASEAN members with

data for which MFN tariffs are substantially away from zero – Indonesia, the Philippines,

and Viet Nam. Second, a significant chunk of China’s electronics exports go to the US and

EU, where ASEAN ROO do not apply. Even those shipped to Japan are affected only by the

ASEAN–Japan rules rather than AFTA’s.

Beyond the special case of the electronics sector, what is the evidence on the

importance of domestic vs. foreign content in exports? Figure 5.6, constructed using

Koopman et al.’s data, provides evidence on how constraining ASEAN’s RVC could be by

plotting the average foreign content of exports for countries in Koopman et al.’s sample.

With a 40 percent RVC, the foreign content of exports should be no more than 60 percent.

Koopman et al. did not calculate the regional value added in gross exports, but only the

domestic vs. foreign value added (all origins including both regional and non-regional). So

only foreign content widely in excess of 60 percent would put a country’s exports at risk of

violating the 40 percent RVC. Figure shows that for most of ASEAN’s member states for

6 Six out of 10 ASEAN countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam –

were members of the ITA-1; and almost all ASEAN’s main trading partners, such as Australia, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand, are also members of ITA. China is in the process of accession. The ITA commits all members to completely eliminating duties on IT products covered by the Agreement. In 2013, the ITA-1 had 70 members, which had trade of about 97 percent of world trade in information technology products. The ITA-2 is now in the progress of negotiation.

Chapter 5

137

which data are available, the foreign content of exports is less than 60 percent, suggesting

that prima facie ASEAN’s ROO could not be overly constraining.

Figure 5.6: Foreign Content of Exports, by Exporting Country

Source: Adapted from Koopman et al. (2011).

Prima facie evidence thus suggests that ROO only moderately constrain ASEAN’s trade. But

the prima facie evidence can hide substantial effects once the sectoral composition of

trade is taken into account. Moreover, the bureaucratic hassle of proving compliance may

be perceived by companies to be a burden. Only econometric analysis, controlling for

various possible confounding influences, can provide some answers.

3. Theoretical Framework

3.1. Set Up

Our theoretical framework is based on the Anderson–Van Wincoop (2004)

framework at the product level, from but relaxing key symmetry assumptions on

production costs and trade costs. Suppose that country i exports varieties to country j in


138

and let be the quantity of variety k exported from i to j (in tons), its CIF price,

the total expenditure in country j, and its share in country j’s expenditure. We have

(1)

With CES preferences, being composite price index in j and elasticity of substitution

amongst varieties, it can be shown that

(2)

Let be the producer price of variety k in country i; we will assume that it is affected by

an idiosyncratic shock representing comparative advantage; i.e.

(3)

Let be the bilateral trade cost between i and j for variety k, including all of its

components (tariffs, ROO, and other barriers). The consumer price of variety k in country j is then

(4)

Let be the total value of exports from i to j. Bilateral trade between i and j is:

(5)

Country i’s GDP is the sum of its sales to all destinations, including itself:

(6)

Let us define a product-specific remoteness term (the product-specificity comes here

only from the fact that trade costs vary across products):

ijkx ijkp jE

ijks

ijk ijk ijk jp x s E

jP

1

ijk

ijk

j

ps

P

ikp

ik

iik

ik

pp

ijk

ijk ijk ikp p

ijV

1

1

ijk

ij ijk ijk ijk j jk k kj

ijk ik

jkj

pV p x s E E

P

pE

P

1 1

1

1 1 1

m m mijk ik ijk

i ij j ik jk kj j jj j

pY V E p E

P P

ik

ijk

Chapter 5

139

(7)

and write

. (8)

Let

(9)

be a remoteness term adjusted for comparative advantage. Inverting (8) gives

. (10)

Writing (5) in terms of gives

(11)

Noting finally that income equals expenditure, and letting be the

average trade cost from i to j across all varieties gives a modified gravity equation holding

at the aggregate level in the absence of symmetry:

(12)

We are here interested in estimating this equation at the product level. Let be the value

of the flow of variety k from country i to country j. Using (2)

(13)

3.2. Estimation Strategy, Data, and Data Sources

Our estimation strategy is based on the ubiquitous gravity equation, but we

estimate it at a disaggregated (product) level, which requires some adjustment in the

1

11

mj

ik ijk

j j

E

P

1

1 1i ik ik i ikk k

ik

Y p p

1

1i ikk

ik

ii

i

Yp

ip

1

1 1

1 1

ijk j i jiij i j ijk ijkk k k

ik j i j i j

E Y EYV p E

P P P

j jE Y1

ij ijkk

1

i j

ij ij

i j

YYV

P

ijkv

1

1

1

ijk

ijk ijk ij ij

j

i ijk i j

ij

ik j i j

pv s V V

P

p YY

P P


140

formulation of the estimation equation. That is, we allow for variation in those costs across

products and estimate the gravity at the product–country pair level. Rewriting equation

(13) after log-linearisation:

(14)

The difference between our estimation with an ordinary gravity equation is

twofold: first is the presence of an exporter-product term correcting for comparative

advantage, and second, the presence of a dyad-product term correcting for product-

specific trade costs, which are what we are interested here (product-specific tariffs and

ROO). Letting and be respectively importer and exporter-product fixed effects,

where

(15)

and being respectively the tariff and ROO applying to good k between countries i

and j, and being the usual array of gravity controls (distance, common border,

common language, and so on).

In the presence of RTAs, market access is affected by both MFN and preferential tariffs.

Let

(16)

is a dummy variable marking preferential trade (for any RTA), where indexes the

various forms of ROO (CTC, local content, etc.), let

(17)

Let be the MFN tariff rate on product k applicable to trade between i and j, and,

finally, let be a vector of country-pair attributes such as distance, common border,

common language, and common colonizer. The trade-cost expression is then

(18)

1 2ln ln lnijk ijk ij ik j ijv u

ik

ijk

j ik

1 2ijk ijkt r

ijk e

ijkt ijkr

ij

1 if and are members of the same RTA

0 otherwise

RTA

ij

i jI

1 if RoO applies to product in the agreement between and

0 otherwiseijk

k i jr

MFN

ijkt

ijx

MFN MFN

1 2 3 4exp RTA RTA RTA

ijk ijk ij ijk ij ij ijk ijt I t I I r x γ

Chapter 5

141

Expression (18) represents an ‘ideal’ formulation that we need to adapt to data

constraints. First, we have ROO data only for ASEAN countries and not for other

preferential agreements elsewhere in the world. Therefore, we can hope to disentangle

the effect of tariffs from those of ROO only for ASEAN country pairs, not for others.

Accordingly, we mark all country pairs eligible for preferential rules with a single

dummy variable defined as in (16). Because the value of preferences depends on MFN

tariffs (for instance, when MFN tariffs are zero, preferences are nonexistent), we include

MFN tariffs in the estimation, both linearly and interacted with the RTA dummy. Given that

for most RTAs, preferential tariffs are set to zero, the coefficient on the interaction term

gives the effect of tariff preference margins in RTAs (and should therefore be positive).

For RTAs other than ASEAN, the RTA dummy and interaction term together capture

the average effect of trade-preference packages including both tariff-preference margins

and ROO. For ASEAN pairs, however, we also include the applicable ROO in the form of a

vector of dummies, one for each type of ROO, as in (17). Thus, for ASEAN country pairs, the

RTA dummy and its interaction with the MFN tariff capture only the effect of tariff-

preference margins, while the ROO dummies capture specifically the effect of ROO.

Country-product fixed effects at HS6 imply the estimation of one million

coefficients. Estimating a system with about 30 million observations and over one million

coefficients is beyond the computational capabilities of most computers and would tie up

too much costly time on a super-computer. Therefore, we simplify the estimation in several

ways. First, we replace country-product fixed effects by a vector of fixed effects by

exporter, importer, and product, totaling about five thousand instead of one million. This

gives the following alternative formulation:

(19)

where and are respectively exporter, importer, and sector (HS4) fixed effects,

s(k) being the HS4 sector to which HS6 product k belongs. Using HS4 instead of HS6 fixed

effects reduces the number of fixed effects from five thousand to one thousand,

substantially reducing the estimation’s computational demands.

ASEAN

1 2 3 4ln MFN RTA MFN RTA

ijk ijk ij ijk ij ij ijk ij i j ijks kv t I t I I r u x γ

,i j s k


142

We also carry out the estimation by section, making sure that each section includes

goods with different types of ROO. We then convert estimates into ad-valorem equivalents

(AVEs) of ROO using a standard formula for semi-logarithmic equations, namely

(20)

The main data source is ROO data in the form of precise requirements at the HS6

level of product classification that were provided to us by the ASEAN Secretariat. Trade

data in thousand US dollars are from the CEPII’s BACI database, which is based on

COMTRADE but reconciles direct export and mirrored import data. Gravity variables are

from CEPII’s free-access online database.

The data cover 1,241 HS-4 digit product lines or 5,180 HS-6 digit level product lines

for 185 exporting countries and 108 importing countries in 2012, which were the latest

available data when the analysis was conducted. HS Chapters 25, 26, and 27 are excluded.

This leaves all agricultural products, but excludes mining products as well as crude oil and

gas products (forestry products and oil and its derivatives are still included). This results in

the number of observations of 4,411,362 for all products and 3,959,384 for manufactured

products, excluding the commodities products mentioned above.

4. Empirical Results

Baseline results are presented in Table 5.2 (note: in all regressions, commodities

and oil products are excluded). Columns 1 and 2 present estimates for the whole sample

of non-commodity trade; in column 1, ROO variables are omitted, whereas in column 2,

they are included. Column 3 presents results for manufactured products only. For

readability, the table is split into two parts – the first with standard gravity control variables

plus tariffs and RTA markers, and the second with ROO coefficients only. These two parts

refer to the same regressions.

Parameter estimates on standard gravity controls are as expected. Note that the

trading countries’ GDPs are not included because they are absorbed by exporter and

importer fixed effects. This formulation is superior to one with GDPs, as fixed effects

control adequately for ‘multilateral resistance terms’.

4 1AVE e

Chapter 5

143

Table 5.2: Gravity Regression Results, Non-commodity Trade: Control Variables

Estimator OLS (within) OLS (within) OLS (within)

Sample All a/ All a/ Manufacturing

Dependent Variable: ln(trade value) (1) (2) (3)

Gravity controls

ln(distance) -0.442 -0.448 -0.477

(268.00)*** (260.15)*** (264.38)***

Comm. border 0.420 0.415 0.407

(97.47)*** (95.84)*** (89.42)***

Comm. language 0.189 0.191 0.227

(55.28)*** (55.77)*** (63.38)***

Comm. colonizer 0.234 0.235 0.234

(38.24)*** (38.18)*** (36.33)***

Trade policy variables

MFN tariff -0.005 -0.005 -0.009

(22.52)*** (22.40)*** (38.31)***

RTA pair 0.223 0.223 0.231

(54.28)*** (54.13)*** (54.22)***

MFN tariff x RTA 0.001 0.001 0.001

(3.59)*** (2.96)*** (2.56)***


144

Table 5.2: (continued): Gravity Regression Results, Non-commodity Trade: ROO Estimator OLS (within) OLS (within) OLS (within)

Sample All a/ All a/ Manufacturing

Dependent variable: ln(trade value) (1) (2) (3)

Rules of origin

CC -0.205 -0.204

(5.35)*** (3.97)***

CTH -0.101 -0.067

(1.26) (0.75)

RVC -0.062 -0.063

(4.02)*** (3.89)***

RVC at 35% (ASEAN-India) -0.443 -0.519

(19.69)*** (22.17)***

Wholly obtained -0.459 -0.136

(10.42)*** (1.16)

CTC & exception -0.177 -0.193

(6.40)*** (6.80)***

CTC & RVC 0.542 0.841

(1.71)* (1.69)*

CTC or TR -0.533 -0.528

(8.33)*** (8.19)***

CTC or (TR & RVC) -0.314 -0.340

(1.64) (1.78)*

RVC or CC -0.149 -0.036

(6.08)*** (1.16)

RVC or CTH 0.059 0.047

(5.76)*** (4.48)***

RVC or CTSH -0.170 -0.222

(8.71)*** (11.06)***

RVC or TR -0.459 -0.563

(11.19)*** (13.76)***

RVC or (CTC & exception) -0.286 -0.347

(15.94)*** (19.07)***

Constant 6,525 6,600 6,518

(138.18)*** (138.45)*** (128.62)***

Observations 4411362 4411362 3959384

R-squared 0.26 0.26 0.28

Note: Parameter estimates on standard gravity controls are as expected. Note that the trading countries’ GDPs are not included because they are absorbed by exporter and importer fixed effects. This formulation is superior to one with GDPs as fixed effects control adequately for ‘multilateral resistance terms’.

Chapter 5

145

The elasticity of trade to distance is -0.442, implying that a doubling in bilateral

distance reduces trade by 25 percent.7 A common land border raises trade by 50 percent (

). Note by comparison between columns 1 and 2 that parameter estimates are not

affected by the introduction of ROO dummies, which confirms that the specification and

baseline results are robust.

The second part of Parameter estimates on standard gravity controls are as

expected. Note that the trading countries’ GDPs are not included because they are

absorbed by exporter and importer fixed effects. This formulation is superior to one with

GDPs, as fixed effects control adequately for ‘multilateral resistance terms’.

Table 5.2. shows parameter estimates for the effect of ROO, with different types

consolidated into 14 main rules. Twelve out of 14 are highly significant (at the 1 percent

level), and all except two are negative. Of the two positive ones, only one, on RVC or CTH,

is strongly significant.

Parameter estimates are displayed graphically in Figure 5.7. It illustrates that the

most trade-inhibiting instruments are wholly obtained (-36.8 percent) and the Textile Rule,

even when offered as a choice between either a change of tariff classification (CTC or TR)

or a regional value content (RVC or TR). This is somewhat of a puzzle, since RVCs do not

appear very restrictive when used alone (-6.0 percent) while change of chapter (CC), the

most restrictive of CTCs, has an AVE of 18.5 percent, already high but much lower than

when offered as a choice with the textile rule.

7 Note that distance is a continuous variable, not a binary one; so the formula does not apply. Instead, the coefficient can be read directly as an elasticity, as both value and distance are in logs.

0.420 1e


146

Figure 5.7: Ad-valorem Equivalents of ROO, All Sample

Source: Authors’ calculations using BACI.

The apparent puzzle of the Textile Rule’s very strong effect suggests that the

restrictiveness of ROO should be assessed by section to better filter out heterogeneity of

effects across sectors. Our estimation method with product fixed effects filters out the

effect of product heterogeneity on trade values, but not on ‘treatment effects’ (the effect

of ROO on trade). Section-by-section estimates allow for different effects across sectors.

Across the board, ROO appear heavily restrictive. However estimation on the whole

sample may capture confounding influences that artificially inflate their estimated effect

on trade flows. We now turn to estimation section by section.

3.3. Results by Section

We now report the results of 21 regressions run on sub-samples restricted to

products within one section. Averages across all instruments are shown in Table 5.3,

together with weights used to calculate the trade-weighted average. Following Leamer

(1974), to avoid the endogeneity of trade flows from biasing the weights used in calculated

weighted averages, we use world trade weights rather than ASEAN trade weights.

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

Chapter 5

147

Table 5.3: Average AVEs for All ROO Instruments, by Section

Section Summary description Average AVE (%) Trade weights a/

1 Live animals; animal products -

2 Vegetable products 1.91 2.61

3 Animal or vegetable fats 6.67 0.58

4 Food and beverages 1.73 3.05

5 Mineral products 1.52 19.59

6 Products of the chemical or allied industries 3.50 9.70

7 Plastics and articles thereof; rubber and articles thereof 1.87 4.63

8 Leather and leather products 9.05 0.60

9 Wood and articles of wood -3.20 0.77

10 Pulp and paper 4.98 1.75

11 Textiles and apparel 8.29 4.06

12 Footwear 12.67 0.77

13 Cement, glass and stone 2.42 0.93

14 Precious metals and stones 3.81 2.97

15 Base metals and articles of base metal -0.46 7.77

16 Machinery and electrical equipment -0.36 25.89

17 Vehicles 6.89 8.99

18 Precision instruments, optics, watchmaking 3.34 3.33

19 Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories thereof - -

20 Miscellaneous manufactured articles -3.37 1.99

21 Works of art, collectors'pieces and antiques -

Average (%)

Simple 3.40

Trade-weighted 2.09

Note: Trade weights calculated using world trade, following Leamer (1974), averaged over 2010–2011. Only sections where ROO AVEs are significant used in their calculations; Section 1 is omitted because it is entirely covered by the ‘wholly obtained’ rule.

Source: Authors calculations using BACI.

Figure 5.8 further decomposes the AVEs of ROO by section and by instrument, keeping only

statistically significant estimates. For brevity, we display only a few sections selected for

their importance in ASEAN trade. Results for other sections are available from the authors

upon request.


148

Figure 5.8: Ad-valorem Equivalents of ROO (%), Selected Sectors

Section 4 (food, beverage, and tobacco) Section 6 (chemicals)

Section 11 (textile and apparel) Section 12 (footwear)

Section 16 (machinery and electronics) Section 17 (transportation equipment)

Source: Authors’ calculations.

-60.00

-40.00

-20.00

-

20.00

40.00

60.00

80.00

Wholly

obtained

CTC &

exception

RVC or CC RVC or CTH RVC or CTSH

-120

-100

-80

-60

-40

-20

0

20

40

60

80

-50

-40

-30

-20

-10

-

10

20

30

40

50

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

RVC RVC at 35%(ASEAN-India)

RVC or CC RVC or CTH RVC or (CTC &exception)

-40

-30

-20

-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

RVC RVC at 35%

(ASEAN-India)

RVC or CTH RVC or CTSH RVC or (CTC

& exception)

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

RVC or CTH RVC or (CTC & exception)

Chapter 5

149

Although results are, unsurprisingly, less stable at the sector level than at the

aggregate level, a few observations can be made based on the analysis. First, the wholly

obtained criterion appears to have a restrictive effect on preferential trade in the food,

beverage, and tobacco sector, which is to be expected since it essentially prevents foreign

sourcing of any sort. Section 6 (chemicals) is one of the few where the RVC seems to have

a strong trade-inhibiting effect. In Section 11 (textile and apparel), unsurprisingly, the

Textile Rule appears restrictive, while in Section 12 (footwear) all rules appear restrictive.

This parallels results obtained for NAFTA and PANEURO. In Section 16 (machinery and

equipment, including electronics), the results are very unstable, which is to be expected

given the presence of the World Trade Organization’s IT agreement already discussed.

Finally, in the all-important section 17 (transportation equipment) strong trade-inhibiting

effects are observed for regional value contents, even when offered as a choice between

these and other rules (change of tariff heading or change of tariff classification other than

heading, but with an exception). These rules may stifle automobile trade in the region.

5. Conclusion

This chapter reviews the evidence on the effects of ASEAN’s ROO on preferential

trade. While the first-best approach to measure the effect of ROO would be to use the

trade value that uses preferred tariff rates as the dependent variable, in the absence of

utilisation-rate data, we based our identification strategy on the variation in trade flows

across country pairs, controlling for product and country heterogeneity with product,

exporter, and importer fixed effects in a disaggregated (HS6) cross-section gravity

framework.

Prima facie, ASEAN’s ROO have a relatively simple and transparent structure, with

a large chunk of trade flows subject to a 40 percent regional value content or a change of

tariff classification. In many cases, the importers can choose which rule they claim, which

makes the system less penalising. That is, ASEAN’s ROO ‘deny preferences’ by an amount

roughly comparable to one fourth of the tariff-preference margins. Although moderate,

this may contribute to low take-up rates that have been observed on the basis of

fragmentary evidence.


150

However, the econometric analysis of trade flows uncovers evidence of

moderately restrictive effects, with an average tariff equivalent, across all measures and

products, of 3.40 percent. This is in line with estimates in the literature. This means that

ROO inhibit ASEAN’s trade by an amount roughly equivalent to one quarter of its MFN

tariffs. Put differently, ROO seem to ‘nullify’ one quarter of the effect of tariff-preference

margins. The trade-weighted average is substantially lower, at 2.09 percent. However, the

effect is heterogeneous. Whereas it is small in sectors like electronics or capital equipment,

where anyway MFN tariffs are low so trade is only weakly affected by preferences, it peaks

in sectors that matter for the development of ASEAN’s poorest member states, like fats

(6.7 percent), leather products (9 percent), textile and apparel (8.3 percent), footwear

(12.7 percent), or automobiles (6.9 percent). Thus, the streamlining of ASEAN’s ROO should

be viewed as part of its own development agenda.

Overall, ASEAN’s relatively restrictive ROO may not have a huge impact on trade

flows as a large proportion of international trade in the Asia-Pacific area is in the electronics

and capital equipment sectors, where MFN tariffs are low and the attractiveness of

preferences is (with or without ROO) limited anyway. Thus, low take-up rates may simply

reflect the fact that most trade is in product lines that do not stand to benefit very much

from tariff reductions.

However, there may be gains to reap from the simplification of ROO in sectors like

textile & apparel or footwear, which currently represent a low proportion of Asia-Pacific

trade, but may represent substantial opportunities for export-led growth and thus poverty

reduction in some of the region’s poorest countries. The same applies to prepared foods.

Automobiles also stand out as a sector where the relaxation of ROO might be considered,

or at least carefully coordinated with plans to build up ‘deep’ value chains within the

region.

The simplification and streamlining of ROO should therefore prioritise light

industries like textile and apparel, footwear, and prepared foods (in particular fats) and this

should be seen as part of ASEAN’s internal development and poverty-reduction strategy.

Future research should be carried out to assess the specific gains that ASEAN’s poorer

member states would reap from less stringent ROO.

Chapter 5

151

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Appendix 1

This appendix details the classification of ROO used in our regression analysis. The large

number of instrument combinations used in the various trade agreements involving ASEAN

required consolidation for regression analysis. We have consolidated all types into 15

broader types, preserving special categories for instruments combined with additional

requirements and for cases of instrument choice. Frequency numbers shown in Table A1

are the numbers of HS6 lines concerned by the instrument on all ASEAN trade. Thus, the

numbers add up to substantially more than the notional number of HS6 lines (about 5,000).

Consolidation choices were made on the basis of frequency ratios (the consolidation

concerned instruments or combinations of instruments with low frequency).

Table 5.A1: ROO Types

Raw Consolidated

Frequency,

all ASEAN

imports

Frequency

ratio, all

ASEAN

imports

RVC rvc 5,149 16.52

RVC + CC rvc+ctc 2 0.01

RVC + CTH rvc+ctc 5 0.02

RVC + CTSH rvc+ctc 3 0.01

RVC + Textile Rule or CC (rvc+tr)_or_ctc 218 0.7

RVC + Textile Rule or CTH (rvc+tr)_or_ctc 6 0.02

RVC or CC rvc_or_cc 1,323 4.24

RVC or CC + Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 2 0.01

RVC or CC or SPR rvc_or_ctc+x 89 0.29

RVC or CC or Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 463 1.49

RVC or CC with exception rvc_or_ctc+x 86 0.28

RVC or CTH rvc_or_cth 11,764 37.74

RVC or CTH + CTSH rvc_or_ctc+x 195 0.63

RVC or CTH or CTSH rvc_or_ctc+x 136 0.44

RVC or CTH or SPR rvc_or_ctc+x 24 0.08

RVC or CTH or Textile Rule rvc_or_ctc+x 347 1.11

RVC or CTH with exception rvc_or_ctc+x 194 0.62

RVC or CTSH rvc_or_ctsh 1,877 6.02

RVC or CTSH with additional reqt rvc_or_ctsh 4 0.01

RVC or CTSH with exception rvc_or_ctsh 41 0.13

RVC or Textile Rule rvc_or_tr 428 1.37

RVC with additional reqt rvc 5 0.02

RVC35+CTSH rvc_35 5,224 16.76


154

Table5. A1 (continued): ROO Types

Raw Consolidated

Frequency,

all ASEAN

imports

Frequency

ratio, all

ASEAN

imports

CC cc 987 3.17

CC + Textile Rule cc+x 40 0.13

CC or Textile Rule ctc_or_tr 15 0.05

CC with additional reqt cc+x 348 1.12

CC with exception cc+x 261 0.84

CTH cth 230 0.74

CTH or Textile Rule ctc_or_tr 91 0.29

CTH with additional reqt ctc+x 615 1.97

CTH with exception ctc+x 32 0.1

CTSH cth 8 0.03

WO wo 963 3.09

SECTION II

Trade in Services: Beyond The List

157

Chapter 6

Liberalisation of Trade in Services under ASEAN+1 FTAs: A Mapping Exercise

Hikari Ishido

Faculty of Law, Politics and Economics, Chiba University, Japan

This paper examines how Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–centred

free trade agreements (FTAs) or so-called ASEAN+1 FTAs are correlated amongst themselves

and thus have the potential to be merged into one single commitment towards the

establishment of a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The ‘Coverage

Index’ defined in this paper highlights similarities and differences amongst the ASEAN+1

FTAs, i.e. the Eighth Package of Commitments under the ASEAN Framework Agreement on

Services (AFAS–8), the Second Package of Specific Commitments under the ASEAN–China

Free Trade Area (ACFTA–2), the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement

(AANZFTA), and the ASEAN–Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA). We found that the degree

of liberalisation in terms of the Coverage Index is highest under AFAS–8, which could serve

as the focal point for convergence of the ASEAN+1 FTAs, which are positively correlated with

AFAS–8. Also, the ASEAN priority integration sectors are making progress (with the

exception of transport-related sectors). While the coverage index shows rather low levels of

commitment by the member countries, a feasible policy suggestion is to continue

prioritising the priority integration sectors including transport-related sectors for a

seamless ASEAN Economic Community as well as for a well-connected RCEP.


158

1. Introduction

This chapter attempts to show how Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN)-centred free trade agreements (FTAs) (so-called ‘ASEAN+1 FTAs’1) are correlated

amongst themselves – in that many of the member countries cover each of the service

subsectors in their commitments – thus demonstrating the potential to merge them into

one single commitment. This attempt is expected to clarify what more could be done in the

actual policy arena towards the establishment of a Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP).

The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section we define ‘Coverage

Index’ and comment on the similarities and differences between the four ASEAN+1 FTAs,

i.e. the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS), the ASEAN–China Free Trade

Area (ACFTA), the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), and

the ASEAN–Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA).2 In Section 3 we conduct an extension

analysis with an exclusive focus on the ASEAN countries. We also make a comparison with

the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) commitment. Section 4 provides some

policy suggestions and conclusions.

2. Overall Comparison of the ASEAN+1 FTAs using the ‘Coverage Index’ Convergence of

the ASEAN+1 FTAs

For the convergence of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS),

ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade

Agreement (AANZFTA) and ASEAN–Korea Free Trade Agreement (AKFTA), an overall

comparison of service trade commitments would be needed. In this section, one such

comparison is made through introducing the ‘Coverage Index’ as defined below. While

commitments in the form of specific commitment tables submitted by FTA members are

different from their actual policy3, we expect that this kind of analysis will shed some new

1 In this paper, the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS) and the ASEAN–Australia–New

Zealand FTAs are included as part of the ASEAN+1 FTAs. 2 Under the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP), negotiations on

market access are ongoing as of this writing; as for the ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA), negotiations

on trade in services are reportedly progressing, but relevant information is not yet publicly available. 3 The actual policy is usually different from and the degree of liberalisation can be higher than the policy indicated under free trade agreements: in the case of, e.g. ‘11.D. Space Transport’ – no restriction in actuality, it seems, because there is no domestic industry covering space transport – in terms of the level of liberalisation,

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light on the realisation in the near future of the Regional Comprehensive Economic

Partnership (RCEP) amongst the ASEAN members and their dialogue partners.

2.1. Definition of the ‘Coverage Index’

The ‘Coverage Index’ (introduced and discussed in, e.g. Adlung and Roy, 2005)

attempts to capture the extent to which the sectors are covered by the participating

countries. It is defined as ‘the share of commitments by FTA members in a certain sector ’:

when all the participating countries are committed (in each of their specific commitment

tables) to a certain service sector, the value of the Coverage Index takes its maximum value

of 1.0; when no participating countries are committed, the value is 0.0; when a

commitment is made by some (not all) the countries, the Coverage Index takes a value

between 0.0 and 1.0, depending on the number of countries with commitments. For

instance, when half of the FTA member countries are committed to a particular service

sector, the sector’s Coverage Index takes the value 0.5. Since there are three broad types

of commitments in specific commitment tables, i.e. ‘No limitation’ (symbolised as ‘N’),

‘Limited commitment4‘ (symbolised as ‘L’), and ‘Unbound’ (symbolised as ‘U’), the Coverage

Index can be calculated for each of these three commitments (or non-commitment for the

case of ‘U’).

The Coverage Index and the Hoekman Index 5 (Hoekman, 1995) are

complementary, in the sense that the former index measures the coverage by FTA member

countries of a particular service sector, while the latter index measures the depth of each

member country’s commitment in a particular service sector.6 We expect that with the

calculation of this Coverage Index, some convergence scenarios for the four existing

ASEAN+1 FTAs – AFAS (package 8, abbreviated in this chapter as AFAS–8), ACFTA (package

2, abbreviated as ACFTA–2), AANZFTA, and AKFTA – are made clear for concrete

implementation by the policy makers.

although the actual policy is always subject to restrictions at some point in the future. 4 Under this commitment pattern, there are some legal descriptions stipulating the restrictions in terms of market access or national treatment. 5 The method of Hoekman Index calculation assigns the value of 1.0 for the sectors with ‘None’ or no limitation, the value of 0.5 for those with ‘Limited’ or some legal restriction, and the value of 0 for those sectors with ‘Unbound’ or no promise of market openings. In this sense, the ‘depth’ of limitation in a particular sector is not captured. See Ishido (2011) for an application of Hoekman Index calculation to the commitment level under ASEAN+1 FTAs. 6 Ishido and Fukunaga (2012) conducted a detailed analysis of services chapters in the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs in terms of the Hoekman Index.


160

2.2. Results of the Coverage Index calculations

The results of Coverage Index calculations in terms of the ‘N-commitment’, ‘L-

commitment’, and ‘U-commitment’ are listed in the database constructed for this study at

the back of this chapter (note that these three types of indices add up to 1.0). Since the

most disaggregated information seems to be useful for actual negotiations on convergence,

we provide the full lists. It is rather difficult, however, to get an overall sense of the

similarities amongst the four ASEAN+1 FTAs.

Table 6.1 lists the Coverage Index calculation results at the 55-sector level. In the

calculation, simple averages of the values for the most detailed 154 sub-sectors under the

same 55-sector classification code are taken. 7 This table reveals the following

observations: (In the spirit of increasing the number of sectors with ‘N-commitment’ away

from ‘U-commitment’ and through ‘L-commitment’, the focus is first placed on ‘N-

commitment’ only).

AFAS–8 has an average Coverage Index value of 0.38 (the highest amongst the four

ASEAN+1 FTAs), with ‘01B Computer and Related Services’ taking the highest value (0.71).

ACFTA–2 has an average Coverage Index value of 0.20, with ‘09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour

Operators services’ taking the highest value (0.57). AANZFTA has an average Coverage Index

value of 0.25, with the sector ‘01.B. Computer and Related Services’ taking the highest

value (0.58). AKFTA has an average Coverage Index value of 0.19, with the sector ‘09.B.

Travel Agencies and Tour Operators services’ taking the highest Index value (0.56).

Concerning the ASEAN Economic Community ‘priority integration sectors’ of e-

ASEAN, air transport, healthcare, logistics, and tourism, AFAS–8 has relatively high

Coverage Index values: for Air Transport (11.C. Air Transport Services), the N-commitment

value is 0.13; for e-ASEAN (in terms of 01.B. Computer and Related Services) it is 0.71;

regarding Healthcare, ‘08.A. Hospital Services’ has a value of 0.56 and ‘08.B. Other Human

Health Services’ has a value of 0.41; for Tourism, ‘09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour Operators

services’ has a value of 0.63, and ‘09.C. Tourist Guides Services’ has a value of 0.30; for

Logistics, ‘04.B. Wholesale Trade Services’ has a N-commitment Coverage Index value of

0.48, ‘11.B. Internal Waterways Transport’ has an N-commitment Coverage Index value of

7 These sub-sectors are all defined under the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), although the digits used for definition are different across sectors. For definitions of each of the service sub-sectors, see the WTO document ‘MTN.GNS/W/120’ (available online).

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0.26, ‘11.E. Rail Transport Services’ 0.32, ‘11.F. Road Transport Services’ 0.42, and ‘11.H.

Services Auxiliary to All Modes of Transport’ 0.39.8 The ASEAN priority integration sectors

are shadowed in the table. It seems, therefore, that the ASEAN priority integration sectors

have been making progress, in relative terms (with the exception of transport-related

sectors). That said, since the corresponding values under the other ASEAN+1 FTAs are lower

overall, more convergence efforts would be needed towards establishing an RCEP.

8 This is due to the absence of a detailed official definition of the priority integration sectors. Thus, in this chapter, we take the following sectors as the priority integration sectors: 01.B. Computer and Related Services, 02.C. Telecommunication Services, 04.B. Wholesale Trade Services, 08.A. Hospital Services, 09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour Operators services, 09.C. Tourist Guides Services, 11.A. Maritime Transport Services, 11.B. Internal Waterways Transport, 11.C. Air Transport Services, 11.E. Rail Transport Services, and 11.F. Road Transport Services.


162

Table 6.1: List of Coverage Index Calculations at the 55-sector Level

AFAS–8 ACFTA–2 AANZFTA AKFTA

Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

01.A. Professional Services 0.41 0.13 0.45 0.27 0.07 0.66 0.34 0.25 0.41 0.27 0.09 0.64

01.B. Computer and Related Services

0.71 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.07 0.49 0.58 0.28 0.14 0.43 0.04 0.53

01.C. Research and Development Services

0.43 0.07 0.50 0.18 0.03 0.80 0.14 0.26 0.60 0.21 0.02 0.78

01.D. Real Estate Services 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.13 0.01 0.86 0.14 0.27 0.59 0.06 0.00 0.94

01.E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators

0.34 0.09 0.58 0.16 0.02 0.83 0.23 0.26 0.52 0.18 0.02 0.80

01.F. Other Business Services 0.41 0.06 0.54 0.22 0.03 0.75 0.24 0.26 0.51 0.24 0.02 0.74

02.A. Postal Services 0.11 0.11 0.78 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.03 0.06 0.91

02.B. Courier Services 0.61 0.11 0.28 0.32 0.02 0.66 0.24 0.24 0.52 0.24 0.10 0.66

02.C. Telecommunication Services 0.61 0.20 0.18 0.36 0.17 0.47 0.43 0.32 0.25 0.41 0.12 0.47

02.D. Audiovisual Services 0.28 0.06 0.66 0.13 0.02 0.85 0.11 0.27 0.62 0.13 0.02 0.85

02.E. Other 0.06 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

03.A. General Construction Work for Building

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.31 0.08 0.61 0.48 0.30 0.22 0.36 0.09 0.55

03.B. General Construction work for Civil Engineering

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.44 0.32 0.24 0.45 0.16 0.39

03.C. Installation and Assembly Work

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.34 0.10 0.56 0.42 0.30 0.28 0.38 0.10 0.52

03.D. Building Completion and Finishing Work

0.46 0.18 0.36 0.27 0.02 0.70 0.36 0.31 0.32 0.26 0.08 0.66

03.E. Other 0.46 0.18 0.36 0.26 0.09 0.65 0.40 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.09 0.61

04.A. Commission Agents' Services 0.59 0.08 0.34 0.32 0.05 0.64 0.33 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.00 0.72

04.B. Wholesale Trade Services 0.48 0.06 0.46 0.22 0.01 0.77 0.29 0.25 0.46 0.25 0.01 0.74

04.C. Retailing Services 0.38 0.05 0.58 0.19 0.01 0.80 0.22 0.25 0.53 0.19 0.03 0.77

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04.D. Franchising 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.27 0.00 0.73 0.19 0.25 0.56 0.27 0.00 0.73

04.E. Other 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.11 0.02 0.86 0.06 0.25 0.69 0.07 0.00 0.93

05.A. Primary Education Services 0.26 0.10 0.64 0.07 0.03 0.90 0.14 0.26 0.60 0.05 0.00 0.95

05.B. Secondary Education Services 0.34 0.15 0.51 0.09 0.03 0.88 0.35 0.27 0.38 0.16 0.03 0.81

05.C. Higher Education Services 0.36 0.10 0.54 0.20 0.06 0.74 0.34 0.29 0.36 0.20 0.05 0.75

05.D. Adult Education 0.54 0.10 0.36 0.24 0.03 0.73 0.24 0.28 0.48 0.27 0.02 0.70

05.E. Other Education Services 0.44 0.11 0.45 0.23 0.06 0.72 0.36 0.29 0.34 0.14 0.01 0.85

06.A. Sewage Services 0.50 0.14 0.36 0.25 0.03 0.72 0.36 0.25 0.39 0.26 0.03 0.70

06.B. Refuse Disposal Services 0.51 0.11 0.38 0.24 0.02 0.74 0.35 0.24 0.41 0.25 0.02 0.73

06.C. Sanitation and Similar Services

0.44 0.06 0.50 0.22 0.02 0.76 0.33 0.24 0.43 0.17 0.02 0.81

06.D. Other 0.55 0.09 0.36 0.26 0.02 0.72 0.32 0.24 0.44 0.28 0.02 0.69

07.A. All Insurance and Insurance-related Services

0.47 0.12 0.41 0.38 0.15 0.47 0.34 0.37 0.29 0.32 0.15 0.53

07.B. Banking and Other Financial Services

0.38 0.10 0.52 0.32 0.11 0.57 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.24 0.09 0.67

07.C. Other 0.05 0.05 0.90 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.03 0.26 0.71 0.03 0.01 0.95

08.A. Hospital Services 0.56 0.16 0.28 0.17 0.03 0.80 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.33 0.06 0.61

08.B. Other Human Health Services 0.41 0.11 0.48 0.15 0.03 0.82 0.14 0.26 0.60 0.09 0.00 0.91

08.C. Social Services 0.36 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.25 0.71 0.05 0.00 0.95

08.D. Other 0.25 0.04 0.71 0.11 0.00 0.89 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

09.A. Hotels and Restaurants 0.70 0.10 0.20 0.55 0.09 0.36 0.54 0.27 0.19 0.50 0.10 0.40

09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour Operators services

0.63 0.09 0.29 0.57 0.07 0.36 0.61 0.28 0.10 0.56 0.06 0.39

09.C. Tourist Guides Services 0.30 0.00 0.70 0.19 0.01 0.80 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.20 0.00 0.80

09.D. Other 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.09 0.02 0.89 0.05 0.24 0.71 0.11 0.02 0.86

10.A. Entertainment Services 0.54 0.05 0.41 0.28 0.02 0.69 0.18 0.26 0.56 0.24 0.01 0.75

10.B. News Agency Services 0.18 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.25 0.69 0.00 0.00 1.00

10.C. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural services

0.29 0.04 0.68 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.06 0.25 0.69 0.07 0.00 0.93


164

10.D. Sporting and Other Recreational Services

0.35 0.04 0.61 0.24 0.03 0.73 0.18 0.26 0.56 0.14 0.03 0.83

10.E. Other 0.16 0.08 0.76 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

11.A. Maritime Transport Services 0.55 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.04 0.73 0.21 0.27 0.51 0.24 0.05 0.71

11.B. Internal Waterways Transport 0.26 0.08 0.66 0.04 0.01 0.95 0.01 0.25 0.74 0.01 0.00 0.99

11.C. Air Transport Services 0.13 0.01 0.87 0.16 0.03 0.82 0.09 0.25 0.66 0.18 0.02 0.80

11.D. Space Transport 0.06 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

11.E. Rail Transport Services 0.32 0.12 0.56 0.07 0.00 0.93 0.13 0.25 0.63 0.07 0.00 0.93

11.F. Road Transport Services 0.42 0.07 0.51 0.31 0.02 0.67 0.21 0.24 0.55 0.16 0.01 0.83

11.G. Pipeline Transport 0.14 0.09 0.78 0.05 0.02 0.93 0.17 0.27 0.56 0.07 0.02 0.91

11.H. Services Auxiliary to All Modes of Transport

0.39 0.09 0.52 0.24 0.05 0.71 0.22 0.25 0.53 0.20 0.04 0.75

11.I. Other Transport Services 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.05 0.00 0.95

Average 0.38 0.09 0.53 0.20 0.04 0.76 0.23 0.27 0.51 0.19 0.04 0.77

Source: Calculated from the database constructed (version updated on 3 October 2013).

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As the next consideration, what could be the similarity of overall coverage

patterns amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs away from the U-Commitment? To get a better idea,

we combine ‘N-Commitment’ and ‘L-Commitment’: where the summation of the N-

Commitment and L-commitment values is higher than 0.5 (in other words, where the U-

commitment value takes a value lower than 0.5), the N-Commitment and L-Commitment

figures are highlighted in bold. As shown in the table, AFAS–8 is the most highly

committed, while in the case of AANZFTA, the commitment is a bit lower, but similar to

AFAS–8. ACFTA–2 and AKFTA are rather similarly committed9 at a lower level than under

AFAS–8 and AANZFTA. Indeed, there is a wedge between the groups of ‘AFAS–8 and

AANZFTA’ and ‘ACFTA–2 and AKFTA’, which should be addressed in future policy

negotiations on convergence.

Table 6.2 lists the Coverage Index calculations at the most aggregated 11-sector

level: again, we use simple average for the values under the same 11-sector classification.

Figures 1–3 graphically compare the levels of the Coverage Index by each of the

commitment patterns (N, L, or U). This level of aggregation shows the following: (In the

spirit of increasing the number of sectors with ‘N-commitment’ away from ‘U-

commitment’ and through ‘L-commitment’, the focus is placed on ‘N-commitment’

only.)

As for AFAS–8, it has an average Coverage Index value of 0.39, with ‘09. Tourism

and Travel Related Services’ taking the largest Coverage Index value (0.53) for N-

commitment, whereas ‘11. Transport Services’ has the smallest Coverage Index value

(0.25). An important note is that the sector ‘11.Transport Services’ plays an important

part in ASEAN connectivity – enhanced policy efforts for greater liberalisation by those

ASEAN members who have not yet committed would be needed especially in this sector.

For ACFTA–2, it has an average Coverage Index value of 0.21, and ‘09. Tourism

and Travel Related Services’ has the largest Coverage Index value (0.35), while ‘08. Health

Related and Social Services’ and ‘11. Transport Services’ both have the lowest Coverage

9 This is probably because for some ASEAN members, China and Korea as their dialogue partners are seen to pose a common set of ‘concerns’ including the possibility of losing domestic market shares, thus a common set of commitment patterns under ACFTA and AKFTA.


166

Index value (0.12), for N-commitment.

AANZFTA has an average Coverage Index value of 0.24, with ‘03. Construction

and Related Engineering Services’ taking the highest value (0.42). The sector ‘08. Health

Related and Social Services’ has the lowest Coverage Index value (0.09). AKFTA has an

average Coverage Index value of 0.20, with ‘09. Tourism and Travel Related Services’

taking the highest sectoral value (0.34) and ‘10. Recreational, Cultural and Sporting

Services’ taking the lowest value (0.09). It should be noted that since this FTA has a

separate chapter on Mode 4, which covers almost all the subsectors, the index tends to

be overvalued.

An interesting observation is that ‘there are smaller variations in terms of

liberalisation level across sectors in AFASs10‘. This observation might suggest that AFAS–

8 is rather ‘harmonised’, which is encouraging in terms of boosting policy coordination

towards achieving an RCEP. A sectoral convergence scenario could therefore have AFAS

as the central ‘convergence point’.

10 This is a comment from Mr. Yoshifumi Fukunaga (Research Coordinator, ERIA).

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Table 6.2: List of the Coverage Index Calculations at the 11-sector Level


Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

01. Business Services 0.41 0.08 0.51 0.23 0.04 0.73 0.28 0.26 0.46 0.23 0.03 0.74

02. Communication Services

0.34 0.10 0.56 0.17 0.05 0.78 0.16 0.26 0.58 0.16 0.06 0.78

03. Construction and Related Engineering Services

0.47 0.18 0.36 0.31 0.09 0.60 0.42 0.31 0.27 0.35 0.10 0.55

04. Distribution Services 0.44 0.04 0.52 0.22 0.02 0.76 0.22 0.25 0.53 0.21 0.01 0.78

05. Educational Services 0.39 0.11 0.50 0.17 0.04 0.79 0.29 0.28 0.43 0.16 0.02 0.81

06. Environmental Services

0.50 0.10 0.40 0.24 0.03 0.73 0.34 0.24 0.41 0.24 0.03 0.73

07. Financial Services 0.30 0.09 0.61 0.24 0.09 0.67 0.24 0.31 0.45 0.20 0.08 0.72

08. Health Related and Social Services

0.40 0.09 0.51 0.12 0.02 0.86 0.09 0.27 0.64 0.12 0.01 0.87

09. Tourism and Travel Related Services

0.53 0.07 0.41 0.35 0.05 0.60 0.36 0.26 0.38 0.34 0.05 0.61

10. Recreational, Cultural and Sporting Services

0.30 0.04 0.66 0.13 0.01 0.86 0.10 0.25 0.65 0.09 0.01 0.90

11. Transport Services 0.25 0.07 0.68 0.12 0.02 0.86 0.12 0.25 0.63 0.11 0.02 0.87

Average 0.39 0.09 0.52 0.21 0.04 0.75 0.24 0.27 0.49 0.20 0.04 0.76



168

Figure 6.1: Comparison of N-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors)

Source: Derived from Table 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Comparison of L-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors)

Source: Made from Table 6.2.

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169

Figure 6.3: Comparison of U-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors)


A summary of the results is shown in Table 6.3. This table calculates

correlation coefficients of all pairs of ASEAN+1 FTAs, based on the database

constructed for this study (i.e. calculation is made at the most disaggregated 154-

sector level).

As shown in the table, AFAS–8 has rather strong correlations with ACFTA–2

and AKFTA, whereas its correlation with AANZFTA is not so strong. The highest level

of correlation (0.98) is observed between ACFTA–2 and AKFTA, indicating that both of

these FTAs are actually strongly correlated with each other. AANZFTA is somewhat

exceptional in the sense that it has a separate chapter on the movement of people

(corresponding to Mode 4 of service supply). When mode 4 is excluded from the

calculation of coefficients involving AANZFTA, the FTA (AANZFTA) is also rather

strongly correlated with the other three FTAs.

Overall, all the correlation coefficients are positive, indicating that industry-

level commitment patterns are more or less shared amongst all the ASEAN+1 FTAs.


170

Table 6.3: Correlation Coefficient of all Pairs of ASEAN+1 FTAs

AFAS–8 ACFTA–2 AANZFTA(1–4) AANZFTA(1–

3) AKFTA

AFAS–8 -

ACFTA–2 0.76 -

AANZFTA(1–4) 0.32 0.40 -

AANZFTA(1–3) 0.70 0.95 - -

AKFTA 0.76 0.98 0.41 0.96 - Notes: AANZFTA (1–4) means that all the four modes have been considered in the calculation for this

FTA; AANZFTA (1–3) means that modes 1–3 only have been considered; this is because AANZFTA is unique in that it has a separate chapter on mode 4, which might be a source of deflated correlation. The correlation coefficients involving AANZFTA (1–3) use data on modes 1–3 only (excluding data on mode 4).


It would be useful to make an analysis of the Coverage Index by mode. For

ease of viewing, the 11-sector disaggregation results only are shown in Tables 6.4–

6.8, for Modes 1–4, respectively. In the following, the focus is on N-commitment only.

In Mode 1 (Table 4), AFAS–8 has an average Coverage Index value of 0.48, ACFTA–2

has 0.19, AANZFTA 0.24, and AKFTA 0.19. Thus, AFAS–8 has the highest average

commitment level amongst the four ASEAN+1 FTAs. In Mode 2 (Table 6.5), AFAS–8

has the highest average Index value, at 0.66, ACFTA–2 has 0.36, AANZFTA 0.40, and

AKFTA 0.36. In Mode 3 (Table 6.6), AFAS–8 has the highest Index value, at 0.39,

ACFTA–2 has an average value of 0.25, AANZFTA 0.29, and AKFTA 0.24. In Mode 4

(Table 6.7), AFAS–8 has the highest (albeit low in absolute terms) average value of

0.04, ACFTA–2 has 0.03, AANZFTA 0.02, and AKFTA 0.02. Also, AANZFTA has the

highest L-commitment value (since it has a separate service chapter in which almost

all sectors are committed).

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Table 6.4: Coverage Index of the ASEAN+1 FTAs in Mode 1


Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment


02. Communication Services 0.46 0.04 0.50 0.20 0.05 0.75 0.19 0.02 0.79 0.20 0.05 0.75


0.25 0.00 0.75 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.28 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.00 0.85



06. Environmental Services 0.63 0.00 0.38 0.16 0.00 0.84 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.16 0.00 0.84



0.56 0.00 0.44 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.16 0.00 0.84


0.71 0.00 0.29 0.44 0.00 0.56 0.42 0.01 0.57 0.38 0.00 0.63


0.36 0.00 0.64 0.09 0.00 0.91 0.08 0.00 0.92 0.06 0.00 0.94


Average 0.48 0.01 0.51 0.19 0.01 0.80 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.19 0.01 0.80



172



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




1.00 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.83 0.00 0.17 0.80 0.00 0.20






0.69 0.00 0.31 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.20 0.00 0.80


0.78 0.00 0.23 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.55 0.00 0.45


0.52 0.00 0.48 0.24 0.00 0.76 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.16 0.00 0.84


Average 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.36 0.00 0.63 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.36 0.00 0.64


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Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.60 0.30 0.10 0.44 0.24 0.33 0.53 0.26 0.21 0.43 0.28 0.29






0.34 0.28 0.39 0.14 0.07 0.80 0.10 0.06 0.83 0.10 0.06 0.84


0.49 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.14 0.50 0.42 0.09 0.49 0.36 0.13 0.51


0.31 0.09 0.60 0.17 0.04 0.79 0.13 0.03 0.85 0.12 0.03 0.85


Average 0.39 0.20 0.41 0.25 0.10 0.64 0.29 0.08 0.63 0.24 0.10 0.66



174



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.03 0.40 0.57 0.03 0.12 0.85 0.03 0.98 0.00 0.03 0.14 0.84






0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00


0.13 0.08 0.80 0.09 0.06 0.85 0.06 0.94 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.85


0.02 0.07 0.91 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.98


Average 0.04 0.14 0.83 0.03 0.05 0.93 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.94


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175

Tables 6.8–6.11 show correlation coefficients of the Coverage Index amongst the

ASEAN+1 FTAs under Modes 1–4, respectively. Table 8 shows that in Mode 1, ACFTA–2

and AKFTA have the highest correlation value of 0.97; Table 9 shows that ACFTA–2,

AANFTA and AKFTA have a common correlation value of 0.96; Table 10 shows that

ACFTA–2 and AKFTA have a correlation value of 0.96; and Table 11 shows that AFAS–8,

ACFTA–2, and AKFTA share a common correlation value of 0.96. In Modes 1–3, AFAS–8

has positive correlations with all the other ASEAN+1 FTAs, and in Mode 4, AFAS has

strong positive correlation with ACFTA–2 and AKFTA. Since AFAS–8 is to be at the centre

of the establishment of the RCEP in the near future, the remaining three ASEAN+1 FTAs

(ACFTA–2, AANZFTA, and AKFTA) should ensure that each service sector is covered by as

many member countries as possible.

Table 6.8: Correlation Coefficient of the Coverage Index amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 1)

ASEAN+1 FTA AFAS–8 ACFTA–2 AANZFTA AKFTA

AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.64 -

AANZFTA 0.70 0.95 -

AKFTA 0.65 0.97 0.96 -

Source: Calculated from the database constructed for this study.

Table 6.9: Correlation Coefficient of Coverage-indices amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 2)


AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.68 -

AANZFTA 0.71 0.96 -

AKFTA 0.66 0.96 0.95 -



176



AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.67 -

AANZFTA 0.70 0.94 -

AKFTA 0.66 0.96 0.95 -

Source: Calculated from The database constructed for this study.



AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.96 -

AANZFTA -0.35 -0.46 -

AKFTA 0.96 1.00 -0.46 -


3. An Extension Analysis: Focus on the ASEAN Countries Only

In this section we conduct the same analysis as in the previous section, but with

an exclusive focus on the ASEAN countries. Thus, Table 6.12 Lists the Coverage Index

calculations at the 55-sector level, focusing only on the ASEAN countries, to the exclusion

of China under ACFTA, Australia, and New Zealand under AANZFTA, and Korea under

AKFTA. Likewise, Table 13 lists the Coverage Index calculations at the 11- sector level,

focusing only on the ASEAN countries. As shown in Table 13, AFAS–8 has the highest

Coverage Index for N (0.39), followed by AANZFTA (0.23), ACFTA–2 (0.22), and AKFTA

(0.20). As for individual sectors, ‘09. Tourism and Travel Related Services’ has the highest

N-commitment (0.53), signifying that more than half of the ASEAN members have

confirmed full liberalisation. On the other hand, both ‘10. Recreational, Cultural and

Sporting Services’ and ‘11. Transport Services’ under AANZFTA and AKFTA have the

lowest N-commitment value (0.09). Figures 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 graphically show the

commitments under each of the four FTAs.

The N-Commitment and L-Commitment figures combined are highlighted in bold.

As discussed for Table 6.1 (which includes non-ASEAN members’ commitments), there is

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177

a similarity between AFAS–8 and AANZFTA; also, the commitment patterns are similar

between ACFTA–2 and AKFTA. As in the case of Table 1, the pair of ‘AFAS–8 and AANZFTA’

is more highly committed than the pair of ‘ACFTA–2 and AKFTA’. The average figures

imply that, overall, the ASEAN countries are most widely committed under AFAS–8. Also,

the ASEAN priority integrated sectors (defined for this chapter as those shaded grey in

the table) are rather well covered by the ASEAN members, judging from the overall

correspondence of the bold figures and the shaded sectors (with the exception of

transport-related sectors towards the bottom of the table).


178

Table 6.12: List of the Coverage Index Calculations at the 55-sector Level (focus on the ASEAN countries only)


Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

01.A. Professional Services 0.41 0.13 0.45 0.26 0.06 0.68 0.29 0.26 0.45 0.25 0.09 0.66

01.B. Computer and Related Services

0.71 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.07 0.49 0.56 0.29 0.16 0.40 0.05 0.56

01.C. Research and Development Services

0.43 0.07 0.50 0.17 0.03 0.80 0.14 0.26 0.60 0.16 0.02 0.82

01.D. Real Estate Services 0.14 0.00 0.86 0.08 0.00 0.93 0.04 0.25 0.71 0.04 0.00 0.96

01.E. Rental/Leasing Services without Operators

0.34 0.09 0.58 0.17 0.02 0.81 0.15 0.26 0.59 0.14 0.01 0.85

01.F. Other Business Services 0.41 0.06 0.54 0.21 0.02 0.77 0.19 0.26 0.55 0.20 0.02 0.78

02.A. Postal Services 0.11 0.11 0.78 0.04 0.06 0.90 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.04 0.06 0.90

02.B. Courier Services 0.61 0.11 0.28 0.29 0.01 0.70 0.29 0.24 0.48 0.24 0.06 0.70

02.C. Telecommunication Services 0.61 0.20 0.18 0.35 0.16 0.49 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.38 0.13 0.49

02.D. Audiovisual Services 0.28 0.06 0.66 0.13 0.02 0.85 0.10 0.26 0.64 0.11 0.02 0.86

02.E. Other 0.06 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

03.A. General Construction Work for Building

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.30 0.08 0.63 0.45 0.31 0.24 0.35 0.10 0.55

03.B. General Construction work for Civil Engineering

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.36 0.15 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.26 0.46 0.16 0.38

03.C. Installation and Assembly Work

0.48 0.18 0.35 0.34 0.10 0.56 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.38 0.10 0.53

03.D. Building Completion and Finishing Work

0.46 0.18 0.36 0.26 0.01 0.73 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.09 0.63

03.E. Other 0.46 0.18 0.36 0.25 0.09 0.66 0.35 0.31 0.34 0.29 0.09 0.63

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179

04.A. Commission Agents' Services

0.59 0.08 0.34 0.31 0.04 0.65 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.75

04.B. Wholesale Trade Services 0.48 0.06 0.46 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.25 0.55 0.24 0.00 0.76

04.C. Retailing Services 0.38 0.05 0.58 0.18 0.00 0.83 0.13 0.25 0.63 0.16 0.03 0.81

04.D. Franchising 0.49 0.03 0.49 0.23 0.00 0.78 0.15 0.25 0.60 0.23 0.00 0.78

04.E. Other 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.08 0.00 0.93 0.08 0.25 0.68 0.08 0.00 0.93

05.A. Primary Education Services 0.26 0.10 0.64 0.05 0.01 0.94 0.09 0.26 0.65 0.05 0.00 0.95

05.B. Secondary Education Services

0.34 0.15 0.51 0.08 0.01 0.91 0.28 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.04 0.79

05.C. Higher Education Services 0.36 0.10 0.54 0.20 0.04 0.76 0.28 0.30 0.43 0.20 0.04 0.76

05.D. Adult Education 0.54 0.10 0.36 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.29 0.29 0.43 0.28 0.01 0.71

05.E. Other Education Services 0.44 0.11 0.45 0.23 0.04 0.74 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.15 0.01 0.84

06.A. Sewage Services 0.50 0.14 0.36 0.23 0.03 0.75 0.29 0.25 0.46 0.23 0.04 0.74

06.B. Refuse Disposal Services 0.51 0.11 0.38 0.21 0.01 0.78 0.28 0.24 0.49 0.21 0.03 0.76

06.C. Sanitation and Similar Services

0.44 0.06 0.50 0.19 0.01 0.80 0.25 0.24 0.51 0.19 0.03 0.79

06.D. Other 0.55 0.09 0.36 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.24 0.24 0.53 0.24 0.03 0.74

07.A. All Insurance and Insurance-related Services

0.47 0.12 0.41 0.38 0.14 0.48 0.33 0.37 0.30 0.33 0.15 0.53

07.B. Banking and Other Financial Services

0.38 0.10 0.52 0.32 0.10 0.57 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.25 0.10 0.66

07.C. Other 0.05 0.05 0.90 0.03 0.00 0.98 0.04 0.26 0.70 0.04 0.01 0.95

08.A. Hospital Services 0.56 0.16 0.28 0.19 0.04 0.78 0.24 0.31 0.45 0.36 0.06 0.58

08.B. Other Human Health Services

0.41 0.11 0.48 0.16 0.04 0.80 0.11 0.26 0.63 0.10 0.00 0.90

08.C. Social Services 0.36 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.05 0.25 0.70 0.05 0.00 0.95


180

08.D. Other 0.25 0.04 0.71 0.13 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

09.A. Hotels and Restaurants 0.70 0.10 0.20 0.54 0.09 0.38 0.53 0.28 0.20 0.50 0.11 0.39

09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour Operators services

0.63 0.09 0.29 0.56 0.06 0.38 0.60 0.28 0.13 0.54 0.06 0.40

09.C. Tourist Guides Services 0.30 0.00 0.70 0.21 0.01 0.78 0.15 0.25 0.60 0.15 0.00 0.85

09.D. Other 0.48 0.09 0.44 0.10 0.03 0.88 0.06 0.24 0.70 0.13 0.03 0.85

10.A. Entertainment Services 0.54 0.05 0.41 0.25 0.01 0.74 0.21 0.26 0.53 0.23 0.01 0.76

10.B. News Agency Services 0.18 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

10.C. Libraries, archives, museums and other cultural services

0.29 0.04 0.68 0.08 0.00 0.93 0.08 0.25 0.68 0.08 0.00 0.93

10.D. Sporting and Other Recreational Services

0.35 0.04 0.61 0.19 0.04 0.78 0.14 0.26 0.60 0.15 0.04 0.81

10.E. Other 0.16 0.08 0.76 0.05 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

11.A. Maritime Transport Services 0.55 0.16 0.29 0.23 0.04 0.73 0.21 0.27 0.52 0.22 0.05 0.73

11.B. Internal Waterways Transport

0.26 0.08 0.66 0.04 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.25 0.73 0.01 0.00 0.99

11.C. Air Transport Services 0.13 0.01 0.87 0.17 0.03 0.81 0.09 0.26 0.66 0.14 0.02 0.84

11.D. Space Transport 0.06 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

11.E. Rail Transport Services 0.32 0.12 0.56 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.07 0.24 0.69 0.07 0.00 0.93

11.F. Road Transport Services 0.42 0.07 0.51 0.32 0.01 0.67 0.17 0.24 0.59 0.17 0.01 0.82

11.G. Pipeline Transport 0.14 0.09 0.78 0.05 0.03 0.93 0.05 0.28 0.68 0.05 0.03 0.93

11.H. Services Auxiliary to All Modes of Transport

0.39 0.09 0.52 0.17 0.04 0.80 0.17 0.25 0.58 0.13 0.04 0.83

11.I. Other Transport Services 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 1.00

Average 0.38 0.09 0.53 0.26 0.06 0.68 0.29 0.26 0.45 0.25 0.09 0.66


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181

Table 6.13: List of the Coverage Index calculations at the 11 sector level (focus on the ASEAN countries only)


Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.47 0.18 0.36 0.30 0.09 0.61 0.38 0.32 0.30 0.35 0.11 0.54






0.40 0.09 0.51 0.13 0.02 0.85 0.10 0.27 0.63 0.13 0.02 0.86


0.53 0.07 0.41 0.35 0.05 0.60 0.33 0.26 0.41 0.33 0.05 0.62


0.30 0.04 0.66 0.11 0.01 0.88 0.09 0.26 0.66 0.09 0.01 0.90


Average 0.39 0.09 0.52 0.22 0.03 0.75 0.23 0.26 0.51 0.20 0.03 0.77



182

And Table 6.12 lists a more detailed breakdown of sectors: ‘01.B. Computer and Related

Services’ under AFAS–8 has the highest N-commitment index value (0.71), whereas ‘02.A.

Postal Services’ and ‘10.B. News Agency Services’ both have low N-commitment values

under all of the four FTAs.

Figure 6.4: Comparison of N-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)


Figure 6.5. Comparison of L-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)


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Figure 6.6: Comparison of U-commitment under the ASEAN+1 FTAs (11 sectors, focus on the ASEAN countries only)

Source: Derived from Table 13.

Table 6.14 compares the four FTAs in terms of correlation coefficients, and Tables

15–18 show the Coverage Index by mode. As shown in Table 6.14, AANZFTA (1–3), i.e.

Modes 1–3 only being considered, are rather closely correlated with both ACFTA–2 and

AKFTA, whereas AANZFTA (1–4), i.e. Modes 1–4, all being considered, are not so closely

correlated mainly because AANZFTA has a separate chapter on the movement of natural

persons.

Table 6.14: Correlation Coefficient Between all the Pairs of the ASEAN+1 FTAs

AFAS–8 ACFTA–2 AANZFTA(1–4) AANZFTA(1–3) AKFTA

AFAS–8 -

ACFTA–2 0.67 -

AANZFTA(1–4) 0.31 0.43 -

AANZFTA(1–3) 0.66 0.95 - -

AKFTA 0.73 0.98 0.45 0.97 - Notes: AANZFTA (1–4) means that all the four modes have been considered in the calculation for this

FTA; AANZFTA (1–3) means that modes 1–3 only have been considered; this is because AANZFTA is unique in that it has a separate chapter on mode 4, which might be a source of deflated correlation. The correlation coefficients involving AANZFTA (1–3) use data on modes 1–3 only (excluding data on mode 4).



184

Table 6.15 (the Coverage Index in Mode 1) shows that in Mode 1, AFAS–8 has the

highest N-commitment value (0.48), whereas AFCTA–2 has the lowest N-commitment

value (0.16). Table 16 (the Coverage Index in Mode 2) shows that AFAS–8 has the highest

N-commitment value of 0.66, whereas ACFTA–2 has the lowest N-commitment value

(0.32). Table 17 (the Coverage Index in Mode 3) shows that AFAS–8 has the highest N-

commitment value (0.39) (which is lower than the highest values under Mode 1 and

Mode 2), whereas ACFTA and AKFTA both have the lowest N-commitment value (0.24).

Table 18 (the Coverage Index in Mode 4) shows that AFAS–8 has the highest (albeit by a

small margin) N-commitment value (0.04), whereas the other three FTAs have the same

N-commitment value (0.03). As it stands, all of the FTAs exhibit the lowest commitment

amongst the four Modes, indicating that Mode 4 (movement of natural persons) remains

the least open.

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185



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.25 0.00 0.75 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.24 0.00 0.76 0.16 0.00 0.84






0.56 0.00 0.44 0.10 0.00 0.90 0.13 0.00 0.88 0.18 0.00 0.83


0.71 0.00 0.29 0.31 0.00 0.69 0.39 0.00 0.61 0.36 0.00 0.64


0.36 0.00 0.64 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.07 0.00 0.93


Average 0.48 0.01 0.51 0.16 0.01 0.83 0.22 0.01 0.76 0.21 0.01 0.78



186



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




1.00 0.00 0.00 0.46 0.00 0.54 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.80 0.00 0.20






0.69 0.00 0.31 0.15 0.00 0.85 0.18 0.00 0.83 0.23 0.00 0.78


0.78 0.00 0.23 0.48 0.00 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.48 0.53 0.00 0.48


0.52 0.00 0.48 0.18 0.00 0.82 0.16 0.00 0.84 0.16 0.00 0.84


Average 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.32 0.00 0.68 0.40 0.00 0.60 0.38 0.01 0.62


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187



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.60 0.30 0.10 0.33 0.13 0.54 0.44 0.31 0.25 0.42 0.28 0.30






0.34 0.28 0.39 0.10 0.05 0.85 0.10 0.08 0.83 0.11 0.06 0.83


0.49 0.20 0.31 0.36 0.10 0.54 0.35 0.11 0.54 0.33 0.14 0.54


0.31 0.09 0.60 0.14 0.03 0.83 0.11 0.03 0.86 0.12 0.03 0.85


Average 0.39 0.20 0.41 0.24 0.07 0.69 0.26 0.11 0.63 0.24 0.11 0.65



188



Sector N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment




0.03 0.40 0.57 0.03 0.11 0.86 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.82






0.00 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00


0.13 0.08 0.80 0.10 0.05 0.85 0.08 0.93 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.84


0.02 0.07 0.91 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.98


Average 0.04 0.14 0.83 0.03 0.04 0.93 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.92


Chapter 6

189

Tables 6.19–6.22 list correlation coefficients of the Coverage index amongst the

four FTAs by mode. As shown, AFAS–8 is somewhat distinct from the other three FTAs

in all the Modes. A special mention should be made of the fact that in Mode 4, AANZFTA

is distinct from the other three FTAs (negative correlation coefficients are observed

between AANZFTA and any one of the three other FTAs); this is due to the fact that

AANZFTA alone has a separate chapter on the movement of natural persons.

Table 6.19: Correlation Coefficient of the Coverage Index amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs

(Mode 1, ASEAN countries only)


AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.55 -

AANZFTA 0.66 0.97 -

AKFTA 0.62 0.98 0.98 -


Table 6.20: Correlation Coefficient of Coverage-indices amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 2, ASEAN countries only)


AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.52 -

AANZFTA 0.66 0.94 -

AKFTA 0.63 0.96 0.97 -


Table 6.21: Correlation Coefficient of Coverage-indices amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs

(Mode 3, ASEAN countries only)


AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.58 -

AANZFTA 0.67 0.95 -

AKFTA 0.63 0.97 0.97 -



190

Table 6.22: Correlation Coefficient of Coverage-indices amongst the ASEAN+1 FTAs (Mode 4, ASEAN countries only)


AKFTA -

ACFTA–2 0.95 -

AANZFTA -0.35 -0.48 -

AKFTA 0.96 0.99 -0.46 -


Just to provide a rough estimate, the GATS-based Commitment Index was

calculated by incorporating the nine ASEAN countries with GATS commitment tables, i.e.

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand, and Viet Nam. Table 23 shows the results at the 11-sector level. As the average

value of the Coverage Index for the N-commitment 0.03 indicates, the ASEAN members’

commitment under the GATS is significantly lower than their commitments under any of

the ASEAN+1 FTAs.

Table 6.23: GATS-based Coverage Index (excluding Lao PDR)

N-commitment

L-commitment

U-commitment

01. Business Services 0.03 0.18 0.79

02. Communication Services 0.07 0.21 0.71


0.05 0.22 0.73

04. Distribution Services 0.00 0.12 0.88

05. Educational Services 0.00 0.11 0.89

06. Environmental Services 0.01 0.20 0.78

07. Financial Services 0.11 0.24 0.65

08. Health Related and Social Services 0.01 0.06 0.93

09. Tourism and Travel Related Services 0.05 0.28 0.67


0.01 0.07 0.92

11. Transport Services 0.01 0.08 0.90

Average 0.03 0.16 0.81 Source: Calculated from The database constructed for this study.

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4. Policy Suggestions and Conclusions

This chapter addresses the issue of converging the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs. The

Coverage Index used in this chapter shows to what extent the FTA members are

committed to particular services sectors: in an ideal scenario, the Index should converge

to 1.0, and this is an important consideration since the RCEP should aim for the simplest

structure of ‘N-commitments in all the service sectors by all the partner countries’.

The ‘convergence point’ of ‘all the RCEP members committed to all the sectors’

(the above-mentioned scenario of the coverage index being 1.0 for all the service

sectors), however, would be infeasible in reality. This study revealed that while AFAS–8

is rather distinct, the other three FTAs – ACFTA, AANZFTA, and AKFTA – are very similarly

correlated (except for the fact that the Mode 4 commitment under AANZFTA is unique

due to its separate chapter on the movement of natural persons). Therefore, AFAS–8

could evolve into AFAS–9, which serves as a realistic ‘convergence point’ for all the RCEP

members.11

We also found that amongst the four ASEAN+1 FTAs studies, AFAS is the most

deeply committed agreement. This is promising in the sense that ASEAN is at the centre

of policy efforts towards streamlining the ASEAN+1 FTAs. In the services sector, World

Trade Organization (WTO)-mediated liberalisation efforts (as reported by, e.g. Gootiiz

and Mattoo, 2009) were not making progress at the time of writing.

Overall, enhancement of the coverage-widening efforts in each of the ASEAN+1

FTAs would be needed to realise the RCEP in the near future. More specifically, it is

imperative to: (1) harmonise the N-based as well as L-based commitments amongst the

ten ASEAN members under the current three ASEAN+1 FTAS, i.e. amongst ACFTA,

AANZFTA, and AKFTA; then (2) attempt to enhance the level of liberalisation (an

‘ASEAN+1 template commitment on services’, so to speak); thereby finally, (3) harmonise

the N-based and L-based commitments between the ‘ASEAN+1 template commitment

11 At the time of writing it seemed AFAS-9 may be skipped as a result of the time constraint of achieving the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. That said, AFAS has been making progress under its unique modality of package-based gradual liberalisation. Separate calculations show that the N-commitment value (on average) has been evolving as follows: 0.22 (AFAS-5), 0.34 (AFAS-7), and 0.39 (AFAS-8); the L-commitment value (on average): 0.07 (AFAS-5), 0.08 (AFAS-7), and 0.09 (AFAS-8); the U-commitment value (on average): 0.72 (AFAS-5), 0.58 (AFAS-7), and 0.52 (AFAS-8). Clearly, the N-commitment value has been on an increasing trend, which is promising.


192

on services’ and AFAS–8, to realise a first version of an RCEP agreement on services.

While the coverage index shows rather low levels of commitment by the member

countries, a first step and more tractable policy suggestion is to continue prioritising the

priority integration sectors, i.e. ‘01.B. Computer and Related Services’, ‘02.C.

Telecommunication Services’, ‘04.B. Wholesale Trade Services’, ‘08.A. Hospital Services’,

‘09.B. Travel Agencies and Tour Operators services’, ‘09.C. Tourist Guides Services’, ‘11.A.

Maritime Transport Services’, ‘11.B. Internal Waterways Transport’, ‘11.C. Air Transport

Services’, ‘11.E. Rail Transport Services’, and ‘11.F. Road Transport Services, to achieve a

seamless ASEAN Economic Community as well as a well-connected RCEP.

Under the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement

(AJCEP), negotiations on market access are ongoing at the time of writing. As for the

ASEAN–India Free Trade Area (AIFTA), negotiations on trade in services are reportedly

progressing, but relevant information is not yet publicly available. That said, including

both India and Japan in the sequencing of service trade convergence is indispensable to

realise an RCEP. India and Japan are committed to bilateral agreements, e.g. India with

Singapore, and Japan with several ASEAN members including Indonesia, Malaysia,

Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. Commitment to these bilateral

agreements is stronger than to the ASEAN+1 FTAs considered in this study. We expect,

therefore, that both India and Japan will be committed to a future common template for

trade in services under the proposed RCEP.12

12 Since the Coverage Index is calculated assuming the existence of multiple partner countries, measuring Japan’s and India’s degrees of commitment is not feasible. In terms of the Hoekman Index, just for reference, separate calculations show that under the Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership agreement, Japan’s average value is 0.68 and Indonesia’s is 0.14. Judging from this and also from the fact that Australia’s average Hoekman Index value is 0.52 under AANZFTA (as indicated in Ishido and Fukunaga, 2012), Japan’s commitment level is high. This suggests that Japan is likely to be actively committed to a future RCEP agreement. As for India, it has a bilateral FTA with Korea (i.e. the India–Korea FTA); under the bilateral FTA, India’s Hoekman Index value is 0.29 and that for Korea is 0.32. This suggests that India’s potential level of commitment under a future RCEP would be more or less comparable to that for Korea, which is rather actively committed.

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193

References:

Adlung, R. and M. Roy (2005), ‘Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services and Prospects for Change’, Journal of World Trade, 39(6), pp.1161–1194.

Gootiiz, B. and A. Mattoo (2009), ‘Services in Doha: What's on the Table?’, Policy Research Working Paper WPS4903. (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2009/04/10455617/services-doha-whats-table) (accessed 28 July 2015).

Hoekman, B. (1995), ‘Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services’, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 307, Washington, DC: The World Bank.

Ishido, H. (2011), ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services under ASEAN+n: A Mapping Exercise’, ERIA Discussion Paper 2011–02, Jakarta: ERIA. (http://www.eria.org/publications/discussion_papers/liberalization-of-trade-in-services-under-aseann-a-mapping-exercise.html) (accessed 2 October 2014).

Ishido, H. and Y. Fukunaga (2012), ‘Liberalization of Trade in Services: Toward a Harmonized ASEAN++ FTA’, ERIA Policy Brief No. 2012–02, Jakarta: ERIA.


194

195

Chapter 7

Services Productivity and Trade Openness: Case of ASEAN

Shandre Mugan Thangavelu

University of Adelaide

Lili Yan Ing

Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) and University of Indonesia

Shujiro Urata

Waseda University and Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)

Using fixed effect and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimations, this

paper analyses the impacts of trade on the labour productivity of the services sector (at the

four key sub-services sector levels: (i) wholesale, retail, and hotel; (ii) transport, storage,

and communications; (iii) finance, insurance, and real estate; and (iv) community, social,

and personal sectors) for five ASEAN countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand—from 1990 to 2005. The results show that more exposure to

exports will improve labour productivity in the services sector in these countries. Based on

input–output relationships, services play an important role as inputs in the manufacturing

sector, which is notable in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand.


196

1. Introduction

Several studies highlight the importance of more ‘openness’ in the services sector

for industrial development due to its complementary effects on the manufacturing sector

through intermediate input linkages and, hence, overall productivity improvements in the

economy (Hoekman, 2006; Eswaran and Kotwal, 2002). Burgess and Venables (2004)

highlight the importance of services sector liberalisation for growth through the increase

in the variety of services ‘inputs’ that support specialisation, creation and diffusion of

knowledge, and exchange of goods and services. For example, the role of financial services

in channelling savings to productive investments tends to increase the allocative efficiency

in the economy (Goldsmith, 1969; Levine, 1999). In fact, Levine (1999) highlights the

important functions of financial activities in reducing transactions cost in terms of risk

diversification, allocation to productive investments, monitoring moral hazard activities,

mobilising private and public savings through financial innovation, and facilitating the

exchange of goods and services. Other services, such as telecommunication services that

facilitate trade and enhance the diffusion of technology and knowledge across borders,

also have a greater impact on investment and growth in the economy. The more open the

telecommunications services sector is, the lower the costs of cross-border trade and

contributes to the better exchange and specialisation of production activities.

Other than telecommunications and financial services, we expect to see other key

services enabling and facilitating trade with and across borders, such as the innovation in

transport services which should reduce the cost of shipping of goods and movement of

workers within and between countries. More open business services, such as accounting,

engineering, consulting, and legal services, reduces transaction costs and diffuses better

management and human resource practices across countries, thus, improving production

processes and productivity. Innovation and improvements in retail and wholesale

distribution services are a vital link between producers and consumers, thereby affecting

the effectiveness of the global supply chain. Health and education services are key inputs

into the flow and stock of human capital. Another dimension is that services are frequently

direct inputs into economic activities, and thus determinants of the productivity of the

‘fundamental’ factors of production – labour and capital – that generate knowledge, goods,

and other services. Education, research and development, and health services are

examples of inputs into the production of human capital. Since most services are

intermediate inputs for manufacturing and services production, these are important

components of the production process and productivity of the economy. Thus, more

openness in such services creates economies of scale and scope for greater specialisation

(fragmentation) and improvements in the global and regional production value and supply

chains. It is also suggested that outsourcing and fragmentation of production activities in

manufacturing and services will provide positive impacts on the growth of productivity in

the services sector (Oulton, 2001).

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197

The other stylized fact of the services sector is that the share of services to GDP and

employment increases as per capita income increases. Services increase with the growth

of middle-income households in the domestic economy (their income elasticities of

demand tend to exceed one) and their desire for more specialised services increases as

their income grows (Hoekman, 2006). Employment tends to shift towards the services

sector from the manufacturing sector as per capita income increases and the economy

moves to more developed levels.

One critical issue in economic development is that the productive contribution of

the services sector to the overall economy is limited due to their limited potential growth

for investment and the technological capacity (Baumol, 1967).

The pace of opening up services for trade and investment was slow in Southeast

Asia, but it has quickened in the last two decades. Over the same period, there has been a

sharp increase in free trade agreements (FTAs) in Southeast Asia, which have opened the

ASEAN1 economy to trade and investment. The first major FTA for Southeast Asian

countries was the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) enacted in 1992. ASEAN member

countries also began to actively establish bilateral and regional FTAs. Indeed, ASEAN has

established five ASEAN+1 FTAs with its six main trading partners—China (ACFTA), Japan

(AJCEP), Korea (AKFTA), India (AIFTA), and Australia–New Zealand (AANZFTA). One of the

main objectives of FTAs is to promote trade in goods and services among FTA members.

One question that arises is how trade and trade policy affect economic

performance. In our case, we shall focus on the impacts of trade and trade policy on the

productivity of the services sector in ASEAN. A recent study of the Global Value Chain

highlights the importance of services links and trade as an important component for the

growth of value-chain activities in the region (Asian Development Bank, 2012). In

particular, it highlights the important role of producer services such as transport,

communication, distribution, and business services in linking and supporting supply-chain

activities at every level leading to greater integration and growth of value-added activities

in both the region and the global economy. Services play an important role at every stage

of production and consumption from design and branding at the manufacturing stage to

consumer marketing, selling, and after-sales services such as consumer training and

technical assistance and maintenance. However, the services sector seems to be lagging

behind the manufacturing sector in terms of opening up to foreign competition in ASEAN

(Thangavelu and Lim, 2011).

This paper aims examine the impacts of the share of exports to trade and regional

integration which is represented by the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) on the labour

productivity of the services sectors for selected ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, the

Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, from 1990 to 2005. We focus our analyses in four key

services sectors: (i) wholesale, retail, and hotel; (ii) transport, storage, and

communications; (iii) finance, insurance, and real estate; and (iv) community, social, and

1 The 10 ASEAN countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.


198

personal sectors. The results indicate that openness of the services sector creates

significant linkages within the domestic economy and supports the manufacturing sector

in the regional and global production supply chain. The results of the paper are also

relevant for Regional Cooperative Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement among ASEAN

plus 6 countries (Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP

negotiations provide ample opportunities to liberalise the services sector and increase

market access across the ASEAN plus 6 countries. The results of the study also highlight the

importance of the complementary effects between manufacturing and services

liberalisation, as these will be important considerations for deeper liberalisation in the key

services sectors that could smoothen the process of trade in goods and investment in the

region.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the labour productivity

of the selected ASEAN countries. Section 3 discusses the linkages between manufacturing

and services sector. Section 4 presents an empirical findings on the impact of trade on

labour productivity in the services sector. Section 5 concludes.

2. Labour Productivity in ASEAN

2.1. Macroeconomic recent trends of ASEAN countries

Figure 7.1 presents the key macroeconomic trends of the selected Asian countries.

It illustrates the real GDP growth across from 2005 to 2013. Generally, we can observe that

most Asian countries were affected by the global financial crisis. However, we also see that

there was a strong recovery across the countries, apart from the larger economies such as

China and India which were not affected by the global shocks but are adjusting to domestic

structural changes.

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199

Figure 7.1: Real GDP Growth Rate of Selected Asian Countries, 2005–2013

Source: Authors’ calculations based on Asian Development Bank Statistics Database.

Table 7.1 describes the shares of agriculture, industry, and services sectors of the

total value-added from 2000 to 2013. The share of the agricultural sector is declining for

most Asian countries. We also observe a rising share of industry for Cambodia, Lao PDR,

Viet Nam, and Thailand from 2000 to 2013, and a declining share of industry for Malaysia,

the Philippines, and Singapore over the same period. This reflects adjustments to the global

financial crisis for the mature economies of Malaysia and Singapore. An interesting trend

is the emerging services sector across the selected Asian countries. We observe a rising

share of services for the larger economies of China and India and for the ASEAN economies

of Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Viet Nam. This

indicates that there is a general shift in industrial structure towards services activities for

most Asian and ASEAN economies.

-4.0

-2.0

0.0

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

12.0

14.0

16.0

2005

2009

2013


200

Table 7.1: Share of Agriculture, Industry, and Services Sectors to GDP

for Selected Asian Countries, 2000–2013

Agriculture Industry Services

2000 2013 2000 2013 2000 2013

China 15.1 10.0 45.9 43.9 39.0 46.1

Hong Kong 0.1 0.1 12.6 7.0 87.3 93.0

Korea 4.4 2.3 38.1 38.6 57.5 59.1

India 23.4 18.4 26.2 24.7 50.5 57.0

Brunei 1.0 0.7 63.7 68.2 35.3 31.0

Cambodia 37.9 33.8 23.0 25.7 39.1 40.5

Indonesia 15.6 14.4 45.9 45.7 38.5 39.9

Laos 48.5 30.0 19.1 30.0 32.4 40.0

Malaysia 8.3 9.4 46.8 41.0 44.9 49.6

Myanmar 57.2 36.9 9.7 26.5 33.1 36.7

The Philippines 14.0 11.2 34.5 31.1 51.6 57.7

Singapore 0.1 0.0 34.8 25.1 65.1 74.9

Thailand 8.5 10.6 36.8 40.1 54.7 49.3

Viet Nam 24.5 18.4 36.7 38.3 38.7 43.3 Source: Asian Development Bank Statistics Database.

Table 7.2 shows the key trends in the share of exports and imports of goods and

services to GDP for selected Asian countries from 1990 to 2013. We observe its rising trend

across the Asian economies, particularly for the larger economies of China and India. We

also observe a rising trend in exports for the newly growing economies such as Cambodia

and Viet Nam. The rising share of exports is also matched by a rising share of imports of

goods and services for the Asian countries.

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201

Table 7.2: Share of Exports and Imports of Goods and Services to GDP for Selected Asian Countries: 1990–2013

Exports of Goods and Services

Imports of Goods and Services

1990 2000 2010 2013 1990 2000 2010 2013

China, People's Rep. of 19.0 23.3 29.4 26.2 15.6 20.9 25.6 23.8

Hong Kong 130.6 141.8 219.4 229.6 122.0 137.4 213.5 228.7 India 7.1 13.2 21.9 24.9 8.5 14.1 26.3 28.8 Korea, Rep. of 27.6 35.0 49.4 53.9 28.3 32.9 46.2 48.9 Brunei Darussalam 61.8 67.4 81.4 76.2 37.3 35.8 32.9 32.5 Cambodia 2.4 49.9 54.1 55.0 8.4 61.7 59.5 59.0

Indonesia 25.3 41.0 24.6 23.7 23.7 30.5 22.9 25.7 Malaysia 74.5 119.8 93.3 82.9 72.4 100.6 76.3 74.0 Myanmar 1.9 0.5 0.1 0.2 3.6 0.6 0.1 0.2 Philippines 27.5 51.4 34.8 27.9 33.3 53.4 36.6 32.0

Singapore 177.2 189.2 199.3 190.5 167.1 176.9 172.8 167.5 Thailand 33.1 64.8 66.6 67.0 40.6 56.5 61.0 61.0 Viet Nam 26.4 55.0 72.0 83.9 35.7 57.5 80.2 79.8

Source: Asian Development Bank Statistics Database.

Figure 7.2 illustrates that trade in the services sector in ASEAN has been expanding

over the years. Exports of services of ASEAN increased from US$120 billion in 2005 to

nearly US$260 billion in 2011. At the same time, imports of services of these countries

increased from US$143 billion in 2005 to nearly US$270 billion in 2011. Among the services,

transport, travel, and other business services account for major components of overall

trade in services. The transport service sector is the key service import with nearly 40

percent of total value of service imports, followed by business services of nearly 24

percent, and travel of 18 percent in 2011.


202

Figure 7.2: Exports and Imports of Services for ASEAN: 2005–2011 (US$ billion)

Source: ASEAN Secretariat.

Figure 7.3 presents the share of exports of services to the total value-added of the

services sector for selected Asian countries from 1990 to 2009. Export of services is rising

for Asian countries in general, in China, India, Korea, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand, and Viet Nam. It is interesting to observe that the smaller economies of Hong

Kong and Singapore rely heavily on the exports of services to drive their economic growth.

The larger economies of China and India have a share of services exports of less than an

average of 10 percent of value-added of the services sector from 1990 to 2009.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

export Import

2005 2011

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203

Figure 7.3: Share of Services Exports to Value-Added of Services Sector for Selected Asian Countries, 1990–2009

Source: Authors’ calculations, reconstruction from Park and Shin, 2012.

2.2. The FDI Trends in the Service Sectors in ASEAN

Unlike other regional associations such as the European Union (EU), ASEAN could

not be more diverse in its economic and institutional framework. In 1992, ASEAN forged a

deeper economic understanding in the region through the conclusion of an agreement to

set up the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This agreement aimed to attract more intra-

ASEAN foreign direct investment (FDI) through active liberalisation of restrictions within

ASEAN countries. In 1998 the ASEAN Investment Area was formed and is now considered

to be the most significant attempt by ASEAN at liberalising FDI restrictions in the region

(Plummer, 2009).

To create stronger regional economic integration, ASEAN decided to create a single

market with the formation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. Through the

formation of the AEC, ASEAN is aiming to achieve a single market and production base in a

highly competitive economic region with equitable economic development and one which

is fully integrated into the global economy. ASEAN aims to build on past agreements, such

as the AFTA and ASEAN Investment Area, and work towards achieving a free and open

investment regime in the AEC to further attract both intra- and extra-ASEAN FDI (ASEAN

2010a). ASEAN’s continued emphasis on liberalising FDI restrictions in the last two decades

thus emphasises the importance of FDI to the economic progress of the region.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1990

2000

2009


204

Figure 7.4 shows the key FDI trends from 1995 to 2009. Between 2002 and 2007,

FDI in the region expanded from US$17.3 billion in 2002 to US$73.9 billion in 2007. This

increasing trend was then disrupted by the 2008 global financial crisis, but the FDI inflows

have rebounded in more recent years to the pre-global financial crisis level (ASEAN 2010b).

The rebound was not uniform across and within ASEAN countries, however. The FDI inflows

are non-ASEAN countries, while intra-ASEAN FDI inflows contributed at moderate level and

relatively did not change much.

Figure 7.4: FDI Inflows into ASEAN (1995–2009)

Note: The full data are available for Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand; for Brunei Darussalam except 2001-2006, 2009, and 2012; for Indonesia except from 2001 to2003; for Malaysia except 2007; for Singapore except 2012; and for Viet Nam except from 2001 to2010. Source: Authors’ calculation

Figure 7.5 shows the trends of FDI inflows into ASEAN by country. Singapore,

Thailand, and Viet Nam are the key countries attracting significant FDI inflows into the

region. In recent years, we also observed rising FDI inflows into Indonesia particularly after

key structural reforms following the Asian financial crisis. With greater economic openness

and reforms in the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam), we are expecting

to see further growth in FDI inflows into the region.

-50%

-25%

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

125%

150%

175%

200%

-

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012G

row

th o

f to

tal F

DI i

nfl

ow

s (i

n %

)

FDI I

nfl

ow

s (i

n U

SD b

illio

n)

Intra ASEAN ASEAN RCEP partners

The rest of the world Growth of FDI Inflow (RHS)

Chapter 7

205

Figure 7.5: Share of FDI Inflows by ASEAN Countries (%), 2000–2009

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010b.

Figure 7.6 presents the share of FDI inflows into ASEAN by key sector. It is clear

that multinational activities are concentrated in the manufacturing sector in ASEAN. The

share of FDI inflows into manufacturing accounts for nearly 40 percent in 2000 and 2005.

However, this share has been declining over the years to less than 25 percent in 2009. In

contrast, the share of FDI inflows into the services sector is rising especially in the financial,

real estate, logistic, and aviation services sectors. It also shows a rising share of FDI in the

mining sector mainly due to the rising demand for resources which resulted in increasing

prices of a number commodities.

In recent years the share of global FDI inflows into ASEAN has been showing a

declining trend. ASEAN’s share of global FDI inflows from 1980 to 2009 dropped from a

pre-Asian crisis peak of 8.8 percent in 1991 to only 3.3 percent in 2009. ASEAN’s share since

2000 is also notably lower than in the 1980s. This alarming trend indicates that a shift in

multinational activities in ASEAN, whereby multinationals may be consolidating their key

activities in the region.


206

Figure 7.6: FDI Inflows into ASEAN (%) by Sectors, 2000–2009

Source: ASEAN Secretariat, 2010b.

ASEAN recognises these concerns and its members have taken several active steps

aimed at keeping the region attractive to FDI activities. Besides taking conclusive steps in

forming the AEC, ASEAN has also recently concluded all five of its external free trade

agreements (FTAs), including the investment agreement between ASEAN and China in

2010. These agreements could allow ASEAN and its partners to exchange favorable FDI

conditions that would contribute to increasing extra-ASEAN FDI inflows. Of these the

ASEAN–China FTA (ACFTA) and the ASEAN–Korea FTA (AKFTA) are the only ASEAN+ 1 FTAs

with existing investment agreements.

3. Linkages and Productivity of Services in ASEAN

This section explains the linkages across sectors and productivity of the services

sectors in selected ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand, and Viet Nam). The labour productivity of selected ASEAN countries is shown in

Figure 8. It is measured as real GDP per number of workers.

Chapter 7

207

Figure 7.7 shows that the growth of labour productivity of the services sector is

lower than that of the manufacturing sector for the selected Asian countries as expected

from the literature. These low levels of service labour productivity growth are likely to

impede the overall average productivity growth of the economy. Thailand has experienced

a negative growth of labour productivity in the services sector. Among the Asian countries,

only Malaysia’s productivity growth rate in services was slightly higher than that of its

manufacturing sector.

Figure 7.7: Labour Productivity Growth of Selected Asian Countries, 1995–2005

Source: Groningen Growth Developing Centre (GGDC), 2013.

The labour productivity growth of selected services sectors for selected Asian

countries is illustrated in Figure 7.8. We observe that sectors that are more open for

trade—such as transport, storage, and communications and finance and business

services—tend to have a higher labour productivity growth. In particular, we observe that

the transport, storage, and communication services sector has a high labour productivity

growth across ASEAN countries especially for Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. However,

the finance, insurance, real estate, and business service sector has relatively low labour

productivity growth among ASEAN countries, except for Malaysia.

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

China Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia ThePhilippines

Singapore Thailand

Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing Manufacturing Services


208

Figure 7.8: Labour Productivity Growth by Service Sector for Selected Asian

1990–2005

Source: Groningen Growth Developing Centre (GGDC), 2013.

We also explore the linkages of services with trade and within the domestic

economy by examining input–output relationships using the I-O tables based on the Asian

Development Bank Statistics Database. The share of various imports to total imports by

key sectors for selected ASEAN countries is shown in Figure 7.9. Clearly, the manufacturing

sector has greater intra-industry imports, as these are mostly from overseas manufacturing

sectors. 2

The figure also shows high levels of manufacturing imports into the services sector,

reflecting the importance of the services sector for the growth of the manufacturing sector

as a part of regional and global production supply chains. The role of the services sector as

an engine of growth in the regional supply chain is clear from this strong relationship.

However, we do not see a strong services import into the manufacturing sector, which

2 Input-Output model could be constructed to study the change in the output resulting from changes in the final demand. Output coefficients represent the scale of output of each sector to total output of the respective industry. Input coefficients represent the scale of raw materials and intermediate inputs used in each sector to the total inputs of the respective industry.

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

China Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Korea Malaysia ThePhilippines

Singapore Thailand

Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Restaurants Transport, Storage and Communications

Finance, Real Estate and Business Services Community and Government Services

Chapter 7

209

generally indicates the slow rate of opening up of the services sector compared to the

manufacturing sector in ASEAN, and hence its low level of support for the manufacturing

sector’s activities. This clearly indicates a need for greater openness in the services sector

and, hence, the potential for growth of regional and global supply-chain activities in ASEAN

in the near future.

Figure 7.9: Input-and Output Relationships for Imports by Sector for Indonesia,

Malaysia, Thailand, and Viet Nam

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Input-Output Database for Imports.


210

We also explore the input and output relationship between services and

manufacturing sectors as illustrated in Figures 7.10a and 7.10b. This shows strong linkages

between the services and manufacturing sectors in the selected ASEAN countries. The

services sector provides strong linkages for the manufacturing sector across the selected

ASEAN countries. The services inputs are relatively strong for the manufacturing sector for

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. However, we do not see a strong services

input into Viet Nam’s manufacturing sector and this reflects the potential for services

sector growth in Viet Nam’s domestic economy.

Figure 7.10a: Input and Output Relationships for

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Input Coefficients Indonesia, 2008

Services Manufacturing Agriculture

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Input coefficients Malaysia, 2005


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Input coefficientsSingapore, 2005


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Input coefficientsThailand, 2007


Chapter 7

211

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Input-Output Database.

Figure 7.10b: Input and Output Relationships for

Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Input coefficientsViet Nam, 2007


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Output Coefficients Indonesia, 2008


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Output coefficients Malaysia, 2005


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Output coefficients Singapore, 2005


0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Output coefficients Thailand, 2007



212

Source: Authors’ calculation based on Input-Output Database.

4. Impacts of Trade on Productivity of the Services Sector in ASEAN: Empirical Analysis

This section explores the impact of exports on the productivity of the services

sector. The sectoral data for the services sector are from the Groningen Growth Developing

Centre (GGDC) 10-sector database, which provides annual data on value-added (at both

current and constant prices) and employment data from 1990 to 2005 (Timmer and de

Vries, 2009). The GGDC data provide disaggregated data consisting of 10 sectors, as defined

by the ISIC Revision 2. Productivity is defined as output per worker. In this case it is value-

added per worker for the respective services sectors of (i) wholesale, retail, and hotels and

restaurants; (ii) transport, storage, and communications; (iii) finance, insurance, real

estate, and business services; and (iv) community, social, and personal services. The data

are in real values at the 2000 prices in US dollars.

The data cover five ASEAN countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,

Singapore, and Thailand. We have also incorporated country-specific data for human

capital (the average years of schooling), the share of exports to total trade (the share of

the value of exports of goods and services to the total value of exports and imports of

goods and services), a dummy representing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (1992–2005

= 1) and a dummy for the Asian financial crisis (1997–2005 = 1) from the respective country

statistical data. We create panel data by pooling across the above countries for each key

sector.

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00

Agriculture

Manufacturing

Services

Output coefficients Viet Nam, 2007


Chapter 7

213

We adopt the dynamic fixed effect and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM)

estimations to examine the impact of the share of exports of services to total exports on

services labour productivity as presented in Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5. Table 7.3 presents that

human capital is not statistically significant in affecting labour productivity in services in

most of key services sectors. The share of exports to total trade tends to have significant

impacts on the transport, storage, and communication sector. The AFTA dummy, beginning

in 1992, has a statistically significant impact on labour productivity in the services sectors

except for the non-tradable community, social, and personal services sector. As there

might be some endogeniety issues with labour productivity having a reverse impact on

trade, we re-estimated the model by including the lags of variables of labour productivity,

the share of exports to total trade, and human capital (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This issue

is corrected in the estimations presented in Table 4.

Table 7.3: Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity in Key Services

Sector for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

Fixed Effect Estimation (Dependent variable: Ln_labour Productivity)

Wholesale, Retail, and Hotel

Transport, Storage, and Communications

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

Community, Social and Personal

Human capital 0.464* (1.930)

0.228 (1.050)

0.383 (1.150)

0.283 (1.450)

Share of export to total trade

15.175*** (4.070)

21.609*** (4.850)

7.775* (1.800)

18.904*** (4.840)

AFTA dummy 8.700* (1.700)

11.880** (1.990)

9.870** (1.980)

5.627 (1.100)

Lag labour productivity

- - - -

Lag share of export to total trade

- - - -

Lag of human capital - - - - Asian financial crisis dummy

Yes Yes Yes Yes

R-Square 0.062 0.093 0.080 0.115 No of observations 80 80 80 80

Note: t-test in parentheses ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%


214

Table 7.4 presents the results of the dynamic labour productivity analysis. It reveals

that there is a significant dynamic effect of the share of exports to total trade on the labour

productivity of the services sectors. The dynamic impacts of the lag variables significantly

improved the overall fit of the analysis (higher R-square). Human capital (including the lag

of human capital) is statistically significant and positive. This indicates that developing

human capital in ASEAN is an important factor in improving the productivity of the services

sector and the overall aggregate productivity of the respective ASEAN countries; hence,

the overall productivity of ASEAN.

The lag of the share of exports to total trade is also statistically significant, which

indicates the dynamic effects of trade on labour productivity in the services sector. This

indicates that exports should be expected to improve the role of services in providing the

varieties of intermediate inputs (increasing the varieties of services) and creating greater

linkages with the manufacturing sector. This has important implications for regional and

global supply-chain production. We also observe that AFTA has a statistically significant

impact on the labour productivity of the respective services sectors. This suggests that

increased openness to trade will significantly impact across the services sector and the

overall economy due to the linkages created by the services sector across industries.

Chapter 7

215

Table 7.4: Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity for Indonesia,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

Fixed Effect Estimation (Dependent variable: Ln_labour productivity)

Wholesale, Retail, and

Hotel

Transport, Storage, and

Communications

Finance, Insurance, and Real

Estate

Community Services, Social and Personal

Human capital 6.060*** (14.420)

6.164*** (14.872)

4.499*** (15.350)

5.591*** (11.620)


-10.708 (-1.101)

-2.054 (-0.220)

-2.388 (-0.690)

-6.970 (-0.720)

AFTA dummy 12.720*** (6.150)

9.634*** (6.080)

3.020** (2.050)

12.780*** (5.410)


-1.524*** (-17.290)

-1.232*** (-17.670)

-1.390*** (-2.978)

-1.450*** (-12.800)


7.803** (2.300)

5.981** (1.970)

8.354*** (2.850)

7.459** (2.270)

Lag of human capital

0.267** (1.980)

0.208* (1.740)

2.902*** (19.480)

0.2640 (0.160)

Asian financial crisis dummy

Yes Yes Yes Yes

R-square 0.155 0.208 0.842 0.264 No of observations

80 80 80 80

Note: t-test in parentheses ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

To address the endogeniety issues in the estimation, GMM estimations are used.

The results are presented in Table 7.5. Based on the GMM estimation results, both the

share of exports to total trade and human capital are statistically significant and have

positive impacts on the labour productivity of services sector. It shows positive impacts of

export activities on (i) transport, storage, and communications and (ii) finance, insurance,

and real estate for the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN FTA dummy (AFTA) is positive for all

the services sectors particularly on the transport, storage, and communications sector. This

clearly indicates that logistic connectivity and infrastructure will be crucial in improving the

labour productivity of the services in the region.


216

Table 7.5: Empirical Results of Trade on Services Labour Productivity for Indonesia,

Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (1990–2005)

Generalised Method of Moments Estimation (Dependent variable: Ln_labour

Productivity)

Wholesale, Retail, and

Hotel

Transport, Storage, and

Communications

Finance, Insurance, and Real

Estate

Community Services, Social and Personal

Human capital 0.375** (1.970)

2.056*** (5.190)

1.499* (1.950)

1.596*** (4.170)


3.867* (1.880)

13.105*** (4.270)

12.629* (1.950)

1.890** (2.070)

AFTA dummy 4.663*** (2.500)

13.094*** (3.880)

8.220* (1.960)

6.803** (2.200)


-0.670*** (-12.880)

-0.599*** (-9.810)

-0.633** (-8.680)

-0.732*** (-11.220)


1.747** (2.170)

0.245* (1.960)

1.633*** (4.560)

0.459 (0.270)

Lag of human capital

2.465*** (18.170)

2.083*** (11.350)

2.902*** (11.810)

1.983*** (5.160)

Asian financial crisis dummy

Yes Yes Yes Yes

R-square 0.701 0.163 0.390 0.411 No of observations

80 80 80 80

Note : t-test in parentheses ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

Chapter 7

217

5. Policy Recommendations

The results show that rising levels of human capital and growth in export activities

will improve labour productivity in the services sector, and that the services sector provides

significant inputs for the manufacturing sector in the region. Thus, more openness in the

services sector will provide positive impacts on the development of manufacturing and the

regional supply chain for ASEAN.

However, levels of openness of the services sector in ASEAN were still relatively low

(Thangavelu and Lim, 2011). This highlights that developing economies within ASEAN, such

as Cambodia and Viet Nam, tend to have a more open policy towards foreign investments

compared to economies with more developed and mature industries such as Malaysia,

Indonesia, and Thailand.

ASEAN faces several challenges in improving the productivity of the services sector.

In this respect, the RCEP negotiations should consider the impact of services liberalisation

on the overall manufacturing and economic activities of ASEAN and the region. The current

ASEAN plus one agreements are limited in services liberalisation; RCEP could be important

to increase the market access and commercial presence of services activities in the region.

First is to improve the innovation and competition in the services across the region.3

In this case, the trade facilitation and behind-border-issues are key to increase innovation

and competition of the services sector through better national treatment and greater

foreign ownership in the key domestic services sector.

Second, there are still infrastructure gaps in ASEAN, particularly in the services

sector. Both hard and soft infrastructure are important tools to enable trade and develop

the services sector in the region. A number of quick wins, for example, improvement in the

management systems in ports could reduce dwell time; and the development of

information and communications technology (ICT) and infrastructure will improve links for

trade and movement of goods that will enhance services trade. RCEP could focus on

improving ASEAN connectivity across ASEAN plus 6 countries.

Third, there is a strong need to accelerate human capital development. Some

countries have made tremendous improvements in human capital development; however,

3 There are relatively high levels of regulatory burden in particular cases of state-owned enterprises in the services sectors (Thangavelu and Lim, 2011; Park and Shin, 2012).


218

more need to be done. While CLMV countries need to address issues on basic education,

more mature economies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and

Thailand need to improve the skills and training of their workers to maintain the relevance

and contribution of their labour force in the economy. Human capital and labour mobility

are crucial for the development and openness of the services sector in the region. In this

respect, the movement of natural persons has been always a sensitive and lagging issue in

ASEAN plus one negotiations, which could be a critical issue in discussing the RCEP

framework. As the results of the study highlight, human capital development and mobility

of skilled workers will increase the impact of services productivity and the contribution of

services sector to the overall growth of both domestic and regional economies.

Last, there is a huge data gap in the services sector in the region in terms of quality

of data and information which can be used to understand the key issues and guide policy

discussions on relevant topics such as productivity, innovation, and linkages of the services

sector and services trade in the region.

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220

Appendix 1

Table 7.A.1: Real GDP Growth of Selected Asian Countries, 2005-2013

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

China 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.7

Hong Kong 7.4 7.0 6.5 2.1 -2.5 6.8 4.8 1.5 2.9

South Korea 3.9 5.2 5.5 2.8 0.7 6.5 3.7 2.3 3.0

India 9.5 9.6 9.3 6.7 8.6 8.9 6.7 4.5 4.9

Brunei Darussalam 0.4 4.4 0.2 -1.9 -1.8 2.6 3.4 0.9 -1.8

Cambodia 13.3 10.8 10.2 6.7 0.1 6.0 7.1 7.3 7.5

Indonesia 5.7 5.5 6.3 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.2 5.8

Lao PDR 6.8 8.6 7.8 7.8 7.5 8.1 8.0 7.9 8.0

Malaysia 5.3 5.6 6.3 4.8 -1.5 7.4 5.1 5.6 4.7

Myanmar 13.6 13.1 12.0 10.3 10.6 9.6 5.6 7.6 7.6

Philippines 4.8 5.2 6.6 4.2 1.1 7.6 3.7 6.8 7.2

Singapore 7.5 8.9 9.1 1.8 -0.6 15.2 6.1 2.5 3.9

Thailand 4.2 4.9 5.4 1.7 -0.9 7.4 0.6 7.1 2.9

Viet Nam 7.5 7.0 7.1 5.7 5.4 6.4 6.2 5.2 5.4


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221

Table 7.A.2: Share of Agriculture, Industry, and Services to Total Value-Added for Selected Asian Countries, 2000-2013

Agriculture Industry Services

2000 2010 2013 2000 2010 2013 2000 2010 2013

China 15.1 10.1 10.0 45.9 46.7 43.9 39.0 43.2 46.1

Hong Kong 0.1 0.1 0.1 12.6 7.0 0.7 87.3 93.0 93.0

South Korea 4.4 2.5 2.3 38.1 38.3 38.6 57.5 59.3 59.1

India 23.4 18.2 18.4 26.2 27.2 24.7 50.5 54.6 57.0

Brunei Darussalam 1.0 0.8 0.7 63.7 66.8 68.2 35.3 32.5 31.0

Cambodia 37.9 36.0 33.8 23.0 23.3 25.7 39.1 40.7 40.5

Indonesia 15.6 15.3 14.4 45.9 47.0 45.7 38.5 37.7 39.9

Lao PDR 48.5 30.6 31.0 19.1 29.8 30.0 32.4 39.6 39.0

Malaysia 8.3 10.5 9.4 46.8 41.6 41.0 44.9 48.0 49.6

Myanmar 57.2 36.9 36.0 9.7 26.5 26.0 33.1 36.7 38.0

Philippines 14.0 12.3 11.2 34.5 32.6 31.1 51.6 55.1 57.7

Singapore 0.1 0.0 0.0 34.8 27.6 25.1 65.1 72.3 74.9

Thailand 8.5 10.6 10.6 36.8 40.1 40.1 54.7 49.3 49.3

Viet Nam 24.5 18.9 18.4 36.7 38.2 38.3 38.7 42.9 43.3



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SECTION III

Investment: Beyond Protection

225

Chapter 8

Searching for an Ideal International Investment Protection Regime for ASEAN+ Dialogue Partners: Where Do We Begin?

Junianto James Losari

National University of Singapore

The members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its

six dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand

– decided in November 2012 to launch the negotiation of a free trade agreement

(FTA) amongst them, also known as the regional comprehensive economic

partnership (RCEP). The scope of the agreement includes investment, despite the fact

that the negotiating states already have various international investment

agreements (IIAs) with each other. This article analyses how RCEP can better improve

and add more value to the current regime of international investment protection

within the region, by suggesting standards that should be considered by negotiators.


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1. Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States along

with their six dialogue partners – Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New

Zealand – have concluded numerous international investment agreements (IIAs) at

an unprecedented rate during the last three decades. Often, this leads to parallelism

– overlaps of various legal frameworks, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs),

regional investment agreements, and investment chapters in various free trade

agreements (FTAs) – that potentially adds a layer of complexity (UNCTAD, 2013). In

fact, this phenomenon had occurred earlier in international trade law with the

conclusion of various FTAs, and was referred to by Jagdish Bhagwati as the ‘spaghetti

bowl’ effect (Bhagwati, 1994).

In international trade law, the spaghetti bowl phenomenon had been

predicted to potentially create trade diversion and exclusive clubs in the global

trading system. However, this is less clear with IIAs. Should the parties involved avoid

creation of such a spaghetti bowl, and instead strive to consolidate the various IIAs?

Although there have been attempts to conclude a multilateral framework of

investment agreements, this has not so far been a success (Koschwar, 2009). In any

event, where multiple regimes exist, companies will structure their investments in

such a way that they are able to enjoy the benefits from the best regime(s).

ASEAN Member States and their six dialogue partners have more than 80 IIAs

themselves, either in the form of BITs, investment chapters of bilateral and

plurilateral FTAs, or regional investment agreements (UNCTAD, 2013). The regional

comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP), if concluded, could be an opportunity

to consolidate the overlapping legal frameworks of investment protection. In this

chapter, we review the existing legal frameworks and analyse the provisions based

on previous investor – state arbitration cases to come up with recommendations on

consolidated standards in RCEP’s investment chapter that could improve current

standards in the existing IIAs of the negotiating states.

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2. Nature, Object, and Purpose of RCEP

It is important to clearly identify the object and purpose of RCEP’s investment

chapter for the purpose of negotiation as well as interpretation of its contents at a

later stage when disputes arise. By understanding the object and purpose, the

negotiating states can better customise the agreement to advance their own objects

and purposes.

The lack of clarity in most investment protection clauses in existing BITs or

bilateral FTAs of RCEP negotiating states leaves a wide margin of discretion for

investor-state arbitral tribunals in interpreting the clauses. In this process, arbitral

tribunals often look at the object and purpose of the agreement (Sauvant and Ortino,

2013).1 Unfortunately, the object and purpose of some IIAs are often not clearly

stated. Some tribunals have simply relied on the preamble of the BITs to find that the

object and purpose of BITs is ‘to encourage and protect investment’2 or ‘to promote

greater economic cooperation’. 3 Such a liberal interpretation of the object and

purpose may put states at a disadvantage, especially if their measures have

legitimate reasons despite their effects on some investors.

The Preamble of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA),4

one of the most comprehensive IIAs we reviewed, declares its purpose as being to

create a favourable investment environment that will enhance a freer flow of capital,

goods and services, technology and human resources, and, eventually, overall

economic and social development in the region. This is one of the implementations

of the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint that seeks to create a competitive

single market and production base (ASEAN, 2008).5 On this matter, Ewing–Chow’s

study finds that production networks in several sectors have actually been

established within ASEAN. Nevertheless, IIAs amongst ASEAN countries remain useful

to prevent backsliding of countries’ commitments and ensure that freer flow of

1 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969 (entered into force on 27 January 1980) [VCLT], Article 31(1). 2 Azurix v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, 14 July 2006, p.307. 3 LG&E v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006,p.124. 4 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (entered into force 29 March 2012). 5 Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (signed 20 November 2007).


228

capitals, goods, and investments can be achieved to create even stronger production

networks (Ewing–Chow et al., 2014). In this chapter we do not elaborate further on

whether investment rules affect actual investment flows.6

In the context of RCEP, the region’s aggregate gross domestic product (GDP)

of US$17.2 trillion and a population of more than 3.4 billion reveal a huge potential

that can be explored further through economic integration. 7 One of the general

guiding principles in the negotiation highlights RCEP’s broader and deeper

engagements with significant improvements over the existing ASEAN+1 FTAs.8

For the investment chapter negotiation, the guiding principle provides the

following objective:

RCEP will aim at creating a liberal, facilitative, and competitive investment environment in the region. Negotiations for investment under RCEP will cover the four pillars of promotion, protection, facilitation and liberalization.

It is understood that the core objective of RCEP’s investment chapter is to

create an appealing investment environment to attract foreign investors. However,

RCEP negotiating states still need to further specify the object and purpose of the

agreement to avoid arbitral tribunals’ exercise of wide discretion in interpreting

clauses in RCEP’s investment chapter based on its objective ‘to promote, protect,

facilitate and liberalise investments’. RCEP’s investment chapter should also mention

explicitly the object and purpose of creating a refined IIA that maintains the balance

between investment protection and preservation of the member states’ policy space

to pursue their legitimate policy objectives, including protection of public health and

environment.

6 There have been separate studies on this topic. It is acknowledged though that establishing a clear link between changes in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows and the existence of investment provisions is difficult. 7 Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore, ‘Factsheet: What you need to know about RCEP’, available at: https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHAT-YOU-NEED-TO-KNOW-ABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf 8 ASEAN, ‘Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership’, available at: http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf

https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHAT-YOU-NEED-TO-KNOW-ABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf

https://www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/SiteAssets/Pages/FACTSHEET-WHAT-YOU-NEED-TO-KNOW-ABOUT/Factsheet%20on%20RCEP%20(June%202014).pdf

http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf

http://www.asean.org/images/2012/documents/Guiding%20Principles%20and%20Objectives%20for%20Negotiating%20the%20Regional%20Comprehensive%20Economic%20Partnership.pdf

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Table 8.1: FTAs with Investment Chapter/IIAs amongst ASEAN Member States + Dialogue Partners [Reviewed IIAs]

No. Name Date of Entry Into Force

ASEAN + Dialogue Partners

1. ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement [ACIA]

29 March 2012

2. ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement [AANZFTA] Investment Chapter

1 January 2010: Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, New Zealand, Singapore, and Viet Nam 12 March 2010: Thailand 4 January 2011: Cambodia and Lao PDR 10 January 2012: Indonesia

3. Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China [ASEAN–China Investment Agreement]

1 August 2010

4. 2009 Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation among the Governments of the Member Countries of the ASEAN and the Republic of Korea [ASEAN–Korea Investment Agreement]

1 September 2009

Singapore + Dialogue Partners FTAs

5. Singapore–Australia FTA 28 July 2003

6. Singapore–India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement

1 August 2005

7. Agreement between Japan and Singapore for a New-Age Economic Partnership

30 November 2002

8. Korea–Singapore FTA 2 March 2006


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9. Agreement between New Zealand and Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership

18 August 2011

Malaysia + Dialogue Partners FTAs

10. Malaysia–Australia FTA 1 January 2013

11. Malaysia–New Zealand FTA 1 August 2010

12. Malaysia–India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement

1 July 2011

13. Malaysia–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

13 July 2006

Thailand + Dialogue Partners FTAs

14. Thailand–Australia FTA 1 January 2005

15. Thailand–New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership

1 July 2005

16. Thailand–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

1 November 2007

Philippines + Dialogue Partners FTA

17. Philippines–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement

11 December 2008

Indonesia + Dialogue Partners FTA

18. Japan–Indonesia Economic Partnership Agreement

1 July 2008

Other IIA

19. Agreement among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment [Trilateral Investment Agreement]

Signed on 13 May 2012, but it has not entered into force

Source: Author’s compilation.

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3. Searching for Appropriate Standards

3.1. Investment Promotion

BITs are normally titled ‘Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of

Investments’. However, most BITs do not further elaborate on the promotion

obligation, and simply use the generic phrase of requiring the Contracting Parties to

encourage and create favourable conditions for foreign investors.

In some plurilateral IIAs, the obligation to promote is made clearer with a list

of actions to be undertaken by the parties involved. For example, Article 24 of ACIA

incorporates one of the agreement’s main objectives – enhancing production

networks in the region – into this obligation. The provision reads as follows:

Member States shall cooperate in increasing awareness of ASEAN as an integrated

investment area in order to increase foreign investment into ASEAN and intra-ASEAN

investments through, among others:

(a) encouraging the growth and development of ASEAN small and medium

enterprises and multi-national enterprises;

(b) enhancing industrial complementation and production networks

among multi-national enterprises in ASEAN;

(c) organizing investment missions that focus on developing regional clusters

and production networks;

(d) organizing and supporting the organization of various briefings and

seminars on investment opportunities and on investment laws,

regulations and policies; and

(e) conducting exchanges on other issues of mutual concern relating to

investment promotion (emphasis added).

While having a more detailed investment promotion clause is beneficial for

providing clearer guidance for implementation by host states, any investment

promotion actions will be even more useful if the host states have a favourable

investment climate as we elaborate further below in the discussion about investment

protection.

The promotion clause in ACIA is considered as soft law because it only

imposes an obligation to cooperate rather than being a strong, binding obligation.


232

Nevertheless, due to its comprehensiveness, RCEP could use ACIA’s clause as a

baseline to develop an investment promotion clause that imposes binding obligations

and provides capacity building for the less developed members to fulfil the

obligations therein.

3.2. Investment Protection

Investment protection provisions should be the main focus of RCEP’s investment

chapter negotiation as it contributes to the creation of a favourable investment

climate. These provisions become ever more important due to foreign investors’

perception of the public sectors of some countries in the region as reflected in the

2014 Corruption Perception Index below.

Table 8.2: 2014 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Ranking of RCEP Countries

Ranking Country Global Ranking (175 Countries and Territories)

1 New Zealand 2 2 Singapore 7 3 Australia 11 4 Japan 15 5 Brunei Darussalam 38* 6 South Korea 43 7 Malaysia 50 8 Philippines 85 9 India 85

10 Thailand 85 11 China 100 12 Indonesia 107 13 Viet Nam 119 14 Lao PDR 145 15 Myanmar 156 16 Cambodia 156

Note: * CPI 2013 as Brunei was not ranked in CPI 2014. Source: Transparency International (https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results).

Having investment protection provisions in RCEP magnifies the negotiating

states’ commitments to upholding the rule of law in the region. A recent survey of

301 senior decision makers at Forbes 2000 companies revealed that an average of

https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

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more than 70% of respondents across various sectors – energy and natural resources,

technology, media and telecoms, life sciences, consumer and retail, and financial

institutions – affirmed that the absence of investment protection treaties in a country

deterred them from investing or caused a reduction in their investments.9

Yet, investor–state arbitration mechanisms to enforce these investment

protection provisions has been under scrutiny due to diverging interpretations of the

provisions by arbitral tribunals (Echandi and Sauve, 2013). The lack of clarity in these

provisions is actually one of the sources of the problem.

Governments have also realised that the existing IIAs (particularly the earlier

generation BITs) often do not explicitly specify the right of states to regulate certain

matters for public purposes, such as protection of public health, safety, or the

environment. Often, these measures affect foreign investments in ways that

constitute violations of protection guarantees in IIAs.

ACIA and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement

(AANZFTA) contain more precisely formulated protection provisions that attempt to

strike a balance between investment protection and the right of states to regulate.

Their investment protection clauses can be used as a baseline for those that should

be improved further in RCEP’s investment chapter. In analysing the various

investment protection provisions of ASEAN+ dialogue partners’ FTAs, we focus on the

plurilateral IIAs rather than the bilateral IIAs, as the former are relatively more

advanced. Note that we also include the trilateral investment agreement between

China, Korea, and Japan as a reference to the recent approach of the East Asian

countries to IIAs.10

9 Hogan Lovells, Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, and BIICL, Survey Tool: Foreign Direct Investment and the Rule of Law, available at: http://www.hoganlovellsruleoflaw.com/survey-tool 10 Agreement among the Government of Japan, the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the People’s Republic of China for the Promotion, Facilitation and Protection of Investment (signed 13 May 2012).

http://www.hoganlovellsruleoflaw.com/survey-tool


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Table 8.3: Snapshot Comparison of Investment Protection Provisions in Investment

Chapters of ASEAN Member States + Dialogue Partners’ FTAs and other Regional

Investment Agreement ASEAN–

Korea ASEAN– China

AANZFTA ACIA Trilateral China–Korea–Japan

Covered investment, e.g. approval in writing

Art. 1 (c) and Annex 1

Yes, for Thailand (Art. 3 (3))

Yes, for Thailand and Viet Nam (Art. 2(a))

Art. 4(a) and Annex 1

Art. 2(2)

NT (both pre- and post- establishment)

Art. 1 (k) and Art. 3

(Art. 4) – no pre-establishment

Art. 2(d) on def. of investor and Art. 4

Art. 4(d) and Art. 5

Article 3 – no pre-establishment, and with a list of non-conforming measures.

MFN treatment (both pre- and post-establishment)

Art. 4(1) Art. 1(1)(e) and Art. 5 – excludes ISDS

No MFN clause, Art. 16(2)(a)

Art. 6(1) – excludes ISDS

Article 4 – excludes ISDS

FET (Limited scope: not to deny justice or admin. proceedings)

Art. 5(2) Art. 7(2) Art. 6(2) Art.11 Art. 5 (1) – scope limited to CIL, no elaboration.

Expropriation Art. 12 (no annex on expropriation)

Art. 8 –exception for land and compulsory licenses (CL)

Art. 9 – annex on expropriation, and exception for land and CL.

Art. 14 – annex on expropriation, and exception for land and CL.

Art. 4.1 – Protocol on Expropriation, and exception for land acquisition.

Prohibition on performance requirement

Art. 6 - Art. 5 Art. 7 Art. 7

SMBoD Art. 7 - See AANZFTA Chapter 9

Art. 8 Art. 8 – limited to facilitation.

Freedom of transfer and its exception

Art. 10 Art. 10 Art. 8 Art. 13 Art. 13

Balance of payment/ prudential measures

Art. 11 Art. 11 Chapter 15 Art. 16 Art. 19/20

General exceptions

Art. 20 Art. 16 Chapter 15 Art. 17 No, Art. 18 provides security exceptions.

Denial of benefits

Art. 17 Art. 15 Art. 11 Art. 19 Art. 22

ISDS Art. 18 Art. 14 Art. 18 Section B – Article 29

Art. 15

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Note: CIL – customary international law; NT – national treatment; MFN – most-favoured nation; FET –

fair and equitable treatment; ISDS – investor–state dispute settlement; SMBoD – senior management and board of directors. Source: Author’s compilation.

3.2.1 Scope and Coverage

Determining the scope and coverage of an IIA is important to regulate the

investments and investors entitled to benefits from the agreement. These provisions

include the definition of investments and investors, admission clauses, explicit

exclusion of certain investments, and in FTAs, the relationship of the investment

chapter to other chapters.

(a) Admission Clause – Approval in Writing

Admission clauses govern the entry of investments into host states. In some

IIAs, the clause requires investments to be admitted in accordance with the host

state’s national laws. In fact, this investment-control model is the one most

commonly used. It does not grant a right to admission, but allows the host state to

control all inward foreign direct investment (FDI). While some argue that this type of

admission clause is useful to protect sensitive industries, others argue that it may

lead to rent seeking and corruption (Pollan, 2006).

All of the reviewed IIAs contain admission clauses, but some require the

investment to be approved by the host state. Article 4(a) of ACIA provides the

following:

“[C]overed investment” means, with respect to a Member State, an investment in its territory of an investor of any other Member State in existence as of the date of entry into force of this Agreement or established, acquired or expanded thereafter, and has been admitted according to its laws, regulations, and national policies, and where applicable, specifically approved in writing1 by the competent authority of a Member State. (emphasis added)

Footnote 1 of the provision further provides ‘for the purpose of protection,

the procedures relating to specific approval in writing shall be as specified in Annex


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1 (Approval in Writing)’. It is pertinent to obtain such a specific approval because

without it, the investment may not be protected at all.11

Although such an approval requirement may be burdensome for investors,

ACIA deals with this matter by means of the inclusion of Annex 1 that clarifies the

specific procedure for approval. This can improve governance in the host state, thus

contributing to a better investment climate.

In the RCEP negotiation, if the negotiating states want to incorporate the

approval requirement, they should include specific procedures as provided in Annex

I of ACIA. They can improve Annex I further by listing each host state’s focal point

that will be responsible for the issuance of such approvals as well as procedures

involved.

(b) Relationship with Other Chapters or Agreements

ACIA clarifies its relationship with the ASEAN Framework Agreement on

Services (AFAS). In relation to liberalisation under AFAS, ACIA clarifies the sectors that

will be liberalised further by the Member States. However, this clarification is done

under the provision of Scope of Application. Article 3(3) of ACIA states that:

For the purpose of liberalization and subject to Article 9 (Reservations), this Agreement shall apply to the following sectors: (a) manufacturing; (b) agriculture; (c) fishery; (d) forestry; (e) mining and quarrying; (f) services incidental to manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining

and quarrying; and (g) any other sectors, as may be agreed upon by all Member States.

This provision is problematic because ACIA does not define the term

‘liberalization’. While in trade law the term is normally understood as the opening up

of certain sectors for foreign investors (market access), in investment law the term

11 Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd. v. Government of the Union of Myanmar, ASEAN ID Case No. ARB/01/1, Award, 31 March 2003 (ICSID Additional Facility Rules).

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can also mean providing better protection for foreign investors. This provision

becomes ambiguous and could be interpreted as limiting the scope of ACIA, including

its investment protection provisions, only to the listed sectors.

However, if we read paragraph 3 in the context of the provision, we will find

that Article 3(5) of ACIA indicates that the agreement applies more broadly. The

provision provides:

5. Notwithstanding sub-paragraph 4 (e), for the purpose of protection of investment with respect to the commercial presence mode of service supply, Articles 11 (Treatment of Investment), 12 (Compensation in Cases of Strife), 13 (Transfers), 14 (Expropriation and Compensation) and 15 (Subrogation) and Section B (Investment Disputes Between an Investor and a Member State), shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to any measure affecting the supply of a service by a service supplier of a Member State through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member State but only to the extent that they relate to an investment and obligation under this Agreement regardless of whether or not such service sector is scheduled in the Member States’ schedule of commitments made under AFAS.

This can only mean that all investment protection provisions of ACIA are

applicable to all sectors, except those explicitly excluded under Article 3(4) and

subject to Article 3(5).

The guiding principle of RCEP negotiation also includes the liberalisation pillar

within the investment chapter. Given the possible misinterpretation of the provision

about scope of coverage in ACIA, RCEP negotiators should define the term

‘liberalization’ more clearly.

3.2.2. Performance Requirements

A performance requirements clause places an obligation on host states not to

impose certain requirements on foreign investors during the operations of their

investments, such as local content requirements, trade-balancing requirements, or

export controls. In Mobil v. Canada, the tribunal found that Canada breached the

prohibition on domestic performance requirement of the North America Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA) Article 1106, by imposing a research investment target on


238

operators of petroleum projects.12 Under the government’s guidelines, the operators

were obliged to allocate certain amounts of funds for research and development

matters – endowing a university chair, furnishing a classroom, providing scholarships,

or an in-house research facility – for each of the exploration, development, and

production phases of the project. The tribunal further found that this constituted a

performance requirement to acquire services locally.13

Most of the reviewed IIAs contain performance requirement clauses that

refer to the Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) of the World

Trade Organization (WTO). For example, Article 6 of the ASEAN–Korea Investment

Agreement provides as follows:

The provisions of the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures which are not specifically mentioned in or modified by this Agreement, shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to this Agreement unless the context otherwise requires.

In RCEP, the negotiating states should consider including a clause on

prohibition of performance requirements to create a more liberal investment

environment for foreign investors that need the freedom to determine their

production processes to gain more efficiency. If some of the negotiating states are

not ready to make certain commitments in this regard, they may make reservation

and produce lists of their non-conforming measures. However, this reservation

should be temporary and phased out soon.

Since governments can easily issue regulations containing performance

requirements, perhaps RCEP should look into the possibility of imposing an obligation

to create a domestic review mechanism to deal with investors’ allegations of a host

state’s performance requirements. Arguably, this could positively contribute to

governance, provided the mechanism is fast and impartial so that issues that arise do

not need to be brought before investor–state arbitration tribunals.

12 Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. Canada, ICSID Case No.

ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and Principles of Quantum, 22 May 2012, pp.45–46. 13 Ibid.pp.237–38, and 242.

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(a) Senior Management and Boards of Directors (SMBoD)

An SMBoD clause normally is meant to facilitate the entry of foreign

employees and grant foreign investors the right to hire expatriate personnel. This

provision is critical because foreign investors may need to place their senior

management team who understand their business operations in the host state. A

simpler and more liberal approach to this clause is found in Article 7 of the ASEAN–

Korea Investment Agreement, which provides:

1. A Party shall not require a judicial person of that Party that is covered investment appoint to senior management positions natural persons of any particular nationality.

2. A Party may require that a majority of the board of directors, or any committee thereof, of a juridical person of that Party that is a covered investment, be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of the Party, provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of the investor to exercise control over its investment.

Host states often want to increase spill over effects from foreign investment,

including by requiring employment for domestic or indigenous workers. They also

want to retain control over their immigration policies (UNCTAD, 2012). To addres

such concerns, the clause could be modified to be less liberal, as can be seen in Article

8 of the Trilateral Investment Agreement:

Each Contracting Party shall endeavor, to the extent possible, in accordance with its applicable laws and regulations, to facilitate the procedures for the entry, sojourn and residence of natural persons of another Contracting Party who wish to enter the territory of the former Contracting Party and to remain therein for the purpose of conducting business activities in connection with investments.

Admittedly, such a provision provides host states with significant discretion.

To maintain the facilitation element, RCEP’s investment chapter should contain an

obligation on host states, e.g. to install a transparent and streamlined mechanism for

work permit applications of SMBoD. It must at least incorporate a timeline as well as

an obligation on the part of the host state to provide the reason for refusing a work

permit application of SMBoD.


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(b) National Treatment (NT)

National treatment (NT) is a contingent standard of treatment because its

application requires a comparative analysis between the treatment granted by the

host state to its domestic investments or investors and the treatment granted to

foreign investors of another contracting party to an IIA (UNCTAD, 2007). To create a

level playing field between foreign and domestic investors, the host state must

provide no less favourable treatment of foreign investments or investors than of

domestic investments or investors.

In analysing whether the NT obligation has been breached, tribunals normally

assess whether there is de jure or de facto discrimination (Bjorklund, 2008).

Additionally, some tribunals also consider whether the investors are in ‘like

circumstances’ by analysing whether the difference in treatment has been justified

by rational policy objectives of the government (Bjorklund, 2008).14

Some IIAs contain NT clauses that grant the right of pre-establishment to

foreign investors. This can be in the form of market access commitments, such as

allowing foreign equity ownership in certain sectors that were previously closed to

foreign investors. These commitments are reflected in each member’s schedule and

relate to the liberalisation pillar of an IIA. For example, Article 5(1) of ACIA provides:

1. Each Member State shall accord to investors of any other Member State treatment no less favourable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the admission, establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.

Under Article 4(d) of ACIA, the protection is extended to natural or juridical

persons who are making their investments – before the investment is fully

established in the host state.

Normally, each party to an IIA maintains a reservation list of measures that

will not constitute NT violation. Such flexibilities for an NT clause might be needed to

14 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, NAFTA, Award on the Merits of Phase 2, 10 April 2001,p.103; see also Alvaro Antoni and Michael Ewing-Chow, ‘Trade and Investment Convergence and Divergence: Revisiting the North American Sugar War’ 2013 1(1) Latin American Journal of International Trade Law 337-341.

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preserve the policy space of host states. However, a long list of reservations may

reduce the scope of protection, and thus become unfavourable to foreign investors.

RCEP’s investment chapter should have an NT clause that contains both post-

establishment and pre-establishment commitments. In the negotiation, the states

must carefully choose the approach to list their pre-establishment NT commitments.

There are two possible approaches – the negative-list and the positive-list. The

former approach requires more resources as the negotiating states must conduct a

thorough audit of existing domestic policies. In the absence of specific reservations,

a negotiating state commits to open those sectors/activities that at the time the IIA

is signed may not yet exist in the country. In contrast, the positive-list approach offers

selective liberalisation. States create a list of industries in which investors will enjoy

the rights of pre-establishment (UNCTAD, 2012). ACIA adopts a hybrid approach.

Using the positive-list approach, ASEAN Member States limit their pre-establishment

commitments for the purpose of market access liberalisation to only certain

sectors. 15 Furthermore, Article 9 provides that certain reservations (negative-list

approach) shall apply to these sectors.

( c ) Most-favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment

A most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment clause in an IIA is meant to create a

level playing field between all foreign investors of different nationalities. It can apply

to conditions of entry and operation of foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2010).

In practice, besides claiming violation of MFN treatment, investors/claimants

use the MFN clause in the primary IIA – under which a dispute is brought – to

incorporate/import more favourable substantive provisions 16 or rules of dispute

settlement17 from a third-party treaty (secondary IIA) into the primary agreement.

Although it is possible to import substantive protection standards from third

party agreements by virtue of an MFN clause, there are limitations.

15 ACIA, Article 3(3). 16 Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, Award, 27 August 2009, pp.227–35. 17 Emilio Augustin Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Decision of the tribunal on the objections of Jurisdiction, 25 January 2000, pp.62–63.


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For example, investors may not invoke an MFN clause to eliminate provisions

of the basic agreement. The claimant in CMS v. Argentina attempted to eliminate the

emergency exception clause in the primary agreement, the US–Argentina BIT.

However, the tribunal ruled that the absence of such a provision in other agreements

simply did not eliminate the provision from the primary agreement (UNCTAD, 2010).

Even so, questions might arise with regard to two different agreements with different

treaty exceptions where one has less than the other. We refrain from addressing this

issue as it is beyond the scope of this chapter.

The importation of more favourable rules of dispute settlement is

controversial (Ewing–Chow and Ng, 2010). While some tribunals are willing to

incorporate rules of dispute settlement from secondary treaties by virtue of an MFN

clause,18 others have been reluctant.19 We are more inclined towards the view that

some MFN clauses may extend to rules of dispute settlement, as in the case of

Maffezini, provided the language of the clause is broad enough, e.g. ‘in all matters’,

and there is no explicit statement from the parties to the treaty against it. This will

be more consistent with the interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna

Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).20

Due to the over-expansive application of MFN clauses, some states excluded

the clause altogether or reformulated the MFN clause in their newer IIAs. The

investment chapters of AANZFTA, ASEAN–India FTA, and some bilateral FTAs

between ASEAN Member States and dialogue partners, do not contain any MFN

clause. Most of the ASEAN+1 Dialogue Partner Investment Agreements, except the

ASEAN–Korea Investment Agreement, explicitly exclude the application of the MFN

18 Maffezini, supra note 17, pp.62–63; Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, 21 June 2011, pp.104–08; RosInvestCo v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. Arb. V 079/2005, Award on Jurisdiction, October 2007, pp.124–35. 19 Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005, pp.202, 215; Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A. v. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 November 2004, p.112; Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence, 19 June 2009, p.220. 20 VCLT, supra note 1.

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clause to provisions on ISDS. For example, Article 5(4) of the ASEAN–China

Investment Agreement provides: 21

For greater certainty, the obligation in this Article does not encompass a requirement for a Party to extend to investors of another Party dispute resolution procedures other than those set out in this Agreement.

The most recent development as regards the MFN clause can be seen in

Article X.7 (3) of the Draft Text of the Canada–European Union Free Trade Agreement

(CETA)22 that provides:

[…] Substantive obligations in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements do not in themselves constitute “treatment”, and thus cannot give rise to a breach of this article, absent measures adopted by a Party pursuant to such obligations.

The main rationale for adding such a clause is to prevent the incorporation of

other standards of treatment contained in other IIAs of host states. In fact, most MFN

claims in investment arbitration clauses were invoked for such purpose, rather than

to claim against different treatments between foreign investors. However, even the

clause in the Draft CETA is not very clear and can lead to various interpretations by

arbitral tribunals. If RCEP’s investment chapter is to include an MFN clause after all,

it must consider adopting the Draft CETA’s limitation and improve it further.

Otherwise, the efforts of negotiating refined standards of protection can become

futile because investors can simply incorporate the provisions in older IIAs of the host

state into RCEP’s investment chapter by virtue of an MFN clause.

( d) Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)

In IIAs, Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) clauses often lack a precise

meaning and have raised lots of controversies leading to multiple interpretations by

arbitral tribunals (UNCTAD, 2007). Some of the reviewed IIAs link the FET clause with

customary international law (CIL), and the clause can be phrased as follows:

21 See also Malaysia–New Zealand FTA, Article 10.5 (2); AANZFTA, Article 16(2)(a); ACIA, Article 6 footnote 4(a). 22 Consolidated Text Canada–European Union Free Trade Agreement (Draft), dated 26 September 2014, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.

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This Article prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of the other Party. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.23

In Merrill & Ring, Canada argued that a CIL-linked FET clause refers to the

standard of protection that was developed by the Neer case (Vandevelde, 2010).24

Violation occurs when the conduct of the host state amounts to an ‘outrage’, ‘bad

faith’, ‘wilful neglect of duty’, or conduct ‘so far short of international standards that

every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognise its insufficiency’. 25

However, several tribunals opined that CIL evolves and therefore FET is not frozen to

the standards developed in the Neer case.26 Simply, the standard is broader and

protects investors against ‘all such acts or behaviour that might infringe a sense of

fairness, equity and reasonableness’.27

Some of the reviewed IIAs have attempted to limit the standard only to the

guarantee against denial of justice. For example, Article 11(2) of ACIA provides:

1. For greater certainty: a. fair and equitable treatment requires each Member State not to deny justice

in any legal or administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due process; …28

Although there has been no case suggesting how tribunals interpret this type

of clause, it is expected to limit broad interpretation of the standard to mainly the

guarantee for procedural matters and patently arbitrary and unjust decision

23 Agreement between Japan and the Republic of the Philippines for an Economic Partnership (signed 9 September 2006), Article 91; see also the Trilateral Investment Agreement, supra note 10, Article 5(1). 24 Merrill & Ring Forestry LP v. Canada, Award, 31 March 2010, p.121. 25 Neer v. Mexico, 4 R. Int’l Arb. Awards, 15 October 1926, 4, pp.61–62; Case Concerning Electtronica

Sicula S.p.A (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment of 20 July 1989 [1989] ICJ Rep 1989, p.15; Gami Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 15 November 2004, pp.116, 123,125,127. 26 Maffezini, supra note 17, p.179; Pope & Talbot Award, supra note 14, p.18; Merrill & Ring, supra note 24, p.193. 27 Merrill & Ring, supra note 24, p.210, 213. 28 ACIA, Article 11(2); ASEAN–China Investment Agreement, Article 7(2)(a); AANZFTA, Article 6(2)(a).

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(Bjorklund, 2005).29 In Flughafen v. Venezuela, the tribunal ruled that to establish a

denial of justice, two elements must be fulfilled: 1) treatment that is clearly and

manifestly anti-juridical, and 2) exhaustion of all local remedies to challenge the

decision (unless proven that such remedies would be futile).30 Relevant to this, due

process principle also requires a host state: 1) to provide prior notice to the relevant

party upon whom the state applies coercive power, and 2) to provide an opportunity

for the party to contest the application before an international tribunal including the

right of legal representation (Vandevelde, 2010).

RCEP negotiators should consider limiting the scope of the FET clause to add

more clarity and certainty for both investors and the host states.

(e) Expropriation

Generally, states may expropriate foreign investments under the notion of

lawful expropriation provided it is done on a non-discriminatory basis, for public

purposes, in accordance with the due process of law, and against the payment of

compensation (UNCTAD, 2007). While in the past there were many cases of direct

expropriation – seizure of investments or transfer of legal title over investments –

nowadays the cases of indirect expropriation are more prevalent.

Unfortunately, expropriation clauses in older IIAs tend to be vague and fail to

explain governmental measures that constitute indirect expropriation. As a result,

different tribunals have developed different approaches in determining what

constitutes indirect expropriation.

First, the sole effect approach proposes that a measure or a set of measures

constitutes indirect expropriation when it has a permanent character, or substantially

deprives the investor of property rights, or conflicts with the investor’s investment-

backed expectations (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008; Dugan, Wallace Jr. et al., 2008),31

29 Rumeli Telekom AS and Telsim Mobil Telekomikasyon Hizmetleri AS v Republic of Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, 29 July 2008, p.653. 30 Flughafen Zürich AG and Gestión e Ingeniería IDC SA v Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/19, Award, 18 November 2014, pp.635, 642. 31 LG&E Energy Corp v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on Liability, 3 October 2006, p.190; Metalclad Corp v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (2000), Award,


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with an emphasis on the existence of substantial interference/ deprivation of

investor’s right of ownership of its investments.32 Nonetheless, if the government

actions only reduce the profits of the investments, they will not necessarily amount

to indirect expropriation.33

The second approach to defining indirect expropriation takes into account the

nature or character of the governmental acts in pursuing its public policy objectives

(Newcombe, 2005; Dugan, Wallace Jr. et al., 2008).34 The tribunal in Tecmed found it

necessary to consider ‘whether such actions or measures [of the host state] are

proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the

protection legally granted to the investments’ 35 (emphasis added). With this

approach, the analysis focuses on how the government measure is to be

characterised and how much the nature or character should weigh against the

depriving effects on investors (Dugan, Wallace Jr. et al., 2008).

The last approach, as developed in Methanex, provides that a governmental

measure will not be expropriatory and no compensation shall be owed to investors

when the measure is: 1) non-discriminatory, 2) in accordance with due process, and

3) for public purpose (Weiler, 2005; Schneidarman, 2008).36 The potential implication

of following this approach is that there could no longer be a notion of lawful

expropriation, as the criteria for a measure to be non-expropriatory is the same as

the criteria for lawful expropriation, except for the obligation to compensate. This

will render the clause of lawful expropriation in an IIA meaningless. This approach

has received a lot of criticism and subsequent tribunals have been reluctant to follow

this route.37

30 August 2000, p.103; Nykomb Synergetics Technology Holding, AB, Stockholder v. Republic of Latvia, Riga, SCC, 16 December 2003, p.4.3.1. 32 EnCana Corporation v Ecuador, LCIA, Case No. UN3481, Final Award, 3 February 2006, pp.172–83. 33 Ibid., pp.173–74; Perenco Ecuador Ltd. v The Republic of Ecuador and Petroecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, 12 September 2014, p.672. 34 Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003,¶115. 35 Ibid., p.122. 36 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award on Jurisdiction and Merits, 3 August 2005 Part IV Chapter D, p.7. 37 Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/02/01, Award, 17 July 2006, p.176; Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Award, 14 May 2009, p.356.

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While all of the reviewed IIAs cover both direct and indirect expropriation, the

differences lies in the elaboration of what constitutes indirect expropriation and in

the carve-outs. For example, ACIA carves out the expropriation of land and the

issuance of compulsory licenses in accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related

Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) from the rule of expropriation.

In addition, Annex 2 of ACIA elaborates the factors to assess whether a

governmental measure constitutes indirect expropriation. Paragraph 4 provides that

non-discriminatory measures of a member state that are designed and applied to

protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the

environment, do not constitute indirect expropriation.38

Although the provision preserves the host state’s right to regulate, the

requirements to exercise such power should be clearer. Paragraph 4’s requirements

are not necessarily different from those developed by the tribunal in Methanex that

conflated those requirements with the requirements of lawful expropriation.

Besides providing further clarification as Annex 2 of ACIA, RCEP’s investment

chapter could be improved further by including a procedural mechanism that has to

be followed by governments who seek to exercise its regulatory power. This could be

in the form of a requirement to notify affected investors prior to the implementation

of the measure and/or a domestic review mechanism for the investors to challenge

the proportionality of the measure. The mechanism prevents abuse of government’s

policy space, thereby ensuring proper balance with investment protection.

(f) Transfers and Exceptions

All of the reviewed IIAs contain clauses on guarantee of transfers relating to a

covered investment. The clause guarantees that such transfers can be made freely

without delay into and out of the host state’s territory. Normally, the clause also

contains a list of exceptions under which the host state may prevent or delay a

transfer so long as it is done in an equitable and non-discriminatory manner and in

38 AANZFTA, Article 9, Annex on Expropriation and Compensation.


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good faith. The difference between the clauses mainly lies in the list of exceptions.

For example, Article 13(3) of ACIA lists the exceptions to freedom to transfer as

follows:

a) bankruptcy, insolvency, or the protection of the rights of creditors;

b) issuing, trading, or dealing in securities, futures, options, or derivatives;

c) criminal or penal offences and the recovery of the proceeds of crime;

d) financial reporting or record keeping of transfers when necessary to assist

law enforcement or financial regulatory authorities;

e) ensuring compliance with orders or judgments in judicial or administrative

proceedings;

f) taxation;

[…]

Such a list is important because in certain situations host states should be

allowed to prevent transfer of funds by investors who seek to evade their obligations

under the domestic law of the host states.

(g) Treaty Exceptions

The trend of including treaty exceptions in an IIA has begun just recently.

Governments use treaty exception clauses as a policy tool to strike a balance

between investment protection and safeguarding other values or objectives

considered to be fundamental to the countries concerned, such as public health

(Ewing–Chow and Fischer, 2011). The clause provides the host state with significant

room to manoeuvre when facing circumstances that may justify derogation from its

IIA obligations. If the host state successfully invokes the treaty exception, it is

exempted from liability (Dugan, Wallace et al., 2008).

There are several types of treaty exception clauses. A simpler one could be

found in BITs, such as the essential security exception clause in the cases involving

Argentina. 39 This exception has its own complexity as reflected in diverging

39 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 25 April 2005 [CMS Award], pp.349-352; CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Application for Annulment, 21 August 2007 [CMS Annulment]; LG&E, supra note 31; Sempra Energy International v. Argentina, ICSID ARB/02/16, Award, 28 September 2007 [Sempra

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interpretations developed by the tribunals that had generated extensive debates

amongst scholars.40

On the other hand, the most comprehensive types of exceptions can be found

in newer IIAs, such as ACIA, which contains 1) exceptions to transfer of funds, 2)

measures to safeguard balance of payments, 3) general exceptions, and 4) security

exceptions. Similar types of exceptions can also be found in AANZFTA, the ASEAN–

Korea Investment Agreement, and the ASEAN–China Investment Agreement. As

these exceptions have never been invoked in investment arbitration cases, we have

yet to see how tribunals will interpret them. Notably, the general exception clause is

similar to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 Article XX

exception – word-by-word with minor modifications. It can be expected that some

tribunals might refer to the WTO cases for interpretation (Kurtz 2008).

For example, the balance of payments exception in Article 16 of ACIA

preserves host states’ policy space in the event of financial difficulties to ensure that

states can adopt or maintain restrictions on payments or transfers related to

investments. This can be critical to prevent abrupt capital outflows from a host state

during a financial crisis, which can worsen the situation in the country as had

happened during the 1997 Asian Financial crisis. To prevent abuse, host states must

comply with certain restrictions and procedures to be allowed to invoke the

exception.

RCEP’s investment chapter should incorporate these treaty exceptions to

balance investment protection and states’ legitimate right to regulate. At the same

time, these exceptions provide greater clarity and certainty about the scope of host

states’ policy space.

Award], p.366–68; Sempra v. Argentine Republic, Decision on Argentina’s Application for Annulment of the award, 10 June 2010 [Sempra Annulment]; Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, 22 May 2007 [Enron Award], pp.324–26; Enron v. Argentine Republic, Decision on the Application for Annulment, 30 July 2010 [Enron Annulment]; Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 5 September 2008, p.183.


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(h) Denial of Benefits

The denial of benefits clause is inserted into IIAs to try to prevent treaty

shopping and nationality planning by investors – both domestic and foreign

(UNCTAD, 2014). For example, Article 19 of ACIA allows host states to deny the

benefits of the agreement to non-ASEAN investors or domestic investors who

establish a shell company with no substantive business operations in the territory of

another ASEAN Member State.

Indeed, corporations often structure their companies in such a way that their

investments are protected by a certain IIA. Law firms have been openly advising in

favour of this. 41 While some tribunals have allowed this type of corporate

structuring,42 in certain cases where the restructuring is done much later for the

purpose of bringing a dispute, tribunals rejected the claims and found them to be

abuses of process despite the absence of the denial of benefits clause.43 We believe

that structuring investments is not illegal per se in the current economic context

where multinational companies (MNCs) operate within their Global Value Chains

(GVCs). It is only when restructuring is done at a later stage with the intention of

merely accessing the international arbitration mechanism, that it becomes an abuse

of process.44 After all, the most important matter is not the source of the capital,

which in itself if very difficult to trace in this era, but rather the contribution of the

capital.

In Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. the Republic of Ecuador, the tribunal did not find

any abuse of process, but it found that the host state may deny benefits to an

American mailbox company based on the denial of benefits clause in the Dominican

Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement. 45 If RCEP

41 Herbert Smith Freehills, ‘Indonesia Update: What are the Possible Consequences of Termination of Indonesia’s Bilateral Investment Treaties?’ Jakarta, May 2014 <http://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/media/Files/ebulletins/2014/20140512 – Indonesia update what are the possible consequences of termination of Indonesias Bilateral Investment Treaties.htm>. 42 Tokios Tokeles v Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction, 29 April 2004, 29. 43 Tidewater Inc., Tidewater Investment SRL, Tidewater Caribe, C.A., Twenty Grand Offshore, L.L.C., Point Marine, L.L.C., Twenty… v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/5, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2013, p.146. 44 Phoenix Action Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/5, Award, 15 April 2009, 140,142. 45 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v the Republic of El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2012, pp.4.80–4.82, 4.92.

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negotiating states are eager to prevent treaty shopping, at the very least they should

clarify the denial of benefits clause, especially as regards the factors to determine the

existence of ‘substantive business operations’. This phrase has been interpreted by

several tribunals, including those using the term ‘substantial business activities’.46

Substantial or substantive is defined as having ‘substance and not merely form’.

Some investment-related activities and the employment of a small but permanent

staff have been considered sufficient to fulfil this requirement. 47 Even a holding

company may carry out substantial business activities, except if the activities were

simply to hold assets of its subsidiaries.48

(i) Dispute Settlement – Investor–State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)

All the reviewed IIAs contain both state–state dispute settlement and ISDS.

The latter has been subject to the scrutiny of many countries for several reasons. In

fact, some recent FTAs’ investment chapters exclude ISDS.49

First, some developed countries argue that they do not need any ISDS

mechanisms because they have fair and competent courts. While this may be true,

in reality investments do not go only to developed countries, but increasingly to

developing countries, including those with problematic rule of law, including their

judiciary systems. Many states involved in RCEP negotiations are increasingly

becoming both capital-importing and capital-exporting countries. For this reason,

they have an interest in ensuring that their investors have direct access to a

competent and impartial judiciary when investing in the region.

Second, some argue that ISDS exposes governments to expensive litigation.

This may be true, but it can be resolved by ensuring that ISDS is used only as a last

resort. For this reason, the creation of a dispute prevention mechanism in each

respective member of RCEP can alleviate this issue. The mechanism is meant to

46 Limited Liability Company Amto v. Ukraine, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, Case No. 080/2005, Final Award, 26 March 2008, pp.61–62, 69. 47 Ibid.,p.69. 48 Pac Rim Cayman v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, 1 June 2012, pp.4.72, 4.74, and 4.78. 49 Agreement between Japan and Australia for an Economic Partnership (entered into force 15 January 2015).


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prevent a conflict from escalating into a dispute and it should be implemented as an

investor after-care service (Echandi, 2013). Further, RCEP members must ensure

transparency by publishing the procedure of the mechanism. An example is the

Republic of Korea’s Office of the Foreign Investment Ombudsman.50

Third, some argue that ISDS leads to various, often contradicting,

interpretations of investment standards by different arbitral tribunals. This can be

addressed in RCEP by the inclusion of a binding joint interpretation mechanism, as

found in Article 40 (2) and (3) of ACIA. Under this mechanism, the tribunal or a

disputing party may request a joint interpretation on any disputed ACIA provision.

Thus, member states can ensure that the agreement will be interpreted in

accordance with their intentions.

In addition, the negotiating states of RCEP can also improve its ISDS procedure

by including a clause on the mechanism to select the members of a tribunal. For

example, Article X–10(5) of the Draft CETA requires the appointed arbitrators to have

expertise or experience in public international law, in particular international

investment law. It is desirable that they have expertise or experience in international

trade law, and the resolution of disputes arising under international investment or

international trade agreements.

This type of provision helps to ensure that members of a tribunal are qualified

to adjudicate in the dispute. The preference to have arbitrators with multi-

disciplinary expertise demonstrates the negotiators of the Draft CETA’s cognisance

of the greater level of convergence between international trade law and international

investment law as a result of the rise of GVCs around the world (Antoni and Ewing–

Chow, 2013).

Another suggestion to improve the current ISDS mechanism is to create an

independent appellate body to review decisions made by ad hoc tribunals (Sauvant

and Ortino, 2013). There has been a proposal to create an International Investment

50 The office was established in October 1999. For further information: http://www.i-ombudsman.or.kr/eng/index.jsp

http://www.i-ombudsman.or.kr/eng/index.jsp

http://www.i-ombudsman.or.kr/eng/index.jsp

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Court as a permanent appeals mechanism to resolve widespread and difficult

questions of law, and interpretations that could eventually lend greater legitimacy to

the regime (Bishop, 2005; Crawford, 2005). Nonetheless, there are concerns that an

appeal mechanism could undermine the finality of an arbitral award, that it could

‘repoliticise’ the process, and that the added layer would replicate the difficulties in

the current system (Sauvant and Ortino, 2013). Nonetheless, we believe that

ensuring better governance in the system and a more harmonised interpretation –

especially when the clauses in the IIAs are the same or very similar – should prevail

over such concerns.

All the above suggestions should be considered by RCEP negotiating states to

address the concerns that they have about the current ISDS mechanism. After all, this

mechanism is one that has been perceived to be relatively reliable by foreign

investors compared with domestic courts in some countries.51

3.3. Investment Facilitation

An investment facilitation clause is relatively new in IIAs, but it can be found

in ACIA. This type of clause requires member states to cooperate on matters including

the following: 1) streamlining procedures for investment applications and approvals;

2) promoting dissemination of investment information, including investment rules,

regulations, policies, and procedures; 3) establishing one-stop investment centres; 4)

strengthening databases on all forms of investments for policy formulation; 5)

consulting with the business community on investment matters; and 6) providing

advisory services to the business community of the other member states.

Similar to the investment promotion clause of ACIA, the investment

facilitation clause basically constitutes soft law that only imposes the duty to

cooperate. For this reason, ensuring compliance may be difficult. RCEP negotiating

51 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Safeguarding the Public Interest and Protecting Investors’ 27 March 2014: http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/blog/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-Protecting-Investors (accessed 21 October 2014).

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states should consider complementing such a clause with an obligation to engage in

capacity building or perhaps to offer more flexibility for the developing states so they

are also able to fulfil their obligations under the agreement.

Another successful investment facilitation initiative is Korea’s Office of the

Foreign Investment Ombudsman, which provides assistance in resolving difficulties

companies face both in business management and in daily life. The office has

specialists in various fields, such as labour, taxation, finance, and construction, who

will assist foreign investors’ in resolving their grievances while investing in the

country. If RCEP could push for all negotiating states to create such a kind of office, it

would greatly facilitate investments.

3.4. Investment Liberalisation

If RCEP is meant to add more value to the existing IIAs amongst individual

ASEAN Member States and the dialogue partners, it must cover deeper and broader

areas. Berger et al. found strong evidence that liberal admission rules – IIAs with pre-

establishment market access commitments (NT and/or MFN treatment) – promote

bilateral FDI (Berger et al., 2013). They estimated that a host state could increase its

FDI inflow by up to about 29 percent in the long run by switching from an investment

chapter of Regional Trade Agreement (RTA) without NT provisions to an investment

chapter of RTA with NT provisions (Berger et al., 2013). (For further discussion about

the liberalisation pillar, see Chapter 6.)

4. Monitoring Mechanism

Aside from the standards referred to above, a monitoring mechanism is

essential to ensure implementation. The only mechanism that is close to being

considered as a monitoring mechanism for the implementation of the various

economic agreements of ASEAN, including ACIA, is the ASEAN Scorecard. This

Scorecard endeavours to review the so-called implementation by focusing on the

ratification and transposition of international agreements into domestic laws (ASEAN

Secretariat, 2012). Unfortunately, real implementation goes beyond that. For

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example, with regard to market access, implementation should also assess whether

investors are really granted permits/ approvals according to the relevant Member

State’s commitment in its schedule, instead of merely analysing whether the

commitment has been translated into domestic laws (Chia and Plummer, 2015).

RCEP negotiating states must consider including a more advanced monitoring

mechanism such as the WTO’s Trade Policy Review (TPR) mechanism for the

investment chapter. This mechanism is used regularly to ensure compliance with

WTO agreements. The TPR report is prepared by the WTO Secretariat based on the

policy statements of the member under review and on a report of the Secretariat’s

TPR division. The issued policy statements will contain potentially non-compliant

measures of the member state under review. This is a comprehensive mechanism

that can promote greater transparency and alert member states about their non-

compliant measures, thus promoting better implementation of the agreement.

5. Consolidation Efforts – Relation to Other Agreements

Due to the existence of various IIAs – BITs, FTA with investment chapters, and

regional investment agreements – RCEP’s investment chapter poses an issue of

parallelism, which can potentially add more complexity for the states. Foreign

investors, on the other hand, may welcome this as it presents them with

opportunities to pick and choose the IIA that grants the best treatment. But it

undermines the very purpose of concluding RCEP – to conclude a refined IIA that

strikes a balance between investment protection and the states’ right to regulate –

because investors would most likely opt for the older IIAs, which appear to emphasise

only investment protection.

RCEP’s investment chapter should consolidate and simplify these complex

and multiple regimes. This can be done by including a provision to terminate the

existing IIAs negotiating amongst states upon enforcement of RCEP. Improving on

Article 47 of ACIA, RCEP negotiating states could consider the following clause:52

52 Article 47 of ACIA with some of the author’s own revisions.


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Article X Transitional Arrangements Relating to other International Investment Agreements

1. Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this paragraph, nothing in this Agreement shall derogate from the existing rights and obligations of a Member State under any other international agreements to which it is a party.

2. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the International Investment Agreements (IIAs) amongst the Member States (as provided in Annex X) shall be terminated.

3. Notwithstanding the termination of the IIAs mentioned in Annex X, the Reservation List and Non-Conforming Measures of those agreements shall apply to the liberalisation provisions of RCEP Investment Chapter, mutatis mutandis, until such time the Reservation List of RCEP Investment Chapter comes into force.

4. With respect to investments falling within the ambit of this Agreement, as well as under one of the IIAs mentioned in Annex X, investors of these investments may choose to apply the provisions, but only in its entirety, of either this Agreement or one of the IIAs mentioned in Annex X, as the case may be, for a period of x years after the date of termination of the IIAs mentioned in Annex X.

Such a clause would give the region one harmonised investment rules regime

applicable in all 16 member states, for all investors from these states, which may

resolve the issue of parallelism.

6. Conclusion

With 16 negotiating states, including some major emerging economies in Asia,

RCEP has broad geographical coverage. Despite the fact that most of these states

may already have bilateral or multilateral IIAs amongst them, RCEP’s investment

chapter could add more value in four ways.

First, it can liberalise further access to these states by providing more

aggressive liberalisation commitments. This can be done through the granting of a

pre-establishment right in the NT clause as well as fewer reservations in each state’s

schedule. Second, RCEP can enhance the investment protection provisions by

refining and adding clarity to find a balance between investment protection and the

right of states to regulate. Third, RCEP can also contribute further to the provisions

on investment promotion and facilitation by providing a better list of the various

actions to be undertaken by member states to make investing easier. This should be

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complemented with capacity building for the less developed members to fulfil those

obligations. Finally, especially from the perspective of host states, RCEP is an

opportunity to consolidate various IIAs amongst the negotiating states to come up

with a refined agreement that can improve the investment climate in the region.

Despite such potential benefits, RCEP also faces various obstacles. The large

number of negotiating states can also mean that the level of commitments –

liberalisation, promotion, facilitation, and protection – may be lower as the

negotiating states have differing interests. This makes it harder to reach an ambitious

agreement. In particular, the lower level of commitments might be seen as a

reflection of compromises amongst different points of views as regards the rights of

pre-establishment under the NT clause. In addition, while some countries –

Indonesia, Australia, and India – seem to take position against ISDS, others seem to

be more supportive – Singapore, Korea, and China – as could be seen in their recent

agreements. Nonetheless, the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation

may provide more incentives for RCEP negotiating states53 to match the high level of

commitments in the TPP.

For foreign investors in the region, the outcome from RCEP’s investment

chapter negotiation, particularly the investment protection provisions, may not

necessarily be more favourable for them compared with the old regimes. They may

want both RCEP and the other IIAs to continue to exist side-by-side. Such an

arrangement would provide them with options to choose the most favourable regime

to protect their investments.

In conclusion, the investment chapter of RCEP must progress further through

the formulation of new standards in international investment law that can strike a

balance between investment protection and the right of states to regulate. It must

be ambitious enough to add more value to the existing regime. Furthermore, it

53 It is noteworthy that Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Viet Nam, are parties to both negotiations.


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should also consolidate the multiple current regimes, or the efforts of negotiating

RCEP’s investment chapter could prove to be rather futile.

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Chapter 9

Learning from the ASEAN+1 Model and the ACIA

Nanda Nurridzki

University of Indonesia

As the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a new regional integration initiative intended to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement amongst the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States (AMSs) and ASEAN’s free trade agreement (FTA) partners, it important to review similar existing agreements in ASEAN, including ASEAN+1 and the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA). This chapter aims to provide input for RCEP through analysis of the current ASEAN+1 FTA agreements. We discuss the evolution of the agreements on investment in ASEAN, namely the Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), the ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA), and the ACIA; the progress of the ASEAN+1 FTA Agreements on Investments, as well as some characteristics of the ACIA Reservation Lists. Our analysis is expected to become an input for policy on the baseline for RCEP negotiation in the area of investment.

In principle, there is equivalence in the goals and norms between agreements, both the general FTA agreements and the more specific investment agreements. Based on its development, it can be assumed that the ACIA is the most comprehensive basis agreement, which underlies other FTA agreements. In the commitments that are more specifically sector related, it can be seen that each AMS has its own unique approach to scheduling its sectors in the agreement frame, although there are some similarities in the substance of reservation lists proposed under the ACIA.

Hence, the challenge for the RCEP is to formulate a higher-level agreement, which is able to consolidate a variety of concerns, needs, and national policies of each AMS in a modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement.


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1. Introduction

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a new regional

integration initiative intended to achieve a modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and

mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement amongst the Association of

Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States and ASEAN’s free trade agreement

(FTA) partners. The RCEP initiative was announced by ASEAN Leaders at their 19th ASEAN

Summit held in November 2011. It is believed that this ASEAN-led process will enable

ASEAN to broaden and deepen its economic engagements with its FTA partners. RCEP will

enhance access to a huge potential market, bringing benefits to businesses and

consumers in the participating countries. The agreement is between 16 countries, which

make up 45 percent of the world’s population and contribute one third of the world’s

gross domestic product (GDP). RCEP should lead to greater economic integration, support

equitable economic development, and strengthen economic cooperation amongst the

countries involved.

In general, RCEP can be seen as regional economic integration in East Asia on a

higher level. It is assumed that RCEP will produce a commitment from ASEAN Member

States (AMSs) and all partners (although there are several possible exceptions). The

commitments to be made under RCEP are supposed to be substantially better than the

existing ASEAN+1 commitments. This technical note aims to provide input for RCEP

through analysis of the current ASEAN+1 FTA agreements. We expect that our analysis

will become an input for policy on the baseline for RCEP negotiation in the area of

investment.

This chapter is made up of the following parts: an account of the evolution of the

Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), the ASEAN Investment Agreement (AIA), and the

ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA); a discussion on the progress of the

ASEAN+1 FTA Agreements on Investments; a comment on the ACIA Reservation Lists, and

a brief conclusion.

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2. Evolution of IGA, AIA, and ACIA

Accelerating the industrialisation of ASEAN countries has been a most important

issue for ASEAN leaders. To achieve this, healthy flows of technology and investment into

ASEAN countries were needed, which necessitated the creation of profitable conditions

for investment for ASEAN companies and companies from outside ASEAN. This led to the

establishment of the Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA), which was signed in 1987.

The objective of the IGA was to promote greater investment flows between pairs of

countries by providing a legal framework that clearly set out the investment norms and

protection applying when investing in the other country.

There were several basic principles underlying the IGA:

1. Principle of fair and equitable treatment;

2. Principle of non-discrimination (National Treatment and/or Most-Favoured Nation

Treatment);

3. Compensation in the event of expropriation;

4. Free transfer of funds; and

5. Investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.

Furthermore, the ASEAN countries’ objectives shifted from just trying to increase

investment flows into each country, to also developing ASEAN into an integrated united

economic system, thus reducing restrictions on investment flows amongst ASEAN

countries. The expansion of the ASEAN market through economic integration and the

wider acceptance of investment inflows amongst ASEAN countries was aimed to increase

foreign direct investment (FDI) in each ASEAN country.

Such considerations resulted in the need for a more comprehensive agreement

than the existing IGA agreement, resulting in the signing of the ASEAN Investment

Agreement – an enhancement of the IGA – on 7 October 1998. Moreover, the economic

crisis experienced by ASEAN countries in 1998 triggered the implementation of the AIA.


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Figure 9.1: FDI Inflows, in million US$

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

The trend of FDI inflows in ASEAN countries showed a significant increase

between 1992 and 1997, from US$ 11,549 million in 1992 to US$ 27,042 million in 1997.

The economic crisis suffered by ASEAN countries in 1998 resulted in a drastic decline of

FDI, to US$ 20,817 million, in that year. Several ASEAN countries, such as Malaysia and

Thailand, managed to rapidly recover from the crisis, but others, including Indonesia,

needed several years to recover.

As stated in the Framework Agreement on ASEAN, the objectives of the AIA were

(i) To establish a competitive ASEAN Investment Area, with a more liberal and

transparent investment environment amongst Member States, so as to increase FDI

inflows into ASEAN; (ii) To jointly promote ASEAN as the most attractive investment area,

and to strengthen and increase the competitiveness of ASEAN’s economic sectors; (iii) To

reduce or eliminate regulations and conditions which impede investment flows and the

operation of investment projects in ASEAN; and (iv) To contribute towards a free flow of

investment by 2020.

In 2008, a global financial crisis occurred, initiated by the collapse of the financial

sector in the United States (US). As newly emerging countries, ASEAN countries ran the

risk of investment fund withdrawals by the developed countries, and their companies,

that had invested in ASEAN territories.

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Figure 9.2: Inward Direct Investment to ASEAN

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.

With the failure of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations, bilateral and

multilateral FTAs developed between ASEAN as an economic union and neighbouring

countries, such as China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Additionally, all

ASEAN countries had concluded bilateral agreements with one another, all of those FTA

agreements having more comprehensive provisions than the AIA or the ASEAN IGA. For

that reason, ASEAN countries felt the need to review the AIA and tried to redesign a new

agreement to suit the current situation and conditions. A review of the AIA and the

ASEAN IGA was conducted for the 34th ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) meeting and a

set of principles and guidelines as a basis for formal negotiations had been developed by

AIA/AEM. On 26 February 2009, the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA)

was completed and signed by the AEM.

As stated in the ACIA Agreement, the aims of the ACIA are: ‘(i) Progressive

liberalisation of the investment regimes of Member States; (ii) Provision of

enhanced protection to investors of all Member States and their

investments; (iii) Improvement in transparency and predictability of

investment rules, regulations and procedures conducive to increased

investment amongst Member States; (iv) Joint promotion of the region as

an integrated investment area; and (v) Cooperation to create favourable

conditions for investment by investors of a Member State in the territory of

the other Member States’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009)


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The AIA Agreement covers manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining

and quarrying, and services incidental to these five sectors. The ACIA has the same scope

as the AIA, but, unlike the ACIA, the AIA does not include portfolio investments. In

addition, according to the ACIA it is possible to add new sectors to the reservation lists –

the headnote of the ACIA Schedule states that each member state reserves the right to

make future reservations, including new and emerging sectors or subsectors or existing

sectors that are unregulated at the time of submission of the reservation lists.

Both the AIA and ACIA have lists of sectors/subsectors known as the reservation

list. In relation to the reservation lists, the AIA applied a two-track approach, using a

Temporary Exclusion List in which a sector/subsector was to be reviewed every two years

and to be phased out in general by 2010, and a Sensitive List, which would also be

reviewed periodically. The ACIA, in contrast, applies a single negative-list approach, in

which the progressive reduction or elimination of reservations refers to the Strategic

Schedule of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) over three phases (2008–2010, 2011–

2013, and 2014–2015).

The AIA consists of three main programmes – (i) a co-operation and facilitation

programme; (ii) a promotion and awareness programme; and (iii) a liberalisation

programme. The ACIA consists of more comprehensive provisions covering the ‘four

pillars of investment’ – liberalisation, protection, facilitation, and promotion.

Associated with the protection pillars, the ACIA has broadened its scope to include

investors from outside ASEAN. As stated in the ACIA agreement, ‘investor’ means a

natural person of a Member State or a juridical person of a Member State who/that is

making, or has made an investment in the territory of any other Member State. Thus, a

person can be considered as an ASEAN investor as long as he/she founds a juridical entity

in one of the ASEAN countries even if the person comes from a non-ASEAN country.

He/she can then also invest in other AMSs.

Another difference between the ACIA and the AIA is the period of limitation.

According to the AIA, all industries were scheduled to be open for investment by ASEAN

investors by 2010, and for all investors by 2020. The ACIA, however, sets a target date of

2015 for both ASEAN investors and ASEAN-based foreign investors.

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3. The Progress of ASEAN+1 FTA Agreements in Investment

One means by which ASEAN countries have sought integration with other global

economies has taken the form of the ASEAN+1 agreement. This scheme aims to open

opportunities for economic cooperation, investment, and market development both

inside and outside ASEAN.

The first ASEAN+1 agreement was between ASEAN and China. The Framework

Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and China was

signed on 4 November 2002. The Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic

Cooperation amongst the Governments of the Member Countries of ASEAN and the

Republic of Korea was signed on 13 December 2005. The ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive

Economic Partnership Agreement (AJCEP) was signed in April 2008. The ASEAN–

Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) was signed in February 2009. These

four agreements were all ratified on 1 January 2010 and amongst the areas they cover

are trade in goods, trade in services, and investment. Another ratified agreement is the

ASEAN–India FTA, which only covers trade in goods. Negotiations on an ASEAN–European

Union (EU) FTA, another version of the ASEAN+1 FTA model, were paused by the Joint

Committee in 2009, and the approach is to be changed to a bilateral model.

Both Korea and China have made specific agreements on investment with ASEAN,

which were signed on 2 June 2009 and 15 August 2009, respectively. Australia and New

Zealand have entered a specific chapter on investment into their FTA, comprising

protection, promotion, and facilitation. Exclusively for ASEAN–Japan collaboration, a

subcommittee on trade in service and investment was responsible to do the negotiations.

FTAs emerged as the multilateral trade process under the auspices of the WTO

stagnated. Gains from FTAs can be divided into traditional and non-traditional benefits

(Zhang, 2013). Some traditional benefits are: trade creation and trade diversion by

cutting tariff barriers; improving terms of trade by having common standards for

production technology, product regulations, distribution and after-sales service;

increasing returns to scale by export expansion, more efficient allocation of resources,

and stimulating regional and outside investment which will subsequently create more


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jobs and facilitate transfers of advanced technology. Some non-traditional benefits are:

having assurance through regional cooperation; a more secure international

environment; improved bargaining power in external negotiations; and promotion of

domestic reforms.

But there are also some concerns with regard to ASEAN+1 FTAs, such as trade

diversion effects on FDI. By utilising an ASEAN+1 agreement, multinational companies

have less need for direct investment to expand to each ASEAN country (Chirathivat,

2013). This implies that ASEAN countries that rely heavily on FDI will suffer as a result of a

trade diversion effect. Moreover, the implementation of a cumulative regional policy on

Rules of Origin based on an ASEAN+1 agreement can lead to an increase in exports from

the ASEAN partner country. There is also a longer-term concern that an ASEAN+1 FTA

might lower ASEAN’s potency as the hub of Asia for economic matters.

Another concern relates to the weak bargaining power of ASEAN vis-à-vis each of

its dialogue partners, since there is no official resolution that binds all ASEAN members

prior to negotiations with a dialogue partner (Chirathivat, 2013). An ASEAN+1 agreement

is regarded as a result of negotiations by each ASEAN country with one powerful trade

partner, not for ASEAN as a whole.

The two sections below discuss several matters regarding the ASEAN+1 FTAs,

especially those which already have an Investment Agreement with ASEAN – the ASEAN–

China FTA, the ASEAN–Korea FTA, and the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA.

3.1. Negotiation Approach

In general, the approaches to conducting negotiations between ASEAN and FTA partners

can be divided into: negotiation’s approach regarding the area of agreement and the

negotiation’s approach regarding the coverage of ASEAN member countries.

(i) Based on the area of agreement, the ASEAN–China and ASEAN–Korea FTAs

employ the gradual/sequential approach when conducting FTA negotiations with

trading partners. As a general rule, the first phase relates to goods, the second

phase to services, and the third phase to investment.

By contrast, the ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA used the ‘comprehensive and

single undertaking upon signing’ approach. The agreement has eighteen

substantive chapters, with the schedule of specific commitments annexed. It has

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one chapter on Investment and another on Economic Cooperation, which provide

a framework for trade and investment-related cooperation. To complete this

agreement and to ease its implementation, another agreement called the

Implementing Agreement for a five-year Economic Cooperation was concluded.

(ii) Under the country-based negotiation approach, in general the negotiations

between ASEAN and a developing partner are conducted inclusively and

comprehensively as a unity. The negotiations do, however, also consider sensitive

issues and discrepancies in levels of development amongst ASEAN member

countries. This consideration could include the provision of Standard and

Differential Treatment to ASEAN and consideration of the flexibility of some

ASEAN countries, especially the CLMV countries – Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR,

and Viet Nam – in implementing the points of agreement.

Referring to the guidelines, it is likely that RCEP will adopt the single undertaking

approach. Besides, country based approach might still also be employed, as it will

consider the sensitive issues and discrepancies in the level of development amongst

AMSs.

3.2. Objectives and Principles of ASEAN+1 FTAs

In general, all of the ASEAN+1 FTA countries have similar backgrounds, which means

that all have several main objectives. These are to:

(i) minimise barriers and deepen as well as widen economic linkages

amongst parties;

(ii) lower business costs;

(iii) increase trade and investment;

(iv) increase economic efficiency;

(v) create larger markets with more opportunities and greater economies

of scale for business.

Or, more specifically:


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(vi) To progressively liberalise and, through progressive eliminations of

tariff and non-tariff barriers, to facilitate trade in goods amongst parties;

(vii) To promote investment flows and create a liberal, facilitative,

transparent and competitive investment regime;

(viii) To establish a cooperative framework, which further strengthens

economic relations amongst the countries.”

Some ASEAN+1 FTA objectives are summarised in the table below:

Table 9.1: Summary of Objectives of some ASEAN+1 FTA

ASEAN–KOREA ASEAN–CHINA ASEAN–A&NZ ACIA

Create a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment regime with business-friendly environment

To promote investments flows and to create a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment regime

To move towards deeper economic integration between the two regions through progressive elimination of all forms of barriers to trade in goods, services, and investment; and through trade and investment facilitation, and economic cooperation measures

Create a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive investment environment in ASEAN

Source

Article 2.3 (Investment) Framework Agreement on CEP

Article 5 (Investment) Framework Agreement on CEP

Guiding Principles for Negotiation

Article 2 (Guiding Principle) of ACIA

Source: Some ASEAN+1 Framework Agreements.

In addition, there are also some main principles, which have developed into the

objectives for ASEAN countries and their partners to conclude the FTA agreements. These

objectives are:

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(i) The FTA should be consistent with and build on members’ commitments

in the World Trade Organisation (WTO);

(ii) There should be special differential treatments, because there are

discrepancies in the level of development and capacity amongst member

countries, both in the ASEAN countries and the potential ASEAN partners;

(iii) The FTA has to boost economic cooperation, which mutually benefits

all parties, both the ASEAN countries and the potential ASEAN partners.

Thus, we can assume that an ASEAN FTA complements the multilateral WTO

agreement framework, rather than substituting it. Although it is difficult to determine

which is the most preferable trade regime, especially from the perspective of

business operators, we conclude that the ACIA offers more comprehensive provisions

than other FTAs.

The Guiding Principles and Objectives for Negotiating the Regional Comprehensive

Economic Partnership state that RCEP will aim at creating a liberal, facilitative, and

competitive investment environment in the region. Negotiations on investment

under RCEP will cover the four pillars of promotion, protection, facilitation, and

liberalisation, so the guiding principles and objectives for negotiating RCEP are in line

with the ACIA.

3.3. Liberalisation Pillar

One of the pillars in the ACIA, liberalisation, has also been part of the framework

of the ASEAN+1 Free Trade Agreement, mainly as a target to conclude more specific

negotiations on trade in goods, trade in services, as well as investment. As stated in the

Framework of Agreement, implementation of liberalisation should keep into

consideration the special and differential treatment and flexibility for the newer AMSs.

Furthermore, the liberalisation principle was also highlighted in the Agreement on

Investment in ASEAN–China FTA, ASEAN–Korea FTA, ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand FTA,

as well as ACIA, primarily under the objectives of the agreements. The more specific

objectives of the agreements related to investment liberalisation are: to promote


272

investment flows and to create a liberal, facilitative, transparent, and competitive

investment regime in ASEAN and its partner countries, through progressively liberalising

the investment regimes of ASEAN and its partner countries1.

More specifically, the liberalisation principle is also included in the articles of the

agreements, particularly in the lists of sectors to be liberalised. Compared with the

ASEAN+1 Agreement, the ACIA presented a clearer liberalisation provision in terms of

forward looking principles, as it has a list of five sectors to be liberalised and a list of

reservations that contains country-specific and sector-specific measures that do not

conform to the ASEAN countries’ obligations under Article 5 (national treatment) and

Article 8 (Senior Management and Board of Directors) of the ACIA. . This would imply that

all other parts of those five sectors not in the single reservation list are subject to national

policy, liberalised, and open to ASEAN Investors. AMSs would then reduce or eliminate

the existing restrictions, which this would refer to Strategic Schedule of the AEC

Blueprint, including its timeline.

Conversely, there is no specific provision in ASEAN+1 FTA that has a list of sectors

prioritised for opening up, but only a schedule of specific commitments regarding trade in

services. However, there is room to provide a restriction elimination provision, as stated

in Article 6(1) of the ASEAN–China Agreement on Investment: ‘The Parties will endeavor

to progressively remove the non-conforming measures’2. Besides, an article of the

ASEAN–Korea Agreement on Investment stipulated that modification of the schedule of

reservation will refer to a work programme, namely discussions with the members within

five years.

In addition, there are some provisions in the ACIA and the ASEAN+1 FTA on

National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment, which principally extend the

non-discrimination principle to all investors, both local and foreign investors.

We suggest RCEP follows what has been proposed under the ACIA, since it is

clearer about what sectors are to be liberalised, what parts of the sectors will be subject

to reservations, and the schedule for reducing or eliminating the reservation lists in the

future.

1 As stated in the IA ASEAN–China. 2 Ibid.

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4. Reservation List in ACIA

To implement the transparency principle towards investors under a host country

investment regime, each ASEAN Member State has submitted a list of reservations which

provides non-conforming measures3 and regulations maintained in the sectors under the

ACIA – manufacturing, agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying, as well as

services incidental to these five sectors (ACIA Guidebook, 2013).

The Schedule of Reservations is based on a single reservation list, which provides

ASEAN Member States with policy space in the liberalisation of investment in the above-

mentioned five sectors. This also means that all other parts of the five above-mentioned

sectors not included in a single reservation list are, subject to the national policy,

liberalised, and open to ASEAN Investors.

Below are some of the main measures and regulations included in the reservation

list:

1. Sectors closed for investment

Amongst AMSs presenting closed commitments to foreign investors, Indonesia is

one country that often proposes very detailed lists of reservations. This relates to

Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2010 Concerning the Lists of Closed and Open

Businesses with Reservation in the Investment Sector.

Usually, the reasons why certain sectors are closed to foreign investments relate

to several concerns, such as:

a. To provide safety and control

Cambodia applied closed investment treatment to foreign investors,

especially in the fields of poisonous chemicals, agricultural

pesticides/insecticides, and other goods that use chemical substances.

Indonesia also closed the possibility for foreign investors to get involved in

the production of weapons, ammunition, explosive devices, and war

equipment. However, these subsectors are still open to local investors

with a special permit from the Ministry of Defence.

3A non-conforming measure is any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice that violates certain articles of the investment agreement. For example, a law prohibiting an investor of another member state from owning a factory would not conform to the article on national treatment.


274

b. To provide protection for traditional or small-scale economies

Generally, this category includes fisheries, manufacturing, and agriculture

for some ASEAN member states. The traditional fisheries subsector is

closed to foreign investors in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia

(using the term ‘captured fisheries’), as many people with small incomes

work in this field. In Brunei, particularly, the reservation is also applied to

fisheries and services incidental to fishing, which stipulate that National

Treatment shall not apply to any measures relating to any fishing activities,

including in its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ).

In the manufacturing sector, Indonesia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar are also

closed for foreign investments in traditional/micro-economic sectors such

as: Salting/drying fish, Hand painted Batik, Handicrafts including specific

cultural assets, arts value using natural or artificial raw materials, etc., in

Indonesia; production, processing, and preserving of meat and meat

products (cattle, pigs, sheep, horses), traditional textiles, etc., in Lao PDR;

and manufacture of bakery products, etc., in Myanmar.

Regarding the agricultural sectors, Indonesia has put up barriers to foreign

investments, especially in individual crop cultivation in areas smaller than

or equal to 25 hectares, and to many other similar investments.

c. To maintain sustainability of natural resources

Several business fields are closed to foreign investors, especially those

with issues of sustainability. Malaysia had closed foreign equity

participation especially in the Forestry sector and Services Incidental to

Forestry subsector. More specific is the limitation on foreign investment in

the extraction and harvesting of timber. This policy has been implemented

in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah. In Indonesia several business fields are

closed, such as fishery, manufacturing, mining & quarrying, and services

incidental to the mining & quarrying sectors.

2. Sectors open for investment or managed by certain parties

In the ACIA reservation list, there are also reservations for several industries,

which can only be handled by certain institutions, such as Petronas in Malaysia, to

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explore, exploit, win, and obtain petroleum, either onshore or offshore, especially

for Oil and Gas Upstream Industries. In Myanmar, several sectors such as the

Manufacture of Pharmaceutical drugs, the Manufacture of Refined Petroleum

Products and some Forestry sectors are only open to state-owned enterprises

under the associated ministry. In addition, newspapers can be run by government

bodies only.

3. Restrictions on land ownership

In general, foreign investors cannot own land, but they can acquire certain rights

of land use including concessions and leases. Commonly, the only difference in

reservations amongst AMSs is the length of the lease periods allowed by each

AMS.

Countries that restrict land leases include Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar.

Cambodia allows a land lease period of 15 years or more, or renewable short-term

leases. In Lao PDR, the reservation including the period of lease is between 35–50

years and can be extended for another 25 years to a maximum of 75 years, in the

fields of agriculture, mining, and energy. Myanmar’s period of land lease is initially

30 years, extendable by two consecutive terms of 15 years, subject to the

approval of the Myanmar Investment Commission.

Other AMSs, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, assert that National

Treatment4 may not apply to any measures affecting land, property, or natural

resources associated with the land, including acquisition, ownership, and lease of

land and property. In some ways, therefore, land use may be seen as ‘unbound’, a

term used under WTO and ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)

commitments, or to put it differently, the countries have not decided on a

particular restriction or provision, but it cannot be said that the sector is totally

open or that there are no restrictions.

4 The National Treatment obligation means that investors from other ASEAN Member States and their investments will not be discriminated vis-à-vis the domestic/local investors and their investments unless specified in their reservation lists.


276

4. Obligation to divest

Provisions regarding the obligation to divest are applied in Indonesia. Foreign

investors are able to own 100 percent of an enterprise, subject to prior

notifications before the license is granted, but after a certain period following

commencement of commercial production, the foreign investors are obliged to

sell a part of the company to domestic investors. This provision is applied in every

business sector.

In the case of the Mineral and Coal Mining subsectors in Indonesia, foreign

investors, subject to prior notification before the license is granted, should sell

shares to domestic investors, so that after five years from the commencement of

commercial production, domestic investors own at least 20 percent of the

company’s shares.

5. Restriction on the percentage of the foreign investor ownership

This restriction is the most common form of reservation, in WTO, AFAS, and other

ASEAN FTAs. Among AMSs there are differences as to how each AMS schedules its

reservations for ACIA.

Brunei has not scheduled towards foreign investor ownership in the ACIA business

sectors, but requires a 30 percent foreign equity limitation for the following

sectors: manufacturing, agriculture, fishery and forestry including services

incidental to those sectors.

Indonesia imposes many restrictions on foreign investors in various subsectors or

business fields, with foreign equity limitations ranging from 49 percent to 95

percent, including business partnership with SMEs, needs for specific permits in

certain areas. The Indonesian reservation list in the ACIA corresponds with

Presidential Decree No. 36 of 2010 on the Indonesian Negative Investment list.

For Lao PDR, particularly for joint ventures, the foreign equity limitation is 30

percent, with a minimum registered capital of US$ 100,000. In addition, the

investment term of a foreign investment enterprise can be no more than 75 years,

depending on the nature, size, and condition of the business activities or projects.

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277

The reservation list submitted by Malaysia is quite interesting. All privatised

projects are subject to Malaysia’s development policies and the Privatisation

Master Plan in respect of foreign equity participation. Privatisation projects must

be at least 75 percent owned by Malaysian shareholders. In addition, foreign

participation may be considered in the following cases:

When foreign expertise is needed to upgrade efficiency because such

expertise is not available locally;

When their participation is necessary to promote export markets;

When local capital is insufficient; and

When the nature of the business requires international linkages and

exposure.

All conditions imposed on existing privatised entities will continue to be

applicable.

There is also a limitation on foreign equity (up to 30 percent only) regarding

certain activities/products, of which batik fabrics and apparel, and Integrated

Portland Cement are examples. Other provisions in the reservation list only

mention that there is a list of business fields that may be inconsistent with

National Treatment, or in other words, may be considered as unbound.

Cambodia has quite a short list of reservations regarding maximum foreign

investment, which consists only of tourism and travel-related service sectors and

the telecommunication service sector, in which each sector’s limit is 51 percent.

Myanmar and Singapore have not submitted a reservation list for foreign equity

limitation. As implied in the reservation list that all other parts of the five said

sectors are not in the single reservation list, subjects to national policy, are

liberalised and open to ASEAN Investors (ACIA Guidebook, 2013).

For the Philippines, in general, the maximum foreign equity limitation is 40

percent for domestic market enterprises with paid-in equity capital of less than

the equivalent of US$ 200,000. This foreign equity limitation is also applied to

forestry and services incidental to forestry, but is also subject to government

approval. There is also a requirement for foreign-owned corporations/entities to


278

export at least 60 percent of their output to be considered as an export

enterprise, subject to certain terms and conditions.

In Thailand, generally foreign equity participation in an enterprise has to be below

50 percent. Foreign investors may own more than 50 percent of shares if they

meet certain conditions – (i) if they obtain permission from the Minister of

Commerce with the approval of the Cabinet, and several other conditions are

fulfilled; (ii) if they meet the requirement of the minimum capital used at the

commencement of the business operation; (iii) if they obtain a license or

certificate from the Department of Business Development, Ministry of Commerce;

and (iv) if they comply with other conditions prescribed in the Foreign Business

Act and related laws.

In Viet Nam there are several schemes for foreign equity limitation, depending on

the sector. As stated in the reservation list, there are several limits on foreign

equity – 30 percent, 40 percent, 49 percent, and 51 percent. The types of sectors

included in the ACIA reservation list are limited to the services incidental to

Mining and Quarrying, Fishery and Agriculture, and Hunting and Forestry.

Manufacturing is limited to manufacturing related to infrastructure and

transportation, which are the manufacture of railway rolling stock, spare parts,

wagons, and coaches, as well as the aircraft manufacturing industries.

5. Conclusion

In principle, there is equivalence in the goals and norms between agreements,

both the general FTA agreements and the more specific investment agreements. Based

on its development, the ACIA is the most comprehensive basis agreement, which

underlies other FTA agreements. The ACIA and its reservation lists can be used as a basis

for formulating the RCEP agreement since its provisions are comprehensive.

As RCEP may adopt a single undertaking approach, the agreement on investment

should be concluded at the same time as the agreement on trade in goods and services.

This would ensure the most comprehensive and optimum outcome.

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279

RCEP should provide greater clarity in the liberalisation pillar, including the

modalities and time frame of liberalisation, and also consider differentiated timeframes

for countries and products at an early stage of the negotiations.

In the commitments, which are more specifically sector related, each AMS has its

own unique approach to scheduling its sectors in the agreement.. As a result, it is difficult

to standardise the limits on foreign equity ownership. In addition, if we compare the

CLMV countries with others, there is no uniformity in the reservations they propose in

the reservation list under the ACIA.

The relatively similar provisions are those that close certain sectors/subsectors to

foreign equity ownership and specifically for traditional trade and micro and medium

scale business trades. Both the CLMV and non-CLMV countries have the same concerns

regarding the protection of their traditional business fields, which is apparent from their

reservation lists.

There are also similarities regarding land ownership restrictions – typically foreign

investors cannot own land or properties and only have the right of land use. There are

differences in the time limits of land use, on which each AMSs has a different policy.

Other discrepancies can be seen in the reservation lists in the ACIA. For example,

several countries impose an obligation on foreign investors to divest, while several AMSs

require only SOEs who have opportunity to provide the services.

Thus, the challenge for RCEP is to formulate a higher level agreement that

consolidates the variety of concerns, needs, and national policies of AMSs in a modern,

comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement.

References

ASEAN Secretariat (2009), Agreement Establishing the ASEAN–Australia New Zealand Free Trade Area. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Agreement on Investment of the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between the ASEAN and the People Republic of China. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

Agreement on Investment under the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation amongs the governments of the member countries of the ASEAN and the Republic of Korea. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.

ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement (ACIA) (2013), A Guidebook for Businesses and Investors. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.


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Chirathivat, S., and P. Srisangnam (2013), ‘The 2030 Architecture of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Agreements’, ADBI Working Paper 419, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. Available at: http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2013/04/25/5627.2030.architecture.asean.free.trade.agreements/

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Sallehuddin, M. (2012), Critical Issues on Investment Law Harmonization within ASEAN, Asean Law Association, Workshop, 2012 (online version).

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Shimizu, K. (2012), ‘Economic Integration in East Asia: Issues and Tasks in the PostWorld Financial Crisis Era’, Economic Journal Of Hokkaido University, 41, pp.47–57.

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http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2013/04/25/5627.2030.architecture.asean.free.trade.agreements/

http://www.adbi.org/working-paper/2013/04/25/5627.2030.architecture.asean.free.trade.agreements/

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