dynasticism and state consolidation

8/12/2019 Dynasticism and State Consolidation

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Dynastic Succession and Territorial Consolidation in Europe Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,

Washington D.C., September 1- , !""#.

$i%e& S. Sharma

Department of Political Science'ale (ni%ersit)P.*. +o !" "1

/e0 a%en, C2 "3#1"

%i%e&.sharma4)ale.edu

5ough Draft6 Do /ot Cite Without Permission.


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I am surprised that ancient and modern political writers have not attributed a greater influenceon the conduct of human affairs to laws dealing with successions. True, these laws belong tocivil affairs, but nonetheless they belong at the forefront of political institutions because theyexercise an incredible influence upon the social status of a people, of which political laws arebut a reflection. 1

The role of social institutions as an explanatory variable in international relations has been

neglected. In this paper I will lay the ground work for an institutionalist account of the

international politics of premodern Europe. Specifically, this paper will show how the laws of

succession, to a very large extent, determined the political geography of Europe. here

primogeniture was practiced !in combination with female inheritance" polities got larger as a

result of a logic endogenous to the laws of property that governed the transmission of politicalpower in this society. here partible inheritance persisted !despite female inheritance" we

observe continued fracturing of holdings. #y showing the institutional basis of territorial

consolidation in premodern Europe I am calling into $uestion the view of international relations

in the this period that can be described as %&arwinian'. (

The &arwinian model of the international system is emphatically not an accurate

framework with which to understand the international politics and war of late medieval and early

modern Europe. Indeed, as will be demonstrated below, the very power structure of the )atin

European international system was determined by dynastic social institutions. Internally, the

logic of high politics followed different rules* rules, that channeled political competition in a way

less dependent upon raw coercion. The logic endogenous to the laws of succession created

uni$ue mechanisms for the consolidation of territory and power short of all out war. The

vagaries of birth, life and death in dynastic ruling families under conditions of the prevailing laws

of succession meant that marriage provided bargaining chips that had high value in this society.

#ecause of dynasticism the politics of inheritance that was played out at all levels of society

became of paramount importance at its highest levels when the inheritances being transmitted

1 +lexis de Toc$ueville, Democracy in America, chapter .( See -ivek Sharma, The Impact of Institutions on /onflict and /ooperation in Early 0odern Europe ,2npublished 3ew 4ork 2niversity &issertation, (556.


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were principalities and varying configurations of lordship. The power configurations of this world

moved in different ways from the modern world and rules of inheritance meant that houses like

+ustria, with poor resources bases, could inherit their way to a world empire that could never

have been created through con$uest.

7f course, as is the case with modern families, disputes over inheritances were a ma8or

source of social strife and violence. &ynastic wars of succession were a logical conse$uence of

this configuration of property rights in which political power is transmitted in much the same way

as peasants transmitted their worldly goods. +s 9ames /ollins notes The families of European

rulers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries followed reproductive and lineal strategies entirely

similar to those of the peasant families over whom they ruled. I have addressed the issue ofdynastic wars of succession elsewhere. : ;ere I simply wish to note the sheer novelty of

dynastic politics. The ability to transmit political power through kinship created a uni$ue kind of

composite polity in which a common heir exercised rule over disparate lordships !whether

kingdoms or castles" as a conse$uence of inheritance. The potential for the consolidation of

political power to occur without coercion and by the mere act of following simple and generally

accepted rules of property permeating all levels of society, differentiates the patterns of behavior

of this society from all others. This is behavior rooted in social institutions not in the power

configurations of the international system. To be sure, strategic power considerations dictated

kinship strategies and violence often accompanied the assertion of dynastic rights, but the fact

remains that dynastic succession more often than not was entirely regular and peaceful and

much of the violence surrounding succession occurred under conditions of regencies when

minors had succeeded. The fact that minors succeeded to European kingdoms as a matter of

course with generally little danger of displacement through coups is evidence of 8ust how stable

this system of succession was.

State #uilding in Earlyrance in Modern Asian Studies 1 !9uly, 1??@",pp. A5


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+s will be shown below, this remarkable institutional innovation occurred within a deeply

troubled society. The Bermanic successor kingdoms of the west Coman empire were inherently

unstable political organisms. +t the root of this instability was the practice of partible

inheritance. hat Cichard >letcher has to say about the -isigothic kingdom of SpainDthe

largest and wealthiest of the subrankish entities. ;e writes, like all other early

medieval monarchies, -isigothic kingship was basically unstable. 3o clear conventions

governed the succession to the throne, and faction


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of a process through which a new form of political organiFation uni$ue to )atin EuropeD

dynastic lordshipDcame into being. H rimogeniture and female inheritance unleashed forces

that reshaped the )atin European world. The fragmentation of landholdings that had developed

by the tenth century was reversed and in short order what had been a world under siege and in

contraction began a long period of expansion whose conse$uences are still being felt today.

#efore getting to the institutions of dynastic succession it is important to first briefly place the

ages in Ceuter !ed.", The Medieval No ility * T.3. #isson, 3obility and the >amily in 0edieval >rance= +Ceview Essay in )rench *istorical Studies 1A ! " !Spring, 1??5", pp. 6?@eudalCevolution in (ast and (resent 1:( !>eb., 1??:", pp. Aeudal Cevolution' in (ast and (resent 166 !0ay, 1??@", pp. 1@@


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problem of succession in a broader framework.

+mong a cascade of institutional innovation that occurred around the turn of the

millennium were= 1" primogeniture and (" female inheritance. ? These two institutions were part

of a process through which a new form of political organiFation uni$ue to )atin EuropeD

dynastic lordshipDcame into being. 15 rimogeniture and female inheritance unleashed forces

that reshaped the )atin European world. The fragmentation of landholdings that had developed

!!&%$!=!# , hiladelphia, 2niversity of ennsylvania ress, 1?? .? See 9ane 0artindale, Succession and olitics, c. 1555rance in American *istorical Review H !:" !7ct., 1?@H", pp. ?5A


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by the tenth century was reversed and in short order what had been a world under siege and in

contraction began a long period of expansion whose conse$uences are still being felt today.

#efore getting to the institutions of dynastic succession it is important to first briefly place the

problem of succession in a broader framework.

The Succession

+ comparative perspective may help to clarify the problem of the succession. +ll monarchies

!except elective kingships" must devise strategies to transmit, as peacefully and orderly as

possible, the highest office of the polity. 2sually !even in elective monarchies" some form of

kinship is a critical factor in deciding the succession. e often refer to closely related peoples

who successively occupy the office of king !or whatever title is used to refer to the highest officeof the land" as %dynasties'. Thus, we hear of dynasties of Coman emperors, dynasties of

7ttoman emperors, dynasties of 0ughal emperors and even dynasties of merchants and

industrialists in more recent times. The presumption most of the time is that a reasonably

competent adult son of a reigning monarch will have at least a strong claim to succeed his

father. 11

/hicago= 2niversity of /hicago ress, 1??:, pp. 156


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;owever, most societies, including those mentioned above !the Coman, 7ttoman and

0ughal empires" fail to establish clear and indisputable lines of succession. There was no law

of the Coman succession* there were many attem+ts !such as under &iocletian" to create a

stable system of succession, but in practice the Coman succession from the very beginning

under +ugustus was determined by the army, usually through civil war. The Coman empire

never became a hereditary dynastic monarchy. This is not to say that kinship played no role in

determining the potential candidates* only to say that blood !or adoption as was possible in the

Coman kinship system ut not the )atin European one" did not determine or create an

automatic presumption. It follows from this discussion that the Coman political system had a

ma8or institutional flaw* an unstable succession system led repeatedly to civil war.1(

Similarly, while 7ttoman sultans usually transmitted their empire to one of their sons,

there was no mechanism to determine which son !and given that the concept of illegitimacy had

no meaning in Islamic societies this was all the more complicated by the fact that a sultan could

produce doFens of sons all e$ually legitimate". >ratricide, therefore, became the selection

mechanism of the 7ttoman succession. 1 In both of the cases alluded to here the imperial

succession owed nothing to property law* partibility, as practiced by the Bermanic kingdoms,

was out of the $uestion !and, as we shall see, was a less than desirable system in any case".

This discussion is meant to convey the fact the familiarity of the term %dynasty' should not

distract the reader. The dynastic system of succession as it emerged in Europe has no analogy

in other monarchic systems. Importantly, the dynastic system as it had emerged by 1(55, as I

demonstrate below, was also fundamentally different from the prevailing practices of the early

medieval period. I retain the term %dynasty' for simplicity sake, but do not wish to imply any

commonality with other systems of rule.

Politics and Property in Early Medieval Europe

1( See +ppendix 1 for a more detailed discussion of the Coman case.1 See +ppendix ( for the case of the 7ttoman Empire in more detail.


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>amilies in early medieval Europe were loose kinship groupings > 1: In this social system private

property mattered less than family property and political offices were not hereditary. 16 The rules

governing inheritance were fluid and to a large extent ad hoc with a loose form of partible

inheritanceDthe practice by which an estate is divided among heirsDbecoming the norm by the

sixth century. #ecause the governing classes of early medieval society did not discriminate

between legitimate and illegitimate sons or rank their sons in order of birth, inheritance was an

uncertain affair with no set rules of succession and within the extended kinship grouping all

males !legitimate and illegitimate" were likely to press claims.

There were two significant political conse$uences of early medieval inheritance

practices. >irst, the lack of fixed and stringent rules of inheritanceJsuccession under conditionsof partible inheritance created enormous uncertainty among a large number of potential

claimants that made violent successional conflict almost inevitable. Since all male kin !through

both the male and female lines" were potentially legitimate claimants to the succession and it

was rarely the case that any given claimant was clearly dominant, coalitions played an

important role in determining outcomes. ;owever, neither the composition, ambition, nor the

stability of these coalitions were certain creating a fertile ground for misperception and violence.

1A Second, the practice of partible inheritance inexorably led to diminishing family holdings over

time. In societies in which one of the fundamental currencies of power is land, the results of

partible inheritance is the dissipation of political power and a further invitation to coalition born

instability.

The impact of these forces are wellranks,1: >or an overview of the historiography of the European family in the middle ages see 9anet 3elson,>amily, Bender and Sexuality in the 0iddle +ges in 0ichael #entley !ed." Com+anion to *istoriogra+hy ,3ew 4ork= Coutledge, [email protected] See 9ean &unbabin, )rance in the ma/ing , 6%'$!!6" , 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2 , !second edition (555", p.151. See also )eopold Benicot, Cecent research on the medieval nobility in Ceuter !ed.", The MedievalNo ility , p. (@.1A )irst Euro+ean Revolution c> 27"$!=!& , 7xford, #lackwell, (555, p. A?.1@ This discussion is based on atrick Beary, ?efore )rance and ;ermany The Creation andTransformation of the Merovingian 9orld , 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2 , 1?HH* Cichard Sullivan, The /arolingian

+ge= Ceflections on Its lace in the ;istory of the 0iddle +ges in S+eculum A: !(" !+pr., 1?H?", pp. (A@


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and founder of 0erovingian kingdom died in 611 he divided among his four sons the >rankish

kingdom he had spent thirty brutal years uniting. #etween 611 and 66H the various heirs and

descendants of /lovis maneuvered, fought and killed each other until in 66H the kingdom of the

>ranks once again was reunified in the hands of a single man= /hlothar I. In 6A1 /hlothar died

leaving four sons to be provided for and the kingdom of the >ranks was partitioned among them.

This cycle of violence continued for :( years until A1 when the only prince of the royal house

left alive reunited the >rankish kingdom yet again. #etween A1 and A ? the >rankish royal

house was united in the person of /hlothar II and his only son &agobert I. 2pon &agobertKs

death in A ? the 0erovingian realm was partitioned yet again, this time into two parts ruled by

Sigebert III and /lovis II. #y the end of the seventh century the incessant internecine fightinghad fractured the authority of the 0erovignian family beyond repair and de facto political

authority devolved to the %0ayor of the alace' ippin II, the greatranks. +lthough he assumed power over a united >rankish realm, the 0erovingian practice of

partible inheritance was maintained. 1H 2pon his death in @AH Baul was partitioned between his

two sons, /harlemagne and /arloman, and the traditional >rankish pattern of partition and

conflict began to assert itself. /arloman died in @@1 with two young sons as his heirs and a

further partition of his portion of Baul was a possibility. It was only after /harlemagne

dispossessed his young nephews that he assumed control over a united >rankish realm, which

he spent the rest of his long life expanding.

/harlemagne is, of course, famous for having been crowned Coman emperor on

/hristmas day of the year H55 by ope )eo III. 1? It is clear, however, that despite his %imperial'

5A* illiam 0. &aly, /lovis= ;ow #arbaric, ;ow agan in S+eculum A? ! " !9uly, 1??:", pp. A1?


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pretensions he never intended to deviate from what had become the long established >rankish

custom of inheritance and succession. In H5A /harlemagne laid out his wishes for the

disposition of his realm=

So as not to leave my sons a confused and unsettled matter of dispute and contentionas regards the status of my entire kingdom, I have divided the whole body of the realminto three portions* the portion that each of them is to guard and rule, I have caused tobe described and designated. I have done this so that each may strive to defend theborders of his kingdom which face foreign peoples and maintain peace and charity withhis brothers. (5

ith these words /harlemagne revealed himself to be the >rankish chieftain that he was. (1 In

the event, upon his death in H1: /harlemagneKs empire was transmitted intact to his son and

successor )ouis the ious, but only because his two other legitimate sons predeceased him.

The twentyrankish realm envisioned by /harlemagne in H5A was

actually implemented in the next generation among the sons of )ouis the ious. #y the Treaty

of -erdun !H: " the /arolingian dynasty divided the >rankish realm into East >rancia !what

would eventually become the ;oly Coman Empire", est >rancia !what would become the

kingdom of >rance" and the short lived middle kingdom of )otharingia. 2nfortunately, a failure

to reform the underlying social institutions that governed inheritance and success meant that the

partition of H: , like all other property division treaties that had preceded it, was only a

temporary fix. ith the successional conse$uences of a ma8or land holders death still illrankishworld" is one of the contributing factors to the crises of the ninth and tenth centuries. The more

(5 /ited by ierre CichL, The Carolingians A )amily who forged Euro+e, hiladelphia= 2niversity ofennsylvania ress, 1?? , p.1 6. See also 0athew Innes, /harlemagne's ill= iety, olitics and theImperial Succession in English *istorical Review 11( !::H" !Sept., 1??@", pp. H


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proximate cause, however, were the barbarian invasions that increased in tempo and intensity

around the middle of ninth century. )atin Europe, after expanding under /harlemagne to

encompass the Bermanic tribes settled between the Chine and the Elbe, suffered devastating

attacks at the hands of the -ikings from the north, the 0agyars from the east and the Saracens

from the south. Coyal authority, already partitioned by the descendants of /harlemagne,

disintegrated in the face of the onslaught.

This process of disintegration began at the highest levels of royal administration and

slowly but surely made its way down the hierarchy. rior to the midrankish kingdom!s" had been in the hands of officials appointed by the

crown. The highest of these officials bore the Coman military titles of count or duke. The crownmaintained control over the realm by ensuring that loyal officials, serving at the pleasure of the

court and dependent upon royal favor, occupied these offices. The 0erovingian and

/arolingian aristocracies did not, therefore, possess hereditary rights to the high offices of the

realm. This began to change in the mid


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in their father's beneficeOSo that in contemporary law a benefice passes to the maledescendents in infinitum . ((

olitical authority had become hereditary property and in becoming so gave rise to a new form

of political organiFation best understood as dynastic lordship.

Primogeniture

The >rankish custom of partible inheritance acted as a catalyst to the process of %feudaliFation'.

%>eudaliFation' under conditions of partible inheritance transformed the nature of successional

conflict because political offices were now transmitted !and partitioned" along with real property.

artible inheritance had created an increasingly absurd and unsustainable situation where

ownership of castles, villages and fields was held in fractions. 2ltimately, the problem of how to

exercise ownership of a fraction of an office !say 1J1A of a castle" had to be confronted. )atin

European civiliFation was on the brink of total collapse.

rimogeniture emerged as one of several institutional mutations that provided a solution

to this problem. It has been such an artifact of the ancien r@gime that its true novelty is difficult

for moderns to appreciate. rimogeniture altered inheritance practices by restricting the

paternal inheritance to the oldest surviving son to the exclusion of younger brothers who were

disinherited. ( The ob8ective was to concentrate the familial resources in the interests of

(( /ited by Calph Biesey, The 9uristic #asis of &ynastic Cight to the >rench Throne, Transactions of the American (hiloso+hical Society , 3ew Series 61 !6", p. H. The obvious $uestion that this process offragmentation raises is why the ultimate authority of kings and emperors was not repudiated by thoseplayers that ac$uired the rights and privileges of the crown as property Beoffrey GoFoil provides apreliminary answer. The most elemental reason is that a duke or margrave could not repudiate thelegitimacy of a king's office, a count repudiate a duke's, a castellan a count's without repudiating the verybasis of his own authorityDthat was anarchy dreaded by all, for it could have no winners. olitical/ulture , in 0arcus #ull !ed.", )rance in the Central Middle +ges, 3ew 4ork= 7xford 2 , (55(, p. 66.( 2sually systems of primogeniture give primacy to the eldest son and do not disinherit the other siblingsentirely. See &.+. #ullough, Early 0edieval Social Broupings= The Terminology of Ginship in (ast and(resent :6 !3ov., 1?A?", pp.


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maintaining and enhancing the wealth and social standing of the entire family which remained

the basic unit of political life in this world.

That the )atin European aristocracy was able to disinherit its younger sons in good

conscience is attributable to the uni$ue structure of Coman /atholicism. The Coman /atholic

/hurch had, for reasons beyond the scope of this pro8ect, evolved rules that profoundly

impacted society. The emergence of dynasticism occurred within the context of a /hurch that

was by far the best organiFed and wealthiest institution in society. The structure of the /hurch

impacted the emergence of dynasticism in two significant ways=

1" #y the tenth century the /hurch had begun to successfully impose upon society a particular

definition of marriage. This definition of marriage had three important aspects= +" marriage hadto be sanctified in a /hurch ceremony conducted by a priest* #" these unions had to be

monogamous* and, /" the /hurch imposed a particularly strict definition of incest by prohibiting

marriage between people related within the seventh degree. These rules were enforced by

imposing a high cost on deviance through the disinheritance of %illegitimate' children.

0onogamy decreased the probability of producing a male heir and the prohibition of marriage

between people related within the seventh degree vastly complicated the search for suitable

matesDparticularly among the highest echelons of society. In other words, the children

produced of unions unsanctioned by the /hurch, whether it be for reasons of incest, polygamy

or improper ceremonial procedure, were separated into an inferior legal category consisting of

people who could not inherit property rights in the same way as did those born of sanctioned

unions. (:

(: The importance of this point can be best illustrated by the case of the 3orman ducal house. henCobert I, duke of 3ormandy, died in 15 6 he was succeeded by his illegitimate infant son illiam %the#astard'. Illegitimacy, therefore, was not yet an absolute bar to the succession. ;owever, a century later,when illiam the /on$ueror's youngest son, ;enry I, king of England and duke of 3ormandy, died in11 6 without legitimate male issue, he designated his legitimate daughter 0atilda as his heiress. Thiswas in spite of the fact that ;enry I had at least nine surviving illegitimate sons including the influential,powerful and highly regarded Cobert, earl of Bloucester. It is also worth emphasiFing that in the earlytwelfth century female succession had not yet been firmly established as the law of +nglo


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(" The Coman /atholic /hurch, because of its autonomous wealth and vast patronage powers

became, unlike the 7rthodox /hurch, an attractive and honorable career for the younger sons

of the nobility. In fact, all noble families vigorously competed to place their cadets in higher

/hurch benefices where they could utiliFe the immense prestige and wealth of the /hurch to

enhance the social standing and wealth of their families. The fact that the /hurch demanded

celibacy simply meant that the children produced by clerics had no legitimate claims on the

wealth of the /hurch. The /hurch was, therefore, a massively endowed autonomous institution

in which younger sons could participate in dynastic high politics while permitting their families to

institute primogeniture. The /hurch became another venue in which noble rivalries were played

out.rimogeniture halted the fragmentation of estates and principalities by transmitting

patrimonial lands to the eldest son while disinheriting younger sons who could be provided for in

four ways= 1" they could be placed in the /hurch* (" they could be married off to heiresses !see

below"* " they could be provided for out of collateral inheritances* and :" they could be forced

to make their own way in world by 8oining the military retinues of greater lords and hope for

suitable rewards !above all fiefs of their own". (6 This shift in successional practices came with

an additional cost= the /hurch gained control over the institution of marriage and, in doing so,

and attempt to designate his legitimate daughter as his heir even though he understood that this wouldlikely lead to a contested succession. In the event, Stephen of #lois, count of #oulogne and 0ortain,illiam the /on$ueror's grandson through his daughter +dela, was accepted as king of England makingcivil war inevitable. The point is that the bar against illegitimate sons succeeding their fathers vastlycomplicated the probability that a father would leave his inheritance to a son. See Gathleen Thomspson,+ffairs of State= the illegitimate children of ;enry I in 3ournal of Medieval *istory (? !(55 ", pp. 1(?


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made it more difficult for lords to transmit their estates to a legitimate son. (A The high fre$uency

of failures of families in the male line made the $uestion of further inheritance an urgent

$uestion and led to the second ma8or innovation in property rightsDfemale inheritance. (@

Female Inheritance and Dynastic Unions

The Salic )aw, the sixth century legal code of the >ranks, had barred females from the

inheritance. This exclusion of women did not, however, extend to their male offspring who were

potentially legitimate heirs. The Salic )aw was updated on numerous occasions until the time of

/harlemagne and then fell into abeyance in the ninth century. (H In the tenth and eleventh

centuries the laws of dynastic inheritance were refined and clarified to cover the scenario of the

absence of legitimate sons. In essence, the $uestion was were daughters and their offspring tobe privileged over more distant male relatives Initially, two different answers were provided to

the $uestion. In matters of %private' property !i.e. excluding land to which political power was

attached" daughters came to be privileged over more distant male relatives, but in the case of

fiefs daughters continued to be excluded. 7ver time, however, the customs governing the

devolution %private' property came to be applied to fiefs and principalities.

The ability of women to inherit and transmit %public' rights and offices in addition to

strictly %private' property constituted the second key component of dynasticism. (? This second

aspect of dynastic inheritance practice when coupled with primogeniture led to the formation of

a new kind of polity that was uni$ue to )atin Europe= dynastic unions. 5 &ynastic unions were

(A It is important to emphasiFe that the role assumed by the /hurch was an extraordinary development.Coman marriage practices had always been governed by secular law !there was ecclesiastical law ofcourse"* and the rise of /hristianity did not change this. It was only in this period that the features ofmarriage that we take for granted came into being. The best introductions to the history of Europeankinship are 9ack Boody, The Euro+ean )amily , 0alden, 0+= (555 and 9ames /asey, The *istory of the)amily , 3ew 4ork= #asil #lackwell, 1?H?.(@ See below for more on this issue. 3ote that the high failure rate of families in the male line wasoverwhelmingly a conse$uence of /hurch policies. The aristocracies of the Islamic or of the earlymedieval >rankish worlds, for example, were never so constrained. They could produce %legitimate' heirswith as many women as they pleased.(H See 3ancy >ischer &rew, +nother )ook at the 7rigins of the 0iddle +ges= + Ceassessment of theCole of the Bermanic Gingdoms in S+eculum A( !:" !7ct., 1?H@", pp. H5


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polities comprised of two or more separate political entities united in the person of a common

ruler who had inherited them through legitimate succession. In other words, they were

conglomerations of territories !or empires" united as a conse$uence of the laws of succession.

It is important to emphasiFe here that a dynastic union did not imply that absorption and

incorporation of one polity into another. In other words, a dynastic union was a union of

%crowns' not a union of %parliaments'. 1

Benerally, in the absence of near male heirs, estates, principalities and kingdoms were

permitted to pass through daughters. The conse$uence of female inheritance under conditions

of feudal lordship was that when nobles married heiresses they took both her and her lands.

There had of course been heiresses for centuries, but up until the 1(th

century daughters hadbeen permitted to inherit %ordinary' property, but not property that was coupled with political

power. >rom now on, however, as a result of a new development in inheritance custom we find

daughters being allowed to succeed to principalities and kingdoms. The twelfth century is a

%century of heiresses.' (

>rom an institutional standpoint, female inheritance made possible the peaceful

consolidation of property that formerly could only have been united through con$uest.

redictably, actors $uickly adapted themselves to the incentive effects provided by this new

transaction cost savings strategy. 0arriages now took on an entirely different significance and

the ac$uisition of an heiress became as much of an imperative for ambitious dynasts as the

launching of military campaigns aimed at territorial con$uest. To an ambitious politician

capturing heiresses came to be at least as important as capturing castles. + new type of

polity was born. + dynastic composite monarchy was a %personal union' of two or more

1 This distinction can be best appreciated by considering the union of England and Scotland in 1A5when 9ames -I, king of Scotts, became 9ames I, king of England. England and Scotland from 1A5 tothe +ct of 2nion in 1@5@ had the same ruler* but they were not the same polity. They only became a%united' kingdom when the Scottish arliament was absorbed into the English arliament. 7nce thishappened the kingdoms of England and Scotland ceased to exist and a new entityDthe kingdom of Breat#ritainDcame into being.( 9ohn Billingham, Richard Coeur de 4ion 8ingshi+, Chivalry and 9ar in the Twelfth Century , )ondon=;ambledon, 1??:, p. (:H.

Ibid., p. 1(.


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principalities in the person of a common ruler brought about by the marriage of two heirs. 2nder

this political system there was, over time, a general tendency for the concentration of more and

more estates, principalities and wealth into the hands of fewer and fewer families. :

The Fragility of the Dynastic Family

This tendency towards the concentration of territory into fewer and fewer hands was

exacerbated by the fragility of the direct male line in dynastic families which led to dynasties

arising and then dying out at a rapid pace. E. erroy has estimated that the noble family lasted

on average three to six generations in the male line. 6 This meant that at each succession

there was only a fifty percent chance of an adult male succession in the direct line. A

There were many reasons for this fragility, as may well be imagined. +side from theeveryday perils that afflicted the entire medieval and early modern worlds, among the

aristocracy the perils of discharging the obligations of dynastic lordship took its toll. +s

9onathan &ewald explains=

;istorians of several countries have established the dimensions of this dying out andreplacement process, and it could be astoundingly rapid. +mong the lesser nobility offifteenth century >rance, about one


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father !in 16:@ when ;enry II succeeded his father >rancis I". +part from this case there were

six minorities !/harles -III, >rancis II, /harles IP, )ouis PIII, )ouis PI- and )ouis P-", three

adult collateral successions !)ouis PII, >rancis I and ;enry I-" and two successions of younger

brothers !/harles IP who was a minor upon succeeding the short lived >rancis II and ;enry III

who succeeded /harles IP". H The fragility of the dynastic family can be further illustrated by

the fate of the last -alois kings of >rance. ;enry II, king of >rance !16:@rancis, duke of +lenQon and

+n8ou, was, in 16H:, not only heir to the king of >rance, but was also engaged to EliFabeth I, $ueen ofEngland, and therefore a potential king


20/47

had a dramatic consolidating effect. Table (.1 shows the decline in the number of ruling

dynasties that took place in )atin Europe over the 15 year period from 1 55


21/47

efficient way to ac$uire political power altered the nature and purpose of conflict and

cooperation in this society. &ynastic actors when interacting with other dynastic actors had

political tools at their disposal not available to their predecessors in early medieval Europe or to

their descendants after the >rench Cevolution. These second order effects are=

1" Europe in the ninth and tenth centuries was a violent and turbulent place. &ynasticism did

much to channel this energy outwards by forcing younger sons to seek their fortunes as

soldiers. :: Coman /atholic Europe had reached the nadir of its fortunes around the year ?66

when the 0agyars were defeated at the )echfeld. >ifty years later )atins were on the offensive

across the board. The greatest strides of the recon0uista took place in the eleventh and twelfth

centuries* the 3ormans, through con$uest, brought England and Sicily into the )atin Europeanmainstream. Shortly afterwards Scotland followed by emulation and was reorganiFed along

%feudal' lines. The most spectacular phase of expansion began in 15?A with the launching of the

>irst /rusade* less well known, but more enduring, was the great )atin offensive into the lands

east of the Elbe called the drang nach osten that would lead to the establishment of )atin

societies among the western Slavs and all along the #altic. In all of these cases the social

organiFation of societies was changed, sometimes by force, but mostly through emulation and

immigration, to make them resemble the world of dynastic lordship.

(" The nature of conflict and cooperation between actors within the family of dynastic )atin

Europe differed fundamentally from the nature of conflict and cooperation between the actors of

)atin Europe and those of the Islamic and 7rthodox /hristian worlds. In the later case conflicts

could not be resolved with marriage nor could marriages be used to seal instruments of

cooperation !alliances". It was, therefore, not possible for marriage to be used as an instrument

for territorial expansion for non


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!i.e. the tools" and the types and range of outcomes in this society cannot be understood without

reference to the underlying incentive structures of the actors. :6

" hile presumably contingency is a universal feature of human affairs, the institutional

structure of societies determine in what ways contingency will o+erate . olitical institutions

channel the pursuit of interests in particular ways and make specific variables sub8ect to the

forces of contingency in specific ways. The cycle of birth, death and marriage in the dynastic

world had immense conse$uences for the stability of polities, the shape of alliances, the

concentration of power and the timing of events like wars. In other words, while contingency

acts upon both all polities it does not do so in consistent ways. The ways in which contingency

can impact the course of events is a function of political organiFation.:A

olities headed byregencies were vulnerable to external intervention. Similarly, the imminent failure of a dynasty

created uncertainty and therefore weakness. The birth of an heir to a ruler always strengthened

the hands of the ruler in relationship to his sub8ects, his allies and his enemies. +ll of these

scenarios were a normal part of the political landscape of )atin polities because of the

underlying social institutions that structured political life in this society. /ontingency, therefore,

cannot be properly understood outside of this larger context.

International !elations in a "orld of Dynastic omposite Monarchies:

+n important implication of dynasticism is that maps that delineate early modern dynastic

composite monarchies as blocs are very misleading if they imply that these polities are like

modern nation


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the dynastic union or with those of the ruler. +s a conse$uence of its political structure these

dynastic composite monarchies had different inherent strengths and weaknesses when

compared to other kinds of polities. These polities used different kinds of tools in the pursuit of

different kinds of goals with different kinds of results* and this has ma8or implications for how we

conceive of international politics. ;.B. Goenigsberger writes=

0ost ma8or monarchies of early modern Europe were composite states whose parts haddifferent social structures, different laws and institutions and sometimes, differentreligions. Ruite often they were not even contiguous but were separated by othercountries or by a stretch of sea, and yet the more distant parts were not colonies in thesense which the Spanish or English settlements were colonies. In Europe thiscomposite structure of states meant that not only was tension between center andperiphery an inbuilt pattern of early modern states but that, in the case of actual conflict,the resources which the contestants could command depended on countries, or parts of

countries, which were not involved in the causes of the conflict, or only remotely so.:@

hat is important to underline here is that it is erroneous to assume that these unions

constituted single political entities, let alone a stable foundation for the long term establishment

of larger territorial entities. hat it is in fact going on in these kinds of political associations is

the union of disparate offices within the person of a common ruler. There is, in other words, no

a +riori reason why some dynastic unions led to permanent polities and others did not. :H

:@ (oliticians and :irtuosi Essays in Early Modern Euro+ean *istory , )ondon= The ;ambledon ress,1?HA, p. P.:H 9ohn Elliot explains that there were two kinds of dynastic unions= !1" %accessory' unions in which the anewly ac$uired polity is 8uridically incorporated into an existing polity !as was the case with the Indies,which was part of the kingdom of /astile or ales which became part of the kingdom of England throughthe +cts of 2nion of 16 A and 16: " and !(" the more typical ae0ue +rinci+aliter in which thedistinctiveness of each component part was maintained. 7ver time those dynastic unions which becamepermanent !the kingdoms of England and Scotland for example" converted the second type of dynasticunion into the rarer first type. The vast ma8ority of dynastic composite polities in early modern Europewere ae0ue +rinci+aliter , in which each part maintained its own institutions of social and political life. +Europe of /omposite 0onarchies , pp. 6(


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hat generally explains the difference between those dynastic unions that eventually

turned out to be permanent !for example +ragon and /astile" and those that were temporary

alignments are three factors= 1" the continuity of the line of the succession !this was also

dependent on whether the laws of succession barred females from the inheritance"* (" factor 1

is dependent on the degree to which the laws of the succession of the various component parts

are uniform* :? and " the nature of the offices themselves, i.e. whether or not one of the crowns

was an elective monarchy like the kingdom of oland, which during much of the eighteenth

century had a dynastic union with the electorate of Saxony. 65

:? Take the example of the /apetian inheritance in the early fourteenth century. hilip I-, king of >rance!1(H6rance and 3avarre !1 ((rance, on the other hand, was transmitted to the closest male relative in the male line , hilipof -alois, who now became king of >rance but not of 3avarre. It was the contingency of the failure ofthree of hilip I-'s sons to produce legitimate surviving male heirs that led to the rupture of the dynastic

union between >rance and 3avarre. #etween 1 (H and 16H?, the kingdoms of >rance and 3avarre wereruled by different branches of the royal family. In the sixteenth century 3avarre came through marriageinto the possession of the house of #ourbon !a cadet branch of the royal family". hen the -alois linefailed in 16H? the closest male relative in the male line happened to ;enry of #ourbon, king of 3avarre,who upon accession restored the dynastic union of the kingdoms of >rance and 3avarre after aseparation of (A1 years.65 See chapter of Sharma, The Impact of Institutions for more on how dynastic politics functioned inelective monarchies. Elective monarchies used the office of king to establish alliances with foreignpowers. oland had a very long tradition of establishing this kind of relationship !in the early modernperiod reaching back to the election of ;enry of -alois, duke of +n8ou, the future ;enry III, king of >rance,in 16@ ", as did the kingdoms of #ohemia and ;ungary !#ohemia became hereditary in the ;absburg linein 1A(@ and ;ungary, albeit with less drastic conse$uences, in 1AH@ as a conse$uence of the 7ttomanars". The election of >erdinand, king of the Comans, and younger brother of the emperor /harles -, asking of ;ungary and of #ohemia, in the aftermath of the catastrophic battle of 0ohacs in 16(A, is a primeexample of elective monarchies using dynastic unions as a deeper form of cooperation. The #ohemiansand the ;ungarians, by electing the ;absburg archduke as king were gaining the alliance of the mostpowerful princely house in Europe against a mortal threat !the 7ttoman Turks". Similarly, between 1A?@and 1@A , the electors of Saxony were elected kings of oland, in some sense as an alliance againstrussia and Sweden* oland remained an elective monarchy until the very end when in a desperate setof reforms implemented to stave off extinction, the oles made the crown hereditary in the Saxon line in1@?1Dthe ultimate acknowledgment that hereditary monarchy, by the eighteenth was the only stable formof the institution, because elections always gave ample opportunity to foreign princes to meddle in theaffairs of the kingdom. Thus, by the eighteenth century, this venerable form of alliance becameincreasingly anachronistic and even dangerous.


25/47

>urthermore, the authority wielded by the common ruler was extremely varied across

these component parts. >or example, the emperor /harles -, was obeyed in /astile as /harles

I, king of /astile* in +ragon as /harles I, king of +ragon* in ;olland he was obeyed in his dual

capacity as hereditary count of ;olland and as feudal overlord in his capacity as emperor !this

was also the case in all of the ;absburg patrimonial lands including the archduchies of +ustria

proper"* and, he was obeyed in the Empire as liege overlord of all imperial fiefs. hat all of this

amounted to was a plethora of dyadic idiosyncratic relationships, the substance of which varied

enormously between, say, /astile where the crown exercised relatively strong authority and the

electorate of Saxony where the authority of the emperor consisted of bundles of rights and

obligations which were constantly sub8ect to negotiation and fluctuating interests !especiallyafter the rotestant Ceformation". There was nothing at all unusual about this state of affairs.

The +ngevin %empire', formed in 116( from the union of the houses of England


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therefore, deeper forms of cooperation that enabled certain kinds of sustained collective action

otherwise not easily attainable through normal contractual forms which were sub8ect to a range

of disputes not applicable in dynastic unions. These polities cannot be assumed to be the

functional e$uivalent, in terms of behavior, of all other polities.

+s this discussion hints at, dynastic composite monarchies were fragile and often

temporary personal unions that did not have any implications of uniformity. This meant that it

was by no means obvious that war involving one part of this union applied to any other part.

&uring certain phases of the Italian ars, the #urgundian inheritance under its regent 0argaret

of +ustria maintained neutrality while other components of the ;absburg monarchy were

fighting the >rench for control of Italy. Benerally, the various constituent components of thesemonarchies were loathe to have their blood and treasure expended on conflicts which they felt

had nothing to do with them. In other words, they experienced moral haFard problems and

sought institutional solutions to them. 6( The king of %Spain', then, could not count on the

automatic support of +ragon, >landers, 0ilan or Sicily in his wars with the king of >ranceDand

any attempt to force them into support for %foreign' wars was dangerous in the extreme. 6 The

>rench could, therefore, be at war with the king of +ragon without being at war with +ragonD

and this distinction mattered. In sixteenth century #arcelona, what the kingdom of +ragon had

to do with >landers was far from obvious to the fiercely independent estates which managed to

spare the people of +ragon the misery of supporting their king's foreign wars.

Minorities# $%senteeism and !egencies

hile one of the strengths of this form of political organiFation was its ability to consolidate

power and authority through dynastic succession and thereby to enable the succession to

become an instrument of power politics, this form of dynastic succession gave rise to two

phenomena that had implications for how these political forms behaved= 1" minorities and ("

6( See chapter of Sharma, The Impact of Institutions for more on this.6 robably the best way to appreciate 8ust how tentative these relations were between the variouscomponent parts of dynastic unions is through the medium of biography. +n excellent example of suchwork is 9ohn Elliot, The Count$Du/e of -livares The Statesman in an Age of Decline . 3ew ;aven, /T=4ale 2 , 1?HA.


27/47

absenteeism. #oth of these situations led to the pervasive use of regents to govern in the name

of a ruler who was either a child or physically absent !or mentally incapacitated as occasionally

was the case". 6:

7ne of the perennial problems of European hereditary dynastic succession was the

occurrence of minoritiesDa time period of potential instability. 2nder conditions of a regency,

government was conducted by proxies who were unlikely to be fully accountable for their

actions until the monarch came of age and was able to rule as well as reign in their own right.

Cegencies were times of intense political competition between the highest echelons of society

and it was an axiom of the early modern world that it was impossible to pursue an active foreign

policy under conditions of a minority. 0inorities were sub8ect to greater incidents of revolt,dissent and opposition to the crown than was the case during ma8oritiesDa time period when

those in control of the regency were able to use their temporary custody of the crown's power to

rewire the system to suit themselves and settle personal scores with enemies. This kind of

polity was, therefore, wea/er during a minority than during a ma8orityDa problem, of course,

that does not occur in modern nationrondes'. These were, as always in medieval and early

modern minorities, revolts led by princes of the blood who were seeking to remove, in the

6: hile absenteeism was a problem for a society in which the physical presence of the prince was ofenormous importance for the proper functioning of the polity, an adult prince was, however imperfectly, atleast able to issue commands and when necessary come in person to have affairs settled to their liking.0inorities were, therefore, far more serious than absenteeism.


28/47

%greater interests of the king and kingdom' of course, the perceived sinister and harmful

influence of ministers then in control of the regency. 66

In this sense, early modern polities were fragile, and dependent upon legitimacy and

consent* and legitimacy and consent were simultaneously the source of the greatest strengths

and weaknesses of these polities. 6A So while consent and legitimacy set strict limits on the

freedom of maneuver that the crown possessed, it was this precise variable that enabled

dynastic composite monarchies to exist and function during times of regency or minority. This

means that the crown's greatest source of strength and its greatest potential weakness was the

attitude of the nobility. ;.0. Scott and /hristopher Storr note that the military and

administrative changes at this time did not destroy the nobility's political role= on the contrary, inimportant respects it consolidated and even extended this MroleN. 6@ This fact of noble power

and noblerance was engulfed by revolt led by princes of the blood at a moment when themonarchy was fighting the Thirty 4ears' ar under a regency and desperately seeking a strongbargaining position in the then ongoing talks at estphalia. 3ote that in this case, as in most others, theprinces were not seeking to overthrow )ouis PI-* only to replace his advisors until )ouis reached hisma8ority. + good short summary on the >rondes in available in &avid Sturdy, 4ouis .: , 3ew 4ork= St,0artin's ress, 1??H, pp. ((< :.6A &onna #ohanan writes= It is widely understood now that sixteenth century kings governed throughpatronage by making the great nobles provincial governors. Brandees who served in this capacity thenbrokered the king's patronage to their clientele who assisted them in governing the region. The problemwith this use of clientage was that it enabled great nobles to build huge power bases in the provinceswhich they would later put to use in civil war. Crown and No ility in Early Modern )rance , 3ew 4ork=algrave, (551, p. 6@.

6@ The /onsolidation of 3oble ower in Europe in ;.0. Scott, !ed." The Euro+ean No ilities in theSeventeenth and Eighteenth Century vol. 1, 3ew 4ork= )ongman, 1??6, p. H.6H + Europe of /omposite 0onarchies , p. 6 .


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provincial boundaries, the chances of stability were still further improved. 6? The potential longrance. In spite of all the turbulence in >rench history, its crown

passed in the direct male line in an unbroken chain of successions lasting from ;ugh /apet's

coronation in ?H@ to the accession of )ouis P-I in 1@@:Da not negligible span of time for any

institution and is a testament to the endurance and durability of dynastic political organiFation.

$n E&ample: The 'Empire( of harles )

/harles, the fifth of that name, Coman emperor, sem+er augustus * elected king ofBermany and Italy* by the grace of Bod, king of /astile, +ragon, Sicily, 9erusalem, the#alearic Islands, the /anary Islands, the Indies and the mainland on the far side of the

+tlantic* archduke of +ustria* duke of #urgundy, 0ilan, #rabant, Styria, /arinthia,

/arniola, )uxemburg, )imburg, +thens and atras* count of ;absburg, >landers,;olland, eeland and the Tyrol* count palatine of #urgundy, ;ainault, firt, Coussillon*landgrave of +lsace* count of SwabiaOetc. A5

So reads the principal titles of the emperor /harles -. These few lines summariFe the profound

conse$uences of dynastic political organiFation. The emperor /harles - ruled over a collection

of European territories that was vaster than that of any other ruler between the years :55 and

6? Ibid., p. [email protected] +dapted from ilfried Seipel !ed." 8aiser 8arl : !&""$!&&6F Macht und -hnmacht Euro+as , -ienna=

G;0 ien, (555= p. xi. 0y translation. It is important to note that /harles - was %the emperor' by virtueof his election as king of Bermany. In European history prior to the age of 3apoleon there was properlyspeaking only one empireDthe ;oly Coman EmpireDwhich was the successor to the Coman Empire. Itis customary to refer to this entity as %the Empire'. There were, however, in )atin Europe in the dynasticperiod other %empires' in an informal sense* that is, collections of diverse territories and peoples thatrecogniFed the authority of a single ruler. These can be understood to be %dynastic' or %feudal' %empiresas distinct from other historical entities !like the 7ttoman, 0ughal and Coman empires" which had beencreated by con$uest. In the language of the day these %dynastic' empires !or as Elliot calls them %dynasticcomposite monarchies'" were called %monarchies' not %empires' because Europeans only recogniFed oneempire. hat moderns sometimes call the %Spanish empire', for example, was referred to bycontemporaries as the %Spanish monarchy' ! monarchia ". The authority exercised by /harles - in /astilewas that of a hereditary king of /astile !he was /harles I, king of /astile" and was in no way related to hisimperial title. It is important to emphasiFe that the %empire' of /harles - was of the same species asthose %feudal empires' of the eleventh and twelfth centuries. )ike its predecessors of the middle ages, theempire of /harles - was comprised of components that were themselves %feudal empires'. /harles -'s%dynastic empire' was simply a larger and grander version of the +ngevin %empire' that came togetherbetween 1165 and 116: when ;enry lantagenet inherited the kingdom of England and the duchy of3ormandy from his mother, the counties of +n8ou, 0aine and Touraine from his father and marriedEleanor, heiress of +$uitaine and oitou. This was an entity that stretched from the Scottish lowlands tothe yrenees. See .). arren, *enry .. , #erkeley= The 2niversity of /alifornia ress, 1?@ * /. arren;ollister and Thomas Geefe, The 0aking of the +ngevin Empire in The 3ournal of ?ritish Studies , 1(!0ay, 1?@ ", pp. 1


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1H55. In 16 5 his (H million sub8ects comprised :5 of the )atin European population. A1 This

extraordinary collection of territories, rights, and 8urisdictions is simply the grandest

conse$uence of a system of politics that operated at all levels of European society. The story of

the creation of /harles -'s inheritance is, therefore, illustrative of the general processes

unleashed by dynastic political organiFation.

The core of /harles -'s inheritance was the #urgundian inheritance. The house of

#urgundy was one of the greatest princely dynasties of late medieval Europe. A( #etween 1 A?

and 1:@@ the dukes of #urgundy, mostly through inheritance, ac$uired a vast collection of

territories, titles and rights that collectively placed them in the first tier of princely rulers. They

were exemplary only in the extent of their success, not in the methods they used.The -alois house of #urgundy was founded in 1 A when hilip the #old was granted in

appanage the recently escheated duchy of #urgundy by his father 9ohn II, king of >rance

!reigned 1 65rench kingdom in 3ournalof Medieval *istory ( !1?@A", pp. 11?


31/47

continued six years later when, in an alliance between the >rench royal house and )ouis of

0Ule, count of >landers, hilip the #old, duke of #urgundy, married 0argaret of 0Ule, heiress of

>landers, +rtois, the >rancherench crown and his twelve year old widow released back onto the

marriage market. Biven that these events were coterminous with the ;undred 4ears ar !1 @landers was signed in 1 A:. ;owever, given their consanguinity !they were related within the fourthdegree" papal dispensation was re$uired and this ope 2rban - refused to grant. 3egotiations were thenundertaken by )ouis of 0Ule with the >rench royal family. These were concluded in 1 A? in two treatiesof alliance between the >rench crown and the count of >landers. These events were of the outmostimportance in the %international' politics of the period. ;ad Edmund of )angley, earl of /ambridge,succeeded )ouis of 0Ule as count of >landers, +rtois, 3evers and Cethel and as count palatine of#urgundy, a cadet branch of the English royal house would have been established on the northern andeastern perimeter of the >rench royal domain. To add insult to in8ury, it would also have made the earl of/ambridge and his line peers of >rance and amongst the greatest vassals of the king of >rance. Thestakes could not have been higher. The ac$uisition of this great heiress by the duke of #urgundy vastlyincreased the power base of the >rench royal family at a time when its fortunes had reached their nadir.See -aughan, (hili+ the ?old The )ormation of the ?urgundian State and .C. 7rmond, Edward III and;is >amily in The 3ournal of ?ritish Studies (A !7ct., 1?H@", ?Hrance at +gincourt in 1:16. hilip the #old's principal heir 9ohn the>earless, duke of #urgundy, who had murdered his cousin )ouis, duke of 7rlLans, !the younger brotherof /harles -I, king of >rance" in 1:5@, was conspicuously absent from the battle and it was largely hisenemies in the royal family and their partisans that were killed or captured. The murder of )ouis, duke of7rlLans, triggered a civil war within the royal family which profoundly destabiliFed the >rench kingdom in


32/47

9ohn the >earless, duke of #urgundy, was murdered in 1:1? as a part of a feud that tore

the >rench royal family apart with devastating conse$uences for the kingdom of >rance. ;e

transmitted his inheritance !which now became an indivisible patrimony" intact to his heir hilip

the Bood, duke of #urgundy. The second son of hilip the #old, +nthony, duke of #rabant,

)uxemburg and )imburg, had two sons. Three years following +nthony's death in 1:16, his

eldest son and heir 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant, married 9ac$ueline of #avaria, heiress of

;ainault, ;olland and eeland. Through this marriage 9ohn I- became in right of his wife count

of ;ainault, ;olland and eeland. The two senior branches of the house of #urgundy, by right

of inheritance, now controlled between them, much of the )ow /ountries and greatest royal fiefs

in eastern >rance and its imperial frontiers. 9ohn I-, duke of #rabant, died without issue in1:(@ leaving his paternal inheritance to his younger brother hilip, who died in 1: 5, also

without issue. AA ith the death of hilip, duke of #rabant, this collateral line of the house of

the years before and after +gincourt. 9ohn the >earless was himself murdered in 1:1? by the partisans ofthe &auphin /harles !the future /harles -II, king of >rance" in retaliation for the killing of )ouis of 7rlLansand 9ohn's alliance with ;enry -. The point here is to emphasiFe the fact that relationships within theroyal family determined the fundamental stability of any dynastic polity. The endowment of cadetbranches of the royal family with great appanages was a strategy that increased the likelihood of survivalof the lineage in the male lineDit did not and could not ensure that the resources used to endow thesecadet branches would be used in the interests of the crown or of the kingdom. In other words, adistinction has to be drawn between the interests of the dynasty, its individual members, the crown and

the kingdom. 7n the complicated !and convoluted" politics of of the royal family in this period see 0ichael9ones, The )ast /apetians and early -alois kings, 1 1:


33/47

#urgundy failed leaving its territories, titles and rights to the head of the house of #urgundy. #y

outliving his childless relatives hilip the Bood, duke of #urgundy, inherited #rabant, )imburg,

;ainault, ;olland, eeland and )uxemburg. A@ The remarkable territorial consolidation of the

)ow /ountries outlined here was a conse$uence of genealogical accident. AH

hilip the Bood left his son one of the greatest inheritances of late medieval Europe. ;is

territories stretched from the 3orth Sea to the +lps. +mong his principalities were some of the

wealthiest and most urbaniFed regions of Europe. ;is reckless son and heir /harles the #old,

duke of #urgundy, after a reign of less than eleven years, was killed in the battle 3ancy in 1:@@.

The death of /harles the #old, the last in the male line of the -alois dukes of #urgundy, was an

event of momentous conse$uence in European historyDit lead to the merger of the domains,dignities and titles of the house of #urgundy with those of the house of +ustria. A?

In 1:@@ /harles the #old's only legitimate child, 0ary of #urgundy, the greatest heiress

of the fifteenth century, married, in accordance with her father's plans, 0aximilian of ;absburg,

inherited ;ainault, ;olland and eeland as the closest male relative of 9ac$ueline of #avaria which was aconse$uence of the double marriage concluded by their grandparents in 1 H6.A@ In addition to these inheritances hilip the Bood ac$uired the #oulonnais by marriage, the counties of3amur and #Lthune by purchase and onthieu, +miens and -ermandois by treaty.AH There are other fifteenth century examples of massive territorial consolidation occurring as a

conse$uence of dynastic accidents. )ater in the fifteenth century a similar series of fortuitousgenealogical accidents laid the foundations for the resurgence of the power of the >rench crown. In thereign of )ouis PI there was a remarkable demographic windfall that accrued to the crown. The se$uenceof events is nothing short of astonishing= 1" )ouis PI's brother, /harles of >rance, duke of #erry, diedwithout heirs in 1:@( leaving #erry and 3ormandy to the crown* (" in 1:@ the count of +rmagnac waskilled in battle leaving his fiefs to )ouis' daughter +nne* " in 1:@@ /harles the #old, duke of #urgundy,was killed in battle and )ouis PI asserted the rights of the crown over #urgundy, icardy and the#ouillonnais* :" in 1:H5rench royal house, reverted to crowncontrol upon the demise of the direct male line of the house of #urgundy in 1:@@. +lthough the duchy of#urgundy reverted to the >rench crown, 0ary of #urgundy and her heirs continued to use the ducal titleand the collection of territories that had been accumulated by the -alois dukes of #urgundy continued tobe called the %#urgundian inheritance'.


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king of the Comans and archduke of +ustria. @5 The death of /harles the #old and the marriage

of his daughter provide a perfect illustration of the role of contingency in dynastic politics. ;ad

/harles died leaving a legitimate son rather than a legitimate daughter as his heir, his death,

while conse$uential, would not have led to the dramatic redistribution of power in Europe that it

did. #y the single act of marriage, 0ary brought to the house of +ustria what con$uest could

never haveDa collection of principalities that were the envy of Europe.

0ary, heiress of #urgundy, and the emperor 0aximilian I had two children. In 1:?A their

heir hilip the >air, archduke of +ustria, duke of #urgundy, etc., married 9oanna of /astile,

daughter, and as fate would have it, heiress of >erdinand, king of +ragon, 3aples, Sicily etc.

and Isabella, $ueen of /astile and the Indies.@1

Two generations of heirs of the house of +ustria had married great heiresses. It was these twists of dynastic fortune, and not military

prowess, that laid the foundations of ;absburg power. It is important to appreciate that the

creation of this %empire' was entirely the conse$uence of marriage and inheritance. This is not

to say that strategic considerations did not underlie the patterns of dynastic marriageDclearly

they did. It is simply to note that dynastic unions came into being and dissolved for reasons

$uite independent of geopolitics. Indeed, the transmission of these polities occurred without

much reference to the %interests' of the principalities. +s #en8amin +rnold notes Othese

assemblages of multiple principalities under a single dynastyOdemonstrate the tendency of

aristocratic family right to outweigh any other considerations or claims of power politics,

economic geography and social structure. @( Through the laws of inheritance the unimaginably

@5 They had been betrothed in 1:@ .@1 The case of 9oanna of /astile is another powerful illustration of the role of contingency in dynastic highpolitics. She was the second of five surviving children of Isabella of /astile and >erdinand of +ragon. +ssuch, she had a low probability of succeeding her parents. + series of demographic accidents laid thefoundations for her improbable fortune. The first in the line of the succession, 9oanna's only brother 9ohn,died without issue in 1:?@. 9ohn's death made Isabella, 9oanna's older sister, first in the line of thesuccession. Isabella was married to 0anuel I, king of ortugal, and it therefore seemed likely thatortugal, /astile and +ragon would become part of a dynastic union. Isabella died in 1:?H leaving a son,0ichael of ortugal, as heir to ortugal, /astile and +ragon. ;e, however, suddenly died in 1655 endingthis prospect. ith 0ichael's death, 9oanna of /astile became heir to /astile and +ragon.@( (rinces and territories in medieval ;ermany , 3ew 4ork= /ambridge 2 , 1??1, p. (AA.


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vast inheritances of the houses of +ragon, /astile, #urgundy and +ustria became the patrimony

of the eldest son and heir of 9oanna of /astile and hilip the >airDthe emperor /harles -.

+s has been shown above, the house of #urgundy was shaped by forces that were

contingent upon the vagaries of lifeDbut that it was shaped by these specific variables was not

contingent. /ontingent events impacted the history of dynastic Europe, but in specific and

predictable ways as a conse$uence of its political structure. The successional system of

premodern Europe produced political forms that were sub8ect to the forces of contingency in

ways that differentiates them from all other political forms.

These dynastic composite monarchies stand in sharp contrast to both the other Eurasian

empires of its dayD0uscovy, the 7ttoman, ersian and 0ughal empiresDwhich had beencreated by military con$uest as well as the great empires of anti$uity all of which had also been

forged primarily by force of arms. It is only in )atin Europe between the twelfth and eighteenth

centuries, which were also the only places that combined primogeniture and female inheritance

under conditions of feudal lordship, where empires were created by law rather than by the

sword.

Parti%le inheritance in Early Modern Europe

hile primogeniture became the dominant form of inheritance practice among the nobility of late

medieval and early modern Europe there were ever diminishing Fones where partible

inheritance persisted into the seventeenth century. e can, therefore, get an idea of the impact

of primogeniture by comparing the experience 8ust described with that of those areas of )atin

/hristendom that adopted the reform much later. The most important of these areas was the

;oly Coman Empire !henceforth the Empire". @

The Empire was an elective monarchy comprised of estates of varying constitutional

status possessing territorial lordship ! 4andeshoheit ". ith the exception of the ecclesiastical

principalities and the imperial cities, these lordships were fiefs of the Empire sub8ect to

@ See chapter of Sharma, The Impact of Institutions for an extensive analysis of the functioning of theEmpire.


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hereditary tenure and governed by princes with varying titles !prince, archduke, duke, count

palatine, margrave and landgrave". @:

The patchwork of miniature principalities that stands out so markedly on maps of the

early modern Empire was a product of the nature of partible inheritance in the Empire. In the

thirteenth century there were around ninety spiritual princes and only thirteen secular ones. +

hundred years later, the second group had grown to a little more than forty. #y 16H( it

numbered forty


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between the Ernestine ettins !electoral Saxony" and +lbertine ettins !ducal Saxony"* control

of these dignities was reversed by the emperor /harles - as a result of the Schmalkaldic ar

!16:@". The +lbertine ettins adopted primogeniture relatively early for a Berman princely

house !although not consistently" in 1:??. In 1A6(, however, 9ohn Beorge I, elector of Saxony,

established three lines of +lbertine ettinsDSaxony< eissenfels, Saxony


38/47

The persistence of partible inheritance in Bermany raises the obvious $uestion of why it

deviated from the )atin norm over many centuries The answer here is the continued

expansion of the Berman nobility into lands both internally !i.e. bringing abandoned or virgin

lands under cultivation" and externally. hile the crusades against Islam are the best

remembered, aside from Iberia and Sicily they were not enduring successes. East of Elbe,

however, the northern crusades led principally by Bermans !including the Teutonic Gnights

which carved out a crusader lordship that endured until seculariFed in the sixteenth century"

brought russia and the #altic coastline under )atin rule. H1 This movement of the Berman

nobility into Slavic and #altic territory provided an additional outlet for younger sons and

contributed to an environment in which the need to institute primogeniture was less pressing. +s this source of land dried up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Berman nobility

began to institute primogeniture bringing Bermany into line with the rest of the European

nobility. H(

hat this discussion has shown is that the exact configuration of the dynastic laws of

succession had profound impact upon the political geography Europe. e have here an

example of simple micro


39/47

remodern Europe has long been viewed as an archetype of an anarchical system of

international relations in which international politics is largely a function of power relationships

understood in starkly materialist terms. Cealists, whether balance of power or hegemony

theorists, and those that share their world view, build on the assumption that power relations in

premodern Europe approximate a %survival of the fittest' logic. +s I show elsewhere, there was

indeed a lot of war in the premodern era* precious little of it, however, was actually leading to

con$uest.

This paper has shown that vitally important aspects of the power structure of )atin

European international relations were grounded in dynastic social institutions. The logic

endogenous to dynastic configurations of property and kinship explain the movements in thepolitical of Europe in this period far better than do realist theories. /on$uest and survival were

phenomena of the frontiers of )atin European civiliFation. ithin the boundaries of )atin

Europe, dynasticism provided different mechanism for the transmission of power. +s a

conse$uence of the use of dynastic tools vast patrimonies could be built solely on the basis of

legitimate succession. e can observe the fact that different configurations of dynastic

succession produced different outcomes. In those parts of Europe in which primogeniture and

female inheritance had been adopted a logic endogenous to laws of succession drove a

process of consolidation that was independent of the power structure of political relationships.

In Bermany, by contrast, which formed an integral part of )atin Europe, we observe a process

of dramatic fragmentation driven by partible inheritance practices.

Two important theoretical conclusion can be drawn from this fact. >irstly, social

institutions and not the power configuration of the international system are what most

responsible for these patterns. Indeed, the power configurations of the international system in

this period are caused by the contingent nature of dynastic succession. Secondly, the

fundamental unit of analysis in international relations in this period is not the state. In fact, by

focusing on the state entire domains of what constituted international relations is lost. +s I show


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elsewhere, lordship along with dynastic institutions continued to be the primary arena of

international relations into the post< estphalian period. International relations after the Treaty

of estphalia continued to operate in ways inconsistent with the assumption that the state had

become the primary unit of analysis. &ynasticism and its central explanatory role in )atin

European international relations reveals 8ust how limited the realist theoretical apparatus is.

International order in )atin European history !pre and post 1A:H" was ultimately derived from

social institutions and not from the anarchical nature of the international system.

Appendix 1: The Roman Succession:

The importance of the successional system to the stability of any polity can be best appreciated

in comparative perspective. The Coman Cepublic had, until the age of /aesar, /rassus andompey, an extraordinarily stable system of succession for its magistrates. rior to this period,

only Sulla had successfully used force to ac$uire the chief magistracy of the republic and even

he, after instituting constitutional reforms to his liking, voluntarily laid down his dictatorship after

the re$uired ten years and $uietly retired from public life. hile the republic was dominated by

the senatorial aristocracy, comprised of a few doFen families organiFed around competing and

ever shifting networks of alliances !sealed by marriages and adoptions", the offices of the

republic never became hereditaryDComan magistrates did not own their offices. The

republican nobility conducted its conflicts within the framework of an electoral system that was

designed to prevent the emergence of monarchy and in the context of a society in which blood

was not the sine 0ua non of kinship. The greatest testament to the genius of this system is the

chaos and violence that marked the successional system of its imperial successor that never

managed to satisfactorily solve this most fundamental of political problems.

The prolonged agony of the /ivil ars that ended in 1 #/E resulted in the principate

as instituted by +ugustus. This was, for all practical purposes, a monarchy, albeit a peculiar

one in the sense that +ugustus simply accumulated in his person the more significant Coman

magistracies !in order to preserve the illusion that the republic was %restored' under his


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benevolent auspices". +ugustus, adopted son of /aesar, never formally created an imperial

office let alone one that was hereditary property. 2pon his death in /E 1: Tiberius, his chosen

successor, was %voted' by the Coman Senate all of the offices that +ugustus had held. The

formula of the %imperial succession', therefore, remained firmly anchored within the framework of

republican magistracies. olitical office and authority, therefore, had no basis for hereditary

succession of any kind, let alone one organiFed around a line of succession determined strictly

by blood or kinship. This is not to say that +ugustus did not envision a %dynastic hereditary

monarchy' when he overthrew the republic. 7n the contrary, he clearly sought, in some sense,

to establish the %imperial dignity' as the %possession' of the 9ulian


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example between /E 1?( and (H: there were H: emperors !give or take a few who %reigned' too

short a time to really count" of whom only two died peacefully. In the fifteen years between (6

and (AH there were 1: emperors !all of whom met violent deaths".

This failure in the early years of the empire to establish a secure and stable basis of

succession !whether dynastic or not" was to have disastrous conse$uences for the rest of

imperial history. The Coman emperors never had an unambiguous and legitimate right to

transmit the imperial dignity to anyone including their offspring or other kin !let alone through the

strict primogeniture that brought such a high degree of stability to the late medieval and early

modern worlds". The Coman empire did see relatively brief periods of successional stabilityD

most importantly at the end of the first century and much of the second centuryDbut for themost part the Coman succession was a violent and uncertain affair and dangerous in the

extreme to those who sought the imperial dignity. The Coman empire %experimented' !so to

speak" with a variety of ad hoc successional practices, none of which accomplished the vital

task of ensuring a peaceful, legitimate and uncontested transfer of power. The one period in

which there was a prolonged respite in successional crises is the so called era of the %five good

emperors' !/E ?A


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on a grand scale. The Coman succession was, therefore, determined by the army and the

%selection process' was typically civil war.

The third century and much of the fourth were dominated by attempts to devise a

satisfactory solution to the problem of the imperial succession!s". The most important of these

was &iocletian's creative but ultimately failed attempt to create a tetrarchy with two senior

emperors !one each in the west and east" and their designated successors !called /aesars" in

theory sharing authority and working together to ensure a smooth transfer of power. This

innovative but failed solution to the problem of the Coman succession ended with yet more civil

wars and this round of successional fighting was finally settled by the battle of the 0ilvian #ridge

that paved the way for /onstantine's assumption of power as sole emperor. So aside from agolden age lasting less than a century and a few other interludes, the political history of the

Coman empire can be written from the vantage point of the problem of the imperial succession.

Appendix 2: The Expansion of the Ottoman Empire:

The formation and expansion of the 7ttoman Empire, the greatest Eurasian land power of the

sixteenth century, provides a stark contrast to how the European dynastic composite

monarchies of the same period were formed and expanded. H The 7ttoman Empire was a

most highly developed example of a near


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The Ottoman Succession

The successional practices of the 7ttoman Empire differed in fundamental ways from those of

the )atin European monarchies of the late medieval and early modern periods. The contrast

between the two can be used to arrive at a deeper understanding of dynasticism and its

uni$ueness. 7ttoman sultans, like all Islamic ruling families, practiced polygamy. + central part

of the imperial household was the harem in which the wives and concubines of the sultan were

maintained. 2nlike European rulers who, for the purposes of producing legitimate successors,

were restricted to one lawful wife at a time !and, as ;enry -III found out, for whom divorce was

not necessarily a simple matter", the sultans of the Islamic world could produce legitimate heirs

with as many women as they pleased. The status of their mates was irrelevant to the issue ofthe succession* the mothers of sultans could be of any religious, social or legal status !including

slaves and /hristians". The successional practices of the )atin /hristian world were, therefore,

firmly grounded in the institutional structure of western /hristianity and was not transplantable to

societies in which family structures and property rights were so different from those obtaining in

)atin Europe. The 7ttoman succession was open to all sons of the deceased sultan with no

legal restrictions on the pool of potential claimants other than paternity and age at the time of

the succession !Islamic custom held that the successor had to be a male of full age and of

sound mind". 2nder conditions of polygamy the numbers of potentially legitimate successors

e$ualed the total number of sons sired by the deceased ruler. The 7ttoman succession was,

therefore, governed by imprecise laws and customs with no nonviolent way to distinguish

between the claims of the contestants. Essentially, hichever 7ttoman prince succeeded in

securing the empire's capital, Treasury, archives and in winning the support of the 9anissaries

Mthe slave army owned by the sultanN, ulema, bureaucracy and alace officials, was the

legitimate sultan. In practice after 1:(1, the support of the 9anissaries became a fundamental

factor in the succession. H6

H6 Ibid., p. 6?.


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The conse$uence of this was something approximating the situation obtaining in early

>rankish Europe with the significant difference that the 7ttomans of the early modern period did

not practice partible inheritance !see above". /ivil war was an endemic conse$uence of this

system of succession. 2nder these circumstances the 7ttomans devised a %solution' to the

problem of the succession= legaliFed fratricide. >rom the early years of the empire the

successful claimant eliminated all other potential claimants to throne by killing them. 2nder

0ehmet II !reigned 1:61


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#osnia and allachia were 7ttoman tributaries and all of western +natolia was annexed to the

Empire.

#y the early fifteenth century the 7ttomans had experienced a century of expansion and

territorial growth. This phase of expansion was interrupted in the early fifteenth century by the

catastrophic defeat of #ayeFit I at the hands of the great con$ueror Tamerlane in 1:5( at the

battle of +nkara. +fter a few decades of recon$uest and retrenchment, the expansion of the

7ttoman Empire resumed in earnest in 1:6 with the con$uest of /onstantinople.

The period 1:61


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+s Table 1.( shows, beginning in 1:6 the 7ttoman Empire expanded at a phenomenal rate.

+t a time when the ;absburg %empire' came into being as a conse$uence of genealogical

accident, the 7ttomans were forging their own state through con$uestDthe 7ttomans were very

much in the mold of all other near

dynasticism and state consolidation

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