e. ann kaplan, michael sprinker the althusserian legacy 1992.pdf

The Althusserian Legacy--------------♦ -------------

Edited by E. A N N ^ A P L A N

andM IC H A E L SPR IN K ER

VV E R S O

London · New York

First published by Verso 1993 © Verso 1993

All rights reserved

VersoU K : 6 Meard Street, London W 1V 3HRU SA : 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001-2291

Verso is the imprint o fN ew Left Books

ISBN 0-86091-399-6 ISB N 0-86091-594-8 (pbk)

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congi

Printed in G reat Britain by Biddles Ltd, Guildford and Kings Lynn

Contents

IntroductionMichael Sprinker

T h e N on -C on tem poran eity o f A lthusser Etienne Balibar

A lth u sser’s Solitude Gregory Elliott

W hat Is Living and W hat Is D ead in the Philosophy o f A lthusser A lex Callinicos

Spinoza and Althusser A gain st H erm eneutics: Interpretation orIntervention?

Warren Montag

A lth u sser’s Liberation o f M arxian Theory Stephen Resnick and Richard W olff

H istory o f Scien ce and the Scien ce o f History M aria Turchetto

A lthusser and A nn ales H istoriography — A n Im possibleD ialogue?

Peter Schöttler

From A lthusserianism to “R egulation T h eory”Alain Lipietz

Ideology and Fantasy Rastko Mocnik

T h e M arxist Thing Tom Lewis

A lth usser’s M arx, A lth usser’s Lacan Michèle Barrett

vii

1

17

39

51

59

73

81

99

139

157

169

f

T h e Lonely H our o f the Last Instance: Louis Pierre A lthusser, 1 9 1 8 -1 9 9 0

Gregory Elliott

T e x t R ead at Louis A lth usser’ s Funeral Jacques Derrida

Politics and Friendship: A n Interview with Jacques Derrida

Introduction

T h e papers collected in th is volum e (w ith the exception o f the interview with Jacques D errida and the two obituaries that close it) were delivered at the conference on “T h e A lthusserian Legacy” held at the S tate U n iversity o f N ew York at Ston y B rook in Sep tem b er 1988 under the auspices o f the university’s H um anities Institute. Financial support from the Institute’s D irector, E. A n n Kaplan, and the D ean o f H um anities, D on Ihde, m ade the conference possible, and it is gratefully acknow ledged here. In addition, innum erable students and colleagues aided in various conference activ ities— not least in housing m any o f the participan ts. W ith out their ch eerfu l p artic ip atio n , the con feren ce could n ever h ave go tten o ff the ground.

Th ese papers reflect the conflicted and still vital heritage o f the A lth u s se r ia n re se arch p ro gram , in a u g u ra te d in the 1 9 6 0 s and m u ch co m m en ted u pon an d cr itic ized in th e en su in g th re e d ecad es. T a k e n together they represent a fa ir sam pling o f the various strands in A lth usser’s work th at have been pursued by researchers in a variety o f disciplines in the hum an sciences, from philosophy and sociology to history, literature, and ec o n o m ics . If the p artic ip a n ts d isag ree w ith each other in m atters o f em phasis an d detail, they are united in their co nviction th a t A lth u sser’s im pact has been— indeed co n tin u es to be— enorm ous, even if in m any instances covert or unacknowledged. A s E tienne B alibar remarked shortly b e fo re th e c o n fe r e n c e c o m m e n c e d , th e re is no su c h th in g as an A lthusserianism in the sense o f a uni vocal, unified theoretical discourse. But as we generally agreed at co n fe ren ce ’s end, there h ave b een num erous A lthusserian research agendas in the sense o f being inspired, influenced, or significantly enabled by A lth usser’s m ajor work. It is therefore fair to judge his im pact as having a distinctive legacy that extends beyond the dom ain of its origin and initial reception in France and Britain. Like the M arxism that w as its p r in c ip a l o b je c t o f in v e s t ig a t io n , A lth u s se r ia n ism h as b ee n productive precisely to the exten t th at it has not been reduced to a few easily quoted slogans and has not ossified into a dogma.

It is a matter o f great sadness to the editors and contributors that this volume could not appear prior to A lth usser’s death in O ctober 1990. N o t that any o f us would have sought h is approval for the project, nor would he have felt obliged to bestow it. But it was hoped that the darkness of his last years m ight be brightened, how ever sligh'tly, by the appearance o f a volume that testifies to the ongoing interest in and continuing vitality o f the

viii THE ALTHUSSERIAN LEGACY

intellectual tradition inextricably bound up with his nam e and his writings.T h is Volume, then, must stand as a testam ent to an intellectual

career and a political life pursued with passion, intensity, and the utm ost seriousness under enorm ous strain and often at great personal cost. It is but a token, however inadequate, of the respect and adm iration we continue to feel for the m an who contributed as m uch as any 20th-century intellectual to sustaining the critical tradition o f M arxist thought.

M ichael Sprinker

Etienne Balibar

The Non-Contemporaneity of Althusser

Let me th an k you very sincerely fo r this invitation . A n d allow me to make a few com m ents on the mere fact that a whole conference devoted to “the A lthusserian Legacy” takes place here, in the U nited States, in 1988, owing to th e efforts o f M ichael Sprinker, E. A n n Kaplan, and th e intellectual environm ent o f this H um anities Institute. You asked me to be the first speaker: this, is a great honor, but also a strange position for a Frenchm an indeed. Believe it or not, such a conference would be unthinkable in France, and very unlikely in m ost European countries, although it is only fair to m ention , in the presence o f G regory Elliott, Peter S ch ö ttle r and M aria T urchetto, th at England is the one country where a com prehensive study o f A lth usser’s works and politics was elaborated,1 that (W estern) G erm any is the one country where an edition of the collected papers of A lthusser has b een started (in c lu d in g m u ch th a t has n ever been really a v a ila b le in France),2 and that Italy is the one country where A lthusser is still publicly discussed in m ilitant and intellectual circles on the Left.3 I recall these facts to emphasize a paradox: namely, that in his own country there is an absolute tab o o now su p p ressin g the n am e o f th is m an and the m ean in g o f h is writings.

Sev era l reasons indeed m ay be alleged to exp la in it. W e should n ot u n d erestim ate the effects o f th e scan d alo u s m urder o f A lth u sse r ’s wife, w h ich influence bo th opponents an d friends, and are certainly not weaker am ong intellectuals. T o the contrary, since they are especially ill at ease w hen confronted w ith questions o f crim e an d m adness, if these are n ot (yet) literary cases. “A lthusser’s fate” blurs th e clear distinction betw een “public” and “private” sphere, and destroys the narcissistic image o f the intellectual community. But there are obviously other reasons, related to the general taboo now imposed on M arxism .

For a lm ost twenty years, A lth u sse r was the co n tro v ersia l M arx ist in F rance: I m ean co n tro v ersia l am o n g “ M arx ists” (w ho would discuss his form ulations and react to h is positions in a passionate m anner), but a lso one who forced other in te llec tu a ls to take M arx ism seriously in th eir own debates and controversies (not only M arxism as an interesting case in the history o f ideas, a legacy o f the past, but M arxism as an actual challenge in

2 THE ALTH U SSERIAN LEGACY

their practice o f philosophy, economy, political theory, psychoanalysis, etc .). W iping out the role o f A lthusser in this period is a typical aspect o f a more general censorship, which has a very precise m eaning: it means denying that M arxism in the post-war period (and especially in the 60s and 70s) was not a simple repetition o f dogm as drawn from Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin (or even M ao), denying therefore that changes and events took place in its realm, bearing an objective relationship to the social and political issues of the period . It seem s im portant now to deny th at there was in te llectu al ac tiv ity — therefore p ro d u ctiv ity — w ith in M arx ism , n ot only illu sion s. M arx ist in te lle c tu a ls , an d esp ec ia lly co m m u n ist in te llec tu a ls, m ust be portrayed as either passive victim s or impostors, the mere instruments o f a gigantic conspiracy. They should not have been able to think by them selves, ju st as M arxism and com m unism should n ot h ave had any real history, except th e history o f a catastrophic imposture. It is n o wonder that th is way o f presenting history as non-history is typically displayed in countries like France, where M arxism indeed played a decisive role in philosophy, the so c ia l sc iences, literary culture. In tellectu als m ight pay a high price for a c c e p t in g th is a m n e s ia c v iew o f th e ir ow n h isto ry , ju s t as M a r x is t in te lle c tu a ls p a id a h ig h price in d eed for th e ir d is to rted view o f the p h ilo so p h ica l an d cu ltu ra l backgroun d o f th e ir own. ideas. Perhaps the situation is different in the U nited States.

You e n tit le d th e co n fe ren ce “T h e A lth u sse r ia n L e g a c y .” I have a difficulty with this form ulation, I must say. A gain, some o f the reasons are personal: after all, A lthusser is still alive, or maybe I don ’t quite understand the exact m eaning o f the English word “legacy.” Please don ’t mistake my remark; it is not a critique. T o calculate the legacy o f a living m an is always risky. But on the other hand, you are right: if A lthusser is not physically dead, it is as if he were dead morally, since he doesn’t com m unicate with anybody. H aving always been a m an o f living exchan ges rather than an egocentric “author,” it seems unlikely that he will now add som ething to his work. O r if he does, I guess that it would in fact constitute a com pletely different work, in a sense com ing from a com pletely different person ...I' So our debates will involve a paradoxical relationship with time; they will be ill-tim ed in many respects. C alcu lating A lthusser’s legacy, w ith each o f us retaining his (her) share, could be our u topian attem pt at keeping open a work which is de facto closed.

But is there som eth ing to share? Is there a work o f A lth usser, in the strong sense, a treasury o f inheritable thought? Here lies the real cause o f my perplexity. W hat strikes me at once, at least on the Fren ch scene, is the rem arkable persistence o f some expressions th at have been either coined by A lthusser or transferred by him out o f their specialized initial field into the

com m on culture: “epistem ological break,” “overdeterm ination,” “ideological state apparatuses,” “Process without a Su b ject.” People actually use them, in different ways— with little or no reference to the texts in which A lthusser elaborated them — far beyond the (now restricted) circle o f “M arxists.” They h ave started to live the sam e k ind o f au ton om ous life and con tin u ous m etam o rp h o ses as, say, th e “C o p e rn ic a n re v o lu tio n ,” or “ co m m o d ity fetishism .” B ut it is doubtful whether we could really go back to th e work itself to find the complete m eaning o f these fam iliar A lthusserian concepts, because there is noth ing in fact like a system atic work o f A lthusser, with a beginning, an end, a structural unity. A lm ost everything is program m atic. “Premises without conclusions,” and “conclusions w ithout prem ises.” W hen A lth u sser published For M arx (h is only real book), he described in the Preface in an ironic m anner “les philosophes sans oeuvre," philosophers with no work whom the sectarian practice o f the Com m unist Party had produced in the period o f the C old W ar. A n d now, by a double irony, he would becom e him self a “philosophe sans oeuvre.” His legacy is made o f a handful o f ambiguous notions, one single book an d a number o f partial an d lacunary texts, some rather lengthy (as in Reading Capital), some beautifully written (o th e rs n o t ) , but a ll h e a v ily d e p e n d e n t on a c e r ta in c o n te x t— b o th discursive and political— with am azing discrepancies o f style and positions a m o n g th e m . In a se n se it is to o la te to g ra sp the u n ity o f th e se “ in te rv en tio n s ,” a s h e w ould h im se lf label them , sin ce the fate o f any intervention is to wither away in its own effects. In a sense it is too early to decide whether som ething from these interventions will remain influential,i.e. active in philosophical thinking: another generation is needed to give an objective account.

But in a sense now is perhaps exactly the right m om ent— in the suspense o f memory and history— to avoid the mystificatory dissertations about the U nity o f the W ork or the Tragedy o f the M an, the academ ic com m entaries and the psychological inquiries. W h at should be im portant for us is the present value o f some questions raised by A lthusser, which derives precisely from their “non-contem poraneity,” their running against the current o f both orthodox M arxism and what I would call orthodox anti-M arxism , their breaking the linear pictures o f a M arxism doom ed to wither away ju st as they broke with the linear picture o f M arxism on the way to becom ing the “dom inant worldview.”

W h at were these questions m ainly about? M ost people would say they were about M arxist theory. My suggestion is somewhat different: they were about the relationship betw een M arxism (as a theory) and communism (as a political m ovem ent and a historical “tendency” ). W hat Gregory Elliott in h is rem ark ab le essay has c a lle d “ th e detou r o f th e o ry ” sh ou ld not be

THE NON'CONTEMPC^KANEITY OF ALTHUSSER 3

4 THE A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

m isunderstood: if theory is a detour, it could not be an end in itself. T h e debates around A lthusser’s theoreticism were violent, and the contradiction th ey p ro v o k ed w ith in his own p o sit io n s was acu te , p rec ise ly b ecau se “th eory” was requested by him to be transform ed into a “revolu tion ary p ractice ,” from the perspective o f com m unism . T h e “new d e fin itio n ” o f philosophy that he proposed during these debates (“ class struggle in theory” ) would apparently invert the conceptual pattern, but so as to emphasize that M arxism had an original m eaning (a “problem atic” o f its own) only if it was a theory o f and for the com m unist tendency. T h e criterion for accepting or re jecting any “M arxist” thesis was always the same, be it presented as an “epistem ological” or a “philosophical” criterion: nam ely whether it made a communist politics intelligible, im plem entable, or not.'

But what does “com m unism ” m ean here? T h e question is unavoidable. It poses for us another difficulty, m aybe with a narrow lim itation o f A lth usser’s “critical” attitude towards M arxism . By m easuring the capacities of M arxist theory with regard to com m unist politics, did not A lhusser simply leave the concept o f com m unism unquestioned? D on ’t we find evidence for this on the practical side in A lthusser’s continuous (some people would say blind) fidelity to the C om m un ist Party (or the Ideal o f the C om m unist Party) that is sustained throughout his activity? W hat is the benefit, if a critical attitude to w a rd s “ M a r x is m ” is p a id fo r by an u n c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e to w a rd s “com m unism ” ?

T h e r e is no d o u b t th a t A lth u s se r alw ays to o k it for g ra n te d th a t “com m unism ” w as the (proper) nam e for th e liberation from all kinds of oppression and exploitation, the general m ovem ent encom passing all forms o f struggles towards freedom and fraternity in our societies (including the “socialist” societies). W e could say even more. W hat A lthusser repeatedly q u e st io n e d was the picture o f com m unism w ith in M a rx is t th eo ry and ideology, but he did it in the nam e o f com m unism itself. For in stan ce, A lthusser becam e increasingly critica l towards th e evolutionist p icture o f com m unism as a final stage o f th e “socialist transition,” as it was proposed by M arxist (Leninist) orthodoxy. In the sam e way he criticized the pictures o f com m unism as a “transparent society” (where the com pelling relations o f p rodu ction sh ou ld give way to the “free a ssociation o f persons” ), or as a society “without contrad iction s,” “without ideology.” A dm itted ly there is more than one picture o f com m unism and the path towards communism in the M arx ist trad itio n and in M arx h im self. By rad ically critic izin g the periodization pattern, and the transparency pattern as well, A lthusser com es closest to the m ost econom ical “definition” o f com m unism th at we can find in M arx (especially in The Germ an Ideology), therefore also perhaps the more m ateria listic , the less depen den t on any sp ecu lative “ syllogism o f

reason”: the one that defines it as “not a future State, but the real m ovem ent w hich abolishes the existing state o f affairs.”

However, in spite o f his tentative contributions to historical m aterialism (which were mainly developed by his disciples), A lthusser was never really a (M arx ist) social theoretician; h e is, rather, a philosopher, whose co n stan t concern is “the transform ation o f philosophy”6 from a com m unist poin t o f view. H is m ain concern is with the way philosophy becom es subverted when it begins to think its own internal political conditions (som ething which, according to Althusser, can be done only from a communist point of view, since these conditions are linked with dom ination, more particularly with State dom ination). Therefore, he pushes to the extrem e the la ten t tension between M arxist theory and M arxian communism , and he forces us (I m ean today) to clarify our ideas concerning the nature and the (practical) value o f a co m m u n ist c r it iq u e o f M a rx is t th e o ry (w h ich is the o p p o site o f a “revisionist” critique, but also more generally the opposite o f every current critique o f M arxist theory). But in doing so he confronts us with an even greater tension within the notion o f “com m unism ” itself, since it appears in se p a ra b le fro m a t tr ib u te s w h ic h , in m o st p h ilo so p h ie s , are q u ite an tagon istic : absolute materialism (th e con d ition for a political n otion o f c o m m u n ism ) an d a b so lu te negativ ity ( th e c o n d it io n fo r c u t t in g o ff com m unism from every utopian “realistic” picture). C om m unism should be seen as a particular “m ode o f production ,” but also as a universal unlim ited “destruction” of the historical forms o f subjection (always already started, never finally ended).

W e c a n th in k h ere o f o th e r figu res in th e co u rse o f 2 0 th -ce n tu ry M arxism who approached the same issues from different angles. O n e is Korsch, with his project o f a “M arxism o f M arxism ,” or a “self-criticism ” of historical m aterialism . A noth er is Benjam in , with his deconstruction o f the teleology o f “progress” in socialist thinking. Even Gram sci, with his m otto that, for “historicism ” to be “absolute,” it should relativize its own position in history. But the com parison that seems to me unavoidable is w ith the “early” Lu k âcs, ju st because the two m en and their p rop ositio n s are so com pletely symmetrical. If For M arx bears a resem blance w ith som ething in M arx ist lite ra tu re , it is w ith th a t a sto n ish in g book , H istory and C lass C onsciousness, la ter on a lso subm itted to “ se lf-cr itic ism ,” also m ade o f successive essays crossing philosophy and politics— which may explain why both o f them are so deeply concerned with the question o f the “en d” of ph ilosophy. E xcept that Lukâcs concluded th at philosophy is realized in history, inasm uch as history is the becom in g o f the unity o f Su b ject and O b je c t, therefore the b ecom in g o f se lf-co n sciou sn ess in the m ak in g of history by the proletariat, w hereas A lth u sser’s book suggests that neither

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF A LTH USSER 5

6 THE ALTHUSSERIAN LEGACY

scientific nor revolutionary practice is reducible to self-consciousness. T h us philosophy as a “theoretical practice” should be the actual critique o f the illusions of any “consciousness,” helping m en and forces in history to, so to speak, overcom e the point o f view of consciousness. These two great books can indeed be view ed as the extrem ities o f com m u nist theory in 20th- century M arxism : they lie on its edges, as intellectual signals o f its com plete cycle. A n oth er striking com m on feature o f the two books is their attem pt at introducing a new mode o f writing in M arxist philosophy, which signals their singular position within the “adventures o f the d ialectic.”

Lukâcs invented the concept of the “Sub ject of History,” by com pletely id en tify in g the o b jec tiv e or su b sta n tia l p rocess o f c ap ita lism w ith the su b jectiv e tran sition o f the revolu tion ary class from a lien tatio n to self- consciousness: in cap italism consciousness should be com pletely reified, th ere fo re n e g a te d ; in co m m u n ism it sh ou ld be co m p le te ly lib e ra ted , therefore realized. A lth u sser v irtu ally closed th e d iscussion s abou t this them e by showing that ideology— including th e proletariat’s ow n ideology— being itself real, could never be identified with practice within the unity o f any co n sc iou sn ess ; h en ce , there cou ld be no qu estio n o f a “ su b ject o f history.” T h is does not m ean that there is no class struggle, no antagonism to grant the proletariat a revolutionary function , but rather that the actual p ra c t ic e o f the p ro le ta r ia t can alw ays c o n tra d ic t its re p re se n ta t io n s . U ltim ate ly it must co n trad ict them . C a ll it a structural lim ita tio n or a “fin itude” if you like. T h us Lukâcs (for whom the Sov iet R evolution had destroyed forever the sc ie n tistic and reform ist co n cep tio n s o f c la ss ica l M arxist “orthodoxy” ) a im ed at an intrinsic foundation o f M arxist dialectics; w hereas A lth usser (who saw the reform ist m oves inside orthodox M arxism - Leninism as bound to failure) anticipated the new and decisive “crisis o f M arxism ,” at least philosophically, seeing that th is crisis was deeper than anyone in the M arxist cam p was ready to admit, since it concerned the very notion o f proletarian politics.1

* * *

U p to this p o in t I have ju x taposed several them es: com m unism and M arx ist theory, ph ilosophy and po litics, pro letarian revo lu tion and the “crisis o f M arx ism .” A ll o f th em revo lve around one central ap o ria o f contem porary history: if com m unism is located outside history, th at is to say outside class struggles, it is simply another speculative or religious m yth; but if com m unism is simply the process o f present history (or the direction o f present history), it will never becom e real. How to break with the mainstream o f history from within7. How to separate in practice what is dominant in class

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF ALTH USSER 7

struggles from what is determining? A lthusser’s originality lies apparently in su b jectin g th is en igm a (w hich could help us u n d erstan d why, in som e famous pages o f Reading Capital, A lthusser proposed “non-contem poraneity” as the essential character o f historical time) to three successive conceptual shifts:

1. C lass antagonism is perm anent, arising from the very structure of exploitation. But it takes continuously changing forms. T h e crucial question a b o u t th e “ p o l i t i c a l c a p a c i t y ” o f th e p r o le t a r ia t a n d p r o t e la r ia n organizations, therefore, is whether they w ill prove able to recognize changes in the forms o f class struggle to w hich they belong them selves, in order to “do politics.”

2. T h e general field or “elem ent” o f politics is ideology: here we can rely upon some “rare but precious” indications in M arx, above all the phrase in the Preface to the Critique o f Political Economy that says: “it is in the ideological form s” o f social consciousness that h istorical antagonism s are “fought to the en d.” T h is exp lain s why proletarian class struggle can not spare a theoretical m om ent. V ery m uch in the line o f Gram sci's notion of “hegem ony,” it implies that the im portance o f “sc ience” in revolutionary practice is not so m uch to “exp la in reality ,” even less to forecast future history , but above all to tran sform the m asse s’ ideology , therefore the p ro letariat’s own ideology. O n e m ay wonder w hether this project can be actually im plem ented. However, it is im m ediately m odified by a third shift.

3. Ideology is not consciousness (not even “social” or “co llective,” not even “false” consciousness); it is, rather, unconsciousness (o f which the forms o f consciousness are only one aspect and a consequen ce). O n this point A lthusser opposes n ot only G ram sci but also M arx himself. T h e sam e m otto, qu oted above, w hich h elped to em phasize the auton om y o f p o litic s by sh ow in g that th e rea l “ m a tte r” o f p o lit ic s is m ad e o f th e id e o lo g ic a l m ediation s overdeterm in ing any c la ss an tago n ism (th u s determ in ing its concrete form s), is now criticized.

W hether these successive shifts, w hich give A lth usser’s reflections on ideology their em barrassing “constructive” and “deconstructive” aspect, are productive or not, whether they lead to a contradictory result, is the whole question with his program. Before we try to discuss it, we should m ake clear how uneasy and paradoxical A lth usser’s position will appear with respect to M a rx ’s own form u latio n s on “ id e o lo gy .” A d m itted ly , A lth u sse r alw ays claim ed that his propositions were faithful to the genuine M arxian concepts (or even constituted a “return” to M arx). N o less clearly, his argum ents imply that there is an irreducible inconsistency in M arx ’s own definition.

T h e introduction of “ideology” (m ore precisely, the joint introduction o f “m ode of production” and “ideology”) in the theory o f social form ations is


seen as a conceptual break with any expressive causality, the decisive step towards materialism. But the m echanism of ideology as it is pictured by M arx (including his analyses o f fetishism) is seen as idealist: hence, the im m anent tendency that always already pushes M arxism towards essentialist patterns of explanation. T o escape this aporia there was only one solution for A lthusser: to introduce under the very sam e nam e a concept that is basically non- Marxian, while presenting it at the sam e time as the only possible Marxist concept o f ideology, the only one consistent w ith historical m aterialism . T o play off M arx against M arx: th is strategy lies at the heart o f the so-called “sym ptom atic reading” of Capital and other classical texts.

T o be sure, the aporia was n oth ing abso lu tely new in the history o f M arxism . R ight from the beginning it had been the guiding thread o f its successive philosophical recastings. But, from Engels onwards,8 it was m ainly seen as a lacuna, a case o f u n even d ev e lo p m e n t. A co m p le te M arx ist sociology should include both a theory o f the econom ic “structure” and a theory o f the ideological “superstructure.” M arx’s own personal achievem ent had been the exp lan ation o f the econom ic laws o f cap italism : w hat was needed after him was an explanation o f the superstructure. M oreover, the philosophical key to this achievem ent was always looked for in the dialectic o f (social) Being and (social) Consciousness (Sein vs. Bewusst-sein: a play on words already present in Hegel, w hich was now supposed to encapsulate the essence o f m aterialism ). Engels himself, but also Kautsky, Plekhanov, Lenin, Labriola, G ram sci, and even Lukâçs or Sartre, with all their divergences, would adopt these two prerequisites, with m ore or less interesting outcom es. A lth u sser ’s p osition is exactly the opposite : he rejects any “d ia lectic” o f B ein g and C on sciou sn ess, w hether in its m ech an istic or its sp ecu lative forms, and , instead o f adding a theory o f th e “superstructure” to th e existing theory o f the “structure,” he aims at transforming the con cept of the structure itse lf by sh ow in g that its p rocess o f “ p ro d u c tio n ” an d “ re p ro d u c tio n ” originarily depends on unconscious ideological conditions. A s a consequence, the social form ation is no longer representable in dualistic term s— a thesis th at logically should lead us to abandon the image o f the “superstructure.”9 A noth er concept o f historical com plexity must be elaborated, w ith opposite sociological, anthropological and ontological prerequisites.

B u t why sh o u ld we a d m it th a t M a r x ’s d e f in i t io n o f id e o lo g y is inconsistent? There are two m ain arguments, I think, running throughout A lthusser’s writings on this point: one is a priori and philosophical; the other is a posteriori and political.

T h e philosophical argument is ismply th at you cannot at the sam e time define ideology as a “reflection” o f reality (i.e., the forces and relations of production) in the realm of ideas and consciousness, and explain that it has

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF ALTHUSSER 9

an effective “action ,” or feedback, on the behavior o f individuals and groups, except if you implicitly adm it that ideas are m aterial them selves, or that the course o f history is determ ined by spiritual forces. But the second solution is incompatible with the M arxist thesis that h istorical change arises from class struggles, whereas the first is ruled out by the very notion of consciousness as a “representative” notion . A cco rd in g to A lthusser, M arxism could never really free itself from this vicious circle. It was an on tological circle, the classical idealist dilem ma: “ ideas,” “consciousness” are nothing real (they add n oth in g to reality save a representation), or they are really everything (every real change results from ideal m ediations). T h e next step merely reproduces the d ilem m a in ep istem ic term s: th a t form o f co n sc io u sn e ss w h ich is supposed to be h istorically effective is true consciousness, th e “pure” or “adequate” reflection o f reality . But th is im m ediately raises an ob jection : isn ’t it rath er false consciousness th a t has h istorical effects, since it is the only one that impedes the otherwise inexorable course o f history ( if only by “d isto rtin g” or “delaying” it)? It would not be difficult to show that the o n to log ica l-ep istem ic circ le , when app lied to the problem o f h isto rica l progress, reproduces theological dilem m as: whether it is the good or evil that “m akes history.” But it is more interesting here to indicate how it is rooted in M arx ’s contradictory treatm ent o f the anthropological problem : at the sam e tim e th a t he w ould draw the co n seq u en ce s from h is an a ly sis of p rodu ction and exch an ge as so c ia l re lation sh ips, in order to re jec t any concept o f “the essence o f man,” he would also express his discovery o f the determ ining role of econom ic forces by practically considering “production” as the “essence” o f m an-in-society, consciousness being its m anifestation and “phenom enon.”

T h e political argum ent arises from the effects that the im plem entation o f th is n o t io n p ro d u ce d in the s o c ia l i s t m o v e m e n t, and a b o v e a ll th e com m unist revolutions. M arx ’s own initial position was, so to speak, doubly negative: the proletariat was the revolutionary force because it was seen as th e “ r a d ic a lly o p p re sse d ” c la ss , an d b e c a u se it was “ d e p r iv ed o f any id e o lo g ic a l i l lu s io n s ” (b o th E igen tu m slos and Illu sio n slo s) . B u t th is representation proved untenable as soon as the proletariat, in order to carry out its historical mission, should becom e a collective force, form a political “party” in the broad sense o f the term. T h is gave rise to such n otions as “ c la ss co n sc io u sn e ss ,” 10 “ p ro le ta r ia n id e o lo g y ,” so c ia lis t or co m m u n ist “w orldview ” (W eltanschauung), w ith a perm an en t o sc illa tio n betw een a c o n ce p t o f co n sciou sn ess as identity and a co n ce p t o f co n sc iou sn ess as organization. T h e notion o f proletarian ideology is especially sym ptom atic b e c a u se it led to the m y stif ic a to ry c o n c e p t io n and p r a c t ic e o f th e d ic ta to rsh ip o f the p ro le ta ria t in th e S o v ie t U n io n and oth er so c ia list

10 THE ALTH USSERIA N LEGACY

countries: “proletarian ideology” would be presented as the political basis o f “proletarian science” itself, the “class standpoin t” that makes it possible to transform society according to the “laws o f scientific socialism ,” including the general im position o f “proletarian” morals, philosophy, aesthetics, etc. to individuals. T h us a “revolutionary ideology” would becom e a “dom inant ideology,” a n otion th at is not only contradictory in itself, but has dram atic political effects. Instead o f transform ing a “S ta te ” into a “n on -Sta te” (to borrow Lenin ’s form ulation), it helps transform an em bryonic “n on -State” (the mass dem ocracy o f the Soviets) into a classical “ S tate ,” or to put it in other terms, transform ing the proletariat into a class dominated in its own name. Com m unists would find them selves trapped in their own “dialectic.”

T h e notion o f ideology that A lthusser proposed relies upon the idea of the imaginary as the general “elem ent” o f any individual or collective “lived” relationship to the real, i.e., to the forces and institutions o f history." It has n oth in g to do with either M arx or H egel, but rather with Spinoza and even m ore with Freud, i.e., with philosophers o f the unity o f the cognitive and em otional aspects o f the mind, an d o f the am bivalence o f trans-individual relations. Being always already im aginary, hum an life will never cease to be such, even if the m odalities o f this structural dependency can change, and do indeed ch ange according to practical attitudes (a “practice” in the strong sense— whether political, aesthetic or scientific— has real effects precisely in asm u ch as it m odifies the p o sitio n o f “ su b je c ts” w ith respect to one an o th er in th e im ag in ary ). “ R e a l” an d “ Im ag in ary ” th ere fo re are n o t opposites, they are inseparable one from another: thinking the real is part o f th e real, in an in fin ite p rocess (so m e th in g th a t p re v e n ts an y theory , including scientific theory, however accurate it c a n be, from ever giving a total picture o f the real). Thus the Imaginary and the R eal encroach upon one another: they do not belong to separate worlds, but produce together what we actually perceive as a coherent or a conflictual “world.”

W hat does it mean, then, to say that ideologies are basically unconscious? N o t that they would lack co n sciou sn ess: rather, they produce form s o f consciousness for individuals and groups, that is, m odes o f representation, m odes o f “being in the world” and subjective identities, always already knit together with non-representative elem ents (such as hopes, fears, beliefs, moral or immoral values, m oves towards liberation or dom ination— possibly both). In do in g so they m ust depend o n con d ition s th at n o “ su b ject” can ever master or create himself: m aterial constraints from th e division o f labor, the form s o f property, etc., and the no less m aterial constrain ts o f language, desire, sexuality, etc. Ideologies are the various historical form s in w hich unconscious conditions can be elaborated to allow individuals and groups to im agine their own practices.

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF A LTH U SSER 11

In prin cip le such a co n ce p tio n does n eith er deny th at there can be sc ien tific know ledge or p o litica l activ ity , n or should it p rev en t us from b e lie v in g th a t k n o w led ge can b e c o m e “ p u r if ie d ” o f any id e o lo g ic a l m ystification , an absolute wisdom , or that p o litics c a n becom e a purely “rational” adjustm ent o f ends an d m eans, an absolute liberation from o n e ’s ow n ideology or an instrum ental m anipulation o f the other’s ideology. It is d irected a g a in st p o sitiv ism an d sc ie n tism ju st as it is d irected aga in st decisionism an d voluntarism . Scien tific knowledge can only be a protracted “break” with particular, determ inate ideological beliefs (not with ideology as such), just as politics can only be a transform ation o f determ inate social relationships (not o f “ the w orld” as such). T h ese intrinsic lim itations are in fact not n ih ilistic or relativist abandonm ents, but con d ition s o f a greater realism . T h ey increase the degree o f necessity o f know ledge and liberty them selves. A gen cy goes along w ith necessity, and necessity goes along with finitude.

Nevertheless, w hen the question at stake is com m unist politics— that is to say, a p o lit ic s th at a im s at tran sfo rm in g th e c a p ita lis t system , the dom inant structure o f exp lo itation — it is very hard to escape the feeling that such a conception contradicts the possibility o f a genuine revolution. A n d it is not quite satisfactory to state, in general, that the pictures o f “absolute Freedom ” or the “birth o f a N ew M an ” are them selves im aginary (in fact they might well be the m essianic forms o f subjectivity or utopias necessary for any revolutionary mass m ovem ent). N either is it satisfactory to explain that the construction o f the Im aginary in the social structure displays a w hole new p ositiv e field (th at o f cu lture, aesth etics, even re lig ion ) for r e v o lu tio n a ry p ra c t ic e s . W h a t seem s n e e d e d at the very le a s t is an explanation o f why the oppressed or exploited enjoy a (virtually) privileged, active role with respect to “ideology. ”

T h is is the crux o f A lthusser’s program. Form ally speaking, a discussion o f this question involves understanding how the sym m etrical aspect o f ideology in g e n e ra l (ev ery m an is an “ id e o lo g ic a l a n im a l,” every in d iv id u a l is “ in t e r p e l l a t e d ” or “ su m m o n e d ” as a s u b je c t ) c o m b in e s w ith its dissym m etrical aspect (the fact that there are “class ideologies,” or, better, there is a “class character” to ideologies, a m aterial determ ination o f the im aginary by class antagonism s). In For M arx A lthusser merely posed the question, and in the well-known paper on “Ideological S tate A pparatuses,” h e proposed elem ents o f a n answer, which are notoriously incom plete and seem qu ite con trad icto ry w ith oth er a ssertion s on the “ ed u ca tiv e” role played by the class struggle for oppressed p eop le again st the do m in an t id eo logy (o r id e o lo g ie s) . W h at we can do h ere is sp ec u la te on th ese elem ents in order to clarify their orientation.

12 THE ALTH USSERIAN LEGACY

It seems to me that two classical interpretations are ruled out. First, what I would call the “Platonic” reading: namely, the idea that the roots o f class ideologies (or the capacity o f ideologies to enforce and “reproduce” class d om ination) lie in the ignorance and illusions of the vulgar, the uneducated “com m on people,” i.e., the oppressed themselves. A n d second, what I would call the “H o b b e sia n ” read ing: n am ely , the sym m etrica l idea that c la ss ideologies are rooted in the ability o f th e masters, the dom inant classes (or their “professional ideologists”) to im pose their representations upon the masses in their own interest (a process that you can picture either in moral or technical terms: the masters are wicked, they are tricky, they control the c o m m u n ic a t io n n etw ork s, th ey know how to tak e a d v a n ta g e o f the am bigu ities o f language, e tc .). In e ith er case, we w ould be b ack to the idealist notion s o f “error” an d “illusion.” But it is also insufficient to refer to the different co llective experiences th at are “ lived” by the dom inant and the d o m in ated (a lth ou gh such a d ifference clearly ex ists, sin ce to organize exp loitation an d to be exploited can not consist o f the sam e practices): it would be mere tautology. A pparently the m issing link has to do with the articulation o f the individual with collective (groups, classes and m asses). T h e basic im aginary m echanism s refer to the individual (this is w hat the notion of “subject” ultim ately indicates: even a “collective subject” is no m ore than indiv iduals who identify their su b jective experien ces), but the sym bolic p a tte rn s (e .g ., G o d , th e Law , the N a t io n , th e R e v o lu tio n , e tc .) th at “interpellate subjects” and cast their practices in to institutional structures are collective. T h ey produce, so to speak, a community-effect.

It is the m odality of this articulation (what I would call again the trans- individual m echanism of ideologies) that is decisive. W e m ust adm it that A lthusser gives little hint on this point, except for the proposition that ISA s are “neither public nor private ,” and therefore work below or before this distinction. I would say, nevertheless, th at logically his position should be the follow ing: if the dom inant ideology m ust work beyond the experience or “world” o f the rulers them selves to becom e “norm al” (and norm ative) in society, it m ust be universal in some strong sense. W e are led to the following question: w hich is the (im aginary) experience that can be universalized, that is b o th generalized an d idealized in society? Contrary to the com m on assum ption o f m ost so cio logical theories o f legitim acy and hegem ony, it cannot be primarily the “lived” experience o f the rulers, bu t only th e “ lived” exp erien ce o f the dominated m asses, w hich— as M arx said o f re lig ion — involves at the sam e time an acceptan ce or recognition and a protest or revolt against the existing “world.” 12 W e reach the paradoxical thesis that in the last instance there is noth ing like a dom inant ideology of the rulers (for exam ple, a dom inant “cap ita list” ideology). T h e dom inant ideology in a

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF A LTH USSER 13

given society is a specific universalization o f the imaginary o f the dominated: what it elaborates are such notions as Justice, Liberty and Equality, Effort and H appiness, etc., w hich draw their p oten tia l universal m eaning from their belonging to the im aginary o f the individuals who live the m asses’ or the people’s conditions.

W e must understand th at there is no “ illusion,” no “alienation” here (if only because the basic discourse o f the dom inant ideology is not to present justice or happiness as already realized, but rather as com m on values and objectives for which to continuously strive). T h e m ystification lies only in the denegation o f a structural antagonism between the dom inated and the d o m in a n t. B u t for th is very sim p le re a so n th ere is a h ig h d egree o f am bivalence. Just as the accum ulation o f capital is m ade o f “living labor” (according to M arx), so the oppressive apparatuses o f the State, C hurches, and other dom inant institutions function with the popular religious, moral, legal and aesthetic imaginary o f the m asses as their specific fuel. A n d just as there is a latent contradiction in exploitation, there is a latent contradiction in id e o lo g ic a l d o m in a t io n . W h en th e d o m in a te d tak e se r io u sly th e universality o f their own imaginary, w hich h as been returned to them “from above,” more precisely, when they collectively undertake to act according to the calling o f their own imaginary, they don ’t any longer accept the existing order, but revolt against it.13 A n d when in given historical conjunctures the contradiction of exploitation and ideological revolt m eet, you can call it a revolution (successful or n ot). N o class is the absolute “ Subject o f H istory,” but there is no doubt th at only the masses really “m ake history,” i.e., only they can produce political changes.

* * *

Finally, we must adm it that A lth usser’s conception o f ideology offers a rather tragic vision o f politics. It is tragic— not only dram atic, as in the classical tradition o f the philosophy o f history, to w hich M arx ’s v ision o f rev o lu tio n w ould still adh ere , w here the forces o f Progress and T ru th struggle against the forces o f R eaction an d Illusion— because th e “m asses” (i.e ., the p o ten tia l unity o f in d iv id uals from the do m in ated or popu lar classes) are seen as really divided, in ternally sp lit betw een two different agencies or m odes o f organ ization o f their own im aginary: their norm al behavior in the Ideological S ta te A pparatuses th at cover the whole society (som ething m uch stronger th an simple “ ideas” ), and the com m unitarian, eg alitarian , liberatory co n seq u en ces o f th eir exp erien ce , w hich alw ays already imply a latent revolt. T h ere is absolutely no guarantee that th e latter side will trium ph over the former.

14 THE ALTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

It is a tragic view, but not a pessim istic or a fatalistic one. Com m unism as a m ode o f p ro d u ctio n is a p o ss ib ility ro o ted in the c o n tra d ic t io n s o f c a p it a l is m a t ev ery “ s t a g e ” o f its d e v e lo p m e n t , n o m ore, n o l e s s .11 C om m unism as another way of living social relations, by revolting against the “dom inant universality,” is a possibility that always exists in the history o f any ideology, not only “bourgeois” ideology: this is but the reverse side of ideology being “eternal” or “having no history,” that is, not an evolutionary history, but a repetitive history. T h e possibility exists in religion (ca ll it heresy) as it exists in “hum anistic” m oral and econom ic ideology (call it socialism ).

O rthodox M arxism would see the econom ic conditions o f com m unism as a consequence of “m ature” cap italism , and its sub jective conditions as a consequence o f the com plete dom ination o f “class consciousness.” H ence the M arxist revolutionaries in power would aim at “outrunning” capitalist production (with the actual result o f being always behind its innovations) and would build a gigantic ideological m achine to force the masses into a h o m o g e n o u s “ p r o le t a r ia n w o r ld v ie w ” (w ith th e a c t u a l r e su lt o f e x t in g u ish in g a n y sp ir it o f r e v o l t , e x c e p t o f c o u rse a g a in s t o f f ic ia l com m unism ). T he “transition towards com m unism ” would becom e another m ode o f tra n s it io n tow ards c a p ita lism , w ith its v io le n t and p e a c e fu l episodes. B y drawing the conclusion that ideology is everywhere in society (from the labor process to the sta te), and th at conflict is everyw here in ideology, A lthusser did certainly not solve the problem of revolution for our days, but he would certainly re-open it, th at is, rephrase it. A t a tim e when we are to ld that the q u estio n o f rev o lu tio n has no future, that it was (negatively) answered by the “facts,” isn ’t th is worth discussing a little bit more?

THE NON-CONTEM PORANEITY OF ALTH USSER 15

NOTES

1. See Gregory Elliott, Althusser: The Detour of Theory (London and New York: Verso, 1987).

2. See Louis A lthusser, Machiavelli— Montesquieu— Rousseau (Schriften 1); Philosophie.,und Spontane Philosophie der Wissenchaftler (Schriften 4 ); herausgegeben von Peter_Schöttler und Frieder O tto W olf (Berlin: Argum ent Verlag, 1985, 1987).

3. See La cognizione della crisi— Saggi sul marxismo di Louis Althusser, (Milano: Centro Studi di Materialismo Storico, Franco A ngeli Editore, 1986).

4. There is a provocative assertion in Spinoza on this point: Ethics, IV, scholium of prop. 39.

5. S o , “H egelianism ” (more precisely: the “H egelian concept o f historical tim e” ) was rejected in Reading Capital because its teleology would make such a politics unthinkable, by associating communism with the “end of politics,” even when “reversed” in materialistic terms. Later on, something o f Hegelianism (and something essential indeed: “Process without an Origin or an End”) was vindicated exactly for the same reason: because it appeared as a prerequisite to understanding communism as an infinite political struggle.

6. The title of Althusser’s Lecture at G ranada in 1976, now translated into English (see L. Althusser, Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists and Other Essays [London and New York: Verso 1990]).

7. T h e symmetry o f A lth u sser’s For M arx and Lukâcs’ History and C lass Consciousness is very impressive indeed. In spite o f some critical allusions, I hardly think th at A lth u sser had properly read L u kâcs’ book (w hich was com pletely translated into French only in 1960) when he started writing the essays collected in For M arx. But I can think of a precise “lin k ” betw een them : M erleau-Ponty ’s Adventures of the Dialectic (1955), which based its critiques o f any com m unist philosophy of history on a careful reading o f Lukâcs, and which— much more than Sartre, for example— undoubtedly acted as an intellectual challenge to Althusser.

8. I am especially thinking of the brilliant developments in his later writings, above all Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of German Classical Philosophy.

9. A t le a st as far as ideology is con cern ed : the n o tio n o f a “p o lit ic a l superstructure,” including the set of State institutions or apparatuses, can retain a descriptive function.

10. W hich is not literally traceable in Marx, although it is anticipated in the d istin ction s betw een “ class in i t s e l f ’ and “class for itse lf,” the “reform ist” or “revolutionary” attitude o f the working classes.

11. Even this formulation is perilous, unless you immediately make clear that “real” m eans practice(s), not a given “ th in g” or “o b je c t .” T h e substitu tion o f “imaginary” for “consciousness” appears as a necessary counterpart to the substitution of “practice” for “object” in the materialist conception of reality. T h is implies that the imaginary is not a reflection or a reproduction, but a production o f identities, representations and discourse. It is fictional in the active sense of the term, as justly pointed out in Michael Sprinker’s Imaginary Relations: Aesthetics and Ideology in the Theory of Historical Materialism (London and New York: Verso, 1987).

12. Nietzsche had an acute understanding o f this, although from a passionate counter-revolutionary point of view: a “dom inant” ideology is always, in his terms, a “slave’s morals” (e.g., Christianity, the Rights of M an)’.

16 THE ALTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

13. Som e people think that A lth u sser never spoke o f the possib ility of revolting against the dom inant ideological apparatuses. This is a clear mistake. N ot only are there his praise of the students' and workers' revolt in 1968, but there is his rem arkable analysis o f the critical effects o f “m aterialist theatre” in For M arx (“Bertolazzi and Brecht” ). T o say that the latter is metaphoric is to miss the point, since, following the line of Brecht, aesthetics is seen here as a political practice.

14. A communist revolution is not materially possible in just any social or econ om ic con d ition s, but it does not depend on the necessity o f reach in g a predeterm ined “m ature” form o f capitalism . W hat shall mature are the political contradictions arising from exploitation, not the rate of concentration of capital. Here we can borrow an idea from Gram sci: a fatalistic view of the revolutionary conditions merely reflects the “subordinate” position of a divided working class.

Gregory Elliott

Althussers Solitude

C om m unists, when they are M arxists, and M arxists w h en th e y are C o m m u n is ts , n e v e r cry in th e W ilderness. Even when they are practically alone.

— Louis A lthusser, Reply to John Lewis

In a lecture delivered in 1977, A lthusser reflected on ‘M achiavelli’ s So litude’. In .h is solitude M achiavelli is not quite alone. For the author of The Prince was not the only thinker in whom Louis A lthusser discerned a certa in so litu d e . In deed , the figure o f the so lita ry in te lle c tu a l recurs, implicitly or explicitly, throughout his oeuvre, from Montesquieu: L a politique et l’histoire to “Solitude de M achiavel.” A m on g M achiavelli’s com panions in so litu d e are S p in o z a , p r o ta g o n is t o f an “ u n p re c e d e n te d th e o r e t ic a l revolution in the history o f philosophy,” subjected to “a massive historical repression” (A lth usser and B alibar, 1970: 102); C o m te , “the only mind worthy o f in terest...p roduced ...[by] F ren ch p h ilo sop h y in the 130 years follow ing the R ev o lu tio n ,” repaid w ith “re lentless h o stility ” (A lth usser, 1969a: 2 5 ); an d Freud, bereft o f “th eoretica l p receden ts,” and therefore com pelled to “set up in business alone” (A lthusser, 1971: 182). T h e single most striking occurrence o f it, however, concerns M arx. In the concluding paragraph o f his contribution to Reading Capital, A lthusser writes that the latter’s

repeated efforts to break down the o b jec tiv e lim its o f the ex istin g Theoretical, in order to forge a way o f thinking the question th at his sc ien tific d iscovery has posed ph ilosophy, h is failures and even his re lap se s are a p art o f th e th e o re tic a l d ram a he liv ed , in ab so lu te solitude... A lon e, M arx looked around h im for a llies an d supporters: who can reproach him for allow ing him self to lean on Hegel? A s for us, we can thank M arx for th e fact that we are not alone: our solitude only lies in our ignorance o f what he said (A lthusser and Balibar, 1970: 193).

S u c h so li tu d e d o e s n o t a t t a c h to th e p e r so n o f M arx or F reu d , M achiavelli o r Spinoza; it is not a hum an solitude. N or, despite A lth usser’s occasion al allusions to such qualities ( in contravention o f his refusal o f the


claim s o f the “constitutive subject” ), does it conn ote intellectual gen ius.1 Rather, it signifies “theoretical solitude” (A lthusser, 1971: 182), referring to an extra-territoriality vis-à-vis dom inant theoretical ideologies, an isolation in d isp e n sab le to any “ re v o lu tio n a ry d isco v e ry ”— any m u ta tio n in , as op po sed to m o d u lation of, the “ ex istin g th e o re tic a l.” M a c h iav e lli, for exam ple, “had to be alone to write The Prince and the Discourses. A lone— th at is, he had to turn out to b e ...cu t o ff from the se lf-ev id en t tru th s dom inant in the old world, detached from its ideology, in order to h ave the freedom to found a new theory and to ven tu re ...in to unknow n w aters” (A lthusser, 1988: 473).

E xcep tion a lity w ith respect to the se lf-eviden t truths o f a p articu lar historical conjuncture entails neither total insulation from ideology, n or the au to m a tic ad v en t o f the co n ce p tu a l system requ ired to g ive ad eq u ate expression to a theoretical revolution (the burden o f A lthusser’s reading of M arx ’s “epistem ological break” is that it is both protracted and vulnerable— all too easily d e fea sib le by its su p porters, let a lo n e its op p o n en ts: see A lth u sser and Balibar, 1970, p assim ). A s w ith M arx, Freud’s so litude is co m p o u n d ed by the ab sen ce o f the req u isite in te lle c tu a l resou rces to consum m ate his rupture:

when he wanted to think i.e. to express in the form o f a rigorous system of abstract concepts the extraordinary discovery that met him every day in his practice, search as he m ight for theoretical precedents, fathers in th eory , he co u ld fin d n o n e . H e h ad to co p e w ith th e fo llo w in g situ a tio n : to be h im se lf his own fath er, to co n stru ct w ith his own c r a f t s m a n ’s h an d s the th e o r e t ic a l sp a c e in w h ich to s itu a te h is discovery, to weave with thread borrowed intuitively left and right the great net with w hich to catch in the depths o f blind experience the teem ing fish o f the unconscious...(A lthusser, 1971: 182).

A ccordingly, Freud had been obliged “to think his discovery and his practice in imported co n cepts,” an Instrum entarium borrowed from contem porary sc ie n c e an d p h ilo so p h y an d q u ite in a d e q u a te to th at d isc o v e ry an d practice— with th e result that th e new science o f psychoanalysis rem ained v u ln e rab le to a “ re la p se ” into the p sy ch o lo g ism , etc . esch ew ed in its con stitu tion (1971: 182-86). S im ilarly , faute de mieux, M arx h ad in part thought his “im m ense theoretical revolution” in terms bequeathed by the very “G erm an ideology” rejected in the foundation o f historical m aterialism.

T h eoretical solitude, then, is at on ce a privilege and a cross— “the fate of all inventors” (1970: 120) in their revolutionary singularity. Posthumously, th ey m ay be sav ed from the se co n d d egree o f i so la t io n (c o n c e p tu a l

A LTH U SSER'S SOLITUDE 19

d e p r iv a tio n ). T h u s, L a c a n ’s ‘re tu rn to F reu d ’ is cred ited w ith h a v in g elucidated his irreducible discovery o f the unconscious through adequate imported concepts (borrowed from Saussurian and Jakobsonian linguistics) and rescued it from the deform ations— hence reductions— imposed upon it by W estern Reason as the price for a belated “pact o f peaceful coexistence” (1971: 186). N ow , however, it is the partisan, repeating the experience o f the artisan, who is condem ned, “for m any years,” to an “isolated...theoretical

effort” (1970: 16 n .l) .G iven the sym ptom atic recurrence o f this them e, a question arises: can

we discern solitude in A lthusser’s own situation as a partisan and artisan o f M arxism? Is there som ething in this philosopher’s “return to M arx,” or its modality, which justifies us in suggesting that he was “practically alone” ? M ight we in turn speak o f A lth usser’s solitude?

Judging from a handful o f references,2 Althusser himself would appear to have experienced intellectual isolation as a C om m unist philosopher intent upon reconstructing M arxism “pour la cause de la Révolution” (1969b: 72). H e would b e the first to insist, however, that his own consciousness o f his p red icam en t does not se ttle the qu estio n . M oreover, num erous factors m ilitate against an affirm ative response to it. T o begin with, subjected to the “terrible education o f deeds” by the war (1969a: 21), A lthusser was unique neither in his affiliation to the M arxist tradition, nor in his adherence to the French C om m un ist Party, thereafter. T h e “ sem i-disarray” o f C om m un ist intellectuals in the afterm ath o f Zhdanovism and Lysenkoism in the early 1950s, and the perception o f a philosophical vacuum once such “theoretical m onstrosities” had been rescinded— these too are scarcely peculiar to him (the In troduction to For M arx characterizes the texts collected therein as merely “the docum entation o f a particular history”— 1969a: 21). N o more was he alone, following the depredations o f Stalin ism , in his am bition to renovate M arxism , constitute M arxist philosophy, resolve the M arx-H egel relationship, clarify the base-superstructure connection , etc. N or, again, was A lth u sser iso la ted in essay in g a left-w ing critiqu e o f S ta lin ism ; in h is enthusiasm for Leninism , sym pathy for M aoism , disdain for H egelianism ; in utilizing non-M arxist discourses (n or ev en in some o f those that he utilized). S im ply by v irtue o f the fact th at h e possessed the w h erew ithal for his en terprise, A lth u sser was n o t a lon e . A n d here too it co u ld n o t but be paradoxical to speak o f solitude in con n ection w ith an author w ho, like M achiavelli, h as h im self been “surrounded...by a... crowd o f irreconcilable opponents, supporters and a tten tiv e com m en tators” (1 9 8 8 : 4 6 9 ), whose work enjoyed a considerable vogue and resonance, not only in France, but throughout W estern Europe, and beyond (especially Latin A m erica).

20 TH E A LTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

Y et despite all the contrary evidence that can be adduced, it is possible to venture A lth usser’s solitude. N o t, o f course, as a thinker o f the stature or originality o f M arx, but in a m an ner strictly com parable to L acan . T h e e x p l ic i t a n a lo g y draw n in “ F reu d a n d L a c a n ” b e tw e e n th e fa te o f psychoanalysis and o f historical m aterialism (1971: 179-80) suggests a subtext: identification, mutatis mutandis, o f a parallel between the ‘returns’ to the ‘m aturity’ o f Freudian and M arxist theory (1971 : 185) conducted by Lacan and A lthusser as m arginalized m embers o f the n ation al sections of international organizations,’ re-readings designed to restore M arx and Freud to their rightful solitude and thereby save ‘us’ from ours. If, as a C om m unist M arxist, he never cried in the wilderness, in certain respects— in his “system o f thought...its rejections and its position ” (1988 : 478-9)— A lthusser was practically alone. How?

In an interview published in 1982, two o f A lth u sse r ’s co llab orators, Etienne Balibar and Pierre M acherey, were at pains to insist that A lthusser was “a M arxist...not an ‘A lthusserian ’” (Balibar and M acherey, 1982: 46). A lth u s se r w ould d o u b tle s s h a v e co n cu rred w ith th is c o n c lu s io n . By ch aracteriz in g h is own w ritings as co n ju n ctu ra l in terven tion s (cf., e.g ., 1976a, passim ), their author likewise disavowed any am bition to construct a theoretical system in For M arx and Reading Capital (and if he did attem pt any such construction prior to 1967, subsequently he was unquestionably preoccupied with its deconstruction). Nevertheless, w hether welcom ing or repreh en d in g the fact, in his w ork the m ajority o f com m en tators have en co u n tered a d is tin c tiv e d iscou rse w hich m erits it ow n proper n oun : ‘A lthusserian ism ’— som ething that pertains to, yet does n o t exactly coincide w ith M arxism . H ow ever we u ltim ately ev alu ate it, A lth u sse r ’s th ou gh t possesses an “unwonted character” (1988: 470) w ithin the M arxist tradition, which consists in its effective rupture not only with the orthodox D ialectical and H istorical M aterialism o f the Secon d and T h ird Internationals, and with the heterodox W estern M arxism that em erged as a contestant o f it, but w ith key c o m p o n e n ts o f c la s s ic a l M arx ism itse lf. For in the n am e of restoring M arxism to its original purity, and then developing it, A lth usser’s return issued in substantial revision, even a radical recasting, o f it.

W h at was A lthusser’s solitude in his own tim e? T h e conjuncture in the in t e r n a t io n a l C o m m u n is t m o v e m e n t in w h ic h h is “ p h i lo s o p h ic a l m anifestos” appeared was dom inated by the “earthquake”4 o f K hrushchev’s denu n ciation of S ta lin at the T w en tie th C ongress o f the C P S U (1 9 5 6 ), w h e re u p o n a n ew “ ro a d to C o m m u n is m ” w as m a p p e d ; a n d by th e convulsions o f the S ino-Soviet split (1960), wherein, reacting against these developm ents, the C hinese Party berated the ‘revisionism ’ o f their Soviet (an d F ren ch ) com rades. T h e im pact o f K h ru sh ch evism upon the PCF,


c o n d e m n e d to the ghetto by D e G au lle ’s exploitation o f the A lgerian crisis, was profound. “E veryth ing for M an ” becam e its ideo log ica l w atchw ord, “peaceful coexistence” betw een the superpowers its foreign policy, “peaceful transition” in alliance with socialists and dialogue with “all m en o f good will” its dom estic horizon. Correlatively, in the realm o f theory a return to the Young M arx as the truth o f h is m aturity resounded throughout the Com m unist universe, its leaders effecting an adroit appropriation o f M arxist hum anism from critics and dissidents for their official ideology. T h e latter naturally experienced the lifting o f the “dogm atist n ight” (1969a: 31) as a M a r x is t d aw n . A lth u s s e r , by c o n t r a s t , r e g a rd e d S t a l in i s m as an abandonm ent o f the revolutionary theoretical and political heritage o f M arx and Lenin, and K hrushchev’s “Secret Speech ” as a right-wing critique of it conducive to rightwards evolution o f the C om m unist m ovem ent (Sartre ’s optim ism was m isp laced : d e-Sta lin ization h ad n ot de-Sta lin ized the de- Stalinizers; cf. Sartre, 1969: 73). Conversely, in its putative fidelity to the Leninist legacy at hom e and abroad, M aoism gave every appearance o f not subord inatin g raison de la révolution to raison d ’état. Yet C h in a was the excep tion to the v irtu al id e o lo g ica l, p o lit ic a l and th e o re tica l “pact o f p eace fu l c o e x is te n c e ” (A lth u s se r ’s use o f th e ex p re ss io n e lsew h ere is pointed) being concluded betw een M arxism an d its opponents, o f whose “suspicious side” its supporters were seem ingly oblivious, “believing that the world was com ing round to their positions— when they w ere...com ing round to the world’s” (1971: 186).

A lth usser’s dissent from the rapprochem ent beckoning C om m unists at the turn o f the 1960s, his intention to alert them to the “suspicious side” of the p a c t th e n b e in g se a le d , w as su m m ed up in a re tro sp e c t iv e self- assessment:

I would never have written anything were it not for the 20th Congress and K hrushchev’s critique o f Stalin ism and the subsequent liberalization. But I would never have written these books if I had not seen this affair as a bungled destalinization, a right-wing de-stalinization which instead o f analyses offered us only incantations; which instead of M arxist concepts had availab le only the poverty o f bourgeois ideology. M y target was therefore clear: these hum anist ravings, these feeble dissertations on liberty, labour or a lienation which were the effects o f all this am ong French Party intellectuals. A n d my aim was equally clear: to m ake a start on the first left-wing critique o f Stalinism, a critique that would make it possible to reflect not only on Khrushchev and Stalin but also on Prague and Lin Piao: that would above all help to put some substance back into the revolutionary project here in the W est.5


C o u n terin g the prevalent “recourse to (h u m an ist) ideology” (1 9 6 9 a : 238), A lthusser’s enterprise proclaim ed a “return to M arx” (and intim ated a turn to Peking— see, e.g., 1966b), aim ed at a renovation o f the po litical p ra c t ic e o f the P C F by a re sto ra t io n /re n e w a l o f M a rx is t th e o ry — an undertaking whose voluntarist w ager was th a t w orking-class politics, and h en ce h istory , cou ld be put b ack on the righ t track by a reversion to theoretical rectitude. T h e Althusserian reform ation was distinguished by its sense o f th eoretica l rectitude, o f what was required in order to recover M arx ’s scientific revolution and render it “a living and active truth for us”(1976a: 194).

It involved a critique o f actually existing M arxism in its entirety, which, grosso m odo, id e n tified all its v a r ia n ts as v a r ia t io n s upon a H e g e lia n p rob lem atic (th is equally app lied to D ella V o lp e a n M arxism , w h ich , as A lthusser noted [1976a: 173]), was a lso a m aterialist counter-trend within W estern M arxism , explicitly an tipathetic to H egelianism and com m itted to the scientificity o f M arxism ). Tw o basic tendencies could be identified in it: econom ism and hum anism , each o f w hich was a species o f h istoricism , a philosophy o f history as a process with a subject and a telos derivative o f the G erm an ideology with which M arx had settled accounts in the m id-1840s as a p recondition o f the foundation o f the science o f history. C onsequently , both were counterrevolutions against Capital (cf. G ram sci, 1977: 34-7). Very sch e m atica lly , econ om ism — “the poor m a n ’s H eg e lian ism ” (1 9 7 1 : 78) characteristic of the Second International after Engels and the Th ird after L e n in — w as a t e le o lo g ic a l te c h n o lo g ic a l d e te rm in ism w h e re in th e developm ent o f the productive forces m otored history towards its appointed d estin ation in com m unism , en route engendering the class w hich would deliver capitalism , highest stage o f class society, its quietus in a negation o f th e n e g a tio n . H u m an ism — “th e r ich m a n ’s e v o lu tio n ism ” (1 9 6 7 : 12) ch aracteristic o f the reaction again st K autskyism in the early 1920s and Stalin ism in the late 1950s— was a teleological philosophical anthropology wherein the ineluctable travails o f the hum an essence in alienation presaged its reappropriation and realization under com m unism , “solution o f the riddle of history,” (M arx, 1975: 348) courtesy o f the praxis o f the “universal class.” T h e s c a n d a l o f A l t h u s s e r ’ s a s s a u l t u p o n th e se d o c t r in e s w as h is iden tifica tion o f them as m irror-im ages, resem blin g each other in their u n d e r ly in g th e o r e t ic a l s t ru c tu re ( th e re b y o f fe r in g sc o p e for th e ir a m a lg a m a tio n ) a n d h is to r ic a l m e ss ia n ism . A n d n o tw ith sta n d in g h is reticence, it is clear that A lthusser’s critique o f econom ism was directed at the “h isto m at” adum brated in S ta lin ’s catech ism (1 9 4 1 ), beh in d whose su rface h o st il ity to H eg e l A lth u sse r d e te c te d a re -H e g e lia n iz a tio n o f M arxism in which, the Econom ic hav in g been prom oted to the rank of Essence, the Ruse o f Reason is reversed (1969a: 107-8).


A lth u s se r ’s o p p o s it io n to su ch re d u c t io n is t sc h e m a s— se cu lar ize d versions, in their closed narrative structure, o f H egel’s theodicy— derived from the consideration that, quite the reverse o f affording facilities for the investigation o f the com plexities o f real history, they precluded it. H ence they in h ib ited the “con crete analysis o f a con crete situ atio n ”— a prim e desideratum o f any ra tio n al p o lit ic a l p ractice (h en ce o f “sc ie n tific ,” as opposed to utopian, socialism )— and were destitute before th e “im placable test o f the facts” o f nineteenth-tw entieth-century history (1976a: 187).

In these circum stances, A lth usser adopted an am bitious program m e of reconstruction and an audacious strategy, involving an intellectual reversal o f alliances, to accom plish it. In counterpoint to the national culture in its turn from phenom enology and the “three H ’s” (H egel, Husserl, Heidegger— Descombes, 1981: 3), and its em brace o f various forms o f theoretical anti- humanism, Althusser resorted to several non-M arxist currents o f thought in an attem pt to force an exit from the crisis afflicting M arxism . O f these, the most important were, firstly, a tradition o f “rational m aterialism ” in French philosophy o f science associated with G aston Bachelard, Jean C availlés and G e o rg e s C a n g u ilh e m , in w h o se c o n v e n t io n a l i s m an d h i s t o r ic a l epistem ology, adopted by A lthusser, are probably to be found a C om tean co n n ex ion (w h ich w ould ex p la in A lth u sse r ’s e le c tio n o f C o m te as an excep tio n to the p h ilo so p h ica l ru le ) .6 S ec o n d ly , the “ u n p rec ed en te d ” rationalist and determ inist philosophical system o f Spinoza, some o f whose key principles A lthusser sought to naturalize in “dialectical and historical m aterialism ” (in a quite different fashion from P lekh anov ’s “m aterialist m onism ”— cf. 1969a: 201-02 n .), sin ce, contrary to a century o f M arxist selfre f le c t io n , it w as h e — an d n o t H e g e l— w ho w as M a r x ’s “ h is to r ic a l predecessor” (1969a: 78 n .40 ).7 Thirdly— though subsidiary to Spinozism — a sp ec ts o f the s t ru c tu ra lis t p a rad ig m in its S a u s su r ia n re w o rk in g o f D urkheim ’s m ethodological co llectiv ism (com pare Sartre ’s pro ject in his 1976), and insistence on the irreducible specificity o f “social fac ts” ; and especia lly L a c a n ’s re -th eo riza tio n o f Freud (read m itted to the fold by A lthusser fifteen years after the P C F’s condem nation o f psycho-analysis as a “re ac tio n ary id e o lo g y ” ) ,8 som e o f w h ose c a te g o r ie s w ere borrow ed to reconceptualize the M arxist d ialectic and the theory o f ideology.

T h u s, p ara lle l w ith L a c a n ’s em ploym en t o f stru ctu ra l lin gu istic s to theorize Freud, A lthusser h ad “recourse to a detour through other sciences” or philosophies (1971: 191) in order to illuminate the object o f M arxism and pinpoint “the disconcerting novelty o f M ar’s revolutionary discovery” (1970: 78). A nd it is this that accounts for the disconcerting novelty o f A lthusserian M arxism , for it is these reference-poin ts th at determ in ed the differentia spedfica o f his system of thought— the singularity o f A lthusserianism .


T h e Althusserian programme featured the elaboration o f a new M arxism of M a r x ism (a r e p e r io d iz a t io n o f M a r x is m ) ; o f an a n t i - e m p ir ic is t e p is te m o lo g y ( t r a d it io n a l ly , “ d i a le c t i c a l m a t e r ia l i s m ,” or M a r x is t philosophy); and o f a non-historicist theory o f social form ations (“historical m aterialism ,” or M arxist science). T h e reperiodization o f M arxism revolved around the postulate o f a sim ultaneously conceptu al and ep.istem ological discontinuity betw een the supposedly non-M arxist Early W orks o f 1840-44 and the unevenly M arxist w orks o f 1845-9— an “ep istem ological b reak” betw een irreconcilable “problem atics,” separating the science o f history from any ideo log ica l ph ilo soph y o f h istory , located where M arx h im se lf h ad a tte ste d a “ se ttlem en t o f a cc o u n ts” (The G erm an Ideology), and w hose p r in c ip a l im p o rt was th e r e in s t a t e m e n t , a m id s t its c o n te m p o r a r y devaluation, of Capital as the pinnacle o f M arxism. A gainst the grain o f the M arx ist-h u m an ist ren aissan ce en co m p assin g th eo lo g ian s like B igo and Calvez, independent M arxists like Lefebvre and G oldm ann, C om m un ists like S c h a ff and G arau dy ,10 in its broad outlines this chronology accorded w ith p rev iou s C o m m u n ist orth od o xy (as on e o f A lth u sse r ’s ow n early articles, 1953a, dem on strate s). H ow ever, h is acco u n t differed from the available alternatives in three crucial respects. First, in th e severity o f the rupture it posited between M arxism and its “sources” (G erm an philosophy, English political econom y and French utopian socialism ) and betw een the M arx o f Capital and the M arx o f the Paris Manuscripts. T h e latter was now merely and irrevocably “an avant-garde Feuerbachian applying an eth ical problem atic to the understanding o f hum an history” (1969a: 4 6 ), whose conceptual repertoire could only be assim ilated to M arxism by a teleological re ad in g w h ich trav e stie d the “ ad v en tu re o f sc ie n c e in d e v e lo p m e n t” ; (1969a: 245) whereas the former was neither H egel inverted nor Feuerbach transcended, but the founder o f an utterly unanticipated science. Second, in its scrutiny o f the road to Capital, its interrogation o f the M arxist status of the writings subsequent to the Manuscripts, but prior to Capital. A ccording to A lthusser, these still bore the im print o f the ideology with w hich they were in rupture; M arx’s passage from the quicksands o f speculative ideology to the terra firma of conceptual science was no instantaneous transportation to scientificity, but a laborious transition period. Third, in its insistence on the lacunary nature o f Capital itself, insofar as M arx ’s text failed to specify the scientific revolution realized in it, thereby facilitating recrudescence of the ideological within M arxism . For in his solitude, M arx had wanted for the concepts (in particular, “structural causality”) required unequivocally to encapsulate his critique of political econom y at the level o f its m ethod and object; his revolution therefore stood in need o f com pletion— A lth usser’s self-appointed task.


A lthusser conceived Capital a s a radically non-H egelian, non-Ricardian tex t w h ich had “op en ed up to sc ie n tific k n o w led ge ...th e co n tin e n t of H istory,” (1971: 42) but only com m enced exploration o f that continent. T h e “ B ook in w hich the S e c o n d In te rn a tio n a l read the fa ta lity o f the a d v en t o f so c ia l ism as if in a B ib le ” (1 7 0 : 1 2 0 ) did not c o n ta in an evolutionist discourse, be it econom ist or hum anist. Therein M arx had laid the corner-stones o f historical m aterialism by: ( 1 ) theorizing the econom ic leve l (o r in frastru ctu re ) o f the c a p ita l is t mode o f p ro d u ctio n and (2 ) p ro v id in g g u id e lin e s for th e th e o r iz a t io n o f (a ) th e n o n - e c o n o m ic (sup erstru ctural) levels o f th e ca p ita lis t m o d e o f p rodu ction ; (b) non- capitalist m odes of production; (c) transition from one m ode o f production to another. M arx , in sh ort, h ad in itia ted a gen eral theory o f m odes o f production and social form ation s— a research program m e, rather than a finished or fixed doctrine.

T h e thrust o f A lthusser’s interpretation was to affirm the scientificity of M arx ism , w h ile h ig h lig h tin g its im p e rfe c tio n — a co n se q u e n ce of the inevitable lim itatio n s o f M arx ’s own ach ievem en t (an d its d isto rtio n by successors), an d a norm al correlate of its character as a scientific problem atic am enable to rectification and capable o f yielding new know ledge. It was here, in its a ttem pted rec lam atio n o f the sc ien tific ity and autonom y o f historical m aterialism , as a theory o f history, from Stalin ist naturalism and W estern-M arxist an ti-n aturalism , from orthodoxy and heterodoxy alike, that A lthusser’s M arxism of M arxism was novel. Contrary to the positivism o f the one an d the relativism o f the other, the theory developed in Capital was u nderstood as a “sc ien ce am on g o th ers,” that is to say, as a theory governed solely by the exigencies o f the pursuit o f ob jective know ledge, o p e n to s u b s t a n t ia l d e v e lo p m e n t , p r o d u c t iv e o f r e su lt s w h o se ep istem ological d ign ity w as equal to th ose o f the n atu ral sc ien ces, and possessed o f its own theory, m ethod and object.

T h e concepts deployed in A lth usser’s epistem ological history pertained to a h istorica l ep istem ology— the “T h eory o f th eoretica l p rac tice .” T h is p h ilo so p h y was a ttr ib u te d to M a rx , a r t isa n o f a “ d o u b le th e o re t ic a l revolution” (1966a: 90 ), a “double foundation in a single break” (1969a: 33 ). Operative in Capital, it remained to be theoretically constituted. Hence A lth u sser not only re jec ted the in it ia tiv e s o f the W estern M arx ists as historicist philosophies o f praxis which, in assim ilating the sciences to the superstructure, represented them as the expression o f class su b jects. He likew ise repudiated the d ia lec tica l m ateria lism hazarded by Engels, and systematized in the form o f “d iam at” by Stalin (1941), as an ontology o f m atter-in-m ovem ent which, c la im in g to co n stitu te a general science o f nature, history and thought, prescribed laws that infringed the autonom y o f

26 TH E ALTH USSERIA N LEGACY

the sc ien ces. T h e “v o lu n tar ism ” and “ su b je c tiv ism ” com m on to b o th currents had reached their calam itous clim ax under the intendancies o f Z h d a n o v an d L y se n k o d u rin g the C o ld W ar in th e o ry , w ith w h ic h A lth u sse r ’s m em bersh ip o f th e P C F co in c id e d (see 1969a: 2 1 -3 1 ). H e essayed a construction at their antipodes.

Sui generis, M arxist philosophy would be a “theory o f the production of know ledges,” comprising a theory o f the specificity o f theoretical practice (sc ien tific and id eo lo g ica l); a theory o f the au ton om ous h istory o f the sciences; and a theory of the non-theoretical social practices w ith w hich th e o re tic a l p rac tice is ‘a r t ic u la te d ’ in the so c ia l fo rm ation . A lth u sse r discovered the license and rough draft for it in M arx ’s 1857 Introduction. A s developed by him, it w as in effect an ontology and an epistem ology, the form er u n d erp in n in g the la tte r . A c c o rd in g to A lth u s se r ’s “h isto r ic o - d ialectical m aterialism o f praxis” (1969a: 229) society— the “com plex unity of ‘social practice’”— could be dissected into four m ain practices— econom ic, political, ideological an d theoretical— each o f which h ad the transform ative stru ctu re o f the lab ou r p ro ce ss as an aly zed by M arx , in v o lv in g th ree “m om en ts”: raw m aterial, m eans o f production an d product. Insofar as it co n ce iv ed so c ia l rea lity as a co m p le x u n ity o f d is tin c t yet im bricated practices (irreducible on e to another an d n o t appearances o f som e originary e s se n c e ) , the o n to lo g y o f p ra c t ic e s to o k its d is ta n c e from id e a lism , em piricism and historicism , positing “the ever-pre-givenness o f a structured c o m p le x u n ity ” (1 9 6 9 a : 1 9 9 ) . D e v e lo p in g S p in o z a ’s c o n c e p t io n of knowledge as production, the epistem ology proposed that the production of k n o w led ge by the p ro d u c tio n o f a d e q u a te c o n c e p ts was the re su lt o f theoretical practice, possessed o f its own raw m aterial (facts, concepts, etc .), m eans o f p roduction (prob lem atic , o r th eoretica l m atrix ), and products (know ledges) (1969a: 166-67). T h is finessed the frequent contraposition o f concrete/m aterial practice to abstract/spiritual theory, since the latter was itself precisely such a practice, the denial o f w hich entailed nullification o f the reality o f science. T h ereb y A lth u sser sough t to secure its cogn itive autonom y aga in st th e intrusions o f po litics, while recogn izing its so c ia l “relative autonom y” vis-à-vis the other practices.

C ontrary to what he term ed the “em piricist conception of know ledge,” (1970: 35 if) A lthusser’s epistem ology excluded any confrontation betw een (know ing) subject and ob ject (to be know n). T h e cognitive process was intra-theoretical and the “real object” (e.g., contem porary capitalism ) was not directly involved in it. O n the contrary, its starting-poin t and end- product alike were the “ob ject of know ledge,” via which knowledge o f the real object was appropriated in thought. T h e theory o f theoretical practice sim ultaneously aspired to m aterialism (prim acy o f the real, w hich exists


independently o f theory) and anti-em piricism (specificity o f the theoretical, which is irreducible to the real). It was sufficiently confident to claim that with its arrival the classical “problem o f know ledge” dissolved. T heories of know led ge e rec te d in re sp o n se to th is (n o n -)p ro b le m ille g it im a te ly adjudicated on the results o f the sciences. But once a theoretical practice had experienced an “epistem ological break” with the ideological (governed by non-cognitive interests and factors), crossed the threshold o f scientificity, and a t ta in e d au to n o m y , it re q u ired no p rio r g u a ra n te e s or e x te rn a l confirm ation. C on tra ep istem ological realism or pragm atism , th eoretical practice was its ow n criterion and verification was internal to theory (1970: 59-60). G iven that such discontinuity betw een a science and an ideology occurred at a particu lar m om ent in th eoretica l history, it could only be located by an epistem ological history (e.g., A lthusser’s o f M arx)— a form of h istoriograph y w hich departed from E n gligh ten m en t tales o f sc ien tific progress and recognized th e “necessity o f contingency” (1970: 45).

T h e th eory o f th e o re tic a l p ra c t ic e red eem ed th e au to n o m y o f the verid ica l from S ta te , Party, C la s s , e tc ., and in stitu ted the co n tin u ou s p roduction o f new know led ge as opposed to the rep etition o f “ Fam ous Q uotations” as a criterion o f scientificity. O ver and above such conjunctural merits, it constituted an effort to incorporate the lessons o f modern, non- M arxist philosophy of science into M arxism and, in particular, to integrate the com pelling aspects o f the co n ven tion alist critique o f positiv ism and empiricism into a materialist epistem ology. In other words, it am ounted to an attempt to reconcile the conventionalist analysis o f the historical, social and theoretical character o f scientific practice with the realist postulate of the ex iste n c e o f an in d ep en d en t re a lity irredu cib le to th eory ( i f only know able v ia it) . W h atev er its p rob lem s and co n trad ic tio n s, it was o f unprecedented soph istication w ithin the C om m unist tradition. T o have fashioned a m odernist epistem ology o f this order within the PCF, erstwhile cham pion o f Lysenkoism, was a singular achievem ent.

A s was the A lth u sser ian reco n stru ctio n o f h isto r ica l m ateria lism . If A lth u s se r ’s e n d e av o u r to c o n s t itu te M a rx is t p h ilo so p h y im p arted to d ia lec tica l m ateria lism a qu ite n o v e l co n ten t, his p ro ject in h isto r ica l materialism was n o less radical: to reconstitute it on non-historicist bases so as to facilitate its com prehensive developm ent now th at the long Stalin ist night had passed. T h e upshot o f A lth usser’s labours was four-fold. First, a new conception o f the M arxist d ialectic. A lthusser rejected the terms o f the stan d ard in te rp re ta tio n s o f the M a rx -H e g e l re la t io n sh ip , from M arx (“ inversion”) and Engels (m ethod-system dichotom y) onwards (1969a: 93- 4). T h e M arxist d ia lectic w as n o t som e Aufhebung o f the H egelian , but structurally d istan t from its illustrious predecessor. T h e la tte r ’s log ic was

28 TH E ALTH U SSERIA N LEGACY

inexorably teleological; the type o f contradiction figuring in it was “sim ple,” c h a rg e d w ith “the m a g ic a l m o v e m e n t o f th e c o n c re te c o n te n ts o f a h istorical epoch towards their ideological G oal” (1969a: 104). Yet it was precisely this that had been preserved in econ om istic M arxism , w herein econom ic contradiction (between the forces and relations o f production) was to be found “standing to atten tion in its role and essence” (1969a: 209). A lth u sser sough t to strip the M arx ist d ia lec tic o f such ab strac tion and fatalism with his theory o f “contradiction and overdeterm ination” (1969a: 8 9 ff). E very co n trad ic tio n , it asserted , is “ov erd eterm in ed ,” so th at the m u ltip lic ity o f co n trad iction s active in any social form ation , a lth ou gh organized in a determ inate (though variab le) order, are inelim inably real and effective, sim ultaneously determ inant and determ ined— a circum stance w h ich m ay resu lt in their “ c o n d e n sa t io n ” in the “ ruptural u n ity ” o f a revolutionary rupture.

C om plem entary to A lth usser’s recasting o f the M arxist dialectic was a reconceptualization o f the structure o f social form ations in their constitutive com plexity. Engels’ late efforts to wrest the base-superstructure topography from vulgar determ inism had issued in a “bad infinity” (1969a: 117-28) and the interaction model (action/reaction) led to a “night in which all cows are b la c k ” (1 9 6 9 a : 4 9 ) . W h at Fredric Ja m eso n (1 9 8 1 : 3 7 ) has term ed the “A lthusserian revolution” here consisted in restoring the “specific effectivity o f the superstructures” (1969a: 113) by differentiating the M arxist totality fro m th e H e g e l ia n . T h e la t te r w as an “ e x p re s s iv e t o t a l i t y ,” w h ose com ponent parts express each other and the totality ’s sim ple essence (1970: 94 ). T h e M arxist totality, in contrast, secreted n o essence to be expressed or centre to be reflected . A global structure, subsum ing three inerad icab le re g io n a l s tru c tu re s (e c o n o m ic , p o l it ic a l and id e o lo g ic a l) , th e so c ia l form ation was to be viewed as a “structure o f structures” (1970: 17), each o f which is assigned “relative autonom y.” T h e superstructural levels are not, then heteronom ous— secondary ph en om ena subject to the extern al laws o f the infrastructural essence; the “lonely hour o f the last instance (econom ic d e te rm in a tio n ) n ev er c o m e s” (1 9 6 9 a : 1 1 3 ). Y et n o tw ith sta n d in g its “articulated decentricity” (1970: 104), th e social form ation w as unified, for governed by (econ om ic) d eterm in ation in the last in stan ce. A n y social form ation was a “structure in d o m in an ce ,” th a t is to say regu lated by a “structural causality” whereby ultim ate [economic determ ination] operated th rough the p erm u tation o f d o m in an ce betw een the d ifferen t regions, determ ining its own dom inance under capitalism , for exam ple (e.g., 1969a: 200-13; 1970 :216-24 ).

In th is in ge n io u s ( i f frag ile ) so lu t io n to the p e re n n ia l p ro b lem o f econom ic determ inism , the econom ic w as n o longer the primum mobile of

A LTH U SSER ‘S SOLITUDE 29

history and society. T h e M arxist theory o f the econom y was itself radically tran sfo rm ed in the a n t i - te le o lo g ic a l th e o ry o f m o d es o f p ro d u c tio n p ro p o u n d ed by A lth u sse r an d B a lib a r— th e th ird c o m p o n e n t o f the Althusserian reconstruction. Contrary to th e technological determ inism and ev o lu tio n ism of h isto m a t, e c o n o m ic m odes o f p ro d u c tio n w ere to be conceived as articulated, not contradictory, com binations o f relations and forces o f production, under the dom inance o f the relations. T h e forces were thus dem oted from their status as independent variable and treated as a variety or sub-set o f the relations. T h e contradictory dialectic o f forces and relations, which had provided the principal dynamic o f history on M arx ’s reading o f it in the 1859 Preface, was excised from historical m aterialism , indicating its “radically anti-evolutionist ch aracter” (1970 : 225). M odes o f production harbored no inherent tendencies to the grow th o f the productive forces, to the “fettering” of the forces by the relations o f production, to the latter's replacem ent that the forces m ight resume their forward m arch. They were not to be analyzed, in the m anner of Stalin , as historical forms whose quasi-Hegelian supersession was predeterm ined by iron laws of motion, but as self-reproducing to ta litie s w hose ex isten ce was n ot circum scribed by an y th in g o th e r th an the p re re q u isite s o f rep ro d u ctio n . T h e th eory of h i s t o r ic a l t r a n s i t io n fu r n ish e d by B a l ib a r r e m a in e d o n e o f n o n - correspondence (1970: 273-308), but explored its object in two directions that diverged from econom ism : non-correspondence betw een the forces and re lation s o f p rod u ction in w h ich the la tter are d eterm in an t; and non- c o rre sp o n d e n c e (o r “ d i s lo c a t io n ” ) b e tw e e n the le v e ls o f th e so c ia l formation, in which dom inance is displaced onto the political and the class struggle intervenes as the m otor o f history (a quasi-M aoist thesis directed against political gradualism).

O ne thing was clear in the A lthusserian schem e o f things: M arxism was not a h u m an ism . H u m an b ein gs were not the co n stitu tiv e su b je c ts o f history, but constituted subjects in history. T h at is to say, they were agents subsumed under, and alloted their places/functions by, an ensem ble o f social structures (ideological, econom ic, political) anterior and exterior to them, and regulated by their own peculiar laws. H istory was not the creation o f a subject, singular or collective, but a “process without a subject” which only a science disjunct from the consciousness and illusions of hum an subjects— viz·, h is to r ic a l m a te r ia l ism — co u ld illu m in a te , th e reb y e n a b lin g its transform ation and their em ancipation (see, e.g., 1955: 15; 1970: 119-44; 1971: 219; 1972: 182-86). O f these structures, the ideological performed a crucial role.

On A lth usser’s retheorization o f ideology, it was n ot “an aberration or a contingent excrescence o f H istory” (1969a: 232), destined to disappear with


the advent o f com m unism (com pare M arx), but an “organic part” o f any society because a trans-historical requirem ent o f social reproduction (1965: 23-33; 1969a: 231-36). T o suppose a d isalien ation o f hum anity in w hich false yielded to true consciousness, w hereupon the veil would be torn from the opacity o f social form ations and their structural determ inants laid bare, renderin g sc ien ce superfluous, was to indulge in h isto r ica l m essian ism . B re a k in g w ith th e co n cep tio n o f ideo logy as “false c o n sc io u sn e ss” and draw ing upon Lacan ian psychoanalysis, A lthusser conceived it as the realm o f the “im aginary” in w hich hum an subjectivity is constituted, the subject of experience and consciousness endow ed w ith identity and the illusion o f autonom y. T h e constitution o f subjects in ideology, it is argued, inverts the re a l re la t io n s b etw een in d iv id u a ls and th e so c ia l fo rm a tio n in to an imaginary relation. Therein individuals live those relations as if they were c o n s t itu t iv e o f th em , w h ereas th ey are in re a lity su b je c te d to th em (h e te ro n o m o u s, and n o t a u to n o m o u s) . Id eo lo g y , th e n , is th e se t of representations o f peop le ’s imaginary relations to their real conditions o f existence required in order for them to function as social agents under any conceivable set of relations o f production.

M erely sketched in the roughest o f outlines here, A lthusserian M arxism was an enterprise o f great scope and originality. W hatever its protagonist’s solitude at the outset, nationally an d internationally he proved “lucky in the m om ent o f his em ergence” (H obsbaw m , 1982: 145) in the middle o f a red decade. W hilst the leadership o f the PC F sharply criticized theoretical anti- hum anism shortly after the publication o f Reading C a p i t a l the fact th at it pointed in a contrary ideological and political direction to the evolution o f his party assured an en th u siastic recep tio n elsew here. A lth u sser ian ism possessed su ch allure because it com bined ph ilo sop h ical m odernism and political radicalism . Politically, A lthusser was— and was seen to be— a left- wing critic o f the m oderate course o f French C om m unism , sym pathetic, at least, to M aoism ; yet as a member o f the PC F, he was in some sense rooted in w orking-class politics, w hich held open the possibility o f an influence outside the academ y. Philosophically, A lthusser was both sophisticated and co n tem porary , p rop ou n d in g , d e sp ite h is p re se rv atio n o f m u ch o ffic ia l term in ology , a recon stru ction o f M arx ism in im peccab ly m odern— and m o d ish — term s, a p p a re n tly c o n so n a n t w ith le dernier cri o f P a r is ia n intellectual culture.

It rapidly lost its allure— again , fo r p o litica l and th eoretica l reasons. A lthusserianism was discom fited by the surprise o f M ay ‘68 and discredited, in the eyes o f the groupuscules the events spawned, by its association with the PC F. M oreover, it was subjected to a series o f critiques, for “theoretic ism ,” an ti-h um anism , an ti-h istoricism , etc ., som e o f w hich A lth usser


p a r tia lly a d o p te d in th e a u to c r it iq u e an d r e c t if ic a t io n to w h ich he proceeded.

A lthusser was open to criticism on numerous counts. Thus, whatever the merits o f his re-reading o f M arx ’s oeuvre in orienting M arxists away from the cult o f the Early W orks and foregrounding the em ergence o f a theory o f h istory as th e d e c is iv e d e v e lo p m e n t in h is th o u g h t, it was te x tu a lly ten den tious (w itn ess the sy m ptom atic ab sen ce o f the G rundrisse), and theoretically contentious (witness the substitution o f Spinozist for H egelian categories). Sim ilarly, notw ithstanding its virtues as a philosophy for science in com parison with the je june m aterialism o f orth odox m arxism and the so p h istica ted idealism s o f W estern m arx ism , the theory o f th e o re tica l practice was u ltim ately a mésalliance o f convention alism an d m aterialism . For it was unstable betw een a rationalism in w hich the prior identity o f the order o f theoretical practice and the order o f “practice in general” perm itted the appropriation o f the latter in the form er— hence an extraordinary reedition o f d ialectical m aterialism itself— and a convention alism in which the total disjunction betw een theory and reality precluded any such thing— hence an anticipation o f relativism .

M ost seriously fo r the su b seq u en t fortu n es o f A lth u sse r ’s work, the reconstruction o f historical m aterialism proved on inspection to be vitiated in its core com ponents. U nquestionably, it represented a liberation o f the “materialist conception o f history” from its Stalin ization into iron laws and stages, and re-established it as a potentially infinite research program m e. T h e price paid fo r th is, h ow ever, was its re ca stin g as “ a m ost unusual structuralism” (A lthusser et al., 1965, vol. II: 205— a phrase cut from the second edition o f 1968), so as to retrieve M arx from the n ineteenth century, “century o f history and evolution .” In other words, in his solitude Althusser broke w ith the G erm an ideology in actu ally ex istin g M arxism , only to coalesce with the French o f the m id-1960s in his alternative to it. M arx’s historical m aterialism in its A lthusserian rendition was a structuralism avant la lettre— and that because it was a Spinozism after the event.

A lth u sse r h im se lf h ap p ily a d m itted th is and co n sid ered it a v irtue (1976a: 132-41); and in many respects it was. N evertheless, the assim ilation o f the philosophy o f his “real com panion in heresy” (Pécheux, 1982: 214)— the distinction between real ob ject and ob ject o f knowledge, the critique o f the theory o f knowledge, the notion o f structural causality, the perm anence o f ideology, are all o f Sp in ozist ped igree— did not resolve the very real problems w hich led A lth usser to excise central tenets o f classical M arxism and introduce it. H is in n ovation s were extrem ely pow erful as critiques, successfully problem atizing som e o f th e basic theoretical assum ptions o f M arxism and m aking reversion to pre-Althusserian forms o f it difficult; yet


they were precarious as constructs. A nti-hum anism , for exam ple, so utterly excluded hum an agency in its prioritization o f structural necessity that it rendered the action o f subjects in history/society inexplicable, unless as the e ffect o f an agen cy transferred to the stru ctu ral-sy stem ic leve l, w hose e x ig e n c ie s su b je c ts in tern a lize (a p o lit ic a lly , as w ell as th e o re tica lly , p rob lem atic n o tio n ). A n ti-h isto ric ism so utterly excluded h istory in its prioritization o f social reproduction (the ahistorical structurality o f m odes o f p rodu ction ) that it rendered so cial ch an ge in con ceivab le , unless as the effect o f a surreptitiously teleological history (B alibar’s transitional m odes o f production), or of an unstructured history (the supervention o f class struggle in the m achinery o f structural causality).

A lth u s se r ’s en d e av o u r to re so lv e so m e o f th e se p ro b lem s in au to - d e co n stru c tio n o f h is system , fro m th e 1967 lec tu re s on Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savants (1 9 7 4 ) to L a Transform ation de la filosfia (1976), foundered. A new account of M arx ’s intellectual developm ent (e.g., 1976a: 151-61) reconnected it with the non-theoretical history from which it had been disarticulated, yet restored historicism. A second definition o f philosophy as, in the last instance, the class struggle in theory, represented a v a lu a b le a t te m p t to r e a lig n M a r x is t p h ilo so p h y as a L o c k e a n “underlabourer” to the sciences, but surrendered m uch that was o f value in the theory o f theoretical practice, and constituted a partial return to pre- A lthusserian positions (including those o f the Y oung A lthusser— see 1971: 27-68 an d cf. 1953b ). A re c tif ic a tio n o f h is to r ic a l m ater ia lism by the in jection o f the class struggle provoked a profound contradiction betw een fu n c t io n a l i s m — an a u t o m a t ic i t y o f s o c ia l r e p r o d u c t io n v ia s t a t e apparatuses— and voluntarism — a contingency o f social transform ation via th e class struggle (see, e.g., th e remarkable IS A se ssa y in 1971: 121-73).

Several points are in order about A lth usser’s later work. N o t only did it offer no com pellin g a ltern ative to his in itia l version s o f d ia lec tica l and historical m aterialism ; a com prom ise form ation, in part at least it am ounted to a r e g re s s io n to fo rm s o f M a r x ism w h ic h h e , a m o n g o th e r s , h ad problem atized. A s such, it was always liable to be surpassed by other internal critiques o f A lthusserian ism , w hich would be m uch more com prehensive and ultim ately lead out o f M arxism . T h is phenom enon was widespread, for it was discovered that some of the fertile elem ents in A lth usser’s writings (e.g., the theory o f ideology) could be extracted from his residual M arxist fram e w o rk , (se e , inter a lia , H ir s t , 1 9 7 9 ) . A fte r M ay ‘6 8 the F re n c h th e o re t ic a l an d p o lit ic a l co n ju n c tu re g rad u ally tu rn e d as in im ic a l to A lthusserian ism as it had once been hospitable. For all A lthusser’s optim ism about w hat M ay portended (1969b: 1, 107, 150; M acciocch i, 1973: 302, 310, 3 2 0 ), h e also had a p resen tim en t o f the ascen dan cy o f th eories o f


pow er/know ledge an tith etica l to his ow n— and against w hich he vain ly defended M arxism as furn ish ing an “em an cip atory scientific know ledge” (1969b : 126 ). A t th e o u tse t, o f course , these assum ed an u ltra-le ftist, maoisant form, and possibly even had an influence o n the gauchiste accents of A lt h u s s e r ’s a u to c r i t iq u e . By th e m id - 1 9 7 0 s , h o w e v e r , a m id s t th e disappointm ents o f the revolutionary expectations o f the 1960s a t hom e and abroad (especially in M ao ’s C h in a), in the guise o f la nouvelle philosophie they had becom e virulently an ti-M arxist. If one secret o f A lth u sser ’s original success was his conjugation o f the classical and the contem porary and his left-wing C om m unism , w hich togeth er seem ingly imparted an actuality to theoretical M arxism , he was now trebly vulnerable— as a Com m unist, as a M arxist, and as a structural-M arxist— to generalized Parisian suspicion o f the intellectual pretensions (let alone political intentions) o f social science and of m odernity ’s grande histoire o f hum an em ancipation.

A lthusser was not unaffected by these developm ents. In the late 1970s h is w ork w as in fec ted w ith sk e p t ic ism about th e s ta tu s o f h is to r ic a l m a te r ia lism . In c re a s in g ly iso la te d d u r in g th e P C F ’s f l ir ta t io n w ith Eurocomm unism, his defence o f the dictatorship o f the proletariat (1977) was the la st th e o re tica lly co n fid e n t p iece from h is pen . S o o n h e was proclaim ing a “crisis o f M arxism ” (1978b an d 1978c), for whose resolution he looked to popular political practice. T h e failure o f one such practice, with the defeat o f the U n ion o f the Left at the polls in the spring o f 1978, w as recogn ized for th e g riev o u s h is to r ic a l se tb a ck it w as, an d in c ite d A lthusser to the assault on the Sta lin ist legacy within h is party (1978a) with which his career effectively ended.

T en years on, the crisis o f M arxism can be seen to have endured and deepened. M oreover, it is now only a sub-set o f a general crisis o f working- c la ss p o l i t ic s in its t r a d i t io n a l fo rm s (so c ia l-d e m o c ra c y , so c ia l ism , com m unism ), organizations (the Secon d and T h ird Internationals, trade- union m ovem ents, etc .), and ideologies. T h e tw entieth anniversary o f 1968, widely heralded a t the tim e as a return o f the repressed revolutionary project to the W est, serves only to underscore the extent to w hich the French M ay was “less the portent o f the future th an the high point o f an h istorical era of unfulfilled hopes” (Jay, 1984: 359). It is the less surprising that A lthusserian Marxism, com m itted to that project, has been marginalized, or supplanted, am on g p rogre ssiv e in te lle c tu a ls , by p o st-stru c tu ra lism , m odern ism , or analytical M arxism . Indeed, A lth usserian ism can appear “very dated and, like the Beatles’ music or G o dard ’s first films, inevitably evokes a recent but vanished past” (Ferry and Renaut, 1985: 200).

Perhaps this is the ultim ate poin t in A lth ussér’s solitude (cf. 1988: 474): the fac t th a t h e o c c u p ie d a u n iq u e an d p re c a r io u s p la c e in m o d ern


in te llec tu a l h istory betw een a trad itio n o f M arxism w hich he rad ically critic ized and sough t to re co n stru ct, an d a “p o st-M arx ism ” w h ich has submerged its predecessor, and in w h ich the class o f ‘68 has found its self- image. For in its critique o f Englightenm ent M arxism , its anti-evolutionism and an ti-h um an ism , A lth u sser ian M arx ism proved to be a tran sitio n a l fo rm a tio n , the p ro d u c t o f a very sp e c if ic t h e o r e t ic a l an d p o l i t ic a l con juncture whose m utation h e lp s to exp lain its fate. T h us inscribed in history, A lthusser is restored to his solitude.

T o say th is is n ot to accept the prevalent evaluation o f A lthusser’s work; or to deny a considerable A lth usserian influence, in particu lar areas, on current in te llec tu a l work (n o tw ith stan d in g am n esia and settlem en ts of accoun ts); or even to suggest that A lth usser’s writings cannot contribute to d ay (fa r fro m it ) . It is to ta k e se r io u sly th e o r ig in a l a m b it io n o f A lth u sse r ia n ism , as a re c o n stru c tio n o f M arx ism , not to fa sh io n the scientific sociology and epistemology, but as a political enterprise aspiring to “help put som e substance back into the revolutionary project here in the W est”— and the failure, in its own tim e, o f that am bition. T h is would be A lth u sse r ’s fin al so litude (cf. 1988: 47 8 -9 ). L ike M ach iav elli, A lth u sser knew th a t if his thought contributed to the m aking of history, he w ould no longer be there; nor did this in tellectual believe that in tellectuals m ade history. A n d he also h ad said— and stood for— too much n ot to be repressed in the afterm ath o f a history w hich proved so unexpectedly resistant to the m aking of history by the exploited and oppressed. In the last instance, no other system o f th ou gh t, how ever c lose to his by its re jec tio n s and its position, could save him from his solitude— only the em ancipatory practice he endeavoured to aid. A s for us, faced with the crisis o f M arxism , we can thank Louis A lthusser, am on g others, for the fact that we are not alone.

W orks Cited

A lth u sser , Louis ( 19 5 3 a) “A p ro p o s du m arx ism e,” Revue de l’enseignement philosophique 3,4-

A lth u sse r , L o u is (1 9 5 3 b ) “ N o te sur le m a té r ia lism e d ia le c t iq u e ,” R evue de l ’enseignem ent philosophique 3 ,5 .

A lth u sse r , L o u is (1 9 5 5 ) “ S u r l ’o b je c t iv ité d e l 'h is to ir e ( le ttre à P au l R ic o e u r ) ,” Revue de l’enseignement philosophique 5,4-

A tlh u sser , L ou is (1 9 6 5 ) “T h éo r ie , p ratique th éo riq u e e t fo rm ation théorique. Id éo logie et lu tte id éo lo g iq u e ,” u n pu b lish ed m an u scrip t (E n glish tran sla tio n in A lth u sser [1989]).

A lth u s se r , L o u is (1 9 6 6 a ) “ M a té r ia l ism e h is to r iq u e e t M a té r ia l ism e d ia le c t iq u e ,” C ah ie rs marxistes-léninistes 11.

A tlh usser, Louis (1 9 6 6 b ) “S u r la rév o lu tio n cu ltu re lle ,” Cahiers marxistes-léninistes 14.

A lth u sse r , Louis (1 9 6 7 ) “ S u r le t ra v a il th é o r iq u e . D ifficu lté s et re so u rce s ,” L a Pensée 132 (English tran slation in A lth u sse r [1989]).

A lth usser, L ou is (1 9 6 8 ) “L én in e e t la p h ilo so p h ie ,” Bulletin de la Société française de Philosophie

.4- .

-A lthusser, Louis (1 9 6 9 a ) For M arx , H arm on dsw orth : A llen L an e .

A lth u sser , Lou is (1 9 6 9 b ) D e la S u perstru ctu re : D roit - E tat - Idéologie, u n pu b lish ed m an uscrip t.

A lth usser, L ou is' (1971 ) Lenin a n d Philosophy an d O ther E ssay s, L o n d o n : N L B .

A lth usser, L o u is (1 9 7 2 ) Politics and History— M ontesquieu, Rousseau, Hegel and M a rx , L o n d o n :

N LB .

A lth usser, L ou is (1 9 7 4 ) Philosophie et philosophie spontanée des savan ts, Paris: M aspero (En glish translation in A lth u sse r [1989]).

A lth u sser, Lou is (1 9 7 6 a ) Essays in Self-Criticism , L o n d o n : N L B .

A lth u sser, L o u is (1 9 7 6 a ) L a Transform aciôn de la filosofia, G ran ad a : U n iv ersid ad de G ran ad a (English tran slatio n in A lth u sser [1989]).

A lth usser, Lou is (1 9 7 6 c ) Positions, Paris: E d itio n s S o c ia le s .

A lth usser, L ou is (1 9 7 7 ) O n th e T w e n ty -S e c o n d C o n g re ss o f the Fren ch C o m m u n ist P arty ,” N ew Left Review 104.

A lth usser, L o u is (1 9 7 8 a ) “ W h a t M u st C h a n g e in th e P arty ,” N e w Left Review 109.

A lth usser, L ou is (1 9 7 8 b ) “T h e C ris is o f M arx ism ,” M arxism Today July.

A lth u sser , L o u is (1 9 7 8 c ) “ Il m a rx ism o o g g i,” Q u el ehe deve cam biare nel partito com m unista, M ilan : G arzan ti (E n glish tran slatio n in A lth u sser [1989]).

A lth u sser, L o u is ( 1988) “M a c h ia v e lli ’s S o litu d e ,” Econom y and Society, N o v em b er.

A lth u sser , L o u is (1 9 8 9 ) Philosophy an d the Spontan eou s Philosophy o f the Scientists & O ther Essays, L o n d o n : V erso.

A lth u sser , L . et al. (1 9 6 5 ) Lire le C ap ita l, (2 v o ls .) , Paris: M aspero .

A lth u sser, L ou is an d B alibar, E tien n e (1 9 7 0 ) R ead in gC ap ita l, L o n d o n : N LB .

Balibar, E tien n e and M acherey , Pierre (1 9 8 2 ) Interview , Diacritics 12.

B en ton , T e d ( 1984) The Rise an d Fall o f S tructu ral M arx ism , L o n d o n : M acm illan .

D esan ti, D o m in iqu e (1 9 8 5 ) Les Staliniens, Paris: M arab ou t.

D escom bes, V in c e n t (1981 ) M odem French Philosophy, C am b rid g e : C am b rid ge U n iversity Press.

Dew s, P eter (1 9 8 0 ) “S tru c tu ra lism an d th e F ren ch E p iste m o lo g ica l T ra d it io n ,” u n pu b lish ed m anuscript.

Elliott, G regory (1 9 8 7 ) Althusser: The D etour o fT h eory , L o n d o n : V erso.

Ferry, Luc an d R en au t, A la in (1 9 8 5 ) L a Pensée 68 , Paris: G allim ard .

G ram sci, A n to n io (1 9 7 7 ) Selections from the Political Writings 1 9 1 0 -1 9 2 0 , L o n d o n : L aw ren ce and W ishart.

G u itto n , Je a n (1 9 8 7 ) “U n d o cu m en t Je a n G u it to n ,” Lire.


H irst, P au l (1 9 7 9 ) O n L aw an d ideology, L o n d o n : M acm illan .

H obsbaw m , E.J. (1 9 8 2 ) Revolutionaries, L o n d o n : Q u arte t.

Jam e so n , F red ric (1 9 8 1 ) T h e Political U nconscious, L o n d o n : M eth uen .

Jay , M artin (1 9 8 4 ) M arxism an d Totality, C am b rid ge : Polity;

L a c a n , Ja c q u e s (1 9 7 7 ) The F o u r Fun dam en tal C on cep ts o f P sychoanaly sis, H a rm o n d sw o rth : P en gu in .

M ac c io cc h i, M aria -A n to n ie tta (1 9 7 3 ) Letters F rom inside the Italian C om m unist Party to Louis A lthusser, L o n d o n : N L B .

M arx , K arl (1 9 7 5 ) Early W ritings, H arm on dsw orth : P en gu in .

P éch eu x , M ich e l (1 9 8 2 ) Language, Sem an ticsan d Ideology, L o n d o n : M acm illan .

R o u d in esco , E lisab eth ( 1986) L a Bataille de cent an s— Histoire de la psychanalyse en F ran ce, Paris: S eu il.

S a r tre , Je a n P au l (1 9 6 9 ) The Spectre o f Stalin, London: H am ish H am ilton .

Sa rtre , Je a n P au l (1 9 7 6 ) Critique o f Dialectical Reason, L o n d o n : N L B .

S ta l in , J. V . ( 1941 ) Dialectical and Historical M aterialism , M osco w : F o re ig n L an gu ag es P u b lish in g H ou se .

3 6 THE A LTH USSERIAN LEGACY


Notes

1 S e e , fo r ex am p le , A lth u sser an d B alib ar 1970 : 27 an d cf. the gestu res tow ards M arx ’s genius in , fo r ex am p le , A lth u sse r 1969a: 65 an d 1971 : 9 (an d ev en tow ards E n gels in A lth u sser an d B a l ib a r 1 9 7 0 : 1 4 8 - 4 9 ) . T h e se “ h u m a n is t ” re s id u e s in a n oeuvre d e d ic a te d to th e ir expürictîôft‘ from M arx ism dou btless derive from A lth u sse r ’s e lisio n o f two d istin c t p roposition s: v iz , re jectio n o f the co n stitu tive su b ject an d re jec tio n o f in d ep en d en t h u m an agen cy tout court in sc ien tific p ractice . S ee B en to n 1984 : 43-5.

2 C f . A lth u sser 1969a: 114; 1971 : 136 ; 1976a: 39, 169 , 173; A lth u sser an d B alibar

1 9 7 0 :5 3 .3 S e e R o u d in esco 1986 : 3 85 . Indeed, L a c a n h ad been censured by th e In tern ation al

P sy c h o a n a ly t ic a l A s s o c ia t io n an d his t e a c h in g b an n ed by th e F re n c h P sy c h o a n a ly t ic a l A sso c ia tio n in 1963 in response. S ign ifican tly , in h is first sem in ar thereafter h e w as to in voke the e x co m m u n ic a tio n o f Sp ino za (1 9 7 7 : 3 -4 )— ’’ce t E x c lu U n iv e r se l ,” in A lth u sse r ’s w ords (1969b : 109). A lth u sser ’s p art in fac ilita tin g tran sfer o f L a c a n ’s sem in ar to th e E co le N o rm ale Supérieure, an d th e role o f h is essay o f 1964 , “Freud an d L a c a n ,” in th e d iffusion o f p sy ch o analysis in France, are u n derlin ed by R o u d in esco .

4 T h e .re c o lle c tio n o f fo rm er lead in g P C F in te lle c tu a l, Je a n -T o u ssa in t D e sa n ti, in D esanti 1985 : 510.

5 Q u o ted fro m Le N ouvel O bservateur in Radical Philosophy 12, W inter 1975 , p . 44·6 S e e D ew s 1 9 8 0 : 19 ; an d E l l io t t 1 9 8 7 : 53 n .1 0 3 fo r r e fe r e n c e s to C o m t e in

A lth u sserian texts.7 P rior to h is ad m ission o f Sp in o z ism in h is “ ‘E le m e n ts o f S e lf- C r it ic ism ” o f 1974

(1976 : 132-41). A lth u sser h a d tak en th e opportu n ity o f h is lecture on “L en in a n d P h ilo so ph y” to the S o c ié té fran çaise de p h ilosoph ie to co n fid e to an in terlocutor: “P eo p le alw ays situ ate them selves in re la tio n to so m eo ne . B u t my referen ce p o in t w ou ld be n e ith e r K an t nor H ege l; it w ould be Spinoza.. .I’m a S p in o z ist” (1 9 6 8 : 164 ). In a letter d a tin g from 1974 recen tly publish ed by Jean G u itton , A lth u sse r is q u o ted as say ing th at “o f all p h ilo so ph ers, S p in oza is truly an d in com parably the greatest” (G u ittn , 1987 : 87 ).

8 S e e A lth u sse r ’s co m m e n ts i n '1971: 178-79 an d h is rem arks w hen rep rin tin g “Freud an d L a c a n ” (1 9 7 6 c : 7).

9 For A lth u sser ’s su b-d iv ision s o f M arx ’s oeuvre, see 1969a: 31-8.10 A c c o r d in g to h is su c c e s so r as th e P C F ’s p h ilo so p h ic a l a u th o r ity , L u c ie n S è v e ,

G araudy it w as w ho vetoed th e p u b lic a tio n o f P our M a rx an d Lire le C ap ita l by th e P arty ’s im prin t, E d itio n s S o c ia le s , in 1965 ; see L ’H um anité, 24 A p ril 1976 an d Le M onde, 25 -26 , A p ril 1976.

11 S e e C ahiers du C om m unism e 5-6, 1966 , “ D é b a ts sur le s p ro b lèm es id éo log iq u es et cu lturels,” co n ta in in g the in terven tion s m ade at the C e n tra l C o m m itte e m eetin g a t A rgen teu il in M arc h 1966— especially G en era l S e cre ta ry W ald e c k -R o c h e t ’s “Le m arxism e et les ch em in s de l’a v e n ir .”

Alex Callinicos

What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Althusser

W ho reads A lthusser now? Even before personal tragedy silenced him Althusser had ceased to attract— to the extent that he had ever enjoyed - the attention accorded Parisian maîtres à penser— first Sartre and Merleau- Ponty, then Lévi-Strauss and Lacan , m ore recently D errida and Foucault, now Lyotard and Baudrillard. T h e ultim ate put-down cam e in Luc Ferry’s and A lain R en au t’s exp lanation for why they largely ignored A lthusser in their study o f La pensée 68, the French anti-hum anism o f the 1960s and 1970s: “A lthusserian ism ... seem s very dated and irresistibly evokes, like the Beatles’ music or G o dard ’s first film , a recent but van ished past.” (Ferry and Renaut, 1985, p. 200)

T his is hardly an argum ent likely to recom m end itself to som eone who has seen the way in which, in B ritain at least, rubbish ing the 1960s in general and 1968 in particular is one o f the favorite themes o f the N ew Right— and indeed o f those on th e left busy writing th e class struggle out o f socialism . N o r is the appeal to fashion to settle w hich philosophers merit study calcu lated to contribute to the restoration o f intellectual standards after the depredations of N ietzschean irrationalism w hich Ferry and R enaut are o ste n sib ly co m m itted to a c h ie v in g . T h e g e n e ra l c o n sig n m e n t o f A lthusser to the dustbin of h istory is a powerful tem ptation to em phasize his merits, a tem ptation to w hich I succum b in what follows.

It is, however, w orth pausing a m om ent at Ferry’s and R en au t’s book, which is a m uch m ore serious and substantial work than the lam entable passage cited above m ight suggest. T h ey shrewdly n ote a ch aracteristic oscillation in La pensée 68, for exam ple in Foucault:

T h e cen tra l thesis o f the Histoire de la folie suffers from a carefully controlled am biguity concerning the identity o f th at constituting the m otor o f the process o f exclusion . Som etim es, in accordance with the p h i lo s o p h ic a l a u t h o r i t ie s a c c e p te d by F o u c a u lt (H e id e g g e r + N ie tz sch e), the h istory o f m ad n ess’s exc lu sion seem s to h ave been a ch ie v e d by the d e p lo y m en t o f re a so n as su ch , from its c la ss ic a l em ergence to its m odern co m p letion in the reign o f tech n o logy ... S o m e tim e s , a b a n d o n in g th is N ie tz sc h e o -H e id e g g e r ia n re g is te r ,


Foucault suggests that the m otor o f this exclusion o f m adness is none other than the developm ent o f the productive forces, in other words the grow th o f capitalism . (1985, pp. 113-14)

W h ile th e first “ re g is te r” is ev id e n t in F o u c a u lt ’s “ a p o lo g ia o f the irra tio n a l” at the en d o f th e Histoire de la folie, the secon d issues in “ a c r it iq u e o f the te c h n o -e co n o m ic r a t io n a liz a t io n so u gh t by b o u rgeo is society, b u t it is a m atter in this case o f denouncing a pseudo-rationality in th e n am e o f a m ore d e v e lo p e d ra t io n a l i ty , c o n c e iv e d as g e n u in e ly em ancipatory” (Ferry and R enaut, 1985, pp. 115-16). Ferry and R enaut argue th at “it is by constan tly playing on these two tableaux (th at o f a N ietzscheo-H eideggerian critique o f reason in the nam e o f the ‘w ithout- reason ’ [sans-raison], th at is, o f the irration al, and th at o f a critiqu e o f bourgeois rationality in the nam e, if on ly implicitly, o f anoth er rationality) that the possibility is preserved o f an “objective alliance,” beyond surface p o le m ic s , b e tw een F o u c a u lt and B o u rd ie u , or b e tw een D e rr id a and A lth usser. But, it is ju st th is rally in g o f ten d en c ies th at are profoundly heterogeneous, and in the last instance incom patible, that m ade possible, despite the cleavages, the birth and survival o f a “pensée 68 ’” (ibid., p. 118).

W hatever reservations one m ight have about the ideal type Ferry and R enaut construct of French anti-hum anism (it is, for exam ple, too simple to ca ll Foucault an irration alist), let a lone about the liberal-dem ocratic alternative with which they seem to replace it, they have, in my opin ion, correctly identified the “a llian ce” betw een M arx and N ietzsche w hich som e French philosophers sought, w ith vary ing degrees o f conviction , to achieve in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It is evident in the genuflections to M arxism m ade by D errida and Foucault in interviews o f the early 1970s, in the extensive (though eccentric) use o f M arx by Deleuze and G u attari in I’Anti-Oedipe, and in A lth usser’s own writing— not sim ply in the favorable references he m akes, for exam ple, to D errida (1 9 7 0 , p. 184), bu t m ore substantively in the influence o f N ietzsch e ’s and H eidegger’s critiques o f W estern m etaphysics on his thought. D om inique Lecourt, fo r instance, has described the first essay in Reading Capital, whose opening pages invoke the “m aste rs o f su sp ic io n ”— n o t ju st M a rx , but a lso N ie tz sc h e and Freud (A lth u sser an d B alib ar 1968, p. 16), as “m an ifestly draw ing in sp iration from H eidegger” (1982 , p. 63 ). T h is blurring o f th e boundaries betw een M arxism and the tradition stem m ing from N ietzsche helps to exp lain the w idespread reception o f French anti-hum anism (A lthusser included) by a W estern in telligen tsia radicalized by ‘68 and search in g for soph isticated tools for the critica l analysis o f the dom in an t culture.

W HAT IS LIVING AND W HAT IS DEAD 41

Th e story o f the subsequent Parisian “crisis o f M arxism ” is that o f how— in a p o litica l clim ate w hich no lon ger seem ed to offer the prospects o f instant revolution w hich m any entertained at the end o f the 1960s— it becam e c le ar th at M arx and N ie tz sc h e were indeed in co m p atib le . A discourse reducing rationality and subjectiv ity tout court to instances o f the will to power traversing the social and natural worlds could not be married to historical m aterialism , w hich uses the procedures o f theoretical inquiry f a sh io n e d by th e p h y s ic a l s c ie n c e s to a n a ly z e p r o c e s s e s o f s o c ia l transform ation, and w hich sees the developm ent o f the productive forces to w hich the a p p lic a tio n o f th e se p rocedu res in creasin g ly co n trib u te s as actually destructive but expand in g the possib ilities o f hum an liberation. M arxism m ay not, as E tien n e B alibar has argued (1978) , be a rationalism , but it is certainly not an irrationalism .

M arxism .nevertheless lost the contest with N ietzscheanism in the late 1970s. T h is was fundam entally for political reasons. V arious factors— the reflux o f class struggle in the W est after the great upturn o f 1968-76, the crisis of the C om m unist Parties, caught betw een “really existing socialism ” and a re invigorated social dem ocracy, the d isin tegration o f M aoism (see H arm an 1988, esp. ch. 16)— underm ined th e confidence o f m any w ho yet rem ained M arxists in th e v iab ility o f th e socialist p roject. Gregory Elliott has detected such a failure o f nerve in A lth u sser 's writings o f the later 1970s (1987 , ch. 6). R e p ack age d fo r the A m erican m arket as “poststructur- alism,” the writings o f the m ajor French N ietzscheans— Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze— could now be consum ed in a depoliticized form as sim ply the la te st in te llec tu a l sty le, a d ev e lo p m en t foresh adow ed by the acad em ic appropriation o f Derrida by the Yale D econstruction ists and whose latest, degenerate phase can be seen in the current “postm odernist” craze w hich has p rom oted such epigoni as Lyotard and B au drillard far beyond their intellectual merits.

A lth usser’s eclipse can not, however, be put down sim ply to changes in the p o lit ic a l co n ju n c tu re an d the acad em ic m ark et. T h ere were also in tern al co n cep tu a l reason s w h ich h ave been u nderlined by su ccessive cr itiq u es (G lu c k sm a n n 1 9 67 ; G e ra s 1 972 ; C a ll in ic o s 1976 an d 1982; H indess and H irst 1977; T h om pson 1978; A nderson 1980; Benton 1984; E lliott 1987). W hat is interesting is how often the well-known aporias of A lth usser’s system stem from his attem pt to use what Ferry and Renaut call “ N ie tz sc h e o - H e id e g g e r ia n ” th e m e s to re c o n stru c t M a rx ism . T h u s , incorporating difference— a concept key both to H eidegger and to the Paris N ietzsch ean s— in to the M arx ist d ia lectic by m eans o f such con cepts as o v e rd e te rm in a t io n led to a c o lla p se in to p lu ra lism ; c o n c e p tu a liz in g su b je c t iv ity as a “ fo rm ” im po sed on in d iv id u a l a g en ts by id e o lo g ic a l


relations rendered it mysterious how, as A lthusser also argued, “the masses m ake h isto ry ,” and en couraged accep tan ce o f a fu n ctio n alist theory o f ideology; developing an account o f the sciences w hich in its insistence that in d iv id u al th e o re tica l d iscou rses in v o lv e th eir ow n cr iter ia o f v a lid ity denied the possibility o f any general dem arcation betw een science and non- sc ie n c e th e re b y u n d e rm in e d any a t te m p t to d e fe n d the c e le b ra te d distinction betw een science and ideology from the N ietzschean reduction o f every knowledge to a form o f the will to power. T h a t once notorious pair Barry H indess and Paul H irst did at least have the m erit o f ruthlessly dem onstrating, on their way to Fabianism , the inconsistency o f A lth usser’s own theoretical postulates.

It is tem pting to see this episode from the perspective o f the co n tem porary debate about m odernity. H aberm as argues th at this debate has not in fact m oved on sin ce the tim e o f the Young H eg e lian s, w hen three d e fin itiv e re sp o n ses were m ade to H e g e l ’s a tte m p t to p ro v id e a self- understanding o f m odernity in terms o f the workings o f an absolute reason subtending the individual subject. M arx and the H egelian left “argued for revolution , aim ed at m obilizing the historically accum ulated poten tial of reason (a w aitin g re lease ) aga in st its m u tila tio n , aga in st the on e-sided rationalization o f the bourgeois world.” (1985, p. 56) T h e H egelian right se ttled fo r ex istin g so ciety as the best a v a ilab le em bodim en t o f reason (H aberm as does n ot m en tion him, but Parsons an d the k ind o f conception o f m odernity he represents seem a better exam ple o f this response than the G e rm a n n e o - c o n se r v a t iv e s h e d is c u s se s ) . N ie tz sc h e “ re m o v ed th e d ialectical thorn from the critique o f a reason centered o n the subject and shrivelled into purposive rationality; and he related to reason as a whole the way the Young H egelians did to its sublim ations: Reason is nothing else th an power, th an the will to power, w hich it so radiantly conceals.” (loc. cit.)

From th is p ersp ectiv e A lth u sse r ’s m istak e was to try to recon stru ct M arxism , w h ich involves w h at Ferry an d R en au t ca ll “ a m ore developed ra tio n a lity [th an bou rgeo is Zweckrationalitaat], co n ce iv ed as gen u in ely e m a n c ip a to ry ,” by d raw in g .on th em es derived fro m th e N ie tz sc h e a n critique o f reason tout court. H aberm as by contrast rightly argues that any project com m itted to what M arx called “hum an em ancipation ” must place itse lf in the tradition o f the “radicalized E n lighten m en t” (1986 , p. 158). N e v e r th e le ss , h is own a tte m p t to re fo rm u late w hat h e regards a s the enduring insights o f h istorical m aterialism on the basis o f the con cept o f com m unicative action seem s to me profoundly problem atic (see C allin ico s 19 8 9 b , ch . 4 ) . A t th e sam e tim e, d e sp ite th e m ista k en c o n c e ss io n s A lthusser m ade to the N ietzschean variant o f th e C ounter-Enlightenm ent,


his thought has certain enduring strengths w hich m ake it an indispensable part o f any attem pt to continue the M arxist tradition. I shall try to bring out these strengths, in part by com paring them with what H aberm as has to say on the relevant subjects.

In the first place, A lth u sser ’s critique o f any attem pt to base historical m aterialism on the conceptual structures o f H egelian thought is, in my view, absolutely definitive. “C on trad iction and O verdeterm ination ,” “T h e O bject o f Capital," and, in some ways most cogently, “M arx ’s R elation to H egel,” dem olish the idea that H egel’s d ialectical method can be separated from h is id e a lis t sy stem . T h e re h a v e , o f co u rse , b een o th er M arx ist opponents o f H egel, but n o n e form ulated th e d ifferences betw een the H egelian and M arxist d ia lectics w ith the sam e clarity and m etaphysical insight as A lth usser. T h e one to com e closest to doing so— A dorno— was never able fully to escape the circle o f H egelian concepts, since his own account o f capitalism was heavily indebted to the masterwork o f H egelian M arxism , History and C lass Consciousness.

A lth usser’s dem onstration that a genuinely m aterialist theory o f history could n ot m ake use o f such H eg e lian co n ce p ts as the n ega tio n o f the negation has had consequ en ces w hich have outlasted the eclipse o f his school. T h e m ost philosophically fertile contem porary current o f M arxist thought is w ithout a doubt the analytical M arxism o f G .A . C oh en , Jon E lster, Jo h n R oem er, Erik O lin W right, and o th ers. But the k in ds o f questions they have pursued arè ones w hich only becom e pressing once a H egelian fram ew ork is ab an d on ed . T h us the debate over the re lative weight o f fun ction al an d ration al-ch o ice exp lan atio n s in accoun tin g for h istorical processes presupposes that M arxism can no longer rely on any variant o f H egelianism , whether it take the objectivist form of D iam at or the subjectivist form of post-1917 “historicism ” (Lukàcs, G ram sci, K orsch). S im ila r ly , th e p re o c cu p a tio n o f a n a ly t ic a l M a rx is ts w ith th e issue o f whether M a rx ’s theory o f exp lo itation involves or requires a principle o f justice is sym ptom atic o f the problem s which arise once one cannot rely on a H egelian teleology interw eaving fact and value into a seam less garm ent. T h ere is, then, quite a strong sense in w hich analytical M arxism is post- A lthusserian M arxism . (See C allin ico s 1989a.)

A lth u s se r ’s cr itiq u e o f H e g e lia n M arx ism has im p lica tio n s for the contem porary debate about m odernity. For one thing, a m ain corollary o f his argum ent, th e distinction betw een expressive an d com plex totalities, is o f direct relevance to argum ents raised by attacks on “totalizing” thought. M any o f these attacks, typically o f ultim ately N ietzschean inspiration, are little more than confused and inconsistent rejections o f any form o f general theory (see , for exam p le , P atto n 1 9 8 8 ). But A lth u sse r ’s gen ealogy o f


com plex to ta lity , his dem on stration th at th e best M arx ist th ou gh t has sought to understand social form ations sim ultaneously as concrete wholes and as m ultip licities o f determ inations, provides an im portant rebuttal o f the argum ent that any totalization necessarily involves the eradication of d ifferen ce. I h ave already in d icated th at h is own p o sitiv e accou n t of com plex totality , developed through such concepts as overdeterm ination and stru c tu ra l c a u sa lity , is u n sa t is fa c to r y . Its fa u lt s a re , h o w ev er , rem ediable, as I have tried to show elsewhere, particularly once we see that co n ce iv in g a so c ia l form ation as a m u ltip licity is not in con sisten t with recogn izin g a hierarchy o f de term in ation w h ich m ateria list exp lan a tio n seeks to respect (see C allin ico s 1982, chs. 5-7). I know th a t ta lk about hierarchies these days is held to be in bad political taste, but a social theory which does not attend to the relative causal weight o f different practices, institutions, and agen ts is strategically w orthless and conceptually empty.

A lth u sse r ’s c ritiqu e o f H eg e lian ism is re le v an t to the debate abou t m odern ity in an o th er respect. H e argues th a t the d ec isiv e d ifferen ce betw een M arx an d H egel is th at the latter conceives h istory ideologically , as the process o f self-realization o f the A bsolute Idea. T h e paradox is that the subject o f this process— the A b so lu te— is identical with the circular structure o f the dialectic: th at is why there can be no separation between H egel’s m ethod and system— the m ethod is the system. T h is clearly has a bearing on w hat is for Haberm as the central question in the discourse o f modernity, the relation betw een history and reason. In what sense is history the em b o d im en t o f reason once we h a v e ab a n d o n ed the te le o lo g ic a l H egelian dialectic? H aberm as’s answer lies partly in following W eber and Parsons in seeing the differentiation into distinct “sub-systems” (econom y, polity, etc.) as a form o f genuine, albeit one-sided rationalization, and partly in tracing the developm ent o f a broader form o f com m unicative rationality: thus, “even modern, largely decentred societies m aintain in their everyday com m unicative action a virtual centre o f self-understanding” (1985, p. 359). Passages such as this one suggest that despite his frequent attacks o n the “philosophy o f consciousness” Haberm as still tends to conceive society as a m acro-subject, an interpretation encouraged by his propensity to assim ilate social developm ent to individual learning processes (see H aberm as 1979). A lth u s se r ’s re je c t io n o f H eg e l lead s h im , u n d er th e in flu e n ce o f the “N ietzscheo-H eideggerian” tradition, to th e opposite extrem e o f conceiving history as “a process without a subject,” rendering individual or collective agency mysterious. T h e rational kernel this approach nevertheless contains lies in the insistence th at social theory centers on uncovering the objective stru ctu res w hich en ab le or im pede ch an ge ra th er th an o n trac in g , as Haberm as does, the self-differentiation o f com m unicative action.


T h is m ay be ju st a w ay o f say in g th a t A lth u sse r rem ain ed a fa ir ly orthodox M arx ist, w hile H aberm as is n ot. H ere lies A lth u sser’s second m ajor ach ievem en t, nam ely th a t Reading C apital in particu lar, in Perry A n d erson ’s words, “pioneered closer theoretical scrutiny o f the can on s o f h istorical m aterialism ” (1980 , p. 65 ). T o com pare A lth usser’s and B alibar’s discussions o f the concepts im bricated in that o f m ode o f production with the m ost so p h istica ted co n tribution s o f earlier M arx ist philosophers — L u k âc s an d S id n e y H o o k , fo r e x a m p le — is to be c o n fro n te d w ith a quantum -leap in the level o f conceptual precision and attention to detail. A fu n d am en ta l w eakn ess o f all H a b e rm as’s c r it ic a l d iscu ssio n s o f the “production paradigm ” in M arxism , from “Labour an d Interaction” to The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity, con sists in his com plete incom prehension o f the concept o f production relations— on w hich A lthusser and Balibar focus— and his consequent coun ter-position o f instrum ental and c o m m u n ic a t iv e a c t io n w ith o u t any u n d e r s ta n d in g o f the e s se n t ia l m ediating role assigned by h istorical m aterialism to the social relations of effective control over the productive forces and the forms o f exp loitation and class struggle to which they give rise.

T o stress the im portance o f A lth u sse r ’s an d B a lib ar ’s an alyses o f the basic concepts o f h istorical m aterialism is n o t o f course to assert th a t they are unproblem atic. M ost obviously, A lthusser and his collaborators— no doubt in part because o f the in fluence on them o f M ao ism — tended to assign cau sa l p rim acy to p rod u ction re la tion s, redu cin g the p rodu ctive forces to m ere effects— a theoretical m ove whose disastrous consequences are am ply dem onstrated by the first two volum es o f C harles B ette lh eim ’s Class Struggles in the U SSR . In this respect C o h e n ’s Karl M arx ’s Theory of History, w ith the explanatory prim acy it accords to the developm ent of the p ro d u ctiv e fo rces, is the n ece ssary co u n terw e igh t to Reading C ap ita l. C ohen, in the preface to his book, acknow ledges the influence o f For M arx and praises B a lib a r ’s co n tr ib u tio n to Reading C ap ita l bu t critic izes the obscurity o f the A lth usserian idiom , preferring log ica l positiv ism for “ its in sisten ce on p rec is ion o f in te llec tu a l co m m itm en t” (1 9 7 8 , x ) . But if analytical M arxism has, as its nam e suggests, chosen to express itself in a vocabulary derived from the dom inant form s o f twentieth-century English- speaking philosophy, it has continued the project initiated by A lthusser, nam ely , in th e w ords o f W righ t (h im se lf a form er A lth u sse r ia n ), “the sy stem atic in te rro g a tio n an d c la r if ic a tio n o f b a sic co n cep ts an d th eir reconstruction in to a more coherent theoretical structure” (1985, p. 2). In this sense also , analytical M arxism is post-A lthusserian M arxism , exploring a theoretical space created by the dem olition o f H egelianism .

46 THE ALTHUSSER.IAN LEGACY

T h is is not to gloss over the real differences betw een A lthusser and the a n a ly tic a l M arx ists , w h ich co n cern m atters o f su b stan ce as w ell as o f p h ilo sop h ical idiom. I shall refer merely to one issue, where the m erits seem to lie m ore with A lth usser than with the an aly tical M arxists. O ne reaso n for the la t te r ’s w illin gn ess to em ploy co n ce p ts and p rocedu res derived from an aly tica l ph ilo sophy an d from m ain stream so cial sc ience (ration al-ch oice theory, for exam ple) is th e belief they tend to share that there is no d istinctive M arxist m ethod (see, for exam ple, Levine 1986, p. 728 n. 2 5 ). A s a re jection o f the exaggerated and u ltim ately form alist iden tification o f M arxism with m ethod whose m ost extrem e exam ple is p rov ided by History and C lass C onsciousness, but w hich was also qu ite com m on during the heyday o f A lthusserian ism (the classic case is H indess’ and H irst’s Precapitalist M odes o f Production, rapidly consum ed by an au toc r it iq u e w h ic h r e f le c te d , a m o n g o th e r th in g s , a k in d o f fren zy o f m ethodological purity), this eclecticism is com prehensible. But it carries with it the danger, m ost fully realized in E lster’s an d R oem er’s work, o f so fra g m e n tin g M arx ism as to deprive it o f any d is t in c t id en tity , w hose consequences are evident in th e wholesale collapse o f analytical M arxism into variants o f social dem ocracy. In this respect, A lth u sser’s insistence, m ost obviously by m eans o f the concepts o f prob lem atic and epistem o- lo g ica l break, that M arx ism is a th e o re tica l d iscou rse ch aracterized by certain system atic properties whose rem oval would lead to its dissolution retains its im portance.

T h ese concepts fin d their place within A lth usser’s third m ain contribution, nam ely his attem pt to situate M arxist theory within a general, an tiem p iric ist an d n o n -p o sit iv is t p h ilo so p h y o f sc ie n ce . He was ab le , in se ek in g to e sta b lish the sc ie n tific ity o f M arx , to draw on the F ren ch ‘ep istem ological’ tradition o f Bachelard, C availlés an d C anguilhem , whose significance lay in the project o f continuing C o m te ’s program o f a history o f the sciences, but one which gave prim acy to the conceptual elaboration of sc ien tific d iscou rses rather than to th eir im m ediate co rrespon d en ce to sen se-exp erien ce (even w hen p h en om en o lo g ica lly redu ced ). A lth u sser took over various Bachelardian themes, transposing the idea th a t a science constitutes itself by breaking with com m on sense into the con cept o f an epistem ological beak betw een science and ideology. H is own epistem ology, o f co u rse , h as its stre n g th s an d w eak n esse s. T h u s th e m u ch -d erid ed distinction betw een real and thought-object m eets o n e requirem ent for any r e a l i s t a c c o u n t o f s c ie n c e , n a m e ly t h a t th e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s characteristic o f a science are likely to differ sharply form those concepts which correspond directly to im m ediate experience. A lthusser’s insistence, how ever, on the self-validating character o f th eoretical discourses prevents


: him from giving due weight to another such requirem ent, nam ely the need for some criterion by m eans o f which it is possible to establish an — at least approxim ate— corresponden ce betw een thought O b je c t and real ob ject. Imre Lak atos’s m ethodology o f scientific research program s seems to m e the best available account o f how both requirem ents can be properly fulfilled.

W hatever one m ay feel about the lim itations o f A lth u sser’s epistem ology, it is in a different league from H aberm as’s discussions o f the sciences. T h ese h ave never su cceeded in lib e ra tin g th em se lves from the m align in f lu e n c e o f n e o - K a n t ia n is m a n d o f th e e a r ly F ra n k fu r t s c h o o l ’ s identification o f the Enlightenm ent with instrum ental reason. T h e result is an in stru m en talist accou n t o f the p h ysica l sc ien ces as a co m po n en t o f n a tu r e - d o m in a t in g p u r p o s iv e - r a t io n a l a c t io n and a d e n ia l o f th e m ethodological unity o f the sciences. T h e terms in w hich these m istaken positions are .form ulated have ch anged over tim e, from the highly doubtful notion o f kn ow ledge-con stitu tin g interests to the d istin ction H aberm as now draws betw een different k inds o f rationality on the basis o f his theory o f co m m u n icative ac tio n . But lack in g in all version s are the insigh ts A lth u sser was able to articu la te— the co n stitu tio n o f every th eore tica l discourse by certa in im plicit questions (the A lth usserian problem atic or L ak atosian heuristic) w hich allow it, under the right conditions, to develop an “in tern al h istory” governed by w hat C ollin gw ood called the logic o f question and answer rather than by any external im peratives, a dynam ic whose understanding is essential to any account o f the objectivity o f all the sciences, physical and social alike. T h e absence o f any sense for these general features o f scientific discourse in H aberm as’s work is a sad reflection o f the d am a g e c a u se d by R o m a n t ic ism in G e rm a n p h ilo so p h y , an d underm in es h is a ttem p t to prov ide a p h ilo so p h ica l defen se o f m odern reason.

T h ese , then, are the three respects in w hich I believe A lth u sser has made a la st in g c o n tr ib u tio n — the c r it iq u e o f H e g e lia n M arx ism , the conceptual clarification o f h istorical m aterialism , and the elaboration o f a realist philosophy o f science. T o stress these achievem ents is not to deny that there were others, but these— for exam ple, his theory o f ideology— seem to be generally cases where, after the m ystical husk has been rem oved, the r a t io n a l k ern e l p ro v es to be ra th e r sm all. It is w orth n o tin g , in conclusion, that the effect o f A lth usser’s intervention is to leave M arxist philosophy itself in a som ew hat uncertain position. S o long as there was a d istin c tiv e co n ce p tio n o f a m ater ia list m eth od ex trac ted from H e g e l’s Logic, then M arxist philosophy had a secure status as the guardian o f the d ialectic. But once A lthusser had driven Hegel out, what was the rationale o f th is d iscou rse? A lth u sse r ’s two a ttem p ts to re h ab ilita te d ia le c tic a l


m ateria lism , first as the Theory o f th eo re tica l p ractice and then as the proletarian class struggle in theory, were n ot great successes. O ne problem with the second definition o f philosophy was that its theoretical content seem ed to com e down to a defen ce o f realism —-the thesis th at reality is prior to but know able by thought— undoubtedly a worthwhile task, but not one reserved exclu sively for M arxists, as my in v o catio n o f the work o f L a k a to s , a fe r v e n t a n t i-M a r x is t , sh o u ld in d ic a te . P e rh a p s M a r x is t philosophers are left w ith the role o f Lockean underlaborers explicating and clarifying the theoretical framework o f h istorical m aterialism . T h e record o f analytical M arxism in the past decade shows that this activity can be a fertile one— though this current’s political trajectory also underlines that conceptual analysis is not an innocent practice. T h is is hardly a surprising discovery— it is, after all, what A lthusser taught us to expect. So perhaps there is still scope for the class struggle in theory. A t any rate, it does seem as if we should see A lth usser as contributing to the gen eral de flation o f philosophy th at is so strik ing a feature o f late tw entieth-century intellectual life.

Works Cited

A lth u sse r , L ., (1 9 7 0 ) “ M a rx ’s R e la t io n to H e g e l,” in Politics a n d H istory (L o n d o n : N L B , 1 972 ).

A lth u sse r , L ., an d B a lib ar , E ., (1 9 6 8 ) Reading C ap ita l (L o n d o n : N L B , 197 0 ).

A n d e rso n , P., (1 9 8 0 ) Argum ents within English M arxism (L o n d o n : V e rso , 1980 ).

B a lib ar , E ., (1 9 7 8 ) “Irra tio n a lism a n d M arx ism ,” N e w Left Review 107 (1 9 7 8 ) .

B en to n , T ., (1 9 8 4 ) The Rise and F all o f Structual M arxism (L o n d o n : M ac m illa n , 1984 ).

C a llin ic o s , A ., (1 9 7 6 ) A lth usser’s M arxism (L o n d o n : P lu to , 197 6 ).

C a llin ic o s , A . , (1 9 8 2 ) Is there a Future for M arx ism ? (L o n d o n : M ac m illa n , 1 982 ).

C a ll in ic o s , A . , (1 9 8 9 a ) “In tro d u c tio n ,” t o C a ll in ic o s , ed ., M arx ist Theory (O x fo rd : O x fo rd U n iv ersity P ress, 198 9 ).

C a llin ic o s , A ., (1 9 8 9 b ) “Postm odem ity” and Revolution (C am b rid g e : P o lity , 198 9 ).

C o h e n , G .A . , (1 9 7 8 ) K ar l M a rx ’s Theory o f H istory— a D efence (O x fo rd : C la re n d o n Press, 1 9 7 8 ).

E llio tt, G ., (1 9 8 7 ) A lthusser— the D etour o f Theory (L o n d o n : V e rso , 1 987 ).

Ferry, L ., an d R en au t, A ., (1 9 8 5 ) L a Pensée 68 (P aris : G a llim a rd , 1985 ).

G e ra s , N ., (1 9 7 2 ) “A lth u sse r ’s M arx ism ,” N ew Left Review 71 (1 9 7 2 ) .

G lu c k sm an n , A ., (1 9 6 7 ) “ A V e n tr iloq u ist S tru c tu ra lism ,” N ew Left Review 72 (1 9 7 2 ) .

H a b erm as, J ., (1 9 7 9 ) C om m unication and the Evolution o f Society (L o n d o n : H e in em an n , 1979 ).

H a b erm as, J., (1 9 8 5 ) The PhilosophicalD iscourse o f M odernity (C am b rid ge : P o lity , 1987 ).

H a b erm as, J ., (1 9 8 6 ) Autonom y an d Solidarity (L o n d o n : V erso 198 6 ).

H a rm an , C ., (1 9 8 8 ) The Fire L a stT im e (L o n d o n : B o o k m ark s, 198 8 ).

L e v in e , A .E ., (1 9 8 6 ) R ev iew o f J. E lster, M ak ing Sense o f M arx , in Jo u rn a l o f Philosophy 83 (1 9 8 6 ) .

W H A T IS LIVING A ND W H A T IS DEAD 49

P atton , P. ( 1 9 8 8 ) “ M arx ism an d B ey o n d ?,” in C . N e lso n an d L. G ro ssb e rg , eds., M arxism and the Interpretation o f C ulture (H o u n d m ills : M ac m illa n , 1988 ).

T h o m p so n , E .P ., (1 9 7 8 ) The Poverty o f Theory and O ther E ssay s (L o n d o n : M erlin , 197 8 ).

W right, E. O ., (1 9 8 5 ) C lasses (L o n d o n : V erso , 198 5 ).

Warren Montag

Spinoza and Althusser Against Hermeneutics: Interpretation

or Intervention?

Despite the fact that Spinoza was am ong the m ost im portant reference poin ts for F ren ch p h ilo so p h ic a l and p o lit ic a l re fle c tio n in the six tie s (especially the now m uch criticized anti-hum anist offensive o f that tim e), his n am e is strik in g ly and th erefore sy m p to m atica lly ab sen t from the A nglo-A m erican work th at takes or at least claim s to take its inspiration from the French. T h is absence takes on even greater significance when we note that H egel, N ietzsche and H eidegger have proven com patib le with the A nglo-A m erican reconstruction o f French anti-hum anism , more easily assim ilated into its theoretical (and political) project. O f course, Sp in oza’s singular fate is not too surprising: H egel, H eidegger and N ietzsche were already present in A n glo-A m erican philosophical culture, even by m eans o f an antiquated, naive reading th at was supplanted by “the other H egel,” the “new N ie tz sc h e ” and m ost recen tly , th e Fren ch H eid egger. N o su ch prim ary read in g p reced ed and th erefo re m ade p ossib le a re cep tio n o f Spinoza. A n g lo -A m erican philosophy, at least fo r the last one hundred years, h as found Spin oza unintelligible. Even the m ore recen t tendency in critical thought w hich sees its very raison d ’être as the co n te sta tio n or deconstruction o f the certitudes o f analytic philosophy has nothing to say about Spinoza even as their Fren ch counterparts speak constantly o f him. W hat is it th a t renders Sp in oza unthinkable for A nglo-A m erican thought even in its divergence?

O f all the ph ilosophers in France in the six ties none is m ore closely a ssociated w ith Sp in o za th an A lth u sser . T o speak o f the in fluence o f Spinoza on A lth u sser is already to gran t a con ceptu al regim e th at both thinkers refused. T h e term “ influence” does not begin to capture the way in w h ic h a n im p o r ta n t p ar t o f A lth u s se r 's w ork is i t s e l f S p in o z is t , constitu ting a th eoretica l p ro ject profoundly internal to the con ceptu al space delim ited by Sp inoza's works. O f course, as A lth usser h im self has said, th is tak in g o f p ositio n s was never sim ply the result o f a p erson al ch oice. It was rath er th at so m eth in g o f Sp in oza 's th eore tica l struggle, m odified by the relation sh ip o f th eoretica l forces that characterized the


latter h a lf o f the seven teen th century, repeated itse lf in the th eoretical con juncture o f 1960’s France. T h is repetition, or return o f the repressed, signalled and continues to signal the existence o f a conflict to be analyzed. T o m ake m atters even m ore com plicated, A lthusser said very little directly about Spinoza in. his published works: aside from a brief chapter in Essays in Self-Criticism on h is Sp in oz ist d ev ia tio n , th ere are no m ore th an b rie f references scattered throughout his works. A m on g these b rie f references, I want to focus on one in particular from Reading Capital.

A lthusser writes in that place: “the first m an ever to pose the problem of reading and in consequence, o f writing, was Spinoza, and he was the first m an in the world to have proposed both a theory o f history and philosophy o f the opacity o f the immediate. W ith him, fo r the first tim e ever, a m an linked together in this way the essence o f reading and the essence o f history in a theory o f the difference between the im aginary and the true.” 1 O n first reading, this passage would seem to m anifest the theoreticism for w hich A lth usser’s critics reproached h im and w hich he h im self recognized as one o f his errors. T h e apparent elevation o f reading to a status equal to that o f a th eory o f h isto ry or the k now ledge o f w riting, o f tex ts , to that o f the know ledge o f the class struggle would seem to signal the erasure o f non- discursive or m aterial reality and its replacem ent by an infinite, seam less discursivity without other or outside.

H ow ever, if we take this adm ittedly elliptical passage and reconstruct th e a n a ly s is o f S p in o z a th a t fo rm s its c o n d it io n o f p o s s ib i l i ty and in tellig ib ility , we w ill find qu ite the op po site : not an in terpre tation o f Spinoza but an intervention in the relationship o f forces that governs his text, takin g the side o f certain hypotheses against others, push ing these hypotheses to extrem e conclusions, tow ards the d ism antling o f a theoretical apparatus in w hich the notions o f transcendence, im m ateriality or ideality are dom inant. T h is intervention produces a m aterialism so thoroughgoing th at it remains for A lth usser’s critics, as for Sp in oza’s three hundred years earlier, illegible and unthinkable.

Let us now turn to the theory o f reading and o f writing that A lthusser found so revolu tion ary in the history o f ph ilosophy. It is stated in the se v e n th c h a p te r o f S p in o z a ’s T ra c ta tu s T h eo logico-P oliticu s: “ O f th e Interpretation o f Scripture.” 2 O n e o f th e m ajor objectives o f th e work is to analyze and thereby dim inish the power o f superstition. Superstition , the chain o f ideas that perm its “men to fight as bravely for servitude as for their own w ell-being” and “to count it not sham e but the highest glory to risk their lives for the vanity o f a tyrant,” is based on a rejection o f nature, o f w hat is, in favor o f what is above, beyond or behind it, that is, in favor o f w hat is n o t .3 S p in o za , by co n tra st, so u gh t to co m b at su p erstit io n by

SPINOZA AND A LTH USSER 53

elim inating the supernatural and the tran scen d en tal. In the Ethics, he posited a world whose essence entirely coincided with its existence, a world of actuality without potential, a world without an outside or a beyond. It was for this reason that the phrase Deus sive N atura, whose parenthetical ch aracter belied its im po rtan ce both fo r Sp in oza an d for his critics, so scan d aliz ed h is age an d se em ed to su m m arize w h at B ay le c a lle d h is “system atic atheism .”4

How to conceptualize nature (o f which the hum an was part and in no way a “kingdom w ithin a k ingdom ”) without recourse to the category o f transcendence w hich would render nature su sceptib le to a herm eneutic reading: it is to this th at A lth usser refers in his phrase “the opacity o f the im m ediate.” Further, the identification o f this ob jective renders intelligible S p in o z a ’ s f ir s t p r o p o s i t io n c o n c e r n in g the m e th o d o f s c r ip t u r a l interpretation in the Tractatus: “the knowledge o f scripture m ust be sought from scripture alone ju st as the knowledge o f nature is sought only from nature.” 5 It is useless to look behind or beyond Scripture for the hidden presence that would be the tru th to w hich it must be reduced. Like nature, a text is entirely co incident with its actual existence, it is a surface w ithout depth, w ithout a reservoir o f herm eneutic p oten tial.6 A ll that scripture is, is displayed fo r anyone to see. A n d so the herm eneutic m ethod, the m ethod proper to the institutionalized superstition that Spinoza sought to unmask, must reject the actuality o f Scripture, just as it does the actuality o f nature, in favor o f ultim ate ends and divine purposes, thus counterpoising what ought to be to what is. In the sam e way that superstition adds to nature the an th ro p o m o rp h ic p ro je c t io n s th at are n ow h ere to be fou n d in it, so superstition adds to Scripture profound m ysteries to justify the despotism that it upholds.

Spinoza confers a substantiality or a m ateriality on Scripture equal to that o f nature itself. It is not to be negated or denied. Scripture does not represent or express a more primary reality; it is itself fully and irreducibly real. T h is irreducibility must be granted at the outset for it to be know n. Scripture is no more the allegorical figuration o f a hidden T ruth th an is n a tu re ; its m e a n in g is thus d iv o rc e d from all n o t io n s o f r e f le c t io n , rep re sen tatio n or re feren ce in so far as these term s im ply a h ierarch ica l relation betw een, for exam ple, the representation an d w hat is represented. A t the sam e time, the in junction “scriptura so la ,” from scripture alone, in no sense negates or subsumes the substantiality o f nature. Rather, scripture and n atu re are, to use S p in o z a ’s p h rase from the Eth ics, p a ra lle l and therefore e q u a lly m a te r ia l. A s S p in o z a argu ed in the Treatise on the Emendation o f the Intellect, nam es or ideas are n ot reducible to th ings or objects: “Peter, fo r exam ple, is som ething real; but a true idea o f Peter is an


o b je c tiv e essence o f Peter and som eth in g real in itself, and a ltogeth er different from Peter h im self.”7 A s different, Sp in oza will add, as a triangle from a circle.

T h e objective, m aterial existence o f Scripture is characterized first o f all by the language in w hich it was written, nam ely H ebrew . T h e precise nature and properties o f the Hebrew language, and even more its history, m ake o f the Scripture w hat it is. In order to establish the m eaning o f each passage and o f the words o f w hich the passages are com prised , we m ust forsake a ll recourse to the truth, i.e., the truth o f nature (or o f what w as for Spinoza the sam e, G o d), a truth external to the text itself. For any attem pt to bring the scripture into conform ity with an external reality would be to deny the reality o f the scripture itself, and to abandon that specific reason that “acknow ledges no foundation but Scrip ture .”“

A t this p o in t, we m ay pose a very S p in o z ist q u estio n : w hat cau ses interpretation to seek the m eaning or truth o f Scripture outside th e very object that is to be known? T h e answer to this question o f course is the key to the history not o f Scripture but o f the interpretations that, according to Spinozist principles, must them selves possess an independent existence. For a th orou gh k n ow ledge o f H ebrew w ill force the reader to co n fron t an inescapable fact o f Scriptural existence. It is traversed from beginning to end w ith obscurities, in consisten cies and con trad iction s. K now ledge o f Hebrew, far from dispelling these difficulties, only places them more clearly in relief. Spinoza adduces an entire series o f com plexities derived from the nature o f B iblical Hebrew. T h e absence o f vowels and punctuation renders even the d iv is io n o f the te x t into d is tin c t se n te n ces. T h e order and co h eren ce o f th e te x t has been im posed or added to it by su bsequ en t g e n e ra t io n s o f read ers an d m ust th e re fo re be re je c te d a t th e o u tse t . Knowledge therefore does not lead us from the appearance o f disorder to a h idden orig in al sim plic ity and purity, but rather to the recovery o f the com plexity proper to Scripture itself.

But a specialized know ledge o f H ebrew is n o t n ecessary to grasp the disorder o f the narrative itself. For this specific disorder is equally apparent in translation to, as Spinoza puts it, “anyone who pays attention .” If we do now w ilfully b lin d ourselves to the o b jec tiv e ex isten ce o f the Torah or Pentateuch, we will see “the way in which all the histories and precepts in these five books are set down prom iscuously and w ithout order w ith no regard to dates; and further how the same story is often repeated, som etim es in a different version; th at all the m aterials were prom iscuously collected and h e a p e d t o g e th e r .” ’ A n d ju s t as la te r g e n e r a t io n s su p p lie d th e gram m atical coherence that the text itself lacked, so have generations of co m m en tators attem p ted to harm onize the d isparate and incom p atib le narrative m aterials o f which the Scripture is com posed.

SPINOZA A ND A LTH USSER 55

Further, Spinoza discovers yet another m ode o f Scriptural com plexity: that o f doctrine itself. “Scripture now here teach es explicitly and as eternal doctrine the nature o f G od, his m an ner o f providing for th ings and similar doctrines; on the contrary we have shown th at the prophets them selves did not agree on such subjects; therefore we must not lay down as scriptural any doctrine concerning such sub jects.” 10

A n d so the m ethod that posits the irreducible m ateriality o f the text co n stru c ts the o b je c t to be k n o w n as a co m p o site m ade o f n arra tiv e m aterials from different tim es an d p laces, an d ev en different languages whose very coexisten ce in a single text becom es a problem to be explained. W e may also see one o f the m ajor principles underlying the entire tradition of Scriptural in terpretation . It is based on a fun dam en tal denial o f the objective m aterial existence o f the Scripture; its very reason for being is to exp lain away the an tagon ism s and in con sisten cies that the text all too openly displays. Even the greatest com m entators such as M aim onides in the More Nebuchim are guilty o f bringing contradictions to ligh t only the better to explain them away, to restore the text's harm ony and quiet the doubts o f the perplexed. T h e re jection o f the Scripture as it is and as it can be read by anyone necessitates the production o f a supertextual m eaning (a n a lo g o u s to the su p e rn a tu ra l m e a n in g ad d ed to the w orld by the m echanism s o f superstition) availab le only to the in itiated and guarded over by the institutions o f ecclesiastical authority.

In an im portant sense, Spinoza’s interpretation o f Scripture is not the sam e o p era tio n that he d e sc rib es in o th ers. In so far as he re jec ts the reduction o f Scripture to nature or reason (just as he rejects the reduction o f nature to scripture), he speaks o f an ob ject, an objective existence that the others do not, can not, or will not see.

But th is in te rv en tio n itse lf required an o th er, separate in terv en tio n whose im portance for th e Tractatus h as n ot been sufficiently recognized. S p in o z a w as n o t th e f ir s t to p o s i t th e i r r e d u c ib il i ty o f S c r ip tu r a l contradiction. N early twenty years earlier T h om as H obbes brought to bear on Scripture the very m ethod he em ployed to arrive at a know ledge o f nature: the resoluto-com positive m ethod. S o in C h apter 33 o f the Leviathan he divided Scripture into its elem ents as he would any corporeal entity and inquires into the “N um ber, A ntiquity , Scope, A uthority, and Interpreters o f the books o f the H oly Scrip tu re .” " For H obbes as for Spinoza the words and sen ten ces o f w h ich the Scrip tu re is com prised no longer reveal or co n ce a l m ean in gs d eep er th a t th e m se lv e s . In ste ad , they co n g e a l in to objects w hich can .be investigated.

H obbes, too, does not fail to fin d contradictory assertions and inconsistencies. M oses, for exam ple, speaks o f his own burial in D euteronom y, a


book attributed to him , som eth ing even a prophet m ight fin d difficult to d o .12 T o cast doubt on the authorship o f the Scripture, to recognize that it is a com posite artifact, the work o f many hands and many minds, is to cast doubt on its very authenticity.

But (and this is what separates H obbes from Spinoza) , the differences in ternal to the Scripture ultim ately call into question its existence as a text and therefore render it uninterpretable, a mystery. T h e radical absence o f organic unity n ecessitates the m ediating fun ction o f the Sovereign who, th ro u gh th e in s titu t io n o f th e e s ta b lish e d ch u rc h , w ill b rin g te x tu a l co n flic ts an d an tago n ism s in to an a rtific ia l unity p ossessed finally o f a (artificial) m eaning. Hobbes therefore needs mystery. H e must suspend his search for an in terpretive m ethod in Leviathan at this p o in t because to p ro c e e d any fu rth er tow ards a r a t io n a lity p ro p er to S c r ip tu re w ould u n d erc u t the very au th ority w hose e x is te n c e the m ystery o f Scr ip tu re justifies and makes necessary.

Spinoza, enem y o f mysteries and opponent o f servitude, was free from th e c o n s tra in ts th a t p rev e n te d H o b b es from d e v e lo p in g a m eth od o f read in g proper to Scrip tu re . In his han ds, tex tu a l co n trad ictio n s were revealed to be th e marks o f th e constitution o f th e Scripture as a m aterial artifact: its historical and authorial diversity (th e problem o f the cortipiling o f Scripture) and the transform ations it has undergone as a text.

Spinoza takes the exam ple o f C h rist’s statem ent, “But if a m an strike you on the right cheek, turn to him the left a lso .” 1’ T h e statem ent constitutes an abrogation o f the law o f Moses, the notion that “an eye should be given an eye.”14 R ath er than attem pt to distort these counterposed doctrines into agreem ent through a herm eneutic procedure (w hich adds to the text what it claim s to d iscover in it), Spinoza accepts the contradiction as irreducible and proceeds to exp la in it by seeking its cause. He finds th at w hereas M oses “strove to found a well-ordered com m onw ealth and to ordain laws as a legislator,” C h rist ’s precept o f “Subm ission to injuries was only valid in p laces w here ju stice is n eglected an d in tim e o f oppression but does not hold good in a well-ordered state.” 15 N either m ystery nor m etaphor, neither indeterm inate (and thus unintelligible) contrad iction nor h idden (because supertextual) unity: the text is in telligible because o f the contrad iction s that constitute its h istorical and m aterial reality.

Spinoza had produced, and his critics in France and England from 1677- 1720 were w ell aw are o f it , a n o tio n o f the m a ter ia lity o f w ritin g, o f S c r ip tu re .16 B ut th a t did n ot m ean others, like H obbes before h im and R ich ard S im on afterwards, could not occupy the sam e position to exploit it, to turn it against itself by producing new mysteries the better to uphold authority.

SPINOZA A ND ALTH USSER 57

N ow we may see why A lthusser accorded such im portance to Spin oza’s theory o f reading. In our own tim e a num ber o f theories have entered the field against the n otion that literary (and philosophical) texts are unified a n d co h e re n t. In so far as th e se th e o r ie s refuse to n eg a te or deny the m ateriality o f the tex tu a l su rface , they draw a line o f d em arcation th at separates th em from a certain idealism o f th e text.

But th e struggle does not en d there; it is sim ply reproduced in a new form. W h en A lthusser proposed th e n o tio n o f the sym ptom atic reading o f M arx, a n o tio n w h ich stressed th e necessarily contradictory character o f theoretical texts, not as a fault for w hich they m ight be reproached but as th e very prin cip le o f their in te llig ib ility , his sta tem en ts con stitu ted an intervention against two d istin ct theoretical adversaries sim ultaneously. For it was not simply the partisans o f textual unity or coherence, whether the h e r m e n e u t ic r e a d e r s w h o so u g h t th e p o ly se m y o f th e t e x t or th e structuralists who described the system proper to every text, against whom A lth u sser argued . A lth u sse r a lso drew a lin e o f d em arcation betw een h im self an d those w ho would exp lo it th e notion o f th e antagonistic and conflictual character o f texts in order to declare them unknow able, beyond the grasp o f any rationality whatever. Tw enty years after Reading Capital, this tendency has grown im m easurably stronger, its partisans celebrating im m ate r ia lity an d in d e te rm in a cy in order, lik e th o se w ho e x p lo ite d Spinoza, to transform literary an d p h ilo sop h ical te x ts into inexplicable, m ira c u lo u s e x i s te n c e s w h ic h in c ite us to w o n d er w h ile r e m a in in g necessarily unknow able.

A lthusser was speaking as a Spinozist when, in the essay “Ideology and Ideo logical S ta te A p p aratu se s,” he argued that m atter exists in different m odalities. T h is statem ent allowed h im to posit the m aterial existence o f ideology. It, in turn, allows us to posit the m ateriality o f writing, to speak o f a d iscu rsiv e m a ter ia lity . T h is n o tio n is th e very c o n d itio n o f our knowledge o f literary texts, an d o f discursive forms in general. If we have not progressed further towards a theory o f literary production, it is because th is p articu lar m ateria lity rem ain s to be sp ec ified and defin ed . S u ch a p ro je c t m ay p la u sib ly b e g in fo r u s, as it d id for A lth u s se r , w ith an understanding o f Spinoza's heresy, that is, his theoretical revolution.

58 THE A LTH USSERIA N LEGACY

N otes

1. L o u is A lth u sse r .a n d E tien n e B a lib ar , Reading C a p ita l, tran s. B e n Brew ster, (L o n d o n : N e w L e ft B o o k s, 1 9 6 7 ), p . 16.

2. B e n e d ic t de S p in o z a , A Theologico-Political T rea tise , tran s. R . H . M . E lw es (N ew Y ork: D o v er, 1 9 5 1 ), 9 8 -1 9 9 . T h i s is th e o n ly readily av a ila b le tran sla tio n o f th e T rac tatu s, but it is o ften u n re liab le . I h a v e a ltered it w h en ev er n ecessary . F o r the. stan d ard e d itio n o f th e L a t in o r ig in a l, see S p in o z a , O pera , ed . C a r l G e b h a rd t , 4 v o ls . (H e ild e lb e rg : C a r l W in te r , 192 5 ).

3. Ib id ., 5-6.4 . P ierre B a y le , H istorical and C ritical D ictionary (N ew Y ork: B obb s-M errill, 1 965 ).5. S p in o za , T reatise , 100.6. S e e A n d re T o s e l , Spinoza et le Crépuscule de la servitude, (P ar is : A u b e r , 1 9 8 4 ), and

Jean -P ie rre O ser, “L ’H erm en eu tiq u e de H obbes et de S p in o z a ,” Studia Spinozana, v o l. 3, 1987.7. B e n e d ic t de S p in o z a , Treatise on the Em endation o f the intellect, in Collected W orks,

ed . Edw in C u rley (P r in c e to n : P rin ceton U P , 1 9 8 6 ), 17-18 .8. S p in o z a , Treatise , 101.9. Ib id ., 135 .10 . Ib id ., 104.11. T h o m a s H o b b es , Leviathan (M id d lesex : P e lic an , 196 8 ), 4 1 5 -2 7 .12. Ib id ., 4 17 .13. Sp in o za , Treatise , 105.14- Ibid.15. S e e P au l V e rn iè re , Spinoza et la pensée française avan t la révolution (P aris: P resses

U n iv e r s i ta ir e s d e F ran ce , 1 9 5 4 ) , an d R o sa lie L C o lie , “ S p in o z a in E n g la n d , 1 6 6 5 - 1 7 3 0 ,” Proceedings o f the A m erican Philosophical Society 107 , 3 (Ju n e 1 9 6 3 ), 183-219 .

16. Sp in o za , Treatise.

Stephen Resnick and Richard Wolff

Althusser’s Liberation of Marxian Theory

T oday M arxists question the A lth usserian project. Ideas only recently taken to be o f extraordin ary im portan ce have been widely relegated to secondary in tellectual status or dism issed altogether. It is often said that while A lth usserian notions o f overdeterm ination and contrad iction were com pelling abstractly, they proved impossible to apply to concrete political an d theoretical activity. Indeed, first A lth u sser’s w ork and th en M arxism m ore g e n e ra lly h ave h ad to fa c e a co m m o n c o m p la in t from form er devotees: neither seem ed to go anywhere after the promises and hopes of 1968. A lth u sse r ’s work, m u ch like th a t o f M arx , seem s to h ave been superseded by events.

In Reading C apital, A lthusser suggested th at there are m any ways to read Marx. T h ere are as well m any ways to read A lthusser. T h e A lthusser that we read has presented us with a very different legacy: namely, that o f some powerful new concepts enabling new departures in social theory generally and in econom ic analysis in particular. W e wish to sketch these departures here.

For us A lth u sse r ’s work is on e o f th e grea test co n trib u tio n s in the M arxian tradition. H is legacy is a profound critique o f all determ inism s enabled by m eans o f the concepts o f overdeterm ination and contradiction (new “re ad in g s” o f M arx , as h e put it) . H is critiqu e sw eeps away the staunch determ in ism s th at h ith erto haunted M arxism : the structuralism and hum anism in its social theory, and the rationalism an d em piricism in its epistem ology. It thus perm its a rethinking o f M arxism . M arxism may finally be liberated from the conservatism bred by these determ inist forms o f thought.

E v id en ce that o th ers have a lso n o te d so m eth in g o f our read in g o f A lthusser exists in certain contem porary trends am on g M arxian theorists. It has becom e de rigueur for m any M arxists to affirm, in one way or another, the A lth u sse r ia n re je c t io n o f d e te m in ism in all its gu ises: e c o n o m ic determ inism , hum anism , h istoricism , em piricism , rationalism , postivism , an d foundationalism . O n th e oth er hand, desp ite su ch affirm ations, these thinkers typically return in their works to the identical forms o f determ inist th in k in g th at elsewhere they seem ed to reject.


How can we account for this paradox? Part o f the explanation lies in the re p u d ia tio n by M a rx ists o f w hat they u n d erstan d , co n sc io u sly or unconsciously, to be th e logical im plications o f th e A lthusserian critique o f determ inism . T h ey fear breaking finally with th e security offered by some d e te rm in ate e sse n ce , w h eth er it be that p o sed in e ith e r h u m an ist or structuralist theorizing about society or th a t offered in either em piricist or rationalist thinking about knowledge. T h is loss o f security (or certitude) is sim ultaneously for th em a terrifying glim pse into an abyss th at has always c o n fr o n te d th o se w h o lo se th e ir g o d s . In th is se n se , A l t h u s s e r ’s contribution was too radical even for those com m itted to radicalism .

M oreover, in a world o f ideas and actions now cast adrift from any guaranteeing anchors, all theories and political m ovem ents becom e merely d ifferent from one another. For traditonal M arxists, such a conclusion confirm s their w orst fears, for it adm its a theoretical and political pluralism in w hich struggle over any non-class part o f life m akes as m uch sense as struggle over class. A rejection o f determ inism , whether in the first or the last instance, carries w ith it, then, the worrisom e im plication that class (econ om ic) contradictions are no longer determ inant. M arx ’s class struggle between capitalists and workers over the m eans o f production or the labor process or the appropriation o f surplus value seems to lose its privileged h isto r ic a l an d th e o re tica l place. It becom e at best m erely on e am on g equally worthy struggles including those over th e rights o f wom en, racial m inorities, gays, the poor, th e hom eless, and anim als. For the determ inist M arxist, this is a pluralism th at has run amok.

T h e A lth usserian critique also implies that M arxism can no longer be held up as science and non-M arxism as ideology. . Consequently, no longer can h isto r ic a l fa c tic ity reveal the tru th o f M arx ism , as em p iric ists so fervently wish to believe. N o longer can the texts o f M arx provide the sin gular theory that allow s the app rop riation o f H istory in th ou gh t, as rationalists so intensely affirm. A ll we have are merely different forms o f th in k in g , d ifferen t th eories w ith th e ir co rre sp o n d in g ly d ifferen t tru th c r it e r ia : n o in te r - th e o r e t ic a l s ta n d a rd s o f t ru th are a d m itte d . For epistem ological determ inists, w ho believe th a t truth is singular rather than plural, this is a n ightm are. It not only dem otes M arxism as a privileged theory, it a lso open s a door to “ irratio n ality ” p osin g as m erely ano th er th eory . F irst an u n w an ted p o lit ic a l an d th en an eq u a lly in to le rab le th eoretica l pluralism seem s to h av e been un leashed by the A lth usserian critique o f determ inist thinking.

A lth usser’s work itself was hardly immune from this paradox. His lapse in to th e id eo lo gy an d sc ie n c e d ich o to m y , on th e one h an d , an d h is affirm ation o f determ ination in the last instance by the econom y, o n the

A LTH U SSER'S LIBERATION OF MARXIAN THEORY 61

other, suggest to u s an unw illingness to free his own texts from determ inist thinking. Like m any others who affirm the im portance o f the critique o f determ inism , he too seem s to have shied away from the consequences o f its lo g ic fo r h is ow n w o rk . H is c o n t r a d ic t o r y a t te m p t to h o ld o n to determ inism , while sim ultaneously castin g it out, parallels the tendencies o f so m an y o th e r M a r x is t s to r e a d m it in to th e ir ow n w ork the very determ inism s they claim to re jec t.1

It is no great surprise, then, to discover in the work o f m any current M arx ists the return o f the d e term in ism s o f Jerem y Bentham and M ax W eber to fill A lth usser’s “lonely hour o f the last instance.” T h e calculus o f p leasu re in the fo rm al gu ise o f a g iv en h u m an agen cy re tu rn s as the ultim ate determ inant o f th e econom y in th e recent school o f “analytical” M a rx ism . T h e c a lc u lu s o f o w n e rsh ip r ig h ts an d a u th o r ity in b o th stru ctu ra list a n d h u m an sit form s return s in th e w ork o f m any current M arxist an d rad ical theorists w ho make pow er the essential determ inant o f econom ic an d social change.

W e think that a radically different alternative than these is possible for M arxists. It is one that accepts the A lthusserian critique o f determ inism but also extends it beyond his boundaries. It em braces rather th an fears the system atic rejection o f determ inism because it sees in all determ inism s a com m on goal o f conserving from change som e form o f experience, thought, or part o f society. In this precise sense, what A lthusser accom plished was o f extraordinary importance, for he provided the tools to recognize and, it is hoped, to challenge this conservative objective. Our task now is to justify this thesis.

A lth u sser clearly recognized an d defined a basic philosophical problem w ithin the M arxian tradition that he inherited and valued highly. T h e problem concerns the ways social entities are thought to stand in relation to one another. T rad ition al M arxism views given objects and events in so c ie ty as in t e r a c t in g , b u t a lso as e i th e r u lt im a te ly d e p e n d e n t or independent, as either fundam entally determ ining or determined. It aims to iden tify th o se asp ec ts o f so c iety th at are d e term in in g essen ces (th e fam ou s “last in stan ce d eterm in an ts” )— the econ om ic base, the m ode o f production, class struggle, etc.— and then to dem onstrate the m echanism s whereby they determ ine all the other aspects o f society— the political and cultural superstructure. In short, traditional M arxism operates within the fram ew ork o f a c lear ly d e term in ist (o r e sse n tia lis t ) so c ia l theory. A s A lthusser often reiterated, this M arxian com m itm ent to determ inist social theory m atch ed-—an d thus did not b reak fro m — an eq u ally p rev a le n t determ inism am ong non-M arxian so c ia l theories.

T r a d i t io n a l M a r x ism a lso o p e r a te s w ith in a c le a r ly e s s e n t ia l i s t

epistem ology, w hich presented a parallel problem to A lthusser. It presumes a fu n d a m en ta l d ich o to m y or gap b etw een th o u g h t ( id e a s) an d b e in g (reality), su ch th a t the goal o f all hum an thought is to bridge th a t presumed gap. H um an thought strives to mirror (represent) accurately the real world of being to w hich thought is directed. T h e key to a successful bridging— a “true” representation o f how the real world actually is— lies in follow ing one or b o th o f the two c la ss ic p ro to co ls o f d e te rm in ist ep istem ology : em piricism or rationalism . In posing th e “problem of know ledge”— how to establish truth and distinguish it from falsehood— in th is way, traditional M arx ism defines ep istem o lo g ica l issues ex ac tly as does the trad itio n a l bourgeois philosophy it opposes. N ot surprisingly, M arxism has found its way to th e sam e tw o sorts o f answers: em piricism or rationalism .

Em piricism presum es th at true ideas are those verified by reference to sensory facts o f experience. T h e essence (ultim ate determ in ant) o f truth is em pirical factuality . T h e M arxian form o f such em piricism stresses the n o tio n th at p ractice (experien ce in the co n crete real w orld) proves or disproves the truth o f all possib le theories o f social structure an d change. T h e sign o f M arxian em piricism is argum ent by reference to w h at “history show s.”

R a tio n a lism presum es th at reality is actu ally gov ern ed , and further presum ed to be know able by, h um an reason w hich is thus orien ted to rep re sen t (m irror) th e underlying orderlin ess o f th e real. T h e essence (u ltim ate determ in an t) of truth is n ot concrete factuality, but rather the reasonable logic that underlies and governs that factuality. T h e M arxian form of such rationalism is the notion that M arx and the subsequent great th in k e rs w ith in the trad itio n h ad f in a lly grasped the true u n d erly in g rationality o f social life— dialectical and historical m aterialism — which had eluded all the pre-M arxists and still eludes the non-M arxists. M arxism ’s m irroring o f the true underlying rationality o f the con crete real enables current day M arxists simply to apply it to truly know an d change the world. T h e sign o f M arxian rationalism is argum ent by quotation.

For A lth u sse r , b o th k in d s o f e sse n tia lism — in so c ia l theory an d in epistem ology— were m ore th an “problem s” for M arxist theory. T h ey had been im ported into M arxism without criticism and transformation from the bourgeois philosophical tradition. T h ey were fetters preventing M arxism from co m p le tin g its break w ith the bou rgeo is trad itio n an d thus from fulfilling it revolutionizing m ission o f establish ing a philosophy and social theory fo r com m u n ism . A lth u sser set about to renew th at m ission by attack in g essentialism s in epistem ology and social theory as incom patible with M arxism .

62 TH E ALTH USSERIAN LEGACY


T h e two key con cepts for A lth u sser in his critica l attack were over- \ d e te rm in atio n — coun terposed to d e term in atio n — and co m plex contra- 1 d ic t io n s— c o u n te rp o se d to sim p le c o n tra d ic t io n s . He borrow ed and I adapted overdeterm ination from Freud (and perh aps Lukâcs) precisely to define an alternative to determ inist analyses o f all sorts in social theory and in epistem ology. W hereas those analyses presum ed a notion o f causation in w hich som e en tities determ ine others, A lth u sser insisted that no so cial en tity was ever determ in ed by on e or a subset o f o ther so c ia l en tities. R ather, each and every entity w ithin society w as always presum ed to be determ ined by the effects o f all the other entities at once. Stated otherwise, each entity was the product o f the in teraction o f all the others. It was overdeterm ined by all th ose others, rather th an being determ ined by any one or a subset o f them .

Further, each social entity bears within itself the traces o f all the other ; social en tities that, together, com prise its overdeterm inants. Indeed, each j en tity ’s ex isten ce is noth ing other th en the com bined effects o f all the others in the social totality .2 A s such, each entity is the site of the different e ffe c tiv it ie s o f all o th er so c ia l e n tit ie s . A n in d iv id u a l is the site , for exam ple, o f the effects o f class, parents, jobs, religions, politics, literature, biology, etc. So , too, is an enterprise, a literary text, or a political party.A s such sites, each entity contain s different effects that push and pull it in all directions with varying force.’ In this precise sense, A lthusser refers to the contrad ictions within every entity as com plex; they em anate from the influences exerted by all other entities. Instead o f the dualistic (A lthusser ; c a l ls it “ s im p le ” ) n o t io n o f c o n t r a d ic t io n in h e r ite d fro m p re v io u s ! p h il o s o p h y — th e m e ta p h o r o f p o s i t iv e a n d n e g a t iv e — A lt h u s s e r counterposes the notion of overdeterm ined and hence infinitely com plex j contradictions constituting every social entity.

If every social entity is overdeterm ined by every other, it follows that A lthusser is here posing a new and different notion o f causation in society and a c ro ss h is to ry . E ach s o c ia l e n tity is n e c e ssa r ily a lw ay s b o th a detrm ining as well as a determ ined entity. It is overdeterm ined by all other en tities and p artic ip ate s in ov erd eterm in in g every other en tity . Every en tity in so c ie ty ex ists as th e site o f th e e ffects from all o th ers ; it is overdeterm ined and h en ce com plexly contradictory.

T h ose influenced by A lthusser have taken this argum ent another step. ! From the overdeterm ination and contradictions o f each social entity, they : have derived the notion that all en tities are in ceaseless change, since a change in any social entity alters the influence it exerts on all others. T h e image o f A lthusserian theory, then, is one o f the ceaseless play of change in a ll e n t it ie s . E v e ry th in g e x is ts in c h a n g e . T o s ig n a l th is as a b a sic


presum ption o f analysis, we drop the word entity and replace it by the word p ro ce ss .4 T h e so c ia l to ta lity is co n ce iv ed th en as the set o f all so c ia l processes. T h e se are grouped , for expository ease, under four headings: natural, econ om ic, po litica l and cultural processes. N atural processes refer to all the changes in the realms o f physical, ch em ical and-biological matter. Econ om ic processes refer to all the changes occurring in the production and distribution o f goods and services. Political processes refer to all the changes occurring in the ordering o f individuals’ interpersonal behaviors. C ultural processes refer to all the changes occurring in the production and dissem ination o f m eanings in the society.

T h e process— the so c ia l entity ex istin g in ch an ge— has becom e the basic elem ent o f social analysis. E ach process ch anges in particular ways an d at a sp ec ific p ac e acco rd in g to its u n iqu e o v erd e te rm in atio n and c o n tra d ic t io n s . M o reo v er , th e se p ro ce sse s do n ot o ccu r a lo n e or by th em se lves in society ; they occur in clum ps or groups w hich com prise particular sites in society su ch as a person, a relationship, an activity, etc. It follows th a t every site in society is approached as precisely a grouping of distinct, constitutive processes. M oreover, since processes are understood as uniquely overdeterm ined and contrad ictory , it follow s that all so cial sites, being com posed o f m ultiple so c ia l processes, m ust experience uneven developm ent. S ince each o f the distinct social processes com prising any site has its own overdeterm ined form and rhythm o f change, the site itself displays the uneven, differential m ovem ents o f its com ponents; it develops unevenly. For A lthusser as for M arx, the uneven developm ent o f all social entities was a basic prem ise o f social analysis. T h e A lth usserian concepts o f o v erd e te rm in atio n and co m p lex co n trad ic tio n , h ow ever, en ab le us to clarify and justify th at prem ise m ore carefu lly and th orough ly than had been possible w ithout those concepts.

T h e concept o f overdeterm ination implies a M arxian understanding o f the ex isten ce o f all so cial en tities th at breaks fully from the prevalent, determ inist notions th a t h ad characterized both M arx ian an d non-M arxian s o c i a l th e o r ie s . It a lso im p lie s , as A lt h u s s e r in s is t e d , a M a r x ia n epistem ology that breaks decisively with both em piricism and rationalism . T h is m ay be sh o w n by n o t in g t h a t a t h e o r e t i c a l c o m m itm e n t to overdeterm ination clearly poses a n im m ediate analytical problem . How can we exp la in any so c ia l en tity— a p o litica l m o vem en t, an en terprise , an individual, a morality— if by exp lanation we m ean an account o f how all other social entities interact to overdeterm ine the entity in question. Su ch an exh au stive accoun t exceeds hum an cap ab ility and would require so m uch tim e th a t the o b je c t o f e x p lan a tio n w ould h ave ch anged beyond re c o g n itio n an d p erh ap s beyond any in te re s t fo r us by the tim e the


e x p la n a t io n w as co m p le te . T h e an sw er to th is p ro b lem is th a t on e im plication o f the notion o f overdeterm ination lies in the recognition that ̂all exp lanations are inherently and unavoidably incom plete. A ll theories ! o f society— forms o f exp lanation — are partial; each takes up only som e o f the factors influencing the ob ject o f its theorizing. W ith those factors it fash ion s an exp lan atio n , a necessarily partia l exp lan atio n reflecting the particular subset o f overdeterm ining factors that it favors.

T h ere are thus always alternative exp lanations or theories o f why and how events occur. T h e m ultiple theories may be distinguished precisely by the particular subset o f determ ining factors upon which they focus as they enter into the task o f social analysis. A s we have argued elsewhere, different theories have different entry p om is.5 A lternative theories vary according to w h ich subset o f asp ects o f any q u estio n they stress in p rodu cin g th eir particular, partial explanations.

It follows that we must m ove away from any notion o f truth as singular ̂to a n o t io n ra th e r o f tru th s as p lu ra l. E ach th eo ry n ot o n ly m ak es j statem ents about what it takes to be social reality; it also erects criteria by w hich practitioners o f the theory can decide w hich subsequent statem ents will be accepted into the growing knowledge generated by the theory and w hich will be rejected as incom patible. T h e criteria erected by each theory com prise its standard and definition o f truth. Truths, then, vary with the theories in and by w hich they are produced. T h ere is no inter-theoretic standard o f truth.

T h e notion o f overdeterm ination also explains how and why alternative theories differ. W hich particular entry points cam e to define any theory,i.e., w hich particular subset o f determ inants o f any object attracted its focal atten tion , is itself overdeterm ined. T h us, for exam ple, the specifics o f the radical m ovem ents in the early n in eteenth century, the legacy o f G erm an philosophy cu lm inating in H egel at that tim e, the effects o f the industrial c ap ita lis t revo lu tion s, the cu ltu ral ch an ges sw eeping Europe and m any other factors com bined to overdeterm ine in Karl M arx and others the idea o f fash ion ing a new social theory bu ilt around the entry point o f a new | c o n ce p t o f c la ss as surplus labor production and distribution, d ia le c t ic s , J m aterialism , and so on . S im ilarly , th e transform ed econom ic, p o litical, cultural an d natural processes o f late nineteenth-century Europe com bined to overdeterm ine in Sigm und Freud and others the idea o f fashioning a new social theory around the entry poin t o f an altogether newly defined process, the unconscious.

T h in k in g , like all o ther social processes, is overdeterm ined by all the other social processes. It is thus replete with the com plex contradictions that overdeterm ination entails. O n e form that these contrad ictions can


an d ty p ic a lly do ta k e is the c o e x is te n c e o f d iffe re n t th e o r ie s , s in ce differently overdeterm ined thinkers find different entry points into social analysis persuasive. T h ey m ake their theoretical com m itm ents accordingly. If and w hen social co nd itions overdeterm ine m any indiv iduals to find a theory convin cing, it can becom e a socially consequen tial truth. If and when so cial con d ition s ch ange, such a theory will change and its truth criteria w ill ch an ge . U nder ce rta in co n d ition s, its persu asiven ess may v an ish ; it w ill th en p erh ap s d isap pear. T h eo rie s , like all other so c ia l entities, are overdeterm ined, contradictory and ceaselessly changing.

T h is c o n c e p tu a liz a t io n o f th eory , o f th in k in g , and o f its re su lts— know ledges— am ounts to a d istinctive epistem ology th a t is clearly neither e m p ir ic ism n o r r a t io n a l i s m . T h e r e are no e s se n c e s h e re : f a c tu a l observation s and th eoretical reasonings are d istinct social processes that participate in each other’s overdeterm ination. T h e truth criteria generate in each theory are overdeterm ined by observations and by reason just as reason influences observation and vice versa. N o single criterion o f truth, app licab le across all theories, is allow ed; no factu al reality is th inkable w ithout tak in g accoun t o f the influence o f on e’s theory in overdeterm ining that reality.

A lth u sser’s critique o f the conventional epistem ologies, em piricist and r a t io n a l i s t , th a t c h a ra c te r iz e d b o th th e M a r x ia n an d n o n -M a rx ia n traditions, also offered a n alternative epistem ological position. H e believed that alternative to be a uniquely M arxian epistem ological position. T h e actual presence and prevalence within the M arxian tradition o f em piricist and r a t io n a l i s t e p is te m o lo g ie s re su lte d fro m th e ir b e in g im p o rte d u n c r it ic a l ly fro m th e n o n - M a r x ia n t r a d it io n . T h u s h e v iew ed h is a lte rn a tiv e e p iste m o lo g y as fa ith fu l to th e e p is te m o lo g ic a l b reak he understood M arx to h a v e made (or at least to have inaugurated) vis-à-vis pre-M arxian philosophy.

Is A lth u sser’s claim to have form ulated explicitly a distinctive M arxian ep istem ology and social theory acceptable? T h e answ er m ust be o f the frustrating “yes and n o” variety. Let us exam ine the epistem ological claim first. T h eo retica l developm ents, especially in France am on g philosophers o f sc ien ce and discourse, literary theorists, and psychoanalysts, but also elsew here, had been m oving steadily toward an ep istem ological position th a t m ore or less sy stem a tica lly re jec ted em p iric ism an d ra tio n a lism . B a c h e la rd , C an g u ilh e m , L acan , F ou cau lt, D errid a , and L y otard ; post- s t ru c tu ra lism an d p o st-m o d e rn ism ; D ew ey , th e la te r W it tg e n s te in , H e id e g g e r , A d o r n o a n d H o rk h e im e r , a n d R o r ty — su ch fig u re s an d m ovem ents were all discarding the received traditions o f various protocols, g u ara n te e s o f w hat a sin g u la r tru th m igh t be . T h ey too ch am p io n ed


difference as em bodied in the m ultiplicity o f truths, m eanings, and realities. O n th e on e h an d , A lth u sse r m igh t be th o u g h t to h ave b ro u gh t the im plication s o f their work, w ith ad ju stm en ts, in to M arxism . T h e n his claim to have rediscovered M arx ’s unique epistem ology would have to be questioned.

O n the other han d , A lth usser did m ake a profound “ad justm en t” to the e p iste m o lo g ica l b reak a sso c ia te d w ith som e o f the n am es and figures id e n tifie d ab ove . M o reo ver, th a t “ a d ju s tm e n t” is su re ly o f M a rx ia n p ro v en an ce . It con cern s the p o lit ic a l p artisan sh ip o f all theory. T h e political struggles o f any society necessarily participate in overdeterm ining the ex isten ce o f the th eories— their entry p o in ts, tru th criteria , e tc .— operating in that society. In turn, the different theories o f any tim e and place play their role in overdeterm ining its political dynamics. T h us it is p ossib le and,, from an A lth u sserian stan dp oin t, necessary to in terrogate every theory in term s o f its social conditions and its social consequences. Indeed, what a M arxian epistem ology does is to erect those conditions and consequences as its criteria o f the acceptability o f all existing theories, i.e., its partisan attitude toward them .

A lth ou gh influenced deeply by the non-M arxian intellectual currents sw ir lin g a ro u n d h im , A lth u s se r d id n o n e th e le s s b e g in to fa sh io n a d istinctively M arxian epistem ology. It broke radically from the essentialist epistem ologies o f traditional social theory, M arxian and non-M arxian. It deployed the concepts o f overdeterm ination and com plex contradiction to ch am p io n tru th s instead o f truth , d ifferen ces am on g a m u ltip lic ity o f theories rath er th an dogm atic adherence to an absolute standard. Finally, it avoided the theoretical relativism th at m ight otherwise attend such an ' ep istem ological position by articulating a basis for theoretical partisanship a m o n g the a lte rn a tiv e tru th s d e v e lo p e d in an d by a lte rn a tiv e so c ia l theories.

From such an epistem ological standpoint, the statem ents m ade within any th eoretical project are interrogated in term s o f their social conditions and con sequ en ces. Based on th at in terrogation , the statem en ts will be accepted, re jected or transform ed for insertion in to M arxian so cial theory. M arxian social theorists will take positions toward and m ake alliances with proponents o f other theories based precisely on its assessm ent o f the social f conditions and consequences o f those theories. AU truths and all theories are n ot equally valid or acceptable from this standpoint.

T h ey are n ot accep ted or re jec ted on th e gounds o f som e ab so lu te stan dard o f a singular truth ; su ch a p rotoco l is exactly what A lth u sser ’s ep istem ological position rules out. T h ey are all treated as theories with th e ir t ru th s ; n o e p is te m o lo g ic a l b a s is e x is t s fo r th e ir r e je c t io n or


acceptance. Rather, such a basis exists on the different level o f an analysis o f each theory’s social conditions o f existence and its social consequences. T h is is why A lth u sse r ’s d is tin c tiv e M arx ian ep istem o lo gy is n e ith er a relativism nor a post-m odernism in the m anner o f Foucault or Lyotard.

A s im ila r a n sw e r m u st be g iv e n to th e q u e s t io n o f A lt h u s s e r ’ s in au g u ra tio n o f a d is t in c t iv e so c ia l th eory . M a rx is ts su ch a s L e n in , G ram sci and Lukâcs had been struggling to produce a M arxian theory freed from the last instance determ inism that had haunted it ever since Engels tried to se ttle the issu e/’ A lth u sse r ’s n otions o f overd eterm in atio n and contrad iction provide an answer to this long struggle. Despite traces o f e c o n o m ic d e term in ism in his work, th ese n o tio n s p erm it M arx ists to produce an entirely new understanding o f the causal role o f the econom y in society.

From an A lth usserian standpoint, the econ om ic base o f society can no longer be assigned som e ultim ate causal prim acy, as was claim ed by the p rop on en ts o f econ om ic determ inism . N or does this re jection o f causal privilege for the econ om y open a door to a kind o f reverse determ inism in w hich econ om ic developm ent is reduced to an effect o f the p o litica l or cultural superstructure. Instead, overdeterm ination offers a notion o f base and su p e rstru c tu re as c o n d it io n s o f e a c h o th e r ’s e x is te n c e . E a c h is understood to play a n active role in constituting the existence o f the other. N eith er can be conceived to exist independently o f the other. T h us both orth odox econom ic determ inism and the now fash ionable non-econom ic determ in ist theories are rejected. A lth usser had found a way to liberate M a r x ia n so c ia l th e o ry from the d e te rm in is t p r iso n in w h ich it h ad languished for alm ost o n e hundred years.

A distinctive way to understand society and history was now possible. By freeing M arxian social theory from the essentialism s o f hum anist and structuralist form s o f thought, A lth u sser’s work created a new way to view h um an agency, class, capital, and the laws o f social m otion . It perm itted the construction o f a theory o f society in w hich no process— econom ic, p o litica l, cultural, or natural— and no site o f processes— hum an agency, en terprise , state , or household— could be co n ce ived to ex ist as a cause w ithout being itse lf caused. A ll, whether h u m an agent or so cial structure, becam e defined within a web o f m utual overdeterm inations.

T h is fo rm u latio n o f a n o n -esse n tia list so c ia l theory m eant th a t the deve lo pm en t o f processes and sites o f p rocesses was always uneven and contingent. Historic M arxian guarantees such as the inevitability o f class struggle, or o f tran sition from one m ode to anoth er, and o f a declin in g profit rate h ad to be jettisoned. A lth usser’s ontology h ad no space in it for advan cing any form of teleo logical developm ent.


T h e last step in our argum ent that A lth usser’s interventions m ark an e p o c h a l s te p in the d e v e lo p m e n t o f M a r x ia n th e o r ie s in v o lv e s d e m o n stra tin g th e w h olly n ew k in d o f c la ss an a ly sis h is work m akes possible. If a ll en tities are to be conceived in M arxism as processes, then that must apply to the en tity called class. How m ay we read Capital to locate within it a concept o f class as process? H ow would such a reading enable and provoke a new kind o f M arxian class analysis?

U tiliz in g A lth u sse r ’s work, we reread Capital with these questions in mind. T h e results m ay be summarized as follow s.7 C lass fo r M arx refers to two p articu la r so c ia l p rocesses. T h e first k in d o f c la ss p rocess is the produciton and appropriation o f surplus labor. In all hum an societies some indiv iduals perform labor transform ing certain n atural ob jects into use- valu es to be consum ed. S u c h indiv iduals perform a quantity o f labor— expenditure o f m uscle and brain over tim e— sufficient to produce the goods and services necessary for their h istorica lly overdeterm ined standard o f living. M arx calls this necessary labor. H ow ever, such individuals always also perform more labor than the necessary quantity; they do surplus labor.

T h is su rp lus labor is not only p rodu ced but is alw ays p rodu ced fo r ! som eone. T h e question is, W ho? In M arx ’s language, the issue is who appropriates the surplus labor bein g produced in every possib le society. T h e process o f producing surplus labor is a lso th e process o f appropriating it. W e call this class process the fundamental class process to distinguish it form the second k ind o f class process defined by M arx. T h e surplus labor— or its product— may be appropriated by the sam e individuals who perform that surplus labor, or the surplus may be appropriated by other individuals who do not perform it.

M arx a lso d is tin g u ish es d ifferen t form s th at the fu n d am en ta l class process h as taken across hum an history. D epending on social conditions, the fo rm s m ay v a ry fro m a r r a n g e m e n ts in w h ic h in d iv id u a ls w ho collectively produce surplus also collectively appropriate their own surplus (c o m m u n is m ) to a r r a n g e m e n ts w h ere so m e in d iv id u a ls p r iv a te ly ap p rop ria te the surplus p rodu ced by o th ers (c ap ita lism , feu dalism and slavery). W hile M arx theorized still other forms o f the fundam ental class p ro ce ss , h e fo cu sed his work o v erw h elm in g ly on the co n tem p o rarily prevalent form, capitalism .

O n ce M arx theorized where and how th is fun dam en tal class process existed w ithin a cap italist society— the ob ject o f Capital, vol. 1— he went on to analyze the second kind o f class process— the ob ject o f Capital, vol. 3. H e reasoned quite simply that the production/appropriation o f surplus labor im p lie d a lo g ic a l n e x t q u e s t io n : n a m e ly , w h at w as d o n e w ith th e appropriated surplus labor (or its products)? M arx ’s com plex answer held

70 TH E ALTH U SSERIAN LEGACY

that the products o f surplus' labor were distributed by its appropriators to o ther people in society. T h is distribution o f already appropriated surplus is the secon d k in d o f class p rocess; we h ave ca lled it the subsumed c lass p ro cess to d is tin g u ish it from the fu n d am en ta l c la ss p ro cess . A s the fundam ental class process encom passes the performers an d appropriators o f surplus labor, th e subsumed class process encom passes the distributors and the recipients o f appropriated surplus.

T h e recipients o f distributed shares o f the appropriated surplus labor are thereby en ab led to live and work, even though they do not participate n ecessarily in p rodu cin g or app rop riatin g surplus labor. T h e different groups o f people who obtain distributed shares o f appropriated surplus play a specific role in M arx ’s conception o f a society’s class structure. Th ey are understood to perform specific non-class processes that provide conditions o f existence for the fundam ental class process. In return fo r so doing, they obtain distributions o f the surplus. For exam ple, m odern state functionaries educate present and future performers o f surplus labor— thereby securing a condition o f existence o f the fundam ental class process, nam ely a supply of capable workers. In return for so doing, cap italists take a portion o f the surplus they appropriate from their productive laborers and distribute it to these state functionaries to enable them to perform the non-class process of education.

S u ch state functionaries are then understood to participate in, am ong m any others, the follow ing two different social p rocesses: the n on-class p rocess o f ed ucation an d the subsumed class process (since they receive a distributed portion o f appropriated surplus— in the form o f taxes). O ther m o d e r n e x a m p le s o f in d iv id u a ls w h o c a n o b t a in su b su m e d c la s s distributions o f appropriated surplus include: bankers who lend m oney to in d ustria l ca p ita lis ts , lawyers who han d le lega l p rob lem s for industrial capitalists, m anagers w ho run industrial enterprises including th eir possible expansion through cap ital accum ulation , m erchants who han dle the selling o f output for industrial capitalists, ow ners o f w ealth who provide capitalists w ith access to the m eans o f production , and a host o f others.

U sin g A lth u sser’s notion s o f overdeterm ination and con trad iction to th in k o f class in term s o f process rather than as distinct groups o f people has far-reaching consequences for the entire corpus o f M arxian social theory. C onsider, for exam ple, th at a process approach suggests th at individuals m ay p articipate in various fundam ental an d subsum ed class processes during the course o f a day or a lifetim e. Sim ilarly, there may be different forms o f the fundam ental class process at different sites in society at the same time: for exam ple, there m ay be cap italist production o f surplus goin g on in large e n te rp rise s , w h ile the feu d al fu n d am en ta l c la ss p ro ce ss re ign s in sid e


h o u se h o ld s, an d w h ile in d iv id u a l p ro d u cers a p p ro p ria tin g th e ir ow n individual surpluses (self-em ployed persons) function in sm all enterprises. T h ese considerations suggest th at class analyses o f societies must presum e and explore far greater com plexities o f class structures th an has often been the case in M arxism .

Sta ted otherwise, the old dualistic m odel o f two great classes, capitalists and proletarians, has to give way to the presum ption th at individuals can and do p artic ip ate in m ultip le and different k in ds o f class processes at different sites in so ciety across th eir lifetim es. T h is presum ption carries heavy im plications problem atizing the linkages betw een any individual’s or group’s political interests and its com plex, m ultiple participation in diverse class processes.

S im ila rly , th e n o tio n o f c la ss as p rocess p rob lem atizes an o th er old sim plicity o f M arxists and other radicals. T h e A lth usserian approach to social theory, qua set o f processes, differentiates between processes o f power and class. T h a t is, power processes refer to ways in w hich individuals order one an oth er’s behavior in society. C lass processes refer instead to whether and how in d iv id u als p a r tic ip a te in the p ro d u ctio n , ap p ro p ria tio n and distribution o f surplus labor. T h us, fo r exam ple, the phrase “ruling classes” is a problem . If it m eans a con cept o f grouping individuals according to the power they wield in society, that is different from using class as a concept o f how indiv iduals participate in producing, appropriating and distributing surplus labor. A t the very least, A lth usser’s approach requires rethinking the indiscrim inate use o f the term “class” in the M arxian tradition, when its users do n ot all m ean the sam e thing. Indeed, while some M arxists use class to refer to the power ind iv iduals wield and o th ers to refer to their participations in the class process, still others use th e term to refer to the property individuals do or do n ot own. T h e m ixing o f different an d often incom patible usages o f so central a term w ithin the M arxian tradition is a sign o f theoretical (and hence also political) confusion w hich A lth usser’s re form u lation en ab les us to recogn ize, analyze and so at least beg in to resolve. W e h ave elsewhere undertaken to elaborate the m any other far- re ach in g im p lica tio n s o f the new c o n ce p t o f c la ss as p rocess w h ich is im plied by A lth usser’s contributions.

In epistem ology, in social theory, and in the conceptualization o f class, A lth usser’s break with the determ inism endem ic to the M arxian tradition h as h ad an d co n tin u es to have ep o ch a l ram ifica tio n s. H is n o tio n s o f overdeterm ination and con trad iction and his prelim inary elaboration o f th e ir im p lica tio n s have set in m o tio n a b ro ad reco n ce p tu a liz a tio n o f M a rx ism . T h e in e v ita b le fits and s ta r ts arid forw ard and b ack w ard oscilla tion s o f any th eoretica l revo lu tion a tten d A lth u sse r ’s p ro ject too.


Yet, if M arxism needs periodic renewal and transform ation to enable it to meet the changing historical conditions facing those com m itted to move b ey o n d c ap ita lism , then A lth u sse r ’s co n tr ib u tio n s deserve the c lo sest a tten tion as precisely the m eans for such a renewal and transform ation.

N o t e s

1. C f . Ja c k A m arig lio , “ M arx ism A g a in st E c o n o m ic S c ie n c e : A lth u sse r ’s L e g a cy ,” in P au l Z a re m b k a , e d ., R esearch in Political E conom y, V o l . 10 G r e e n w ic h , C o n n e c t ic u t an d L o n d o n : J A I P re ss, 1987 , p p . 159-94-

2. It is su ggestiv e to n o te th e p a ra lle l h e re w ith E in s te in ’s fam ou s 1905 p ro p o sa l th at all p h ysica l m asses are form s o f en ergy and th at each p articu lar q u an tu m o f en ergy (m ass) in tu m d ep en d s u p o n th e in te rac tio n o f a ll th e o th ers in th e universe.

3. A sim ilar way o f fo rm ulatin g th is idea h as b een th e d ec o n stru c tio n or d ecen terin g o f th e se lf in to a m ass o f co n trad icto ry se lv es w ith in each person .

4- For fu rth er d iscu ssio n , see our Knowledge an d C la s s : A M arxian Critique o f Political Econom y, C h ic a g o : U n iv ersity o f C h ic ag o Press, 1987.

5. Ib id . F o r a co n c re te a p p lica tio n o f how the n o tio n o f d ifferen t entry p o in ts c a n b e used in d istin g u ish in g o n e theory from an oth er, s e e o u r Econom ics: M arx ian versus N eoclassical, B altim ore an d L o n d o n : T h e Jo h n s H o p k in s U n iversity Press, 1987.

6. E n g e ls to J o s e p h B lo c h , S e p te m b e r 2 1 -2 2 , 1 8 9 0 , in K a r l M a r x a n d F re d e r ick E n gels, Selected C orrespon den ce, M o sc o w : P rogress P u b lish ers, 1975, pp. 394-396 .

7. F o r a d e t a i l e d e x p o s i t io n o f c o n c r e te c la s s a n a ly s i s , see c h a p te r s 3 -5 o f ou r Knowledge a n d C la ss .

Maria Turchetto

History of Science and the Science of History

I am proposing here an exam ination o f the text Reading Capital, written by Louis A lthusser in 1965. I will consider it as a text in the history o f philosophy. In Reading C apital A lthusser explicitly asks w hich philosophy provides the basis, the foundation, fo r M arx ’s scientific work? In this sense, Reading Capital is, at the sam e tim e, a text in the history o f ph ilosophy and a text in the philosophy o f science. In research on M arx ’s philosophy, it becom es essential in the A lthusserian argument to consider M arx ’s historical position in relation to the school o f classical econom y, on the one hand, and to H e g e l’s p h ilo soph y , on the other. In oth er words, it is a m atter o f d e te rm in in g M a rx ’s p o sit io n in a history o f science and in a history o f philosophy.

I spoke o f historical position, not sim ply th eoretica l position . Indeed, according to A lthusser, M arx ’s Capital opens a new epoch in th e history o f sc ien ce an d in th e history o f philosophy: it marks a p o in t o f no return in th ese h istories. I w ant to say that in reading Capital, A lthusser does not simply establish a com parison betw een different theories: he form ulates a historical judgment w hich is tem porally directed, a vector with a very precise course. M arx ’s science is not sim ply “better” th an S m ith ’s or R icardo’s; it is subsequent. A n d M arx ’s philosophy, w hich is im plicit in his science, is not simply “better” than H egel’s philosophy; it is subsequent. It belongs to the follow ing epoch. H egel’s theories o f classical econom y are not sim ply other theories; they are the prehistory o f M arx ’s theories.

Before beg in n in g w ith this top ic , a few words about the title I have chosen for this paper— “History o f Scien ce and Scien ce o f H istory.” T h is is not a play on words, because h istory actually enters in to the A lthusserian argum ent in two ways. O n the one hand, I said that A lthusser analyzes C apital as a scientific work in terms o f the history o f sciences. O n the other hand, the particu lar science whose h istory A lth usser reconstructs is the science o f h istory. A c c o r d in g to A lth u s se r , M a r x ’s C ap ita l m ark s a fundam ental stage in the history o f the science o f history. T o speak plainly, I have schem atized A lth usser’s position in this way: according to A lthusser, it is on ly w ith M arx th at h isto ry b e c o m e s, fo r th e fir st tim e , a true


“science,” or at the very least a “m ature” science. In other words, before M arx there was only prehistory o f the science o f history. O ne can see it; the p lay on words is inevitable.

T o get in to my su b ject, I w ill app roach A lth u sse r ’s tex t by ask ing a question which is possibly “aggressive” but, I believe, not too dissonant with the spirit o f the author. I ask what is philosophy? A lth usser aim s to situate M arx ’s C apital in a history o f the sc ien ce o f history. M oreover, A lth usser explicitly says th at he reads Capital as a ph ilosopher, not as a historian. T o exam ine Capital’s place in the history o f knowledge is then a philosophical not a historical question. A lthusser says that to read Capital as a historian would have m eant to read it questioning the relation betw een its h istorical analyses and an historical object, previously defined outside o f it , w ith o u t d is c u s s in g th is o b je c t . In o th e r w o rd s, th e h i s t o r ic a l co n sid eration invo lved in A lth u sser ’s ph ilosophy does n ot p lace M arx ’s w ork in relation to a “m ilieu” with a h istorical con text defined somewhere else. O n the contrary, A lthusser’s philosophy reflects on how to define these “contexts” or these historical “ob jects.”

Ph ilosophical discourse is specifically characterized by putting the object of a science into question. A lth usser em phazises this characterization in the com parison betw een the p h ilo sph er’s reading on the one hand, and the readings o f the h istorian , the econom ist, the logician , etc., on the other hand. T h ese last readings would have considered the object o f Capital as given, whereas the philosopher’s reading considers the object o f Capital as its tru e p ro b le m . In th is s e n se , A lt h u s s e r so m e t im e s d e f in e s th e philosopher’s reading as an “epistom ological reading.” T o read Capital a s a ph ilosopher, says A lth usser, m eans to ask the ep istom ological question . T h a t is to say, th e qu estion about th e relation with its object, the question o f the discourse co n stru cted to treat this ob ject— the question o f scientific discourse. T o get to the bottom o f the question I asked previously— what is p h ilo so p h y ?— we can say th a t, a cc o rd in g to A lth u sse r , p h ilo so p h y is ep istom ology , and ep istom ology is reflection on sc ien tific discourse and , n o tab ly , re se arch and rc o n stru c tio n o f the c o n c e p tu a l stru ctu re th a t provides th e ob ject o f a science.

It is necessary to stress th at in A lth u sser’s text the term “epistom ology” always has a broad m eaning. I would say it has the classical sense o f theory of knowledge (conn aissan ce). In p articu lar, I w ant to say th a t it is not n e c e ssa ry to th in k o f th e lim ite d se n se th e term is a ss ig n e d in the neopositiv ist tradition, w h ich uses this term to designate the investigation o f the logical coheren ce o f scientific argum ent, in polem ical opposition to the term “philosophy,” suspected o f “m etaphysics.” A ccording to A lthusser, investigation o f the coheren ce o f the argum ent constitutes the goal o f the

HISTORY OF SCIEN CE A ND THE SCIEN CE OF HISTORY 75

logician ’s reading. T h at is to say, the reading w hich poses the problem o f m ethods o f exposition and proof, again without questioning the object o f these m ethods. T h us, the philosophical investigation o f a scientific work is n o t s im p ly an h i s t o r ic a l in v e s t i g a t io n , and n ot s im p ly a lo g ic a l in vestigation . Ph ilosoph ical in vestigation is always a n inquiry into the conceptual structure o f a science w hich involves a h istorical judgem ent. O n e sees th a t the co m p ariso n — and indeed the d is tin c tio n — betw een “ p h i lo s o p h ic a l , ” “ h i s t o r ic a l , ” a n d “ lo g ic a l ” is fu n d a m e n ta l to an understanding o f A lth usser’s lesson.

W e can ask other, sim ilar qu estio n s, alw ays w ith the goal o f b etter u n d erstan d in g w hat A lth u sse r ian “ ep istem olog ica l p h ilo sop h y ” is. For exam ple , on e can in vestiga te p h ilo sop h y w ith regard to the d ifference betw een philosophy and science. O ne can ask again— the question brings us b ack to the sam e n ucleus o f q u estio n s— w hat are the “ m ater ia ls” o f p h ilo so p h y ? W h at d o es p h ilo so p h y c o n c e rn it s e l f w ith? W ith th is q u e stio n , I w an t to put forw ard a g a in a p rob lem ra ise d p rin c ip a lly in debates on th e su b ject o f the history o f philosophy. Should th e history of philosophy feed itself exclusively on interior m aterial, that is, philosophical systems? Or, on the contrary, should it limit itself to the exterior and follow its p ath a lon gsid e the h istory o f sc ien ces, the h istory o f re la tion s, the history o f culture, etc.?

I believe it is possible to find a un ivocal response to this question in A lth usser’s text. First, one must include the sciences w ithin the “m aterials” o f philosophy— that goes w ithout saying. W e have seen th at philosophy is concerned with scientific discourse. Philosophy form ulates a judgm ent o f the capacity for in n ovation o f sc ien tific theories, it aim s at recognizing “ep istem olog ical revo lu tion s” ; th is, notably , is the h istorical judgem ent engaged in by philosophy. T h e sc iences are thus the m aterial par excellence, or indeed the raw m aterial o f ph ilosophy, because philosophy does not really have an ob ject (in the sense that all science has its own ob ject). R a th e r , p h ilo so p h y is a tw ice -re m o v ed re fle c t io n o n k n o w led ge . In addition , sciences are the exclusive m aterial o f ph ilosoph ical work. T h e knowledge philosophy provides for theory is only scientific knowledge. It is not, I w ant to say, a knowledge (savoir) in the broad an d generic sense o f the term, th at is to say, the sense w hich includes religions, m yths, forms o f life, mentalités, etc. T h ese d ifferent form s o f know ldege can en ter into p h ilosophical discourse at best as “epistem ological obstacles,” th at is, on the negative side o f a discourse w hich aims to distinguish betw een “scientific” and “pre-scientific,” between “science” and “ideology,” betw een “history” and “prehistory” o f knowledge.


O f course— we must clarify the point— these cultural “non-scientific” or “p re-sc ien tific” form s can form the specific ob ject o f different particu lar sciences. In this case we will have “sciences o f nature.” In this sense we m u st em p h asize th a t A lth u s se r d e p a r ts fro m a strong unitary idea o f k n o w led ge , an idea w hich su ffices to ex c lu d e a priori any d ich o to m y betw een “nature” and “culture.”

In conclusion, we can say th at A lth u sser’s “epistem ological philosophy” is not related to “culture” in the generic sense o f “hum an expression” or o f any kind o f “know ledge” (savoir). “E p istem ological p h ilo soph y” is only related to w hat is properly called scientific knowledge (savoir). It has to do only w ith the know ledge (connaissance) o f o b je c ts, e ith er “n a tu ra l” or “cultural,” but in any case objects w hich are defined and exam ined in a scientific manner. C onsequently, the history o f philosophy is the history o f sc ie n tific k now ledge (connaissance), and its m ater ia ls can be the “raw m ateria ls” o f sc ien ces, or even o f refin em ents, indeed o f p h ilo sop h ical elaborations.

T o co n clu d e the q u estio n o f the re la tion s betw een p h ilo sop h y and sc ien ce in a p ro v isio n al m anner, we m ust add th at the unitary idea o f knowledge (connaissance) I spoke about does n ot exclude the plurality o f the sciences. T h ere is n ot science (s in g u lar ); th ere are alw ays a num ber o f specific sciences. In the A lthusserian conception , the plurality o f sciences does n ot derive from a descriptive n otation such as the specialization o f the m odern world or som ething similar. T h e plurality derives from the d e fin itio n itse lf o f “sc ie n c e .” In effect, there are a n um ber o f sc ien ces because sc ience exists on ly from the p o in t o f the delimitation of the scientific object. W hereas philosophy, as we have seen, does not have an object, science is always science o f a defined object.

“ D elim ita tio n o f an o b je c t” is really not the proper term . I chose a sy n th e t ic fo rm u la , su ita b le fo r u n ra v e lin g th e d if fe re n c e s b e tw e e n philosophy and science. But we m ust say that it is not really a m atter o f “ d e l im ita t io n ” b u t ra th e r o f co n stru ction . T h e term “ d e l im ita t io n ” nevertheless em phasizes that a ll science provides a rupture in the “infinite unknotting o f sense that is the world.” (H ere, I’m using the words o f M ax W eber.) T h us, the plurality o f sciences finally returns to the plurality o f possible ruptures. O n the other hand, even the term “ob ject” is not the most precise. A lth usser, in fact, alm ost never uses it alone. He always speaks o f the “object-discourse relation,” o f the “unity o f discourse with .its object,” etc. I will return to this shortly. But let’s accept fo r the m om ent this incorrect form ulation, “delim itation o f the ob ject.” W e say then that all sc ie n c e h as a d e lim ite d (c o n stru c te d ) o b je c t , w h ereas p h ilo so p h y concerns the m odalities o f delim itation (construction). T h e sciences can

HISTORY OF SCIENCE AN D THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY 7 7

rightfully be unaw are o f these m odalities o f delim itation (constru ction), either because they are not interested in d iscussing them or, in a strong snse, because they do not understand them at all. T h a t is, because they have forgotten or falsified the delim itation.

W here is the answ er to a question w hich derives spontaneously from the assertion that knowledge is only scientific know ledge: what is philosophy good for? what is the use o f it? In other words, isn ’t the family o f sciences sufficient? W hy would it need to have a philosophy alongside or over it? W e h av e just seen the reason: scientific practice ca n work very well, can produce knowledge very well, even without understanding its philosophical constitution. A ccord in g to A lthusser, this is exactly the case with M arx. H is s c ie n t i f i c p r a c t ic e d o e s n o t c o r r e sp o n d to h is p h i lo s o p h ic a l declarations. N otably— and here the philosophical judgm ent becom es an historical judgm ent— the scientific practice at work in Capital is often more advanced than the m ethodological assertions contained in the same text.

T h e A lth usserian analysis o f the contradictions betw een M arx ’s science and m any o f h is philosophical statem ents is well-known. T h e exam ples he uses are also well-know n (the Letter to citizen Maurice L a Châtre, where M arx says that he applies the H egelian m ethod to econom ic and political argum ents). H ere let me recall the fundam ental ind ication w hich brings us back to A lth u sser ian analysis. W e must look for M arx ’s ph ilosophy in M arx ’s science— a science w hich is extrem ely innovative.

But how is M arx ’s science innovative? It is possible, yet again, to locate a c le ar an d u n iv o c a l re sp o n se in A lth u s se r ’s te x t . M a rx ’s sc ie n c e is inn ovative because it is not empiricist, or, to express it better, because its object is constructed by rigorous, non-em piricist m odalities. I believe the tim e has com e to provide clarification for the term “ob ject.” In fact, there is hardly an em piricist conception o f knowledge that can speak o f “ob jects” w ithout problem s. T h e term “ob ject” as well as the term “subject” belong to the em piricist trad ition . W hen one speaks o f the “con stru ction ” o f s c ie n t i f ic o b je c t s (n o lo n g e r g iv e n o b je c t s ) , or th e “ p ro d u c t io n o f know ledge,” the question becom es com plicated . It is n ot only a m atter o f co n stru ctin g an ob ject. T h e .s ta r tin g poin t o f sc ien tific production is a c o lle c t io n o f “ s tru c tu ra l c o n d it io n s ,” one co u ld say a “ s tru c tu re o f o b s e r v a t io n ” w h ic h , at th e sam e tim e , d e f in e s visible objects (a n d , consequently, invisible ob jects), the position o f the subject in the structure o f observation, and a domain o f verifiability.

I can not enter into the details here o f this triple determ ination which follows from “ scientific construction” (perm it me to refer you to my other work, especially to the text “Per la critica di un ’autocritica” ). In any case, I w an t to stre ss in a few w ords th a t the su b je c t is d e te rm in ed by th e


conceptual structure as well as by the object. Indeed, in the A lthusserian reading o f Capital, anti-em piricism is, at the sam e tim e, anti-subjectivism . S in ce there is no longer a pre-categorial object, just as there is no longer a p re - c a te g o r ia l su b je c t , the su b je c t is “ p ro d u c e d ” by the “ stru c tu ra l con d ition s” o f the theory, as well as the object. In other words, the givens o f a “real ob ject” provided to sensible intuition and the givens o f the “ideal ob ject” com ing from subjective representation are equally poor according to A lth u s s e r : n e ith e r one n o r th e o th e r su c c e e d s in sh o w in g th e conceptual structure w hich constitutes the objects o f knowledge. There you have a critique o f “ id ealist” su b jectiv ism . It is not a m atter o f an id e a list in v ersio n o f em piric ism . T h a t ’s very im p o rtan t, b ecau se th is c ritiqu e can avo id the co n sequ en ces o f a re la tiv ism w ith no m ean s o f escape. Put another way, it concerns m ain tain ing the co nd itions w ith a view to guaranteeing the com parison betw een different theories— to avoid incom m ensurability.

It is also im p o rta n t to en v isio n the d e te rm in a tio n o f a d o m ain o f verifiab ility . H ere one en coun ters the qu estion A lth u sser’s interpreters h ave quarreled a good deal about: the question o f the interiority o f the c r ite r io n o f tru th . A b o v e all it co n ce rn s— ag a in — an an ti-e m p ir ic is t appeal. O ne must reject the idea o f a verification that would be exterior and foreign to the theoretical hypothesis. T h e pressing question o f M arx ’s Capital— one knows it well— is th at a certain M arxism claim ed to verify it sim ply by revolutionary practice. A lthusser notes that such a claim is not legitim ate in other sciences: fo r exam ple, the physicist does not claim to verify all the m athem atical theorem s he uses.

I must now ca ll attention to a subsequent n otion o f A lth u sser’s. O n e grants to sc ience the right to an interior criterion o f tru th from the m om ent it is constituted and developed. W hat does that m ean? From what point can one say that a science is “developed,” th at it is mature, or has com e o f age? In a word, sc ien ce ’s com ing o f age consists o f being at the level o f its tim e. T h us, it is at m ajority relative to its h istorical tim e. O r, accord in g to A lth usser, the form o f scientificity at the level o f the present tim e is exactly that “constructivist,” anti-em piricist form we have been talk ing about. In the h isto r ica l p resen t, sc ien ces m u st1 not depart from the p re-categorial g iven s co n cern in g the o b ject, fo r fea r o f b e in g ju dged “ p re -sc ie n tific ,” “ ideo log ica l.” T o d ay — better, after M arx— there is a p roh ib ition against being an em piricist; em piricism is forbidden.

So one can understand the sense o f h istorical judgem ent involved in the p h ilo so p h ica l in v e stig a tio n o f C apital. T h is is not only a q u estio n o f clarifying what M arx does. A t the sam e tim e it is a m atter o f indicating w hat the sc ien ces m ust do. O n ce criticized, em piricism is n o t ju st any

HISTORY OF SCIENCE A ND THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY 79

theoretical choice whatever; it is backtracking, a retreat. M arx lies beyond the th resh o ld o f sc ie n tific ity ; all em p iric ist sc ien ce after him rem ain s behind it.

I w ant now to draw several conclusions. Philosophy m ust clarify the “form of scientificity” w hich certain scientific knowledge is based on (often without being fully conscious o f it). But it does not simply concern m aking n otes. P h ilosophy does not have a purely exp lica tiv e function . It p resc r ib e s ; it re q u ir ie s c e r ta in c o n d it io n s fo r re co g n iz in g k n o w led ge as “sc ie n tific .” In o th er words, p h ilo sop h y m ust d istinguish th e sc ien tific from the pre-scientific. It follows that philosophy is o f necessity history of philosophy. In effect, “sc ientific” and “pre-scientific” are relative concepts from the historical poin t o f view.

T h a t m ean s, on the one h an d , th a t A lth u sse r a cc ep ts the m odern dim ension o f the relativity o f knowledges, but that does not m ean foregoing ju d g e m e n t in the n am e o f r e la t iv ism . O n the o th e r h a n d , c le ar ly , according to A lthusser, history is directionless. Rather, it has to construct a d ire c t io n , a d ir e c t io n a l i ty w h ich m ark s a s ig n if ic a n t forw ard an d backward. T h at is the ta sk o f philosophy.

From the second h a lf o f the 19th century, m any sciences are carried along by a process o f theoretical transform ation w hich will lead them very far from positiv ism and empiricism. T h is is not a linear process. In fact, on e speaks o f th is proces as a “crisis o f the sc ien ces,” and this is n ot a process w hich unfolds in exactly the sam e m anner in each scientific field. But it is also not a m ovem ent o f totally chaotic dispersion. O ne can locate the directions, the coordinates. G aston Bachelard spoke o f this process as the “form ation o f the new sc ien tific sp irit,” including in it a num ber o f decisive “epistem ological ruptures” in the area o f natural sciences, such as the in tro d u tio n o f p ro b a b ilism in p h y sic s , the m a th e m a tic iz a t io n o f chem istry, etc. In my opinion, the A lthusserian reading o f Capital exhibits m any sim ilarities with the B ach elard ian reading o f the transform ations o f the n atural sciences. O n the one hand, A lth usser judges the concept o f the “m eans o f production ” to be an “epistem ological rupture” in the science of history c o m p a r a b le to th e m a t h e m a t ic iz a t io n o f c h e m is tr y or th e introduction o f probabilism into physics. O n the other hand, A lthusser tries to generalize the ch arac te r is tic s o f this “ ep istem o lo g ica l ru p tu re” beyond th e lim its o f th e particular sc ien ce where it arises. It is th e same synthetic schem e as B ach elard ’s. Bachelard sees different aspects o f the same process in the conceptual transform ations o f chemistry and physics. A process w hich leads, across its oscillations an d alternating rhythms, to the goal o f a new scientific spirit w hich can — in the n am e o f the unity o f sc iences— be pictured in a coh eren t ch art. In a certain sense, A lthusser


will com plete this ch art with the path o f the historical and social sciences. T h is is the sam e path, because after M arx, h istorical and social sciences must leave the old em piric ist sp irit and re-exam in e their co n cep ts o f “ law ,” “causality ,” “determ in ation ,” etc. T h is passing beyond em piricist history, w hich begins with M arx and is far from being attain ed today, is not any theoretical transform ation whatsoever, but the same transformation which the sciences attain in general in the 20th century.

T h e consequences are rem arkable. AU barriers betw een “n atu re” and “culture” are broken down. T h is is not banal; a large part o f 20th-century culture, and notably G erm an culture, has always protected these barriers. A fte r M arx, one can co n stru ct a critique o f the em piric ist ideology o f h isto ry w h ich , on the o th er h an d , is in m any w ays an a lo g o u s to the co n stru c tiv ism em erg in g in the ph ysica l sc ie n ces in the 20th century. C o n se q u e n tly , M arx is d isp la ce d from the 1 9 th cen tu ry to the 2 0 th century. T h us, w ith the perm ission o f th e th eo re tic ian o f the “crisis o f M arxism ,” M arx is n ot properly a “classical” author. O n the contrary, he op en s the co n tem p o rary age— th e new sc ie n tif ic sp ir it in the fie ld o f history.

I would like to add in conclusion th at M arx ’s displacem ent to the 20th century is very sign ifican t w hen on e com pares him w ith the m oderns, rather than com paring him w ith classical authors. A lthusser reads Capital in relation to classical econom ics and H egelian philosophy, according to a tradition w hich is certainly— we must say— philologically correct. H egel, Sm ith , and R icardo are indeed the true sources fo r M arx. W h at I am suggesting is reading Capital in relation to subsequent developm ents in the science o f econom ics and the theory o f history, especially in re lation to authors in the historical school o f econom ics, on the one hand, and on the other, in relation to authors who are engaged in a long debate with the historical school, the so-called conflict o f m ethods (Methodenstreit). O nce more I cannot go into details here, but again perm it me to refer you to my work cited earlier.

In any case, the lesson o f A lthusser is fun dam en tally to attem pt this co m parison betw een M arx, on the on e h an d , and Sch m öller, R osch er, K nies, M enger, W eber, an d Rickert on' the other. It invo lves a com parison w hich is perhaps questionable from a philological poin t o f view, but is in my opin ion correct from a theoretical point o f view. A sim ilar com parison can, I believe, further illum inate the subject if one considers that today, not only in com m on usage, but also am ong a large num ber o f scholars and specialists, the term “h istorical” is used as a synonym for “em pirical.”

Translated by M artha C alhoun

Peter Schëttler

Althusser and Annales Historiography—An Impossible

Dialogue?

I

Louis A lth usser’s philosophical texts are taken to be “anti-h istorical” by m any historians, or a t least to possess n o significance for historiography at all. T h is is true not only o f the p resen t, in w h ich A lth u sse r ’s M arx ist a ffiliation seem s out o f place, but a lso o f th e period when it was widely shared . W h en ever the so-called “structuralist a ttack on history “ (A lfred Sch m id t) was at issue, A lth u sser ’s nam e was im m ediately invoked. Few h is to r ia n s re je c te d th is n e g a t iv e “ c o n se n su s” an d ack n o w led g ed the suggestion provided by For M arx and Reading C apital. 1

A m on g the num erous critiques o f A lthusser, an article by Pierre V ilar e n t it le d “ M a r x is t H isto ry , a H isto ry in th e M a k in g ” is p a r tic u la r ly rem arkable. Its place o f publication was program m atic in itself, since it first appeared in 1973 in the journ al Annales and was then reprinted, a year later, in the co llectio n Faire de l’histoire ed ited by Jacq u es Le G o ff and Pierre N o ra .2 T h e author’s distinctive profile is an additional factor. V ilar was (a n d s t i l l is) on e o f the b e s t-k n o w n h is to r ia n s o f th e “ se c o n d generation” o f the Annales Sch ool, and from 1962 until h is retirem ent held the ch a ir in ec o n o m ic and so c ia l h isto ry at the S o rb o n n e p rev iou sly o c c u p ie d by M arc B lo c h an d E rn e st L a b ro u sse . M o reo v er , h e n ever concealed h is M arxist views w hich he discussed in numerous articles. A n d it is s ig n if ic a n t th a t V ila r fo rm u la te d no p h ilo so p h ic a l or M arx is t- p h ilo lo g ic a l o b je c t io n s to A lth u s se r ’s th e se s , b u t— in c o n tra st to a ll previous critiques— com pared them with the practice and m ethodological “standards” o f the latest historical science.

In Reading Capital (1 9 6 5 ), in the ch apter “O utline o f the C o n cep t o f H is to ry ,” ’ A lth u s se r h ad a sse rte d th at “ m o d ern h is to r io g ra p h y ” st i l l rem ained tied to a n “em p iric ist” co n ce p tio n o f h istory insofar as— like V o lta ire or, la te r , in a “ su b lim a te d ” fo rm , H e g e l— it c o n c e iv e d the h isto r ica l process in the form o f a hom ogeneous and lin ear continu ity , w h ich it was sufficient to put in “order” an d “periodize”; and , secondly, it

82 TH E ALTH USSERIAN LEG ACY

presupposed a concept o f tem porality wherein all the elements or levels o f a society can be reduced to one and the sam e tem poral axis. A s we know, this critiqu e was prim arily d irected again st the “M arxist co n cep tion o f history” predom inant at the time, which— som etim es in fatalist, som etim es in activ ist, fash ion— “ inverted” H egel’s philosophy o f history, instead o f resum ing and continuing the break with any philosophy o f history effected by Capital, as A lthusser dem anded. But at the sam e time, A lth usser was also thinking o f the m ost innovative practitioners o f historiography, since he exp lic itly n oted : “N ow adays, a few h isto rian s are beg in n in g to pose th ese q u estio n s, and o ften in a very rem ark ab le way (L u c ie n Febvre, Labrousse, Braudel, e tc .).”4 T h is reference was followed by a short critique, w h ic h w as, h o w ev er , ra th e r a b stra c t and a llu s iv e ( in lin e w ith th e program m atic tone o f th e book):

b u t they d o not pose those questions exp lic itly a s a function o f the structure o f the whole they are studying, they do not pose them in a truly conceptu al form: they simply observe that there are different times in history, varieties o f time, long times, m edium times and short tim es, an d they are conten t to n o te their interferences as so many products o f their in tersection ; they do not therefore relate these varieties as so m any variations to the structure o f the w h ole, a lth o u gh the la tter d irectly gov ern the produ ction o f th ose variatio n s; rather, th ey are tem pted to relate these varieties, as so m any variants measurable by th e ir d u ra t io n to o r d in a ry tim e i t s e lf , to the id e o lo g ic a l tim e continuum we have discussed. (R C , p. 96)

It was above all th is p assage , and a few o th e rs in w h ich A lth u sse r criticized th e th ou gh t o f th e “best h isto r ian s...to d ay ” (cf. ibid., p. 100), w ithout polem ic but without any concessions either, that served as Pierre V ila r ’s p o in t o f departu re in ch a lle n g in g A lth u s se r ’s p o stu la te s abou t historical science. A lth ough he acknow ledged th a t th e positions advanced in Reading Capital were interesting and possibly even judicious on certain precise points, he thought that generally they were “wide” o f the actual practice o f history, and th at they erected criteria w hich were im possible to fulfill, or were even simply absurd, contradicted by em pirical research. V ilar w ent furth er still. In d igressions on Febvre, Labrousse and B raudel, he sought to show th at the h istorian s m entioned by A lth usser were, in their p rac tic e , already “m ore ad v an ced ” and even m ore “ M a rx is t” th an the ph ilosopher in his abstract generality. H is unwarranted critique o f history was therefore based upon an ignorance o f the m ost recent research and, ultim ately, on an outm oded conception o f the writing o f history.

A LTH U SSER AND AN N A LES HISTORIOGRAPHY 83

V ila r ’s article has been m uch echoed in France and abroad, and was nearly always read as a text directed against A lth usser.5 In attend ing only to the h istorian ’s occasionally ironic and polem ical tone with respect to the p h i lo s o p h e r ’s in ju n c t io n , p e o p le f a i le d to n o te th e fu n d a m e n ta l co n vergen ces betw een V ilar and A lth u sser , and also V ila r ’s underlying critique o f certa in o f his professional colleagues (n otab ly Braudel). T h e subtitle— “Tow ards a Dialogue w ith A lth u sser”— was n ot tak en literally, but read as a rh etorical or courteous turn o f phrase, or even as an additional irony. For how could there conceivably be a constructive debate betw een the “theoreticist” A lth usser and a h istorian im m ersed in em pirical work?

T h e apparent obviousness o f this chasm , this incom patibility, persists, an d has even been reinforced subsequently. T h e evolution o f the political and th eo re tica l co n ju n cture in the la st fifteen years, A lth u sse r ’s tragic retirem ent from the public sphere, as well as the recovery o f his texts by “ secon dary lite ra tu re ,” have con tributed to this. But from the angle o f theoretical history, the last word has possibly not yet been said. M ight not a h is to r ic a l sc ie n c e o f the fu tu re , w h ich w ish ed to re fle c t on its w ork ep istem ologically , on e day find in A lth usser— am ong others— som eth ing w hich would aid it to “fou n d ” its practice in a m ateria list m anner? O r rather, since it is not a question o f a “foundation” in the sense o f a theory o f k n ow led ge, so m eth in g w h ich w ould h e lp it to defend “ the h is to r ia n ’s craft”— as M arc B loch called it— against its exp loitation by the ideologies o f history.

G iven the current tendencies in in ternational h istorical science, I am obviously rather skeptical that such a resurgence o f interest in A lthusser could rapidly, or indeed ever, occur. But as a “practicing” historian, it seems to me th a t su ch a rereading o f A lth u sser is utterly desirab le and qu ite p ossib le. It w ould ab o v e all in v o lv e co n tin u in g th e d ialogue begun by Pierre V ilar, and w hich he conceived in a w holly constructive m anner,6 betw een the writing o f history from the perspective o f the (first) Annales and th e “ stru c tu ra l” M arx ism o f A lth u sse r . O f co u rse , the en orm ou s d istan ce from th e d eb ates o f the 1960s an d early 1970s will h av e to be taken in to account. For even if— from th e vantage o f the longue durée— the deep structures in the European and W estern countries have not evolved m uch, ce rta in c r iter ia -o f the th e o re tica l debate h ave been com plete ly transform ed. In the case o f the dialogue envisaged here, this essentially bears on two prem ises.

Firstly, today it would be quite absurd to continue to speak o f “M arxism ” as a quasi-m andatory frame o f reference, as a kind o f lingua franca. N o doubt it is som etim es still useful to use the adjective “M arxist” to characterize a theoretical tendency; but it would no longer m ake sense in 1988 to insist


upon a particular scientific discipline called “M arxism ” (naturally this does not exclude scientific treatm ent o f the history o f the theories indicated by this term ).' Secondly , it is im portant to avoid a m isunderstanding which V ilar ’s text implies throughout (probably as a result o f the “self-evidence” o f a “ co n tin e n t o f M arx ism ”— a n o tio n su p ported at th is tim e by the A lth usserian defin ition o f M arxism as the “science o f h istory” ): nam ely, th at philosophy and h istorical science have a com m on “ob ject” regarding w hich they use a com m on language, the language o f “M arxism ”; or even th a t th e y m ig h t “ w o rk ” in c o m m o n . (I s h a l l r e tu rn to th is m isunderstanding, w hich seems to me contrary to A lth usser’s text, later.) In rea lity , there are n um erous p rob lem s o f “ tra n s la tio n ” betw een the sp e c ific d isco u rse s o f p h ilo so p h y and h isto ry , w h ich are bou n d to be reflected when people are apparently speaking about the sam e ob ject (social form ations, m odes o f production, ideologies, etc .). N orm ally , this kind o f problem is them atized with the help o f the abstract/concrete opposition , w h ich m erely reproduces the false obviousness o f com m on sense. W h at is requ ired , in stead , is re fle c tio n on the d ifferen t “ v ie w p o in ts ,” i.e ., the different practices, o f philosophy an d (h istorical) science. H ere again , in his th eses on ph ilo soph y and the spon tan eous ph ilo soph y o f the sc ientists, A lthusser h as contributed som e im portant poin ters.s

In this sense, I would like to probe the possib ilities o f this particu lar d ialogue by revealing and d iscussing from a h isto r ian ’s stan dpoin t som e points o f convergence betw een the problem atic o f the Annales S ch o o l (above all Lucien Febvre, the head and the m ost im portant th eoretic ian o f the “first g e n e ra tio n ” o f the A nnales) and the p h ilo so p h ica l prob lem atic o f A lth usser. “ Po in ts o f co n vergen ce” : in other words, poin ts o f intellectual contact where different practices (here, philosophy and science) or different t h e o r e t i c a l d isp o sit io n s (h e re A l t h u s s e r ’s M a r x is m a n d A n n a le s h istoriography) con jo in , i f only very slightly, so that a jo in t or a suture m ight even tually occur. O f course th is im plies th at the two problem atics w h ich “ re se m b le e a c h o th e r” p e rta in to the sam e th e o re t ic a l sp a ce . H ow ever, this does not m ean that there is a direct continuity, in such a way that their respective “courses” could be laid end to end on the sam e track, or that they sim ply tie up. In other words, I am not claim ing that A lthusser and Febvre “think the sam e th ing”; I am, rather, noting som e convergences which only becom e significant after the event and w hich I believe could be o f interest in the contem porary context.

A LTH USSER AND A N N A LES HISTORIOGRAPHY 85

II

In m y view the m ost im portant poin ts o f convergence betw een Annales historiography and A lth usser’s “structural M arxism ” can be summed up in three theses, w hich I would like to present and discuss here. M oreover, I th ink it is n ot fortuitous that they are negative theses, but an effect o f the mode o f “convergence” itself:

1. T h e scientific writing o f history is only possible in the form o f a history o f problems (histoire-problème).

2. T h e re is no continuity b e tw e e n the sc ie n c e o f h isto ry and the philosophy o f history;

3. R eal history can only be thought in the form o f a structural process o f evolution o f com plex societies.

“T o pose a problem is precisely the beginning and end o f all history. N o problem s, no history.O nly narrations and com pilation s.”

— Febvre

1. W ith the first point o f convergence (the first thesis), we seem ingly find ourselves in an all too fam iliar whirlpool: what is history? How can it be analyzed? T o what ex te n t can h istorio graph y cla im o b je c tiv ity and scientificity? A ll these general qùestions have been debated at length since the n in eteenth century, and the w hirligig keeps on turning. It is striking th at th e fo u n d ers o f A nn ales p ra c t ic a lly n ev e r p a r tic ip a te d in th e se controversies. Even M arc B loch ’s posthum ous book, The Historian’s Craft, does n ot form ulate an explicit “ theory o f know ledge.” Apparently, this kind o f th ing was to be left to the philosophers. N evertheless, Febvre and B loch were always concerned with a m inim um o f theoretical positions, but did not form ulate them in the sight o f the judgment o f philosophy, but o f the craft o f history, that is to say, practical work. T h is is why their scattered theoretical and philosophical rem arks never get lost in a “vacuum ” (w hich a philosophy or ideology could easily “fill” ), but always appear as critical positions in relation to the prejudices or bad habits o f professional h istorians. It is not for n oth in g th at the m ost im portant rubric o f the Annales, w hich Febvre said sum m ed up its whole “sp irit,” was entitled “Débats et combats."

A short sen tence o f Lu cien F ebvre ’s co n tain s in condensed form the whole h istoriograph y o f the A nnales: “History can only be scientific i f the historian has ideas."‘J In fact, this sentence im plies a double thesis: a) history can be a science; b) the h istorian must have some ideas o f his own and add these ideas, that is to say, theories and concepts, to the “facts” o f real history.


R elative to the old G erm an Methodenstreit on the n om othetic character o f history, or on historicism , positivism , M arxism , etc., this scarcely accidental litt le sen ten ce , w ith its double im p lica tio n , turns out to be extrem ely nonconform ist. C om pare, for instance, th e world o f th e G erm an historians: what representative o f G erm an h istoriography betw een the wars or after (hence at the tim e o f Febvre) would h ave been able to form ulate the sam e theoretical declaration o f faith w ithout im m ediately adding a long litany on the lim ited horizon o f any Geistesw issenschaft? Indeed, does not Febvre resum e a q u asi'“M arx ist” claim w hich m ust, in the G erm an perspective, a lm o st a u to m a tic a lly lea d him in to “ o b je c t iv ism ” an d “ d o g m a tism ” ? N evertheless, Febvre and B loch did not ever entertain the vain hope that history as science could one day com pete directly with physics or biology in form ulating ob jective law s.10 But they did not hesitate to com pare the new h isto r ica l sc ien ce w hich they aim ed at w ith the n atu ra l sc ien ces— and e s p e c ia lly C la u d e B e r n a r d ’s “ e x p e r im e n ta l m e d ic in e ” — in o rd er to em phasize its an a ly tica l ch aracter, destined to surpass the h istoric ist or positiv ist realism o f the n in eteenth century. T h e whole significance o f their app roach consists in this dem arcation:

A t th at tim e h istorian s lived in a puerile and pious respect for the “facts.” T h ey had the naive and touch ing co nviction that the scientist was a m an who, putting his eye to his m icroscope, at on ce perceived a p ile o f facts. F acts given to h im , facts m an ufactured for him by an indulgent Providence, facts w hich he had only to record. It would have been enough for one o f these doctors in m ethod to put his eye to the lens o f a m icroscope, how ever briefly, and to observe a h isto log ical preparation, for h im to perceive at on ce th a t it was n ot a question o f the h i s t o lo g is t observ in g, b u t in terpretin g w h at m u st in d e e d be designated an abstraction. Five m inutes, and h e would have assessed, in the scientist’s appropriation o f w hat he had first o f all prepared at length and with difficulty, in accordance with a preconceived idea, the p erson al co n trib u tio n o f the man, o f the research er who only acts because he has posed a problem an d form ulated a hypothesis."

T h e an a lo g y is easy to d e c ip h er. O n ly a h isto ry w h ich fo rm u la tes problems can account adequately for historical reality, n o t by com piling or simply narrating the “facts,” w hich seem to com e to the h istorian o f their own accord, but in delim iting and consciously preparing a research object, w hich the h istorian must first o f all “m anufacture,” th at is to say, construct: “For a ll the sciences m anufacture their ob ject.” 12 Febvre always insisted on this prem ise in his work.

A LTH U SSER A ND ANNALES HISTORIOGRAPHY 87

W ith o u t p re lim in ary th eory , w ith ou t p rec o n c e iv ed theory , n o possible scientific work. A construction o f the mind which answers to our need to understand, theory is the actual experience o f science. O f a science whose ultim ate ob jective is n ot to discover laws, but to enable us to understand. Every theory is naturally founded on the postulate th at nature is exp licab le . A n d m an, ob ject o f history, form s part o f nature. He is for h istory what the rock is for the m in eralogist, the an im al fo r the biologist, the star fo r the astrophysicist: som ething to e x p la in . T o m ake u n d e rs to o d . H e n c e to think. A h is to r ia n who professes pure and simple subm ission to the facts, as if the facts were not m anufactured, as if they had not been previously chosen by him, in all the senses o f the word “ch osen ” ...is only a technical assistant. W ho m ight be excellen t. But he is n ot a h istorian .15

U n fo rtu n a te ly , it is n o t p o ssib le here to d em o n strate in d e ta il the m anner in which th e Annales historians app lied th is principle or to discuss their hesitation or inconsistencies. T a k e their books— for exam ple, Febvre’s The Problem o f Unbelief in the Sixteenth Century or B loch ’s Feudal Society— and compare theory and practice for yourself. Except that at root it is not really a question o f the “app lication ” o f a theory; rather, we can say with A lthusser, that it is a m atter o f a particular theoretical practice which results from th e dem an ds o f a rigorous sc ie n tific re search qu ite d istin c t from nineteenth-century positiv ism and philosophies o f history.

H ere is the first “p o in t o f co n v e rg e n c e” w ith A lth u sse r ’s th eses. In defin ing the science o f history as a history o f problem s w hich does not start from facts en coun tered , but which m ust on each occasion construct its r e s e a r c h o b je c t , L u c ie n F e b v r e in h is ow n way fo r m u la te s an ep istem ological thesis w h ich exactly co in cides (on this particular poin t) with A lth usser’s anti-positivist and anti-em piricist conception o f scientific work. M aybe this striking convergence with the A lthusserian theses on the separation o f the real ob ject and the ob ject o f knowledge, as well as on the difference betw een scientific work as th eoretica l p roduction and sim ple em pirical (“tech n ical”) description or exegesis, etc., is linked through the work o f G a sto n B ach elard and oth er p h ilo sop h ers o f sc ien ce. But such c o n c r e te “ in f lu e n c e s ” are on ly o f se c o n d a ry in te r e s t h ere . W h at is im portant is that A lth usser’s p lea for a theoretical history, o r rather a history oriented in theoretical fashion , upholds the sam e perspective as Febvre’s plea for “an o th er kind o f history.” T h us, in apparently paradoxical fashion, the anti-em piricism of Reading Capital, w hich has so often been understood as a declaration o f war on all em pirical research— even by some so-called


“A lt h u s s e r ia n s ” (e .g . , H in d e ss and H ir s t )— co u ld w ell b e read as a philosophical contribution to aiding a h istorical science at once open to the em pirical and oriented towards theoretical problem s.

“W e who are not philosophers— but, as historians,users o f ph ilosophy...”

— Febvre

2. A s we have already seen, the founders o f Annales always thought that th ey co u ld o n ly co n q u er and work th e ir terra in if th ey su ccee d ed in dem arcating it from the old conceptions o f history, which were certainly outm oded, but nevertheless reproduced them selves. T h eir principal enem y w as th e p o s i t iv i s t h is to r y th e n d o m in a n t in F re n c h u n iv e r s i t ie s (represented by Seignobos, Langlois, etc .). But at the sam e time they never neglected to criticize any phiiosophication o f history, w hich m erely inhibits and exploits h istoriograph ical practice. It was m ainly Febvre, with his wide p h ilo so p h ica l know ledge, who w orked on this dem arcation . H ere I am thinking not on ly o f his interventions again st Spen g ler or Toynbee, etc., bu t a lso o f th e n u m erou s a r t ic le s in w h ic h he ta c k le s p h ilo so p h ic a l argum ents or problem atics such as are found in h istorical discourse itself. It is n o t surprising that in this context h e was also led o n several occasions to refer to th e h arm fu l e ffects o f “d ia le c t ic a l m a te r ia lism .” A lth o u g h he resp ected M arx as o n e o f th e g reatest th e o re tic ian s o f th e n in e tee n th century (and was linked by friendship to history as merely an “econom ic m a te r ia l i sm ” w h ich so u g h t to re d u ce a ll h u m an h isto ry to a s in g le “exp lan atory system ” by econom y and classes), like a ll “m aster-keys,” it needed to be criticized.14 How ever, this skepticism did n o t prevent Febvre from read in g new M arx ist work w ith great in terest and w riting review articles on it.

A particularly significant exam ple is th e discrepant review he wrote o f Lu cien G o ld m an n ’s book , The Hum an Sciences and Philosophy (1952 ). In this text, G o ld m an n based h im self on a work th en untranslated in France, Lu kâcs’ History and C lass Consciousness, and argued for a social science at o n ce p h ilo so p h ic a l and h is to r ic a l, w h ich w ould fo rm a “d ia le c t ic a l” alternative both to D urkheim ’s scientism and to the em piricism dom inant in the F ren ch acad em y . D esp ite its e x p lic it ly M a rx is t lan g u a g e , th is subversive project was very m uch to Febvre’s taste, and h is review begins in a euphoric tone: “S o m any im portant remarks! W e do n o t have to adopt th em : they h av e alw ays b een our o w n .” P a ra d o x ica lly , h o w ev er, th is “accord” and “sym pathy” related exclusively to G o ld m an n ’s philosophy; for as soon as the philosopher starts to practice his conception on the exam ple

A LTH U SSER AND A N N A LES HISTORIOGRAPHY 89

o f classical F ren ch literature o f the seventeenth century, the benevolence o f the h istorian com es to a sudden end. Febvre offers then the m ost violent objections:

A las, a las, there isn ’t on ly p h ilo sop h y in th is little book ... N o t conten t to inquire into what history is, L u d e n G oldm an n wanted to p ass from theory to practice. H e w anted to show us that this transition was easy, and profitable, so he turned historian— and one hunting on the territory o f the m ost difficult o f all histories, social h istory...N o one can follow L u d en G oldm an n here. A n d it is regrettable that it has to be said so firm ly— since the non-h istorical part o f the book displays rem arkable qualities.15

W h a t h a s h a p p e n e d ? W h e re a s F e b v re w as p re p a re d to t o le r a te G o ld m an n ’s “dialectical m aterialism ” as a philosophical position, and could even subscribe to it, fo r he does n ot take it literally and regards it simply as an endorsem ent of, and support for, his own antipositiv ist philosophy o f science, he is profoundly irritated when the author aspires to be a historian and wishes to “dem onstrate” his ideas historically. Thus, w hen G oldm ann, in ideal-typical and quasi-H egelian m anner, “assigns” the great literary and p h ilo sop h ical works to certain so cial classes— G assen d i and M olière, for exam ple, becom e the ideal “represen tatives” o f the nobility , w hereas La Fontaine is “assigned” to the popular classes, etc .— the great h istorian o f id e a s a n d o f th e s o c ia l c o n s id e r s it an in a d m is s ib le r e d u c t io n . U nfortunately, h e does n ot first consider the reasons for this reductionism in G o ld m an n ’s very prem ises, but im m ediately recalls the caustic criticism s he had m ad e o f c e r ta in w orks o f lite ra ry h isto ry an d o f B o rk e n a u ’s som ew hat sim plistic class analysis in his book o n the “transition from the feudal to the bourgeois conception o f the world.” 16 A n article which had begun in such laudatory fashion ends w ith an intransigent dem arcation:

W hy is it n ecessarily the case th at p h ilo sop h ers who d ea l w ith history either deliberately ignore w hat it is, or, not wishing to know that it is a d ifficu lt craft, w hich takes a lon g tim e to learn , act as historians? Let us say, rather, th at they ratiocinate from a great height on problem s w hich can only be tackled by those w ho have inquired for years in to how they were posed in reality , for the m en o f a certain ep och and a certa in society. A n d who h ave not tied their research to the postulates o f any doctrine, any theory, and philosophy o f h istory .17

Febvre’s position can appear utterly contradictory. O n the one hand, he


defends theoretical presuppositions, even “preconceived ideas” (his words!) in order to save history from positivist blindness; and occasionally h e even adds general reflections and excursions into the gardens o f philosophy. A t the sam e tim e, how ever, he rejects all system atic “postu lates,” w hich m ight confine h istory to a P rocrustean bed and inh ib it “the h istorian ’s w ork.” T h is c o n tra d ic t io n d e fin ite ly ca n n o t be e x p la in ed by a p h ilo so p h ica l affiliation or incoherence (although it would be interesting to analyze the philosophical twists and turns in Febvre, B loch , Braudel, etc .). It relates to the difference betw een the historical and the philosophical mode o f thought w hich, as Febvre frequ en tly stressed , “ sh ou ld n ever be reduced to one another. [O n the contrary] it is a question o f som ehow arranging it that, both standing their ground, they do not ignore their neighbor...” 1“ W hen in 1950 the very serious-m inded Revue de métaphysique et de morale devoted a special number to history, Febvre, who also contributed, com m ented on the articles o f his colleagues A ron, Ricoeur, Lévi-Strauss, et al. with an amused shake o f the head:

A n d here we are, poor m echanics, as they used to say o f craftsm en in th e s ix te e n th cen tu ry . H ere we are all in fa tu a te d an d te llin g ourselves: D am n, where do they get a ll th is kindness from ! But what is the link betw een w hat we do, betw een w hat history is for us historians, and all these wonderful things? D ark mystery. A n d radical break. So m uch the worse. I shall n ot say for w hom .15

F e b v r e ’ s p h ilo so p h ic a l p re fe re n c e s w ere d o u b tle s s d iffe re n t from A lth u sse r ’s (for him P roudhon , Erasm us or B lo n d e l were always m ore im portan t th an M arx , Sp in oza or Freud, e tc .) . B ut th is idea o f a break betw een p h ilo sop h y and h istory (w hile u n d erscorin g the irrep laceab le ch ara c te r o f th ese tw o form s o f theory) represen ts a dec isiv e p o in t in co m m on . E v en if Febvre on ly reasons on th e basis o f h is craft, w hereas A lth u sse r b a se s h im se lf on e p iste m o lo g ic a l argu m en ts, we ob serv e a co n v e rg e n c e w h ich is a ll the m ore s ig n if ic a n t in th a t it d e fin e s the modalities o f a p ossib le a llia n c e betw een a m ater ia list p h ilo soph y an d a novel historical science.

T h is dem arcation o f philosophy from history suggests another poin t in com m on w hich runs through the thought o f Febvre and A lth usser: the refusal o f all teleology. O nce again, in Febvre it does not take the form o f an explicitly “philosophical” position; and there are som e passages where he views m odern history from the angle o f the progress o f reason— hence in a fin a lis t p e rsp e c tiv e .20 But w ith in the fram ew ork o f th is “p ro gre ss iv is t” conception o f the world— surely to be expected o f this m an o f the Third


R e p u b lic — he ad o p ts a p o sit io n w h ich is in som e ways sp on tan eo u sly “m aterialist”; it derives from his professional aversion to anachronism. In an article on the history o f the sciences in the eighteenth century, he unfolds w hat h e h im se lf calls “ the suprem e ideal, the u ltim ate ob jective o f the h istorian ”:

For each o f the epochs w hich he studies, to recom pose the m ental m aterial o f the m en o f this epoch by m eans o f thought; to reconstitute, by a powerful effort o f erudition and im agination, the universe o f each o f the g e n e ra t io n s th a t p re c e d e d it ; to h o ld a firm and se t t le d conviction that the inadequacy o f notions o f fact, and the correlative poverty o f theories, are bound to produce lacunae and deform ations in the representations o f any nature that such a historical collectivity has fashioned o f the world, life, and religion, as well as politics; in this way to protect on eself against those redoubtable anachronism s— the least recogn ized , yet the grav est— th at do n ot cred it the co m b atan ts o f Fornovo with musquets or M arie-Louise N apoléon at St. H elena with p h otograph s, but w ithout any ado, m ake R ab e la is a freeth inker...or Lam arck a D arw inian avant la lettre.1'

A t first sigh t, such a qu o tatio n could conceivab ly also derive from a representative o f historicism , for w hich (in R an ke’s words) “each epoch has its d irect re la tio n w ith G o d .” But the Annales p erspective is ev iden tly com pletely different, since it w ishes, by con trast, to write h istory in the l ig h t o f th e q u e s t io n s o f th e p re se n t . T h is “ r e c u r r e n t” p e r sp e c t iv e (B achelard) in their scientific analysis is not a retrospective teleology, b u t a “ re a d in g o f h isto ry a g a in st the g ra in ” (B lo c h ) .22 A n d th is is why th e unevenness, d iscontinuities, an d discrepancies are so insisted upon . T h e past is not sim ply interpreted as the “orig in al” o f a fam iliar present, but m ust be conceived and explained, w ith th e aid o f current knowledge, in its alterity. T h e best and m ost sign ificant exam ple o f th is m ethodological anti- finalism is to be found in the celebrated Histoire des mentalités inaugurated by Febvre and B loch .25 A s has already been noted m any tim es, there are im p o r ta n t d e f ic ie n c ie s , e s p e c ia lly o f a th e o r e t ic a l n a tu re , in th e se p io n e e r in g w ork s— I am th in k in g p a r tic u la r ly o f F e b v re ’ s Problem of U nbelief, p u b lish ed in 1942— w hen co m p ared w ith the ap p ro ach es of contem porary cultural anthropology or psychoanalysis. For exam ple, in all his books Febvre adopts the concept o f m entality in the specific sense o f Lucien Lévy-Bruhl— whom he calls “our m aster”— and w hich postulates a fundam ental difference betw een “prim itive” an a “m odern” m entalities, the form er n ot advancing beyond the stage o f “pre-logical thought.” A nd with


this distinction Febvre accounts fo r the particular thought o f the men o f the Fren ch R en aissan ce!24 T o d ay it is easy to criticize this interpretation as outm oded, and even to regard it as the projection o f a theory o f colonial origins onto the sixteenth century history. But in my view, Febvre’s analysis can also be read differently: as an attem pt, adm ittedly deficient— because based upon concepts which have been outm oded since the middle o f the century— but nevertheless pioneering, at a rupture with any teleology. In fact, Febvre w anted to elaborate an original “h istorical psychology” in order to dem arcate him self from the traditional history o f ideas, and to conceive the difference o f the p eop le in early m o dern tim es in a rad ic a l, an ti- teleo logical way.25

O f course, the “m en tal” distance between the m en o f the second h a lf o f the tw entieth century and a young philosopher called M arx, who at the age o f tw enty-seven worked in 1845 on a critique o f political econom y (based upon F e u e rb a ch an d H e g e l) , is co n sid e ra b ly less th an th at b etw een R ab e lais and his an tic lerical readers under th e T h ird R epublic . B u t the tem ptation to read in the m anuscripts o f the young M arx the “seeds” o f his subsequent discoveries, and to assign to him the theses o f his future or even o f his epigones, is ju st as great. In different ways from Febvre, but no less provocatively, A lthusser devoted h im self from 1960 onw ards to contesting a writing o f the history o f M arxism in the “future anterior.” A t a tim e when the end o f S talin ist dogm atism was issuing in an overvaluation o f the “early w orks,” and a read in g o f the old M arx through the “sp e c tac le s” o f the young, A lthusser was ab le to dem onstrate in this case th e harm ful effects o f an y philosophico-historical reading. Inversely, he cou ld also dem onstrate (a r g u a b ly w ith r a th e r le s s s u c c e s s ) th e p o t e n t i a l o f a h i s t o r ic a l- epistem ological analysis in the case o f the d iscontinuities, the unevenness an d the real ru p tu res w h ich p u n ctu a te the h isto ry o f the th e o re tic a l form ation known as “M arxism .” A passage like th e follow ing m ight as well h ave been signed “Lucien Febvre”:

O f course, we know that the Young M arx did becom e M arx, but we should not w ant to live faster th an he did, we should n ot w ant to live in his place, reject for him or discover for him. W e shall not be w aiting for him at the end o f the course to throw round him as round a runner the m antle o f repose, for at last it is over, he has arrived. R ousseau re m a rk e d th a t w ith c h ild re n an d a d o le sc e n ts the w h o le art o f education consists o f know ing how to lose time. T h e art o f historical c r it ic ism also c o n sists o f k n o w in g how to lose time so th at young authors can grow up. T h is lost time is sim ply the time we give them to live. W e scan the necessity o f their lives in our understanding o f its


n odal points, its reversals and m utations. In this area there is perhaps no greater joy than to be able to witness in an em erging life, once the G o d s o f O r ig in s and G o a ls h a v e b e e n d e th ro n e d , th e b ir th o f necessity .26

W hat follow ed is sufficiently well-know n: with For M arx and Reading C apital, A lth u sser published the first in stallm ents in a reading o f M arx w h ich so u gh t to (r e )c o n stru c t the sp ec ific stru ctu re o f the th eory o f historical m aterialism contain ed in Capital, by unequivocally dem arcating it from the (te leological) philosophy o f history o f the Young M arx, but also from the (te leological) philosophy o f history o f K autsky (even o f S ta lin ). I do not wish to discuss the success o f this enterprise, or the problems which it raised, here. But in any event, it seems to me incontestable that up to the present day it remains the m ost radical attem pt to think and practise the b re a k b e tw e e n a th e o ry o f h i s to r y c o n c e iv e d as s c ie n c e a n d th e philosophies o f history w hich surround it. A n d i f som e o f the “philosophers’ th ings” im plicated in it would certainly have left Lucien Febvre cold, the ca m p a ig n w aged by A lth u sse r a g a in st the p h ilo so p h y o f h isto ry and teleology w ould h av e been deem ed worthy by h im o f a review artic le in the Annales.

“T o understand is to com plicate”— Febvre

3. F inally, in practice, we stum ble upon a third poin t o f convergence betw een Annales and A lth u sser, obviously linked to the two precedin g o n es : th e ir re sp e c tiv e d e fen se s o f a h isto ry o f stru ctu res, or rath er a “structural” history.

W hat characterized the Annales o f Febvre and B loch was not, as the first title o f the journal might suggest, a mere revalorization o f econom ic and social history relative to the traditional history o f ideas and politics. T h e h isto r io grap h ic “ rev o lu tio n ” (F ebvre) which they tried to inaugurate is utterly athwart the usual university barriers. W ith their conception o f “total h is to r y ,” w h ich m atch es the a n ti-h is to r ic is t ap p ro a c h o f the histoire- problème, they devised a project th a t would be supported by all the hum an sc ien ces, and w h ich exp la in ed all p roblem s in a complex and reciprocal re lation sh ip o f efficacity. A s the great works o f social history by Febvre, B loch and Braudel show,27 it was clearly not a question (despite what the adjective “total” m ight suggest) o f naive and vain attem pts at “com plete” h isto r ie s , bu t, on th e b a sis o f a c e r ta in “ th e o r e t ic a l” p ro b lem atic , o f interrelating all th e conditions, all th e possible and concealed determ inants


characteristic o f a historical process— from geom orphology to m entalities, from agrarian structures to the class struggle.

A lth u sser’s plea fo r a structural con cept of history, and the theses he developed in this context, point almost in the same direction (even if they are form ulated in a very abstract manner: but they are only philosophical t h e s e s ! ) . In the c o n te x t o f h is c r it iq u e o f H e g e l ia n is m , A lth u s se r c o n fro n te d in p a r tic u la r th e re d u c tio n ist a n d u lt im a te ly a ffirm a tiv e ch aracter o f history w hich thinks real processes under such categories as “essence” and “phen om enon ,” “class in itse lf ’ and “class for itself,” etc. For tendentially , all phenom ena are then reduced to a h idden noumenon: their unique core. Su ch a tota lity can be taken to p ieces o f course, but each elem ent rem ains pars totalis, that is to say, an expressive m om ent o f the W h o le — w ith o u t its own ir re d u c ib le s t r u c tu r e . O r to u se a n o th e r term in ology , o n e m igh t say th at they m erely reflect a su pposed “ b a se ” “below ,” w hich governs— as the “last instance”— both the Origin and the Goal (the M eaning) o f the process, since in fact it already contains it “ in germ .” A n y h istorical analysis working w ith this conception an d aim ing at such a presum ed Essence, su ch an Origin, obviously can n ever perceive the real, specific and irreducible history o f the so-called “p h en om en a” with their different, m ultiple and surprising effects.

T h is “essentialism ,” this thought on the m odel o f “expressive causality ,” w as cease le ssly d en o u n ced by A lth u sser . A n d in so d o in g , he did n ot restrict h im self to a critical reading of som e o f th e great authors (Spinoza, M ontesquieu, H egel, M arx, G ram sci, e tc .), or certain M arxist positions in recent decades, but also confronted his critique o f teleology with some, at that tim e still rather new, theses which he detected in the “best h istorians” of the present (1965 ). A cco rd in g to him, if one refuses the H egelian m odel of “expressive totality ,” it is necessary to be consistent and equally reject the “m odel o f a continuous and homogeneous time” (R C , p. 99) and replace it with a concept o f “structural history,” w hich was alone capable o f grasping th e u n ev en , in d irect, and in som e sen se m eto n y m ic e ffica c ity o f the different structures w ithin a given social whole. T h e historians, however— and here A lthusser apparently had Braudel in m ind— only observe

the existence of different times and rhythms, without relating them to the concept o f their difference, i.e., to the typical dependence which establishes them in the articulation o f the levels o f the whole. It is not en ou gh , th erefore , to say, as m odern h isto r ia n s do , that there are d ifferent periodizations for different tim es...w e must also th ink these differences in rhythm and punctuation in their foundation, in the type o f a rticu la tio n , d isp lacem en t and to rsio n w h ich harm on izes th ese


different tim es with one another. T o go even further, I should say that we can not restrict ourselves to reflecting the existence of visible and m easurable times in this way; we must, o f absolute necessity, pose the question o f the mode o f existence o f invisible tim es, o f the invisible rh yth m s and p u n c tu a tio n s co n ce a led b en ea th the surface o f each visible tim e. (RC, pp. 100-01)

U nquestionably , this radical anti-essentialism (A lthusser calls it “anti- h istoric ism ” ) can at first appear im m oderate and unrealizable.211 But does n o t the c o n c e p t o f “ t o t a l h i s t o r y ” lik e w ise c o n ta in an a p p a re n t ly unrealizable dem and? A n d is the concept o f “structural causality” erroneous simply because it overinflates the intellectual criteria o f historical science?

It is well known th a t A lth u sser v irtually never put his reflections on the com plexity o f historical processes in to practice. A side from som e analyses o f co n tem p o rary p o lit ic s— o f w h ich the b est, w ith ou t a do u bt, is h is critique o f the P C F in 1978— there are only a few “h istorical” passages, am on g them the fam ous outline on th e overdetermination o f the R ussian R evolution , w ritten in 1962. But if we rem em ber Lucien Febvre’s critique o f G o ld m an n , such an overstrained attem pt by A lthusser to “apply” his theses would perhaps not h ave rendered the co n cept o f structural history a good service. In this light, A lth usser’s prudence (in part unprem editated) on ly serves to underline th at he and m ost o f his pupils are not “historians” and “socio logists,” but p rec ise ly “philosophers”— a “division of labor” w hich apparently has more and more com e to be accepted since the 1970s.0

H ow ever, the concept of “structural causality” does not figure like an errant block in the landscape. For A lthusser developed a certain num ber of other concepts and theses which clarify his structural conception o f history. T h u s , a g a in st the (te le o lo g ic a l) n o tio n o f “to ta l ity ,” he p rop osed the co n cep t o f “com plex w h ole” (or rather: “ ‘p re-g iven ’ com plex structured w hole” ), whose (non-H egelian) d ialectic is governed by the asym metry o f determ inant and dom inan t co ntrad iction s. W ith the aid o f Spin oza and F reu d , an d w ith re d e fin ed or new c o n c e p ts , h e so u gh t to th ink th is c o m p le x a n d u n e v e n in te rp la y o f th e le v e ls a n d “ in s ta n c e s” w h ich , m oreover, m u st be analyzed separate ly in e a c h h isto r ica l case. C erta in classical n otions o f M arx ’s, w hich in th e 1950s h ad lost virtually all their specific conten t (e.g., social form ation, m ode o f production, ideology, etc .), received a rigorous reform ulation . O ther ideas and im ages, on the other hand, were put to shade (since their definitive abandonm ent still did not seem to be “ t r a n s m is s ib le ” w ith in the C o m m u n is t m o v e m e n t)— for e x a m p le , re f le c t io n , n e g a t io n o f the n é g a t io n , a l ie n a t io n , b a se an d superstructure, class consciousness, worldview, scientific socialism , laws of


the dialectic, the “role o f the individual in history,” etc. A n d in order to fill in the lacunae o f traditional M arxist theory, o f w hich A lthusser was more and m ore aware, and from w hich he literally suffered, he even proposed som e n ovel concepts— a fairly risky undertaking at the tim e for a mem ber o f the P C F — w h ich h a v e s in c e b eco m e fam o u s: th e o re tic a l p ra c tic e , o v erd eterm in atio n , p rocess w ithout goals or su b jects, id eo lo g ica l state apparatuses, etc. It could be show n th at all these term inological changes were more or less connected with the concept o f structural history. A n d w ith th is re fo rm u la tio n o f h is to r ic a l m a te r ia lism , it is ab o v e a ll the traditional topography o f “ base an d superstructure” (w hose im portant and finally harm ful effects in the history o f M arxism are well known, and which m ade a spontaneous m aterialist like Lucien Febvre prefer to declare him self “idealist”50) that found itself shattered.

Ill

L e t us conclude. T h e starting point o f my remarks was th e hypothesis that A lth usser is not as “anti-h istorical” as has com m only been believed. O n certa in points an d with the help o f a few exam ples, I h ave attem pted to show th at th ere are som e p o in ts o f co n tac t, som e co n vergen ces, som e re se m b la n c e s , w hich repay c lo se r e x a m in a t io n ; an d to c o n tin u e the dialogue begun by Pierre Vilar. A “fear o f co n ta c t” is utterly out o f p lace and co n trib u te s n oth in g . H ow ever, I by no m eans deny the enorm ous d ifferences betw een structural M arxism and structural h istorica l science w hich, am on g the h istorian s o f the so-called “new new history" (Braudel), th a t is to say, A nnales, today , even seem to am ou n t to a deep ch asm . “R e se m b la n c e” thus does n o t m ean identity . It is sim ply a m atter o f a punctual convergence, a proxim ity in difference, w hich seems to us strange and w hich might, as a result, stim ulate dialogue.

A s can ea s ily be im a g in e d , I h ave n o t so u gh t to d e m o n stra te the possibilities o f such a dialogue for purely “h istorical” reasons. T h is “parallel re a d in g ” o f A lth u sse r and F ebvre is also d irected tow ards the presen t. R e la t iv e to th e co n tem p o ra ry co n tro v e rs ie s am o n g h is to r ia n s— I am th inking, for exam ple, o f debates o n narrativity , fictionality , micro- and m acro-history , even on the d isappearance o f h istory in “post-h istory”— recourse to the problem atic an d themes o f Annales in the period o f Febvre and Bloch, and to structural M arxism, could be o f use in developing some m a te r ia l is t (c o u n te r -) p o sit io n s . O ne o f A lth u s se r ’s s tro n g e st th e ses concern s the separation , the alterity, the break betw een philosophy and sc ie n c e : a good (m a te ria list) p h ilo sop h y m u st n ever give the sc ien ces lessons, an d n o t on ly th e science o f history. But it can support scientific


practice from the outside, by providin g it w ith its specific know ledge in order to criticize the (idealist) philosophies o f history and repel attem pts to exploit scientific results for ideological ends. In this sense historical practice needs philosophy (today, for exam ple, in order to criticize the reduction o f history, advocated by Paul Veyne, to a simple arrangement o f “true facts”) ." But the thesis proposed by A lth usser im plies a second: no philosophy or even epistem ology can in itself “found” or “generate” a science. T h is is why any philosophical theory o f historiography is a futile enterprise: the specific theoretical production o f h istorical science can only occur within its own practice o f research and exposition . It is one o f the tragic aspects o f the history o f A lthusser and the reception o f his work— given the conditions o f p u b lic a tio n o f th ese tex ts and th e ir p articu la r lan gu age— th at a lot o f in tellectuals and h istorian s h ave been unable to recognize the ob jective assistance contained therein. T h at is why Pierre V ila r ’s attem pt to begin a “dialogue with A lthusser” was all the more remarkable. A n d above all when he wrote in Annales itself: “Louis A lthusser has reminded us that the very concept o f history has yet to be constructed.”12

Translated by Gregory Elliott

N otes

1. T h e se la tter in c lu d ed , a m o n g o th ers, R . R o b in , G . D uby , G . B o is, R . C h a r t ie r , G . S te d m a n Jo n e s , an d R . Jo h n so n .

2. R e p r in t e d in P ie rre V i la r , U ne h isto ire en co n stru c tio n . A p proch e m arxiste et p roblém atiques con jon cturelles, P aris 1 9 8 2 , p p .3 8 2 -4 2 5 . T r a n s la te d in N ew Left Review 80 , Ju ly /A u g u st 1973 , p p .6 5-106 .

3. In th e so m e w h a t re v ise d e d i t io n o f 1 9 6 8 , A l th u s se r c la r if ie d th e t i t le o f th is ch ap te r , rep lac in g “co n c e p t o f h isto ry ” by “c o n c e p t o f h isto r ic a l t im e .”

4- L o u is A lth u sse r a n d E tien n e B a lib a r , Reading C apital, L o n d o n 1970 , p .96 ; (c ited in th e tex t as R C ) .

5. O n e o f th e rare ex cep tio n s w as E. P . T h o m p so n , w ho foun d V ila r “too d e fe ren tia l” (T he Poverty o f Theory, L o n d o n 1978 , p .3 9 2 ) . O n th e back gro u n d to th is re a c tio n , see Perry A n d e rs o n , A rgu m en ts within English M arx ism , L o n d o n 1 9 8 0 , an d m y in tro d u c t io n to th e G e r m a n e d itio n o f G . S te d m a n Jo n e s ’ e ssay s , K lassen , Politik und Sprache. F ü r eine theorientierte Sozialgeschichte, M u n ster 1988.

6. O n th e h istory o f th is t e x t a n d A lth u sse r 's re ac tio n to it, se e my In terv iew w ith P ierre V ila r in Kom m une 5, 7, 1987 , p p . 62ff.

7. T h is “ se c u la r iz a t io n ,” w h ic h a ro se in a su rp r is in g fa sh io n , is, like an y p ro gress, am bigu ou s. It req u ire s a h isto r ic a l an alysis.

8 . L o u is A l th u s s e r , S p o n tan eo u s Philosoph)' an d the S p o n tan eo u s Philosophy o f the Scientists, L o n d o n 1989.

9. L u c ie n Febvre , “ D e la th éo rie à la p ra tiq u e de l’h isto ire ,” A nn ales 8, 1953 , p .3 63 .10. E ven i f they so m etim es sp o ke o f “ law s” w hich h istory w ould p erhaps on e day b e in

a p o s it io n to fo rm u late . C f., for e x am p le , L. Febvre , “L ’H isto ire dan s le m on d e en ru in e s,” Revue de synthèse historique, 3 0 , 19 2 0 , p p .1-15, e sp ec ia lly pp.7ff.

11. L u c ien Febvre , C om bats pour l'histoire, P aris 1953 , pp.22ff.


12. Ib id ., p. 116.13. Ibid., p . l 17.14. C f. “L ’H isto ire d an s le m o n d e e n ru in e s”, pp.7ff.15. “D e l a th éorie à la p ratiqu e d e l ’h isto ire ,” pp. 3 67-68 .16. C f . Lucien Febvre, Pour une histoire à parc entière, Paris 1962 , p p .4 6 7 ff an d p p .743ff.17. ”D e la th éo rie à la pratique de l’h is to ire ,” p .3 69 .18. C o m b ats pour l’histoire, p .282.19. L u c ien Febvre , “Q u ’est-ce que l ’h isto ire ?” A n n ale s , 5, 1950 , p .243.2 0 . C f ., for e x am p le , L u c ien F ebvre , The Problem o f U nbelief in the Sixteenth C entury

(1 9 4 2 ) C am b rid ge , M ass.; 1982 , pp.354ff-21 . C om bats pour l’histoire, p .334 .22 . C f. M arc B lo ch , French R ural H istory , B erk e ley an d L o n d o n , 1966.23 . For a d e ta iled p re sen ta tio n an d d iscu ssio n o f th is ap p ro ach , see inter alia, my article

“ M e n ta litä te n , Id e o lo g ie n , D iskurse: Zur so z ia lg e sc h ic h tlic h e n T h e m a tis ie ru n g der ‘d r itten E b e n e ,” ’ in A l f L u d tk e (e d .) , Aiitagsgeschichte: Z u r Rekonstruktion historischer Erfahrungen und Lebensw eisen , C a m p u s-V e r la g , F ran k fu rt/N ew York 1 9 8 9 , p p .8 5 -1 3 6 ; and “ H isto r ia n s an d D isc o u rse A n a ly s is ”, History Workshop Jou rn a l, 27, S p r in g 1989 , p p .37-65 .

24- C f. The Problem o f U nbelief, pp.438ff.25. Ib id ., p .100 .26. L ou is A lth u sse r , F o r M arx , L o n d o n 1969 , p p .70-1 .27 . L u c ien F eb v re , Philippe I I e t la Fran ch e-C om té, P aris 1911 ; M arc B lo ch , French Rural

H istory; id em , Feudal Society (1 9 3 9 - 4 0 ) , tw o v o lu m es, L o n d o n 1961 ; F ern an d B rau d e l, The M editerranean an d the M editerranean W orld o f Philip II (1 9 4 9 ) , two v o lu m es, G lasgo w 1981-82 .

28 . T h u s som e p eo p le h ave deduced fro m it th e ep istem o lo g ica l im possib ility o f any h is to r ic a l sc ie n ce . S ee , fo r e x a m p le , Barry H in d e ss a n d Paul H irst, P re-C ap ita list M odes of Production, L o n d o n 1975 . E .P . T h o m p so n cou ld on ly read A lth u sse r through th is prism .

29. W ith so m e ex cep tio n s. T h u s R o b ert L in h art o r E m m an u el T erray , p h ilo so p h e rs at th e o u t s e t , h a v e b e c o m e s o c io lo g is t a n d e t h n o lo g i s t , r e s p e c t iv e ly . M o r e o v e r , c e r ta in p ro fe ssio n a l h isto ria n s (R ég in e R o b in , G a re th S te d m a n Jo n es, e tc .) h ave d em o n stra ted th at A lth u sse r ’s co n c ep ts an d th eses can be em ployed p ro d u ctiv e ly if they are n o t tak en as dogm as, but tran sfo rm ed in co n c re te analyses.

30 . C f. L u c ien Febvre , “L ’H isto ire d an s le m on d e e n ru in e s,” p. 15.31 . C f. P au l V ey n e , C om m ent on écrit l’h istoire, P aris 1971 . C f . also th e in terview w ith

V e y n e in U . R a u lf f (e d .) , V o m Um schreiben der G eschichte, B e rlin 198 6 , p p .1 3 2 -4 6 , w h ere F ebvre , B lo ch and B rau d e l are a ll d ism issed as “ M a rx is ts” .

32 . “M arx ist H isto ry , a H isto ry in th e M a k in g ,” p .65.

Alain Lipietz

From Althusserianism to “Regulation Theory”

A lm ost the entire generation o f M ay 1968 in France cam e to M arxism through the work o f Louis A lthusser and his school. A n d even today alm ost ev ery th in g fruitfu l that is w ritten in France w ith in a (greatly rarefied) culturally M arxist atm osphere rem ains marked by this origin. T o say this is n o t to negate the im portance o f existential M arxism and the philosophy of praxis (in particular the work o f H enri Lefebvre), nor to ignore the negative effects o f the “structural M arxism ” o f Reading Capital (1965). It is simply to state th at the success o f the articles in the co llectio n For M arx (1965) greatly helped to disengage French M arxism from the oversim plification, determ inism and m echanism inherited from the Stalin ist period. It is also to recognize th at the viable and justified critiques o f w hich “A lthusserian ism ” has been the object have allowed som e currents to “interiorize w hat has been transcended” (to appropriate a H egelian term which doubtless would have displeased the m aster!), and thus to escape the general crisis o f the hum an sciences and o f structuralism during the 1970s. I am thinking in particular o f the sociology o f Pierre Bourdeiu (1987), and, in relation to my ow n profession (p o litica l econ om y ), th at w hich today is referred to as “regulation theory.”1 W e ourselves are “regulationists,” in a way “rebel sons” o f A lthusser.

From th e very first, A lth u sse r (fo r exam p le in “C o n tra d ic tio n and O verdeterm in ation ,” 1962) taught us to conceive o f history as a fabric o f contrad ictory relations, autonomous in relation to one another, although overdeterm ining rather th an “reflecting” one another. N either politics nor ideo log ies “re flec t” econ om ic forces, but id eo lo g ica l-p o litico -eco n o m ic “configurations” exist, either as stab le configurations or configurations o f crisis. D urin g th e 1960s, French M arxism th u s aligned itse lf w ith all the reductionism o f the “kapital-logik” genre. W e were even invited to discover in every social form ation a plurality o f “m odes o f production” (relation-type c o n f ig u r a t io n s ) a r t ic u la te d one to a n o th e r (R e y , 19 6 9 ): in sh o rt , configurations o f configurations.

S in ce then, fo r exam ple, do m estic so cial re lation s (or patriarchy, or “sexage") could be studied for them selves, w ithout previous subordination to “cap ita lism .” France, as everywhere, was acquainted with the opposition


betw een “socialist fem inists” and “radical fem inists,” but it was less virulent there than elsewhere. A utonom y and reciprocal overdeterm ination of social re la tio n s o ffered a th e o re tic a l su b stratu m to th in k th e au ton om y and convergence o f social m ovem ents. T h a t this opportunity was hardly taken ad v an tag e o f p o lit ic a lly , I ex p la in elsew h ere (L ip ie tz , 1986a), bu t the p o s s ib i l i ty o f a c o n v e rg e n c e an d its th e o r e t ic a l a r t ic u la t io n e x is ts nevertheless.

A lth u sser and his school (in particular B alibar in his contribution to Reading Capital, and Bettelheim , 1970) broke with a determ inist vision of h istorical evolution which conceived of the “productive forces” them selves (t r a d it io n a l “ lo c o m o tiv e s” o f h isto ry for S ta l in is t M arx ism ) as so c ia l relations born in the organization o f production. It was not from outside that the local representatives o f a larger current, w hich from M aoists to radical A m erican s by way of the Italian “workerist” m ovem ent, proceeded in the 1960s and ‘70s, to concentrate in its attacks on capitalism no longer on the e x tra c t io n o f su rp lu s-va lu e a lo n e , b u t on the d o m in a n t p ost-w ar in d ustria l p arad igm s, accep ted for th e m ost p ar t by com m u n ist parties: T aylorism and Fordism. T h is current was not only critically in sync with the reality o f the labor struggles o f the period, but also broke above all with the idea that “the developm ent of capitalist productive forces prepared the way for com m unism .” C apitalism did not prepare the way for anything but itself, and further over the course of time it had experienced and developed contrasting “forces of production” (forms o f the organization of labor).

A t the p o l i t ic a l le v e l, th is d o u b le ru p tu re w ith d e te rm in ism w as developed principally by Poulantzas (1968) in h is reading o f Gram sci. For the s im p le and p e rm an e n t ju x ta p o s it io n o f “ b o u rg e o is ie /p ro le ta r ia t ,” P oulantzas su b stitu ted the stab iliza tio n and d ilu tio n o f su ccessive , and always original, “hegem onic historical b locs,” uniting the dom inant an d the dom inated in struggles over the limits and terms o f social com prom ise, on the basis o f a perpetually new articulation o f social relations.

T h ese fecund basic n otions unfortunately began to freeze in a kind o f form al scholasticism in w hich social relations were no longer understood as c o n tra d ic t io n s or u n stab le ten sio n s but as stru ctu res. T h is ev o lu tio n developed explicitly ou t o f Reading Capital. A lthusserian ism w ent o n from there to reject the contradictory ch aracter o f social relations them selves, and with it the autonom y o f the individuals and groups contained in these relations and their capacity to be constituted as social subjects capable o f transform ing structures. T h is was a return to a pre-M arxist m aterialism , forgetting the Theses on Feuerbach, forgetting th at there is a “consciousness” an d thus a p o te n tia l gen erato r o f tra n sfo rm atio n in th e m ost ro u tin e practices, an d cu t o ff a fortiori from th e transform ing practice o f th e masses. T h is o ssification contributed to the crisis o f structural M arxism and all

FROM ALTH U SSERIANISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 101

French M arxism (although, it is true, in a different political conjuncture) in the m iddle of the 1970s.

It is precisely in a return to the contradictory character o f social relations, w hich inh ib its their reproduction , and in taking into con sideration the conscious elem ent, the active role o f “representation” in reproducing itself, that the approaches based on “regulation” found their origin. N aturally the opening o f the G reat C risis o f capitalism in the 1970s obliged us at any rate to k eep our d is ta n c e from any a p p ro a c h th a t p lace d q u a si-e x c lu siv e em phasis o n reproduction.

It is good, at the d istan ce o f a quarter o f a century, to m easure our continuities and discontinuities. In the first part of this article, I will present a sy n th esis w h ich I b e liev e is ab le to h o n estly qualify the m ean in g of “classical A lthusserianism ” in the 1960s, and what com prised its evolution and its divergences. By “classical A lthusserian ism ,” I refer to the texts For M arx, the contributions to Reading Capital (particularly those o f Etienne Balibar) and those o f N icos Poulantzas (1968). T h e post-1968 evolutions o f these authors belong to another history, while the texts o f this “corpus” were the poin t of departure for the m ajority of those who continued in, am ended or broke with “classical A lthusserian ism .”

In the second section, I w ill expand the critique o f the insufficiencies and dilem m as to w hich classical A lthusserianism contributed.2

In the third section, I will briefly show how “regulation theory” currently seeks to overcom e these obstacles. It goes w ithout saying that, here as elsewhere, I speak only for myself: numerous “regulationist” practitioners have long eschewed referring to M arxism at all, and would not accept the connection claim ed here. However, I do not intend to totally ch art their intellectual itinerary, or that o f those who are “agnostics” today.

I. Theses of Classical Althusserianism. In this first section, we will seek to present under the heading o f “theses”

( “d idactic and dogm atic,” as the M aster liked to say) the ideas of the body o f w orks c ited above w hich h ad such a great in te llec tu a l resonance for a g e n e ra t io n o f so c ia l sc ie n c e re se arch e rs . W e w ill see th a t from the beginning (that is, betw een For M arx an d Reading Capital), som e slippages operate whose ravaging effects would only be felt later. W e will only sketch out the critique, poin ting out in passing what the “regulationists” m aintain. But we must begin by p lacing the em ergence o f classical A lthusserianism itself into perspective.

1 ) Althusserianism in its TimeT h e first p art o f th e 1960s m ark ed , in F ran ce , the “ re su rg e n ce” o f

M arxism , the re-em ergen ce o f th e “frozen ” th e o re tica l M arxism o f the


Sta lin ist era. O f course, som e isolated thinkers, m arginal m ilitan ts, had never ceased to oppose the reigning dogmas, but often without taking into account the problem atic which precisely defined these theses as “dogm a.” A s for antidogm atic reactions, for exam ple those o f the journal Arguments and Henri Lefebvre, they slipped rapidly into eclecticism , either directly or through their readers. Finally, the fraction o f the ex isten tia list “fellow trav e le r” current o f the Fren ch C o m m u n ist Party brought into French philosophy a wave o f interest in “the anthropology o f praxis” but virtually without touching the “theory o f history” that they then qualified as M arxist: in a way, they juxtaposed “the supplem ent o f the soul.” In any case these “con testation s” left the intellectual field intact, since they barely affected the p rin cipal “p o ten tia l users” o f M arxism : the p o litica l parties w hich claim ed it fo r them selves (and it was not the French C om m u n ist Party alone), and academ ic research.

It was com plete ly d ifferent for the true th eoretica l “re form ation ” (in C a lv in ’s sense) inaugurated by Louis A lthusser’s articles in For M arx, which would place at the front o f the intellectual scene a pleiad o f scholars and philosophers. Such bastions as the Ecole N orm ale Supérieure and the Ecole P ratiqu e des H au tes E tudes p rop agated a wave o f strictly acad em ic, or p o litica lly more useful, research : what we ca ll here the “ A lth u sser ian sch oo l.”

T h is sch oo l arises from a very p articu lar po litica l an d epistem ological conjuncture, evoked in the preface o f For M arx.

a) Politics first. T h e renaissance o f Marxist thought was provoked by the collapse o f “frozen” M arxism : Althusser attributed the awakening to S ta lin ’s death and the 20 th C on gress. H e evokes the theory o f “two sc ien ces” (bourgeois science/proletarian science) advanced by the com m unist leaders “to defend against bourgeois attacks on M arxism at that time dangerously at risk in L y sse n k o ’s b io lo g y .” T h e A lth u sse r ia n ru ptu re w ith S ta lin is t dogm atism thus goes o n to take the form o f a restitution o f the autonom ous rights o f “theory” in relation to political “necessities.” T h is choice led to a series o f consequences which today appear contradictory but whose logic was clear at the time. Tactically, this signifies the exclusion o f the other “escape h atch ” that Stalin ism then advanced: the “Italian ,” “T o g liatist” route, to which Garaudy can be linked. Philosophically, it is the obsessive refusal of “h isto r ic ism ” and the “problem o f the su b je c t .” Sc ien tifica lly , it is the com pletely natural union with the second com ponent o f the conjuncture at which the A lthusserian school began: the structuralist vogue.

b) In effect, the A lth usserian school was resolutely inscribed in a purely scientific m ovem en t w hich corresponds to the em ergence in the French

FROM A LTH USSERIA NISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 103

university o f a “new scientific con tin en t,” still contam inated by ideology: the social sciences. T h e dom inan t ideology for the most serious researchers was structuralism . T h e A lth usserian school inscribed itself com pletely in the course o f the discovery o f this continent, m arking when necessary its distances from a certain structuralism, but claim ing no partisan specificity: there was only one science, and may the best-equipped win. S ignificant in th is re sp e c t are th e t o ta l a b se n c e o f a “ c la ss b re a k ” w ith in F re n c h epistem ology (B achelard , C an gu ilhem , Koyré, etc .) an d th e fundam ental w eakness o f the break with structuralism . A proudly asserted refusal in the first case (autonom y o f theoretical practice), and a tactical choice in the second case (one sole enemy: historicism ).

2) The Dialectical Materialism o f the Althusserian SchoolW hat then is the “Philosophy,” D ialectical M aterialism (D M ), latent in

the p ra c tic e o f th e “ h isto r ic a l th e o re tic ia n ” o f H isto r ica l M ateria lism (H M )?’ It includes two groups o f theses: m ethodological and ontological.

a) T h e Process o f the Production o f KnowledgesT h e m ethodological theses are posed in opposition to em piricism , and

define the process o f knowledge. W e can summarize them thus:

Thesis 0: T h e real exists independently o f the know ledge we have o f it, and is not en g e n d ere d by h u m an th o u g h t nor by the d e v e lo p m e n t o f an “absolute idea.” T h is is the fundam ental thesis o f all materialism.

Thesis 1 : T h e progress o f know ledge is a process o f production like any other, w hich sets into m otion the activity o f a theoretician (who carries out a theoretical practice), who applies m eans o f production to objects o f labor to furnish a product. T h e whole o f this process unfolds entirely within the re a lm o f th o u g h t. O b je c ts o f lab o r (“ G e n e ra lit ie s I ” ) are p rev io u sly produced notions or concepts, the m eans o f labor ( “G eneralities II”) is the already-existin g conceptu al body, the product (“G en eralities III” ) a new c o n c e p t . In p articu la r , the o p e ra tio n w hich co n sis ts o f p assin g from “ id e o lo g ica l” know ledge (reco gn itio n -m isre co g n itio n ) to the sc ien tific knowledge o f a dom ain, an operation w hich marks the “b irth” o f a science, is c a lle d “e p is te m o lo g ic a l b r e a k .” In th e co u rse o f its a c c u m u la tio n , knowledge is elevated from the abstract to the concrete, that is, from more general concepts to more fertile determ inations, thus reproducing in the form o f “concrete thought” the com plexity o f concrete reality.4

Thesis 2: T h is process is the m ethod for appropriating the realm o f thought; it is different from the m ethod belonging to art ôr pratcial activity. There is thus not a “problem o f know ledge” (the guarantees o f the adequacy o f the


idea o f the real), but a place for m echanistic theory by w hich theoretical practice is articulated to other practices in the appropriation o f the real. T h e result is th at the primacy o f practice does not signify the subordination o f theory to oth er in stan ces o f hum an activ ity , sin ce the “ criterio n o f p ractice” is in ternal to the very m om ent o f theory.5

b) A C om plex O verdeterm inated W holeT h u s we arrive at the on tological theses which are also gnoseological

theses, since there is all the sam e a relation betw een the structure o f the real and the knowledge we h ave o f it. A rriv ing at the ob ject itself (here: the history o f hum an social form ations), we must be aware o f “M arx ’s immense theoretical revolution”: the setting in m otion o f “structural causality” (L LC , II, p. 56 ). It is precisely there that A lthusser h im self brings us the m ost original and useful but also the least infallible and m ost unsable ideas, the most “degradable” in the course o f developm ent o f the A lthusserian school. H ere it follows the m ost controversial path (for other M arxists) yet the most fertile (for everyone). Let us again try to state the theses.

Thesis 3 : T h e real is presented as a structural whole, n ot as an “e v en ” com bination o f hom ogenous elem ents. Everything is first o f all a structure o f structures, a system o f relations more than a collection o f elements. T h e “elem ents” are them selves defined only by their p lace in the structure. For exam ple, the capitalist and the proletarian, more generally defined as “m en,” are defined only as p laces in the capitalist relations o f production.6

Thesis 4: T h ese structures articulate relationships w hich are presented as “contrad ictions” betw een two aspects, o f w hich one “dom inates” the other, the sen se o f the term “d o m in a tio n ” b e in g sp ec ified in each case . For exam ple, the infrastructure o f the C M P (C ap ita list M ode o f Production) com bines two relations o f dom ination, proprietorship and possession.

It se e m s th a t , in c l a s s ic a l A lt h u s s e r ia n is m , “ s t r u c t u r e s ” an d “contrad ictions” are equivalent, and th e categories and theses valid for one are so for the other as well. Here the great slippage becomes a decoy: PM speaks o f “contrad iction s” and “overdeterm ination,” L L o f “relations” and “structural causality.”

Thesis 5 : Everyth ing is always already given to us as com plex (th a t is, constituted o f m ultiple independent contradictions). It is concrete in this sense. T h e real does n ot develop out o f an original “simple unity”: on the contrary, a sim ple category can appear at the heart o f the m ost com plex given structures.

T h is thesis m arks the radical rupture w ith the “vu lgar reversal o f the

FROM ALTH USSERIANISM TO ‘REGULA TIO N THEORY’ 105

H eg e lian d ia le c t ic ,” th at o f the vu lgar M arxism o f the S ta lin ist period, according to w hich th e econom ic infrastructure would be reflected as far as the intellectual sphere, opposing “expressive totality” at every turn: two solitary terms to a single contradiction. Bourgeois science and proletarian science ... T h e following theses specify the structure o f this “already given com plex w hole” and the m odality o f its unity.

T h esis 6 : In e v e ry th in g a d o m in a n t stru c tu re e x is ts su ch th a t th is dom ination is the unity o f the w hole (“ the com plex whole possesses the u n ity o f an a r tic u la te d stru ctu re in d o m in a n c e ” [PM , p. 2 0 8 ]). T h is dom ination consists in that, to repeat the words o f M arx in the Introduction to the Critique o f Political Economy, “ it is a light in which all colors are bathed and w h ich m odifies their p articu lar ton alitie s, a particu lar eth er w hich determ ines the specific w eight o f all forms o f existence which resort to it.” T h e effects' o f th is dom ination do n ot intervene “from the outside” o f the dom inant structure but as a specification o f the structure itself.

Thesis 7: Reciprocally, “the secondary contradictions” are essential to the very existence o f the principal contradiction , in reality they constitute its “condition o f existence.” For exam ple, “the relations o f production are not the pure p h en o m e n a o f the fo rces o f p ro d u c tio n : they are a lso th e ir condition o f existence” (PM , p. 211).

Thesis 8 : W ith in the structure in dom inance the dominated structures and co n d itio n s h ave their own efficacy and auton om y w hich are each tim e precised by the d o m in an t structure, w hich for that reason is said to be “determ inant in the last instance.”

T h e fou r p re c e d in g th e ses p e rm it a d e f in it io n o f th e c a te g o ry o f “ o v e rd e te r m in a t io n ,” w h ich d e sig n a te s w ith in th e c o n tra d ic t io n (or structure), whether it is principal or subordinated, the follow ing essential quality: “the reflection , in the co n trad iction itself, o f its co nd itions o f existence, that is, o f the situation within the structure in dom inance o f the com plex w h ole” (L L , p. 215). For exam ple, the prin cipal con trad iction ( b o u r g e o i s ie /p r o le t a r ia t ) can be o v e r d e te r m in e d in “ b lo c k a g e ” or “exp lo sion ” by the m ultiple secondary contradictions w h ich dom inate it but w h ich are n o t its sim ple d evelopm en t (m en/w om en, citizens/im m igrants, e tc .) . It is im p o rtan t as w ell to grasp th e reality , the e fficacy o f th is overdeterm ination, unthinkable in th e framework o f a dialectic o f H egelian form, where, lack in g the autonom y o f the “already given,” in the absence o f a dislocation, irreducible to the principal, the ’secondary contradictions are m ad e o n ly o f an in te r io r iz a t io n o f th e o n e an d on ly c o n tra d ic t io n ,


indefin itely co n n ected , hence indefinitely “frozen .” W ith th is we have introduced two theses on the dynamic o f reality (the possibility o f change).

Thesis 9 : T h e p rin cipal co n trad iction , a s the p rin cipal asp ect o f every contradiction (said another way: the dom inant elem ent o f each relation) can be d isp laced , because “noth ing ever develops in an absolutely even fash ion” (according to the terms o f Heraclitus and M ao Tse-tung).

Thesis 10: T h e overturnin g o f the structure is m ade possib le w hen the displacem ent o f the contradictions brings dom inance into a “strategic p lace” where a “con den sation ” o f a contrad iction operates. “C om prised in this way, the contradiction is the engine o f all developm ents. T h e displacem ent and condensation, founded in its overdeterm ination, accoun t for the phases w h ich c o n s titu te the e x is te n c e o f co m p le x p ro ce sse s , th a t is, o f the becom ing o f th ings” (PM p. 223).

W hen the A lthusserian school h as finished em ptying th e contradiction, it w ill becom e in cap ab le o f th in k in g the possib ility o f ch an ge , but will rem ain perfectly capable o f describing it. It will extract the too ls o f that description particularly from Balibar and Poulantzas. T h ese we will discuss in the follow ing paragraphs. But we m ust first p roclaim our debt to the A lthusserian school’s first blow to “frozen” M arxism: the end o f the myth o f the single contradiction, o f the m essianic anticipation o f a revolution from the im placable virtue o f the contradiction betw een the productive forces and the relations o f production, “interiorized” in the proletariat/bourgeoisie contradiction.

A ll this, set apart from the degradation o f the contradiction in structure, would then be very positive if it were not necessary to note in the course o f these pages an eleventh thesis, not necessarily a consequence of, yet strongly indicated by the preceding:

T h esis 11 : T h e su p p o r t-a g e n ts o f a c t iv e s tru c tu re s c o n fo rm to th e requirem ents o f the latter, such that they appear in a representation which the th e o r e t ic a l g iv e s th e m , th a t c a n be v a s t ly d if fe re n t fro m th e m conceptually , bu t w hich induces them n evertheless, conform ing to their “p lace ,” to reproduce the structures which define them.

History thus appears as “a theater whose spectators can, on occasion, be spectators only because they are first o f all forced to be its actors, caught in the constraints o f a script and parts whose authors they can n o t be since it is in essence an anchorless cheater" (LLC , II, p. 71). T h is radical negation o f the sub ject in the nam e o f structuralism knows its m ost refined form in the analysis o f “forms o f representation”7 given by Rancière, w hich concludes:

FROM ALTH USSERIANISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 107

“the essential continuum o f the function o f the subject will be constituted in mystified being” (L LC , III, p. 77).

3 ) The Concept of the Capitalist Mode of ProductionT h e philosophical rupture registered with the “H egelian” conception o f

the whole (a single con trad iction w hich exteriorizes and interiorizes the econ om ic ad infinitum) opens in effect the breach o f a series o f scientific ruptures which shake the representation o f historical m aterialism to its very foundation s. W hat is taken again into consideration is the most classic concept o f M arx: that o f “m odes o f production .” T h e famous “Preface o f 1859” presented a sim ple schem a ( “m atrix” ):

— A t the base, productive forces that “evolve.” T h is is the “engine.”

— A bove, the “relations o f p roduction ” adequate to the degree o f developm ent o f the productive forces.

— O n top, a political arm ature and an ideological justification for it all.T h e first two levels form the econ om ic “ in frastructu re ,” where all is

defined; the other levels (political and ideological) only “reflect.” T h is is why, in scholarly terms, a “mode o f production” is defined as these two first le v e ls , d i s t in g u is h in g th e re in tw o d e g re e s : th e f ir s t , fu n d a m e n ta l (m an /n ature re lation s: the p rodu ctive forces), and the already derived second, the relations o f production (relations between m en in nature).

T h e A lth u sserian sch oo l breaks w ith th is sim ple schem a, a H egelian “m atrix” sim ply turned upside-down, an d conducts its attack on tw o fronts.

First Front: the m ode o f production is the concept (entirely within thought) o f the articulation o f three ever-present instances (and always already given to g e th e r ): ec o n o m ic , p o lit ic a l, id e o lo g ica l. T h is “co m p lex w hole in dom inance” is dom inated in the last instance by the economy, in the sense t h a t th e e c o n o m ic s tru c tu re d e te rm in e s the “m a t r ix ” o f th e m o d e (indications o f the dom inance and autonom y of various instances until their ex c is io n ). For exam ple, the econ om y can determ ine the dom inan ce o f politics and religion in the feudal mode o f production.

Secon d F ro n t: it is n e c e s sa r y to c o n s id e r th e very stru c tu re o f th e in frastructure , w ith its can o n ica l d istih c tio n betw een productive forces (defined “ technologically” ) and relation o f production (defined “socially” ). In so doing, the “developm ent o f productive forces” is itself defined as a social relation .8

A lth ough the consequences o f these two affirm ations in the destruction o f technologico-econom ic determ inism are considerable, certain questions must rem ain. Let us stop at one o f them , beginning with the “determ ining instance.”


a) T h e Econom icA ll m aterial production (w hatever its m ode) is necessarily so cial and

brings into p lay the fo llow in g elem en ts: w orkers, m eans o f p rodu ction (objects o f labor an d m eans o f labor) an d non-workers. T h e “relations of production ” are the com bination o f these elem ents. For exam ple, in the C M P, the “worker” is separate from the m eans o f production w hich is the property o f non-workers. T h is is well known. Still, it is necessary to specify what it m eans. From the econom ic poin t o f view , property signifies the capacity o f the dom inant elem ent to “affect the unity o f production onto w hich it brings to a particular production and to dispose o f the product” (Bettelheim , 1970). But one such capacity supposes as a condition on the p o litica l and ju rid ical level, the existence o f the right and property and c o n tra c ts w h ich “p e rm it” the worker to se ll h is lab or pow er, and the proprietor o f th e m eans o f production to keep th e product. T h e juridical right o f property is logically independent o f econom ic property (and it is m ade separate from it in numerous situations com prised w ithin capitalism ).

W e h ave thus already distinguished two re lation s: property/jurid ical p roperty , born e by the sam e supports (m en an d th in g s), bu t in p lace s inscribed in tw o different and relatively autonom ous instances. Th ese two relations define (econom ically and juridically) the conditions o f placing value on capital (the process o f “valorization” ). From this point it is possible to develop theories o f exchange value and surplus value. But nothing has been said o f the process o f labor itself, or the production o f use values that the “frozen ” read in g o f M arx leaves in the in d ifferen t q u an tita tiv e flow o f “productive forces” : the accum ulation o f m en, m achines, invention, knowhow ...

It is there that the A lth usserian sch oo l’s read ing o f Capital delivers a second relation which intervenes in the structure o f econom ics: the relation o f real appropriation (from B alib ar) or possession (from B e tte lh e im ). It d e te rm in es , for the lab or p rocess itse lf, the co m b in a tio n o f the sam e elem ents o f econom ic structure. It substitutes, for th e elem ent “possessor,” “the capacity to set in m otion the productive forces in the process o f labor” (B e t te lh e im , 1970 ). T h is im p lie s a p a r t ic u la r d e te rm in a t io n o f th e com bination o f the activity o f the worker, the m eans o f labor and the object o f labor. It is this com bination (this relation) w hich qualifies the famous “developm ent o f productive forces.”

In the case o f the feudal or the artisanal m ode o f production, the worker h im self sets the productive forces into motion. T h e m eans o f labor is only a tool which extends his arm, and the process o f labor, to his “work.” There is a unity, in terms o f the object, o f the activity and the m eans o f labor. In developed forms o f cap italist production, there is on the contrary unity o f the m eans an d the object o f labor (the press an d the steel p late), a unity that

FROM A LTH U SSERIA N ISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 109

is o p p o se d to th e in d iffe re n t w orker who is on ly the se rv a n t o f the machinery.

W e thus estab lish in the C M P a hom ology betw een each o f the two e c o n o m ic re la tio n s (p rop rietorsh ip and p o ssessio n , n o t co u n tin g their correspondence w itht the juridical relation), characterized by the separation o f the worker and the m eans o f production and by the dom ination o f the non-w orker. T h e profit the th eoretic ian s o f “Ford ism ” draw from these reflections is well-known (in particu lar C oriat, 1978). A t this point, two errors o f v u lg a r M a rx ism , ju r id ic ism an d q u a n t ita t iv ism , are c le ar ly denounced.

T h e first consists o f identifying capitalist relations o f production at the level o f the juridical property relation. W e are thus led not to recognize in such an econom ic form the capitalist relations o f production, th inking that they are not yet there (the putting-out system ), or thay they are no longer there (state capitalism in Eastern nations).

I n addition, B alibar’s dem onstration that the “level o f productive forces” is also a “relation o f p rodu ction ” sh atters the glass o f the “neutrality o f p r o d u c t iv e f o r c e s ” : th e y h a v e a c la s s c h a r a c t e r . T h e p o l i t i c s o f “quantitative” developm ents o f capitalist-type productive forces, from which S ta lin exp ected the production o f “m ateria l bases o f com m unism ” have (literally) bound labor. T h is error (essentially identical to technological determ in ism ) has existed since the begin ning o f the Russian R evolution ; sin ce th en “the w orkers’ op p o sitio n ” has been opposed on this p o in t to Lenin, who m echanically im ported Taylorism and the individual direction o f fa c to r ie s . In th is in s ta n c e , “ fro z e n ” M a rx ism c o n fu se d the tw o constitutive relations o f the econom ic instance.

T h e “tw o” constitutive relations ... according to Reading Capital. Because the least vulgar econom ist can not suppress his astonishm ent: evidently, one is lacking.' T h at to which M arx dedicated the first section o f Capital, and notably the first chapter: m arket re lations. W e will not enter into the sy m p to m atic an alysis o f th is o v ersigh t here, but the fact rem ain s th at c la s s ic a l A lth u s s e r ia n is m ’s criticism , fro m A lth u s se r an d B a l ib a r to P ou lan tzas by way o f M ach erey , purely and sim ply m akes out th at the u n ification o f the m eans o f production an d w orkers, under ju rid ical and econ om ic proprietorship and possessed by capital, operates w ithin separate, non-coordinated econom ic unities, independent o f one another, w hich must first o f all fin d suppliers and afterward a “clien t” for their production.

T h e oversight o f this first relation, its reduction to an ideological and ju rid ica l illu sion , w ithout doubt corresponds first to a sim ple reactio n : Stalin ist M arxism h as for too long lim ited its critique o f capitalism to the “anarchy o f the m arket-place.” By placing the accent on the extortion o f surplus-value and the dispossession o f the direct producer from the control


o f his labor, classical A lthusserianism pursues legitim ate political goals. But this does not excuse (au ton om y o f th eory !) such a failu re to take in to account.

A s we see it, how ever, the critic ism is deeper than th at. W ith the autonom y o f econom ic units, the autonom y o f the individual appears (its “liberty ” ) and the co n trad iction betw een ind iv id ual su b jects and social reproduction. “Su b jec t,” “contrad iction ”: two words w h ich will becom e taboo; “H egelians,” “hum anists.” T h is is why A lthusser, in his Preface to the G arnier-Flam m arion edition o f Capital, strongly advises the reader to “ sk ip ” the first ch ap ters. T h is is why M ach erey (L L C , IV) p ersists in forgetting, over the course o f dozens o f pages, that the process o f capitalist production is adm inistered by different capitals. T h is is why Balibar (L L C ) persists in dem onstrating that th is variety is only illusory an d introduces no “original” contradiction in the reproduction o f cap italism as a whole.

b) T h e A rticulation o f Political and Ideological C onditionsEvidently, it is no longer a question o f building upon this infrastructure a

political and ideological superstructure, “like prelim inary essences entering into a series o f external relations. T h e articulation proper to all research on a M ode o f Production requires the constitution [of these] regional instances” (Poulantzas, 1968 Part I, p. 11). However, these instances have in principle a general definition o f their autonom y, specified in each mode, according to m odalities to be determ ined “in the last instance” by the econom ic.

T h e political level for Poulantzas (p. 36) is that o f decoding, m aintaining or transform ing the unity o f a social form ation. T h e political structures o f a mode “consist o f the institutionalized power o f the S ta te .” Political practice is that which produces transform ations within the unity o f the mode and the so c ia l fo rm a tio n . P o lit ic s is th u s th e c ru c ia l in s ta n c e w h en a ll the contradictions o f a function are reflected an d condensed, that w hich can imply the existence o f political structures (and practices) corresponding to econom ic and ideological functions o f politics properly stated.

T h e “ideological” level is the site where the agents o f a form ation, bearers o f its structures, live their conditions o f existence, the “lived” relations o f agents to these conditions (II, p. 27)., In m odes and social form ations, its function is “to occult real contradictions, to reconstitute in an imaginary plan a relatively coherent discourse” (II, p. 28 ). M ore than the conceptual system, it recovers a group o f practices and structures w hich constitute the “cu lture” o f a society (such as religion). It thus reflects the unity o f the form ation, and constitutes its cement (using G ram sci’s w ord), but only at the level o f the imaginary (w hich does not impede its real efficacy on the other levels o f the structure).

T h e real autonom ization o f the political level is a characteristic aspect o f the capitalist mode of production: to speak truly, there is no “Politics and


“ S t a te ” oth er th an the bourgeois. T h is auton om ous p lace for p o litica l structure within the C M P is precisely the effect o f determ ination in the last instance o f econom ic structure. In this m ode o f production, in effect, the double separation o f the producer from his means o f production assures the unity o f the process o f valorization under the ow nership o f cap ital, and hence the appropriation o f surplus-value, in the (apparent) absence o f all external “v io len ce” except the “despotism o f the enterprise.”

Let us go further. T h e capitalist relations o f production w hich govern the p ro d u c tio n o f ju r id ic a lly p r iv a te lab o r, ex e cu ted on one an o th er independently within separate econom ic unities w hich integrate workers— th e m se lv e s se p a ra te fro m th e ir m e a n s o f p ro d u c t io n — h a v e , in th e consequent practice and social relations o f the agents, an “ isolating effect” (con curren ce betw een cap ita lists and workers, etc .) w hich refers to the juridical-political superstructure, “autonom ous” in relation to the economy, the group o ffu n ctio n s o f the “unity” o f the structurrre (I, p. 133-37). It is the S ta te w hich integrates, organizes and represents a peop le-n ation o f citizens, juridical personalities. In particular, we have already observed that the relation o f “econom ic ow nership” has as a condition o f existence (was overdeterm ined by) the relation o f juridical ownership.

In this way the two specific traits o f politics in the C M P are isolated: autonom y (by its relation to econom ics) and the function o f unity. They d ifferentiate it from the detailed and indissolubly econ om ic structure o f feudal power. These two traits are intim ately linked, when one imagines the ch aracterization o f the bourgois class that we attribu te to M arx, a class “which, at each m om ent, sacrifices its ow n general class interest, its political in terest, to its m ost lim ited p articu lar and p rivate in terests” (The 18th Brumaire o f Louis Bonaparte).

T h is conception is thus opposed to the fixed conception o f the S tate that could be drawn from L en in ’s polem ical definition in State and Revolution: a tool o f the dom inant classes to “subdue” the oppressed classes. It emphasizes (1) th at “the bou rgeo isie” ex ists only as “a class fo r itse lf,” it needs the ex isten ce o f p o litica l structures to be recognized as a class; (2) th at the relative autonom y o f politics permits the S tate to assure the reproduction o f the cap ita list mode o f production even if the bourgeoisie is incapable o f insuring its h istorical responsibility; and (3 ) that, in particular, it is relieved o f co m plex tasks other th an that o f subduing the dom in ated classes by m eans o f “special detachm ents o f armed m en.”

T h e “autonom y” o f politics thus acquires a strong m eaning: structural and institutional autonom y, not identified with optim al political economy (from an econom istic point o f view) and optim al general politics (from the point o f view of m aintaining the social form ation), not identified with the dom inant class (econom ically), the “reigning” class or “tenants o f poverty,” etc.


It is easy to guess the profit w hich the “regulationists” will later draw from the work o f Poulantzas: if politics (and ideology) are “always already” given and econ om ically overdeterm ined, the S ta te is no longer a “support for capital.” Law and Representation intervene in the form ation o f econom ic relations themselves: market, wage-eamers (Lipietz, 1985b). A n d insofar as the S tate (as an institution) “intervenes,” it does so as an archetype o f the regulated forms o f the social form ation (Delorm é, André, 1983; Lipietz, 1986).

H ow ever, the already-sketched critiques d o n oth ing but aggravate the d ifficu lties. F irst o f all, in the absence o f “ su b je c ts” really op posed in contradictory structures, it is no longer possible to see very well what there is to unify. W h at are these if n ot structures com batting one another? T h is is a u se fu l p o in t o f v iew , bu t in su ff ic ie n t , an d we w ill see th e e ffo r ts o f P ou lan tzas to address th is d ifficu lty . In ad d itio n , the “ iso la tin g ” effect (betw een capitalists, between wage-workers) is reported by Poulantzas (who follows classical A lthusserian ism in ignoring the contrad ictions o f m arket re la t io n s) as the ju r id ica l in stan ce : “ec o n o m ic u n its” are au ton om ou s b ecause th ey are juridically p rivate , th e ideological effect o f w hich is th e m is u n d e r s t a n d in g (m é co n n a issa n ce ) o f th e ir u n ity a t th e h e a r t o f rep ro d u ctio n . B e tte lh e im (1970) w ill rectify th is fu n d am en ta l error by show ing that th e separation o f market units is a rea l separation at th e core of the process o f social production, indicating a real contradiction in econom ic reprodu ction , w hich is only form ally recovered by the p lan n in g w ithin nations having public ownership o f the m eans o f production.

4) Social FormationsPure modes o f production do not exist. A ll that exist, in reality, are

particular com binations, specific intersections o f modes. It is thus necessary to have recourse to concrete objects o f thought, social form ations, com plex wholes dom inated in general by a mode o f production w hich im prints its m atrix u pon th em . “ In g e n e ra l,” b ecau se th ere ex ist p rec ise ly so c ia l form ations in transition betw een the dom inance o f two modes.

T o render m ore concrete in thought the concept o f the m ode compared to that o f form ation, two directions can be taken: the external articulation o f the dom inant mode with other modes, or the international periodization o f the mode.

External articulation with other m odes evidently does not consist o f a sim ple juxtaposition : the dom inant m ode overdeterm ines the others and gives them a specific “degen erated” form (ground-rent, the “slave p lan ta tio n s” o f the A m erican S o u th ). It is even possible to locate m odes o f production w hich can not exist as dom inant but w hich can appear in the transitions or under the dom ination o f another, such as the m ode o f “sm all independent producers.”

FROM ALTH U SSERIANISM T O ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 113

This concerns the dom inant mode itself. It delim its first in the history o f the social form ation two phases: that o f its “beginnings” (transition in the strict sense); and the phase o f reproduction enlarged in the structure. But the unequ al developm en t betw een the bran ches im poses case by case a realization o f this distinction after the establishm ent o f the dom inance o f the m ode. N ex t, the displacem ent o f the contradictions o f the mode to the interior o f its invariant structure founds a “periodization" o f this mode which is imposed (w ith dislodgings) on the form ation.

T h e periodization by the C M P by M arxists presents num erous gaps: the contrary would be surprising, the “d islodgem ent” betw een the structures- contradictions perm itting choice. M arx privileges the periodization by the re la t io n o f p o sse ss io n : m a n u fac tu re /la rg e -sca le in d u stry /a u to m a tio n . U ltim ately the M arxists have privileged a periodization in stages relative to th e f u n c t io n in g o f th e u n ify in g s tru c tu re o f th e C M P w h ic h th e A lthusserians ignore: the m arket. W e arrive a t the division “com petitive stage/m onopoly stage.”

T h e c o e x iste n c e in a sin g le so c ia l fo rm atio n o f d ifferen t m o d e s o f production, stages, etc. subdivides the dom inant and dom inated classes into strata or fractions. W hat is then the unity o f a social form ation? Structural unity is inscribed in it, we h ave already said, at the po litical level. T h e question is naturally that o f the unity founded by a “dom in ation .” T h is “unity under dom in ation ” introduces the concept o f hegemony, particularly as developed by Poulantzas following G ram sci, and m eans two things.

— It ind icates the constitu tion o f the p o litica l interests o f the dom inan t classes, in their relation to the C ap ita list State , as representative o f the general interest o f the “people-nation.” G ram sci points out (in his Modem Prince): “T h is m eans that the dom inan t group is concretely coord inated with the general interests o f the subordinated groups and th at the life o f the S ta te is ... like a continual passage o f unstable equilibria ..., equilibria to w hich the interests o f dom inant groups bring it, but only up to a certain point, that is, not up to the paltry interests o f corporative econom y.”

— In the block o f dom inant classes in power, one o f the classes (or a fraction) holds a hegem ony over others.

W e can see th at the analysis in terms o f “social form ation ” rectifies the “econom ic” conception o f “frozen” M arxism :

— Because it takes into accoun t a plurality o f contradictions overdetermined between them , and no longer leaves two hom ogeneous cam ps face to face, defined by their antagonistic p lace in the relations o f production. There are c e r ta in ly at ev ery m o m e n t tw o c a m p s on e-ither sid e o f a p r in c ip a l c o n tra d ic tio n , bu t it m u st be d eterm in ed at a ll m om en ts because it is displaced and not necessarily identifiable at the econom ic level.


— Because, even at the econom ic level, it can explain the obstacle or the lessening o f the tendentially explosive contradictions o f capitalism (against the “catastrophism ” of R osa Luxem burg).

— Because a t the political and ideological level, it perm its a “distan cing” betw een the im m ediate and catastrophic interests o f the bourgeoisie and the stra tegy o f th eir class. T h is d istan ce p ro v o k es a fractu rin g w ith in the dom inan t classes, and shows th at the fraction w hich is hegem onic is not indifferent to the dom inated classes, neither from the point o f view o f their short-term m aterial interests, nor from the point o f view o f the struggle for social transform ation.

Poulantzas certainly had in mind the choice between fascism and social dem ocracy, which the KPD did not know how to m ake under the W eimar R epublic. But the regulationists reintroduced a m uch more general idea: cap ita lism does not always fun ction in the sam e way; there are several solutions, several possible form s o f reorganization at the tim e o f its great crises, and the choice very m uch depends on the forms o f institutionalized com prom ise w hich the d o m in atin g c la sses are cap ab le o f p rop osin g or imposing.

5) The Theory o f PassageW hat is m ost strik ing about the preceding exp lication s is the strange

ap p earan ce o f “h isto r ic a l m a te r ia lism .” T h e A lth u sse r ia n sc h o o l h as brought a quantity o f concepts depicting a static reality up to date, bu t it seem s th at this could be to the detrim ent o f w hat has passed as the very originality o f M arxism: a theory o f variables, even a tentative “absolute historicization” of w hatever seems eternal in the dom inan t ideology.

Balibar and A lthusser do not conceal it: their reading o f Capital is first a c o n d e m n a t io n o f “ e v o lu t io n is m .” “ M arx to ld us th a t a ll m o d es o f production are historical moments; he did not tell us that these moments en gen dered one an o th er ... here the id en tity o f ch ron o logy and o f an internal law o f the developm ent o f forms is found broken” (L L C , II, p. 112). A n d Balibar recognized that “historical m aterialism , reduced to the single concept o f m odes o f production conceived as com binations, should be found in the impossibility o f thinking at the sam e theoretical level the passage o f one com bination to another” (L L C , II, p. 157). Hence the necessity o f a second concept: that o f “passage,” analysis o f the transition betw een two modes, thus o f the form ation and dissolution o f m odes. Balibar (in L L C ) provides the principal contribution on th is point.

T h e m ode o f production is in effect first a reproduction o f the p laces o f th e various elem ents o f the structure: “production o f ob jects and individuals fo r social relations, a production in w hich individuals are determ ined to


produce and objects to be produced in a specific form for social relations” (LLC , II, p. 175). T h is is why the theory o f reproduction is conceptualized not in time but “in a p lan ” which translates the “eternalization” o f the mode and o f its “p laces.” Production is a “process without a subject,” or perhaps (but this m eans noth ing), the subject is the relations o f production that “set in to m otion ” the workers who are already defined as proletarian before being sold to a particular functionary o f capital.

T o conceive o f the structure as reproduction, and reproduction (o f social relations) as the condition o f production (o f objects), is not only to make the mode o f production the very concept o f historical continuity, but also to prevent thinking the passage betw een two m odes as an “irrational gap,” in w hich one stops and sees what one will do next (since to live it is certainly necessary to produce, hence to reproduce the conditions o f production), and inversely to prevent thinking the passage to another structure by the same fun ction in g o f the previous structure (w hich would only be know n as a reproduction o f itself: we know o f the A lthusserians’ affection for Spinoza).

T h e result: each passage is a “revolution,” and one does not slip insensibly from one mode to another; each beginning is a “discovery." T h e new mode needs to “fin d ” elem en ts in the d isso lu tion o f the one preceding; each transition is a “quasi-m ode o f production ,” with its specific structure and reproduction.

a) A T h eory o f OriginsT o form ulate a theory o f the origins o f a mode is to take a retrospective.

W e know the structural elem ents o f this mode: thus, we know the theoretical presuppositions o f the appearance o f this m ode. If they are reunited, the m ode can begin its greater reproduction. But whence com es the reunion? C etain ly not from the mode itself, but as a product o f the social form ation under the dom ination o f the preceding mode, which constitutes the historical conditions o f the ap p earan ce o f the m ode, and o f the realization o f its theoretical presuppositions. T h ese elem ents are defined in the new world but born separately in the ancient one and are thus susceptible to a geneology which is indifferent to its m eans o f arrival: it will “forget” its origin, and from there several series o f “h isto r ica l co n d itio n s” can satisfy the sam e “presuppositions” (L L C , II, p. 184ff).

Th is is far from evolution ism . C ap ita lism , contrary to what S ta lin ist M arxism thought, does n ot descend from feudalism as m an descended from the ape in vulgar Darwinism. T h ese presuppositions can be satisfied as well by the dissolution o f the A siatic mode o f production as by the unleashing o f a “dictatorship o f the proletariat.”


b) T h e Theory o f TendenciesLet us imagine the problem in the other sense (the end o f a m ode). T h e

question is very different: it ignores some elem ents it acts to create (they are defined only by the structure o f the following m ode). W e can at the most see what elem ents o f the present mode tend to becom e.

N ow these are defined in the “space-plan” o f the reproduction o f their structure, the synchrony w hich the concept constitutes o f their relations. T h e “funciton ing” o f th at structure is the “dynam ic” o f the structure, “that is, its existence in tim e” (LLC, II, p. 194). Is this dynamic sim ultaneously the “history” o f the structure, the engine o f its obsolescen ce? N o. T h e “contrad iction” announced by M arx in the C M P betw een the socialization o f productive forces and the private character o f the relations o f production is only, for Balibar, that the structure itself developed in time; in fact it is m anifested only as a contrad iction by the d issociation in thought o f the “contradictory effects” o f the structure. T h e representation o f laws o f the dynam ic as “tendencies” is coupled with “counter-tendencies” : in fact, the tendency (o f the decline o f the rate o f profit, for exam ple) is the same law inherent to the structure, coupled with the internal determ ination o f the rhythm o f the appearance o f its effects (pp. 198-99), that is, o f the definition o f “ its” tem porality.

Thus, “the contradiction is only betw een effects, but it is not original, the cause is not divided in itself, it can not be analyzed in antagonistic term s” (p. 201). N otably, the two relations o f the econom ic base (relations o f property and possession) are in relations o f “reciprocal lim itation,” they co-determ ine the su bm ission o f labor to cap ita l: “we thus red iscover here, not the contradiction , but the com plexity o f the m ode o f production, [its] double articulation” (p. 204).

L e t us specify at on ce th at, for us, B a lib ar m arks h ere the “ p o in t o f inversion” o f classical A lthusserianism , and the substitution o f “structure” for “contrad iction” as a fundam ental category will not be long in m aking its effects felt: the return to non-dialectical m aterialism , with characteristically the c h a n g e “ by the e x te r n a l c a u se s” w h ic h w ill a p p e a r in the n e x t paragraph.

But before “surpassing” Balibar, we will subscribe to the conclusion o f his theory o f te n d e n c ie s : the “ c o n tra d ic t io n ” betw een the e ffects o f the im m anent law s o f econom ic structure cannot, o f itself, elicit th e mode o f its ow n nature; bein g th e very function o f structure, it can on ly arrive at an equilibrium, even in the form o f prolonged or cyclical crises. But the effects o f e c o n o m ic s can be “ the m ater ia l b a se ” o f o th e r re su lts , su ch as the constitution o f reform ative or revolutionary social forces, in other instances endowed with their temporality. T o understand that these tem poralities can be born in the unity o f a con ju n cture is another problem , exterior and

FROM A LTH U SSERIA NISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 117

econom ic. It must be supposed that in addition one rethinks relations in terms o f contradictions, but the analysis o f Balibar is perfectly pertinent to the critique o f the econom ic determ inism o f “frozen” M arxism , as it is to the catastrophism o f R osa Luxem burg.

T h e “regulation ists” rem ain faith fu l on this point to the A lth usserian contribution . In fact, their objects will not be “m odes o f production ,” but the m odes o f particular forms o f capitalism , the “m odels o f developm ent,” an a ly zed as c o m b in a t io n s o f a t e c h n o lo g ic a l p a ra d ig m , a re g im e o f accum ulation , a m ode o f regulation. T h ey will m aintain the d istinction b etw een th e an a ly sis o f “ th e o re tic a l p re su p p o s itio n s” o f a m o del, the “discovery” o f its h istorical con d ition s, th e “ten dencies” conducive to its crisis; but they will refuse, against for exam ple the theory o f “ lon g cycles,” to th ink th at m odels o f developm ent are linked to on e another according to some transhistorical (technological?) determ inism . In m arking a m ore and more pronounced skepticism towards the idea o f the em ergence o f a new mode o f production at the horizon o f their own tim e, they will insist on the profusion o f ruptures (great crises, institutionalized com prom ises) separating the consecutive m odels o f developm ent.9 In return, all their effort against the A lthusserian heritage will consist o f showing that the contradictions o f a model o f developm ent are original, inscribed in its structure, and that it is a veritable miracle (a “find”) that a m ode o f regulation should have been able to be established as a resolution, over a long period, o f these contradictions. Before evoking their solutions, it is necessary to pass to a m ore sym ptom atic c r it iq u e o f c la s s ic a l A lth u s se r ia n is m . B u t f ir s t le t us show w h at is bequeath ed , to th e econ om ists o f M arx ist in sp iration who h ave h a d to confront the crisis o f the 1970s, by the A lthusserian school, in m atters of predictive m ethodology.

6) PredictionW ith the two fu n dam en tal co n cep ts w hich resum e the A lth u sserian

conception o f tim e, th a t o f the dynam ic as the existence o f a structure in time and that o f overdeterm ination, we have two tools at our disposal (to com bine) for thinking evolution and m utation.

a) T h e T en d en tia l A nalysisT h e first type o f resu lt is produced by a th eoretica l reflection on an

abstract structure (the C M P , or the econom y in the C M P ). It expresses the developm ent o f the structure in a tem porality which is proper to it. T h at is to say that such a “state” o f the structure can be found as m uch in the future as in the p ast or even never to be attain ed! Everything depends on the concrete diachrony in which this dynam ic is articulated. T h e process that consists o f developing the internal dynam ic in thought up to its ultim ate


form th en takes on the allure o f a sc ien tifica lly estb lish ed prophecy , a prophecy that may or may not be realized but w hich in all rigor is perhaps written as m uch in the past as in the future. T h is type o f prophecy, frequent in the texts o f M arx, founded on a very profound com prehension o f the essen ce o f the mode o f p rodu ction , L ip ietz and R o u ille au lt (1972) call “prophetic analysis” or “tendenciality.”

T h e m ost celebrated prophetic analysis is the Communist Manifesto (first chapter) o f M arx and Engels, written in 1848. It described in a stupefying fashion the great traits o f the contem porary world. It is written entirely in the p ast tense. “ By e x p lo itin g the g lo b a l m ark et, the b o u rge o isie g iv es a cosm opolitan character to production and consum ption ... It has removed industry from its national base. T h e old industries have been destroyed and replaced by new ones which do not use indigenous m aterials, but m aterials w h ich co m e from the m ost d is ta n t re g io n s , and w h ose p ro d u cts are con sum ed in a ll p arts o f the g lobe ... In p lace o f a n c ie n t iso la tio n a universal interdependence between nations is developed ... In a word the bou rgeo isie fa sh ion s a world in its own im age ... T h e d eve lo pm en t o f m ach in ery and the d iv isio n o f labor, rem oves from the w orker all the autonom ous characters o f his work, all its attraction. T h e producer becom es a mere accessory to the m achine,” etc.

A t the lim it we can say th at the verification or non-verification o f these prophecies has no im portance, any more than the law o f gravity is disproven by the flight o f o b je c ts “h e av ier th an a ir .” T h e n o n -v e rifica tio n o f a prophetic analysis invites us “sim ply” to search for, in the com plex whole in dom inance, the causes which have fettered the articu lated dynam ic in a co n cre te d ich o to m y , cau ses th a t p red ic tio n seek s in the an a ly sis o f a co n ju n c u tu re in order to su p p ort its p ro g n o stic s w ith a sc ie n tif ic a lly produced diagnostic.

“Sim ply”: that is already a great deal. T h e great error o f the m ajority o f M arxists is to take tendential analyses literally. T h ey have good reason at certain m om ents. But not always. N ex t to the genial prophecies such as we have cited, M arx is responsible for celebrated errors (social bipolarization, th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f In d ia , e t c . ) . M o re c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s t i l l is th e “ c a ta stro p h ism ” o f R o sa Lu xem burg . It is p rec ise ly w ith th e p ro o f o f “dev iation ” betw een the tendential scenario and reality (for exam ple the em erg en ce o f the N ew In d u str ia l N a t io n s , the a b se n c e o f a c r is is o f overproduction in 1945 and 1979) that the work o f the regulationist begins. T o understand how an explosive ten dency has been inhibited is the first step in understanding crisis.

b) T h e D iagnostic o f C onjunctureT o u n d erstan d the rea lity o f p ast d ia ch ro n ie s ( th a t is, o f co n cre te

h istories) or to “ev a lu a te” th e possib ility o f future d iach ron ies, suppose,

FROM ALTH USSERIANISM T O ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 119

Althusser tells us (L L C ), that we must rid o f our minds the “linear time in w h ic h e v e n ts u n fo ld .” It is f ir s t o f a l l n e c e s sa r y to c o n s tr u c t th e tem poralities o f each structure or contradiction as a whole, bu t above a ll to exam in e carefully how each structure is cond itioned , overdeterm ined by others, specified in the whole w hich is alw ays already given us, an d th at in a very p recise conjuncture: that w h ich L en in ca lls the “presen t m o m en t.” From this moment, it is possible to see how each dynam ic is articulated with the dynam ic o f other contradictions, and to construct concrete h istorical time.

If a “general synchrony” existed, th at is, if all past and future structures were articulated “as in a p lan ,” it would then be theoretically possible to leave the actual m om ent, to deduce the following moments and begin again. T h is is not possible for several reasons. Practical reasons first: analysis can be “ infinintely concrete” only by being put into the form of the “general e q u a t io n ” w h ic h w o u ld re q u ir e “ B a l i b a r ’s d e m o n ” to fo re se e th e transform ation o f societies just as “L ap lace ’s dem on” foresaw the evolution o f m echan ical systems. R easons o f principle also: contradictions do not “ d isp la c e th e m se lv e s” ; they c a n , as A lth u sse r w ould say , “fu se ” in to exp losive con junctures o n the other side o f w hich the com plex whole is restructured in another “ illu m in ation ,” in a rad ically different structure w hich redefines all contradictions. T h e n ext R evolution or “great crisis” o f a m odel o f developm ent would appear as the closure o f the field which the A lthusserian school opened in the exploration o f the future.

C onsequently, the prediciton must lim it its am bitions (but this is already an enorm ous task) to the analysis o f the conjuncture, from the point o f view of the reciprocal conditioning o f the dynam ics o f diverse contradictions which present them selves. T h is operation is what Lenin calls “the living soul o f M arxism : the concrete analysis o f the concrete situation ,” and w hat we sim ply call diagnostic.

T h e first step o f the diagnotic is to grasp the principal contradiction in a c o n ju n c tu re . T h e se co n d is to d e te rm in e the sta te o f the p r in c ip a l c o n tra d ic t io n , th a t is, th e m o d a lity o f its o v e rd e te rm in a tio n by th e “ c o n d it io n s ” (th e o th e r c o n t r a d ic t io n s ) : by “ d is p la c e m e n t” (n o n - a n ta g o n is t ic c o n tr a d ic t io n , q u a n t ita t iv e v a r ia t io n s ) , or by “ fu s io n ” (antagonistic contradictions can be resolved only by a qualitative change). S u c h , a t le a s t , is th e m e th o d o lo g y w h ic h is im p lic it ly u se d by th e regulationists in the analysis o f the present crisis.10

T h e problem o f A lthusserian ism is that the ossification o f the category o f co n trad iction w ithin the category o f structure no longer allows th inking “fusion,” explosion, the qualitative good, except by inserting every structure into a generalized structure com prisin g the succession o f structures as a variation. Balibar (L L C ) slips toward one such solution: the transition from


one structure to anoth er is there conceived as an effect o f the m ode to come (e .g . c a p ita l ism ) on the a n te r io r m ode (e .g . fe u d a lism ). T h is is the theoretical myth o f “generalized synchrony.”

Poulantzas introduces an audacious so lution . In the social whole, an instance (the political) is the strategic site where the principal contradiction will be condensed when it is antagonistic. But the “structure o f politics” has for h im re a ch e d su ch a p o in t o f o s s if ic a t io n th a t it is co n fu sed w ith institutions. How , as the p o litica l structure becom es “p rin cipal,” can it reverse the social w hole? H e is obliged to reintroduce the notion o f the “p ractice” o f agent-bearers constituted in “classes,” classes defined by the effect, on the practice o f agent-bearers, o f the whole o f the structure. From this is drawn a “field o f practice,” projected shadow of the field o f structures' (with all possible displacem ents: it is not a H egelian expressivity). T h is field is that o f class struggle because all classes are there defined in relations of opposition (here at least contradiction reigns). It is determ ined by the field o f structures (classes are not subjects, even so !), in the form o f limits to the varia tio n s o f class struggle, b it it has its own effectiv ity on the fie ld o f structures at the level o f the political instance. “T h e effectivity o f structure on the field o f practice is thus itself limited by the intervention, in the structure, o f political practice” (1968 ,1, p. 97).

W h at a stran ge c o n stru c tio n ! It is in th is w ay th a t the “sh ad o w s” projected on P lato ’s C ave by the H eaven o f Structures had the capacity to be autonom ized in order to change the constellation o f structures! It is certainly som ew hat in this m anner that the regulationists conceive putting in place new m odels o f developm ent. But from the beginning, they have adm itted that social groups, however constituted by and in ancient relations, can be su b je c ts o f co n trad ic to ry am b ition s, and thus cap ab le o f co n flic ts and compromise.

c) C an W e M ake a “Prediction in the Future A nterior” ?Scoffing at H egelian dialectic, where what is obsolete is also saved, and

where the past thus finds its key to the even ing o f “absolute know ledge,” A lthusser refuses “history in the p ast anterior,” where each era “had already prepared and announced” the future period. N evertheless, we know how to make a geneology o f the elements o f a mode. But it is necessary not to forget that the theory o f origins is a “prehistory,” a “retrospective.” T h is m eans that we know the structural elem ents o f a mode and we will search for them in the products o f the dissolution o f the previous m ode. But for any structure, the new m ode is not p rodu ced by the an te rio r m ode: its co n stitu t io n is a “discovery,” and, from the phase o f reproduction, it radically “forgets” the occasional origins o f its elements. Th e “retrospective” (genealogy element by elem ent) thus has noth ing to do with a “tendential prediction applied in the past.”

FROM ALTH U SSERIANISM TO ‘REGU LA TIO N THEORY’ 121

W ill it not b e possible then to “apply the m ethods o f retrospection to the fu ture” ? T h at is: know ing the th eoretica l presuppositions o f the future mode, to search for the historical conditions in the present? A reading o f the present to illum inate the future? A prediction o f the future anterior (“ the present will have prepared the future” )? T h is would be a powerful guide in the analysis o f the conjuncture. Such an elem ent obeys less and less the dynam ic o f the structure from w hich it issues; it begins to follow anoth er dynam ic, th at o f a structure w hich will remain dom inant tomorrow. T h is is what Lenin m eant when, in response to the “Friends of the People” on the developm en t o f cap ita lism in R ussia, he referred to rural artisan p ro d u ctio n as th a t w hich “ s t i l l” produced under com m an d and w hich “already” produced for the market. But he h ad the conceptual knowledge o f what had to develop: capitalism . T h is is where the problem lies.

A fter they h ad m ade a precise enough “conceptual” idea o f the dom inant capitalist mode o f developm ent after the Second W orld W ar, a m odel called “Fordism ” in hom age to Gram sci, the regulationists undertook the genealogy o f its different elements: Taylorism , collective conventions, welfare state, m oney credit, etc. R obert Boyer" in particu lar will show at w hat point the origin o f these elem ents was heterogeneous, hazardous, and not in the least h avin g in m ind the in stigation o f “F ord ism .” But as a result, num erous social forces gained an idea o f the contrad iction s w hich the crisis o f 1930 revealed , and advan ced propositions o f which some had a nearly Fordist allure (as m uch for fascists as for social dem ocrats and com m unists). Th e projects they advanced often indicated a rupture with the representations w hich were form ed in the preceding period (Lipietz, 1985).

S in ce the regulations tried to perform again the sam e operation on the contem porary crisis, they had to com bine two steps anew:

— A n “A lth usserian ” analysis o f the present m om ent, but taking seriously into consideration the contradictory character o f the real, and the different possible solutions for stabilizing it;

— A location o f th e social forces capable o f bringing a specific solution to th e located contradictions.

Exam ples o f the above can be found in Leborgne and Lipietz (1987), M ah o n (1987), N o e l (1988). S t il l , it is necessary to take seriously the n otion s o f “contrad iction” and “subject.” A n d th en to go beyond the lim its o f A lthusserianism .

II. The Trouble With AlthusserianismR ejection o f C ontradiction and the Subject: these two censures seem to

be the ransom in classical A lthusserian ism for the emergence o f the concept o f Reproduction. T h is connection is particularly clear in the contribution


o f B a l ib a r to R ead in g C a p ita l . H is a n a ly s is o f c a p i t a l i s t e c o n o m ic repro du ctio n furn ish es a “p ro to ty p e” w h ich in vo lv es a w hole v ision o f history and hum ans.

1. Fecundity and Failings o f the Category o f ReproductionIn reading into capitalist production the reproduction o f social relations,

Balibar brings to light a very fertile idea in M arx. In the capitalist process o f the production o f things, seen from the point o f view o f the whole, from the poin t o f view of results, what fundam entally occurs is the reproduction o f places in the syn ch ron ic structure o f the m ode, a p lace from which the structure determ ines the functions in the reproduction o f the mode. For\ exam ple, at the end o f the cycle, Sector I has reproduced all the constant capital and Sector II all the variable capital, but above all the capitalist class is reproduced w ith the ow nersh ip o f the m eans o f p rodu ction , and the p ro letaria t is reproduced always also dispossessed . T h e reprodu ction o f people an d th ings thus determ ines them to produce an d to be products.

W here we can not agree is where reproduction becom es the foundation o f production (determ ines m en to produce), when the production o f things becom es “appearan ce” and reproduction “reality ,” “the effectivity” (II, pp. 174-5). W e disagree that M arx institutes a rupture betw een “production as an act, o b je c tific a tio n o f a su b je c t ,” and the “c o n ce p t o f a p rodu ction w ithout a subject, which determ ines as a result certain classes as their own functions” (p. 171).

In a celebrated text (O n Contradiction, 1937), w hich served as a point of d ep artu re for For M arx , M ao T se-tu n g o p p o ses “ the tw o fu n d am en ta l con cepts o f d eve lo p m en t.” T h e first sees the cau ses o f d evelopm en t o f th ings “fro m the outside, in the action o f exterior forces.” T h e second th in k s th a t “ the d ev e lo p m en t o f o b je c ts is su sta in ed by their in tern a l contradictions.” D oes this exclude the external causes? “N o t at all. Th e external causes constitute the conditions o f change, the internal causes are its base, and the external causes operate by the intermediary o f the internal causes.” W hat is this for Balibar, who sees in the “m atrix o f the C M P ” (the homology o f the relations o f ownership and possession) a non-contradictory structure? H e is obliged to th ink change by the effectivity o f a relation (o w n ersh ip ) over an o th er (p o sse ssio n ), o f an in stan ce (p o lit ic a l) over another (econom ic), o f a new m ode (the C M P) over the an cien t (the feudal mode o f production) ... and o f structures over their supports.

W hat B a lib ar does not see is that the base o f the e ffectiv ity o f the e x te rn a l cau se is in te rn a l to each stru ctu re under c o n sid e ra tio n . He specifically forgets three things:

— First, that the relation o f “possession” is contradictory. It would be more

FROM ALTH U SSERIANISM T O ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 123

correct to speak o f the “im plication/control contradiciton .” In depriving the direct producer o f in tellectual m astery o f the operations (for exam ple in Taylorism ), the capitalist sacrifices the efficiency o f which the producer who is “ im p lic a te d ” in h is w ork is c a p a b le (w h ich S w e d ish and Ja p a n e se em p lo y ers k n o w very w e ll) , b u t in v e rse ly th e p ro d u ce r “ im p lic a te d ” increases h is capacity to control (w hich Taylor understood to o well). T h e “dispossession” o f the direct producer thus is n ot the univocal dynamic of the c ap ita lis t organ ization o f labor; T ay lorism is n ot the u nsurpassable horizon o f professional relations (Leborgne, Lipietz, 1987).

— N ext, B alibar forgets the existence o f m arket relations. T h e cap italist producer is also a vendor w ho must find clients, for exam ple with the wageworkers.

— It follows that thus overdeterm ined, the relation o f exploitation is highly unstable: too m uch surplus-value is extorted, and there are no longer enough clients.

O ne m ore word: each o f the elem entary structures o f capitalism is itself a contradiction. A n d at bottom, it is this way because contradiction unites and opposes hum an bearers o f projects w hich are only com patible within narrow lim its. T h e co n trad ic tio n is “o r ig in a l” (n o t only in its effects) because at the origin a social structure does not unite places but opposes “objective subjects,” beings as capable o f routine activity as o f deviance.

2. The Problematic o f the “Objective Subject”A noth er reading o f Capital is in effect possible. “O ur point o f departure,”

said M arx, “ is labor in a form belonging exclusively to man .... W hat first distinguishes the worst arch itect from the m ost expert bee is that he has constructed the cham ber in his head before building it in the hive. T h e result toward w hich the worker m oves ideally pre-exists in the im agination o f the worker.... H e realizes there his own goal o f w hich he is conscious, w h ich d e te rm in e s h is m ode o f a c t io n as law , and to w h ich h e m u st subordinate h is will. A n d this subordination is not m om entary .... It is even m ore exacting as the work is less attractive” (B ook I, C hapter VII, P 1).

It is th is th e s is o f M a rx , a th e s is o f p h ilo so p h ic a l a n th ro p o lo g y , u n ch an g e d from th e m an u scrip ts o f 1844 to th e Critique o f the G otha Program, th at replaces the oth er theses w hich found the category o f m an as “ob jective sub ject” and as social being, h istorical and “pred ictive ,” which Labriola (1899) and K osik (1968) develop, for exam ple.12

In this problem atic, m an (philosophically) appears with a double aspect:— Subjective being: he introduces a “m ediation.” betw een his needs and

their satisfaction, he forges for h im self an “artificial m ilieu,” and to produce o b jects he is produced and reproduced h im se lf as a social being. “ H is”


nature is thus the product o f “h is” activity, the “objective world o f men and their products”— an originally contradictory world.

— Objective being: he obeys the laws o f nature such as they are (including “his” nature); he evolves in this objective and contradictory world which determ ines the mode o f satisfaction o f his needs.

From the second aspect it is possible to produce the “social sciences,” and this is why econ om ics takes the dom inant role in them . From the first aspect m an could be know n as a historical being, liable to a past, a future, a project, a prediction. .

T h e problem atic o f the objective subject, according to which, as Labriola (p. 237) said , “m an is developed or produces h im self, n ot as an entity, generically provided with certain attributes, who repeats him self or develops h im self according to a rational rhythm , but is produced and developed at o n ce as ca u se an d e ffe c t , as a u th o r an d c o n se q u e n c e o f d e te rm in ed conditions,” thus opens onto two dialectically connected points o f view:

— T h at o f the “objectifying practice”: the m ovem ent by w h ich hum ans are produced and engendered their future routines.

— T h at o f the “objectified practice,” the state o f social m an produced in this way, o f his m aterial production as well as his routine practices in social relations, which are now presented as “conditions.”

K osik com pares th is doubling to Spinoza’s categories o f “natura naturans” and “n atu ra n atu ra ta .” A n d rightly so: the qu estion is n eith er o f two different m om ents (hum ans will som etim es be follow ers o f routine, and so m etim es in n o v a to rs), nor o f a d iv ision o f h um an ity in to two groups (“ leaders” an d sh eep), but in to two aspects, alw ays coexistin g in variable proportions, in all hum an practice. Such is the opposition currently used (from Poulantzas to G iddens) betw een structure and practice. Because in the sam e way that practice is determ ined by conditions, the “trajectories” o f these p ractices are m ech an ically obtained by a “du ality” apart from the know ledge o f structures, and reciprocally so c ia l structures are only the pattern for these objectified practices (Lipietz, 1988b).

Knowledge o f social reality as “conditions” is thus a m om ent (but only a m o m en t) o f the know led ge o f the “so c ia l b e in g ” o f m an . A g a in it is necessary, as K osikrem inds us, not to forget that “conditions are not being” and that these conditions are “products”: “social being is n ot contained, but simply fixed, in econom ic categories and their articulation. For the analysis to grasp social being in the system o f econom ic categories, it must dissolve its fixity and conceive o f it as the expression o f the objective activity o f m en” (1968, p. 135).

It is thus necessary not to confuse the m ethodology o f the analysis of the conditions o f o b je c tif ie d p ra c tic e w ith th e m e tap h y sica l on to lo gy th a t


c o n fu se s th e e x i s te n c e o f m an w ith c o n d it io n s . In m y se n se , th e A lth u sse r ia n sc h o o l is par excellence th e sch o o l o f th e m eth od ology o f con d ition s; in this regard, a renaissan ce o f h istorical m aterislism can be legitim ately atttributed to it. U nfortunately, it slipped from m ethodology to ontology. It has thus rem ained capable o f analyzing past conditions (the retrospective branch o f being) but finds itself powerless to apprehend the new, hum anity in the process o f m aking the world. H aving dissolved the v u lg a r “ p se u d o - c o n c r e t e ,” it fe t i sh iz e s , in an a c a d e m ic m o d e , th e “conditions” that it has analyzed so well, by denying that the “conditions” should them selves be the product o f subjects. It has taken “conditions” for “being.”

W e saw, how ever, th at Poulantzas reintroduced, in the shadow o f the field o f structures, a “field o f practice” determined by the effect o f the field o f structures on the “agent-bearers.” Let us note first o f all the advantages o f this conceptualization . It excludes the em piricism which would read off from the relation s of p rodu ction the existence of a “class in i t s e l f ’ (the proletariat), w hich Would becom e (the concept was developing in the real and was self-conscious) a “class for itse lf’ susceptible to political autonom y. It instituted a field o f analysis where contradiction reigned. It reintroduced, in m aking the class the effect o f the totality o f instances, an entity which, without being a “pars totalis” o f the “expressive totality ,” at least has the ch aracteristic o f being “presen t” (th at is to say, contem poraneous) in all instances (econom ic, ideological, political).

T h ese advantages, we have said, are m et with a singular oddity. W hat are these structures? W hat do they structure? A re they empty form s, a “container” w hich inform s the contents? A n d practice? Is it not structured? If the structures are not those o f the practice— and Poulantzas takes great care to affirm the relative autonom y o f the two fields, the first only imposes “lim its” on the other— then m ust structures be represented as a “too-large garm ent” in which practice “sw im s”?

E ffectively , it seem s th at the “sta k e ” sh ou ld be the effect sough t by Poulantzas in the distinction o f fields. It is a question o f being given with the practices th at w hich is forb idden to lone structures: to th ink their overturning. T h e “practices” appear as an “escape hatch” for structuralism. But P oulantzas takes great care to re stra in them : they are determ in ed (lim ited) by the field o f structures, an d can on ly h ave “effectivity” on the field o f structures at the level o f the political instance. Poulantzas timidly reconnects with the T h ird T h esis on Feuerbach: “the m aterialist doctrine w hich would have m an be the product o f circum stance and education ... forgets that it is precisely the m en who transform circum stance and that the educator him self needs to be educated....T he coexistence o f the change in circum stances and hum an activity or self-change, can only be considered

and com prehended to the same degree as is revolutionary practice.” In an o s s if ie d fo rm , he th u s re tr ie v e s th e tw o f iu n d a m e n ta l id e a s o f th e \ p roblem atic o f the ob jective subject: it is a hum an practice that makes history, but not all practices are transforming.

But it is still necessary to think practice authentically, as K osik reminds us: “E v en a to ta lity th ou gh t as a rticu la tio n o f co n trad ic tio n s rem ains abstract, if on e does n ot show th a t m an , as a real subject o f history, created th e b a se and su p e rs tru c tu re , and in th e p ro c e s s o f p ro d u c t io n an d rep ro d u ctio n , e la b o ra te s so c ia l rea lity as a to ta lity o f so c ia l re la tio n s, institutions and ideas, and, in this fashioning o f social objective reality, was him self created at the sam e time as a historical and social being ....” Lacking which, he pursues, “O ne falls into the snare o f fetishism , o f which the fruit is the false totality. Soc ia l reality then is conceived as the sum o f autonom ous structures which influence one another. T h e subject has disappeared, or better, the actu al su b ject is replaced by a m yth ical su b ject, reified and fetishized, o f knowledge: by the autonom ous m ovem ent o f the structure” (p. 42). O ne thus finds oneself facing the following dilem m a: “ A t one o f the poles relations (condition s) are petrified, and at the other, the spirit, the psyche. Either the conditions are passive, such that the spirit, the psyche, sets them in m otion and gives them a m eaning; or else the conditions are active and themselves becom e subjects, whereas the psychic element or the consciousness has as a function only to know in an exac t, or m ystified, m anner their natural or scientific law s” (p. 92 ). T h is takes yet another form: “T h e alternative, either mechanical causality, where one factor is cause and the o th er effect, or pluralist in terac tio n , sim p le rec ip ro ca l co n n e c tio n excluding all actual causality ... ; th is alternative is already the consequence o f a determ in ed v isio n o f reality w hich, apart from so cia l realitie s, has e lab orated iso lated ab straction s o f w hich it m akes o n to lo g ica l essences (factors) .... M etaphysics bases all its prem ises on this problem atic” (p. 79).

Here we are precisely a t the heart o f the contradiction betw een Balibar and Poulantzas, on the com m on terrain inaugurated by A lthusser. Balibar ch o se the c o m p le te au to n o m y o f the m o v em en t o f the “ stru ctu re o f structures,” o f generalized synchrony, with its consequence, rallying around mechanical causality ( “on e structure over the o th e r” ). Poulantzas, who can not resort to this, introduces political struggle as the “m otor o f history,” p o lit ic a l struggle determ in ed by th e to ta lity o f th e structure, thus by a plurality o f re latively auton om ous in stan ces. B u t are these in stan ces so different from the “factors” against which Labriola and Kosik polemicize?

In fact, this dilem m a ( “sym ptom atic form o f ideological questions,” said A lth usser) already fin ds its source in the fam ou s critique o f the “sim ple reversal o f the H egelian d ia le c t ic .” In p o sitin g reality as a netw ork o f “decentered c irc le s,” o f auton om ous co n trad iction s, For M arx sh attered


FROM A LTH U SSERIA NISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 127

Hegelian and S talin ist mythology, but, failing to put in place an “organizing su b je c t ,” A lth u sse r re jo in e d the w orldview o f the 18th cen tu ry : the k a le id e s c o p e o f D id e ro t . F o r i f th e c ir c le s are d e c e n te r e d , fo r the contrad iction s to condense, it is necessary e ith er for them to be set into p la c e by p u re c h a n c e and to be c o n t e n t w ith a m ere “ h is to r y o f co m b in atio n s ,” or to im agine a structure o f all structures sim ilar to the dream o f “the single equation” o f m odem physics, or to reintroduce structure by m eans o f a subject endowed with the contem poraneity o f all instances. A t the heart o f classical A lthusserianism , the first solution seems to be that o f A lthusser, the second the tem ptation o f Balibar, the third describes well en ough the attem pt o f Poulantzas, w ith his class-effects o f the ensem ble o f structures, and their practices w hich are conden sed in the single political instance.

III. The Regulationist “Surpassing”W hen in the first h a lf o f the 1970s econom ists o f M arxist inspiration had

to think the crisis, there rem ained a f first, for m any o f them, to “surpass” the A lt h u s s e r ia n h e r i ta g e . A p p r o a c h e s in te rm s o f “ r e g u la t io n ” h a v e corresponded, for m any am on g us, to this need. T h e results have since m ostly been published, and it is n ot a question o f explicating them here. I n evertheless w ish to try to “rea lign ” a bit better these results with their heritage. T o do this, I w ill resituate the em ergence o f the regulationist approaches in the intellectual co n tex t o f the 1970s, an d th en I will respond to the notion o f “reproduction” as I have extracted it from Balibar, precisely from econom ic production.

1. Confronting the HeritageFrom the preceding long critical analysis, we can summarize what helped

us and what hindered us in four “m ain theses.”

a ) S o c ia l reality is a fabric, a n articu lation o f relatively autonom ous and specific re lation s, overdeterm in ing one an oth er (even if some are more fundam ental than others): an “always already given, overdetermined whole, in dom inan ce.”

b) Each o f these social relations is reproduced a s a result o f the action o f its “bearers” ( “structure ex ists as a re su lt” ), in p lacing the bearers in to the contradictions o f reproducing it, independent o f their subjectivity.

T o these fundam ental m eth odological theses, the school o f A lthusser associates, in a m ore or less contingent or haphazard way, two im portant theses for econom ists:

c) Productive forces them selves are the m aterialization o f social relations of production (a theme developed by Balibar and Bettelheim ).


d) T h e contradictory character o f the relations o f exchange is superficial and secon dary (a th em e affirm ed forcefu lly by A lth u sse r and deve lo ped by Balibar, but rejected by Bettelheim ).

W e will not discuss any further the fertility o f T h esis (a). N either will we discuss further the fecundity o f T hesis (c), w hich is subjacent to all our work on Taylorist organization o f labor, its crisis and its overcom ing.

T h esis (b ), on the other hand, and T h esis (d ), which is basica lly its corollary and its illustration, constitute the “ bad side” o f A lthusserianism , by w hich it participates in the structuralist hegem ony o f its ep och which, from Lévi-Strauss to L acan , everywhere pum m els the “sub ject.” Individualism , the su b jectiv ism o f the “cap tain o f industry,” fo r exam ple, fin ds its first illu stration (and p erh ap s its econ om ic d eterm in an t) in the ex isten ce o f m a rk e t r e la t io n s , and in the a u to n o m y o f “ p r iv a te la b o rs e x e c u te d indepen den tly o f one an oth er” and w hich search after the fact for their social v a lid a tio n in C h a p ter O n e o f C apital. T h ro w in g on to th is first chapter the m an tle o f N oah , A lthusser erased in a single stroke the subject, contradiction, and m arket relations. D evelop ing this idea, Balibar cam e to deny the ex isten ce o f structural co n trad iction at the origin o f crises: a structure has as its m ission to persevere in its being.

From here to th in k th at “all is done for th is,” it was only a short step to functionalism . T h is is w hat Terray (1977) explain ed quite well: “we have f r e q u e n t ly se e n th e r é in t r o d u c t io n , in fa v o r o f c o n s id e r a t io n s on r e p r o d u c t io n , o f th e w h o le o u t - o f- d a te a r s e n a l o f f u n c t io n a l i s t interpretations: reproduction is conceived a s a final cause from which the ensem ble o f structures and analyzed institutions proceeds.... T o avoid this error, it is necessary to recall first o f all that reproduction can only be a goal: only a subject can propose a goal. Society is not a subject. It is necessary to recall above all th at w hat is reproduced is precisely and before everything else a contradiction .... Consequently, to be placed at the point o f view of reproduction is definitively to understand how the same cycle o f production and d istr ib u tio n co n stan tly rep lace s in p resen ce the two term s o f the contradiction w hich is the fundam ental relation o f production: dom inant and dom inated, exploiter and exploited; how the first attem pts to em bellish the crises to which this contradiction leads so that it could be surm ounted or resolved, how the second is attached to the contrary, more or less concisely, to abolish or invade it. Reproduction in its totality is at once the stake o f their confrontation and its result.”

Retrospectively, we consider the long period o f Fordist expansion w ithout a crisis “ in c ircu lation ” to be the m ost significant part o f the functionalist illusion. “C irculationism ” was thus one insult in the debates betw een M arxists (in particular in the critique o f R osa Luxem burg, but also in the analysis o f “center-periphery” relations). It began to be applied to production, to labor-capital relations.

FROM A LTH U SSERIA NISM TO ‘REGULATION THEORY’ 12 9

T h e sem inal thesis o f M ichel A glie tta (1974) sacrificed a t this altar: it was necessary to work through hundreds o f pages dedicated to the analysis o f the labor/capital relations, but fortunately diffracted in a relation o f labor organization and a relation o f distribution o f the value added (possession and prop rie torsh ip ) before the ex isten ce o f au ton om ous cap ita ls would appear. But this “diffraction” sufficed to bring about th e contradiction in the reproduction o f this com plex relation , hence the possibility o f crisis, and hence the problem of regulation. It was tim e: the crisis o f Fordism was about to erupt.

Let us adm it: the introduction o f the term “regulation” does not at all su ffice to d issip ate the fu n c tio n alist am bigu ities co n n oted by the term “repro d u ctio n .” In some o f our form ulations, “regu lation ” is design ated sim ply “w hat is needed for reproduction to work however.” Evidently, to explain the crisis we sought to explain what, first o f all, was not in crisis, Fordism . T h e “m ode o f regulation” was hence freed for public diffusion in the form o f its result, rather th an starting with a discussion previous to the “how ever,” to the contradiction and the tendency to crisis (w hich it has to inhibit as an unstable result): one can rigorously speak o f “functionalism after the fact.”

2. From Reproduction to RegulationW e in s is t on th is p o in t : it is a p ro p o s o f p ro b le m s o f c a p it a l i s t

accum ulation that the passage o f the notion o f reproduction makes way for that o f regulation. Let us return in effect for an instant to the em blem atic exam ple o f the reproduction o f places (capitalist/proletarian ) in B alibar’s reading o f Capital. H e has clearly underscrored the fact th at the circulation o f m erch an d ise betw een c a p ita lis ts and p ro le ta rian s would resu lt in a reproduction o f the structure o f the wage relation. T h e conditions o f the re lation (an d o f the c ircu lation it induces) appear in effect iden tical in result:

Capitalist

Proletarian

A - P [ $ · · . . M — A' . . . . f A(pi

Money-capital

Conditionsofproduction

Products Money Money-capital

Labour- Money Subsistence Labour-power V goods power

F — V · _ M .............F

Figure 1: Reproduction o f the W age R elation

T h is chart may be read in two ways. Should one be interested in the reprodu ction o f p ositio n s (vertica l, synchronic, parad igm atic , harm on ic readings):


Figure 2: T h e Structure in T im e

S h o u ld one be in te re s te d in the tra je c to ry o f a g e n ts (h o r iz o n ta l, diachronic, syntagm a tic, counterpointed readings):

-I------------ timet2

Figure 3: Trajectories


From th ese figures, the A lth u sse r ia n s h ave essen tia lly re ta in ed the “v ertica l” dim ension (th e system o f p lace s). It is in effect su fficient to consider the first chart “head on ” (that is, with tim e m oving towards us) and not longitudinally (with time from left to right) to obtain the famous “figure eight” o f reproduction:

C A P IT A L IS T S

Figure 4: T h e “Figure E ight”

Seen from this angle, reproduction appears in effect “non-contradictory.” A ll the work o f “regulationists” can thus be understood as a triple effort:

— to show that capitalist reproduction “doesn ’t run by itse lf ’;

— to show why, for vast periods o f tim e, it is pursued “how ever”;

— to show why, at the end o f a certain time, a great crisis erupts.T h ese things are know n today. First, the simple reality o f the market

relation , the uncertainty o f the cap ita list producer concerning the social v a lid ity o f the m erch an d ise offered , in tro d u ces a rad ic a l d issym m etry betw een m erch and ise an d m oney: m oney is a gen eral “ u n co n d itio n al” equivalent o f m erchandise; the realization o f m erchandise in money is on th e c o n tra ry a “ p e r ilo u s l e a p ,” in d ic a te d in F igu re 4 by th e s ig n Z, “dangerous turn.” T h e flow o f m erchandise going out at the northeast end o f the schem a must be correctly proportioned ( in volum e and value) to the dem an d w hich is expressed in the south east loop , but also in the non- re p re se n te d lo o p s, in p a r tic u la r the “ a c c u m u la tio n - in v e s tm e n t” loop (p urch ase o f p rod u ctive goods by cap italists).. T h e u n certain ty in this su b je c t c o n s titu te s th e “ fo rm al p o ss ib il ity ” o f c r ise s. Its n e c e ss ity is introduced by accum ulation itself, w hich tends to inflate the flow com ing


out o f the northeast, all in contain ing the grow th o f the southeast loop. T h is contradiction is at the heart o f the wage relation. It can be summarized in one phrase: either the price o f exploitation is too h igh and the crisis o f o v e r p r o d u c t io n t h r e a t e n s , or e lse it is to o low and th e c r is is o f underinvestm ent threatens. T h is price is itself a function on one hand o f the relations o f distribution (norm s o f consum ption), and on the other hand o f th e tra n s fo rm a tio n s in p ro d u c tio n (n o rm s o f p ro d u c t io n ), and in particular o f gains in productivity and changes in th e organic com position o f capitals.

A m ode o f transform ation conjo ined to and com patible with norm s o f production and consum ption is called a regime of accumulation. T h is regime can be described as the given repetition o f the production o f sections or p rodu ctive bran ch es and o f the correspo n d in g dem an d: what is called schem a o f reproduction or m acroeconom ic structure. W e h ave shown that the “Fordist” regime could be described as a parallelism o f the increase o f p ro d u c tiv ity , th e n orm o f co n su m p tio n o f w age-w ork ers, and o f the com position o f capital. Sa id another way, it follows a schem a o f intensive reproduction with increase o f wage-worker consum ption such that a parallel increase occurs in the volum e o f the net product o f Section s I and II, related in num ber to productive wage-workers. T h is regime o f accum ulation thus is a kind o f “ch ain ” 15 o f possible capitalist reproduction:

Value added in Sector I

Value added in Sector II

I___________ I______ I Purchasing power o f salaries

------ 1---------------- 1---------------- 1--------- '------- ( - ► - timeto t , t 2 t 3

Figure 5: Regime o f A ccum ulation as a C hain

But let us return to Figure 1. T h e question is whether to take sriously the lo n g itu d in a l d im e n s io n o f th is c h a r t . T h e a g e n ts ( c a p i t a l i s t s an d proletarians) can be considered th e proprietors o f “value in process,” that is, o f th e “flow” o f values o f respective generic forms:


> A — > A' — >P. . .and ...— >F — > S — >M ...F — >S...T h is concept o f “values in process” m etam orphosing from form to form is

introduced in the third chapter o f Capital and gradually developed throughout Book II. T h ese m illions o f individual “flows” constitute the thread of econom ic reality. In “everyday life” (Alltagsleben) they are even the only positive reality. A t the heart o f this tide, the values in process change their forms, as is seen developing in tim e in Figure 4, the “figure eight.” In reality, the two spirals o f this figure are com posed o f myriads o f individual spirals: the tide. “Ex post,” when the regim e o f accum ulation is stabilized, this tide, in its structure, must fit exactly the proportions repetitively described by the schem a o f reproduction.

But “ex ante,” the tide is guided by m illions o f individuals, each responsib le for “h is” va lue in process, and m ost p articu larly the w ell-n am ed “cap ta in s o f industry .” T o guide th em selves, they m ake use o f “ m ap s,” Representations (Darstellungen) o f their insertion in the tide, and their errors are sa n c t io n e d by slu m p s or u n e m p lo y m en t. C a n we th en co m p are ind iv iduals to autom atons receiv in g in form ation al “ input” o f w hich the “output” is behavior conform ing to reproduction? By no means.

T h e possibility o f a satisfactory reproduction is only designated by M arx in the celebrated “schem as o f reproduction” and in his reflection on the “price o f production” (Lipietz, 1983 ). But this possibility does not imply any guarantee o f a happy ending. It suffices that the assumed laws o f form ation o f wages and nom inal profit are not be adapted to the evolution o f norms o f production, fo r im balances appear. T h e tide o f values in process thus seems to “overflow ” the increase in value o f the schem a o f reproduction, or on the contrary to prove inferior to the poten tial increase. In the econom ic fabric, wrinkles or holes appear: inflation or overproduction. T h is th en poses the p ro b lem o f th e a d a p ta t io n o f the tid e to th e reg im e, or, to keep the Sm ith ian m etaphor o f w eaving, the w oof to the warp. T h is adaptation is the effect o f regulation in action, which plays, in the m etaphor o f weaving, the role o f warps, or the “invisible h an d” o f A dam Sm ith.

T h e w hole effort o f eco n o m ic w orks in term s o f regu lation , and in particular o f the C E P R E M A P report (1977) and its derivatives, has consisted o f show ing that this “invisible h an d ” was not the transhistorical m echanism o f concurrence pure and simple. T h e m ode o f regulation includes, am ong o th ers, d ire c t and in d irec t form s o f d e te rm in a tio n o f w ages, o f inter- en terp rise co n cu rren ce an d o f in crease an d se lf-gu id an ce o f va lues in process. A s th e regime o f accum ulation is itself transform ed, great crises can arise from the inadequacy o f the mode o f regulation. These great crises (like the current crisis, or that o f the 1930s) are to be distinguished from cyclical “sm all crises,” which are the sam e form of the action o f regulation in the


m odes called “com petitive.” A s for the “intentionality” o f putting in place an adapted m ode o f regulation, as in the “m onopolist regulation” fo r the Fordist regim e, we have been able to show that historically the question has m ost o ften been one o f “discoveries,” which in the thread o f tim e have been able to be consciously consolidated, by K eynesian theoreticians o f Fordist regulation , by reform ist unions, and by governm ents seeking to preserve social consensus.

Inversely, to understand how the great crisis o f Fordism (for exam ple) appears, how the “fabric” is torn, im plies a double labor. O n on e hand, at a profound level, the progressive deform ation o f the m acro-econom ic structure: decline o f gains in productivity, sluggishness o f the organic com position , increased internationalization. O n the other han d , at an “esoteric” level, we seek to show how socioeconom ic actions, in their struggles to “modify the given,” at the very interior o f the logic o f the model o f developm ent, but also in their efforts to transform it in the name o f a “nature” incom patible with this model, have “accum ulated divergences.” T h e unions have sought to render wage increases more and m ore autom atic, to consolidate the assets of the welfare state: offensives internal to the m odel. But workers have resisted more and more alienating forms o f Fordist organization o f work. T o oppose th e se te n d e n c ie s , e n tre p e n e u rs h a v e so u g h t to e n la rg e the sc a le o f production, to accelerate autom ation (a strategy internal to Fordist logic), but also to transfer production to countries with m odes o f regulation more favorable to profit, to distort social legislation by the “dualization” o f the labor m arket: a form o f avo id in g by fligh t the in stitu tion alized Fordist compromises. “R egulation” h as given way to crisis.

T h e result o f these divergent strategies is know n. T h e essential th ing is to u n d erstan d that it is not a q u estio n o f a re g re tta b le w eak en in g o f c o n s e n su s th a t a b it o f g o o d w ill w o u ld be a b le to sm o o th o u t . C ontrad iction is internal to the regime itself.

ConclusionIn France today, A lthusser is, as H egel once was, treated like a “dead

do g .” H e and his school bear certain responsib ilities, deriving from the structuralist deform ation im posed on the reading o f M arx. Forgetting the su b je c t, fo rg e ttin g c o n tra d ic tio n , h y p o sta s is o f re p ro d u ctio n : all th is prevents th inking th e crisis, thinking th e p ositive value o f individualism . A lth usserian ism was thus condem ned by the 1970s. U nfortunately, those who tod ay “fo rg e t” A lth u sse r in fac t “ fo rg e t” M a rx , the e x is te n c e o f structures o f exploitation, the weight o f social relations.

I have attem pted to show th at in “classical A lthusserian ism ” there was m uch to save: the irreducible m ultip licity o f the relations w hich weave social reality, overdeterm ination o f these relations, and, for the little w hich


can b e taken into consideration about their contrad ictory character, the m ultiplicity o f possible conjunctures.

I have recalled that the regulationists began in the school o f A lth usserianism in the com prehension o f notions such as productive forces, social form ations, state/econom ic relations.

I undertook to show that the notion o f “regulation” literally constituted a “surpassin g” (Aufhebung) o f “reprodu ction ”: the unity o f opposition and identity at the heart o f a contradictory structure, the m om ent dialectically opposed to that o f “the crisis o f the structure.” I did it, like Balibar, through the exam ple o f econom ic reproduction o f capitalism . I was equally able to evoke the regulationist surpassing o f the reflections o f Poulantzas, w hich is beginning today (Jenson, 1988; Lipietz, 1988b).

But I wish to conclude by recalling what rem ains for m e the fundam ental lesson o f A lthusser: simply the m ethodological theses 0, 1 and 2. T h e real ex ists indep’endently o f our th ou gh ts. T h e con cepts through which we pretend to know it ex ist only in our m inds. Their adequation to other practices at the heart o f the real is only a m atter o f pertinence. O r again, as U m berto Eco, author o f The Absent Structure, made the hero o f The N am e of the Rose say: “T h e concepts w hich we fabricate are only ladders, threads by w hich to grasp som ething. A fter which, they can be thrown into the fire.”

Sh a ll we one day throw into the fire M ode o f Production, Reproduction, Fordism, and Peripheral Fordism? Certainly. But they can be useful in the m eantim e.

Translated by Erika Thom as

Notes

1. T h e w orks o f referen ce o f th is “sc h o o l” are: A g lie t ta (1976), B oyer (1987), B oyer and M istral (1978), C .E .P .R .E .M .A .P . (1977), C o ria t (1979), Lipietz (1979, 1983, 1985a), w hich all m a k e c r i t i c a l r e fe r e n c e , im p l ic i t ly or e x p l i c i t ly (m in e in p a r t i c u la r ) to A l t h u s s e r ia n c o n t r ib u t io n s . A n I n t e r n a t io n a l C o n g r e s s o n R e g u la t io n T h e o r y , u n it in g e c o n o m is t s , g e o g rap h e rs a n d s o c ia l a n d p o lit ic a l sc ie n t is ts o f a l l c o n t in e n ts , w as h e ld in Ju n e 1988 in B a rc e lo n a . In m y c o n tr ib u t io n (1988a) I re m a rk e d th a t A n g lo - S a x o n geo grap h e rs m a k in g referen ce to the “th eo ry o f s tru c tu ra tio n ” o f A n to n y G id d en s (1984) th em selves also p rac tic ed a form o f c ritic a l A lth u sserian ism .

2. For th is I based m y se lf on w orks (L ip ie tz an d R ou illeau lt, 1972; L ip ietz 1973) rep resen tin g my ow n “rupture w ith the F ath e r.”

3. A c c o rd in g to th e A lth u sse r ian d is t in c tio n , d ia lec tic a l m ateria lism is the sp o n tan e o u s p h ilo so p h y o f sc ien tists , p ractitio n ers o f th e sc ien ce o f h istory , i.e., H isto r ic a l M aterialism .

4 . P ou r M arx (A lth u sser , 1 9 6 5 ), pp. 187 ff. For th e rem ain d er o f this article the b ook w ill be d esign ate d PM . -

5. L ire le C ap ital (A lth u sse r et a l., 1 9 6 5 ), to m e I, pp. 67 ff. For the rem ain der o f th is artic le the b o ok w ill be d e sig n ate d L L C .


6. In n u m e ra b le r e fe re n c e s in P M an d L L C : th is is th e “th e o r e t ic a l a n t i-h u m a n ism ” co m m o n to a ll structuralism .

7. R an c iè re tran sla te s w ith th is single term “D arstellung” an d “Vorstellung” in M arx , w ithout in qu irin g w h eth er they m ean ex actly the sam e th ing.

8 . S e e esp ecia lly B a lib a r (L L C , pp. 2 1 4 ff-) an d B ette lh e im (1 9 7 0 ) .9. S e e , for ex am p le , B oyer (1986), L ip ietz (1 9 8 5 b ) .10. T h u s, G ly n et al. (1 9 8 6 ) an d Lipietz (1 9 8 5 a ) h ave an alyzed th e cu rren t crisis as a “crisis

o f th e F o rd is t m o d e l” (n o ta b ly in th e “ r e la t io n o f p o s s e s s io n ” ), o v e r d e te r m in e d by th e co n trad ic tio n b etw een th e m o re a n d m o re in tern atio na lized ch arac te r o f p ro d u ctio n a n d the n a tio n a l ch arac ter o f th e m od e o f regu lation .

11. S e e h is n um erou s h isto rica l artic le s, in p articu lar h is con trib u tion to the C E P R E M A P (1977) report.

12. T h e co n c ep t o f the “o b jectiv e su b jec t” is d eve lop ed by K o sik (1968). T h e re is a long M arx ist trad itio n that derives (v ia G ram sc i an d L ab rio la ) from th e M arx o f the J8 th Brum aire (“ M e n m ake h istory , bu t on the basis o f g iv en c o n d it io n s”) and ab o v e all the Third Thesis on Feuerbach. T h e se two th eses o f M arx are the p o in t o f dep artu re rec laim ed by the “th eory o f s tru ctu ra tio n ” o f G id d e n s (1984) an d o f th e “g en e tic stru ctu re” o f B o urd ieu (1987) as w ell as my own th eory o f regu la tio n (1988).

L e t us rem ark, fo r th e ben efit o f A n g lo -S a x o n fem in ists, th a t th e gen eric term “h o m m e” (of m ascu line gen der) has been m on opolized by m ales in F ran ce (the L atin root “v ir” ex istin g on ly in the a d je c t iv e “ v ir ile ” ), w h ile in E n glish “ m e n ” h ave in versely im posed th e gen ericn ess o f their n am e to th e en tirety o f “h u m an b e in gs.” It is n o t as easy to d isto rt social re lation s o f gender in th e F ren ch language as it is in English. A s a ll efforts being m ade here are bound to fail, I k eep th e m ascu lin e to re fe r to th e p h ilo so p h ica l c o n c e p t o f “m a n ” (an d th e fem in in e for th a t o f “n a tu re ” : all is ev id en tly n o t n eu tra l).

13. O n th e “w arp /w oof d u a lity ,” see L ip ietz (1 9 8 3 ,1986b).

W o rk s C ite d

A g lie tta , M . (1974)A ccum ulation et Régulation du capitalisme en longue periode. Exam ple des E tats-U n is (1870- 1970), T h e se Paris I, m im eo.

A g lie tta , M. (1976)Regulation and C rises o f Capitalism , C a lm an n -L év y , Paris. E n g lish tran slatio n : V erso .

A lth u sse r , L . (1965)P ou r M arx , F. M aspero , Paris.

A lth u sse r , L . (1970)Lire le C ap ita l, F. M a sp e ro , P a r is . C i te d a c c o rd in g to L a P e t i te C o lle c t io n M asp é ro , 4 V o lu m es.

B ette lh e im , C . (1970)C alcu l économique et form es de propriété, S eu il-M asp ero , Paris.

B ourdieu , P. (1987)C hoses dites, M in u it, Paris.

Boyer, R.; M istral, J. (1987)A ccum ulation, inflation, crises, P .U .F ., Paris.

C .E .P .R .E .M .A .P . (1977)A pproches de l'inflation: l’exam ple fran çais, report to C O R D E S by J .P . B en assy , R . Boyer, R .M . G e lip , A . L ip ietz , J. M istra l, J. M un oz, C . O m in am i. Paris, m im eo.

C o r ia t , B . (1979)L ’ atélier e tle chronométré, B o urgeo is, Paris.

D e lo rm é, R .; A n d ré , C . (1983)L ’ état et l’économie, Seuil, Paris.

G id d en s, A . (1 9 8 3 )The Constitution o f Society, P o lity Press.

G lyn , A ., et al. (1 9 8 7 )The Rise and F a llo fth e G olden A ge , W ID E R /O x fo rd U n iversity Press.

J e n s o n ,] . (1 9 8 8 )“ ‘ D iffe re n t ’ b u t n o t ‘E x c e p t io n a l ’: C a n a d a ’s P erm e a b le F o rd ism ,” C an ad ia n Review o f Sociology and Anthropology, S p e c ia l Issue o n “C o m p ara tiv e M acro socio lo gy .”

K oSik , K . (1 9 6 8 )L a dialectique d u concret, M aspero , Paris.

L ab r io la (1 8 9 9 )E ssais su r la conception matérialiste de l’histoire, ed . G o rd o n &. B reach , L o n don -P aris, 1980.

L e b o rg n e , D ., L ip ietz, A . (1 9 7 3 )“L ’après-ford ism e et s o n e sp ace ,” L e s Tem ps M odernes, A p ril.E n g lish tran slation : Society and Space, vol. 6, 1988.

L ip ietz, A . (1 9 7 3 )“ D ’A lth u sse r à M ao ? ,” Les T em p s M odernes, N o v em b er.

L ip ietz , A . (1 9 7 9 )C rise et inflation: pourquoi? F. M asp ero , Paris.

L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 3 )L e M onde enchanté: de l a valeur a l’énvol inflationniste. F . M asp ero— L a D éco u verte , Paris. E n glish tran sla tio n : V e r s o ,L o n d o n (1 9 8 5 ) .

L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 5 a )M iracles et mirages: problèmes de UndustraUsation dans le Tiers-M onde. L a D écou v erte , Paris. E n lg ish tran slatio n : V erso , L o n d o n (1 9 8 7 ) .

L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 5 b )“ R é f le x io n a u to u r d ’u n e fa b le . P o u r u n s t a tu t m a rx is te d e s c o n c e p ts de ré g u la tio n et d ’a c cu m u la tio n ,” Couverture O range , C E P R E M A P n o . 85 3 0 . E n glish tran slation : Studies in Political Econom e, no. 26 , 1988.

L ip ietz , A . (1 9 8 5 c )“T ro is c r ise s ,” c o n tr ib u tio n to th e co llo q u iu m The C u rre n t C risis in Relation to Previous C rise s , B in gh am to n ( U S A ) , N o v em b er , C ouverture O range, C E P R E M A P no. 8528 .



Lipietz, A . (1 9 8 6 a )“ L e s co n d itio n s de la c ré a tio n d ’un m ou v em en t a lte r n a t if e n F ran c e ,” co n trib u tio n to the C o llo q u iu m o f th e A sso c ia t io n o f In st itu tio n a l an d P o lit ic a l S tu d ie s an d R ese a rch , Les enjeux institutionnels et politiques de M a rs 1986, Jan u ary . English tran slatio n : revised version in Rethinking M arxism .

Lipietz, A . (1 9 8 6 b )“A sp e c ts sécu laires et co n jo n c tu re ls de l’in terv en tion é c o n o m iq u e de l ’é ta t ,” con trib u tio n to the co llo q u iu m Estado y Econom ia, M ed ellin (C o lo m b ia ) , S ep tem b er, Couverture O ran ge, n o . 8621 .

L ip ie tz ,A . (1 9 8 8 a )“ L a t r a m e , la c h a în e e t la r é g u la t in : u n o u t i l p o u r les s c ie n c e s s o c i a l e s , ” C o n g r è s in te rn atio n a le de la T h é o r ie de la R ég u la tio n , D ecem b er, C ouverture O range, C E P R E M A P n o . 8816.

L ip ie tz , A . (1988b)“G o u v ern er l ’é co n o m ie , face au x défis in tern atio n au x : du d év e lo p p em en tism e n a tio n a liste à la crise n a t io n a le ,” co n trib u tio n to the co lloquium In Search o f the N ew France, B ran deis U n iv ersity ( U S A ) , C o u v e rtu re O ran ge , C E P R E M A P no. 8815.

L ip ietz, A . a n d R o u illeau lt (1972)Sur les pratiques et les concepts prospectifs d u matérialisme historique, D .E . S . P aris I, m im eo.

M ah o n , R . (1987)“From F o rd ism to N e w T e c h n o lo g ie s , L a b o r M ark ets a n d U n io n s ,” Econom ic a n d Industrial D em ocracy , vol. 8, pp. 5-60: Sage , Beverly H ills , C A .

N o ë l, A . (1988)“A c tio n co llec tiv e , partis p o litiq u es e t re lation s indu strie lles: u n e logiqu e p o u r l’ap proch e de la régu la tio n ,” International Congress on Regulation Theory, B arcelo n a, Ju n e.

P oulan tzas, N . (1968)Pouvoir politique et classes sociales, F. M aspero , Paris (c ited ac co rd in g to L a P e tite M aspero , 2 vo lu m es).

R ey , P. P. (1969)“ S u r l ’a r t ic u la t io n d es m o d e s de p r o d u c t io n ,” p u b lish e d in L es a llian ces de c la sse s, F. M aspero , Paris.

T erray , E. (1977)“ D e l’e x p lo ita tio n . E lém en ts d ’un b ilan critiq u e ,” D ialectiques, n o . 21.

Rastko Mocnik

Ideology and Fantasy

“L ’idéologie interpelle les individus en sujets.”— Althusser

“I is this Ι-here, as well as the universal I.”— Hegel

T h e whole problem of ideology consists in the interpretation o f the most innocent-looking word in Louis A lthusser’s proposition: en. Th is little word c o n d e n se s a g re a t p ro b le m th a t seem s a s te a d y , if o fte n u n n o tic e d , c o m p a n io n to a n y a tte m p t at a so c ia l sc ie n c e . A t th e b e g in n in g s o f acad em ic socio logy , it took th e form o f the debate betw een le T a r d é ’s psychological individualism and D urkheim ’s spiritualist collectivism ; it later gave birth to epistem ological ambiguities in “social psychology” and reached its several paroxysm s in reasonable attem pts, from R eich to M arcuse and o th e r s , to c o m b in e th e b e s t t h a t b o th “ s id e s ” h a v e to o ffe r , i .e . p sy ch o a n a ly sis an d h isto r ic a l m ater ia lism . T h e su ccessiv e fa ilu res o f activism , still seem ed to imply only a negative epistem ological moral— “no trespassing.” Even worse, the project o f the science o f the social seems to ta k e th e form o f a d ia le c t ic a l in v e rs io n o f G ro u c h o M a r x ’s d ic tu m concern ing the nature o f social institutions (“ If you are in trouble, get a lawyer; then you’ll have more trouble, but at least you’ll have a lawyer” ): if you want to have a fair social science, then don’t enter into the question o f the individual subject; but you w on’t have a social science until you solve this very question.

T h e present state o f the problem becom es clear if we look at the possible ways to tran sla te A lth u sse r ’s th esis. If A lth u sse r m eans th at ideology interpellates individuals as subjects, then the subject has to be, in a way, already there w hen ideology com es upofi her/him and hits her/him with its interpellation: in this case, the constitution o f the subject would escape the epistem ic power o f h istorical m aterialism . A ssum ing with Lacan (and this is already an im plication o f Benveniste’s structural linguistics) that the subject is an effect o f discourse, we would then face the question: w hich discourse is the “other” discourse that “constitutes” the subject? T h is question has two equally unsatisfactory answers, and is therefore badly posed.

If this other discourse is not ideological, we are confronted by an uneasy


question about a universal, yet n on-ideo logical discourse underlying the w hole fie ld o f in tersu b jec tiv ity . Th is dem an ds at least that h isto r ica l m aterialism should define its articulation with its specific exterior; a t most, it underm ines the historical m aterialist project itself.

If this o ther discourse is ideological, then either we get trapped in a vicious circle (an ideology would then always already presuppose another id e o lo g y ),1 or we h ave to tran sla te A lth u sse r ’s th e sis as m ean in g th at ideology interpellates individuals into subjects. But should the consequence o f th is in terpre ta tion be that there are as m any “su b je c ts” as there are id e o lo g ie s? T h is seem s an u n a c c e p ta b le c o n c lu s io n : 1) b e c a u se it conceives o f the subject as “trapped” into a certain ideology— as soon as an individual constitutes her/him self as a subject, there is no way for her/him to say “no” to the constitutive ideology, and thus there is no way for her/him to say anything but as a subject of an ideology; 2) because it also conceives of the ideology in an “autistic” manner. It either breaks down the ideological universe into as m any com m unities as there are ideologies (and, from the proposition “to each ideology— a certain type o f subject,”2 follows the evidently false propostion “to each community— one an d only one ideology” ); o r it postulates a transversal function linking together different ideological discourses. T h is transversal function (securing the effect o f social totality) can easily be recognized as the dom inant ideology— but then the question arises: how does the dom inant ideology exercise its transversal function; how does it “ca tc h ” individuals, if not by interpellating them into subjects?

T h e m ost prom ising line to approach the problem o f interpellation then seems to take us back to the initial question. T h is essay will deal with this apparent short-circuit. H olding with A lthusser that ideological interpellation is subjectivation, we propose to view it as com posed o f two interdependent m echanism s: subjectivation proper, a purely form al sym bolic m echanism th a t has alw ays the sam e ste reo ty p ic stru ctu re ; and identification , an imaginary relation concerned with ideological “contents,” where the ideological conflict as an instance o f class struggle is being carried out. Ideological interpellation “works” by establishing the relation o f identification; but its success depends upon its capacity to trigger the su b jectivatin g m ech anism . T h e aporetic character o f our problem holds to this double nature o f the ideological process: since ideology operates w ithin two registers, the im aginary and the symbolic, it always functions as its own “other” discourse. B ecau se the sym bolic m ech an ism is stereotyped and “m o n o to n o u s,” its analysis is ideologically non-discrim inatin g an d presents a false po litica l neutrality; while the analysis o f the imaginary relation m ay well do justice to the richness o f the political conflict, it misses the sub jectivatin g effect and rem ains theoretically unsatisfactory.

IDEOLOGY AND FANTASY 141

T o secure a solid basis for the analysis, we will first sketch a theory o f in te rp re ta tio n , in sp ired by re c e n t d e v e lo p m e n ts in “p o st- s tru c tu r a l” linguistics and analytic philosophy o f language; we w ill then present two solutions to our problem that seem instructive fo r their very failure; finally, we will indicate the direction which a future theory o f ideology may take.

1. A Theory o f InterpretationL in g u istic (D u cro t) and p h ilo so p h ica l (G r ic e ) app raoch es to in ter

pretation usually proceed from a general principle o f com m unication which we can render in the form o f a syllogism :3 if an utterance is m eaningful, then there must be a way to understand it, and this particular utterance is m eaningful, since its speaker has offered it as such, so let us try and find the way to understand it.

U sually , th e problem o f interpretation is a trivial one: every utterance is uttered w ithin a concrete intersubjective com m unicational situation over w hich both the speaker and the interpreter have su fficient control— the speaker to provide her/his sayings with appropriate “clues” ; the interpreter to “ c a t c h ” th e m a d e q u a te ly . S t i l l , th e p r a c t ic a l su c c e s s o f e v ery d a y c o m m u n ic a t io n sh o u ld n o t b lin d us to its th e o re tic a l p rob lem s. A n interpreter m ay figure ou t the m eaning o f an utterance if (s)he is able to produce a suitable definition o f the intersubjective situation in which it has been uttered. But since this situation is structured by the utterance itself, an d its on ly a v a ilab le in d ic a tio n is its cau se , i.e ., the u tte ran ce under interpretation (falling b ack on th e notion o f th e “co n text” would n o t help, for it simply m eans m ore utterances), the interpreter seems to be trapped in a vicious circle: the key to the m eaning o f an utterance is the definition o f the intersubjective structure, and this structure is defined by the m eaning o f the utterance.

T h e situation would be hopeless if both the interpreter and the speaker were not caught in the sam e trap, and if they both did not know it: they are th ereb y forced in to co m m u n ica tiv e so lid ar ity , and th is so lid ar ity is a solidarity o f beliefs. T h is form al constraint already indicates that ideology is ab so lu te ly n ecessary for any h u m an re la tio n to be possib le . S in ce the speaker believes that it is p ossib le to understand h is/her u tterance, and m aterializes this belief in his/her effort to produce a well-formed string o f signifiers, so must the interpreter believe that it is possible to understand the utterance, this belief being justified by the utterance having been offered as u nderstandable. B oth the speaker’s and the interpreter’s m inim al beliefs m ay be viewed as supported by a sim ilar relation— the relation to a third and “ n e u tr a l” in s ta n c e c o m m a n d in g th e c o m m u n ic a t io n a l s itu a t io n an d m ed iatin g its in tersubjective structure: the relation o f identification to “the subject supposed to believe.” T h e subject supposed to believe operates in the


m odality o f the possible: “ it is possible that this string o f signifiers m akes sense.”

W e can illustrate the function o f the subject supposed to believe by the self-fulfilling nature o f collective delusions. If, in an appropriately unstable social situation, the rumor starts that “the oil (or sugar. . . ) is going to run out,” this rumor may not be true at the m om ent o f its launching (the stocks o f oil being sufficient for the norm al trend o f its consum ption); but when people start acting upon this (originally “false” ) rumor, it may well becom e true. H ow do people act upon such a rumor? Suppose I am enlightened enough not to believe the rumor. I may even positively know it to be false. But notw ith stand in g my rationality and/or know ledge, I w ill reason this way: “I know the rum or to be false; but other people m ay beleive it; acting upon their (false) belief, they will rush out and pile up private stocks; and the oil is likely to run out. S o I better rush to the store m yself and get some oil.” Even under the supposition that everybody in the population reasons this way, the implicit consensus as to the falsity o f the prediction will not prevent its finally com ing true; the general recognition that it is possible to believe the rumor, i.e., the identification o f every member o f the population with the subject supposed to believe, will do the trick.

T h e id en tification w ith the “su b ject supposed to b e liev e” is a forced m ove in the com m unicational game, and further necessitates an ex post facto ju stif ic a tio n . T h is ju s t i f ic a t io n m ay n o t be e x p l ic i t ( ty p ic a l ly it is “spon tan eous” ), but can be articulated by the interpreter if asked for the reasons why (s)he interprets an utterance in a certain way; this justification m ust be a proposition that refers both to the utterance and to the intersubjective situation. W e w ill c a ll th is m in im al d escrip tio n o f the in tersu b jective structure an d o f the utterance in it the principle of interpretation (PI).

1 ) Let a hundred flowers bloom.

W e autom atically interpret 1) as a piece o f political discourse, for we rely upon the PI “M ao Zedong said 1 ).” But suppose we were told that it was Pu Ji who said it. W e would be at a loss, and even the additional inform ation that Pu Ji was the last Em peror o f C h in a would n ot be o f m uch help, since the interpretation would depend on the time o f utterance: if Pu Ji said 1) while being re-educated at the Fushu prison, we would bet that 1) was a q u o ta t io n from M ao ; if he sa id it la te r w h en he d e v o te d h im se lf to gardening, we m ight opt to read it as a gardener’s profession de foi.

2) C om rade Zhdanov said: “Let a hundred flowers bloom .”


T h e reference to the speaker functions as a sort o f PI here, and the very paradox this funciton entails illustrates well the nature o f PI, for whoever would correctly interpret 2) would also challenge it: “But he did n ot m ean it !” By his/her rejection o f the attribution, the interpreter would prove that (s)h e has “got” 2) correctly: the nam e o f Zhdanov situates 2) w ithin a particular debate about cultural politics, and thus yields the PI (the same would be ach ieved by “ a com m unist leader” or by “ a com rade” ), for it is possible th at Zhdanov said som ething like 1 ). T h e meaning, determ ined on the basis o f the PI, suggested by the nam e, th en falsifies the attribution o f 1) to the bearer o f the nam e, since we know (if we know about Zhdanovism — but this knowledge is necessary to produce a proper PI in the first p lace) that Z hdanov did not say 1 ) or, had he ever said it, that he could not have m eant it.

Besides its functioning w ithin th e realm o f the possible, th e principle of in terp re ta tio n derives its “ stre n g th ” from a feature we m ight ca ll “ the econom y o f com m unication.” C on sid er this line:

3 ) Brûle de plus de feux que je n ’en allum ai.

T h e A lexandrine verse, the first person singular, an d a general aura o f “n o b il i ty ” in d u ce us to in te rp re t th e “f ir e s” as m e a n in g the p an gs o f u n requ ited love— even abusively in the su bord in ate c la ss ’s use, fo r the cultural (ideological) prejudice lin k in g the effects o f fire with the feelings o f u n re c ip o rc a te d lo v e is a c o m m o n e n o u g h h e r ita g e , w h ile p a r tic u la r in form ation about the speaker o f the line (Pyrrhus) to the effect that he e x c e lle d at b u rn in g down T ro y , is n eed ed in order to ap p re c ia te th is “ sy l le p s is o f m e ta p h o r ,” as F o n ta n ie r c a l l s it. T h is “ s p o n ta n e o u s ” m is in te rp re ta t io n sh o w s th e im p o r ta n t p ro p erty o f th e p r in c ip le o f interpretation that it tends to extend its power beyond a scope that may, under analysis, appear as its legitim ate dom ain. In 3 ), the m etaphorical m eaning o f “feux” imposed itself abusively also in the subordinate, because it was supported by an ideology th at still dom inates literary studies ( “rom anticism ” ); to do justice to the double m eaning o f the word, it is necessary to introduce another PI, brought in from another ideology (Greek m ythology). Fascinated by the ideological gratification o f “getting the m eaning ,” the reader may easily yield to interpretation by cliché (which, with respect to R a c in e , is qu ite co n tin g e n t), and m iss the other in terp e lla tio n equally available in 3 ). In this case, the reader is deluded by an im plicitly operating “e th ic a l” m ax im o f co m m u n ica tio n : su pport your in terp re ta tio n by a m inim al interpretational base.

W e m ay conclude that, corresponding to the ideological interpellation, vehiculated by the utterance, there com es from the interpreting individual


(the poten tial subject) a demand for the sense that is actually a readiness to subm it to interpellation. T h is demand is “rigid”: it passes, once satisfied. W hat we have called the “econom y” o f com m unication or its minim alistic “ p r a c t ic a l e t h ic s ” is a s t r u c tu r a l fe a tu re o f s u b je c t iv a t io n : o n c e “subjectivated” you can ’t “subjectivate” again. A lternatively, there is only one subject to every particular ideology. A lthough this is a formal feature of the subjectivating m echanism , it m akes the individual swallow ideological contents. A headline in the Yugoslav daily Delo (4 /30/87), follow ing the banning o f W aldheim from the U nited States, offers a striking illustration o f this m echanism :

4) W aldheim and the A ustrians are deeply hurt.

O ne may argue that 4) is a condensation o f two utterances: “W aldheim is hurt (in his feelings). T h e A ustrians are hurt (in their international interests).” T h e condensation would then derive from the hom onym y o f predicates, rather than from their synonymy. But the tendency o f 4) is precisely to prevent the reader from this line o f reasoning: its PI postulates the existence o f a m odality o f being hurt that constitutes the im aginary com m unity “W aldheim and the A ustrian s”— precisely the affective state that served as the material basis for the result o f the last presidential election in Austria.

W h at to a th e o re tic a l eye may ap p ear a v ic io u s c irc le is the b asic ideological m echanism that M ichel Pêcheux called the Munchhausen effect:4 in utterances like 4) there is som ething lacking; th is “lack ” is an obstacle to their m aking sense. But then 4) has been offered as understandable, so let us look fo r a way to understand it; and the interpreter produces an appropriate PI. In this way, the very “lack,” the sense-insufficiency o f 4), beom es the warrant o f its m aking sense, its interpellative “ca tch ,” and the trigger o f subjectivation. A s soon as the interpreter “perceives” the sem antic trait that m akes 4) understandable, (s)he constitutes her/him self as a m em ber o f an im aginary community. T h e trait, Zug, that links her/him to the leader is the same as the trait that holds together the m embers o f the community: it is the trait o f recognition , the Freudian Einziger Zug o f mass psychology. But first o f all it is the trait o f identification o f the interpreter with the subject supposed to believe. T h is identification proceeds by way o f searching for the p r in c ip le o f in te r p re ta t io n , w h ose p ro d u c tio n is, on th e p ar t o f th e interpellated subject, always a petitio principii.

T h e dram a o f phenom ena like 4 ) derives from their not being a “picture” o f som e extra-discursive reality; on the contrary, they are constructive o f social reality, i.e., they establish the basis o f the (ideological) self-evidence upon wich social relations are built. O nly as far as “it goes w ithout saying” does an ideology have interpellative force.5


T h e m echan ism o f ideological in terpellation m ay be described in the follow ing way: in order to pronounce a m eaningful utterance, the speaker identifies h er/h im se lf with a stru ctu ral p o sitio n (the sub ject supposed to b e liev e) from w hich a m eaningfu l, i.e. in terpellative, utterance might be pronounced. T h is identification with the A lthusserian Sub ject o f ideology is a precondition for the utterance to be profferred at all. T h e interpellated individual identifies her/him self w ith the same instance which, from her/his side, operates as the position from w hich it may be believed that the utterance “m akes sense.” T h e m utual “recognition” o f the two parties is thus mediated by a third instance with whom they both actively identify. T h is active stan ce o f the speaker has been traditionally recognized and elaborated as the art o f rhetoric. T h e contribution o f the addressee m ay h ave attracted less attention . Our description stresses the central feature th at “yielding to an ideological interpellation” is som ething th at the interpreter actively achieves. S t i l l , the in te r p e lla t io n is doubly p ro d u c t iv e : it is n ot only a “ se lf- p rodu ction ” o f the conscious self, but also a causation o f the unconscious subject. W e have to articulate the two contradictory effects o f ideological interpellation. W hile identifying her/his conscious se lf with a presumably universal instance o f the understanding speaker-hearer ( the subject supposed to b e lie v e ) , th e u n co n sc io u s su b je c t (e ffec t o f an alw ays idiosyncratic m echan ism ) arises at a place th at supports the identifying operation.

T h e necessary condition for identification is the existence o f a “com m on language” : still, it is not a sufficient condition, for the m ost an interpreter can achieve on the purely linguistic level is to form ulate a dilemma as to the meaning: 1) is either horticultural advice or a political slogan; “fires” in 3) m ean either a war crim e or a private feeling. M ore generally: either PI1 or P I2, but not both. But it suffices to introduce a purely illusionary element, that o f belief, and the m eaning m agically arises. T h e necessary condition opens directly onto the securing o f the sufficient condition, for it defines the locus where the point o f solidarity can be established. Just as the speaker believes that it is possible to believe that the hearer will understand her/his utterance, because (s)he has produced a (reasonably) well-formed string o f signifiers, so the hearer belie-ves that it is possible to believe that the utterance m a k e s s e n se , b e c a u se it is ( r e a s o n a b ly ) w e ll- fo rm e d . T h e m u tu a l identification o f the two com m unicative agents has a m aterial support in the linguistic structure, but is actually ach ieved only if m ediated by a “third p arty ,” the su b ject supposed to b elieve or the A lth u sserian “ Su b jec t o f ideology.”

T h e q u e s t io n now a r ise s how to a r t ic u la te th e so c ia lly fo rm a tiv e m echanism o f identification with the individually-focused (“ idiosyncratic” ) m echan ism o f su b jectivation proper. T o approach this problem we will introduce a new concept: the Freudian concept o f “fantasy .”


2. Fantasy5 ) I w on’t be the first President to lose a war.

T h ere are two interpretations o f this utterance o f L.B . Johnson, and they are exclusive o f each other. T h ey depend on two different principles o f interpretation:

5a) 5) & L .B .J. has a specific interpretation o f U .S . history.5b) 5) & the U .S . has never lost a war.

A ccording to our definition o f PI, 5a) should have a m uch better chance to im pose itself, for it may be justified by a proposition that refers both to the u tteran ce and (v ia the m en tion o f the speaker) to the in ter-sub jective com m unicative situation. S till, intuition tells us an d history teaches us that 5b) is m uch “stronger,” although its PI is evidently deficient. It is precisely this “deficiency” th at m akes for the strength o f 5b); on a closer look, we see th at 5a) already im plicityly refers to 5b) as to a “universally accepted truth” that can only be challenged by a specific justification. W hile 5b) implicitly gives itself as universal, 5a) explicitly presents itself as specific; while 5b) is void an d directly operative, 5a) open s in to a m atter-of-fact argum ent and may be o p erative only if the argum ent is persu asive ; w hile 5b ) invites intuitive agreem ent and precludes any analytical approach, 5a) depends on analytic argum ent and makes intuition irrelevant. T h e relation betw een 5b) an d 5 a ) is th e re la t io n b e tw een th e d o m in a n t id e o lo g y an d a n on - hegem onic ideology, where the dom inant ideology defines the field o f the argu m en t, w h ile the bu rden o f ju st if ic a t io n fa lls on the su b o rd in ated ideology.

T h e PI in 5 b ) is a c o m m o n p la c e , an d it is p rec ise ly w hat m ay be irrational in it that m akes for its ideological appeal: stereotypes o f this kind can only be accepted in the modality o f sheer belief. T o the intepreter, they pose a rad ical dilem m a: is this nonsen se, or is it to be believed? T h is is precisely the basic dilem m a an interpreter faces with every utterance (s)he wants to “understand,” because every utterance fundam entally involves this p rob lem . T h e “ sp o n tan e o u s” a ttitu d e o f an in terp re ter is to sav e the m ean in g an d to look for a principle o f interpretation th at would render the u tteran ce m eaningfu l. W hen (s)h e com es across th is same problem in regard to the PI, (s)he has already solved it: if (s )h e had not already p ositively responded to the sense/nonsense a ltern ative , (s)h e would not h ave com e across a possib le PI at all. In a “sp on tan eo u s” (id eo log ica l) reading, th e radical dilem m a (nonsense/belief) is never posed: its “positive” re so lu tio n , i.e ., th e in te rp re te r ’s h a v in g o p ted fo r the “ b e lie f ,” is the structural co n d ition th at the PI be reached at all. T h e op en in g o f the

radical dilem m a is structurally self-defeating: it cannot be opened unless it has already been liquidated in a previous phase. T h e PI o f this ideologically p riv ile g e d k in d in v o lv e s the fa m ilia r nachträglichkeit lo g ic o f p sych ic processes: it is only after havin g identified w ith th e subject supposed to believe that the interpreter discovers what had been the “m aterial basis” for h er/h is id e n tifica tio n . T h is m ater ia l basis, w hose co n ten ts h av e b een swallowed by the interpreter due to structural constraint, is an elem ent that com prises the form al necessity that it be an object o f belief.

It is precisely at this p o in t that th eoretica l in tervention can produce d irect ideo logica l effects. First o f a ll destructive effects: it breaks the stru ctu ral in terdepen den ce th at is necessary fo r an in terpe llatio n to be “successfu l,” th e link betw een (im aginary) identification an d (sym bolic) subjectivation. W hile recognizing the structural (“form al”) necessity o f the subjectivating machine, a theoretical approach refuses the pseudo-autom atic endorsem ent o f the ideological “conten ts” vehiculated by identification and its b e lie f-co m p o n en t. T he very p ossib ility o f any critiqu e o f ideology presupposes an active introduction o f this discontinuity, the breaking down o f ideo logical “spon tan eity”— and that is why every critique o f ideology entails a genuine theoretical com m itm ent. Still, an explicity theoretical them atization o f this rupture is not a necessary condition for a successful critique o f ideology, and a theory o f the subjectivating m echanism even less so. T h e sam e disruptive o p eration m ay be successfully perform ed by a “vicarious” strategy— by a “n aive” endorsem ent o f an ideological critique that is obtained at the expense o f the theoretical insight into the workings o f the id e o lo g ica l m ech an ism . It is th is p o in t o f im m ediate p rac tic a l incidence o f theory that is theoretically crucial— and a lso th e m ost difficult.

W e m ay p ro ceed by d istin g u ish in g tw o e lem en ts w ith in the ad hoc concept o f the principle o f interpretation: one is the definition a speaker or an in terpreter h er/h im se lf g ives o f the co m m u n ication al situ ation (th is com ponent h as a ll the characteristics o f a “rationalization” ); the other is its belief-nucleus, the elem ent th at com prises the formal necessity th at it be an ob ject o f belief. T h is feature o f the second com ponent m akes it a point at w h ich desire ( th a t an u tte ra n c e be m e a n in g fu l) and con strain t ( th e com pulsion to believe) coincide. It has the structure o f Freudian fantasy.

H aving introduced the concept o f fantasy, we can and must refine our notion o f interpretational principle: as far as it is the justification that the interpreter can provide for her/his interpretation o f an utterance, it depends on the interpreter’s identification with the subject supposed to believe; this is ideology in the fam iliar sense (sy stem atization , ra tion a liza tion , self- delusion e tc .). But since it depends upon a m echan ism o f transference (id e n tifica tio n ), the principle o f in terpretation necessarily com prises an articulation o f social demand (the basic relation o f a subject to the other )

IDEOLOGY A N D FANTASY 147


with individual desire (the basic relation o f a subject to her/himself, i.e., the level o f the constitution o f the subject). T h e locus o f this articulation is the second com ponent o f the interpretational principle, its belief-nucleus or, in Freudian terms, the fantasy. A s a form al matrix o f the sense/nonsense alternative that both imposes the constraint o f belief on the subject and responds to her/his desire,6 fantasy is the material basis o f the identification process— for it is su b ject-con stitu tive . T o the form al criterion fo r the success o f ideo logical in terpe llatio n (th at it should open into the sense/nonsense alternative), we must therefore add another one: if a fantasy is to be socially (i.e ., ideologically ) operative, it m ust be capable o f catch in g the always idiosyncratic individual unconscious fantasies. It must be able to function as a cloaca maxima draining individual fantasies into a social dim ension.

M uch has been said about the relationship betw een ideology and reality; sym ptom atically, no attem pt to define it can avoid som e contrdiction .7 T h is necessary contrad iction derives from the contradictory nature o f ideology itself— from its being a part o f the very reality upon which it “operates.” In ad d itio n to E n g e ls ’ m odel o f Wiederspiegeln an d A lth u sse r ’s co n cep t o f représentation imaginaire, there is a m uch better way to think this paradoxical “relation ,” a way which not only em braces both these concepts but also has the advantage not to presuppose a difference o f nature between ideology and the material upon which it operates: it is to think ideology through the Freudian concept o f sekundäre Bearbeitung (usually translated as “secondary .revision”; alth ough m istranslation underlines an im portant dim ension o f the concept, we prefer the more literal one— “secondary elaboration” ).

3. Ideology as Secondary ElaborationSeco n d ary e lab o ratio n is a dream m ech an ism th a t unifies the dream

m a te r ia l .8 Freud describ es it, a lm ost in M arx ist sty le, as a tendentious revision,9 and has som e trouble in situating it.10 T h is difficulty derives from the nature o f secondary elaboration itself:

1. O n the one hand, it is already an interpretation: it interprets the results o f the dream-work, and is therefore no part o f it.

2. O n the other hand, it is a tendentious or a deformed interpretation; the character o f distortion assim ilates it to the dream-work.

Secondary elaboration thus presents a sense o f the dream — but this is a false sense. W ithout it, the dream is a heap o f disconnected fragments; with it, it has a sense, but not the true one. W ith secondary elaboration , we get a sense, but this is not the sense o f the dream; it m akes us lose the sense. T h e only m otive for secondary elaboration is the claim o f intelligibility o f the dream -m aterial; and its only achievem ent is a faltification o f what is there to be understood. T h e fascinating result o f secondary elaboration is that the intelligibility blocks the understanding.


Freud stresses that “before we start upon the analysis o f a dream, we have to clear the ground o f this attem pt at an intepretation,” and explains this paradox by an analogy:

It [secondary elaboration] behaves towards the dream -content lying before it just as our norm al psychic activity behaves in general towards any perceptual content that may be presented to it. It understands that content on the basis o f certain anticipatory ideas, and arranges it, even in the m om ent o f p erceiveing it, on the presupposition o f its being intelligible; in so doing, it runs a risk o f falsifying it, an d in fact, if it can n o t bring it into line with anything familiar, is prey to the strangest m isunderstandings. A s is well known, we are incapable o f seeing a series o f unfam iliar signs or o f hearing a succession o f unknow n words, w ith ou t at o n ce fa ls ify in g the p e rc e p tio n from co n s id e ra tio n s o f intelligibility, on the basis o f som ething already know n to us.

T h is is Freud the m aterialist at work: the whole is the untrue. T h e analogy with the M arxist problem o f the illusion o f totality as the result o f ideological totalization is more than an analogy. T h e illusion o f totality is a “ lie ,” but this “ lie” is a part o f the non-totalizable material itself. Dreams, d ic ta te d by se x u a l d e sire , are as n o n -to ta liz a b le as so c ie ty , torn and constituted by class struggle. “Structure” is not a whole precisely because the illusion o f its w holeness is a part o f it.

T h is, o f course, is only the leftist elem ent in Freud; to stop here would be to yield to th e infantile m alady o f m aterialism . Freud’s genius was to carry on the analysis, and to do it, he was obliged to introduce a new concept, the concept o f Phantasie, wishful fantasy.

T h e in te r p r e ta t io n p re se n te d by se c o n d a ry e la b o r a t io n is a fa lse interpretation; insofar as it is false, it is n o interpretation, b u t part o f the dream-work; and insofar as it is a part o f the dream-work, it is a part o f the truth o f the dream. Therefore, the result o f secondary elaboration is “true” precisely (an d only) inasm uch as it is “fa lse .” A lth ou gh this may be an excessively logistic deduction , it n evertheless exactly reproduces Freud’s point: w hat is false in the distorting operation is not the distortion itself, but its interpretative character. The “consideration o f intelligibility,” the claim o f a “sense” is what is “fa lse.”

A c c o r d in g to F reu d , se c o n d a ry e la b o r a t io n b u ild s up a fa c a d e o f coherence for the dream: this facade has to be broken in order to ge t to the latent dream -content. Still, this does not m ean it should be discounted: its framework is not accidental, but is made o f pre-fabricated dream m aterial:


It would be a m istake, however, to suppose that these dream fa ca d e s are n o th in g o th er th an m istak en an d so m ew h at arb itrary revisions o f the dream -content by the conscious agency o f our m ental life. In the erection o f a dream -facade, use is not infrequently m ade o f wishful phantasies which are present in the dream -thoughts in a preconstructed form, and are o f the sam e ch aracter as the appropriately n am ed “ d a y -d re a m s” fa m ilia r to us in w ak in g life . T h e w ish fu l p h antasies revealed by analysis in night-dream s often turn o u t to be repetitions o r m odified versions o f scenes from infancy; thus, in some cases, the facade o f the dream d irectly re v ea ls the d rea m ’s actu al nucleus, distorted by an adm ixture o f other m aterial." T h e labour of, as it were, building up a facade o f the dream— the case, nam ely, in which a form ation o f that kind already exists, available for use in the m aterial o f the dream -thoughts . I am in the habit o f describing the elem ent in the dream -thoughts which I have in mind as a “phantasy” (P h an tasie).12

T h e phantasy is thus what Lacan calls the point de capiton, the quilting point, an elem ent com m on both to the facade and to w hat it conceals.

T h e response to an ideological interpellation is also m ade in the nam e o f a claim o f sense: it is this “presupposition o f intelligibility” that pushes the interpellated individual towards an identification with the subject supposed to believe. T h e active part played by the interpellated individual consists precisely in her/his helping to establish a “facade”— an ideological effect of coherence. T h e interpellated individual certainly interprets “on the basis of certain anticipatory ideas,” but (s)he ascribes them to the subject supposed to believe, and thus confers an a priori social status on them. M isunderstanding and falsifaction are, o f course, always possible, but this possibility has a positive th eoretica l m eaning: it dem onstrates th at every interpretation, be it adequate to the “original” speaker’s in ten tion or not, is socially, i.e., ideologically, motivated. In this sense (and on this level), the interpreting in d iv id u al is alw ays a lread y a su b ject, that is, h as alw ays already been interpellated by a n ideology. T h is level (o f L ebensweit, o f th e background b e lie fs a sc r ib e d to th e su b je c t su p p o sed to b e lie v e ) p re su p p o se s the interpellation already “consum m ated,” i and its contents are in p art trivial and abstract,13 in part specifically ideological. In 4) above, the trivial and abstract (ideologically non-specific) part o f the background beliefs would, am ong others, com prise the belief in the existence o f certain kinds o f m ental events or states (em otion s), the postu lation o f a causal relaion betw een certain even ts in the “ou ter” world (like the banning o f W aldheim from the U .S .A .) and a certain type o f unpleasant em otion, etc.; the ideologically specific belief-background would be an intim ate notion o f the political life (a typical exam ple o f “reified consciousness” à la G o ldm an n) and, o f course,


the newly produced sem an tic feature. T h e individual act o f identification with the social instance o f the subject supposed to believe (the A lthusserian Su b ject o f ideology), m akes the individual accede to the social dim ension of ideo logical beliefs (H aberm as’s Lebenswelt), and assum e them for her/his ow n accou n t. But the act o f iden tifica tion is im possib le if, w ith in the so cially “p re-ex isten t” belief-background , it can n o t fin d support fo r the in d iv id u al’s id iosyn cratic “wishful fan tasies”— if the utterance offered to interpretation does not touch upon the individual’s (unconscious) subjectiv atin g fantasy . T h e general, ab stract and socially-oriented demand for sense m ust find a way to translate itself into the individual’s unconscious and specific desire, supported by her/his fantasy. T h is is an absolute condition for the success o f an ideological interpellation. T h e phantasy (w hich is a “petrified” string o f signifiers, offering itself to different interpretations that depend on different successive libidinal organizations in the history o f the su b je c t )14 is th u s an e lem en t th a t has a double status: it figures in the “facade” o f coherence (our prin ciple o f in terpretation ), in the conscious belief-network that “rationalizes” the identification-process, as well as in the individual’s unconscious desire. Fantasy is the poin t where the conscious dem and fo r sense tran slates itse lf in to the u n con scious su b jec t’s desire, w h ich su p p o rts the id e n tific a t io n -p ro c e ss . W e co u ld say th a t in the ideological process, th e ind iv idual’s dem and “bounces off” th e Su b jec t of ideology and returns to the individual subject in a non-inverted form— the u n c o n sc io u s t r a je c to ry “ fa n ta sy - d e s ir e - id e n t i f ic a t io n ,” w h ich is the m echanism o f subjectivation, b e in g the m aterial “basis” o f th is process.

Ideology as an effort to build up a “facade” o f coherence, as a totalizing enterprise guided by “considerations o f intelligib ility ,” therefore does not work directly upon social “reality”: it “works upon” fantasy, and its effort aim s at incorporating fantasy. W ith in the coherence-facade o f ideology, fantasy represents the non-totalizable nature o f the social structure (without g o in g in to d e ta i ls , le t us in d ic a te th a t ou r th e o ry e n ta ils an iro n ic reform ulation o f Engels’ and A lthusser’s form ula). T h e elem ent o f fantasy is typically void o f any explicit class-content or tendency15 and presents the sam e confusing mixture o f universal pretension and singular idiocy as the Freudian Phantasie. (A n analysis o f 4) above would probably point to the fantasy o f the “hum iliated father.” In 5), we referred to the fantasy o f the invincibility o f western imperialism; we could put on the same list the fantasy o f the decline o f the W est, or the fantasy o f O riental despotism , and any num ber o f racist stereotypes.) Bein g a qu ilting poin t, fantasy punctually conn ects the ideological facade with its specific exterior: so-called social reality. It is typically an inert string o f signifier^, capable o f being inserted into different facade interpretations; behind this set o f signifiers, there is


“nothing”— nothing but the hiatus that m akes the social structure unwhole, the hiatus o f the class-struggle.

4. (Open) Problems and (Unsatisfactory) SolutionsT h e introduction o f the concept o f fantasy seems to be a mixed blessing:

a lth ou gh it gives a fairly satisfactory “general d e scrip tio n ,” it open s the d ifficu lt q u estio n o f where to s itu a te this c o n c e p t w ith in th e fie ld o f h istorical m aterialism — if this concept can figure within this field at all.

Solution IT h is has been im plicit throughout the preceding discussion. It presents

the “ideological universe” (the background network o f beliefs) as structured around the fantasy as its “umbilical point”: the interpretation proceeds by reading an utterance “ in the light o f ’ this background o f beliefs; it is made possible by the interpreter’s yielding to the ideological interpellation. T h e in terpella tion , in turn, is m ediated by the m ech an ism o f iden tification , w hich depends upon the individual subject’s desire being “caught” by the “ideological fantasy.”

T h e Objection to So lu tio n I is: are we to accep t the n o tion o f social fantasy? If th e answ er is Y ES, th en how are we to relate th is so-called “ so c ia l” fan tasy to in d iv id u a l fan tasie s? For it is c le ar th a t the grip o f ideology will on ly ho ld if it succeeds:

— either in inducing the individual to en tertain the social fantasy as her/his own individual fantasy;

— or to establish a strong enough relation betw een the two.T h is alternative brings us back to our initial problem o f the articulation

betw een the social and the individual, and only presents it in a different term inology. So lu tio n I seems only a Verstellung, a d isp lacem en t o f the problem . If we are not to accept the notion o f social fantasy, we are led to take a different direction.

Solution IIT h is consists in reversing the perspective on the m odel o f the classical

Freudian treatm ent o f fantasy (cf. “A C hild is Being B eaten .” ) In Freud, fantasy as a petrified string o f signifiers takes on different m eanings under the im pact o f the background beliefs that depend on the specific libidinal econom y at successive stages o f the individual’s developm ent. T h e sentence (a well-formed string o f lexical item s) could then be viewed as functioning in the m ode o f fantasy, acquiring m eaning only when inserted into a co n crete inter-subjective situation, i.e., only after having becom e an utterance (assum ed by a speaker determ ined by her/his “ situational” status and addres


sing h er/h im self to an equally determ ined addressee.) T h e other side o f interpellation would then be the “de-fantasizing” o f the exchanged linguistic form ation.

T h e Objection to S o lu tio n II is obv iou s even before we work out its im plications: there are simply too m any fantasies circulating around. Th e problem o f the passage from the indiv idual to the social or, in H egelian terms, from the singular to the universal, is resolved in a m echanical way: S o lu tio n II m akes every sin gu lar sen ten ce im m ediate ly u n iversa l, and conceals this quid pro quo under the nam e o f fantasy. Solution II turns out to be ju st anoth er kind o f Verstellung: it m akes the in terpretation o f a “fan tasy -sen ten ce” depend on a background netw ork o f beliefs, w ithout g iv in g a th e o re tica l status to th is back groun d. S in c e the back groun d can n o t be anything else but ideology, So lu tion II falsely pretends to have solved the problem of ideology by introducing a new name for it.

Solution IIIT h e question abou t th e possibility o f an individual’s active stance as to

the interpellation can be put in a simpler, and a more precise way: how are we able to “u n d erstan d ” (to in terpret) u tteran ces w ithout (n ecessarily ) yielding to their interpellation? W e said that interpretation depended on, or could at least be supported by, a principle o f interpretation. T h e PI is a “rationalization” o f the interpreter’s identification with the subject supposed to believe: it is a coherent part o f a structured network o f the background beliefs ascribed to the subject supposed to believe. Our thesis has been that the choice o f a particular PI anticipates the rest o f the connected beliefs, and th at all belief-im plications may not be, and typically are not, accessible to the interpreter. Further, we have m aintained that within the netw ork o f background beliefs, there is a “n ucleus” th at has all the properties o f a Freudian fantasy; that an expansion o f the PI necessarily touches upon this fantasy-nucleus; and that the fantasy-nucleus is the interpellative “catch .” W e have also stressed th at the in terpretation does n ot dem and that the interpreter actually endorse the PI and the beliefs conn ected w ith it: it suffices that the interpreter concedes as possible the beliefs required to make an utterance “m ake sense.” Consequently, a conditional identification (with the subject supposed to believe) is all th at is needed for “understanding”; th ere is th en a discontinuity betw een id e n tifica tio n and su b je c tiv a tio n proper: an (ideological) exchange m ay be carried on without th e fantasy- nucleus having been m ade explicit. T h is is even the typical case, exposing the ch ara c te r is tic in sid io u sn ess o f the id eo lo g ica l process: the parties involved n o t only do n o t conrol the efficacity o f the fantasy-nucleus, they are usually not even aware o f it. Ideological transactions are being carried out on the level o f identification and its rationalizations, and even political


theory usually rem ains on this level, w hich fa c t does not d im in ish the even tual force and rationality o f its argum ents— it only show s th at it does not necessarily (and does not usually) handle its ideological effects. T h e triggering o f the interpellative catch rem ains beyond its control.

Conversely, this explains the relative facility o f everyday com m unication th a t has re m a in e d an en g im a in the lig h t o f our th eo ry : a m b igu ity , am phibology, etc. very often arise within the field dom inated by the same fantasy-nucleus. T h is is even characteristic o f strong ideological utterances which, offering a seem in g freedom o f in terpretation , covertly define the space where this freedom m ay be exercised.

6) Look, I’m not going to pick on an invalid.— Ronald R eagan

A linguistic analysis à la D ucrot would dem onstrate that 6) entails an infam ous presu p position , like: “D ukak is is an in v a lid .” S till , the sam e sentence (i.e., the sam e linguistic form ation) could be used in an utterance entailing the opposite presupposition, and whose developed form could be rendered in this way:

6 a) I am not going to pick on an invalid when I am going to encourage Dukakis to release his medical records, for he is perfectly O .K ., as far as I know.

N otw ithstanding the essential difference in the sense the sam e sentence can acquire in utterances 6) and 6a), they are both dom inated by the same fantasy— or belief— nuclei: that there is som ething disqualifying in seeking p sych iatric ass istan ce . T h e co n cept o f fan tasy— or b e lie f— n ucleus has nevertheless m ost probably been w eakened and conceptualized not as a strictly defined fantasy, but as a delim itation o f a place where individuals are invited to insert their idiosyncratic phantasies proper.16

T h e tw o m ean in gs o f 5 ) are equally d o m in ated by the sam e belief- nucleus: that there is som ething fatally and personally degrading in losing a war. Just as 5) would preferably attract narcissistic fantasies, 6) would appeal to fantasies related to the castration-com plex.

T h e Objection to Solu tion III would be that it tends to explain ideological in terpellation by ind iv idual psychological ch aracteristics, rather than by objective social positions. T h e answer would be th at we should view social positions as m ediated by the individual “psyche” as an ideological phenom enon. A theory along these lines should further develop indications in note 16 below , and m ight resolve the false dilem m a w hether social conditions “deform ” individual psychologies (a basically rom antic or Rousseauist thesis) or have a selective effect on the natural offer o f characters (a thesis à la

IDEOLOGY A ND FANTASY 155

T ain e), or depend on differences in the “social character” (a very old thesis that can be found, e.g., already in the 4th-century writer Julian A postate .)

N o te s

1. T h is seem s to be th e trouble w ith H a b e rm as’s L ebensweit— h erm en eu tics: an in d iv idu al m ay subm it to in terp e lla tio n on ly un der th e co n d itio n o f h a v in g alw ays a lready su bm itted to it.

2. A ce rta in type o f “ p o st-M arx ism ” (a w h o lesa le m a rk e tin g b ran d o f “p o st-stru ctu ralism ” ) ch eerfu lly tak e s up th is p o sitio n : “ W h e n e v e r we use th e category o f ‘su b jec t ’ in th is tex t, we w ill do so in the sen se o f ‘su b ject p o s it io n s ’ w ith in th e d iscu rsiv e stru ctu re” (E . L a c la u an d C h . M ou ffe , Hegemony a n d Socialist Strategy [L on don , 1985], p . 11 ). T h is e ith er le a d s in to the trap we d iscussed su p ra u n der 1); o r (a s in th e ca se o f the q u oted au th o rs), it m ean s giv ing up any a ttem p t to w ork out a theory o f th e su b ject, w hich finally leads to a th eoretica l cap itu la tio n , m asq u erad in g its o p p o rtu n istic re lativ ism w ith a h eavy “ sem io tic” co sm etics.

3 . 0 . D u cro t, Le dire et le dit, Paris 1984 ; H .P. G ric e , “L o g ic an d C o n v e rsa t io n ,” Syntax and Sem antics, [V ol. 3], Speech A cts, P. C o le an d J .L . M o rgan (ed s) [A cad em ic Press, 1975]. T h is p rin c ip le is so g en era l th at it u n derlies oth erw ise d ifferen t an d ev en con trary ep istem o log ical p rocedu res; co m p are , e .g ., S e a r le ’s trea tm en t o f “ in d irect sp eech a c ts ” (Expression an d M eaning [C am bridge , 1979 ]), w ith D u cro t ’s theory o f p resu p p o sitio n s an d sous'entendus (w h ich den ies b o th p h e n o m e n a l an d th eo retica l statu s to “in d irect sp eech ac ts” ).

4- M . P ech eu x , Les vérités de la Palice [Paris, 1975].5. T h e p h rase “ it go e s w ith o u t sa y in g ” str ik e s a t th e h e a r t o f th e m atter : an id eo logy

su ggests h ow w h at is said is to be tak en . It o ften suffices to m a k e it “sp eak ou t” to d estro y its in te rp e lla tiv e m agic . A s fo r th e p o ssib ility th a t an id eo lo gy “c o n s tr u c ts ” th e “o u te r” so c ia l w o r ld , w e m ay d e m o n stra te o u r p o in t in t r a d it io n a l te rm s: t r a d it io n a lly sp e a k in g , th e d ifferen ce betw een th e “ in n er” a n d th e “ o u te r ” w orld is th a t, u n lik e th e latter, th e form er does n o t k now th e “essen c e /ap p ea ran ce” d istin c tio n , so that “ in n er” th in gs are w h at they seem to be. Id e o lo g y a c ts u p o n th e “ in n e r ” w orld by in d u c in g “ a p p e a r a n c e s ” th a t in stan tly tu rn in to “e ssen c e s.” In th is m eth od o log ica lly so lip s is tic m an ner, we m ay m in im alistica lly c la im th a t the se lf-d e fin ition (or se lf-p ercep tio n ) o f a su b ject en ters in to h er/h is in tersu b jective re lation s. A s w e have ad m itted that this se lf-d e fin ition o f a su b ject is an id eo lo g ica l product, we have thus d em o n stra ted that, ev en u n der th ose ex trem ely u nsu itab le ep istem olog ical presu pposition s, it fo llow s th a t ideology is co n stru ctiv e o f so c ia l reality .

6. B e lie f is th e p riv ileged (an d m aybe the o n ly ) self-fu lfilling m o d ality o f desire: any form o f ren u n c ia tio n is su pported by the b e lie f th at it g ives so m eo ne else p leasu re , an d is gratified by th is m ere su p position . T h e lib id in al e c o n o m y o f b e lie f m a k e s “ th e su b ject supposed to en jo y ” a n e c essary com p lem en t to “th e su b ject su p p o sed to b e liev e .” (O n th e m ech an ism s o f ren u n cia tio n an d the com p lem en tary su p posed p leasure, see A . G ro srich ard , L a Structure du sérail).

7. T h is is a r e c e n t e x a m p le , c o m in g fro m a n h is to r ia n w h o tak es id eo lo g y se r io u sly : “Id eo logy , as w e k n o w , is n o t a re flectio n o f reality , b u t a way to a c t u p o n it. For th is ac tio n to h a v e a t le a s t so m e e f fe c t , th e re sh o u ld n o t b e to o la rg e a g ap b e tw e e n th e i l lu s io n a ry rep re sen ta tio n a n d th e ‘r e a lity ’ o f l i fe .” (G . D uby , L ’Im aginaire du féodalism e [P aris , 1978]). Ideo logy is p o sited b o th o u tside th e so c ia l reality ( a s a n in stru m en t t o act u p on i t ) an d in side it (its im p o rtan ce fo r a h isto rian com es from its b e in g a so c ia l fa c t am o n g o th ers). T h e so lu tio n o f s itu atin g ideology at an in term ed iate d istan c e— n o t to o close , n o t too far— from th e reality , is sy m p to m atic o f its u top ian in de term in atio n .

8. “ T h e th in g th a t d istin gu ish es an d at th e sam e tim e reveals th is part o f the dream -w ork is its purpose. T h is fu n c t io n b e h a v e s in the m a n n e r w h ic h the poet m a lic io u sly a sc r ib e s to p h ilo so ph ers: it fills up th e gap s in the d ream -stru ctu re w ith sh reds an d p a tc h e s (H e in e , “D ie H e im k e h r ” ). A s a re su lt o f its e ffo r t s , th e d ream lo ses its a p p e a r a n c e o f a b su rd ity an d d isco n n ec ted n ess an d ap p ro x im ate s to th e m o d e l o f a n in te llig ib le ex p erie n ce . . . . D ream s ap p e a r to h a v e a m ean in g , but th at m ean in g is as f a r rem o v ed as p ossib le from th eir true sig n ifica n c e .” (S . Freud , The Interpretatin o f D ream s).


9. Ibid.10. In T h e Interpretation o f Dream s (1 9 0 0 ) an d in O n D ream s (1 9 0 1 ) , secon d ary e lab ora tio n

is su p posed to be a p art o f th e dream -w ork, ev en th o u g h its less im p o rtan t part, n o t even n ece ssarily p re sen t in every dream . In A n Evidential D ream (E in T rau m als Beweismittel, 1913 ), Freud already dou bts i f secon d ary e lab ora tion form s a part o f th e dream -w ork proper, an d finds a S o lo m o n ic so lution to get rid o f the problem : “S eco n d ary revision by the co n sc io u s agen cy is here rec k o n ed as part o f th e dream -w ork. E v en if on e were to sep ara te it, th is w ould n o t in v o lve any a lte ra tio n in our co n cep tio n . W e sh ould th en h ave to say: dream s in th e an aly tic sen se c o m p r ise th e d rea m -w o rk p ro p er to g e th e r w ith th e se c o n d a r y r e v is io n o f its p r o d u c t s .” ( S t a n d a r d E d it io n , X I I , 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 .) In h i s a r t ic le o n “ P s y c h o - A n a ly s is ,” c o n t r ib u te d to M arc u se ’s H andw örterbuch, F reu d s ta te s th a t “strictly sp e a k in g ,” seco n d ary e la b ora tio n “does n o t form a p art o f the dream -w ork ” (Ib id , 2 4 1 )· Freud ’s h e sita tio n can be best sh ow n if we ju x tap o se th e fo llow in g tw o p assages: “A re we to su p p o se th at w hat h a p p e n s is th at in th e first in stan ce the dream co n stru ctin g factors . . . put togeth er a p ro v isio n a l d ream -co n ten t out o f the m ate ria l p rov id ed , an d that this c o n te n t is su bseq uen tly re-cast so as to con form so far as p ossib le to th e d em an ds o f a second agency? T h is is scarcely p ro bab le . W e must assum e rath er th at fro m th e very first th e dem an ds o f th is sec o n d fa c to r co n st itu te on e o f th e co n d itio n s w h ich th e d ream m ust s a t is fy an d th at th is c o n d it io n . . . o p e ra te s s im u lta n e o u s ly in a con d u ctive an d selective m a n n e r” (S tan d ard Edition , V , 4 9 9 ) . “I shall n o t dea l exh au stively w ith th is p a rt o f th e dream -w ork, an d will th erfo re m erely rem ark th a t th e e a s ie s t w ay o f form in g an idea o f its n atu re is to suppose— th ou gh th e su p p o sit io n p robab ly does n o t m eet the f a c t s — th a t it ony c o m e s in to o p e r a t io n A F T E R the d r e a m - c o n te n t has a lr e a d y b e e n co n stru c ted ” (Ib id ., 6 6 6 ).

11. T h is p aragrap h add ed to O n Dream s in 1911; S tan d ard E d itio n , V , 667 .12. L a te r in th is tex t (The Interpretation o f D ream s, S ta n d a rd E d itio n V , 4 9 1 ) , w e com e

a cro ss th is im p ortan t statem en t: “H ysterical sym ptom s are n o t a ttach ed to actu al m em ories, b u t to p h an tasie s erected o n th e basis o f m em ories.” In an add en du m to h is le tter to F liess o f M ay 2, 1897 , Freud already sp ecified th at idea: “F an tasies are p sych ical facades con stru cted in order to bar th e w ay to th ese m em o ries [of prim al scen es].”

13. D . D av id so n , in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, p ersu asive ly d em o n stra tes th at m ost o f th e b ac k gro u n d belie fs necessary fo r a co m m u n icatio n are shared an d true; th ey are also triv ial (b e lie f in th e ex isten ce o f m acro-ph ysical o b jects, tim e-sp ace coord in ates, ce rta in causal re la tio n s e tc .) . A n a ly tic p h ilo soph y redu ces all id eo logy to th is “sp o n tan eo u s” an th rop o log ica l “ m e ta p h y s ic s ” ; th e ch o ice o f its ex am p les betrays w ell its id e o lo g ic a l b ia s : in ten d ed to be “ n eu tra l,” they are su ch th at cou ld on ly ex cep tio n a lly figu re in any “rea l” everday con versa tion .

14- C f . F reu d ’s essay “E in K in d w ird g e sc h lag e n ” (A C h ild is B eing B e a te n ) , S ta n d a rd E d ition X V II.

15. A n a ly s in g th e B e lg rad e trial a g a in s t th e s ix d iss id e n t in te lle c tu a ls (1 9 8 4 - 1 9 8 5 ) , we d isco vered th is e lem en t in the p opu lar fan tasy o f a foo tb all (soccer) m atch “A la Y o u go slav e” (Problemi no. 257 , 198 5 ).

16. T h e fac t th at fan tasie s are rigid n o t on ly “in tra-su b jec tiv e ly ” b u t “in ter-su b jec tive ly ” as w ell, supports our thesis rather th an defeats it. T h e fa c t that the fan tasy o f th e prim al scene takes the sam e aspect with m ost n eu ro tics, i.e., th e fo rm o f a coitus a tergo, con fu sed Freud in h is en d e a v o r to d e te rm in e w h eth er th e se fan tasie s are re c o lle c tio n s o f “ rea l” p e rcep tio n s o r ju st “c o n stru c t io n s .” (C f . “ W o lfsm an n ,” w here h is fin al v e rd ic t is n o n liquet.) T h e p ro b lem o f in d iv id u al p sych o logy is the sam e as the prob lem o f ideology: the fantasy is the p lace where p e rc e p tu a l (o r “f a c t u a l ” ) m a te r ia l m e e ts w ith “ s e m io t ic ” c o n s t r a in t s . N e u r o t ic s n e e d to fan tasize a c o ita l p o s itio n that m ax im ally ex p o se s the d ifferen ce o f the sex u a l organs in an u n d ecid ab le interplay.

Tom Lewis

The Marxist Thing

I w an t to th a n k ev ery o n e w ho h as h ad a h an d in o rg an iz in g th is conference and also a ll o f those panelists and audience members who have participated in it by sharing their ideas with the rest o f us. I have learned a lot, and, ju st as im portantly, I have sensed here a camaraderie that is all- too-easy to lose sight o f in the A cadem y. O ut on the prairie we often keep this cam araderie alive, both in the universities and in the broader public sp h e re , th ro u g h s ig n if ic a n t in te r a c t io n s w ith the rh e to r ic o f— and som etim es through strategic interventions into the politics o f— good ol’ m idw estern populism. A fte r all, in Politics and Ideology in M arxist Theory, E rn e sto L a c la u d id su cc e e d in d e m o n str a t in g th a t “p o p u lism ” a in ’t necessarily bad!

M ost o f us can agree that it would be “ just great” if there really were a “p o p u lar-d em o cratic” m ovem en t in the U n ited S ta te s , one that m ight prove capable o f remotivating a few ideological signifiers here and there in the interests o f helping to articulate a counter-hegem onic political practice. O f course, such a m ovem ent has been underway since 1983. Yet many o f us still resist understanding its sign ificance according to Laclau ’s precise terms and prefer too o ften to go on living “som ew here over the Rainbow .” I know you realize I m ean the “Rainbow C o alitio n ,” and I will agree with you that Rainbow p o litics ain ’t no revolutionary socialist politics: truth be told, rainbows result from reform ist refractions. It would be to mistake a reality fo r an illusion, however, to think th at socialism in the U nited State s could e ver be won in “splendid isolation” from a m ovem ent such as the Rainbow C o a li t io n . L a c la u ’s le s so n s a b o u t the n eed to a r t ic u la te “ p o p u lar- d e m o c ra tic in te rp e lla t io n s” in re la tio n to w o rk in g-class in te re sts and revolutionary organizations are indeed m uch m ore to the point.

I d o n ’t d a re c a l l w h at y o u ’re a b o u t to h e a r “ w o rk - in - p ro g re s s .” Som etim e down the line I want to write a book called M arxism and Chaos, and I think that A lthusserian theory has substantial contributions to make to such a book. I becam e interested in this theoretical topic because lately I have been trying to figure out w hat the so-called Span ish “R evolu tion o f 1854” was and m eant. It lasted two years— until 1856— assum ing that IT really was a “revolu tion .” W hatever it was, tw entieth-century historians h ave generally view ed it as a mere “loca l” event, a blip on the screen o f


“P C ” time, w ithout profound ram ifications o f its own in Span ish history. In ways I only suspect and can n o t yet explain , however, I believe th at the course o f Span ish history was altered by it significantly. M y only solace at the m om ent is th at M arx and Engels published 208 pages o f journalistic a rt ic le s ab o u t w hat M arx h im se lf e n th u sia st ic a lly (th o u g h som ew h at prem aturely!) ca lled th e “R evolu tion in S p a in .” If it’s still feasible to me after more research, I intend to argue those pages into a M arxist theory of “ch aos.”

A s a sort o f inform al prolegom enon to such a project, I want to try this a ftern oon to overlap a vocabulary derived from “ch aos theory” as it has been developed in the natural sciences with w hat I take to be some o f those s t i l l l iv in g in s ig h ts o f A lt h u s s e r ’s (a s A le x C a l l in ic o s c a l le d th e m yesterday). C h aos theory may well be new to m any o f you, and I bovinely confess that I’m insufficiently know ledgeable about m any o f its concepts and im plications. Yet I’d like to offer a limited set o f rum inations— the verb “to rum inate,” by the way, originally had to do with cows chew ing th e ir cuds— for w hich the follow ing two c ita tio n s from Jam es G le ic k ’s C haos: Making a N ew Science may serve as epigraphs:

T h e more [scientists] had thought about nonlinearity , the more [they] felt the force o f . . . universality. (G le ick 1988: 183)

In science as in life, it is well known th at a chain o f events can h ave a p o in t o f crisis th at could m agnify sm all changes. But ch aos m eant that such points were everywhere. T h ey were pervasive. In systems like the w eather, sensitive dependence on in itia l conditions was an inescapable consequen ce o f the way sm all scales intertw ined with large .(G leick 1988: 23)

Please allow me to ante up two more citations, which, although taken from different sources, may serve to indicate the stakes (steaks?) in these rum inations. I d o n ’t know how m any o f you m ay have had occasion to listen to a song called “T a lk in ’ Bout A R evolu tion .”

D on ’t you knowT h ey ’re talkin’ about a revolutionIt sounds like a whisperW hile they’re standing in the welfare linesC rying at the doorsteps o f those armies o fsalvationW asting tim e in the unem ploym ent lines S itting around w aiting for a prom otion D on ’t you know

THE M A RXIST THING 159

T h ey ’re talk in ’ about a revolution It sounds like a whisper Poor people gonna rise up A n d get their share Poor people gonna rise up A n d take w hat’s theirs . . .Yes, finally, the tables are starting to turn.

W ere you ab le to hear IT ? IT soun ds like a w hisper. T h a t ’s T racy C h ap m an o ff her 1988 album Tracy Chapman (side 1, band 1). T h is is now V in cen t D escom bes in his 1979 book Modern French Philosphy: “In brief, A lth u sser ’s enterprise im plies th at in the long [run] the word ‘d ia lec tic ’ sh ou ld be d iscarded— a p ro ject w h ich could n ot be d isclosed u n til the ground had been prepared for its reception” (122).

T h is afternoon I shall endeavor to explore the ch aotic consequences o f th ese last two passages. I’m go in g to suggest in fact th at they take us directly to th e M arxist thing: chaos in history.

A ctually , I’ve already told you that m uch when I cited “T a lk in ’ Bout A R evolu tion .” A lthough you may already understand what I m ean by “the M arxist thing,”— nam ely, “revolution”— you still may wonder what I mean by “ch aos.” For starters, I m ean by “chaos” the notion that com plexity and u n p red ic tab ility arise in sim p le , d e te rm in istic , n o n lin e ar system s th at m anifest sensitive dependence on initial conditions (G le ick 1988: 23). I a lso m ean th a t sim ple processes can “produce m agnificent edifices o f com plexity without ran dom ness” (G le ick 1988: 306).

For exam p le , “ the h istory o f a ll h ith e rto ex istin g society is”— quite simply— ’’the history o f class struggles.” Yet it is a lso true that history gives rise to highly com plex social form ations an d th at it perm its only relatively sm a ll w in d o w s o f p r e d ic t a b i l i t y w ith r e s p e c t to th e e m e rg e n c e , developm ent, or demise o f such form ations.

A chaotic M arxism thus en thusiastically recognizes determination, and it does so p re c ise ly in th e stro n g p h ilo so p h ic a l se n se . B e ca u se it a lso u n d erstan d s h isto ry an a lo g ica lly — or m etap h o rica lly , if you w ill— as a nonlinear de term in istic system , a ch a o tic M arxism recognizes, too , th at com plexity an d unpredictability are constitutive o f history in function o f the se n sitiv e d ep en d en ce o f h isto r ic a l p h en o m e n a on variab le in it ia l conditions that do n o t “change at th e sam e rate.” T h e expression “variable in itia l con d ition s” here should be taken to suggest n ot only the obvious p o in t th at different social form ations m ay originate from different initial conditions, but also the perhaps less obvious p o in t that the sam e social fo rm atio n co n stan tly is exp o sed to new “ in itia l” co n d itio n s. “ In itia l” co n d itio n s , therefore, are n o t f ix e d o n ce an d for a ll at a h y p o th e tica l


m om ent o f origin but are constantly either reproduced or ch anged in a relation o f “com plex and uneven developm ent.”

O n e could say th at a ch ao tic M arx ist, like a ch a o tic m eteoro log ist, envisions systems as conjunctures, since conjunctures display n o necessary fea tu res o f c lo su re , h o m ogen e ity , or te leo logy . E v en th ose contingent fea tu re s o f c lo su re , h o m o gen e ity , or te leo lo gy th at co n ju n c tu re s m ay display, m oreover, rem ain volatile in space-tim e precisely because they are sensitively dependent upon initial condtions. For exam ple, w hen certain in itia l conditions are satisfied, it will rain. But it w on’t necessarily rain forever. T h is was Y ahw eh’s com fort to N o ah (at a tim e when there were no holes in the ozone layer!).

D oes a chaotic M arxism hold to a view of econom ic determ inism ? You bet! A n d it even holds to views o f political and ideological determ inism ! It’s just that it considers th at all those debates over the “last in stan ce” or th e “ first in s ta n c e ” im p lic itly rem ain as d e p e n d en t on now outw orn , ineffective tem poral m etaphors, as older debates on th e “prim acy o f the base” vs. the “relative autonom y o f the superstructure” im plicitly rem ain d e p e n d e n t on now ou tw orn , in e ffe c tiv e sp a t ia l m etap h o rs. H ap p ily , m oreover, you w ill discover that i f you don ’t use those m etaphors you w on’t need the “d ia le c tic ”— a term w hich precisely im poses u pon ragtag and b o b ta il revo lu tion aries such d iscreetly and even ch arm in gly sacerd o ta l questions as “ a lp h a or om ega?,” “hum an or divine?,” or “tw o-in-one?.” (It ended up anyway as “three-in-one,” or so said A ugustine!)

W e need a better way to understand what is correctly if inadequately encapsulated by the expression “relative autonom y.”

A ccord in g to M ike D avis, one o f the “th ings” Lenin eventually cam e to u n d e r s ta n d w as t h a t “ p o l i t i c a l c o n s c io u s n e s s g ro w s o u t o f th e overdeterm ination o f the econom ic class struggle by other contradictions and form s o f o p p p re ssio n ” (1 9 8 6 : 3 0 8 ) . M ich ae l Buraw oy h as argued sim ilarly th a t you c a n ’t con stitu te the econ om ic as a “th in g ” in M arxist theory independently o f those “th in gs” we habitually refer to as politics and ideology (1 9 8 5 ). N o r v ice versa, v ice versa, v ice versa. N ow , you can shoehorn D avis’s and Buraw oy’s insights into a H egelian M arxist theory o f “d ialectics” if you wish, but this would be to fudge the “th ing” in the sam e way scientists often fudge solutions to nonlinear equations by deciding, say, to forget about fr ic tio n — resistan ce— w hen ca lc u la tin g the am ou n t o f energy n ecessary to accelera te a hockey puck . If ) u j take acco u n t o f friction, what otherwise can be represented as a linear system can only be represented as a nonlinear system, where the relationships am on g elem ents are not strictly proportional and generally the elem ents don ’t all add up. T h e te leo lo g y o f lin ea r sy stem s vs. th e u n p re d ic tab ility o f n o n lin e a r systems? T h e expressive sym metries and even hom ologies o f linear systems

THE M ARXIST THING 161

vs. the structural asym m etries and even overdeterm inations o f nonlinear system s? T h e totalizations o f linear systems vs. the general im possibility o f adding together nonlinear systems? A m on g other “th ings,” “nonlinearity m eans that the act o f playing the gam e has a way o f ch anging the rules”(G le ick 1988: 24).

S o I ta k e D a v is ’ s an d B u raw o y ’s in s ig h ts to m ean th a t h is to r ic a l “ th in g s”— at least “ th in g s” as v iew ed by h isto r ic a l m ateria lism — show sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Yet, if this is so, those “th ings” still must be theorized as “bounded”’ that is, as havin g entered or as having been entered into various “determ inate relations” (this is the definition o f “bounded” in modern m athem atics as well as in modern linguistics). “M en [sic] m ake their ow n history, but they do not m ake it just as they please; they do not m ake it under circum stances ch osen by them selves, but under given circum stances directly encountered and inherited from the past.” T o put this in the language o f chaos, hum an beings have freedom. Th ey are free precisely in the sense that hum an agency m ay be said to constitute the equivalent o f a “variable” in a m athem atical equation or a “coord inate” in a graph. A ctually, although som e o f you may find this overture to science initially disturbing, you m ay be pleased to recall from high school or college th at a “ v a r ia b le ” in m a th e m a tic s is d e fin ed p rec ise ly as a “d egree o f freedom .” Econom y, politics, ideology. G ender, race, class. D egrees o f freedom , yes, but woefully undertheorized as “relative autonom y.”

W hy? Because in som e real sense socialist revolution requires n-dimen- sionality. S im ply put, the fam ous three structural in stan ces o f M arxism — econ om y, p o litic s, and ideology— are autonom ous. Like an y th in g else, how ever— including “classes,” “ideas,” and even “individuals” as n-number o f agencies also constituting n-num ber o f autonom ies o f various scale— the possible guarantees o f their effects always lie elsewhere. T h us, n-dim ension- ality, is to be understood as infinite possib ility in a fin ite space. T h a t ’s an o th er defin ition o f chaos.

Every p iece o f a dyn am ical system th at can m ove independently is anoth er variable, anoth er degree o f freedom. Every degree o f freedom requires another dim ension in phase space, to m ake sure th at a single poin t contain s enough inform ation to detem ine the state o f the system uniquely. . . . M athem aticians had to accept the fact that systems with infinitely m any degrees o f freedom — untram m eled nature expressing itself in a turbulent w aterfall or an unpredictable brain — required a p h ase space o f in fin ite d im en sio n s. But who could han d le such a thing? (G leick 1988: 137)


A nd maybe that’s also as good a m etaphorical definition o f revolution as any. A s well as o f the problem s that ruling classes East and W est have in im agining that IT could ever happen again: “ It was a hydra, m erciless and uncontrollable, and it was L an dau ’s [1959] image for turbulence: infinite m odes, in fin ite degrees o f freedom , infinite d im en sio n s” (G le ic k 1988: 13 7 ) . In a n y c a se , w h e th e r in n a tu re or h is to r y , c h a o s is a t o n c e determ inistic and unpredictable. W hat chaos is not, o f course, is random. W hat IT is, is subject and structure together: the sensitive dependence o f nonlinear determ inistic systems on initial conditions.

In the 1960s, A lth usser set out to destroy epistem ology: a noble and necessary mission. Yet he wrote so m uch epistem ology in the process that, arguably, he ended up doing more to perpetuate ep istem ology than any other M arxist born this century. In the m ost general sense in our current con juncture, that is the legacy o f A lthusser: M arxist epistemology. I say M arxist epistem ology and not M arxist philosophy— which is what A lthusser said he w anted to found, system atize, and bequeath— because A lth usser m ade his contribution to M arxist philosophy largely in the form o f a First Philosophy. “First Philosophy” is a term in the A nglo-A m erican tradition o f analytic philosophy, where it is used to convey the idea that the role and goal o f philosophy is to provide the “truth about . : . truth— its origin and extent, its ground and nature. [First] Philosophy as the theory o f theory, or th e sc ie n c e o f sc ie n c e , is sim p ly p h ilo so p h y as the th e o ry o f t ru th ” (R om an os 1983: 188).

N ow , th a t ’s G eorge D . R om anos talk in ’— but h e ’s n ot exactly ta lk in ’ ‘b o u t n o re v o lu tio n . ( H ere I w an t to add th a t I very m uch ad m ire R o m a n o s ’s 1983 b o o k e n t it le d Q u in e and A n aly tic Philosophy .) Y et R o m an o s soun ds a lot like h e ’s describ in g A lth u sse r in For M arx and Reading Capital, n ’est-ce p as1 Indeed, “w ell-intentioned” as A lth usser was as a “sub ject,” nowhere did A lth usser enter into greater com plicity with the “ stru c tu re ” o f m id d le -c la ss p h ilo so p h y than in h is co n ce rn to de fin e “T heory (w ith a cap ita l T ) , [as] general theory, . . . w h ich transform s into ‘k n o w le d g e s ’ ( s c ie n t if ic t ru th s) the id e o lo g ic a l p ro d u c t o f e x is t in g ‘em pirical’ practices (the concrete activity o f m en [sic])” (A lthusser 1965: 168). “Th is T h eory ,” o f course, is also said by A lth usser to be identical to “ th e m a te r ia lis t dialectic w h ich [itself] is n o n e o th e r th an d ia le c t ic a l m aterialism ” (A lthusser 1965: 168).

O r so A lthusser thought— and often practiced. Yet, in the most specific future conjunctural sense, the other and better A lth usserian legacy is that there a in ’t no more “d ialectic”— neither idealist nor m aterialist— no flavor, no persuasion thereof. D on’t you know. They’re talkin’ about a revolution. It sounds like a whisper.

THE MARXIST THING 163

A n d , I would suggest, good riddance to the D ialectic! Because, you see, when you dump the n otion o f epistem ology as First Philosophy— as you must also dump the “d ialectic .” “D ialectic”— except, o f course, in M arx ’s usage— has always been the nam e o f a First Philosophy. A n d it’s hard for me to im agin e any future c o n te x t in w h ich it cou ld n am e a d ifferen t function.

In h is late w orks— at least in one o f them , “T h e T ran sfo rm ation o f Ph ilosophy”— A lth usser realized this about the D ia lectic and really and tru ly d u m p ed F ir st P h ilo so p h y . T h e r e he d o e s n ’t talk m u ch a b o u t “d ialectic” spcifically, though. In one way this m atters, because A lthusser never explicitly abandoned “d ialectic ,” as far as I know. A n d it would have been easier for everyone if h e ’d just com e out and said it. Yet, then again, maybe he didn’t know what he was doing. Or, again, maybe he (subject) co u ld n ’t guarantee the effects (structure) o f w hat he was do in g then . In another way, o f course, it simply doesn ’t m atter, because he (subject) did do it (structure). T h e groundwork for getting rid o f “d ialectic” was laid early on in his “C ontrad iction and O verdeterm in ation ” (A lthusser 1965: 87- 127). T h at it was unlikely this would have been recognized a t the tim e of th e p u b lic a tio n o f For M arx p ro b ab ly had so m eth in g to do w ith the appearance in th e sam e vo lum e o f an engaging but positively unch aotic essay, “O n the M aterialist D ialectic” (A lthusser 1965: 161-219). N o doubt a num ber o f other initial conditions, m uch as those G reg Elliott discussed yesterday, had som eth in g to do with it as well.

W h at’s w rong with the dialectic? M arx answers that it’s upside down. A lth usser replies that M arx ’s answ er w on’t do because you can ’t just invert the d ialectic: you’ve got to overdeterm ine it. A n d this can be done only by understanding som ething quite specific. A lth ough exegetically it may be tru e — as A lth u s se r say s in “O n the M a te r ia l i s t D ia le c t ic ”— th a t “d ialectic” “ is the study o f contrad icion in the very essence o f ob jects,” or w h at com es to th e sam e th ing, “ th e doctrine o f th e unity o f op posites” (A lthusser 1965: 193), you still m ust understand contradiction in such a way that— as A lthusser says in “C on trad iction and O verdeterm ination”— “it appears [as] overdetermined in the direction o f a historical inhibition, a real ‘b lock ’ for the contradiciton . . . , or in the direction o f revolutionary rupture . . . , but in n eith er co n d ition is it ever found in the ‘pure’ state" (1 0 6 ) . Sen sitive dependence on initial conditions? Friction m aking an otherwise linear solution to the hockey-puck-acceleration equation a little more, shall IT be said, problématique1

In my view, the answer A lthusser should have given . . . wait, stop de pucking tape a minit. W hat A lth usser d idn ’t say but w hich he enables to be said today is this: contradiction has nothing w hatsoever to do with the “essence” o f objects. N either does contradiction have anything to do with


“dia lectic .” A n d it has even less to do with “the doctrine o f the unity of o p p o s ite s ,” w h ich is as m y stica l a d o c tr in e as th e C h r is t ia n T r in ity . A lthusser should have answered that M arxism was the “th ing” o f history as a chaotic dynamical system. O f history as a weird flow, aperiodic insofar as its representation displays neither a fixed point nor a lim it cycle, a simple determ inistic system that gives rise to trem endous com plexity and quickly attain s unpredictability. W eather is nature’s ch aotic behavior as history is hu m an ity ’s ch ao tic beh avior. S im ple , determ in istic , dyn am ical system s show ing sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Your calculations can never be local enough, just as your “big picture’’ is still, and rightly so, your “big picture.’’ A littler big picture that is also a bigger little picture. “Sen sitive dependen ce on initial conditions was an inescapable consequence o f the way small scales intertw ined with large” (G le ick 1988: 23).

T a lk about mystical ideas: a littler big picture that is also a bigger little p icture!? C an you change the big picture? “Finally, the tables are starting to turn.” W hy? Because the dialectic is “m astersublating” ? N o whispers there. O nly “talking heads.” T h en talk to me about a revolution. T h a t ’s just talk. How can you talk to me? W hy are you talking to me? W here can we talk? In Bensonhurst. H ow ard Beach. A t clinic defenses. O n the picket lines. A t the schools. S tan d in g together shouting in the M igra’s fa ce . W h ile “ sta n d in g in the w elfare l in e s .” “ W a stin g tim e in the unem ploym ent lines.” East and W est. W om en and M en. B lack , Latino, A sian , and W hite. N o t the “laundry lis t ,” but W orkers’ Power. Initial conditions are also conditional initiatives. N o t ran dom ones. M uch less sporadic ones. L e t ’s Party!

“Structure and Su b ject”: many o f us have com e to recognize th at this is a false dichotomy, and we are trying to find a language o f concepts and actions to express this recognition (see, for example, C allin icos 1988). T h e subject is structured, and in the strong sense: freedom. Must it continue to be N ature vs. Culture or vice versa; C lass vs. Individual or vice versa; Structure vs. Subject or vice versa; Effect vs. A gent or vice versa? Vice is som etim es nice, dependin g on conditions, and versa a in ’t always no virtue anyw ay. Try chaos: ordered disorder. In som e ways th at’s a contradictory term. But not, I will add, a contradiction in terms. Because it thoroughly recast our notions o f order and disorder, o f determ inism and freedom. How c ’est?

A lth usser left us “functionalism ”— which is potentially enabling under favorab le co n d ition s for tom orrow ’s w eather— but he left us “fu n ctio n a lism ” largely as an in su ffic ien tly p rob lem atized so lu tio n to a host o f problem s to be solved. I’m sure a ll o f you in th is audience know how the forecast against a blustering functionalism reads. W ith in any established mode o f production, forces and relations o f production traditionally are said to “correspond,” and each is said to fulfill specific functions th at enable the


m aintenance o f the m ode o f production as a whole. If these functions are taken as providing the fully adequate concepts o f the forces and relations of p ro d u ctio n , h ow ever, and if su ch fu n ctio n s are co n ce iv ed o f as b e in g essentially reproductive in nature, th en a functionalist view o f th e social form ation arises necessarily (see H indess an d H irst 1975).

For exam ple, M arx m aintains that the initial and indispensable function o f production within any m ode o f production is the reproduction o f the m eans (forces) o f production . A lth u sser m aintains, m oreover, th at the function o f ideology within any m ode o f production is the reproduction o f the re la tio n s o f p ro d u ctio n (1 9 6 8 Ί 9 7 0 ) . N ow , if these fu n ction s are c o n stru e d as co m p le te ly d e te rm in a n t o f th e ir c o n c e p ts , and i f th ese c o n c e p ts a lso are a r t ic u la te d in a re la t io n o f co rre sp o n d en ce to on e a n o th e r , th en the c o n c e p t “ m o d e o f p r o d u c t io n ” m u st be se e n as d e s ig n a t in g an eternal stru ctu re . T h a t is, o n ce it is c o n c e iv e d th a t p roductive forces and relation s “co rrespon d” and that they fun ction ally “ re p ro d u ce” th em se lves in a re la tio n o f “co rre sp o n d en ce ,” it becom es im po ssib le to theorize an y c o n d itio n s u nder w h ich so m eth in g on the (d is )o rd e r o f even a “tra n s itio n a l” ph ase o f “n o n -co rre sp o n d en ce” can occur. T h is m eans, o f course, n o t on ly th a t no account can be rendered o f p ast h isto r ic a l ch an ge but a lso th a t no strategy can be ca lcu la te d for p rom oting future historical change. A n d that exp lain s why the issue o f fu n c t io n a ls im is so c ru c ia l fo r the im p o rta n t p ro je c t o f “ re th in k in g M a rx ism ” tod ay . If we try, we o u g h t to be ab le to “ th in k ” fu n ctio n s w ith o u t “d o in g ” fu n c tio n a lism . W h at s to p s fu n c tio n a lism w ith ou t “disappearing” functions? Sen sitive dependence on initial conditions. T h e now then “A lthusserian Legacy.”

T h ree days ago I discovered th at my talk had been scheduled for the se ss io n o f th is c o n fe r e n c e e n t it le d “ R e p r e s e n ta t io n /In te r p r e ta t io n : A lth u sse r a n d L iterary T h e o ry .” I reran th e ta p e , a n d it f i t “R e p re se n ta t io n /In te r p r e ta t io n .” T h e re was a b ig lit t le l it t le b ig p rob lem , however, as far as the session ’s subtitle, “A lthusser and Literary T h eory ,” was co n c e rn e d . S o I w ould lik e to c lo se w ith so m e th in g a b o u t the im p lication s o f ch aos in re la tion to M arx ist literary theory. D on't you know. I’m suddenly v isited by th e m emory that chaos was K A O S for A gen t 86 in G et Smart.

N o m eanings are intrinsic to texts. T o think otherwise is to step in a l i t c r i t v e r s io n o f the co w p ie W it tg e n s te in d o d g e d w h en he argu ed successfully against the possibility o f private languages. T extual m eanings depend on context. Ergo, oh ! ego, M acherey (1966) has enjoined us to analyze and to ex p la in the in it ia l co n d itio n s o f literary “p ro d u c tio n .” O th e r s h a v e sh o w n t h a t th is is a c tu a l ly a re fo rm ist r a th e r th a n a revolutionary m oo-ve, however, if initial h istorical context— the m om ent


o f production— is to be defined as the latest in a long line o f candidates for the trad itio n a l o ffice of “ ep istem o lo g ica l g u aran to r .” O f “c o ar se ,” the analysis and exp lan ation o f the initial conditions o f literary production can be O K , if it is understood th at the conditions o f any specific process o f “ p ro d u c tio n ” a lso in c lu d e th ose o fte n n o n lin e ar co n d itio n s k now n as “consum ption .” Yet even this reform ulation rem ains inadequate, unless it is affirm ed as well th at initial conditions are constantly either reproduced or changed. T h u s the m eanings o f literary texts m ust be theorized as showing sensitive dependence on variable in itial conditions that do not necessarily “ch ange at the sam e rate .”

T h e m ost use-valuable goal o f literary criticism today is to develop new “ y ou ses” for tex ts w ith in the b road er so c ia l p rocess (see , for exam ple, B enn ett 1979). Follow ing A lthusser, I would suggest that literary criticism does have m any constitu tively unpredictable objectifs, w hich, depending on conditions, may be right on! or right wing! B e n n ett’s (1979) an d E agleton ’s ( 1 9 7 6 , 1 9 8 1 , and 1 9 8 4 ) m o st v ir tu o u s v ic e , th e re fo re , has b e e n to dem on strate . T o dem on strate th at literature and literary criticism form part o f ideological practice.

W orks Cited

A lth u sse r , L . (1 9 6 5 ) F o r M arx , trans. B en Brew ster, N ew Y ork: R an d o m H ouse, 1970.___ . (1 9 6 8 ) Reading C ap ita l, t r a n s . B e n Brew ster, L o n d o n : N e w L eft B o o k s, 1975.___ . (1 9 6 8 -1 9 7 0 ) Lenin and Philosophy and O ther E ssay s, tran s. B en Brew ster, N e w Y ork an d

L o n d o n : M on th ly R eview Press, 1971.___ . (1 9 7 6 ) “T h e T ra n sfo rm a tio n o f P h ilo so p h y ,” P/iiiosop/i^ an d the Spontaneous Philosophy of

the Scientists, ed. w ith in tro . G regory E llio tt, trans·. T h o m a s E Lew is, L o n d o n an d N ew Y ork: V e rso , 1990 .

B e n n e tt, T . (1 9 7 9 ) Form alism an d M arx ism , L o n d o n an d N ew Y ork: M eth u en .Bu raw oy, M . (1 9 8 5 ) The Politics o f Production, L o n d o n : V erso .C a llin ic o s , A . (1 9 8 8 ) M aking H istory. A gency, Structure a n d C hange in Socia l Theory, Ith aca ,

N Y : C o r n e ll U n iv e rsity Press.C h a p m a n , T . (1 9 8 8 ) T racy C h ap m an, N ew Y ork: E le c tra R eco rd s.D av is, M . (1 9 8 6 ) Prisoners o f the A m erican D ream , L o n d o n : V erso .D e sc o m b e s , V . ( 1 9 7 9 ) M od ern Fren ch Philosophy, tran s. L. S c o t t - F o x an d J . M . H a rd in g ,

C am b rid g e , an d N ew Y o rk : C am b rid g e U n iv ersity P ress, 1980.E a g le to n ,T . (1 9 7 6 ) C riticism a n d Ideology, L o n d o n : N e w L e f t B ook s.___ . (1 9 8 1 ) W alter Benjam in, or, T ow ards a Revolutionary C riticism , L o n d o n an d N ew Y ork:

N ew L e ft B o ok s.___ . (1 9 8 4 ) The Function o f C riticism . From the Spectator to Post-Structuralism , L o n d o n : V erso .G le ick , J. (1 9 8 8 ) C h ao s. M a k in g a N ew Science, N e w Y ork: V ik in g .H in d ess , B . an d H irst, P .Q . (1 9 7 5 ) P reO ap ita list M odes o f Production, L o n d o n , B o sto n , an d

H enley : R o u tled g e an d K e g a n Paul.L ac lau , E. ( 1 9 Π ) Politics an d Ideology in M a rx is t T h eory. C apitalism — F asc ism — Populism ,

L o n d o n : V e rso , 1979.Lorenz, E. (1 9 6 3 ) “ D eterm in istic n o n p erio d ic flow ,” Jo u m a lo f Atmospheric Sciences 20 : 130-141· ___ . (1 9 6 3 ) “T h e m e ch an ic s o f v a sc illa tio n ,” Jo u rn a l o f Atmospheric Sciences 2 0 : 448-464-


___ . (1 9 6 4 ) “T h e prob lem o f d ed ucin g th e clim ate fro m th e govern in g eq u a tio n s,” Tellus 16:1- 11.

M ach erey , P . (1 9 6 6 ) A Theory o f Literary Production, C h ic a g o : U n iv ersity o f C h ic a g o Press, 1978.

M a rx , K . a n d E n g e ls , F. ( 1 9 7 5 -) C o llec ted W ork s, 5 0 v o ls , p u b lish e d o r in p r e p a ra t io n , M oscow a n d L o n d o n : P rogress P ublish ers.

R e sn ick , S . A . an d W o lff, R .D . (1 9 8 7 ) Knowledge an d C la ss . A M arx ian Critique o f Political Econom y, C h icago : U n iv ersity o f C h ic ag o Press.

R o m an o s, G .D . (1 9 8 3 ) Q u in e and A nalytic Philosophy, C am b rid g e , M A : T h e M IT Press. W ittg e n s te in , L . ( 1 9 5 3 ) Philosophical in vestigation s, tran s. G .E .M . A n sc o m b e , N ew Y ork:

M ac m illa n , 1973 .

Michèle Barrett

Althusser’s Marx, Althusser’s Lacan

If the A lthusserian engine was running out o f steam at the end o f the ’60s, it received a massive new burst o f energy with the publication o f what w as to b e c o m e k n o w n u b iq u ito u s ly in E n g lish as “ th e IS A s e s sa y ” : “Ideology and Ideological S ta te A pparatu ses.” ' T h e essay is divided into two parts, and the division is, I shall argue, n ot merely one o f convenience; it reflects the profoundly divided and contradictory nature o f the argum ent A lthusser was attem pting to m ake. In the first part o f the essay A lthusser a d v a n c e d a n id ea th a t was to b r in g a b o u t a “ re v o lu tio n ” in M arx ist th ou gh t: th e thesis th at we h a d to u n d erstan d “rep ro d u ctio n ,” a n d in particular the way a social form ation must reproduce itself over tim e, and not restrict ourselves to an analysis o f production. S ince classical M arxism had concentrated alm ost exclusively on production, in both its sociological analysis and its w orkplace-based political practice, A lth usser’s argum ent hit a raw n e rv e and m o v e d th e d is c u s s io n in M a rx ism away fro m th e “ p ro d u c tiv ism ” th a t h a d d e fin ed E u ro p ean M arx ism from th e S e c o n d International onwards. A lthusser (as ever) sought textual authority from M arx, citing an 1868 letter to K ugelm ann as proof that M arx understood— but subsequent M arxists had neglected— the im portance o f understanding the need for a society to reproduce its conditions o f production as well as sim ply to carry on producing.

In practice, A lthusser cam e up with a surprisingly “sociological” account o f production, focusing on the d ivision o f labor and the role o f the fam ily in reproducing labor power and the “relations o f production” rather loosely d e fin ed . P u rsu in g G r a m sc i ’s d is tin c t io n betw een the sta te an d “ c iv il so c ie ty ,” A lth u sser drew a som ew hat d ifferent d istin c tio n betw een the rep re ssiv e ap p aratu ses o f th e sta te (arm y, p o lic e , e tc .) and the s ta te ’s ideological apparatuses, which, in his m odel, resem bled the institutions o f G ram sc i’s c iv il society: p o litica l parties, the church, education , fam ily, m edia, trade unions an d so on.

In th e second p art o f th e essay, w h ich begins with th e subheading “O n Ideology,” A lthusser elaborates th e theory o f ideology put forward in earlier w orks (ideology as the lived relationship o f individuals to their h istorical conditions o f existence) through an exposition , in a L acan ian context, o f the idea o f “interpellation .” A s we shall see in a m om ent, his argum ent on the question o f subjectivity is best read in conjunction with the com panion


essay, “Freud and L acan .” In general, in the first part o f the essay we are invited to see ideology as an aspect o f the reproduction o f class relations in c a p it a l is m , w h ile in the se c o n d p a r t we are in v ite d to u n d e rs ta n d su b jectiv ity th rough Freud’s “ sc ien ce o f th e u n co n sc io u s .” A lth u sse r ’s fa ilu re to recon cile these two p ersp ectiv es, in w hat was to becom e an extraordinarily influential essay, h a s contributed in no sm all measure to a continuing divide betw een two traditions o f work on ideology: those who see ideology as functional to the reproduction o f cap italism and those who see ideology as a key to the understanding o f subjectiv ity as an im portant question in its own right.

I want to take the “social reproduction” thesis first. W ithin M arxism generally , perh aps the m ost typical (n on -A lth u sserian ) response was to regard the argu m en t as unduly fu n c tio n a list— in stre ssin g the sm ooth reproduction o f th e ideological relations o f th e so c ia l form ation, A lthusser had left no room for resistance, contestation and struggle. H ence, those who felt th at their tireless activ ities, in such organizations as schools or trade un ion s, were p o litica lly w orthw hile took excep tion to A lth u sser ’s accou n t o f their ro le as— m ore or less— th a t o f co gs in the c a p ita lis t m achine. R ichard John son , criticizing A lthusser o n this point, suggested that the term “reproduction” is conceptualized very differently by G ram sci as “a hard and constantly-resisted labor, a political and ideological work for c a p ita lism an d for th e d o m in an t c la sse s , on very o b stin a te m a ter ia ls indeed.”2

O n e p la c e w h e re th e s o c ia l r e p r o d u c t io n m o d e l w as ta k e n up enthusiastically was, paradoxically it m ight seem now, in fem inism . In the 1970s m an y so c ia l is t and M a rx ist fem in ists u sed the th eory o f so c ia l reproduction, and particularly A lth usser’s reference to th e “ school/fam ily coup le ,” as a m eans o f integrating a discussion o f gender and the sexual division o f labor with a M arxist accoun t o f capitalism . It seem ed at that point as if M arxism was, finally, going to m ove into a consideration o f the hom e as well as the w orkplace, reproduction as well as production , the private as well as the public and so on; very detailed debates about the analysis o f both wage and dom estic labor in cap italist econom ies flourished at the tim e.3

A s I h a v e su g g e ste d e lsew h ere , h o w ev er, th e p ro je c t o f u sin g an A lthusserian concept o f reproduction to “exp lain ” the position o f wom en in capitalism is a vexed and ill-fated one.4 In the first place, a lth ou gh there is an obvious link betw een biological reproduction and the provision o f the n ext generation o f workers (i.e., the reproduction o f labor power in M arxist term s), there is no necessary link betw een this procreative process and the division o f labor or the division o f the population into the class relations

A LTH U SSER’S MARX, A LTH U SSER’S LACAN 171

ch aracteristic o f cap ita list production . A s we know, class p osition is in practice h eavily affected by b irth (a so cio logist’s best advice to som eone w anting to get rich is still “fin d yourself som e rich p aren ts” ), but it is nevertheless theoretically independent o f biological reproduction. C la ss is a p u re ly s o c ia l c a te g o ry , w h ere a s th e d iv is io n o f la b o r in b io lo g ic a l re p ro d u c tio n h a s to be th eorized in term s th a t re fle c t th e b io lo g ic a l com ponent o f the process as w ell as its social p lace and interpretation. S o it is n o t c le a r th a t an in te re st in how c a p ita l is t so c ie t ie s rep ro d u ce th e m se lv e s is, a t an y lev e l o th e r th a n th e m o st o b v io u s o n e o f the biological reproduction o f th e population from on e generation to the next, going to tell us m uch about how we should analyze kinship patterns, the econom ic organization o f households or prevailing ideologies o f fam ily and sexual m ores in a given mode o f production . In fact, a th eoretical link b e tw e e n b io lo g ic a l and s o c ia l r e p ro d u c t io n is s im p ly n ot m ad e in A lth u sser’s essay.

L o ok in g back on the essay now, one m ight even ask why it had been th o u g h t th a t the “ so c ia l r e p ro d u c t io n ” th e s is d id or m ig h t im p ly a lo o se n in g up o f an ex c lu s iv e focu s on so c ia l c la ss . P erhaps the m ost dram atic rebuttal o f th is interpretation ca n be found in th e postscript that A lthusser added in 1970, where he excludes from his definition o f what is “social” everything except for class. A lthusser literally wrote, and here I quote: "social (= c la s s ) .” N o th in g could be clearer than this telegraphic form ulation, w hich occurs in a passage where he is trying to dem onstrate that “the point o f view o f reproduction” is an abstract one, and its practical e f fe c ts ( i t s “ r e a l iz a t io n ” ) h a v e to be u n d e rs to o d in the c o n t e x t o f production an d circu lation .5 H is central con cern in th e postscript is to redress th e b a la n c e o f h is a rg u m e n ts, in re sp o n se to th e c r it ic ism s I m entioned earlier, so that they can be construed as having more purchase on struggle and resistance. H e is keen to em phasize this factor o f class stru ggle , as o p p o sed to a m ore m e ch an istic app roach , but in th e very p r o c e s s o f d o in g so h e ru le s o u t a lo o s e r , le s s c la s s - r e d u c t io n is t , in terp re ta tion o f the theses o n reprodu ction . In em ph asizing th at the theses are about class struggle, he at the sam e tim e lim its the reproduction argum ent to class struggle and clarifies once and for all that we are not speaking o f a more general analysis of, say, the social relations o f capitalism . O ne sentence will stand in for the m any in this postscript one could quote to dem on strate A lth u sser’s insistence th at no so cial division other than c la ss is o f any co n seq u en ce to cap ita lism : “ In fact, the S ta te and its A pparatuses only have m eaning from th e poin t o f view o f th e class struggle, as an apparatus o f class struggle ensuring class oppression and guaranteeing the conditions o f exp loitation and its reproduction.”6


I m ake these points n ot fo r general interest (although the misreading o f the reproduction thesis in an earlier period o f interpretation is interesting), but sim ply to show the backdrop against which we are going to have to set the secon d p art o f the essay, which deals with ideology, an d subjectivity. Before m ovin g to part two, we m ight n ote th at the postscript appears in the text n ot as an addendum to part one, but at the end o f the essay— after the discussion o f subjectivity which is cast in terms o f psychoanalysis. It is as if A lth u sse r “fo rg o t” p ar t two as so o n as he had w ritten it. A lth u sse r rem ained locked in a conventionally class-based M arxism , w hich we might i l lu s t r a t e by lo o k in g at h is fo o tn o te on “ th e f a m i ly .” He b e g in s auspiciously: “T h e fam ily obviously has other ‘functions' than that o f an I S A .” C e rta in ly , if on e is ev en vagu ely a ttu n ed to a p sy ch o a n a ly tic p erspective , th e fam ily ’s “fu n ction s” as an arena for p sych ic dram a and conflict, lib id inal cathexes, and processes o f sexed identification , am ong others, leap to m ind rather starkly. But A lthusser is thinking o f som ething else entirely. H e continues: “It intervenes in the reproduction o f labor power. In different m odes o f production it is the unit o f production and/or th e u n it o f c o n s u m p t io n .” 7 S c a rc e ly a m e e tin g o f th e M a r x is t an d psychoanalytic m inds! T h is is simply an illustration o f th e extent to which, a lth ou gh he used some Lacan ian ideas in th inking about ideology and “the sub ject,” A lthusser rem ained com pletely unaffected by them in going about his usual theoretical business as a M arxist.

A lth u sse r ’s on e-sidedn ess is com plem ented by its double: Freud and L acan do n ot write about class, and certainly do n ot organize their theories around class. Th ey have little com m ent to m ake on any class com ponent in subjectivity and even less on class in relation to the unconscious— which is the c e n tra l ca teg o ry o f th e ir th eo rie s . T h is is n ot a “p ro b lem ” for p sychoanalysis; but it certain ly poses a problem for th ose who want to arrive at a theory that uses aspects o f both M arxism and psychoanalysis. M arxism ’s tendency h as been to think o f subjectivity in th e narrow terms o f “c la ss co n sc io u sn ess”— n ot only em phasizing con sciousn ess rath er than attach ing any weight to the unconscious, but also understanding conscious thought and experience principally in term s o f the effects o f social class. Psychoanalysis, on the other han d , emphasizes the unconscious as the key to understan din g su b jectiv ity , and has trad itionally (th ough this is now debated) cast the contents o f the unconscious principally in terms o f sexual difference. T h e “recon ciliation ” o f these two m odels is, obviously, not an easy task.

A lth usser begins the second part o f his essay w ith a p arallel betw een h im self and Freud. H is approach to ideology is not only like F reud’s to the unconscious, it is “not unrelated” to it. T h e obliqueness o f the reference is


sym ptom atic o f both A lthusser's deference to Freud and the tendency he has to proceed by way o f com parison and hom ology rather than in terms o f the c o n te n t o f the argu m en t. In fa c t , for h im to use su ch a p assiv e form ulation as to say that h is argum ent an d Freud’s are “not unrelated” is extrem ely revealing: he can not state the connection but he wants to claim it— using the word “ justified” twice in as m any sentences— and this is an illustration o f the fundam ental problem with the w hole thesis, as we shall see.

A lth usser's first thesis is one that recapitulates a fam iliar argum ent, and therefore we will pass over it rapidly: ideology represents the im aginary relationship o f individuals to their real conditions o f existence. It is worth noting, however, that A lthusser does tie these conditions o f existence— in the proverbial “last instance”— to relations o f production. Significantly, he p re fa c e s th is p o in t w ith a s ta te m e n t o f w h at w ould n o rm ally be th e obvious, reflecting his recogn ition that he is about to stray a little : “T o speak in a M arxist language . . . ” H is form ulation emerges as the conclusion th at “all ideology represents . . . above all the (im aginary) relationship o f individuals to the relations o f production and the relations that derive from them .”8

A lth usser's secon d thesis at this poin t— th at ideology always exists in m a te r ia l a p p a ra tu se s , and th e ir p r a c t ic e s , and th u s its e x is te n c e is m a te r ia l— is a m ore n u an ced p ro p o sit io n th a n th e crude “ ideo logy is m aterial” slogan that em erged from early readings o f the essay. H e suggests th at m ateriality has a variety o f “m odalities,” w hich are left on one side, but th at we sh ou ld a tten d to the p ractice an d rituals o f apparatuses such as schools, churches and so on.

T h e central thesis o f this part o f the essay is as follows: “Ideology Inter- pellates Individuals as Subjects. ” U nder this heading, A lthusser explains how he sees “the sub ject” as the constitutive category o f all ideology: the action o f ideology is to enable/ensure the sub ject’s recognition o f itself as a subject, a process th a t works through securing the obvious. In on e sense, ideology works by m aking the subject recognize itself in a certain specific way, and sim ultaneously to construe that specificity as the obvious or natural one for itself. A function o f ideology is thus recognition, w hich one can think o f as a circuit o f recognitions— by the self and others— that both construct the subject and are predicated upon what A lthusser describes as “always already sub jects.” This is an im portant poin t to untangle, for A lthusser is using a careful counterpoint here, and in some sense it is merely a heuristic device for h im to say that the process o f recogn ition constitutes the subject— since he also wants to say that the process o f recognition is not possible without an already constituted subject. A t the least, we are speaking here o f an


ongoing constitution and reconstitution, with no apparent fin ite point o f origin since, as A lthusser points out, the subject is positioned as such even before birth.

A lth u sser focussed his accoun t o f the ideo logical co n stitu tion o f the su b je c t on the id e a o f “ in te r p e lla t io n ,” w h ic h is in tro d u c e d in the d e ce p tiv e ly sim p le term s o f “h a il in g ” so m eo n e in th e stree t. In th e m om ent o f acknow ledgeing a shout o f “hey, you th ere!,” o f turning around to respond to the call, o f confirm ation that “it really is he” who was hailed, the su b je c t is b o th p o sit io n e d in ideo logy an d confirm ed in his own re c o g n itio n o f h im se lf. It is d ifficu lt to re sist p o in tin g out here the gen d ered a sp ec t o f A lth u sse r ’s exam p le . “ E x p er ie n c e show s th a t the practica l te lecom m un ication s o f hailin gs are such th at they hard ly ever miss their man: verbal call or whistle, the one hailed always recognises that it is really him who is being hailed.”9 M any wom en m ight say that their experience o f being hailed (especially by w h istlin g!) on the street more o ften has the o p p o site effect o f denyin g th e ir in d iv id u a l id en tity and interpellating them in unnervingly generic terms.

A lth u sse r u ses the in te rp e lla tio n th e sis to m ove tow ards a way o f th inking about the construction o f subjects that is indebted to som e key ideas o f the p sych oan aly st Jacq u es Lacan . E ch o in g L a c a n ’s ce lebrated theory o f th e “mirror p h ase” as a crucial m om ent in the construction o f the c h ild ’s su b jectiv ity , A lth u sser argues that the structure o f ideology is a “speculary” one, since there are processes o f mirroring involved. T h e first aspect o f this is the way in which individual subjects are constructed in the image of, or as reflections of, the dom inant ideological Sub ject which, in A lth usser’s exam ple o f C h ristian religious ideology, is G od . Su b jects are form ed, then, in a relationship o f subjection to the O ther, the Subject, and this relation is a speculary (m irroring) one. T h e whole ideological process is doubly sp ecu lar, acc o rd in g to A lth u sse r , sin ce th is m irror im age is necessary for subjects to recognize each other and them selves as subjects. F in a lly , A lt h u s s e r c o n c lu d e s w ith a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c m ix tu r e o f a q u in t e s s e n t i a l ly L a c a n ia n p o in t — th a t id e o lo g y is m isreco gn itio n (m é c o n n a isa n c e ), bu t o n e th a t h e c a s ts in te rm s o f w h at h a s to be misrecognized or ignored “ in the last resort” for the relations o f production to be reproduced. W hether or not it m akes sense to try and com bine the in s ig h ts o f L a c a n ia n ism w ith a fu n c t io n a lis t v e rsio n o f the M a rx is t reproduction thesis is a point I shall return to later.

Before doing so it m ight be useful to discuss briefly som e key points in differentiating Lacan ’s thought from A lth usser’s. I have already suggested that the central A lth usserian concept in this discussion is interpellation, w hich is not a Lacan ian concept. However, A lth u sse r ’s exegesis o f the

A LTH U SSER’S MARX, A LTH U SSER ’S LACAN 175

sp ecu lary n atu re o f the ( id e o lo g ic a l) co n stru c tio n o f the su b je c t , h is deploym en t o f the su b ject/Su b ject or su b ject/O th er d istinction , and his reference to m isrecognition, are all po in ts w h ich render his analysis one that is closely drawn from Lacan. O ne elem entary difficulty, though, is that A lthusser does n ot reproduce L a ca n ’s theories in a precise way, and indeed uses m any o f L acan ’s concepts very differently. A n obvious exam ple is the term “ im aginary,” w hich can (like Laclau and M ouffe’s expression “th e Ja co b in im agin ary ” ) trail L acan ian reson an ces in A lth usser but is fundam entally a different concept.

For L a c a n the im ag in ary is one o f th e th ree o rd ers o f im ag in ary , sym bolic and real. T h e “im aginary order” includes images and fantasies, b o th co n sc iou s and u n co n sc iou s; it is a key register o f the ego and its id en tifica tio n s, ev o lv in g from th e m irror stage but co n tin u in g in adu lt re lation sh ips; it particularly includes m aterial from pre-verbal experience. T h e “sym bolic order,” on the other hand, is the dom ain o f sym bolization and language, and it is through the so c ia l and cultural processes o f this sy m b o lic o r d e r th a t th e s u b je c t c a n re p r e se n t d e s ire and th u s be c o n s t i t u t e d . T h e “ r e a l ” is d e f in e d as th a t w h ic h e x is t s o u ts id e sym bolization , and outside the an aly tic exp erien ce w hich is necessarily contain ed by th e lim its o f speech : it is th a t w hich is form ally outside the subject. These three orders are all in play in Lacan ’s writings, although the defin itions shift constantly .10 A s far as A lthusser is concerned, “im aginary” m ight be reduced to “lived”: it is the dom ain o f em otion, affect, will and experience. H is usage is n ot the everyday m eaning o f a fiction or m ental construct (“not real” ), but neither is it consistent with L acan ’s distinction betw een im aginary, sym bolic and real.

A se co n d m ajo r p o in t o f d iffe re n c e b etw een L a c a n ’s th eo rie s and A lth u sser’s use (or m isuse) o f them concerns the issue o f recognition and m isrecognition. For although A lthusser speaks o f m isrecognition, his entire approach is cast in term s o f the process o f recogn ition as the m eans by w h ich the su b ject is constitu ted to itse lf and to others. H is use o f the v o cab u lary o f sp ecu larity — o f th e p rocess o f m irroring— occurs in this context. Yet L aca n ’s account o f the “m irror p h ase” could not stress more u nequ ivocally that the founding m om en t is one o f m isrecognition— the whole poin t o f his argum ent is to say that the infant falls for its image in the mirror becuse it offers a false representation o f a whole body gestalt and thus transcends the in fan t’s own know ledge o f physical dependence and psychic frustration. T h e pleasures o f the image in the mirror, for the infant, are thus pleasures o f a sense o f se lf th at is founded on a m isrecognition of itself. Lacan describes the “jubilan t assum ption o f his specular image by the ch ild at the infans stage, still sunk in his m otor incapacity and nursling


dependence S o there is an im portant gu lf between the way in which L a c a n d e v e lo p e d the th eory o f the m irror s ta g e — as sp e a k in g to the “alienating destination ” o f the “I” as w ell as its m ental perm anence— and A lth u sser’s use o f these ideas simply as m etaphors in the context o f a theory that em phasizes recognition rather than m isrecognition.

A s A lt h u s s e r m ad e c le a r at th e en d o f “ F re u d a n d L a c a n ,” he appreciated this em phasis in L acan ’s accoun t o f the ego; yet it is a m oot poin t as to how well he translated the essential instability o f the Lacan ian “ I” into his a cco u n t o f the ideo log ica l in te rp e lla tio n o f in d iv id u als as appropriate subjects in regard to systems o f production. T h e issue at stake is n o t w h e th e r A lt h u s s e r p ro p e r ly “ u n d e r s to o d ” L a c a n ’s fo c u s on m isrecognition, but w hether h e (or anyone else, indeed) could integrate such an argum ent into an account whose backdrop was the M arxist theory o f reproduction o f the relations o f production. A t the end o f “Freud and L a ca n ,” A lth u sser ’s summary o f Freud’s discoveries— w hich is in effect a summary o f Freud as read through the eyes o f Lacan — places a significant em phasis on m isrecogn ition in the form ation o f the ego: “ ...F reu d has discovered for us that the real subject, the individual in his unique essence, has not the form o f an ego, centered on the ‘ego ,’ on ‘consciousness’ or on ‘e x is te n c e ’ .. . that the h um an su b ject is de-cen tered , co n stitu ted by a s t r u c tu r e w h ic h h a s no ‘ c e n t e r ’ e i th e r , e x c e p t in th e im a g in a ry m isrecognition o f the ‘ego ,’ i.e., in the ideological form ations in w hich it ‘recognizes’ itself.” 12

T h is passage is qualitatively closer to L acan th an anyth in g A lth usser said in the course o f the ISA s essay. T h e reason for the disparity is that the fra m e w o rk o f a th e o ry o f so c ia l r e p r o d u c t io n (p a r t ic u la r ly in th e fu n c tio n a lis t form in w h ich A lth u sse r had a lread y argued th e th esis) pressures one towards an account o f the psychic construction o f the subject th at fits these “req u irem en ts.” T h u s, fo r exam p le , A lth u sse r spoke o f subjects recognizing them selves in social categories: “It really is me, I am here, a worker, a boss or a so ld ier!” 15 T h ese social categories may fit the M arxist framework in which Althusser was operating in the essay, but they do not correspond at any m eaningfu l level w ith the co n ten t o f L aca n ’s argum ents about the ego and its identifications.

T h ere are a num ber o f further points that one could m ake to suggest that A lth u sser’s borrow ings from L acan are h ighly selective. O ne rather light-hearted ad hominem exam ple would be the issue o f “hum an nature.” L a c a n is in g e n e ra l term s an an ti-h u m an ist , b u t h e su ggests th a t the discovery o f th e m irror-phase in h u m an infants sprang directly from the com parison betw een their behavior and that o f chim panzees who appear not to recognize them selves in a com parable way. Benvenuto and K ennedy

A LTH U SSER’S MARX, A LTH U SSER ’S LACAN 177

draw the obvious conclusion from L acan ’s remarks: “It might be that the chim panzee does not recognize what he sees as his own image, unlike the child, and that this is what distinguishes the hum an as a subject from the anim al who merely rem ains fascinated by reflections.” 14 It is not fiecessary here to go into the details o f L a ca n ’s caveats and qualifications as to what m ight be m eant by “nature” and so on; the irony lies in A lth usser’s m aking use o f a theory whose origins, according to Lacan him self, emerged from positiv ist hum an/prim ate com parative psychology.

M ore seriously, perhaps, we should address the question as to w hether the th eoretica l paradigm w ithin w hich A lth u sser was working is in any se n se c o m p a t ib le w ith the L a c a n ia n m o d e l as a th e o re t ic a l sy stem . A lthusser h im self was aware o f this problem , a t least a t the time o f writing his essay on Freud and Lacan , but m any o f those who felt th at he had su ccessfu lly -b ro u g h t o f f an in tro d u ctio n o f p sy ch o an a ly tic th ou gh t to M arx ism were less deterred by th e d ifficu lty . W ith the ad v an tage o f h indsight, the gu lf betw een A lth usser an d L acan appears now as com pletely unbridgeable. A s an illu stration we could take the com m ent A lth usser m ade in the letter published w ith the En glish translation o f “Freud and L a c a n .” A s is often the case, the inform al, co ntextu alizing style o f the letter is extrem ely clarifying. In particular, it shows that A lth usser’s project is w hat we m ight now regard as an intellectually co lonialist one: he wanted to harness Lacan ian psychoanalysis to the project o f M arxism , even to the point o f renam ing (although he doesn ’t say why) the founding concept o f psychoanalysis. H e writes:

. ..th e suggestions at the end o f the article are correct an d deserve a m uch extended treatm ent, that is, the discussion o f the form s o f familial ideology, and o f the crucial role they play in in itiating the functioning o f the instance that Freud called “the unconscious,” but which should be re-christened as soon as a better term is found.

T h is m ention o f the form s o f fam ilia l ideology (th e ideology o f p ate rn ity -m ate rn ity -co n ju g a lity -in fan cy and th e ir in te ra c tio n s) is crucial, for it implies the follow ing conclusion— that Lacan could not express, g iven his th e o re tica l fo rm atio n — th at is, that no theory of psycho-analysis can be produced without basing it on historical materialism (on which the theory o f the form ations o f fam ilial ideology depends, in the last in stan ce).15

T h e passage is interesting for show ing how A lthusser wanted to make use o f Lacan ian psychoanalysis where possible w ithin the terms o f his own theory, rather than face up to its claim s in their own terms. W e are now, certainly, m ore aware o f the difficulties o f attem pting to do this. A lthusser may have thought that Lacan “could n o t” express the view that the psychic


should be theorized as reducible to the social, because o f his “theoretical form ation”— as if childhood measles had left h im with poor eyesight; the truth o f the m atter is quite otherwise. Lacan h im self had little hesitation in offering psychoanalytic interpretations or explanations o f social behavior, and there can be no doubt th at A lthusser, clu tching his grandiose project o f h isto rica l m aterialism , would fall under L a c a n ’s know ing observation th at “we place no trust in altruistic feeling, we w ho lay bare the aggressivity th a t u n d e r lie s the a c t iv i ty o f the p h ila n th r o p is t , th e id e a l is t , th e pedagogue, and even the reform er.” 16

T h e problem s left in the wake o f the “A lth usserian revolution” in terms o f a M arxist theory o f ideology seem to me to be twofold: one concerns the general way in w hich “the sub ject” is theorized; the other concern s the specific im plications o f working w ithin a psychoanalytic fram ework. A num ber o f com m entators have drawn atten tion to the question o f what general theory o f agency Althusser is using in his thesis on interpellation, and indeed this has been a topic o f considerable dispute. A s I suggested earlier, m any critics have found A lth usser’s accoun t to be one that strips “the subject” o f powers o f agency in its unduly m echanistic approach to the p ro ce ss w h ereby in d iv id u a ls are co n stitu te d as “ su b je c ts ” in a so c ia l form ation.

Paul Hirst, how ever, has argued th at A lth usser was insufficiently critical o f the legacy o f the subject th at he had inherited and suggests th at he m ade too m any p resu p p o sitio n s abou t the cap a c itie s o f the n asce n t su b ject. A lth u sse r ’s theory only works if, accordin g to H irst, we “fill th e ch ild ’s c r a d le w ith a n th r o p o lo g ic a l a s s u m p t io n s .” H ir s t o b se rv e s th a t in A lth u sse r ’s m odel th e sub ject-to-be is, o n an a priori b a sis and w ithout ju s t i f ic a t io n , c re d ite d w ith c e r ta in c o g n it iv e a b il i t ie s , fo r th e se are n e c e ssa ry fo r the p ro ce ss o f re c o g n itio n to o p e ra te in th e sp ecu lary stru ctu re . A t the root o f the p rob lem is A lth u s se r ’s in v o ca tio n o f an “ indiv idual” who is pre-ideological and indeed m ust be pre-ideological if A lth usser’s m ost fundam ental thesis (that ideology is the process by w hich individuals are constituted as sub jects) is correct. A s Hirst writes: “the ‘indiv idual’ who is prior to ideology and whose pre-ideological attributes o f sub jectiv ity are necessary to its becom ing a sub ject, can not be erased in A lth u sser’s text . . . ” 17 H irst’s critique draws atten tion to w hat A lth usser i lle g it im a te ly p resu m es about th e “ in d iv id u a l ,” ju st as so c io lo g y , fo r in stan ce , has o ften w rongly presum ed the ex isten ce o f individuals with certain attributes who are then socialized into social “roles.”

It is tem pting to add at th is p o in t that A lthusser h as given us th e worst o f all possible worlds in presenting a m odel o f the subject that m anages to strip away or weaken adult powers o f political agency at the same time that


it retains m etaphysical and essen tialist assum ptions about the pre-social c a p a c itie s o f th e in d iv id u a l ch ild . A lth o u g h A lth u sser h ad correctly identified a major lacuna in M arxist thinking about ideology, namely, the u n sa tifa c to ry th e o riz atio n o f the su b je c t , it is hard to argue th a t the form ulation he offered can take it significantly forward.

In rounding off this discussion o f A lth usser’s use o f Lacan , I want to take up some issues re latin g sp ec ifica lly to the im plication s o f the fact that L acan was a psychoanalyst rather th an a so c ia l theorist. T h e nam e o f L acan is frequently cited, along with those o f Derrida, Lyotard or Foucault, as an intellectual pillar o f “post-structuralist” thought, and indeed his work shares some basic themes o f post-structuralism . Yet there are dangers in assim ilating his writings to this definition, and forgetting that Lacan was also a clin ician and teacher whose project was to “return to Freud.” T o o heavy a post^structuralist reading o f Lacan can have the effect of detaching h im from the psychoanalytic tradition so dram atically as to render his work a kind o f “post-psychoanalysis,” in the sense o f being both a continuation and a transcendence o f psychoanalysis. In terms o f psychoanalytic theory L acan is obviously most d istant from those who operate with essentialist c a t e g o r ie s or s im p l is t ic n o t io n s o f p sy c h ic c a u se or o r ig in . T h e characteristic em phasis o n m ental representation in Lacan ian thought has m ade Lacan ian ism the bran ch o f psychoanalysis that is nearest to a project o f cultural enquiry, and least willing or able to defend intellectually a clear b o u n d a r y b e tw e e n c l i n i c a l · a n d n o n - c l in ic a l u se s o f i t s th e o ry . N evertheless, it would be a big mistake to detach Lacan too sharply from the h isto r ica l in stitu tion o f p sych oan aly sis— over w hich he had a very considerable influence1”— and flo at h im off as a theorist o f culture an d the psyche.

O n e aspect o f this has a direct bearing on A lthusser. A s I have suggested elsewhere, there has recently been a significant change in interpretations o f Lacan , as well as a sign ificant change in the perception o f whether some kind o f com patability exists betw een psychoanalysis and a (M arxist) theory o f ideology.1’ Jacqueline Rose has argued that a concern with issues such as sexuality, and a tendency to locate (as A lthusser had) psychoanalytic theory within a theory o f ideology, had the effect o f “displacing” the concept o f the unconscious from its rightful place at the center o f the debate.20 C ertainly one can say that there has been an increasing tendency in recent debates to o ffe r a p s y c h o a n a ly t ic a p p r o a c h as an a l t e r n a t iv e , r a th e r th a n a c o m p le m e n t, to so c ia l a rgu m e n t an d e x p la n a t io n . T h is is p erh ap s p ar ticu la rly true in B r ita in , w here th e fear o f “ so c io lo g ism ” in fec tin g psychoanalysis is great, less so in th e U n ited S ta te s, where a more pluralist and eclectic approach has tended to prevail in these m atters.


A risin g from the qu estion o f w hether a focu s on the u n co n sciou s is c o m p a t ib le w ith a m ore so c io lo g ic a l a p p ro a c h — su ch as a th eo ry o f ideology— is the issue o f how the contents o f the u nconscious are to be theorized. O f particular interest is the question o f whether psychoanalytic m eth od can be used to co n sid e r q u estio n s that h av e a new p o lit ic a l re so n a n c e in so c ia l an d p o lit ic a l th e o ry (rac ism , or h e te ro se x ism , or ch an g in g cu ltu ra l de fin ition s o f m ascu lin ity w ould be good exam p les). O ften this will involve regarding psychoanalysis as a m ethod, rather than an accurate account o f the contents o f the unconscious predicated upon certain known principles; opinion varies widely on how flexibly the system should be treated. W hile there are obviously m ajor differences am on g the various schools o f psychoanalytic thought as to what these principles are (Freud and the psychic consequences o f an atom ical difference, K lein and th e m o v e fro m p a r a n o id - s c h iz o id to d e p r e s s iv e p o s i t io n s , e t c . ) , nevertheless, none o f the classic founding thinkers o f psychoanalysis focus on these newer them es I have m entioned. H ow m uch license can be taken with their ideas, and at w hat point are substantive argum ents about the co n ten ts o f the u n con scious bein g reduced to m etaphors allow ing us to consider quite other m aterial?

In this co n text there is a furth er debate around the issue o f sexu a l d if fe re n c e . C o n te m p o r a r y re a d e rs o f A lt h u s s e r ’s w r it in g s w ill see im m ediately a degree o f sim ple sexism in the way h e writes, n ot to m ention a surprisingly co n v e n tio n a l gendered and fam ilia list v o cab u lary of, for exam ple, theory as m ale. In L acan ’s case, the issue o f phallocentrism is a m uch d eb ated on e. F em in ists in B rita in , n o tab ly Ju lie t M itch e ll and Ja c q u e lin e R o se , h ave argued stron gly for a fem in ist in terp re ta tio n o f L a c a n , a lth o u gh th ey have yet to respond to D av id M acey ’s e loq uen t c r it ic ism o f L a c a n ’s p h a llo c e n tr ism .21 In th e U n ite d S ta te s , fem in ist appropriations o f psychoanalysis are m uch less seduced by the charm s o f the so -c a lle d “p a t r ia r c h a l” t r a d it io n o f F reu d an d L a c a n , w h ere se x u a l difference figures as an organizing principle. H ere, m uch greater attention has been paid to variants o f psychoanalytic thought where m othering, as opposed to the oedipal role o f the father, or where the psychic form ation o f daughters rather than sons, are m ajor concerns.22

It is useful to consider th e historical sign ificance o f w hat I h ave called “A lth usser’s L acan .” T h ere is, initially, the question o f w hether A lthusser m anaged to deliver a plausible accoun t o f the constitution o f subjectivity, com bin ing a M arxist with a Lacan ian perspective. In my view, he did not: the ISA s essay is hopelessly contradictory as betw een its two halves, and no serious resolution o f the problem o f how to square the “reproduction thesis” with a Lacan ian analysis is offered. In the essay itself, one m ight suggest


that A lth usser’s use o f Lacan was a very diluted one, principally because he u sed c e r ta in id e a s m e ta p h o r ic a lly — as in h is very lo o se u se o f the vocabulary o f specularity— rather th a n ta k in g on board th e substan tive conten t o f L acan ’s argum ents.

N evertheless, A lthusser’s attempt to juxtapose these two bodies o f theory w as, I th in k , en orm ou sly s ig n ific a n t and co n tr ib u te d to som e h igh ly influential trends in areas such as film and cultural studies, literary theory and criticism , as well as in M arxisant branches o f social science. Yet it is easy to see th at there was a b ifu rcation in those areas o f research that reflected the very split separating the two halves o f A lth usser’s essay. O n the one h an d , there are th ose who saw the theory o f ideo log ica l state app aratu ses as a m eans to bring back into th e m aterialist fold awkward areas, such as “cultural” or “fam ily” for exam ple, that threatened to subvert M a r x is t c e r ta in t ie s . For th e m , the IS A s e ssa y p ro v id e d a w elcom e ju s t if ic a t io n for ex te n d in g th e sc o p e o f an ec o n o m ica lly red u ctio n ist analysis into hitherto unreachable areas o f social life. For others, on the contrary, the second part o f the ISA s essay seemed to be encouraging them to ta k e up issu e s o f su b je c t iv ity an d id e n t ity — o f th e stru c tu re s o f in terpellation o f individuals as subjects— as im portant in their own right. For this category o f interpretation o f the essay, it was precisely A lth usser’s invitation to m ove away from a reductionist position that was attractive. A lth u sser’s “rise an d fall” is an interesting an d salutary on e to study, partly, n o do u bt, b ecau se the c ircu m stan ce s o f his “d isap p e ara n c e ” from the in tellectual scene h ave contributed to the sense one has th at the “legacy” o f A lth usser has not in the past been rationally assessed in depth.

Notes

1. First published in France in 1970, the English translation (by Ben Brewster) appears in Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971).

2. Richard Johnson, “Histories o f Culture/Theories o f Ideology,” in Ideology and Cultural Production, ed. Michèle Barrett et al. (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 74.

3. See particularly the essays in A n n ette Kuhn an d A nnM arie W olpe, eds. Feminism and Materialism (London: Routledge, 1978); Maxine Molyneux, “Beyond the D om estic Labour Debate,” New Left Review 116 (July-August 1979); Veronica Beechey, “O n Patriarchy,” Feminist Review No. 3 (1979); and also the discussion of these issues in Ted Benton, The Rise and Fall of Structural Marxism (M anchester: M anchester UP, 1984), chapter 6.

4. See my Women’s Oppression Today, rev. edn., (London: Verso, 1988) pp. 19- 29, and pp. xvi-xviii.

5. Althusser, p. 171.6. Ibid.


7. Ibid, p. 137, n. 8.8. Ibid., p. 155.9. Ibid., p. 163.10. These definitions are based on the translator’s note (A lan Sheridan) in

Jacques Lacan, Ecrits (London: Tavistock, 1977), pp. ix-x, and.on Bice Benvenuto and Roger Kennedy, The Works o f J acques Lacan (London: Free Association Books, 1986), pp. 80-82.

11. “T h e mirror stage as form ative o f the function o f the ‘I ’ as revealed in psychoanalytic experience,” in Ecrits, p. 2.

12. Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p. 201.13. Ibid., ISA s, p. 166.14. The Works of Jacques Lacan, p. 53.15. “Publisher’s note” to “Freud and Lacan,’ ’ pp. 177-8.16. Ecrits, p. 7.17. Paul' Hirst, “Althusser: The Theory of Ideology,” Economy and Society, 5:4,

p. 406.18. For an in fo rm a t iv e a c c o u n t o f L a c a n ’s role in .the in s t itu t io n s o f

psychoanalysis, see Chapter 11 in Benvenuto and Kennedy.19. See “The C oncept of Difference,” Feminist Review 26 (1987), pp. 36-39; and

Women’s Oppression Today, pp. xxix ff.20. Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso, 1986), p. 89.21. See particularly Ju liet M itchell and Jacqueline Rose, Feminine Sexuality:

Jacques Lacan and the Ecole Freudienne (London, 1982); David M acey, Lacan in Contexts (London: Verso, 1988), presents a detailed case for regarding Lacan as a writer who “reproduces a basic heterosexism and a trivialization of feminism” (207).

22. S e e N an c y J. C h o d o ro w ’s e ssay , “ P sy ch o an aly tic Fem in ism an d the Psychoanalytic Psychology of W om en,” for a useful review of the different schools of thought in this area, in Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory (Oxford: Polity, 1989).

Politics and Friendship: An Interview with Jacques Derrida

[Editorial N ote : T h e follow ing is the text o f an interview conducted by M ich ael Sprin k er with Jacques D errida in A pril 1989, at the U niversity o f C aliforn ia at Irvine. Som e written questions were subm itted to Professor D errida beforehand, and these provided a rough guide for the discussion. But, as is custom ary on such occasions, the conversation went off in several directions n ot dictated by the written questions. T h e text o f the interview has been left largely as it was spoken (D errida m ostly in French, Sprinker alm ost exclusively in English) and then transcribed by C écile R ivoallan . T h e general top ic m otivating the entire d iscussion was the relationship b e tw e e n so m e th in g c a lle d “ A lth u s se r ia n is m ” an d so m e th in g c a lle d “deconstruction .”]

M S : Y ou cam e to the E c o le N o r m a le to te a c h at the in v ita t io n o f H yppolite an d A lthusser in th e early 1960s. I’m sure you knew A lthusser or about him and perhaps knew som e o f his early work in the fifties. But the first form al engagem ent w hen there would have been an opportunity to see h im on a regular basis and perhaps be close to his projects and so on, would have been when you cam e back to teach. Perhaps, then, you could talk about that period and your relationship to A lthusser, to his students, and the relationship o f your own work to A lth usser’s project.

JD : In fa c t th in gs b egan m u ch earlie r th an th a t— even p h ilo so p h ica l m atters. I w as a student at th e Ecole N orm ale Supérieure from 1952 until 1956. I m et A lth usser as soon as I got there in fall 1952. Before that I h ad n ’t even heard his nam e. O ur first encounter was in his office. He had already been teaching for several years a t the Ecole. In normalien slang, he was a caïman, that is, a director o f study in philosophy. During this first encounter we discovered that we were both born in A lgiers, twelve years apart: he in 1918, I in 1930. I remember that we thus began exchanging recollection s— trivial m atters. It’s paradoxical that I never took a single course with A lthusser. O n the one hand, he devoted w hat little tim e he set a sid e fo r te a ch in g to th ird-year stu d en ts (th a t is, th ose p rep arin g the agrégation); on th e other, he was often ill, already (I d idn ’t know w hat his illness was— some spoke o f kidney disorder follow ing his tim e in captivity). H e d idn ’t teach much. Thus, during the tim e I was a t the Ecole, we had a


very friendly relation, but on e w hich had nothing to do with work. Except this (I am trying to pick out som e philosophical signs): when I wrote my first agrégation paper fo r him, I had already, the previous year ...

M S : W hat was th at on? D o you remem ber?

JD: Yes, it was in 1955.

M S : N o , I m eant what topic? It doesn ’t m atter i f you d o n ’t recall. I was just curious.

JD: I had already w orked for a year on the problem o f genesis in Husserl. T h is was fo r my Diplome d’études supérieures. M y paper on tim e was, I b e lie v e , a lread y q u ite c o m p lic a te d and m ark ed by th is p ro b le m a tic . A lthusser said to me: “ I ca n ’t grade this. I t ’s too difficult, too obscure for the agrégation. It m ight be very dangerous. But since I d o n ’t feel I can ev a lu ate it, I ’ll ask F o u cau lt ’s o p in io n .” M ich e l Foucau lt was then an assistan t professor at L ille . H e cam e to the E cole to give courses and I attended some o f them . I had a very good rapport with Foucault also. He had read and liked my work on Husserl. S o he read this paper and told me: “W ell, its either an F or an A + .” I bring up this episode because it gives a fair idea o f my re lation sh ip to academ ic auth ority— th at represented by agrégation exam in ation com m ittees in particu lar (I failed the exam that sam e year)— and because in the m idst o f this I wrote that 400-page study on Husserl. It was a period when, in certain circles (even M arxist ones), people began taking a keen interest in Husserl— I m ean a different type o f interest, d ifferent from Sartre and M erleau-P on ty ’s ways o f approach ing Husserl. A s for the university and the agrégation com m ittee, H usserl was still poorly know n and poorly received.

M S: Yes. In the fifties?

JD : I rem em ber T ran -D u e T h a o ’s book , Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism. T h is form er normalien who, after h av in g graduated th e sam e year as A lthusser, returned to V ietnam , had attem pted a critical M arxist a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n o lo g y a n d , fo llo w in g a p e r fe c t ly a c c e p ta b le com m entary (w hich Foucault, I believe, had praised in a class o r in private co n v ersa tio n ), proposed a d ia lec tica l m ateria list re in terp re tation o f the problem s o f gen etic phen om enology (passive genesis, tem porality, e tc .). T h is book probably h ad a great influence upon m e: traces o f it m ay be found in my thesis on Husserl.

POLITICS AND FRIENDSHIP 185

T ra n -D u e T h a o w as c r it ic a l o f H u sserl. B u t, arou nd th e th em e o f p h en om en o logica l genesis, he tried to translate, to transcode, one m ight say, the M arxist problem atic by hav in g recourse to genetic psychology, to P iag e t, to a sc ie n c e o f p sy ch o g e n e tic , o n to g e n e tic , and p h y lo g en etic developm ent. I n o longer rem em ber the book precisely, b u t at that tim e it pointed to th e interest that could arise in certain philosophical m ilieux for using H usserl’s transcenden tal p roblem atic in order to pose questions on scientificity, on the em ergence o f theoretical practice, that o f the cognitive attitude, questions on the possibility o f scientific objectivity, all in a non- form al, non-idealist m anner (in the m anner o f K an t), while at the sam e tim e m oving beyond em piricism , or at least a certain M arxist em piricism or positiv ism , and m oving beyond phenom enology as sim ply “phenom enology o f perception .” T h e p h ilo soph ical and po litica l enem y o f M arxists (and first o f all A lth u sser— and th is u ntil the en d), the obsessive enem y was M erleau-Ponty, the author o f a Phenomenology o f Perception. M oreover, he had been a caïman at the Ecole before the W ar and all o f this should be resituated in the strange history o f this strange institution and the no less stran ge “ co m m u n ity ” th at it h o u sed — or, ev en m ore p rec isely , in the genealogy o f the Rue d ’U lm philosophers. A work yet to be undertaken: it would clarify a certain num ber o f th ings about life an d about intellectual fashions in this country over several decades.

M y personal relationship with A lth usser was, at th at time, very good, a ffec tio n ate even (it h as alw ays rem ain ed so, even th rough som e later shockw aves). But philosophical exchanges betw een us were rare, n ot to say non-existent. In any case they were purely im plicit (as they undoubtedly alw ays re m ain ed ). T h e n (to lin k up w ith the startin g p o in t th at you suggested), I left th e Ecole. A fter th e agrégation, I spent a year in th e U .S ., a t H arvard (1956-1957). T h en I d id m y m ilitary service (as a teacher and in civ ilian cloth es). T h en I cam e back to Paris in 1960. A s an assistant for four years at the Sorbonne, I saw A lthusser a few tim es. I rem em ber having given him the m anuscript o f my “Introduction to the O rigin o f G eom etry by H u sserl” in 1961. Th e book appeared in 1962. A lth usser wrote me som e very generous and encouraging things on th at subject. O ne or two years before that, he had published his first book on M ontesquieu. W e had corresponded abou t it. H e was ill qu ite often and often away from the Ecole. I still knew nothing o f w hat was afflicting him. In 1963-1964 he invited m e to give courses at the Ecole.

I su b stitu ted fo r him o c c a s io n a lly before m o v in g in to the E cole as caiman in my turn (upon his invitation , seconded by H yppolite w ho had le ft the Ecole for the C ollège de France, but who had recom m ended me to his successor). I had an office there and took care o f agrégatifs. I had been


accepted to the C N R S , but I declined in order to be nam ed to the Ecole N orm ale. So , I m oved in O ctober 1964 and stayed fo r twenty years. Thus^ for tw enty years I was lucky enough to be A lth u sser ’s co lleague. I now know that I have never had and never will have colleagues on a perm anent basis fo r as long a tim e (or at least n ot in the sam e French institution— H illis M iller has been m y co lleague for tw enty-tw o years, bu t in three different universities: Joh n s H opkins, Yale, U .C . Irvine). Before that, in 1963, I had given courses at the Ecole on Husserl.

M S: T h ese would be to som e o f the sam e students w ho collaborated on Lire ‘le C apital’— Establet, R ancière, Balibar . . .

JD : N o , no. N o t Establet. But Balibar, yes. M acherey had already left the Ecole. Badiou also. T h ey ’re a bit older than Balibar. But I met Balibar and Rancière when they were agrégatifs, as well as som e people I would guess you don ’t know: Jacqu es-A lain Miller, who is a bit younger, M ichel Tort, Patrick G u yom ard , C laude R abant, and Bernard P au trat— m any, m any o th ers. But th en , very q u ick ly — I’m try in g to se le c t th in gs from the p e r sp e c tiv e y o u ’re in te re s te d in — very q u ick ly in 1 9 6 4 -1 9 6 5 , a t the m om en t I began teach in g , there cam e th at juncture: L acan started teaching at the E co le N o rm ale upon A lth u sse r ’s in v ita tio n (th is in v ita tio n was in it ia te d by A lth u sse r as w ell as ce rta in stu d en ts w ho were fo llow in g L a ca n ’s sem inar), and A lthusser began th e sem inars w hich gave rise to For M arx and Reading Capital. T h is coincided with a period when he was in rather good form, very active, etc.

M S: C an I stop you for a second? W ere you already in the fifties interested in psychoanalysis and Freudianism ? You were naturally receptive to this co n ju n c tio n or did your en gagem en t w ith p sy ch oan aly sis b eg in at this m om ent?

JD : I had h ard ly read an y th in g by L a ca n at th a t tim e. P erh ap s “T h e Insistence o f the Letter,” but I d o n ’t rem em ber when.

M S: T h ere was noth ing to read then! O r only a very little. T h e Ecrits were published in 1966.

JD : Yes, bu t there w ere som e fam ous te x ts th a t w ere already published: “T h e R o m e D iscourse” an d “T h e Insistence o f the Letter.”

M S: W ere these fam ous an d celebrated at the tim e?


JD : C elebrated? ... W ell-know n at least in these m ilieux. I had read only “T h e Insistence o f the Letter,” perh aps also “T h e R om e D iscourse,” and more or less superficially. But the space, if you will, in w hich I was situated w as a b it stra n g e . I was p u rsu in g m y w ork on H u sse rl m ore or less continuously. I was teach ing a course on H istory in H eidegger during that year— a course that som e o f those sam e students took. M y relations were e x c e l le n t w ith B a lib a r , R a n c iè r e , an d o th e rs I had p rep ared fo r the agrégation th e year before. But paradoxically in th a t year, just as I b egan to teach as caiman, th a t sem inar by A lthusser started an d captivated all the a tte n tio n o f those students. I felt qu ite ill-at-ease, you know, suddenly quite m arginalized. I attended one or two sessions o f A lth u sser’s seminar: R an cière ’s exposition, for exam ple. Som e o f them were later published.

H ow ever, from the p h ilosoph ical poin t o f view, I felt as if I were in an embarrassing" situation. T h a t whole problem atic seem ed to me necessary, no doubt, within the M arxist field, w hich was also a political field, marked in particular by the relation with the Party o f w hich I was not a member and w hich was slowly m oving away from Stalin ism (and which, while I was a student there, moreover, dom inated in a very tyrannical m anner). Yet, at the same tim e, I found that problem atic— I w ouldn’t say naive or lacking culture, far from that— but too insensitive to critical, transcendental, and o n to lo g ica l qu estio n s w hich th en seem ed to me to be n ecessary— even necessary against H usserl and Heidegger, but in any case through them.

M S : W e ’ll talk ab ou t this aga in and again , but p erh ap s we can begin t a lk in g a b o u t it now . W h a t w ere th e th in g s th a t you fo u n d m o st problem atic in the theoretical field— shall we call it— in which A lthusser and his students were working?

JD : T o review it very quickly, m any questions seem ed to me to have been passed over, notably those about the historicity o f history or the concept o f h istory . I was right in the m idst o f d eb atin g over these questions (the c o n d it io n s o f p o ss ib i l ity fo r a h isto ry o f id e a l o b je c t iv ity , th u s o f a h istoricity o f language and science, the necessity— but also the lim its— of id e a lism an d o f t r a n s c e n d e n ta l te le o lo g y o f a H u sse r l ia n ty p e , th e relationship betw een historicity and objectivity, e tc .). N o t from, let us say, an a-h istorical poin t o f view, but by setting into m otion, on the subject o f h is to r y ’ s h is to r ic ity an d o f the o b je c t ’s o b je c t iv ity , a n o th e r type o f questioning (w hich I believed to be prelim inary, thus more radical, more c r itica l, more “d e co n stru c tiv e ,” th a t is, “ c r it ic a l” even w ith resp ect to criticism and M arxist critique). I had the im pression that their concept o f h istory should have passed through the test o f this questioning. A n d I


constantly felt, not like raising ob jections, but like saying: “You h ave to slow down. W hat is an ob ject? W hat is a scientific ob ject?” Their discourse seem ed to me to give way to a th eoretic ism or a new fangled sc ientism w h ich I co u ld h ave ch a lle n ge d . But, qu ite n atu ra lly , I was paralyzed because at the sam e tim e I d id n ’t want m y questions to be taken for crude an d se lf-se rv in g cr it ic ism s co n n ec te d w ith the R ig h t or the L e ft— in p articu lar w ith the C o m m u n ist Party. Even th ou gh I was n ot a Party m em b er, I u n d e rs to o d th e s itu a t io n . I knew th at the a c c u sa t io n o f theoreticism or o f scientism could be form ulated from th e Party’s point o f view , for exam p le , and , m oreover, it was fo rm u lated by them in quite summ ary fashion— or in terms, at least, to w hich I would have b een th e last to subscribe.

I was thus paralyzed, silent, before som ething that resem bled a sort o f theoreticism , a hypostasis o f T h eo ry with a cap ital “T ,” before a bit too em phatic or grandiloquent use o f cap ital letters with regard to the theory, w ith regard to the sc ien ce. A ll o f th at seem ed to m e quite w orrisom e, problem atic, precritical, but from a perspective th a t was n o t that o f some hum anism or em piricism . A lthusser was conducting a struggle against a certain hegem ony w hich was at the sam e tim e a terrifying dogm atism or philosophical stereotypism within the Party— a struggle that seem ed to me (w ithin the limits o f that context) quite necessary. Yet, at the sam e time, I did not wish to nor could I form ulate questions that would have resembled, from afar, those from the M arxism against w hich A lth usser was fighting. E v en th o u g h I th o u g h t it in an o th er way, I co u ld not say : “ Y es, i t ’s th eoreticism and therefore leads to a certain p o litica l paralysis.” I thus found m yself w alled in by a sort o f torm ented silence. Furtherm ore, all that I am describing was coupled, naturally, w ith w hat others have called an in tellectual, if n ot personal, terrorism . I always had very good personal relations with A lthusser, Balibar, and others. But there was, le t ’s say, a sort o f theoretical intim idation: to form ulate questions in a style that appeared, sh a ll we say , p h e n o m e n o lo g ic a l, t r a n s c e n d e n ta l or o n to lo g ic a l w as im m ediately considered suspicious, backward, idealistic, even reactionary. A n d s in c e I w as a lre a d y fo rm u la t in g th in g s in th e se m a n n e rs , th is appearance w as rendered com plicated to the extrem e, th at is, to the point o f m a k in g th e m u n re a d a b le fo r th o se a t w h om th ey w ere d ire c te d . N atu ra lly , I d id n ’t th in k those form ulation s were reaction ary , bu t th at intim idation was there. I h ad at least as m any virtual questions about what I was beginning to perceive in Lacanianism .

M S: You felt in tim idated by their m anner o f han dling th ings you were interested in— Husserl, Heidegger, and so on.

POLITICS A N D FRIENDSHIP 189

JD : Intim idated, but protesting inside!

M S: Exactly, but, at the sam e tim e, you thought it was im portant that the way in w hich A lthusser and his students would talk about history, science, objectivity , and so on needed to en gage with this problem atic. B ut at this poin t you d id n ’t debate these issues with them directly.

JD: T h e social space didn ’t allow me to.

M S: Because you also felt that from inside the Party, what they were doing was very hopefu l and so you observed a certain reticence then.

JD : Yes, th a t’s right! I thus felt a bit isolated and had the feeling that the p ro b lem atic in w h ich I was en gaged w ould be, in the long run, m ore necessary , m ore in ev itab le . N o n eth eless, at the sam e tim e, I th o u gh t I noticed som ething th a t’s more difficult to form ulate: a more or less avowed, more or less surreptitious borrow ing— not from m e, o f course— but from w hat m atte red to me m o st: H u sse rl and H eid egger. It was a p lace d , d isp la ced , re p la c e d b o rro w in g , a c o n tra b a n d borrow in g . In sp ite o f everyth ing, in sp ite o f th e den ials, in sp ite o f the declared re jection o f H usserl an d Heidegger, there was an incorporation (w hich I judged to be too h asty an d in su fficien tly re fin ed ) o f m odels o f read in g an d types o f questions com in g from them . Q uestions like: U nder w hat conditions is the o b je c tiv ity o f the o b je c t p o ssib le? H ow can regions o f o b je c tiv ity (o f kn o w led ge or o f th eory ) by h ierarch ized in order to su b je c t th em to G e n e ra l T h eo ry , e ith er th ro u gh a Form al or T ra n sc e n d e n ta l L o g ic or through a Fundam ental O ntology? In that theoreticism that was also an epistem ologism (the price, alas, to be paid for breaking with the dogm atic em piricism reigning in M arxist discourse), it was indeed a m atter o f regions o f objectivity , o f regional ontologies as theories o f objectivity w ithout any question (o f H eideggerian type, fo r exam ple) about the determ ination o f th e e n t ity as o b je c t , a b o u t h is to r y , a n d th e im p l ic a t io n s o f th is determ ination . T h e avoidance o f m aking any o f this exp licit annoyed me in a way, especially since A lth usser was always fascinated with Husserl and H e id e g g e r w ith o u t h is h a v in g e v e r g iv e n an y p u b lic s ig n for th is fascination .

M S: I d o n ’t recall these nam es ever occurring in any o f his published texts.

JD : For A lth u sse r , if I m ay be allow ed to say it in such a brutal way, H eidegger is the great unavoidable thinker of this century. B o th th e great adversary and also a sort o f essential ally or virtual recourse (A lth usser’s


entire work should be read follow ing this in d ication ). A s I said to you b efo re , we spoke very .litt le abou t p h ilo so p h y toge th er : on ly in brief, e llip tic , iron ic , so m etim es friendly , som etim es less frien dly exch an ges. A lw ays against a background o f allusions and probably also o f enorm ous m isunderstandings. A n d yet, how m any tim es did he say to me during the last years in the hospital: “Listen, you’ve got to talk to me about Heidegger. Y ou’ve got to teach me Heidegger.” H e was reading him a bit. H e picked th ings up and then dropped them.

M S: W hy do you th ink A lthusser thought th at H eidegger was the m ost im portant thinker o f this era. S in ce he didn’t read h im very m uch, what force could he have exerted on A lth usser’s thinking?

JD : W e all have an idiosyncratic or idiom atic way o f working, reading, not reading, o f reading w ithout reading, not reading w hile reading, to avoid w ithout avoiding, to deny. A lth usser had his. A n d to read and interpret him requires, in turn, that one bear in mind, as in all cases, this singular “econom y.” But I could certainly confirm that H eidegger was a great (oral) reference for him and th at he was never one o f those who tried to denigrate or disqualify H eidegger’s thought, even for the political reasons o f which you are aware. But you are very well aware that a certain configuration, e v e n a r e c ip r o c a l f a s c in a t io n - r é p u l s io n b e tw e e n M a r x is m an d H eideggerianism is o n e o f the most significant phenom ena o f this century. A n d we h a v e n ot fin ish e d m e d ita tin g on it, a ssu m in g that we h av e seriously begun to do so.

M S: T h is is due to the influence o f Sartre? O fH y p p o lite ?

JD : T h e trajectories are no doubt more com plicated, more overdeterm ined, as he would have said. But the shadow o f H eidegger is present not only in A lth usser’s work, but in all o f the works published at that tim e, that is, For M arx and Reading Capital. I suggested in a note somewhere in Psyché (in Désistance) that for a quarter century, H eidegger was never nam ed in any book by those who, in France, were forced to recognize in private or in p u b lic m u ch la te r th a t he had p lay ed a m a jo r ro le in th e ir th o u g h t (A lthusser, Foucault, Deleuze, for exam ple). A n oth er program for another history o f intellectual France.

MS: I know without having the texts in front o f you and not having read them recently this will be difficult, but can you think o f where these traces are visible? W here would you point to in A lth usser’s texts?


JD : L e t ’s take, for exam ple, a big chunk like the critique o f hum anism . Just a fter th e war, the Letter on H um anism d e n o u n ce s or “ d e c o n stru c ts” a particular hum anism as m etaphysical. In all his anti-hum anist discourse, A lth usser never cites H eidegger. Yet to state, as he does, th at hum anism is m etaph ysical or that m etaphysics is hum anistic can n o t but conserve an echo o f the H eideggerian m om en t (I tried to formalize som e o f w hat was h appen in g at th at tim e with “m an ” in France in “T h e Ends o f M an ” ). T h e text in w hich H eidegger states th at M arx is a great philosopher, a great m etaphysician , an d th at the M arxist con cept o f w ork is one o f the great interpretations o f being is indeed in the Letter on Humanism. In paying h im som e hom age, H eidegger in a way declares th at M arx is not essentially a m aterialist— or th at his m aterialism is not a philosophy of m atter, but rather o f work. He is not essentially a thinker o f being as m atter. H e is a th inker o f b e in g as work. O ne must begin to in terpret M arx from the p e r sp e c t iv e o f work and p ro d u c t io n an d n ot fro m th at o f m a te r ia l substance. Tw enty years later, it ’s difficult to im agine that all A lthusserian (but also Foucaldian ) discourse against hum anism at the tim e was without relationship with this text. A ll the more so for the fact that the Letter on Humanism was probably the m ost read text in France at the tim e ( it ’s a text m eant for France, for the French context, one m ight say, as that context was re p re se n te d or d e sc r ib e d to H e id e g g e r by B e a u fre t , the le t t e r ’s addressee) and the allusions to M arx have always been noticed.

H eid e gge r was very p resen t ev en at th e Ecole N o rm ale , th an k s in particu lar to H yppolite, who alw ays spoke a lot about him , and to Beaufret who taught courses there. T h us there was at least an im pregnation. I d o n ’t know if th a t’s a good word or what category to use here. I don ’t believe A lth u sser ever read H eidegger well. But there was th at im pregnation, that is, a c e r ta in p resen ce , an au th ority , a leg itim acy o f the H eid eggerian discourse that was in the air, in references: im pregnation and avoidance. You know th at these m otifs weigh upon a ph ilosoph ical discourse even if one doesn ’t read the author, even if one doesn ’t com e to terms with the letter o f the text as A lthusser did with the letter o f M arx ’s text and that o f a few others.

A t the time, I was sensitive to all this: the traffic o f that surreptitious circulation without rigorous reading. W hence a sort o f uneasiness. I’ll now try to pursue this little narrative. D uring the n ext year (1965), I gave a sem inar on R ousseau ’s Essay on the Origins o f Languages. “Les C ah iers pour l ’A n a ly s e ” h a d ju s t b e e n in a u g u r a te d . T h e c o n ju n c t io n b e tw e e n A lth u sse r ian d iscou rse and a certa in L acan ian ism was dom in an t in its pages. Epistem ology was the big word: th e th in g perhaps fetishized more than practiced. In “Les C ah iers pour l’A n aly se” I published my first text on


L év i-S trau ss. S im u ltan eou sly , the Essay on the Origin o f Languages was published there. T h ere were some curious crossings around the m otifs o f “t e x t ” and “d e c ip h erin g ” at that m om en t w hich was a lso , for m e, the m om en t o f the two “O f G ram m atology” articles w here I began to elaborate a certain thinking on writing and reading. M y first year as caiman at the Ecole N orm ale was a bit unhappy. I felt a little isolated. T h in gs were not m uch better the follow ing year. W hat was called my paralysis a while ago was also a p o litica l gesture: I d id n ’t want to raise ob jection s that would have appeared anti-M arxist. O n e must reflect on that m om ent in French p o litica l h istory in which an ob jection taken as a p o litica l sign o f an ticom m unism was, in the m ilieu th at I lived in, very serious. A nd , right or w ron g , g iv in g in to b o th p o l it ic a l c o n v ic t io n an d p ro b a b ly a lso to intim idation , I always abstained from criticizing M arxism head-on. A n d I stress “head-on .” W here I explain m yself the best on that subject is in “Les fin s de l’hom m e” (Paris: G alilée , 1981; A cte d’un C olloque de Cerisy-la- Sa lle ). In a sem inar there, I tried to describe the situation that was then mine.

T o fo llo w the o rd er o f your q u e s t io n s , l e t ’s ta k e the e x a m p le o f h istoricism again. T h e critique o f historicism is, in my ow n trajectory and my own work, first a determ ining m otif. A lthusser was aware o f the place th at th is c r it iq u e h e ld for me b e g in n in g w ith m y s tu d e n t w ork and developed in an essential and central way in my Introduction to the Origins of Geometry— beginning thus with my reading o f H usserl (to my knowledge, the first p erso n to have d en o u n ced [again st D ilth ey ] h isto r ic ism in a system atic and rigorous m anner; a denun ciation nam ing historicism ; the first to have situated in such a critique o f historicism — and not o f history or o f h istoricity , o f course, to the contrary!— the con d ition o f an access to science and philosophy). I do not wish to reconstitute these steps which are the very object o f my Introduction to the Origins o f Geometry, but le t ’s just say th a t for me this is the first ax iom o f any problem atic o f scientficity, truth, objectivity in general, etc.

W h e n A lth u s se r c r it ic iz e s h is to r ic ism (G r a m s c i ’ s, D e lla V o lp e ’s, C o le tti ’s, o r that o f others, o f Sartre also, I th ink), h e cannot ignore (since he uses it) the principal basis o f this critique o f h istoricism : he goes back to the first years o f this century. T h is was m uch discussed at the end o f the 1950s and at the beginning o f the 1960s in all the works on H usserl (not only m ine). T h is silence or foreclosure seem ed strange to me. It irritated me even if I understood , w ithout approv in g o f it, the p o litica l strategy involved. T ak in g into account the context in w hich G ram sci was writing, I understood the necessity o f refounding the con cept o f history after him, against him. Personally, while tak in g on the critique o f historicism , I was


also interested in a certain h istoric ity— the tran scen d en tal h istoricity of w hich H usserl speaks, a certain history o f the m eaning o f being o f which H eid egger speaks, but also a h isto r ic ity th at I was trying to determ in e beyond, against and w ithout Husserl or H eidegger. I found that A lthusser was subtracting som e things from history too quickly: fo r exam ple, when he said that “ ideology has no h istory.” I found his theoreticism problem atic: the m ove to elim inate theory with a cap ital “T ” or theory o f ideology as well as ideology itse lf from history— problem atic at least until such tim e that a concept o f history were produced. It was probably necessary with respect to a certain con cept o f history, but not with respect to historicity in g e n e ra l. T r a in e d to c r it iq u e h is to r ic ism (a s re la t iv ism , e m p iric ism , skepticism , etc .) in order to accede to a d im ension o f transcenden tal or even u ltratranscendental historicity, I did n ot wish to give up history. T h e destruction o f the m etaphysical concept o f history did not m ean “there is n o h isto ry ” to m e. In A lth u sse r I did not see the sam e m ovem en t or sensitivity to the need to think history otherwise and this bothered me.

I w anted to ask questions. A t every step, I would have liked to have had a long discussion with him and his friends and ask them to respond to questions I felt necessary. T h e fa c t is, as stran ge as it m ight seem, this discussion never took place. A n d yet we lived in the sam e “h ouse” where we were colleagues for twenty years and his students and friends were often, in an o th er context, m ine. Everything took place underground, in the said o f the unsaid. It’s part o f the French scene an d is not sim ply anecdotal. A n intellectual sociology o f this dim ension o f French in tellectual or academ ic life rem ains to be undertaken and notably o f that normalien milieu in which the practice o f avoidance is stupefying. I im agine this appears incredible to a non-French person, especially an A m erican , and perhaps also to a few French. But one has to take into consideration a sort o f overtraining in the treatm en t o f p roblem s from an econ om ica l, p o ten tia l, a lgebraic sta n d point— like ch ess players w ho d o n ’t need for the game to actually advance in order to an tic ipate the o p p o n en t’s moves and to respond in advance virtually, to preinterpret fictively all possible m oves and to guess the oth er’s strategy to the fin est detail. A ll this is related to the theory o f ph ilosophical gam es w ithin a tiny milieu overtrained in decipherm ent.

M S: You said all this was part o f the sociology o f Fren ch intellectual life. I don't know about all A lth u sser’s students, but certainly Baliber was in the Party at the time. W as it because you were not in the Party that you felt yourself to be outside the dom ain o f their discussion


JD : Yes, probably, to a certain extent. A n d this fac t m ust not be insig- n ificant or foreign to what I’m describing. Perhaps th at was also in part my fault. Perhaps I should have insisted on ta lk in g w ith them . But implicitly, underhandedly, there was such a war, so m any m aneuvers o f intim idation, such a struggle for “hegem ony” th at one found on eself easily discouraged. M oreover, everyone was inevitably party to it. T h ere were camps, strategic alliances, m aneuvers o f encirclem ent and exclusion. Som e forces in this m e rc ile ss K am pfplatz grouped arou n d L a c a n , o th ers arou n d F o u cau lt, A lth usser, D eleuze. W hen it had any, th at p erio d ’s d ip lom acy (war by other m ean s) w as th at o f avo idan ce : silen ce, o n e d o esn ’t c ite o r nam e, everyone distinguishes h im self and everything form s a sort o f arch ipelago of d iscou rse w ithout earth ly co m m u n ication , w ith ou t v isib le passagew ay. T o d ay the sea betw een th ese arch ip elagos should be recon stitu ted . In appearance, n o on e com m unicated. N o on e was translated. From tim e to tim e, there were, from afar, signals in the n ight: A lthusser hailing Lacan or hailing Foucault w ho h ad hailed Lacan who hailed Lévi-Strauss. There I was, the new kid— in a certain sense it wasn’t my generation.

M S: A s we say in English, you were “the new kid on the b lock .”

JD : Yet, at the sam e tim e, there was no declared hostility. In spite o f these differences and différends, I was part o f a great “cam p ”: we had com m on enem ies— a lot o f them. N ever, between A lthusser and me, fo r exam ple, was there any public ly declared hostility . T h ere was pub lic ly declared hostility against me on the part o f so m any others (L évi-Strauss, Lacan , Foucault later ... an d the list is far from stop p in g there). For my part there w ere n ev e r any o b je c t io n s p u b lic ly and fro n ta lly fo rm u la te d . I h ad q u estion s th a t I drew back inside m yself an d th a t I still keep tod ay for myself. By the sam e token, on the other side, there was never any attack upon what I was doing— rather avoidance.

M S: If I am w rong about this, correct me. It seems to me that you have observed a certain reticence about the texts o f M arx in your writing. T h is is not to say that M arx is never cited. I was reading today that one footnote in “La m ythologie blanche,” w hich I hope we will be able to com e back to— because it is a very im portant text you cite, a text from M arx on the G erm an ideology; I would like to talk about that. Certainly, unlike Heidegger, unlike Husserl, unlike Plato, M allarm é, Blanchot— M arx never occupied a central place in your writing. I can understand certain reasons for that reticence, but perhaps, in this context, you could precise them a bit. Let me rem ind you about the passage I have in mind. It occurs in Positions. You say: “ I have


never found any satisfactory protocols for reading M arx.” Tw o questions I have about that: 1 )W hy do you think that is the case, that you have never found any satisfactory protocols for reading Marx? 2)Is that still the case? Do you still feel bereft o f the protocols for reading that would be required to intervene in the texts o f Marx; or are there other reasons for having observed this reticence? W e w on’t call it a silence, because it is not a silence.JD: For this my answ er should be a lon g one. L e t ’s say th at I was, at the least, reticent. Indeed I told myself: M arx ’s text rem ains m etaphysical, as far as what I had read. For I did read M arx, you know.

M S: M ost certainly!

JD : I did not read him enough. O n e never reads enough M arx. But I didn ’t sim p ly p ass, h im by. I had th e im p re ssio n th at it was st i l l a la rge ly m etaphysical text. T h e questions that interested m e, that is, the history o f the essence o f being, o f the essential interpretation o f being, o f being as this or that (W hat is m atter? W hat is labor? W hat is the being o f ...?, etc .)— those questions were either not posed or still largely depended upon the H egelian legacy. N ot that M arx is, for me, simply an inheritor o f Hegel; but he is so to a greater and m ore essential extent th an it was adm itted then (through denial, it seem s to m e, if not through m isunderstanding). T h e q u estio n s I h ad e la b o ra te d w ith resp ect to H egel an d th a t I was form ulating at that tim e (in several p laces: notably in Introduction to the Origins o f Geometry, in L a Différance, The Ends o f M an or The Pic and the Pyramid) seem ed to me to concern M arx as well. From that perspective I was not convinced by what then was referred to as “epistem ological break” (after an im portation o f the B achelardian con cept). I was not convinced t h a t th e re h a d b e e n r e a lly tw o M a r x e s — th e s t i l l h u m a n is t ic , anthropological, all-too-H egelian or all-too-Feuerbachian m etaphysician o f the Paris M anuscrip ts; and the sc ien tific M arx delivered from all teleo- eschatology. A s you know, th a t d istinction played an organizing ro le in A lth usser’s entire discourse as well as that o f th e A lthusserians at that tim e. I cou ldn ’t b rin g m yself to believ in g it upon a sim ple reading. I to ld myself, “O K , M arx’s text is heterogeneous like all texts,” but the concept o f break itself seemed to me incom patible with the m eaning I get (and to w hich I h o ld ) from that h e tero gen e ity , from that n o n -o p p o sitio n a l d ifferen ce. P arad oxically , th e break hom ogenizes on b o th sides o f th e op po sition al border an d finally assim ilates the two sides, one after th e other, betw een them . T h is h o m ogen ization th rough o p p o sition is a ruse o f d ia lectics: elsew here I h av e tried to dem on strate an d form alize it— precisely w ith regard to H egel in G las. But that is n ot the object o f our interview.


M S: W hat A lthusser intends by the concept o f the “epistem ological break” is not that at a certain point, M arx ceases to be the hum anist M arx. W hat he m eans is that the problem atic changes in certian determ inate ways. I would say that the later texts, as A lthusser says, are still contam inated by the early M arx , bu t w h at is im p o rta n t is th e em erg en ce o f d iffe re n t discursive strata. In th at case, I have alw ays th ou gh t, th ou gh A lth usser stages it in tem poral term s, that is not really w hat it is about. Isn ’t it really about extracting from M arx a different set o f concerns and problem s that had, for a variety o f reasons, at that point, been subm erged in the ordinary discourse on Marx? In that sense, could not one say that you and A lthusser would not differ m uch on this point? Or would you disagree?

JD: W h at you call the staging was very strong. Even if the secon d phase (th e secon d stratu m , if you prefer to sp eak in term s o f stru ctu re ) was co n tam in ated by th e first, a new p rob lem atic w ould h a v e sprung forth w hich should, in principle, not be contam inated. A n d this second phase was called scientific . T h e order o f questions that interested me was not political or scientific “ in the last in stan ce.” T h e concept o f science was not, fo r me, the last word. T o state that a discourse is scientific does not m ean th a t it is ab o v e su sp ic io n or th a t it is, for th a t fa c t , re fle c tiv e (although I’ve never subscribed to the H eideggerian assertion according to which “science does n o t think”— which further com plicates th e discourse that I am, that I was already trying to m ake heard).

M S: In his texts, A lth usser invokes the term “science” in such a way as to m ake the crucial text fo r M arx Le Capital: A ll the labor o f these texts is precisely to determ ine: what is the concept o f science— scientificity would be better— which governs M arx ’s texts? Now , it is possible, I think, for you to say— and I am alm ost certain you would say— that you are n ot satisfied with the criteria o f scientificity that A lthusser w orks with or develops in these texts. But I th ink that fo r A lth usser, w hat is sc ientificity , indeed w hat is an object, is the decisive question. A fter all, w hat is the point o f the d istincton betw een the ob ject in theory and the ob ject in reality? T h at very distinction is precisely the problem that one has to work out. How do we relate theory to th ings? H ow do we correlate th eories with things? H ow , therefore, can we produce criteria by w hich we judge th is theory better th an th at theory? It is a qu estion I would like to com e back to eventually. For now, I would sim ply w ant to insist on this poin t: th at for A lthusser, the problem o f scientificity is just that, a problem . For him, it is not “the last word.” It sounds that way in those texts, but I d o n ’t th ink it is. W ould you disagree?


JD : It seem ed to me that accord in g to his reading o f Marx, le t ’s say the “good” M arx is the one who em erges beyond neo-H egelian m etaphysics, beyond anthropology, etc., to fin ally reach a theoretico-scientific p roblem atic. But I believed and I still believe now that one m ust pose m any h istorical or “historial” questions about the idea o f theory, about the idea o f o b je c t iv ity . W h e re d o es it co m e from ? H ow is o b je c t iv i ty 's v a lu e co n stitu ted ? H ow is th eory ’s order or au th ority con stitu ted? H ow did theory becom e prevalent in th e history o f European philosophy? etc . A n d I d id n o t see th e se g e n e a lo g ic a l q u e s t io n s , so to sp e a k , on sc ie n c e , objectivity, etc. being posed by the A lthusserian discourse, or at least not in a m anner that seem ed satisfactory to m e. From that, it seem ed to me that his reading o f M arx consisted in dropping a bad text or a pre- M arxist one, let’s say, and in constitu ting the M arxist tex t— M arx ’s text o f a fter the b r e a k — as a t e x t th a t h a d m o v e d b e y o n d m e ta p h y s ic a l su sp ic io n , untouchable. M y reticence o n the order o f thought and about genealogical q u estio n in g was also, by the sam e stroke, fo r the sam e reasons, at least virtually, a po litica l reticence. B ecau se I think good politics n ever com es from a lim ita t io n on q u e stio n in g or on th e dem an d o f th o u gh t. My reservations were not always objections: I didn’t want to say, “It’s not like that. W hat you’re saying is wrong.” I thought that what he was saying was not w rong— n ot n ecessarily , not alw ays— but th a t it was n ecessary to furth er qu estion the ax iom atic o f d iscourse. N ot the sc ientific but the th in k in g a x io m a tic . For me th ere rem ain s a d is tin c tio n b etw een the ph ilo soph ical or the sc ientific and everyth ing I would call th ou gh t in a sense where this distinction is n ot as H eideggerian as it seems. T h a t ’s why A lth u sser’s and the A lth usserian s’ discourse seemed a bit stifling to me: I sensed a new scientism in it, even the refinem ent or the disguising o f (and this term would have m ade them scream ) a new “positiv ism ” that repressed the possibility o f questions like “W hat is an object? W here does the value o f o b je c tiv ity or o f the th e o re tica l com e from ?” etc. S in ce I co u ld n ’t fo rm u la te su ch q u e s t io n s w ith o u t a p p e a r in g to jo in th e ch o ru s o f adversaries, I rem ained silent.

M S: Your reticence, or as you said, your silence was, then, conjunctural.

JD : T h e silence was conjunctural. T h e fact o f not speaking, o f not lending, more precisely, a certain public form was both a conjunctural and a political gesture. In fact I think my texts and my behavior “spoke” expressing what was necessary to have understood for those who were interested and knew how to deciph er it. For all th at, I d o n ’t say th at silence was right or in general the only possibility. It was the one that I believed right and the only


one o f which I m yself at that place and time was capable. O n the French scene I d id n ’t wish to attack, in a conven tion ally coded, utilizable, and m an ip u lab le way, a M arx ist d iscourse that seem ed , righ tly or w rongly, positive inside the Party, more intelligent and refined th an w hat on e usually heard. Furtherm ore, as I ’ve said, I fe lt in tim idated . It w asn ’t easy. It seem ed that maybe silence would be more effective. I believe it was not without effect. Now, you note that the fact that I was not a Party member is not insignificant. W hy didn’t I join? W hat history later m ade more obvious and notorious than ever in France, what was already know n and accessible to anyone who was not sleeping or pretending to sleep, what in the end will have caused the degeneration o f the Party and the covering over o f the A lthusserian problem atic were things that I was sensitive to, as others inside or outside the Party, those who had just left or who were in the process o f leav in g it. I was a n ti-S ta lin ist . I already h ad an im age o f the French C om m unist Party, and especially the Soviet U nion , th at seem ed incom patible with, let’s say, the dem ocratic Left to which I have always wished to rem ain loyal.

But, again, I didn ’t wish to form ulate these political objections and risk having them confused with conservative reticence. I didn ’t want that. I realize that others (few, in truth) found a clear way to take that risk which I didn ’t take. But I would say also that they did so in a code and according to an axiom atic with which I w anted n oth ing to do, which were not in tune with the discourse that I was elaborating. T h at is the deepest reason for my s i le n c e ra th e r th a n sh y n e ss or in t im id a t io n . I n e v e r le t m y se lf be intim idated when I can say what I want with the desired rigor. Basically some o f my silences or abstentions still today m ay be explained thus: the code in which I am asked to express m yself seems laden with unacceptable presuppositions. It seems already deconstructed, already deconstructible to me, in any case too inadequate (for there is no adequation possible or that holds here) with respect to the code I seek to elaborate and which I know to be both indispensable and yet impossible, not to be found.

M S: A t the time, roughly in the middle or late 60s, you saw A lthusser as inside the Party; yourself outside. A n d therefore it was d ifficu lt to see A lth u sse r as anyth in g but a k in d o f co m m u n ist m ilitan t ph ilosopher, a position about which you had certain doubts.

JD: It was the truth!

M S: But he was alm ost thrown out in 1966!


JD : W hat do you m ean by “alm ost” ? Lots o f intellectuals were leaving the Party at that tim e! I can th ink o f other C om m u n ist friends who did it them selves instead o f waiting to be “alm ost” excluded. You know, when I was a student at the Ecole N orm ale (we have to speak about this— they aren ’t an ecd otes), the school’s C om m u n ist group was truly hegem onic— Sta lin ist and hegem onic. A n d it was extrem ely difficult for som eone on the Left (need I remind people that I’ve always been on the Left?) to be thought o f only as a crypto-C om m unist or a fellow-traveler. It was very difficult not to jo in the Party. W ith the repression in H ungary in 1956, som e o f those C om m unist intellectuals began to leave th e Party. A lthusser d id n ’t and, I think, never would have. G érard G enette, who was a Party m em b er u n til 1956 , told m e th a t he w ent to see A lth u sse r a fter the H ungarian revolt to im part his distress, anguish, reasons, and probably to ask his advice. A lthusser supposedly to ld him : “B ut if what you say were true, then the Party would be in the wrong.” T h is seemed to A lthusser to be p rec lu ded an d he p roceed ed to d em on strate ad absurdum that what G enette was saying needed to be corrected. G enette laughed when he told m e: “I drew my co n c lu sio n s from th a t ex trao rd in ary fo rm u latio n and im m ed iate ly left the P arty .” A lth u sse r stayed in. I d o n ’t know u n til when— maybe always— in any case ev en in th e worst m om ents. For him there w as one thing that could n ot be done and that w as leave th e Party. T h us, in spite o f everything, I considered his struggle to be inside the Party. I, on the other hand, was not a Party m em ber and so I couldn ’t even think o f A lthusser as som eone outside the Party also. H e was there; I was not. D o you sense the difference? It can not be ignored.

M S: W e have m oved away from the philosophical discussion, but we can return. M y recollection is that— and this would have been som ething that would have brought you close togeth er in the late 50s and early 60s— A lthusser was very m uch against the Party’s position on A lgeria, because the Party, as I recall, supported the A lgerian war.

JD: A t the very beginning, that is, in 1954 ' 1955, Party politics were, if I rem em ber correctly, a bit cautious. T h en the Party clearly took a position against the A lgerian W ar. U n d er de G au lle that position becam e m ore and m ore clear, a lth ou gh it was different from m ore rad ical forms o f opposition to th e A lg e r ia n W ar. A n d h ere , on e should d istin g u ish betw een the F ren ch Party an d the A lg erian Party w hich h ad “F ren ch from A lg e ria ” m e m b e rs w h o se d e s t in y w ill h a v e b e e n t r a g ic b e fo re an d a fte r independence, the new powers persecuting them in their turn.


M S: I was obviously m istaken about that. S o we will continue with the question. A lthusser never broke with the Party. In the middle to late 60s, it would h ave been difficult to see w h at would happen in 1978. H e was in the end very cr itica l o f the organ ization o f the Party, in the Le Monde articles on w hat cannot endure in the PCF.

JD : A lthusser was som eone who, from inside the Party, sought to transform its philosophical and theoretical discourse, believ ing that through the cause and effect o f this discourse he could ch ange the Party ’s politics. For my little m ilieu— that o f a small group o f philosophers o f a certain Left— this A lth usserian discourse was “successful” even if the bureaucratic apparatus o f the Party d id n ’t accept it. A m on g those intellectuals, he was dom inant, and the official Party philosophers were considered poor retards— not from th e s ta n d p o in t o f the P arty a p p a ra tu s , b u t from th a t o f the M arx is t in telligentsia. A lth ough a m inority voice more o r less ignored within the Party, the A lth usserian discourse, his style and project held m uch authority in certain circles o f the M arxist intelligentsia.

M S: In 1968?

JD : A bsolutely ! U n til 1968. T o me, it was n ot the discourse o f a marginal opposition : it was a dom inant discourse. N o t from the standpoint o f the Party apparatus, but from that o f a certain intelligentsia of the Party. O nce a g a in , the P a r ty ’s o f f ic ia l p h ilo so p h e r s w ere c o n s id e re d a b u n c h o f m ediocrities. I saw the A lth usserian discourse as a hegem onic discourse inside the Party, not at all as one persecuted by the Party. It was rejected by the apparatus, if you will, but not by the m ost visible o f the C om m unist intellectuals. It was the interesting thing, the novelty, the basic reference. In Paris, w hen we thought o f “M arxism ” and “Com m unism ,” it was always in relationship to that discourse.

M S: T o com e back to where we began, was the word that I im posed upon you, w hich you hesitated about, w hat I term ed your reticence about M arx, M a rx ist te x ts an d so o n — you said th at part o f the re tice n c e v is-à-v is A lthusser had to do with a notion o f scientificity, o f a certain epistem ology, being the last word.

JD: T h e concept o f production ! For me, this concept was very im portant. But, at the sam e time, and fo r the sam e reason, it was a con cept whose philosophical genealogy presented m any problem s for me. T h us it was not easy fo r me to use it, to entrust m yself to it, m ake it a key concept, as was


the case for A lth u sser and h is friends. W hen one is m istrustful o f the co n ce p t o f p rodu ction , an en tire d iscursive mass becom es prob lem atic . S in ce I w as attem ptin g to elaborate other questions and to advan ce my d isco u rse tow ard a lev e l th a t I co n sid ere d (r igh tly or w rongly) to be p re lim in a ry a n d m o re r a d ic a l “ in th e lo n g ru n ,” I d id n o t d e e m it strategically advisable to devote a study to a text (th a t o f M arx and the M arxists) w hich staked everything upon that sem antics, that conceptuality. A prelim inary work was indispensable, no m atter how long or interm inable it m ight have seemed. W hat I sought to say would have been am algam ated and massively translated too quickly into a problem atic that dissatisfied me. Y ou know , so m etim es one prefers to rem ain a lo n e , to not be read or u n d ersto o d , ra th e r th an to be a ss im ila te d to o fa st or m isu n d ersto o d . H ow ever, I m eant to read M arx m y way when the tim e cam e. Later on , I did some seminars on Marx. T h ere was one on ideology in 1976, I think. I wrote some texts on scientism at a time when the scene had changed and the discourse I was proposing was sufficiently articu lated and known for c o n fu sio n s n o t to be so c e r ta in (b u t on e is n ev er sure o f a n y th in g ). M eanw hile, before, I felt that it was not advisable to m ove out onto that terrain which was so busied with the A lthusserian problem atic. L e t’s call it a reservation rather than a reticence. If you wish, in order to jum p a few steps, today, w hen in France any reference to M arx has becom e forbidden, im possib le, im m ediately cata logu ed , I h ave a real desire to speak about M arx, to teach M arx— and I will if I can . A t th at tim e, though, I m ust have thought I could or sh ou ld not. It perhaps would h ave been better if I had been able to devote to M arx a great study in order to attem pt to read him otherw ise, follow ing other, m ore acceptab le protocols (to m e). But w ho knows? T h e fact is I believed I h ad slow er but a lso more urgent things to do.

M S: L e t me tak e anoth er, re la te d q u estio n but from a slightly different terrain. H ere is your interview with Jean -Luc N an cy , “Le sujet est aussi un principe de calculabilité. Il faut calcu ler . . T h e n otion o f calcu lation interests me a great deal for a whole variety o f reasons. But let me ask the question in this way, bexause it bears upon what you were saying about the problem atic nature o f A lth usser’s work. For exam ple, on the notion o f the difference betw een an ideological and a scientific problem atic.

JD: T o open a parenthesis: I had great reservation about the word and the concept o f ideology as well. T h e word has an enorm ous history from Plato to the Fren ch Ideologues. Yet I didn ’t see this history being questioned by those w ho, around A lthusser and , to beg in with, A lthusser him self, took


the word and the con cept precisely as if they them selves had no history either! I believe that ideology has a history, th at the concept o f ideology has a history, th at the word ideology has a history— a history that teaches us to mistrust the sharp break betw een science and ideology. T h is makes for a lot o f differences! A round A lthusser people acted as if the word and the concept o f ideology were conventionally definable and as if they were going to be able to start all over again in order to have them accom plish a new task without questioning their genealogy. A s if the concept and the word th em se lves were go in g to beg in fu n ctio n in g by cutting themselves (scientifically) o ff from their history, from sem an tics sedim ented within it, etc., as if on e cou ld ob ta in a non-ideological, uncontam inated, scientific co n cep t o f ideology. My worry thus con cern ed not on ly the ideology- sc ience break, but also th e form ation o f the concept o f ideology. T h e first seminar I did on M arx in the 1970s concerned the word and concept o f ideology, the French Ideologues, etc. It’s difficult to speak about it here in detail or with rigor.

M S: How can one defend A lthusser on that point? I d o n ’t try. But I would like to com e back to the problem o f ideology in the re lation ideology- science. Perhaps I can put the problem th is way, m ost econom ically, from the p o in t o f v iew o f the e m p ir ic a l sc ie n c e s . You y o u rse lf m ad e the d istin ction earlier betw een m etaphysical an d scientific discourse. T h ere always are grounds for, in a given case, asserting or decid ing th at som e ch oices are better th at others. C alcu lation is not undeterm ined in science. T h e m ost general question th at I would ask o f you an d o f your relationship to your work and your philosophical project is: w hat are the principles to be observed in this respect— to use a word that you yourself have used— what are the protocols fo r choice, decision , calcu lation th at M arx ’s “scientific d i s c o u r se ” h a s , as o p p o se d to w h at A lth u s se r c a lls an “ id e o lo g ic a l d iscourse”? It seem s to m e that one can only proceed o n the assum ption that som e choices are better th an others, and th at there need to be some protocols for deciding. T h e core o f the scientificity o f a science is its set o f protocols for ruling certain kinds o f questions out o f court.

JD : I ’m entirely in agreem ent. It’s sim ply that in analyzing the field o f strategies or “choices” possible, it seem ed to me there was room, in the long run, for oth er “c h o ic e s” than A lth u sse r ’s. I have already stated that I believe in a certain contextu al necessity for his “ch o ice .” But there was also room for other “ch o ic e s” ( I ’m pu ttin g the word “ch o ic e ” in scare- quotes). It was urgen t and im portant th a t there be other breakthroughs and my calcu lation , in a context that was precisely n ot determ ined in the


sam e way (for all sorts o f reasons), was other. It was n ot my p lace. O n this, A lthusser would agree: each “sub ject” ( individual subject or subject trapped in a collective field) evaluates the best strategy possible from his place, from the “ interpellation” that situates him. For a thousand reasons that should be analyzed, my place was other. M y personal history, my analytical abilities, etc. m ade it so th at I could not be a C om m un ist Party m em ber. A lthusser could be and was. I had been plugged into another type o f reading, questioning, and style that seemed to me just as necessary. A n d I told m yself that from the stan d p o in t o f my “ow n ” econ om y and o f what I in terpreted as b e in g a politico-econom ic necessity, it was im portant that I pose the questions that I posed. A n d that the explanation will have taken place. It takes/took place along more or less identifiable and overdetermined trajectories, even if it has n ot taken place overtly and directly betw een Althusser and me. For it to take place, it seemed im portant to me that the type o f problem atic I was trying to constitute find its place there. It is an unfinished, insufficient calculation. I w ouldn’t say that I made it, but that he calculated me in a certain sense. In another place, A lthusser was the subject, the ob ject o f another calculation. T h e Althusserians also. Lacan too. So many others. A ll the others, don ’t you agree? T h u s a field o f differences, o f different calcu lations, constituting a “historical form ation” (I don ’t know how else to call it!) may be delim ited empirically, crudely, just like what happened in France from 1960 to 1970- 1975. It was a m ultiplicity o f concurrent strategic calculations in search of hegem ony. T h e form alization o f the law with regard to hegem ony is itself part o f the process, lending it its paradoxical form (I attem pted to describe this paradoxical “ logic” in The Postcard and “Som e Statem ents” in The States o f Theory). T h e always incom plete form alization o f that law is itself regulated, w ith ou t any p o ss ib le m e ta lan g u ag e , by the (m o rta l) ten d en cy tow ard hegem ony, by th at original “ in stin ct fo r m astery” that Freud discusses in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. T h ere were also personal m otivations which “represented,” as some would say, socio-political forces and groups o f force. N o n e o f th ese discourses were reactionary, rightist or conservative in the coded sense o f these term s, but each probably “represented” concurren t groups o f social forces th at would be very difficult to identify. There are no categories for this. U sing old categories, I would say that they were sub-groups o f French capitalist society w hich were having it out with each other at that tim e (here, I am pressing on !). I felt, at least indistinctly, that, for exam ple, the category o f social class was qu ite inadequ ate . Even refined down to overdeterm ined groups o f classes, the idea o f social class seem ed to me more and more inappropriate for understan din g th ose con flic tin g structures. I th ou gh t m uch more subtle in strum en ts were n eeded for defin in g those things. W h en he says: “Philosophy is the class struggle in theory...”


M S: Yes, that is the so-called “second definition o f philosophy . . . ”

JD : A t least in an indistinct way, I felt that the concept o f class struggle and even the id e n tifica tio n o f a so c ia l c la ss w ere ru in ed by ca p ita lis t m o d e r n ity . A s it f u n c t io n e d in th e A lt h u s s e r ia n d is c o u r s e , th a t determ ining reference to social class, to class struggle, appeared to m e to belong to another tim e. T h e concept o f class struggle and identification o f a class are m uch more problem atic than the A lthusserians thought at the time. T h us any sentence in which “social class” appeared was a problem atic sentence for me. For the reasons expressed earlier, I could n ot say it in this form. I believe in the gross existence o f social classes, but the m odernity of in d u s tr ia l s o c ie t ie s (n o t to m e n tio n th e T h ir d W o r ld ) c a n n o t b e ap p ro ac h ed , analyzed , tak en in to a cc o u n t w ith in a p o lit ic a l strategy , starting off from a concept whose links are so loose. I had the im pression I was still seeing models for sociological and political analysis inherited if not from the n ineteenth , at least from the first h a lf o f the twentieth century. F ro m th a t s t a n d p o in t , th e w ay in w h ic h th e d is c o u r se o f c e r ta in A lthusserians (Balibar, M acherey, Rancière) later broke open undoubtedly m oved us closer together. I feel closer to Balibar’s discourse and interests today th an to the very b lu n t discourse o f that period . W h at h appen ed follow ing the big A lthusserian m om ent (that is, after 1 9 6 6 Ί 9 6 8 ) at least virtually m oved m e closer to a ll o f them because they were them selves obliged to com plicate their discourse.

I believe that an interest in what the concept o f class struggle aim ed at, an in te re s t in a n a ly z in g c o n flic t s in so c ia l fo rc e s , is s t i l l a b so lu te ly in d isp en sab le . But I ’m not sure th a t the c o n ce p t o f c la ss , as i t ’s been in h e r i te d , is th e b e s t in s tr u m e n t fo r th o se a c t iv i t i e s , u n le s s it is co n sid erab ly d ifferen tiated . I felt th is already then . I c an n o t construct fin ished or plausible sentences using the expression “social class.” I d o n ’t really know w hat social class m eans. I know som e dictionary definitions, but they d o n ’t seem su ffic ien t fo r u n d erstan d in g p articu la r overdeter- m inations (as we say in French) o f the field. A n d if on e takes the concept and logic o f overdeterm ination seriously (and I have less reticence about th e m ), th e n th is lo g ic c a n co m e b a c k and th re a te n or ru in a lm o st ev e ry th in g to w h ich it a d h ere s in so m e w ay or a n o th e r . E v ery th in g A lthusser says about overdeterm ination satisfies m e m ore than th e rest— alas, this m eans that it satisfies me to the detrim ent o f alm ost all the rest, in p a r t ic u la r the “ in the la s t in s ta n c e ” d isco u rse w h ich I c o n s id e r the m etaphysical anchoring o f the whole enterprise.


M S: I w ant to qu estion you on th a t, b ecau se everyth in g you say about “c la ss” can be throw n on to a d ifferent level by ta lk in g about the other n otion that is linked to overdeterm ination, nam ely, w hat A lthusser calls “L a dernière in stan ce ,” but as he says, “the lonely hour o f the last instance n ever co m es,” “ it never soun ds,” “ it n ever answ ers the b e ll.” If you put th ese two togeth er, it seem s to m e it is a very prob lem atic m o m en t in A lthusser— one I so rt o f understand— but let us beg in w ith th e first. You said you would never affirm “d eterm in ation in the last in stan ce by the econom y.” W hy?

JD : Basically, the concept o f last instance would be the general concept of the deconstructible itself, if som ething like that existed. Th is is why I saw in it the m etaphysical anchoring par excellence. T o deconstruct substantiality, principality,. originarity, archi-causality, etc. always m eans to deconstruct or dism antle recourse to some “last instance.” T o say “last instance” instead o f infrastructure doesn ’t m ake m uch difference and it destroys or radically re la tiv iz e s th e w hole a c c o u n tin g for o v e rd e te rm in a tio n s . E v ery th in g in te r e s t in g an d fru it fu l in th e lo g ic o f o v e rd e te r m in a t io n b e c o m e s com prom ised , reduced, crushed by th is d iscourse o n th e “last in stan ce” w h ich I h ave alw ays been tem pted to interpret as a co n cessio n to the econom ist dogm a o f M arxism if not that o f the C om m u n ist Party.

N everth eless if, instead o f “the econom y is the last instance,” I now said “every ‘last in stan ce ’ is ‘econ om ic,’” this m ight just ch ange everything on co n d itio n th a t I defin e econ om y oth erw ise , as I am tem pted to do — otherw ise , that is, th rough the ex-ap p ro p ria tion o f any re la tion o f any proper or o f any last instance to itself. A s you know, I use the concept o f econom y a lot. But I do so without determ ining it based on production or a p p ro p ria tio n . G e n e ra l eco n o m y also su p p oses so m eth in g o th er th an productivity and , in th e econom ic process, it even incorporates (w ithout being capable o f integrating it) a certain unproductiveness or even a n o n p r o d u c t iv i t y — so m e th in g h e te r o g e n o u s b o th to p r o d u c t iv i ty an d u n p rod uctiven ess. M y re ticen ce , therefore, tow ard th e econ om y as last instance is n ot on ly aim ed at th e last instance, but a lso at the way in w hich the econom y is interpreted by M arxists like A lthusser. Each time I have discussed econom y, I did so by bringing in all sorts o f elem ents that were n ot simply forces o f production or effects o f ow nership or appropriation. A n d n o n -p ro d u ctiv ity , n o n -ap p ro p ria tio n , w hat I call p arad o x ica l e x appropriation , th a t m ovem ent o f th e proper expropriatin g itse lf through the very p ro ce ss o f a p p ro p r ia tio n — n on e o f th is is a n e g a tiv ity nor a d ia le c t ic iz a b le c o n tra d ic t io n n o r a d ia le c t ic a l w ork o f the n e g a tiv e . Sim plify ing things a bit, one m ight say that from this standpoint I belong,


to a certain extent, to the “anti-d ialectical” configuration that in France brought together such philosophers as Foucault, Deleuze, and others. I feel less “an ti-d ialectica l” th an them , but m ore so th an A lth u sser (w ho very o c c a s io n a l ly , c a p r ic io u s ly , w ith o u t d ra w in g any in fe r e n c e fro m it, denigrated the d ialectic; this happened only in private as far as I know ). M o reo v er , n o n e o f th is is a q u estio n o f m ore o r le s s . B u t we ca n n o t a p p ro ach these th in gs— the m ean ing o f “p ro d u ctio n ” and “p rop er”— so quickly, by im provisation. A lth usser, in any case, rem ains a dialectician . Even if he com plicates th ings, even if he fought to com plicate the dialectic by in trod u cin g a p rin cip le o f ov erd eterm in atio n , the d ia le c t ic a l m o tif rem ains dom inan t in his work. W hat my work aim s at also takes shape around a th ink ing o f the econom y— but an econom y th at is not, at first glance, that o f w hich M arxist econom ists speak. T h e difference (w ith an “a ” ) is in an econom y that counts with the aneconom ic. But le t ’s leave that aside...

M S : I feel silly, o r em barrassed, in a way, because I feel in the position o f trying to speak for M arx and A lthusser, and I am insufficient to the task. But w hat I w ant to do is simply to form ulate w hat I th in k are possib le ob jections or p o in ts o f disagreem ent that I feel w ould be raised by them , if th ey were speaking here. So pardon me, I am not go in g to do this very well.

JD : Do you think that A lthusser, B alibar or others would today still say “the econom ic in the last in stan ce” ?

M S : B alibar not, I think; and I d o n ’t know about A lthusser. A ll I know about A lthusser is the published writings and my reading o f his work. He never gives up on that as far as I can tell. Perhaps that is a m isreading, but it would be my reading. R an cière certain ly n ot! B alibar is com plicated , because he com es to m ake that work in terms o f a classica l m odel o f class determ ination. T h a t m oves into the difficult notion o f the determ ination in the last instance by the econom y. H e recently sent me his m ost recent b o o k (d o n e w ith W a lle r s te in ) , w h ich I h a v e lo a n e d to a fr ien d and therefore h ave n o t h ad th e chance to löok at. Probably not, I w ould say, in any simple way would he approve the n otion o f “determ in ation in the last in stan ce by the econom y.” T h e way A lth usser form ulated it— I put great stress on the n o tion — as he says, “T h e lon ely hour o f the last in stan ce n e v e r c o m e s .” W h at h e m e a n t by th at is th at the ec o n o m y , in the traditional topography o f the contradictory unity o f the relations an d the forces o f production , is never accessible or it never operates openly; it is never visible, it is never accessible to analysis in any kind o f pure state. You


can ’t sim ply take the class relations and the productive forces, the factories and so on. T h ey are always contam inated by what he calls the other levels and instances: politics, ideology. Therefore, w hat society is— and A lthusser, at one point, recalls that his only question is “W hat is society?”— it is the contrad ictory unity o f all those things.

Therefore, I want to reform ulate this slogan and say: yes. A ll the things th at you say about all o f the “u n p rod uctiven ess,” the waste, if you like, th in gs th at are don e w ithout any sort o f im m ediate m ateria l pay-off or som eth in g like th at— all o f those things are p art o f th e unity o f society. T h ere is a footnote in th e first vo lum e o f Capital where M arx says: “In the m iddle ages, it appears that religion is the dom inan t instance in feudal society .” But as he says, it is very clear that feudal people could not live on re lig ion alone. T h ey had to en gage in m aterial production , and in that sense, to use-the phrase “ in the long run” is ju st to indicate that the lim it o f what is possible in given epoch is set by the econ om ic instance. It puts boundaries around certain th ings. “D eterm ination in th e last instance,” I think, sim ply m eans setting a boundary.

Let m e give you an exam ple to try to illustrate w hat I am talk ing about. It would be possible, th inkable at least, for a n ation or society today to try to reinstitute feudal re lation s, agrarian relation s, to recapture the feudal m ode o f production, in order, for instance, to com bat industrial pollution. But it would not last, not for very long, because the force o f the capitalist m ode o f production globally is so enorm ous. N o society can survive against the trem endous productivity o f capitalism . T h ey would do so inefficiently, they would go broke. It is exactly th at kind o f “determ ination in the last in stan ce,” I think, th at A lthusser m eans. T h ere is a limit, there is an outer lim it o f what is possible in a given social form ation, and th at is set by the relations betw een the forces and the relations o f production. In th at sense, the econ om y does call the tune. I presum e you are going to disagree with that, and I am interested to see what precisely you would disagree with.

JD: If I follow you and if one assum es that the last instance never com es or appears as such, that it rem ains invisible, nonphenom enal, one’s discourse m ust then be adjusted to this structure, to the possibility o f this h idden god, th is entity, this causality, this th ing— the thing itself (with its effects), a thing th at can be nam ed w ithout our ever gain ing access to it, itself, as su c h . W h a t d o e s i ts n e v e r a p p e a r in g s ig n ify ? W h a t d o e s th e in d e te rm in a b ility o f a la st in s ta n c e m ean ? T h is d is s im u la t io n , n on- phenom enality, this truth as dissim ulation leads us back toward previously b e a te n and fa m ilia r p a th s , to w a rd n e a r ly c l a s s ic a l d is c o u r se s an d p ro b le m a tic s w ith w h ich A lth u sse r an d th o se w ho w orked w ith him


engaged no explanation . If the econom y as last instance can never appear as such, then to what concept o f presence, o f non-presence, o f phenom enon or o f essence does one have recourse? H ere again, some engagem ent with H eidegger or a problem atic o f the Heideggerian type should have been m an d ato ry : it can be d o n e , sh o u ld have b e e n d o n e , an d im p lied no p articu lar a lleg ian ce to an y H eideggerian ism . O n the contrary , th ere is m uch more allegiance in avoidance than in exp lic it problem atization.

M S: You were saying th at A lthusser never really engaged with what for you is the fundam ental problem atic w hich is raised by this non-appearance o f “the last in stan ce.”

JD : W ith ou t sp eak in g o f the co n ten t o f the d iscourse , the fact th at he never tried to at least articulate a problem atic like the one I am poin tin g out (w heth er re ferrin g to H eidegger or o th ers), even if it were only to criticize th at problem atic, the fact th at he never tried to read or to take in to acc o u n t a read in g o f tex ts o f th is type a lread y seem ed n eg a tiv e , w o rriso m e , d is a p p o in t in g to m e . I w o u ld h a v e b e tte r u n d e rs to o d a form ulated and argued disagreem ent or even an explained refusal to engage in problem s o f this type (assum ing that one is not always already engaged in them , w hether one w ants to be or n ot). I saw in this fligh t a fault, whether it was a matter o f thought or politics. Inseparably.

M S: W hy in politics?

JD : Because I saw these questions as unavoidable. B ut while they cannot be avoided, they can be repressed, denied. In that case they resurface with their political consequences. Th ey have had the political consequences we know. But the failure— to go quickly and to speak rather generally— the fact that, in spite o f everything, the A lthusserian discourse o f 1968 lacked the necessary duration and vitality, both from the theoretical standpoint and especially from the standpoint o f w hat was anticipated on the field o f political com bat (that is, an effective transform ation o f C om m unist Party practice in France and elsewhere)— these facts bear witness to its lim itations.

M S: W ait a m inute! You think th at the A lthusserians d idn ’t have a more im portant effect on the th eoretical apparatus o f the Party because they didn’t confront Heidegger?

JD: Expressed in this form, I would agree it sounds ridiculous! But in his not h a v in g p o sed “ fu n d a m e n ta l” q u e st io n s or q u e st io n s on fo u n d a tio n s ,


questions on h is ow n prem ises, even on h is ax iom atic (on “W h at does p resen t m ean?” “W hat does phenom enon or truth m ean?” “W hat does the dissim ulation o f the last instance m ean?” “W hat is the m eaning o f ‘being’ or ‘ev en t’ ?”— I’m going too fast, o f course; surely I’m bein g u n ju st; the interview genre elicits that; I’d refine this if we had the tim e and the texts in h an d), I then saw a lack o f radicality and a yet too dogm atic relation to his own discourse. A n d this could not be w ithout political consequences in the long and the short run. Even m ore generally, this m eant perhaps that it h as alw ays (o r at least th e n ) b een vain to hope to stay in the French C om m un ist Party in order to transform its discourse and thought without giving up posing questions that threaten all dogm atism . You’ll urge me to say that the fault lies in still hopin g fo r som eth ing from the C om m unist Party, but I w on’t state in that form.

M S: Even if we say that— I’m sorry if it was a crude way o f putting it— still, th e actu al reason they d idn ’t h ave a greater effect is because the apparatus simply chopped them down, and not for philosophical reasons.

JD : If the Party chopped them down and the Party chopped itself down, it’s because the failure was not lim ited to A lthusserianism : it was the failure o f the Fren ch C om m unist Party and C om m unist Parties in general. It’s the sign that M arxist discourse o f the tim e, including its A lthusserian breach, was incapable o f analyzing the socio-politico-econom ic reality o f th at time and o f regulating its practice based on th at analysis. I don ’t claim th at if the C om m un ists had read H eidegger it would h ave been otherwise: that would be stupid! W ell, maybe not as stupid as all that! But I do claim th at their concepts were n ot refined or differentiated enough and that cost them . It cost them politically. It was already visible from various perspectives. For ex am p le , from the p ersp ectiv e o f p o lit ic a l th in k ers on the Left, even r e v o lu t io n a r ie s w h o , in F ra n c e , h ad a lre a d y th en b rok en w ith the C om m unist Party, w ith M arxist discourse or at least that o f “dom inan t” and dogm atic M arxism . By dogm atic I m ean w hen, at a given m om ent, one ceases or prohibits oneself from posing a question. T h is is a practical and p o litica l lim itation . T h a t ’s what I m eant. “H eidegger” alone cannot save som eone from that dogm atism . But asking more genealogical questions (in a “decon structive ,” N ietzscheo-H eideggerian style or not— and you know very well that things are very com plicated for me on this poin t— but we’re not here to speak o f m e...), asking m ore questions on the origins o f o n e ’s c o n c e p ts , o n th e w e ig h t o f t r a d it io n , on th e n o t io n o f id e o lo gy , o f phenom enon, o f presence, o f truth , m akes all the difference, dem onstrating o n e ’s readiness to change, th at transform ation is taking place or at least


p o ss ib le . But w h at I m ean t was that the lim ita t io n s w ere n ot sim ply discursive or theoretical: they were also political. In that sense, I feel more M arxist than them. I’m not saying the C om m unist Party was stronger than they: it was w eaker than they. T h e proof? It was at once a theoretical, p h ilo soph ical, an d political debacle n ot only in Europe but throughout the industrialized world. Som ew hat indistinctly, this debacle was predictable in the 1960s. P ersonally , I saw the Party as b e in g closed up in a su ic idal p o lit ic s a lread y th en . It was lo sin g . It h ad tw o a lte rn a tiv e s : e ith er it hardened its Sta lin ism and would lose through losing its electorate (and th erefore b eco m e iso la ted in E u ro pe) or e lse it w ould tran sform in to reform ism , a m oderate socialism o f the social dem ocratic type an d would lose also, since the Soc ia list Party already occupied that space. T h at was the dilem m a, the fatal aporia.

A l t h u s s e r ia n i s m ’s p a r a d o x w as th a t it c la im e d h a r d e n in g an d tran sform ation sim ultan eously . P h ilo sop h ically an d th eoretica lly it was h ard er th an th e p o l it ic a l p arty at the t im e — h ard er an d m ore o f an advocate o f transform ation. But in bo th traits, an d for the reasons I’ve just evoked, it was p laying to lose— more an d faster.

T h a t ’s an interesting ind icator for follow ing the com petition , shall we say, between the apparatus and A lthusserian ism . T h e apparatus renounced its axiom s (class struggle, dictatorship o f the proletariat, etc .) faster than A lthusserian ism did. T h ey all ended up renouncing them. In relation to the a p p a ra tu s , A lth u s se r ia n d isco u rse w as, at v a r io u s le v e ls , b o th m ore innovative an d more radically, more rigidly conservative, b o th more and less adapted in its analyses to current history.

M S: U n d er French conditions.

JD : Yes, under French conditions. A lthusserian ism was a m odel for many th e o re tic ian s abroad , n otab ly in L a tin A m eric a , but it was also a very Parisian , very F ren ch produ ct th at on e can n o t fu lly understand w ithout know ing som ething abou t the history o f the French C om m unist Party and the Parisian th eoretical scene. In a certain sense, it represented a tough current in the French C om m unist Party. A n d from this standpoint, it was even more suicidal than the Party. A lth ough in another sense it was less so because it sough t to regen erate a true th e o re tica l th in k in g to w hich I sincerely believe it is correct to pay hom age.

Even before 1968 it was visible to me in any case, and probably fo r m any o th ers, that the F ren ch C o m m u n ist Party (I w o u ld n ’t say M arxism in general) was bein g drawn toward an irreversible decline. It was beginning to lose out before 1968. A n d in 1968, it was the big loser. A t the tim e o f the


Program m e C om m un in 1 972 , th e lo g ic o f th is c o n d e m n a tio n o f the C o m m u n is t P arty w as o b v io u s . T h e tw o a lte rn a tiv e s were: e ith e r it harden ed an d lo st ou t or e lse it softened and blended w ith the Soc ia list Party an d there w ould be no m ore need for it— no more than as a slight electoral edge. T h e Socialist Party carried out the “com m on ” function very well w hile perversely m arginalizing its C om m un ist ally. T h is was proved true in 1 9 8 3 Ί 9 8 4 . D o gm atism is n ot a c o n tra d ic tio n in M arch a is or so m eo n e e l s e ’s h e a d or in the th in k in g o f a p o lit ic a l ap p ara tu s : th is contrad iction is in things them selves, as one m ight have said only a short tim e a g o — in th in gs and in the course o f h istory w ell beyond F ran ce. W here European industrial society was heading, what the new resources o f cap italism are: these are the questions that needed to be analyzed. From that p o in t o f view , w h at’s h ap p e n in g righ t now in the S o v ie t U n io n provides food, for thought. I can not say that I w as ready to form ulate this theoretically in the 1960s, but it’s certain th at I was th inking that way. A n d th is de term in ed my p o lit ica l ch o ices: th a t ’s why I w asn ’t a Party m em ber. For som eone like me, it would have been easy to be in the Party at that tim e. T h ere was no question o f being anywhere but on the Left. M ost o f my friends were Party members. A n d the fac t that I wasn’t didn’t signify anyth in g like a class reaction (w hich would be a stupid supposition) nor anyth in g reactionary. It sim ply signified what I’ve been talk ing about.

M S: I have two questions, one o f w hich I posed in the initial set th at I sent you, and then another one that occurred to me as I was taking notes in your seminar yesterday. They are related, so why don ’t I give them both to you and we can talk about them alternately or together. T h e first question we have already talked around a bit, and you were just talking about it now: it concerns the A lthusserian slogan that “philosophy is the class struggle at the level o f theory.” W hat I want to ask about is not so m uch your view on that particular way o f putting the m atter, but again to come back to this problem o f specific relations between philosophy and political activity. Philosophy as a discipline— what political effect does philosophizing have? How does one intervene in the political arena from, in general, the point o f view of a philosophical project that you yourself have pursued? T h is is one set o f questions.

T h e second set is as follows. L isten ing to you yesterday, I kept asking myself, since the top ic was the politics o f friendship: what exactly are the politics licensed or authorized (perhaps these are n ot the best words, but I’ll use them anyway) by the m anner o f proceeding that you pursued in these particular sem inars? Or, one could say, if you like, what kind o f political action s are authorized by or are necessitated by deconstruction?


So, those are the two sets o f questions. Yesterday, when we were walking to the car, I gave you a hint o f what politics I th ink are authorized by your work, m ainly by referring to Sain t-Just. But you don ’t have to pick up on that.

JD: T h a t ’s very difficult.

M S: A ll the im portant questions are difficult.

JD : For an articulation betw een deconstruction and politics to be possible must im ply a radical reelaboration o f the con cept o f politics in its general c ircu la tio n . P o litic s is a co n cep t h eav ily m arked by a great num ber o f trad itional and deconstructib le ph ilosophem es. T h e “p o litica l” itse lf is a philosophem e— quite an obscure one. O bviously no deconstruction is, for all th at, ap o litica l. But to say that decon struction is p o litica l through and through is too easy an answer. In any case, a deconstruction can not first be otherwise th an a genealogy, a series o f genealogical questions on the whole o f d iscourse that has len t ju stifica tio n to p o litics, that has constructed political philosophy. For exam ple, since you alluded to it, th a t sem inar on friendship is a t least an attem pt, by fo llow in g th at gu id in g th ou gh t, to reconstitute the m atrix o f a great number o f p o litica l philosophem es and to place them in a netw ork. In this dom ain n oth ing is clear or given any more th a n in any o th er. H ow ever, th is does n o t sto p one from c a lc u la tin g strategies and taking decisions or responsibilities. I would even say that it is to th e extent that knowledge does not program everything in advance, to th e extent th a t knowledge rem ains suspended an d undecided as to action, to th e ex te n t th a t a responsible decision as su ch will never be measured by any form o f know ledge, by a clear and d istin ct certain ty or by a th eoretica l judgm ent, th at there can an d m ust be responsibility or decision , be they e th ica l or p o litica l. I am a citizen too. It h ap p en s th at I take p olitico- institutional initiatives, th a t I “intervene,” so to speak. I vo te an d do other such activities in a context determined by old political discourses. For the tim e being, I vote S o c ia lis t in France. But th is does not m ean th at the political philosophy o f the Socialist Party satisfies me, nor that it is one and hom ogenous. I have great stocks o f questions about all the words, sentences, an d c o n c e p ts u sed to d e fin e th e S o c ia l i s t P arty p la tfo rm . O ne m u st distinguish betw een levels o f analysis, critique, deconstruction, action...

M S: I can understand that. B u t I think there is a theory o f political action that is em erging out o f your discussion o f friendship, and the key to it is the n o t io n o f v io le n c e , stru g g le . I th in k th a t is the word you u se d — its


in e lu ctab ility — and it ’s th at I ’ d lik e to get at. Perhaps it ’s too d ifficu lt because you are in th e m iddle o f th inking about th is question.

JD : Yes, and also I’ve spoken abou t it only at a single session, during a re a d in g o f H e id e g g e r . V ery b rie fly , the sem in ar is o r ien ted tow ard a th inking o f dem ocracy. But a dem ocracy for which the current concepts that serve to define dem ocracy are insufficient. O ne m ight say that it’s a deconstruction o f what is called the “given concept o f dem ocracy.” T h is is always very dangerous. It’s always dangerous to try to com e to terms with H eid egger. T h is is the dan ger th at th e A lth u sse r ia n s ignored . But in th o u gh t, th a t is anyw here, o n e m ust run risks. O th erw ise there is no responsibility. O n e m ust investigate in p laces where thought is exposed to w hat is the worst, in p o litica l terms. If n ot, th ings get even worse— the worst a long with good conscience.

In th a t sem inar, w hat in terests me is to understand how the idea o f dem ocracy arose in the W est and what can and should be conserved out o f it. T h a t ’s why I have kept the word dem ocracy and why, for me, dem ocracy is n ot just a m ode o f governm ent, social organization or regime am ongst others. L e t ’s say that there is an idea o f dem ocracy with respect to w hich all o f the determ inations th at there have been o f it since the Enlightenm ent, the A m erican and French Revolutions, different types o f dem ocracy have all been inadequate. But they all refer to this idea through a unique m ode o f m em ory w hich I am trying to analyze and w hich justifies, to a certain extent, why I keep this old word. T h e old word “friendship” as well, despite all th e p h a llo g o ce n tr ic d e te rm in atio n s (e sp ec ia lly in the figure o f the brother in the “fraternalist” schem a) that have dom inated it. I’m trying to th in k dem ocracy after deconstruction starting with A risto tle (but we are a lso d isc u ss in g M o n ta ig n e , K a n t , N ie tz sc h e , S c h m id t— w ho h im se lf discusses H egel, M arx, and Len in , am ongst others— Blanchot, and a few others, to lim it ourselves to proper nam es), all the philosophem es, politico- philosophem es if you wish, that have structured this th inking o f dem ocracy. T h e gu id in g th o u g h t o f frien d sh ip is very u sefu l fo r th is: it re la te s to everything. I’m trying, for exam ple, to th in k out an equality th a t w ould n ot be h o m o ge n e o u s, th a t w ould tak e h e te ro g en e ity , in fin ite sin gu larity , infinite alterity into account. In m y opin ion neither the m otif o f equality nor e v e n th a t o f r e sp o n s ib i l ity is r e c o n c i la b le w ith the c o n c e p t o f subjectivity or subjective identity (w hich I believe to be de-responsibilizing or bound, in any case, to lim it eth ico-political responsibility in the order o f calcu lable law ). O n the contrary, equality ca lls fo r a consideration o f a certain infinite heterogeneity, an infinite distance. T h is is very difficult to r e c o n c i le w ith the c u rre n t d is c o u r se on d e m o c ra c y . I t ’ s n o t at a ll


H eideggerian either. But I think one must approach, cross through, and go beyond H eideggerian questions. T h is is what I attem pt to do elsewhere, in any case, in particular in that sem inar w hich I can not reconstitute here. W h at I call “dem ocracy to com e,” w hich is n ot the future o f dem ocracy, is what th is work is striving toward.

So what political action is possible? For me the p lace o f the political is th e p la ce o f negotiation betw een , le t ’s say, th e open set o f p resen t or presentable d ata su ch that I ca n attem pt to analyze them (always a fin ite analysis), and this “dem ocracy to com e” w hich always rem ains inaccessible not just as a regulating ideal, but also because it is structured like a prom ise and like a relation to alterity, because it never possesses the identifiable form o f the presen ce or o f the p resen ce to self. But the even t o f th a t prom ise tak es p lace here, now in th e singularity o f a here-now w hich, as paradoxical as it m ight seem, I believe I m ust dissociate from the value o f presence. Everything is at play in this paradox that I can n o t develop here: singularity is never present. It presents itself only in losing or undoubling itself in iterability, thus in the m ark and the generality or ideality which, m oreover (th reat or luck), w ill allow later for a ca lcu la ted n ego tia tio n b etw een th e p re se n ta b le and th e n o n p re se n ta b le , th e su b je c t an d a- sub jective singularity, rights an d a justice beyond rights and eth ics, and perhaps even beyond politics (we can come back to th is). T h e here-now indicates that this is not simply a question o f utopia. T h ere is constan t and concrete renewal o f the dem ocratic promise as there is o f the relation to the o th e r as su ch , o f the r e la t io n to in f in ite d is ta n c e , in c a lc u la b le h e tero gen e ity , etc . It is a m atter, then , o f a n e g o tia tio n betw een th at th in k in g w h ich re se m b le s so m e th in g m e ss ia n ic (b u t I w o u ld n ’t say m essian ic in the cu rren t sense o f the term ) and the p resen t g iven s o f dem ocracy which are unsatisfactory, but which remain (by using the sam e word, the sam e p aleon ym ) “m in dfu l” o f the prom ise o f a dem ocracy to com e. T h ey are the guardrails against the worst— w hat I would call the worst. T oday I prefer dem ocracy as it is— the present dem ocratic m odel— to m onarchy, oligarchy, etc. Yet this doesn’t seem enough. T h ere is violence, repression, an d even the con cept o f the calcu lable subject, as I said before, a p p e a rs in su f f ic ie n t— in su ff ic ie n tly d e m o c ra t ic . T h e r e is no la ck o f c o n c re te sign s o f n o n d e m o c ra c ie s in “ o u r” so c ie t ie s . T h e y a re e v en becom ing more and more generalized.

For the p resen t, to m e, dem ocracy is th e p lace o f a n e g o tia t io n or co m p ro m ise b etw een th e fie ld o f fo rces as it e x is ts or p re sen ts its e lf c u rre n tly ( in su ff ic ie n t d e m o c ra cy , E u ro p e a n d e m o c ra cy , d e m o c racy A m eric an -sty le or F ren ch -sty le , for ex am p le ) an d th is “dem ocracy to com e.” T h is n egotiation m ust readjust itse lf each day in relation to differing


places. T h e responsibility one m ust take for it is always unique. Political action for me today can n ot, m ust n ot be the sam e as th at for anyone else in a n o th e r p la ce , a n o th e r c la ss , a n o th e r coun try . From th is sta n d p o in t, political action is n o t em pirical bu t constantly strategic. For m e, the rule o f this strategy would be this “dem ocracy to com e.” But this rule is n ot that o f a calcu latin g or calculable know ledge through and through. In this respect, it is n ot a ltogether a rule like other rules. R ath er it is a law without rule, even w ithout obligation— in the sense o f obligation to be, ob ligation to be p resen t. A leap is n ece ssary th a t w ould lib erate on e from the rule as know ledge, as a know ledge forever ordered arou n d the ob jectiv ity o f a presence, around a theory, a logic or an ontology— perhaps even around an eth ical, juridical or political system. V otin g Socialist, w hich I said a while ago th a t I do, is a p o lit ic a l gestu re th at I can only try to ju stify as a com prom ise betw een the state o f forces as I can analyze them from my position in France and this incalculable idea o f dem ocracy. T oday in France, I th ink it ’s better that the Soc ia list Party be in power than the U D F or the RPR. N o t th at I’m satisfied with it, but I believe that this hegem ony in i t s e l f is ra th e r p lu ra l and th a t it le a v e s o p e n m ore o p p o r tu n ity for discussion , protest, and, in the end, th at “dem ocracy to com e” th an any o th er party . T h is is where the p lace o f p o lit ic a l ac tio n lies. But if on occasion not on ly I h av e voted Socialist, subscribed to a discourse or even publicly written “O ne m ust vote M itterrand,” perhaps the next day I m ight say “N o, we must not, we m ust no longer do so .” It’s to be evaluated at each m om ent from standpoints that are finite.

I w ould not say th a t th e concept o f “dem ocracy to co m e” is a political concept alone, through and through. A t this point it’s perhaps no longer a question o f politics and that the “best” or the least lousy politics order itself w ith so m eth in g th at exceed s p o litic s. H ere the term “p o lit ic s” itse lf is subject to n egotiation . Perhaps the term “dem ocracy” is not a good term. For now it’s the best term I’ve found. But, for exam ple, one day I gave a lecture at Joh n s H opkins on these things and a student said to me, “W hat you call dem ocracy is what H an n ah A rendt calls republic in order to place it in opposition to dem ocracy.” W hy not? I am only em ploying the term dem ocracy in a sentence or a discourse that determ ines certain things. I th in k that in the d iscursive co n tex t that do m in ates p o litic s today, the c h o ic e o f the term th a t ap p ea rs in the m a jo rity o f se n te n c e s in th is discourse is a good ch oice— it’s th e least lousy possible. A s a term, however, it’s n ot sacred. I can , som e day or another, say, “N o, it’s not the right term. T h e s itu a t io n a llo w s or d e m an d s th at we use a n o th e r term in o th er sentences.” For now , it ’s th e best term for m e. A n d choosing this term is o b v io u sly a p o lit ic a l c h o ic e . I t ’s a p o l it ic a l a c t io n . T h ere is n o th in g


relativ istic in w hat I’m saying. O n the contrary. A n action that did not ta k e a l l s in g u la r i t ie s in to c o n s id e r a t io n w o u ld be a d o g m a tic an d irresponsible m echan ics w hich would drown decision in the environm ent o f a dogm atic generality.

M S : W ou ld you o b je c t to c a llin g w hat you have b een referring to as “d em ocracy to com e” w h at in the M arxist lex ico n would be called “the classless society” ?

JD : W hy not, if the con cept o f class is to ta lly reconstructed n otin g the reservations I form ulated a while ago with regard to the concept o f class. W h at’s im portan t in “dem ocracy to co m e” is n ot “d em ocracy ,” but “ to co m e .” T h at is, a th in k in g o f the even t, o f w hat com es. I t ’s the space open ed in order for there to be an even t, the to-com e, so that the com ing be that o f the other. T h ere is no com ing or event that is not, that does not imply the co m in g o f th e h etero gen eou s, th e co m in g o f the other. “T o com e” m eans “future,” not the present future, w hich would be present and presentable tomorrow. It means the space opened in order for the other and others to com e. N on -dem ocratic systems are above all system s that close and close themselves o ff from this com ing o f the other. T h ey are systems o f hom ogenization and o f integral calculability. In the end and beyond all the classical critique o f fascist, Nazi, and totalitarian violence in general, one can say that th ese are system s that close the “ to co m e” and that close th em se lves in to the p resen tatio n o f the p resen tab le . W h at I h ave said e lsew h ere abou t th e co m in g , the ev en t, th e “ co m e h e re” [viens]— o f différance an d th e deconstruction o f presence is where I w ould begin to try to articulate a th inking o f the political.

M S: Let m e ask you a specific question a lo n g th at line. W h en I th in k about politics, I th ink about this and that, very m uch in the way you have said. You are strategically in a different situation . You h ave been very h o n est an d forthright abou t particular choices you m ade yourself. But, to tak e an exam ple, w h at abou t the Sand in istas? B ecau se one reading o f them , one that you m igh t support, w ould see in the S a n d in ista d ictatorsh ip — and th a t’s w hat it is, after all— a closing, as you just said, o f the possibility o f any kind o f “dem ocracy to com e.” I would n ot read it that way, but you m ight, I guess. W hat do you th ink about the Sand in istas?

JD : Follow ing a rather spontaneous m ovem en t o f sym pathy, it ’s c lear th at I’m again st the way the A m erican adm inistration treats them . B ut I d o n ’t h ave absolute confidence in them . I dem and to be show n, and perhaps my


position could change from one day to the next. Perhaps for a while I would say “U p to a certain point, they must be helped”; then, perhaps one day, in another context, I m ight say “They've got to be fought.” I dem and to be shown. N o more here than anyw here else does my reservation signify a de- p o liticization that suspends. A s such, every p o litica l question im plies an extrem ely com plicated, constantly readjusted strategic analysis, and I have no fixed response to the question you are asking me. I believe that if I were A m e r ic a n , I w o u ld f ig h t w h a t I u n d e r s ta n d a b o u t th e A m e r ic a n adm in istration ’s policies, but not in order to applaud a priori everything the Sand in istas do— the Sand in istas who might tomorrow turn out to be the enem y to be fought. If you had asked me “W h at do you think o f F idel C astro?” I would have been disturbed. N o n e o f what I can observe appears very reassu rin g or a ccep tab le . T h is d o e sn ’t m ean that I approve, from beginning to en d, o f th e A m erican policy w ith regard to C astro. T o many questions, I have com plicated, disturbed answers. W hen I have to vote, that is, when the response is a binary yes or no, it’s rare that I’m sure. S ince the situation in France is basically relatively stable, clear enough, and not very “revolutionary,” dom estic choices are, for the tim e being, rather easy. But when it com es to burning questions, when analysis must be m icrological and attuned to both geopolitical and local stakes, I have the greatest difficulty orienting myself. In these cases, the current codes o f traditional political p roblem atics appear insufficient to me. But on the “S an d in ista ” question that you asked me, and to give a response th at is im m ediately decipherable in the current code, the m oderate and cautious standpoint o f the French governm ent and o f the Socialist Party seems to me, within the limits o f my inform ation and thought on the subject, acceptable.

I too w an t to ask you so m e q u e st io n s . W hat do you th in k o f the Sand in ista situation? Do you have a clear an d simple position?

M S : M y p o sit io n is very stra ig h tfo rw ard , I th in k , an d n o t e sp e c ia lly com plicated . O bviously you stop th e contra aid , and you resist the policy o f the U n ited S ta te s . B ut my own fee lin g— w hatever reservations I m ight h ave about this or th at w hich the San d in istas h ave done— I feel th at the only possibility for any kind o f social am elioration in C en tra l A m erica is som e kind o f regionalization o f the San d in ista revolution . T h ey ca n ’t go it alone. T h ere have to be revolutions in G uatem ala, in El Salvador.

JD : O K . Y ou ’re gen era lly lik e m e, like so m any o th ers, ag a in st N o r th A m erican im perialism . A n d first o f all in C en tral and Sou th A m erica. O K . But now does this m ean th at you support, at all cost, S an d in ista policies, from A to Z? T h a t ’s the question you asked me. T o th at question, I d o n ’t have a firm and fixed answer, so I’m sending it back to you.


M S: I understand and I respect people who say, “Look, this is an extrem ely co m p lica ted p ro ce ss .” T h ere are a lot o f re se rv atio n s one h as. But my feeling, perhaps too sim ple, is th a t the Sand in istas at th is m om ent, given the balance o f forces on the other side, have to be defended at all costs. W h atever they do to defend their revolution is justified. You said earlier th at you observed a ce rta in silen ce abou t A lth u sse r because o f certa in critics. I would observe a certain silen ce abou t som e things in Sand in ista N icaragua, because the discourse o f anti-com m unism is so powerful in the U .S ., m uch m ore powerful th an it ever is in France, I think, because it has a longer tradition and because the political position o f the C om m unist Party in the U .S . has not been what it was in France, for fifty years a t least.

JD : A w h ile ago I sa id : if I w ere A m e r ic an , i f I spoke in a d iscou rse determ ined by th e A m erican situation, perhaps it would be more “M arxist,” but a M arxist discourse with other connotations. Even if som ething can be e x p o r te d from it, my d isc o u rse is fo rm ed from a s itu a t io n in w h ich so m e th in g lik e W este rn E u ro p e e x is ts an d c o n s t i tu te s so m e so rt o f continent. If I were A m erican , w ithout contrad icting w hat I said o n the subject o f principles, I would accentuate things differently. Certainly as an A m erican citizen! O f course I never speak as an A m erican citizen.

M S: T h a t will take us dow n another path , but let’s pursue it anyway. I mean, it’s not my interview, but I feel very m uch the obligation— and I’m sure I’d feel differently if I grew up in France or if I grew up anyw here in W estern Europe— I feel the absolute obligation to, for exam ple, teach the texts o f M arx , becau se they are not w ell-know n here, are not p art o f “gen eral discourse.”

JD : I agree. But w hat allow s you to say th at a discourse like mine teaches M arx less than som e other discourse that cites M arx at each page while neutralizing, paralyzing, do in g nothing with him ? I ask this w ithout trying to justify myself.

T h e m anner in w hich the discourse I find m yself engaged in constituted itself historically— a discourse whose stability rem ains relative— signifies for someone who knows how to read it that M arx is always there. People who decipher my discourse on the French scene o f the 1960s know that I speak w ith M arx ism , th a t I ex p la in m yself, for ex am p le , w ith regard to the M arx ist con cept o f production . M arx is always im m ediately or virtually taken into account. T h ere are traditional or stereotyped discourses th at cite M arx at every page, but do not elicit a reading o f M arx or th at w ould tend to m ake one forget about him. Som e m ight even disgust people with M arx:


look a t w h at’s happening in the Eastern European countries where the least allusion to the nam e o f M arx today produces an explosion o f anger and re jection am on gst intellectuals— people don ’t even want to hear about him any m ore! My am bition (w hich is perhaps excessive) is to call for a new reading o f M arx— a greater am bition th an m any M arxists. A n d the fact th at, for exam ple, on a regular basis, people com e an d say to me, “So , what about M arx?” or “Yes, but, in M arx there’s som ething... O ne m ust...” m eans that because the b lank on M arx is situated in my text in a certain way, that blank is not just any blank. T h a t blank corresponds neither to a distraction nor to a repressive denial th at it brings about, but rather to an active calling into accoun t o f the M arxian legacy. I feel as you do the obligation to have M arx (and a few others) read, but there is more th an one way to respond to th is ob ligation , not on e! T h e best way is not necessarily to always give lessons on M arx or to cite Capital.

M S : A greed, having said one needs to read and teach M arx, the question rem ains: what does it m ean to teach M arx? I accept that. W e are not in disagreem ent on that.

JD : L e t’s take anoth er path to respond briefly to the sam e question. W e are both in academ ic or intellectual institutions. You know very well th at to a large e x te n t trad itio n a l M a rx ist d iscou rse is accep te d or ju dged to be sufficiently reassuring that, in sp ite o f everything, teaching M arx is allowed. T h ere is no war or prohibition on M arxist professors or those who teach M arx— at least neither in the U .S . or in France. W hereas deconstructive qu estions and practices, while they enjoy a certain success, encounter a greater and increasingly bitter resistance from the institution and thus from dom inan t intellectual norm ativity. I could give you a thousand concrete and current indications o f this, notably in this country— indications both inside and outside academ ia. T h is perh aps m eans that, even politically , decon struction effects an d disturbs the acad em ic in stitu tion ’s dom inan t discourse m uch m ore th an the tranquil inscription o f M arxist teachings or M arxist readings. I don ’t w ant to oversimplify: there is also a tranquilizing legitim ation o f deconstruction w hich interests me very little. But w hat is alive an d at work in deconstruction seem s m uch less tolerable, by w hich I m ean that it incites more intolerance th an traditional M arxist discourse w h ich I b e liev e to be largely academ ized . T h e p o litica l im plications o f these two phenom ena should be analyzed.

M S: In the U nited States?


JD : In the U .S . and France as well.

M S: N o , not in the U n ited States; there I disagree. If the teach in g o f M arx was not officially forbidden, it was virtually killed in the 50s. You know about M cC arthyism , but I think it would be im possible for you to register the to ta l id eo log ica l effect o f the first decad e o f the C old W ar on the A m erican academ y. M arxism was purged from intellectual life in A m erica in a very, very system atic way, in a way that it really was not in France. T h a t is my impression. It makes an enorm ous difference.

JD : I th ink that either in its tough or softer form, L e ft M arxist discourse is very m argin al. I t ’s m uch easier to digest, accep t, institu tion alize than a certain M arxist practice.

M S: You are absolutely right about that, but this is really the legacy o f the last twenty years, only since the 60s. A n d w hat it has not led to,. I think, with only very, very few exceptions, is a serious reading on any level o f the texts o f M arx him self. I think you are right. A certain “gauch isan t”— which is really the word for it— discourse is, if not hegem onic, very widespread in the U n ited S tate s. W hat is n ot w idespread is the knowledge o f and the so p h istica ted co m m an d o f C apital, of, I d o n ’t know , even o f the 18th Brum aire. T h ese are not texts that have been widely read and talked about.

JD: T h is state you describe can perhaps partially be explained by a widely held conviction that reading M arx, as it has been practiced until now, is no longer useful in order to understan d m odern econ om ics or geop o litic s, literature or science (social or n o t) today. Either to understand them or to transform them . If today it were possible to produce a new reading o f M arx that would be necessary in order to “understand and transform ,” I would subscribe to it with upen arms. If I could participate in such a project, I would do so with no reservations. Is it, moreover, certain that I am doing none o f that now? In any case, if som eone did it well, I would follow. U p till now , this h as n o t taken p lace and , in my op in io n , this is n ot ju st co incidental. B u t i f you can do it, I’ll follow you!

L e t m e say p are n th e tica lly that I am sh o ck ed to see th a t after the ex trao rd in ary su ccess o f M arx ist d iscourse (u n til the b eg in n in g o f the 1970s, n otab ly in F rance, M arxist discourse had quite an authority), the page has been turned to the point th at it’s a lm ost forbidden, condem ned or ridiculed, old-fashioned to cite M arx. I’m n ot saying this to please you, but it appears quite sh ock in g and politically dangerous. I say so publicly any time the opportunity arises. T h e same goes for Freud, and Lacan a bit too.


M S : You said a m om ent ago th at you thought the branding o f M arx and M arxism as old-fashioned in A m erica was not simply by chance. N or is it by chance in France. In France, it could be the decline o f the authority o f the C om m un ist Party. I would understand that.

JD : W hich is certainly n ot a co incidence!

M S: But in A m erica, it c a n ’t be that. W e d o n ’t h ave th at cause. A m on g even so-called left intellectuals, the sense that the classical texts o f M arx are “dépassés” is very strong. I think that is politically and intellectually dangerous. I d o n ’t th ink we have gone beyond the problem atic o f M arx in any serious sense. It’s not that all the answers are there in M arx ’s texts, but we still must learn to read M arx.

JD : In re re a d in g the p ag e s you p h o to c o p ie d in p re p a ra t io n fo r th is interview, I state that I consider m yself M arxist to the extent that I think that M arx’s text is not an im m obile given, and that we must continue to work, etc.

If the discourse o f an econom ist in the M arxist tradition withstood the test, le t ’s say, o f the econ om ic realities o f our time, do you believe that d iscou rse w ould rem ain repressed , unknow n, m argin alized? I th ink the re su lt w ould stan d on its ow n. I f a M arx is t th e o re tic ia n o f lite ra tu re produ ced a d iscourse effectiv ely form alizing or m ightily transform in g a given situation , would we remain ignorant o f it because o f political censure? I d o n ’t th in k so. If a d iscou rse o f that type— for exam p le , yours— can effectively con vin ce, it’s because it h as integrated, theoretical or conceptual m otifs w hich are not exclusively M arxist. It’s n ot certain that the necessity or p ertin en ce o f your d iscourse corresponds to its M arxist p ro ject. T h e references to M arx are not enough to prove the contrary. N ow , if a new th eoretical configuration integrated certain m otifs w ith M arxist ones, I would not have the least o b jection in principle. “M in e” (if one cap say “m ine” ), well, w hat I try to do, integrates to a certain extent m otifs that could be considered M arxist, which in any case owe som ething essential to that heritage, to a passing from M arxism , through M arxism . Inasmuch, for exam ple, as my discourse is freed from certain idealistic naivetés. But th at’s n ot en ou gh to ca ll it a M a rx ist d isco u rse , d o n ’t you th in k ? I t ’s not a discourse dom inated by the M arxist reference. It ’s not a discourse foreign to M arxism or anti-M arxist either. M oreover, I will always wonder if the idea o f M arxism — the se lf identity o f a M arxist discourse or system or even a science or philosophy— is n ot in principle incom patible w ith the event- M arx.


M S: M aybe by follow ing some itinerary through M arx, to the degree that I’m capable o f producing anything new about Proust, fo r exam ple, I will necessarily go beyond classica l M arxist categories. Is th a t th e force o f what you are saying?

JD: G o in g beyond classical M arxist categories is perh aps an in ju n ction of M arxism . A n in junction in itself contradictory because there should not be any M arxist in junction. S u ch an injunction w ould produce dogm atism and must therefore rem ain foreign to M arxist discourse.

M S: W ith th at I agree. T h a t is probably right. If you continue to do and practice the form s o f intellectual inquiry that M arx would license in the U n ited S ta te s— that, I th ink , rem ains im portant for a variety o f reasons.

JD : I would quite agree. I believe in the political necessity o f taking M arxist argum entation or critique into account, to listen to it and to never close off access to it, provided that this M arxist critique itself rem ain alive, open, th at it n ot becom e sc lero tica lly dogm atic. I h ave on occasion attacked caricatures o f M arxism that didn ’t interest me because I found them to lack pertinence. But I have never attacked the radicality o f M arxist critique as such. I stress the term “critique” as a m otif from the Enlightenm ent: I hold it to be e sse n tia l in M arx ’s lan gu age and p ro je c t as w ell as ab so lu tely indispensable today— insufficient, but vitally necessary.

M S : L e t ’s look at a sp ec ific text in w hich you c ite M a rx ’s critiqu e o f etym ologism . M aybe it’s a hostile question, I don ’t know, but I’ll put it in a way th a t w ill p erh ap s soun d a b it less h o stile . In w h at sen se are the procedures th a t you yourself adopt when you read a tex t allowed to escape that critique o f etym ologism w hich M arx levels a t S tirner et al.? Som eone like M arx— or perhaps A lthusser— would say, “T h ere is a sliding between levels” when you m ove from the linguistic description o f a phenom enon to what that description designates. W e have talked in and around this, and you said, quite conspicuously, that this is one o f the central questions for you. H ow do you escape M arx ’s ironic denunciation o f Stirner?

JD : I can n o t say that I escape th at criticism altogether. W h o can say he does? In fact, in fact and apparently , I am m ore concerned with language than with “econ om ic reality” itself when I speak o f the proper [oikos] — which is nonetheless econom ical through and through. T o the extent that there is this appearance, my text cannot absolutely guard against the risk which you are ju stifiab ly denouncing: I am n ot directly concerned with


w hat one may call “econom ic reality” in the strict and scientific sense (if that exists, independently and objectively). N o one escapes this risk, not even M arx.

N ow , furthermore, since in the passage you quoted and in m any others: 1) I expressedly critique etym ology and etym ologism ; 2) I critique or rather deconstruct logocentrism , that is, the hypostasis o f language through the reduction o f reality to language, etc .; 3 ) it should not be forgotten than deconstruction starts with the decon struction o f logocentrism , continues with the elaboration o f a concept o f the text that does not leave “reality” outside, and avoids reduction to simple writing [graphie] on a page or in a book; 4) them atically , clearly and insistently, I have form ulated a critique o f linguisticism , rhetoricism , etymologism, etc., w hich m eans that when I speak o f the proper, I have already taken the precaution o f saying that it is not simply the sem antics o f the proper or the word “proper” that interest m e— that would be what others would call “reality.” I am trying to show precisely the im possibility and the recurrent failure o f the reappropriation o f the proper within the limits o f language or even semantics. Naturally, for me the problem o f reality is more com plicated than it is on the side o f those who think they can throw it up to me as an ob jection . Precisely for the reason that through différance, the necessary reference to the other, the im p o ss ib ility for a p re sen ce to g a th e r i t s e l f in a se lf- id e n tity or in a su b sta n tia lity , co m p e ls one to in scrib e the rea lity effect in a gen era l textuality or a differential process which, again, is n o t lim ited to language or w r it in g as th e y are u n d e r s to o d p r e - s c ie n t i f i c a l ly an d pre- g ra m m a to lo g ic a lly . I h av e e x p la in e d q u ite th orou gh ly elsew h ere the n ecessity (also strategic) o f elaborating th is new concept o f th e text.

T h a t is why if one th inks th at words are on one side and th ings or reality on the other, one is just as naive. Furtherm ore, I believe th at w hen M arx rightly criticizes Stirner, his discourse im plies at least the possibility and the a im o f a r e a p p r o p r ia t io n ( c la s s s t r u g g le , e x p r o p r ia t io n , f in a l reappropriation , e tc .) . H e th in k s th at the proper m akes sense and that appropriation, reappropriation is not only possible, but that it is the m otif itself o f history as class struggle. In this, I am tem pted to deconstruct the use M arx h im se lf m ak es o f p ro p e rty v a lu e . A n d th at c r it iq u e is n o t linguistic . It is qu ite th e contrary! In believ in g reappropriation possible, on e rem ains, knowingly, willingly or n ot w ithin th e logocentric legacy.

Su ch would be my “critiqu e” o f M arx, or in any case my discrepancy with respect to a certain M arxism or a certain M arxist-inspired onto-theo- te le o lo g y . B e n ja m in h im se lf p erh ap s d o es n ot e sca p e it, d e sp ite h is h e te ro d o x y . U n lik e A lth u s se r , I b e lie v e th a t o n to -th e o - te le o lo g y is ineradicable in M arx. A lthusser and the A lthusserians say “M arx is or must


be M arx , minus the o n to-th eo-te leo lo gy , M arx minus the e sch ato lo g y ” through an operation w h ich is no longer M arxist, through the coup de force o f an artificial strategy (and I have noth ing against this strategy as such, because why should one be strictly loyal to M arx, even- in interpreting his te x ts? ) , through an in te rp re ta tiv e v io len ce (b u t it w ould be b etter to ann ounce it, to them atize and reflect within its possib ility ). N ow that is interesting! I will be alw ays ready to subscribe to th at gesture. But when they do this, there’s no point in citing M arx any more or to pretend that M arx meant-to'say'this— there’s no point, in any case, in lending privilege to th at reference and excluding all others. T h ey could perform that gesture w ithout M arx or else with so many others. A n d then one would say that at least they don ’t teach Marx. O ne could say to them: “O K ! G o ahead and unfurl this an ti-onto-theo-teleological discourse if it ’s possible, as well as the deconstruction o f onto-theo-teleology, o f property, o f the value o f the proper (what I m yself try to do), o f eschatology. But if you do, appealing to M arx is a m ore than problem atical operation w hich you would do well to problem atize critically as such .” Perhaps at a certain m om ent, given the state o f p o litica l forces, the “h istory-of-the-w orker’s-m ovem en t,” “class- struggle,” etc., it will h ave been im portant to refer or to pretend to refer to M arx or to M arx-L en in in a d o m in an t or exc lu siv e way, a ll the w hile saying th ings that n eith er M arx nor Lenin ever said or could have said. Perhaps th is was necessary: I d o n ’t know! Perhaps at a certain m om ent it was necessary to say yes to M arx, to soften, h ard en or violently transform the reading o f his writings in order to serve a “cause .” But those who would deconstruct the m otif o f the proper or the idea o f a fin a l reappropriation o f the m eans o f p rodu ction by the p roletariat, for exam ple, w ould h ave a discourse that is no longer M arxist or called M arxist only by metonym y and for reasons o f strategic convention . Besides, a sign ificant deconstruction o f property should no longer make any reference to a discourse, a work or a p rop er n am e the d o m in a n t, h e g em o n ic or e x c lu s iv e re feren ce . N on - dogm atic M arxists know this very well. They know very w ell the political consequences o f the sacralizing capitalization upon a proper nam e.

M S: I understand. A ctually , w hat you said at the begin ning was, “N o one can escape it entirely, not even M arx .” I th ink th a t’s probably right. It leads to one o f the qu estion s th at I gave you, to w hich I’d like to turn now. A ga in , it’s a sort o f m eth o d o lo g ica l qu estio n , d ea lin g w ith on e o f the passages th at I xeroxed for you from De la grammatologie on reading. A s you know, it’s a frequently cited passage, and, if it is n ot the establishm ent o f a set o f protocols or m ethods for reading, it is very close to being so. It moves in that direction, you know. Okay, this is how you go about reading a text.


A lso , I believe the section is entitled in French, “Q uestion de m éthode”— an obvious reference to Sartre.

N ow , on ce one reads A lth usser, on ce one reads you, it is d ifficult to separate what he calls “sym ptom atic reading” from the kind o f procedures o f reading that you adopt or recom m end. I think A lthusser’s “sym ptom atic re ad in g ” is so m eth in g like a m eth od , p rovided we take “m eth o d ” in a slightly loose sense to include what one m ight call a heuristic, in the sense that A ristotle thought rhetoric was m ethodizable. It is not a science. T h at doesn ’t m ean it is ju st anything at all. T h ere are protocols.

Perhaps I can get you to talk about th at in relationship to your own p r a c t ic e . W h e n y ou go to re a d a t e x t , y o u do p r o c e e d , I th in k , s y s t e m a t ic a l ly , in a w ay t h a t is, i f n o t th e sa m e , d o e s h a v e w h at W ittgenstein calls a “fam ily resem blance” to readings o f previous texts. You m ay h e sita te to talk about this, but I’d like to hear what you’d say. T o put it in the sharpest possible form ula and the simplest (that will probably be the m ost erroneous): is deconstruction as you do it (to the degree that it can be done) a m ethod o f reading in the loose sense I’ve suggested? Is it a m ethod for interpreting, remobilizing, reconfiguring the text?

JD : T h is is a question to w hich one can not furnish an adequate response without rethinking from top to bottom the concept o f m ethod, thus o f path [voie], o f way [chemin], o f becom ing-m ethod o f the way (from Parm enides to H egel and beyond). I have tried to suggest as m uch elsewhere, with and w ithout Heidegger...

M S : W ould you accept the reform ulation that I gave?

JD : If instead o f method, you say “heuristic” and “fam ily resem blance,” the concept o f “fam ily resem blance” is already absolutely devastating. It recalls that there are noth ing but differences. T h e m anner in w hich resem blances are constituted and stabilized is relative, tem porary, precarious: one must take all sin gu lar o ccu rren ces into acc o u n t. I realize th at som e th in gs overlap. B u t th e “ ru le s” fo r th ese o v e r lap p in g s are n o t g e n e ra l ru les, applicable from the outside. A relative generality strives each time to adjust itself to a text, a case, a problem , a singularity. You say, “if the procedures o f decon struction are possib le, ‘su ccessfu l.’” I’m n ot sure decon struction is p o ss ib le , th at it is o f th e o rd er o f th e p o ss ib le . O n th is q u e st io n o f possibility, on deconstruction as the experience o f the im possible, I have explained m yself abundantly in Mémoires and in Psyché.

D e c o n stru c t io n is not “ p o ss ib le ” i f “p o s s ib le ” m ean s to work as a technical instrum ent functions or obeys a program . D econstruction is an


explanation with, an experience o f the im possible. M oreover, it is to the ex te n t that one does more and so m eth in g o th er th an d e v e lo p in g the necessity and the possibilities o f a program that som ething happens and a form of responsibility, a decision, an action takes place precisely where one begins to make out the lim its o f the possible. D econstructing is not possible in s o m e o n e ’s, a g ro u p ’s, a d is c o u r se ’ s, an in s t i t u t io n ’s m a s te r in g a m eth od ology or tech n iq u e app lied to m ak in g so m eth in g h ap p en . T h is deconstructs. F rom th is standpoint, what is ca lled “deconstruction” in the sense o f a relatively coherent set o f discursive rules at a given m oment in W estern discourse is only a symptom— an effect o f deconstruction at work in what one might call history (all o f the geopolitical earthquakes: the 1917 rev o lu tio n , the two w orld wars, p sy ch o an aly sis, the T h ird W orld , the tech n o-econ om ico-scien tific an d m ilitary m utations, etc., etc ., e tc .). A ll this, this open and nonself-identical totality o f the world is decni struction. It’s a deconstruction in act or at work. A n d this must be brought back into play without recourse to either a theory o f reflection or o f ideology (be it refined to the extrem e) in order to analyze this re lation betw een these “real” deconstructions and the apparently academ ic discourse to w hich we g ran t th is n am e and w h ich , m o reo v er, is n o lo n g e r or n ev e r was as academ ic as som e people sometimes thought or allowed it to be thought.

D econstruction happens [ça arrive] and it already happened in P la to ’s discourse in another form, with other words perhaps, but there was already an inadéquation, a certain inability lo close itself off, to form, to formalize itself, w hich was o f a deconstructive order. If it has always been at work everywhere— in particular in the grand philosophical discourses— why does it attem pt today to formalize and thematize itself, to nam e itself as well, but w ithout bein g able to do so? I don ’t believe th at deconstruction can be form alized . “T h is ” a ttem p ts to form alize, them atize , n am e itse lf in th is nam e. A n excellent question would be: W hy does it take this form and this nam e today? W ell, what I would like to call deconstruction would be above all an effort to re sp on d to that q u estio n or, ra th er, to e la b o rate it as q u estio n , in order to perh aps go beyond the e lab o ratio n o f a qu estion tow ard th e p re su p p o s it io n s o f su ch a p ro b le m a tic , even tow ard th e problem atic and th e questionable in general. W hat is happening today that causes “ d e co n stru ctio n ” to becom e a them e u nder this n am e? W hat is “today” ? Really, when I think about it, this is what interests me and seem s to me to n ot have any fixed lim it. W h at interests me, th at is, what engages me before and beyond the question itself is not the success o f a m ethod, a search or a powerful discourse. Rather, what interests me is to try to think about w hat happens there, what happens to thought as thought, w hich h e re is ev ery th in ^ , e x c e p t a s u b je c t iv e , s p e c u la t iv e , t h e o r e t ic a l


representation or a ph ilosophico-academ ic discourse. W hy is it n ot only that we speak this way today, but why also are we not able to rid ourselves o f these questions and m otifs? W hy is it that fo r decades now we can merely decree th at we are fin ish ed w ith them , th at they are ou tdated , as if to exo rc ise , in a k in d o f an im ist d en ia l, the p ersisten t n ecessity o f these deconstructive questions? Powerlessness interests me also: im possibility at le a s t as m u ch as p o s s ib i l ity . I s n ’t p o l it ic s or th e p o l i t ic a l a lso th is engagem ent w ith powerlessness?

W hen I spoke a while ago about opening to the event, the com ing o f the other, etc., that also is the experience o f the im possible. It’s the sole true provocation to be reflected upon. T h in k in g takes p lace not on what we can do, but beginning with w hat we can n ot do. A n d a dem ocracy in which one thinks everything possible and that dem ocracy exists is already gone. If I may be allowed an aphorism , dem ocracy, for me, is the political experience o f the im possible, the political experience o f open ing to the other as possibility o f im possibility. T h e event only happens under the aegis o f th e im p o ss ib le . W hen an e v e n t, e ffic ien cy or an y th in g is deem ed p o s s ib le , it m e a n s th a t we h a v e a lr e a d y m a s te r e d , a n t i c ip a t e d , preunderstood and reduced the eventhood o f the event. O ur relation to the ev en t as our re la tio n to the oth er, that is, as n o n v o id (th u s p o ssib le ) e x p e r ie n c e o f im p o s s ib i l i t y — th is p e r h a p s is a (b a r e ly f ig u r a b le , n o n re p re se n ta b le ) figure o f d e c o n str u c t io n . It can tak e m an y o th e r discursive form s, but, for me, the “liv e liest” aspect o f deconstruction , its very resource, is this singular experience.

H ow ever, I m istrust the form ulas I’ve just used. T a k e n in them selves, a lo n e , w ith o u t an y o th e r c o n te x tu a liz a t io n , w ith o u t su p p lem en ta ry discourse an d precautions, th ey ca n becom e politically qu ite dangerous and com prom ised with that w hich should have been avoided: “opening to the o th e r” h a s a lread y b eco m e a m o ra liz in g and u n p a la ta b le ste reo ty p e ; “possibility o f the im possible” o r “ im possible possibility” is n ot far from the form ulas with which H eidegger defines being-for-death. W ithout wishing to set m yself in opposition either to the ethics o f opening to the other or to the existential analytic o f Dasein as being-for-death (here associated in a very sign ificant way with the other and death), I would not want what I’ve just said abou t th e subject o f the im possible an d o f the o th er to be simply assim ilated to the discourses I have evoked. I will thus, for lack o f time, sp a c e , an d a p p ro p r ia te s i tu a t io n , k eep in re se rv e a g reat n u m b er o f p recau tio n s n ecessary for av o id in g th ese co n fu sio n s— p recau tio n s th a t would a lso be, to a certain extent, political. I believe that those interested in this can find the principle and the developm ent in several o f my texts, fo r e x am p le , th o se on H e id e g g e r an d on L e v in a s . I w ould add oth er


protocols. T h e them es o f the impossible and the incalculable can allow for the worst abuses if they are not articulated carefully, I dare say if one does not ca lcu la te th e ir a r t ic u la t io n w ith c a lc u la t io n , the p o ss ib le , th e m e a su ra b le , th e h o m o g e n e o u s , e tc . O n e m u st m a ste r a n d c a lc u la te dem ocratically also; there must be votes, thus identifiable subjects, subjects by r ig h t , m a jo r i t i e s , d e te r m in a b le l e g a l i t i e s , e t c .— a p e r p e tu a l ly indispensable negotiation betw een the singular opening to the im possible w hich must be safeguarded and the m ethod, the right, the technique, the d e m o c ra tic c a lc u la tio n ; b etw een d em ocracy to com e and th e lim ited present o f dem ocratic reality. T h e law o f iterability w hich I recalled earlier, but w hich I can not explain here (cf. Signature Event Context and Limited Inc.) is decisive here fo r defining the possibility, chance, risks involved in such a n ego tiation betw een singularity and con cept. T h is n egotiation is indispensable: it is included with the rules, but “ in the last in stan ce” (yes!); it is w ithout rule and guaranteed rigor.

M S: Precisely.

JD : T h is is perhaps w hat politics is!

M S: W hat I was going to say in response to what you said earlier— this is L en in ’s point and this is also what A lthusser picks up from Lenin— in order to realize this sort o f sligh tly unrealizable revo lu tion ary “dem ocracy to com e,” in order for that to happen, there has to be science.

JD: A bsolutely.

M S: T h a t w h ich w ill b rin g the in calcu lab le in to p lay w ill be ra tio n a l calcu lation abou t the possibility at any given m om ent.

JD : Each day, one must change, fin d a way, attem pt to calculate without ru les a way b etw een th e in ca lcu lab le and the c a lcu la b le . W hat I ca ll n egotiation does n o t sim ply negotiate th e negotiable, it negotiates betw een the negotiable and the nonnegotiable, it n egotiates tragically because it is terrible and fatal (but would be at least as m uch so otherw ise), it negotiates the n o n n egotiab le . T h is n ego tia tio n is every th in g but a p o sitio n or an assurance, it advan ces without assurance after havin g exhausted all the possibilities o f calculation and, thus, o f science.

M S: O ne m ore question very quickly, an d probably th en we should stop. I kn o w th a t y ou t h in k p h i lo s o p h ic a l d i s c o u r s e a n d th e r e a d in g o f

POLITICS A ND FRIENDSHIP 229

p h ilo so p h ic a l tex ts a n d th e a c tiv ity we are in gen era l en gaged in are im portant interventions in contem porary life . T h e question I w ould want to ask is: how do you think theoretical discourse intervenes in political life? A w h ile ago , you sa id th a t to som e e x te n t the s to p p in g sh ort o f the A lthusserians was in p art responsible for th e dem ise o f M arxism in France. You d idn ’t quite say that. But the im plication is that if they had thought further, had they not simply drawn a line, things m ight have been different.

JD : I’m still too M arxist to th ink that. A t that tim e, in the place they were, and thus who they were, interpellated and situated as they were, they (those “su b jects”) could not think or act otherwise, since the general situation— the place in which they were inscribed— did not allow it. Bad luck.

M S : T h a t i's w h at I w ould say , bu t s t i l l , i f we are in the b u sin e ss o f producing theoretical discourse, we w ant to say that theoretical discourse m atters. T h e question is, precisely, how? W hat is the weight o f theoretical d iscou rse in co n tem p orary p o lit ic a l life in p lace s like France and the U n ited States?

JD : M in im al. I’ve never thought or hoped (especially not hoped !) that a deconstructive practice (as such) would invade the entire field and occupy a dom inan t position fit for transform ing the existence o f a party, not to sp eak o f all the rest. It is ab so lu te ly in d isp en sab le th at other types o f p r a c t ic e s— s c ie n t i f ic or o th e rw ise — be p u rsu e d . B u t the id e a th a t a d e c o n stru c tiv e d isco u rse m igh t co m e to co m m an d and rep lace oth er p ractices, discursive or n ot, is a k in d o f m adness or com edy th a t doesn ’t interest me in the least. D eco n stru c tio n ’s m otif, im pulse or stim ulus is doubtlessly necessary an d at w ork in p laces on e least expects (today in n u m erou s n o n -lite rary and n o n -p h ilo so p h ic a l f ie ld s ), but w ith ou t its replacing or substituting for anything else. A s to th e effects o f theoretical discourse in general upon political reality, they cannot be analyzed as they were in the nineteenth century or even before W orld W ar II. Everything is to be r e v a m p e d in th is r e s p e c t . A d e v e lo p e d c a p i t a l i s t so c ie ty is c h arac terized by th e fa c t t h a t th e w orlds o f ed u c a tio n , re search , and in form ation (u n iv ersitie s and research in stitu te s) d irectly or ind irectly irrigate the en tire social fabric. T h e circulation o f languages an d ideas is fo llow in g a ltogeth er d ifferen t tra je c to rie s . A n d , p arad ox ica lly , w hat is ca lled theoretical discourse has, I w ould say, no more “ influence,” but is more directly in co n tac t w ith the decision -m aking instances— it is both more perm eable and m ore penetrating. It com m unicates a lon g new, more diversified, m ore overdeterm ined trajectories with the “general” discourse


o f society, with “public op in ion ,” with the discourse o f politicians, w ith the military discourse, with the jurid ical'd iscourse. W e should not, therefore, underestim ate what is happening in places where this discourse appears too com plicated or sophisticated. It is indeed less decipherable, m ore confined, more “p r iv a te ” than before on accou n t o f the m ass-m ed iatization th at hom ogenizes, and thus sim plifies and censors, m ore and more. But the in v erse is a lso tru e: it b e n e fits from a g ro w in g ca p illa ry a c t io n th a t undoubtedly carries along w ith it great w aste, but which, a ll to ld , causes m ore com m unication th an before. Our analyses must be adjusted to these paradoxes. W e m ust return to the “ infrastructure/superstructure” m odel(s), the figure o f the intellectual, the relations betw een the university, the nonacadem ic research institutes and the socio-political space— and thereby so m any other things.

M S: W ell, two th ings I would say at this poin t. W hat you said, I th ink th a t’s true. It’s wrong to underestim ate the effects o f theoretical discourse.

JD: N o t the effects in the sense o f effects o f a cause or in a sense where theoretical discourse would be the cause o f effects it would produce all by itself, as a cause or as causa sui. T h e relation o f causality is too overdeter- m ined to enable us to say, “Th is, w hich is this, identical to itself, has m any or few effects (i.e., this or that, w hich is identical to itself) upon this or th at, e tc .”

A sm all exam ple in closing. I burst out laughing when I read twice in the press (notably in the W all Street Journal) that A llan Bloom , the author o f The Closing o f the American Mind, accused Foucault and me by nam e o f a whole bunch o f negative things in the U .S . like, for exam ple, Judge Bork ’s failure and the destabilization o f discussions about original in ten t in the C o n stitu tio n . T h en , after laugh ing— and ju dgin g— I said to myself, “O f course!” N either Foucault, nor I, nor any individual, nor “deconstruction” is responsible for the fact th at at the tim e o f the hearings all those questions on o r ig in a l in ten t to o k on the p ro p o rtio n s they did an d led to th o se conclusions. W e d id n ’t produce those questions: they were produced by a gen eral decon stru ction where everyone asks h im self, “W h at is orig in al in ten t? W h at ax io m atic en sures its authority? W h at in terests serve this ax iom atic? W hat is th e m eaning o f th e C on stitu tion ?” T h ese questions are not the effects o f a theoretical discourse, but, rather, they are theoretical or th e o re tico -p o lit ica l ev en ts th at h ap pen and w h ich can n o t be w ithout relation to th e w ork Foucault an d I, am ongst others, took an interest in, the work whose interest com m anded the attention (and not fortuitously) o f so m any people— work on intentionality , w ill to say [vouloir-dire], m eaning


and signification, the text, the concept o f the author, the theory and limits to the theorization o f speech acts, etc. N on e o f these projects are causes, but they are n ot acciden ts or isolatable epiphenom ena either. Betw een the constitu tion al debates over original intent (w ith their enormous direct or indirect stakes) and a certain state o f genealogico-deconstructive research, th e re is a c e r t a in c o n f ig u r a t iv i t y . T o sa y th a t i t ’ s F o u c a u l t ’ s or “decon struction ’s” fault is stupid; but to claim that there is no relationship and to be insensitive to this configuration would not be serious either.

T ranslated by R obert Harvey

*A related article, indirectlly referred to in this text, is Jacques Derrida, “The Politics of Friendship,” Journal of Philosophy 11 (Novem ber 1988).

Gregory Elliott

The Lonely Hour of the Last Instance: Louis Pierre Althusser, 1918-1990

A gain st w hat com m on sense, the com m on sense o f financiers and lawyers, tells us, there are many w ritings that blow away, but a few words that re m a in . N o d o u b t b e c a u se they h a v e b ee n inscribed in life and history.

— Louis A lthusser on Jean H yppolite, 1968

T h e d eath o f L o u is A lth u sse r— C om m u n ist, M arx ist, p h ilo sop h er— sc a rc e ly c o n s t itu te s a h is to r ic a l fa c t by his ow n e x a c tin g c r ite r ia o f historicity. W ith it, how ever, on e o f th e m ost extraordinary chapters in m odern intellectual history h as finally com e to a close.

O f the prin cipal representatives o f the two m ajor traditions with which he is associated— French Structuralism and W estern M arxism — A lthusser is survived only by C laude Lévi-Strauss and Jürgen H aberm as, respectively, as b io g ra p h ic a l a c c id e n t su p erv e n e s to co m p o u n d th e p h ilo so p h ico - political verdicts o f the postm odernist ‘80s on the marxisant ‘60s.

T o date, w ith th e excep tio n o f T ed B e n to n ’s adm irable n o tice in the Independent (27/10/90), obituaries on both sides o f the C h an n el have been c h a ra c te r ise d by a p e rv a s iv e , i f p re d ic ta b le , an ti-M a rx ism . E v id e n t sym pathy for the man, fond m em ories o f the teacher, deep respect for the maître, have been accom pan ied— w hether in the Guardian, Le Monde or Libération— by the conviction (stated or im plied) th at A lth usser’s u ltim ate s ig n ifican ce resides in h is h av in g d em on strated , n ot on ly th a t it isn ’t “ sim ple to be a M arxist in p h ilo so p h y ,” but th at it is q u ite im possible. Indeed, doubtless pour décourager les autres, some have n ot h esitated to iden tify the d eath o f H élè n e A lth u sse r at her h u sb an d ’s h an d s as the inevitable dénouement o f the very endeavour. Faits divers, fait politique... A s if all th a t rem ained was th e wreckage o f a career tragically term inated by an indivisible act o f destruction an d self-destruction.


Before accounts can be settled, they must be accurately drafted. A n d we have yet to settle our accounts with Althusser. Buried in silence fo r the last decade o f his life, the philosopher who wistfully observed o f h im self th at he was fam ous solely for bein g notorious— but w ho was, by any just reckoning, on e o f th e m ost im portant M arxist th inkers o f th e tw entieth century— deserves better on the occasion o f his passing.

T h e full, desperate story o f the life and deaths o f Louis A lthusser awaits its historian; one day it will have to be told. For, w hilst it may not be allow ed to fun ction — surreptitiously or b latan tly , w ith regret or schadenfreude— as a substitute for an adequate intellectual appreciation , nor should it be evaded by anyone seeking to do elementary justice to him. In truth, it only serves to render his achievem ent the more rem arkable.

T h e bare outlines o f w hat he once referred to as “autoheterobiographical circum stances” are clear enough. Born in Birm andreis, A lgeria, in O ctober 1918, A lth u sse r ’s youth was m arked by the overw helm in g in fluence o f tra d itio n a l R om an C a th o lic ism — first in the sh ape o f a p iou s m oth er, Lucienne, an d th en in th e strongly anti-Popular Front m ilieu o f th e Lycée du Parc, Lyons, where from 1936 to 1939 he was taught in the preparatory c la ss for the E co le N o rm ale S u p érieu re (E N S ) by Je a n G u itto n , Jean L a c r o ix and Jo se p h H o u rs ( in co m m o n w ith c o n te m p o r a r ie s th ere , A lth u sser belonged to the Jeunesse étudiante chrétienne). T ra in ed in the kind o f sp iritualist philosophy he was subsequently to d isdain , A lth usser cam e six th in the h igh ly com petitive exam in ation fo r the E N S in Ju ly 1939— only to be called up fo r m ilitary service that Septem ber. C aptured the follow ing summer, he spent close on five years as a prisoner o f war in Sch lesw ig H olstein , years attended by a loss o f fa ith and the onset o f a long history o f depressive illness.

U po n his release A lth usser resum ed his form al education , com in g first in the extremely dem anding agrégation in philosophy in 1948, with a thesis (sup erv ised by G a s to n B ach e lard ) on The N otion o f Content in Hegel's P h ilosoph y . In N o v e m b e r 1 9 4 8 h e w as a p p o in te d caim an ( te a c h e r re sp o n sib le for p rep arin g stu d en ts for th e agrégation) a t the E N S and rem ained there fo r the rest o f his active life, being prom oted to Secretary o f the Ecole in 1962. T h e sam e m onth he jo in ed the French C om m un ist Party, rallied from quasi-heretical, left-C atholic circles by the bitter class struggles o f the C o ld W ar conjuncture, the prom ptings o f his philosophical in tim ates (in particu lar Jacqu es M artin — the “prince o f in telligen ce ,” in M erleaU 'Ponty ’s words— to w hom For M arx is dedicated), an d the exam ple o f H élè n e L e g o tie n (a lia s R y tm a n )— R e sista n ce h ero in e , C o m m u n ist dissident, later a distinguished sociologist— whom he m et in the winter o f 1945-46. A lth ou gh A lth usser m aintained co n tact w ith various C ath olic

THE LONELY HOUR OF THE LA ST IN STA N CE 235

circles throughout h is life, the die was now cast; h e would never resign his party card, adm ission ticket to the w orking-class m ovem ent, w hich is “our only hope an d our destiny.”

F ir st h o sp ita liz e d in 1 9 4 6 , an d e v e n tu a lly d ia g n o se d as a m an ic - depressive subject to fits o f profound m elancholy, A lthusser was obliged to return to psychiatric institutions with increasing frequency over the years, subm itting to a range o f treatm ents, from drugs to E C T , in search o f some respite from the “fearful traum as” that plagued him and induced a Pascalian terror before reality . A s his form er student, co llaborator, and com rade, E tien n e B a lib ar , rem in d ed m ourners a t his fun eral, A lth u sse r suffered terribly, ten aciou sly w agin g, bu t in exo rab ly lo sin g , th a t “w ar w ith ou t m em oirs or m em orials” h e evoked, in p lan gen t tonalities, in “Freud and L acan ” (1964 ). W hen, in N ovem ber 1980, defeat came, provoked in part by the p o litica l se tbacks o f the late ‘70s, the p itiless form it took — the “murder” o f his com panion o f som e thirty-five years— condem ned him to oblivion thereafter: a living death, divided between a succession o f clinics and the obscurity o f the tw entieth arrondissement o f Paris, nourished only by the devotion o f a few friends and dim inishing hopes o f one day regaining h ealth and resum ing work.

T h a t day never dawned fo r this doux maître à la science pure et dure, who nevertheless persevered in existence with a fortitude one m ight be tem pted to call singular, were it not com m on to all those fo r whom H ell is not other people, but som ething infinitely more insidious and ineluctable: their own subjectivity.

Th is, then , was th e personal backdrop to the public career o f a thinker who only emerged from the seclusion o f the rue d'Ulm into the celebrity of the Q uartier Latin after the Fourth Republic had succum bed to De G aulle's coup d ’état and as the P C F sought to rechart its course am idst the treacherous currents o f de-Stalinization and the consequent S ino-Soviet split. A gain st the current o f the prevalent M arxist hum anism , predom inantly m oral in cast an d now b e in g ad o p ted in h o m e o p a th ic d o ses by the W est E u ro p ean C om m unist Parties for official purposes, A lthusser essayed a reconstruction o f “h istorical and d ia lectica l m aterialism ”— o f M arxist science and M arxist philosophy— conducive to a “left-wing critique o f Stalin ism ... that would ... help p u t som e substance back into the revolutionary project here in the W est.” U nveiled in 1965 in the two books for w hich he is renowned— the ch a ra c te r is tic a lly la co n ic a lly e n tit le d For M arx and Reading C ap ita l— A lth u sse r ’s M arx ism rep resen ted an au d aciou s co m b in atio n o f political radicalism, advertising Leninist affiliations an d intim ating M aoist sympathies, and philosophical modernism, c o n ju g a tin g B ach e la rd ian co n v e n tio n alist epistem ology and Lacanian structuralist psychoanalysis with the “m aterialist conception o f history.”

236 T H E ^LT H U SSE R IA N LEGACY

A lth u sse r was la te r to identify S p in o z a— and not Sau ssu re— as the ph ilosopher-general w ho h ad inspired the n ovel accen ts and distinctive theses o f h is intervention in M arxism . A t the tim e, how ever, its austere anti-em piric ism , its relentless h ostility to h istoric ism , and its astrin gen t theoretical an ti-h um anism partially aligned it w ith the contem poraneous enterprises o f L év i-S trau ss and Lacan , B arth es and Foucault, and it was rapidly assim ilated to the ascendent structuralism .

H ig h A lth u s se r ia n ism e s se n t ia lly e n c o m p a sse d th re e c o n v e rg in g in itia tives. F irst, it ventured a re-reading o f the M arx ist can on , w hich revolved around the p ostu late o f an “ ep istem ological b reak ” betw een the ideological w orks o f the Y oung M arx an d the sc ientific discourse o f the m atu re M arx , re sto r in g C ap ita l to p rid e o f p la c e a fte r its tem p o rary dem olitio n by th e P aris Manuscripts. Secon dly , it offered an altern ative philosophy to “D iam at” positivism an d W estern-M arxist anti-naturalism — the “T h eo ry o f th e o re tica l p rac tice ,” an ep istem ology w hich sought to reconcile convention alist disclosure o f the historical, social an d theoretical ch aracter o f science with realist insistence on the existence o f “real ob jects” independent o f, and irreducible to, theory. T h ird ly , it elaborated a non- econom istic “science o f th e history o f social form ations,” com prising four m ain com ponents: (1 ) an anti-H egelian recasting o f the d ialectic, w hich excised abstract fatalism from and inscribed the “necessity o f contingency” in its stru c tu re s , v ia th e c o n c e p ts o f “ c o n tr a d ic t io n an d o v e rd e te r m in ation ” ; (2) a reconceptualization o f the structure o f social form ations th at credited their constitu tive com plexity by d isp lacin g the base/superstru c tu re m o d e l in fa v o u r o f a sc h e d u le o f “ re la t iv e ly a u to n o m o u s” in sta n c e s— eco n o m ic , p o lit ic a l, id e o lo p 'c a l— gov ern ed by a stru ctu ra l cau sality o f “determ ination in th e last in stan ce”; (3 ) an anti-te leological theory o f m odes o f production as articulated com bin ation s o f re lation s and forces of production, which eschewed evolutionism in the theorization of h istorical transition; (4 ) finally— and perhaps most controversially— a reth eorization o f ideology, n ot as “false co n sc iou sn ess,” but as “ necessary illusion”— people’s imaginary relations to their real conditions o f existence, w hich m ight be transform ed, but w hich would n ot be d issipated , under com m unism .

T h e effect o f A lth u sse r ’s theoretical de-Sta lin ization , in and beyond France, was noth ing short of electric. H is renew al o f M arxism represented a liberation for a younger generation , spared the long S ta lin is t n ight o f th eory fo r w hose duration C om m un ist in tellectuals h ad been reduced to ideo log ica l officiators of th e party “lin e ,” but still invariably intim idated in to “o ffic ia l p h ilo sop h y ” by in sin u ation s o f o r ig in a l so c ia l sin . T h is , crucially, was the significance o f the scandalous A lthusserian revindication

THE LONELY HOUR OF TH E LA ST IN STA N CE 237

o f the autonom y o f theory: not the self-elevation o f a scientific elite which his detractors, wilfully or carelessly , construed it as, neglecting his own d e e p ly - fe lt (a n d l iv e d ) c o n te x tu a l a l lu s io n to th o se “ w h ose lab o u r , sufferings and struggles ... nourish and sustain our whole present and future, all our argum ents for life and hope”; but the defence, against the intrusions (an d p o te n tia l dep red atio n s) o f S ta te , Party or C la s s , o f the co gn itiv e autonom y o f explanatory science— and hence o f freedom o f research— as a prerequisite o f any em ancipatory political practice. In short, C aesar non est supra grammaticos; n or is th e Politburo.

Quite the reverse o f the dogm atist he is so often portrayed as, A lthusser was acutely conscious o f the problem atic ch aracter o f h is alternatives to actually ex istin g M arxism . N o sooner had h e expounded them than he em barked upon a prolonged exercise in auto-critique. F rom the lectures even tu ally p ub lish ed as Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy o f the Scientists (1967 ; 1974), via Lenin and Philosophy (1 9 6 8 ), to Reply to John Lewis (1 9 7 2 ) and Elements o f Self-Criticism (1 9 7 4 ), he returned again and again to ponder and rectify his original theses, in the process concedin g the unilateralism o f their form ation, yet defending the indispensability o f such “ e x tr e m ism ” to a p ro p e rly m a te r ia l i s t p r a c t ic e o f p h ilo so p h y — one concerned, that is, w ith its extra-philosophical effectivity.

T h e redefin ition o f philosophy as “class struggle in theory” occupied m ost o f the second phase o f A lth usser’s career, but not to th e exclusion o f a last sem inal contribution to substan tive social theory: the celebrated extract from on e o f m any abortive projects in this period, published as “ Ideology and Ideological S tate A pparatuses” (1970), which registered the im pact o f the C ultural R evolution in C h in a and May ‘68 in France, and proved to be his single most in fluential text. T h ereafter, in a third phase from 1976 on w ards, A lth u sse r sim u ltan eo u sly d isp lay ed h is p o lit ic a l c red e n tia ls , culm inating in h is philippic against the leadership o f the PC F following its sabotage o f the U nion o f the L e ft in 1978 (W hat M ust Change in the Party), and set about a self-destruction o f A lthusserianism (see especially Marxism Today, 1978) as ruthless as anything undertaken by his critics.

V arious exp lanations m ight be advan ced fo r this sombre developm ent. N o doubt som e ov erd eterm in atio n o f the p h ilo so p h ico -p o litica l hopes aggravated an already d eep en in g m elan ch o lia . “T h e future la sts a long tim e,” A lthusser h ad incessantly cautioned those who lived politics in the mode o f “subjective urgency.” By the turn of the decade there was little reason to suppose that it would witness les lendemains qui chantent.

Tw enty-five- years on, w h at endures o f a th ou gh t th at guarantees its a u th o r an e x c e p tio n a l p o sit io n in co n tem p o rary in te lle c tu a l h isto ry , p re c ar io u s ly p o ise d b e tw een a M a r x is t t r a d it io n w h ich he ra d ic a lly


criticized and reconstructed for the sake o f the revolutionary cause, and a “p o s t- M a rx ism ” w h ich has d isav o w e d h im , a lo n g w ith its e rstw h ile p h ilo so p h ic a l c o n sc ie n c e , in th ese new tim es? W h at p ers is ts o f the “ A lth u sser ian revo lu tion ,” w h ich for a decad e show ed scan t respect for n ation al borders or disciplinary boundaries, sponsored a mass o f research (m uch o f it o f lasting value), and defined the terms o f theoretical debate on the Left? If m any o f his writings have blown away, are there a few words that rem ain, albeit screened by a convenient am nesia?

T h ere is, first and forem ost, the fact th at A lth u sser’s re-reading o f the classics reconnected M arxism with vital, non-M arxist currents o f thought (e .g ., psychoanalysis and lin gu istics), restoring their brutally interrupted com m unication and facilitating a series o f new departures (especially in the theory o f ideology and cultural criticism ). Secon dly , his ph ilosophy for science at once registered the autonom y o f the natural and social sciences, and vindicated the possibility o f science as the (interm inable) production o f rectifiable, objective know ledge o f its object. Thirdly, the A lthusserian critique o f the H egelian dialectic (and its M arxist avatars) as intrinsically teleological released M arxism from a series o f false prom issory notes (the inevitability o f socialism as a function o f linear econom ic progression; the p r o le t a r i a t as th e “ u n iv e r s a l c l a s s ” in a se c u la r iz e d t h e o d ic y o f (de)alien ation ; the historical m essianism o f an “end o f ideology” ). Finally, the system atic reconstruction o f h istorical m aterialism reclaim ed it as an open sc ie n tif ic re se arch program m e, ta k in g dead ly aim at a cr ip p lin g eco n o m ic determ in ism an d its corollary , eco n o m ic redu ctio n ism , as it p ertain ed to po litica l p ractice an d cu ltu ra l p rodu ction alike. In w hat is a rg u a b ly th e q u in te s se n t ia l A lth u s se r ia n essay , “ C o n tr a d ic t io n an d O verdeterm ination” (1962 ), a generation found its licence and its charter:

In History ... the superstructures ... are never seen to step respectfully aside when their work is done or, when the Tim e com es, as his pure phenom ena, to scatter before H is M ajesty the Econom y as he strides a long the royal road o f the D ialectic. From the first m om ent to the last, the lonely hour o f the “last in stan ce” never com es.

“T h eo retica l p ractice”; “epistem ological break”; “sym ptom atic reading”; “ o v e rd e te r m in a t io n ” ; “d e te rm in a tio n in the la s t in s ta n c e ” ; “ re la tiv e au ton om y ”; “ im aginary re lation s” ; “ ideo logical state app aratuses” ; “class struggle in theory”: a few words— concepts an d categories— th at rem ain, inscribed in life and history (and “better fewer but better,” as som eone once said). For they opened up new horizons within the “continent o f history,” restored the intellectual reputation o f M arxism , m ade it, i f not simple, then

THE LONELY HOUR OF THE LA ST INSTANCE 239

that m uch easier to be a M arxist— in philosophy, cultural studies, literary criticism , sociology, anthropology , p o litica l theory, etc .— th an it would otherwise have been , His im m ediate students were not th e only on es for whom A lthusser provided either a theoretical form ation or a form ation for theory. O thers, who never m et him, recognize the immense debt they owe h im an d co u ld m ake B a lib a r ’s ack n o w led g em en t th e ir own: “I lea rn t everything, if not from A lthusser, th en thanks to h im .”

T h a t such a legacy should have been forged am idst such adversity— alm ost on borrow ed or stolen tim e— can only en h an ce (an d in no way qualify) our adm iration fo r Louis A lth usser. In the last instance, if not before, we m ay be grateful to him.

Jacques Derrida

Text Read at Louis Althusser’s Funeral

I knew , in advan ce , th at today I would be in capab le o f speaking, o f finding the words, as it were.

Excuse me, therefore, if I read, and fo r reading n ot what I believe I must say (does one ever know what one m ust say in such a m om ent?), but simply enough to n ot let silence win out over everything else— just a few shreds o f what I was able to tear away from the silen ce in the depths o f which I w ould, like you, doubtlessly , h ave been tem pted to close m yself at this instant.

I lea rn ed o f L o u is ’ d e a th w ith in the la s t tw en ty-fo u r h ou rs, u pon returning from Prague— and th e nam e o f that city already seem s to m e so violent, alm ost unpronounceable. B u t I knew that upon m y return I h ad to call him : I had prom ised him I would.

Som eon e present here, who was near Louis when I last spoke to him on the telephone, probably rem em bers: when I prom ised to call him and to com e and see him when I cam e back from this trip, his last words, the last words I will have heard Louis pronounce were, “ if I’m still alive, yes, call me and com e over, hurry.” I had answ ered h im in a jocular tone in order to hide somewhere above my anxiousness and sadness, “O K, I’ll call and go

_ » over.Louis, th at tim e is no longer with us, I no longer h ave the strength to

call you, to ta lk to anyone— even to you (you are at once too ab sen t and too close: in me, inside m e), and even less have I the strength to speak to others about you even if they be, as is the case today, your friends, our friends.

I h av en ’t the heart either to recount anything or to pronounce a eulogy: there would be too m uch to say and this is n ot the m om ent. Our friends, your friends who are present here know why it is alm ost indecent to speak now— and to continue to direct our w ords to you. But silence is just as unbearable. I can n ot stand the idea o f silence, as if, w ithin me, you too could not stand the idea.

O n the death o f som eone close or o f a friend, when one has shared so m uch with him (and, here, I have been lucky in that, for thirty-eight years, my life h as been linked in a th ou san d strange ways w ith th at o f Louis A lthusser, sin ce 1952, when the caïman received in to his office the young student that I was then, and since the time when, later, in the sam e place, I

242 TH E ALTHUSSERIAN LEGACY

worked by his side fo r nearly twenty years), when one rem em bers just as well the light m om ents and the carefree laughter o f days that pass by as one d o es the m o m en ts sp e n t in in ten se w ork, te a c h in g , th in k in g , in the philosophical an d political polemos, or further, th e wounds an d th e worst w renching m om ents, the dram as and the m ournings, at the death o f this friend, there is, you all know, as always th at pang o f guilt, egotistical, to be sure, narcissistic also, but irrepressible, consisting in com plain ing to on eself and taking pity, that is, taking pity on eself upon oneself, and saying (and I am d o in g ju s t t h is , b e c a u se th is c o n v e n t io n a l p h ra se n e v e r f a i l s , nonetheless, to tell the truth o f this com passion): “ a whole part o f my life, a long and intense coursing o f my liv ing self h as been interrupted today, concludes an d thus dies w ith Louis in order to continue to accom pany him as in the p ast , but now w ith o u t retu rn an d to the lim its o f ab so lu te obscurity.” W hat ends, what Louis takes away with h im is not only this or th a t th in g h ere or th ere th a t we w ould h av e sh ared at som e tim e or another, it is the world itself, a certain origin o f the world— his world, o f course, but also the one in w hich I have lived, in w hich we had lived a unique story, one that is, in any case, irreplaceable and w hich will have had some sense or another for either one o f us, even if this sense could not be the sam e either for him or for me. It is a world that is for us the world, the only world, one that sinks into an abyss from w hich no m em ory (even if we keep the memory, and we will do so) can save it.

Even th o u gh I d e tect som e in to lerab le v io le n ce in th is m o vem en t co n sistin g in co m p la in in g abou t o n e ’s ow n d eath upon the d eath o f a friend, I have no desire to abstain from it: it is the only way remaining to keep Louis in me, to conserve m yself by conserving him in me just as, I am sure, we are all doing, each with his memory, w hich itself only exists with this m ovem ent o f m ourning, with its piece o f torn-off history— and this was such a rich and singular history, a murderous and still unthinkable tragedy so inseparable too from the history o f our tim e, so heavy with the whole p h ilo sop h ica l, p o litica l, geopo litica l h istory o f our tim e— a history that each o f us still apprehends with his own images. A n d there have been so m any im ages— the m ost beautiful and the m ost terrible— but all forever indissociable from the unique adventure w hich carries the nam e o f Louis A lthusser. I th ink I can speak for everyone here today w hen I say th at our b e lo n g in g to th is tim e was in e ra d ica b ly m ark ed by h im , by w hat he searched for, experim ented w ith , risked at th e highest price, by m eans o f all m o v e m e n ts : d e te rm in e d , su sp e n d e d , a u t h o r i t a r ia n an d p e r so n a lly concerned a t th e sam e tim e, contradictory, consequen tial or convulsive, extraordinarily im passioned as he was— a passion th at left him no respite because it spared him noth ing (w ith its th eatrica l rhythms, its deserts, its

TEXT READ A T LOUIS A LTH U SSER'S FUNERAL 243

great spaces o f silen ce, vertiginous retreats, th ose impressive interruptions them selves interrupted in their turn by dem onstrations, forceful incursions, and powerful eruptions o f w hich each o f his books preserves the burning trace for their having first transform ed the landscape around the volcano.

L o u is A lth u sse r trav e rse d so m any liv e s— ours, fir st o ff— so m any person al, h isto rica l, ph ilo sop h ical, an d p o litica l adventures, he m arked, inflected, and influenced so m any discourses, actions, and existences by the ra d ia tin g and p ro v o ca tiv e force o f h is th ou gh t, h is m an ners o f bein g, sp e a k in g , te a c h in g , th a t e v e n th e m o st d iv e r se an d c o n tr a d ic to r y testim onials could never exhaust their very source. T h e fact that each o f us h ad a d ifferen t re la tio n sh ip w ith L o u is A lth u sse r (an d I am n o t only speak in g o f philosophy or po litics), the fact th at each o f us knows that, through his or her singular prism , he or she only caught a glimpse o f but one secret (an inexhaustible secret for us, but also, and in an altogether d ifferen t way, fa th o m le ss fo r h im ), the fac t th at L o u is was a lto geth er different for oth er people, in these tim es an d in others, w ithin academ ia an d w ith ou t, a t the rue d ’U lm an d everyw here else in F ran ce, in the C om m un ist Party, the other parties and beyond all parties, within Europe and without, the fact that each o f us loved a different Louis A lthusser, at som e tim e, in so i" ? decade or anoth er (as it was my fortune till the very en d )— this generous m ultip licity , th is very overabu n d an ce that was his creates an obligation for us not to totalize, n o t to simplify, n ot to stop his step, n ot to fix a trajectory, not to seek som e advantage, n o t to cross things o u t or to ge t e v e n , and e sp e c ia lly n o t to m ak e c a lc u la t io n s , n o t to appropriate or reappropriate (even if it be through that paradoxical form of m anipulating or calcu lating reappropriation that is called rejection), not to seize w h at was in ap p ro p riab le and m ust rem ain so. Each o f us has a thousand faces, but those who knew Louis A lth usser know that, in him , this law found a glittering, surprising an d hyperbolic exam ple. H is work is, in the first place, great by w hat it attests to an d by w hat it risks, by w hat it traversed with th at plural, shattered, and oftentim es interrupted flash, by the very h igh risk taken and the en duran ce accepted : his adven tu re is singular, it belongs to no one.

I have no difficulty speaking (as I m ust h ere) abou t the th ings th at ten d ed to separate h im and m e, even to op pose us (im p lic itly or not, som etim es harsh ly , on bo th sm all and im portant m atters) because they never ch ipped aw ay at a friendship that was the dearer to m e on account o f those differences. For at no time could I consider that what was happening to him or what was happening through him, in these places where I still dw ell w ith him , as anything other th an upheavals in series, earthquakes or aw akenings o f vo lcan os, the singular or co llective tragedies o f our tim es—


the tim e that I will have, like you, shared with him . N ever, in spite o f everything that might have distanced us from each other or separated us, n ev er w as I able or did I w ish to o b serv e ( th a t is, w ith a sp e c ta to r ’s n eutrality ) w hat w as hap pen in g to h im or w hat w as h appening through him. A n d fo r everything which by his m eans or through him occupied my w hole adult life, even as far as the w renching trials that we are all thinking of, I w ill always remain, at the bottom o f my heart, grateful. T h e sam e goes for th at w hich is irreplaceable . A n d o f course, w hat rem ains the m ost presen t to my eyes, the m ost alive today, the closest an d the m ost precious, is h is fa ce , L o u is ’ h a n d so m e fa c e w ith its h ig h fo re h e a d , his sm ile , everything w hich in him, in the m om ents o f peace ( there were m om ents o f peace: many o f you here know that there w ere)— everything that radiated k in d n ess , the g ift an d dem an d o f love , m a n ife stin g an in co m p arab le attentiveness to th e youth o f that w hich is com ing, curiously vigilant for the dawn of signs still waiting to be understood, as to everything that upset the order, the program , facile consonance and previsibility. W h at to me rem ains today m ost alive is what in the light o f that face bespoke a lucidity at once im placable and indulgent, by turns resigned or trium phant, as was som etim es the case with the verve o f certain o f his outbursts. W hat 1 love the m ost in h im , p robab ly b ecau se this was h im , w hat fa sc in a te d me through w h at o th ers probably knew better th a n I, an d from m u ch closer th an I, was the sense and taste o f grandeur— a certain grandeur, o f the great theater o f political tragedy where the greater-than-life engages, deviates or p itilessly shatters the private body o f it actors.

W hen it arranges the echoing o f proper nam es like so many direction arrows or trails upon a territory to be occup ied , pub lic discourse about A lth u sser allow s the nam es o f M on tesqu ieu , for exam ple, or R ousseau , M arx or L e n in to re so n ate . T h o se w ho, so m etim es b eh in d the great c u r ta in s o f th a t p o l it ic a l th e a te r , a p p ro a c h e d A lth u sse r , th o se w ho approached th e hospital room an d th e bedside know th a t th ey ow e it to truth to a lso n am e Pascal, for exam ple, an d Dostoyevsky, an d N ietzsche— and A rtaud.

D eep down inside, I realize that Louis doesn ’t hear me: he only hears me inside me, inside us (we are, however, only ourselves from that point within us where the other, the m ortal other, resonates). A n d I know that within me his voice is insisting th at 1 do n ot pretend to speak to him . 1 also know th at I have nothing to teach you who are here, since you are here.

But above this tom b and above your heads, I dream o f addressing those who com e after him, or after us already, and whom I see (alas, by several signs) as too m uch in a hurry to understand, to interpret, to classify, fix, reduce, simplify, close off, an d judge, th at is, to m isunderstand that, here, it

TE X T READ A T LOUIS A LTH U SSER'S FUNERAL 245

is a question o f a n oh-so-singular destiny and o f th e trials o f existence, o f thought, o f politics, inseparably. I would ask them to stop a m om ent, to ta k e th e tim e to listen to our tim e (we h ad n o other on e), to patien tly deciph er everything th a t from our tim e cou ld be ratified an d prom ised in th e life, th e work, the nam e o f Lou is A lth usser . N o t on ly because the dim ensions o f this destiny should com m and respect (also the respect o f the tim e from which em erge these other generations, our generation), but also because the yet open wounds, the scars or hopes th at they will recognize in it and w hich were and are our scars and hopes, will certainly teach them som ething essential o f what rem ains to be heard, read, thought, and done. A s long as I live, that is, as long as the m em ory rem ains with me o f what Louis A lthusser gave me to live with him, near him: this is what I would like to recall to those who were not o f his tim e or who will not have taken the time to turn toward him . T h is is what I would hope one day to express more eloquently, without bidding adieu, for Louis A lthusser.

A n d now I w ant to give him back or lend him the floor. For another last word: his again. Rereading som e o f his works late into last night, the follow ing passage imposed itself upon me more than I read it or elected it to be resaid here. It is from one o f his first texts, Benolazzi et Brecht ( 1962 ):

Yes, we are first united b y that institution th at the spectacle is, but we are more deeply united by the sam e myths, the sam e them es th at govern us without our adm itting it, by the sam e spontaneously lived ideology. Yes, even though it is p ar excellence th at o f the poor, as in El Nost M ilan, we eat the same bread, experience the same angers, the sa m e r e v o lt s , th e sam e d e l ir ia ( a t le a s t in m em ory , w h ere th is im m inent possibility haunts us), not to m ention the sam e despondency over a time that no History can move. Yes, like M other C ourage, we have the sam e war at our doorstep, a hairsbreadth away, even inside us, the sam e horrible blindness, the sam e ashes in our eyes, the sam e earth in our m ouths. W e possess the sam e daw n and the sam e n ight: our u n c o n sc io u sn e ss . W e sh a re the sam e sto ry — an d th a t is w h ere everything begins.

T ranslated by R obert H arvey

e. ann kaplan, michael sprinker the althusserian legacy 1992.pdf

Documents

ec o n o

philosophy o f

n n kaplan

exception o f

auspices o f

n interview

vital heritage o f

variety o f disciplines