Music, Meaning and the Embodied Mind

Towards an Enactive Approach to Music Cognition

By

Dylan van der Schyff

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the MA in Psychology for Musicians,

Department of Music, University of Sheffield

July 2013

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CONTENTS

Table of Contents..................................................................................................2

Abstract................................................................................................................. 3

Introduction........................................................................................................4

Outline and method.....................................................................................7

One

A Dual Orthodoxy: Understanding the Cognitivist-Adapationist Program...........10

Cognition as computation..........................................................................11

Information processing, modularity and the adapted mind.........................14

Some preliminary concerns........................................................................17

Two

Music and Meaning: From Information-Processing and the Music as Language Metaphor to Embodied Action and Bio-Cognitive Ecology..................................26

Music and the computational mind............................................................28

Modularity and the biological origins of music............................................31

Moving beyond biased, reductive and reified notions of music...................33

Human development and the bio-cultural meaning of music......................36

The musical brain: a dynamic and interactive perspective..........................38

Movement and the corporeal origins of musical meaning...........................42

Three

An Enactive Approach to the Musical Mind.........................................................50

Cognitive ecology and the idea of affordances.........................................51

Outlining the enactive approach................................................................54

Conclusion: music, consciousness and the experience of self..................62

References............................................................................................................68

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Abstract

The study of music cognition has been dominated by a largely disembodied

conception of the mind. This so-called cognitivist perspective treats mental

activity in terms of abstract information-processingwhere the world is

represented in the mind via the computation of sub-personal symbols; and where

the mind-brain relationship is explained in terms of a collection of cognitive

modules shaped by natural selection. Recent decades have seen an ecological-

embodied paradigm emerge in cognitive science, as well as more plastic and

interactive conceptions of the mind-brain and organism-environment relationships.

These new perspectives offer a much broader understanding of meaning-making

and the mind and are becoming increasingly influential in music cognition studies.

The orthodox approach to the mind and its origins is examined; and its influence

on music cognition research is discussed. Alternative embodied, developmental,

ecological and bio-cultural perspectives on cognition and the musical mind are

considered. The enactive approach to embodied cognition is then offered as a

theoretical framework that better accommodates these broader and more nuanced

ways of understanding musical meaning. To conclude, the relevance of the

enactive approach is considered for music education, performance and practice.

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Introduction

The profound influence of the information-processing approach to cognition has

tended to promote a disembodied view of musical experience. This perspective

often treats musical cognition as if it were an abstract reasoning or problem

solving process that proceeds in a hierarchical fashion (Clarke, 2005: 15). It relies

heavily on a computational model of the mind-brain relationship where cognition

is understood in terms of symbol processing at sub-personal or non-conscious

levels: the outputs of lower levels of mental processing feed inputs to higher

levels, with increasingly complex representations of a world out there produced at

each stage. This conception of cognition is supported by an objectivist analytical

philosophical tradition (e.g. Ayer, 1936; Stevenson, 1944) that understands

meaning formation largely in terms of iterative (linguistic-logical) processesi.e.

the formation of representations, propositions and concepts (Johnson, 2007). By

this view, the cognitive function of emotions, feelings, as well as embodied

perceptions and activities are largely ignored.

This so-called orthodox cognitivist conception of mind (see Dennett, 1978;

Hofstadter & Dennett, 1981) is often paired with a modular understanding of the

mind-brain relationship grounded in a strict adaptationist approach to biological

evolution (Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 2009). As a result, the complexity of human

thought and behaviour is often discussed in terms of the evolution of a large array

of cognitive modules, each adapted by natural selection to process a specific type

of information in ways that contribute to the survival of the individual and its genes

(Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, 1992; Pinker, 1997). Because environmental factors

(culture, experience and so on) are thought to exert a negligible influence on the

genome, this approach seeks firm distinctions between the products of nature (i.e.

natural selection) and those of culture in the human phenotype.

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The cognitivist-adaptationist program has underpinned much theory and

interpretation in the study of human cognition, often to the exclusion of other

viable approaches. As I will discuss below, this has resulted in problematic

reductions and reifications, dichotomous conceptions of nature and culture (i.e. the

nature vs. nurture debate), as well as disassociated notions of mind, body and

world. Furthermore, the highly objectivising view this approach demands has

contributed to a problematic epistemological divide between scientific inquiry and

phenomenal experience that has marginalized the study of consciousness in

Western scientific and intellectual circles.

However, while this orthodox approach remains highly influential in Anglo-

American philosophy and psychology, developments in cognitive science and

philosophy of mind have begun to open up alternative possibilities. Increasingly,

cognition is understood to be grounded, first and foremost, in interactive and

embodied experience with the physical and socio-cultural environment (Changizi,

2011; Tomasello, 1999; 2005)where cross-modal perceptions, sensory-motor

activity, emotions and basic metabolic processes play a central role (Damasio,

1994, 1999, 2003; Gallagher, 2005; Johnson, 2007; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, 2003;

Ramachadran, 2011). Related research has questioned the dominance of the

modular conception of mind, especially as it is understood within the strict

adaptationist context of evolutionary psychology (Besson & Schn, 2012; Uttal,

2001; Panskepp, 2009; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003). There is growing

neurobiological evidence that complex human behaviours, such as those involved

with social cognition, depend more on organism environment interactions than on

innate dispositions; the plasticity of the human neocortex and the formation of self-

organizing cognitive structures through experience and epigenetic effects are

increasingly emphasized over a large suite of genetically determined modules

(Gregory, 1987; Maturana & Varela, 1987; Lewontin, 1983; Pansepp, 2009; Sur &

Learney, 2001). In brief, the cognitivist and adaptationist orthodoxies are being

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challenged by more nuanced, integrated and interactive understandings of the

nature and origin of human cognition.

Because the functions and meanings of music span such a wide range of

human experience this work clearly holds great promise for the study of musical

cognition, which is increasingly understood as a bio-cognitive and bio-cultural

phenomenon. A number of scholars have begun to consider the enmeshed

biological, cognitive and cultural origins of music in human evolution and

ontogenesis (e.g. Cross, 1999; Tobert, 2001; Trevarthen, 1998, 1999). While

others, such as Leman (2008) have employed embodied theories of music

cognition to discuss possibilities for more effective mediation technologies. Cross-

modal approaches to music perception and cognition have been investigated by

Eitan (e.g. Eitan & Granot, 2006; Eitan & Timmers, 2010) and Johnson (2007)

among others. And Gibsons (1966) ecological approach to perceptionan early

alternative to representational cognitivist modelscontinues to be influential; it has

been developed in a musical context by Clarke (2005) and others (e.g. Kreuger,

2011a, 2011b; Windsor, 2000, 2004) in order to discuss musical cognition in terms

of specification and affordance (as opposed to cognitivist principles of

codification and representation). Indeed, recent research has prompted some

scholars to reexamine a number of earlier theories that fell by the wayside during

the period of preoccupation with computational models of mind that arose in the

1950s and 60s. The work of James and Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, as well as the

early pioneers of cybernetics, is beginning to reassert an influence among a new

generation of psychological musicologists (e.g. Reybrouk, 2005) and musically

inclined philosophers (e.g. Johnson, 2007).

With this in mind, this paper aims to better understand the so-called

enactive approach to cognition within the context of human musicality. This

approach is most clearly articulated in The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and

Human Experience (1993), a joint effort by cognitive scientist Franscisco Varela,

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philosopher Evan Thompson and psychologist Eleanor Rosch. It has also found

some more recent advocates, such as philosopher Mark Johnson (2007), among

others. I suggest that the enactive approach may provide a valuable addition to the

study of musical experience. It presents a compelling critique of the dual

orthodoxies of adaptationism and cognitivism, potentially allowing for deeper, bio-

cognitive and bio-cultural approaches to questions of music and meaning. It also

offers a critical addition to Gibsons ecological theory of perceptionand by

extension the work of Clarke (2005) in musicby placing a greater emphasis on

cognition as perceptually guided action that both drives and creates the historical

context of structural coupling between organism and environment (i.e. organism-

environment codetermination). Perhaps most interesting is the potential this

approach holds for dealing with the seemingly irreconcilable gap between

scientific aspirations for objectivity and the reality of direct personal experience.

This last concern seems especially relevant in the context of music

psychology, which seeks to understand the experience of music, in all its diversity,

largely through scientific methods. As I will discuss further, the enactive approach

offers useful tools for the analysis of conscious experiencemost notably the

mindful-awareness techniques associated with the empirical/pragmatic strands of

Buddhist philosophy (Murti, 1955; Varela et al., 1993; Kalupahana, 1987; Lowe,

2011; Biswas, 2011). It is suggested that this may enable a new level of dialogue

between scientific inquiry and subjective experience, as well as a systematic (and

radically empirical) means by which performers, teachers, students, and listeners

may analyze and gain a deeper appreciation of their musical experiences.

Outline and method

I am attempting to draw out a broader and more inclusive conception of musical

meaning than is often entertained in mainstream music cognition studies. As a

result, I will necessarily be bringing together a broad range of ideas and concerns,

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some of which may at first appear to be related only tangentially. I will do my best

to contextualize things as I go. The following overview should give the reader some

idea of where the discussion is headed as well as the key areas to be considered.

Section One offers an overview of the dominant cognitivist-adaptationist

understanding of the human mind and its origins. I discuss the history and

influence of both approaches and consider how they reinforce one another. I

conclude by discussing some concerns that will be developed in later sections in

musical contextsi.e. the problematic dichotomies and reductions mentioned

above, as well as difficult issues concerning consciousness and phenomenal

experience. Because the cognitivist-adaptationist approach underpins much

research in music cognition, but is rarely discussed critically in a musical context, it

will be necessary to articulate its core principles as clearly as possible. Therefore,

for the sake of clarity, musical concerns will not be addressed here, but rather will

be taken up in the following section.

Section Two begins with a brief look at Eric Clarkes (2005) illuminating

critique of the dominant cognitivist view of music cognition. Clarkes work is worth

considering not only because he articulates and critiques the underlying

assumptions of the standard approach so clearly, but also because he is one of the

few established figures in systematic musicology to do so. Following Clarkes lead,

I attempt to demonstrate how the deep influence of the cognitivist-adaptationist

program has contributed to a standard view whereby music cognition is understood

to proceed in accordance with the computational model of mind outlined in

Section Onei.e. abstract symbolic operations carried out by an adapted modular

brain. As I will discuss, because such operations are thought to function

syntactically, research is generally grounded in the assumption that musical

cognition is best understood in terms of rule-based and representational processes.

This, I argue, has led to a preoccupation with musics relationship to languagea

valuable area of study, but one that, in the absence of a discussion of other factors

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involved, provides only an incomplete understanding of musical experience. As I

go, I draw on studies of human ontogenesis; more dynamic and interactive

conceptions of the mind-brain and organism-environment relationships; as well as

bio-cultural, action-based, and cross-modal approaches to human cognition in

order to develop a deeper, embodied understanding of the nature and origin of the

musical mind.

In Section Three I consider this broader conception of musicality in the

context of the enactive approach to cognition. In order to distinguish the enactive

view from similar theories I begin with a look at Gibsons ecological (1966)

approach to cognition. Here I return briefly to the thought of Clarke (2005) and

consider his approach to musical meaning (which is largely based on Gibsons

theory). At this point I take a somewhat more critical view of Clarkes work and

discuss some problematic issues with the Gibsonian perspective in general. I then

introduce the enactive approach as a viable alternative to both the cognitivist-

adaptationist and the Gibsonian points of viewone that better encompasses the

wide range of concerns and ideas developed in Section Two. I explain key terms

and concepts; and I consider how the enactive approach offers a welcome

theoretical framework through which we may better understand musical cognition

as an evolving, embodied and bio-cultural phenomenon. To conclude, I discuss the

enactive approach to consciousness and consider how the insights it offers may

afford a means by which the individual may systematically examine his or her own

experience, and thereby gain a more nuanced understanding of their direct

relationship to the musical activities they engage in. This, I argue, may have

important implications for music education, practice and performance, as well as

for the scientific study of musical experience.

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One

A Dual Orthodoxy

Understanding the Cognitivist-Adaptationist Program

Until recently, the understanding of human cognitive capacities and potentials has

been dominated by two mutually reinforcing paradigms of thought. Respectively,

the so-called cognitivist and adaptationist approaches attempt to explain how

mental operations occur, as well as the evolutionary mechanism that produces the

brains capable of carrying out such processes. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the

theoretical framework imposed by this understanding of mind has underpinned

much of the research, interpretation, and theory related to the study of musical

cognition (see Clarke, 2005).

The study of how and why musical experiences are meaningful is of central

importance to systematic musicology; and it draws on an increasingly wide range

of disciplines including sociology (Denora, 2000; 2011), the cognitive and

biological sciences (Rebuschat et al., 2012; Wallin et al., 2000), education and

cultural studies (Small, 1999), archaeology (Mithen, 2005), and the humanities

(Johnson, 2007). Indeed, it is becoming more and more evident that musical

cognition cannot be properly understood apart from the emotional-physiological

responses to music (Juslin & Sloboda, 2010), the role of musical behaviour in

human development (Trevarthern, 1998; Trehub, 2003), and the difficult bio-

cultural question of why humans should have universally evolved into musical

beings in the first place (Cross, 1999, 2001, 2010, 2012; Fitch, 2006; Patel, 2008,

2010; Tolbert, 2001; Pinker, 2009). But opinions and theories vary greatly and the

debate over the hows and whys of musical meaning is far from settled. In fact, the

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growing interest in music cognition has revealed special problems and

opportunities for the study of human cognition in general: because musicality takes

so many forms and spans such a wide range of human experience it forces the

question of how deep and varied the bio-cultural origins of cognition and meaning-

making really are.

Nevertheless, the dominant cognitivist-adaptationist approach continues to

focus our investigations and understandings of musical meaning largely towards

notions of 'internal' mental representations that are assumed to correspond with

pre-given musical structures in the 'external' aesthetic environment. In what

remains of this section, I outline the central tenets of the cognitivist-adaptationist

approach and consider some implications and problems associated with it. In

subsequent sections I will examine the influence of this approach on our

understanding of music cognition and discuss alternatives. I should state from the

outset that it is not my intention to simply refute the cognitivist and adaptationist

programs; they are both based on established research strategies and are as

plausible as any other scientific endeavour (Varela et al., 1993). However, I

suggest that the often-uncritical acceptance of these approaches as the only viable

models reinforces problematic nature/culture and mind/body dualisms, resulting in

reductive, reified, and disembodied understandings of the nature and origins of the

musical mind (see also, Still & Costall, 1991; Potter, 2000).

Cognition as computation

Cognitive science as we know it today can be traced back to the cybernetics

movement that emerged in the early 1940s. It was during this period that

researchers first introduced the idea that mental processes could be understood in

terms of computations carried out by machines (Gardener, 1985; McCulloch,

1965). Such machines (a brain or computer) would consist of many simple

threshold devicesi.e. neurons, silicon chips, or tubes that function in a binary

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on/off or active/inactive capacityconnected so as to be able to perform logical

operations (Heims, 1980; for a thorough account see Pinker, 2009; and Betchel et

al., 1998).

While the theoretical and practical implications of computational cognition

were recognized immediately, in the early days of cybernetics voices coming from

the social and biological sciences still held considerable influence, and there was

much debate whether or not such a strict computational model was sufficient to

fully explain the functioning of the human mind. However, the rapidly growing

achievements and incredible potential of digital computing outshone alternative

theories, and the computational model quickly became the dominant approach by

which all cognition was understood (Boden, 2006).

By the mid 1950s social and biological concerns were shunted to the

margins and the field of cybernetics became focused on a clear computational

hypothesis (Posner, 1989). The central idea is that intelligent behaviour should be

grounded in the capacity to represent the world intentionallythat is, in the

ability to cognize the aboutness of things and situations in ways that allow us to

form representations of (about or directed to) the world out there in certain ways

rather than others; [t]o the extent that her representation of a situation is accurate,

the agents behaviour will be successful (all other things being equal) (Varela et

al., 1993: 40).

While there is something rather commonsensical about this view of things,

the cognitivist account of the causal nature of intentionality is not quite so intuitive.

The central problem, for the cognitivist, is to explain how intentional states are

physically instantiated and how these states result in intelligent behaviouri.e. to

explain what goes on between raw sensory input and intelligent behavioural

output. The cognitivist solution to this question of how internal ideas and

processes are related to external situations and actions in the world is symbolic

computation: because symbols may be instantiated physically and may be

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ascribed semantic value, they are able to be subject to computational operations

that function syntactically according to the language of the system (Haugleland,

1981). Or to put it another way, when semantic distinctions are encoded into the

rules of syntax, abstract symbolic representations become possible; these

representations are then able to be logically manipulated (i.e. computed) by the

system in order to produce further representations and intelligent outputs (Betchel

et al., 1998; Pinker, 2009).

To be a cognizer is to possess a system of syntactically structured symbols-in-the-

head (mind/brain), which undergo processing that is sensitive to that structure.

Cognition, in all its forms, from the simplest perception of a stimulus to the most

complex judgment concerning the grammaticality of an utterance consists of

manipulating symbols in the head in accord with that syntax. The system of

primitive, innate symbols-in-the-head and their syntactic, sentence-like structures is

sometimes called mentalese. (Betchel et al., 1998: 63-64; also quoted in Johnson,

2007: 116)

Of course, a computer carries out operations only on the physical form of the

symbols available to it in accordance with the rules of syntax programmed into it

by human beings. It possesses no knowledge of semantic values; the computer

has no access to what a symbol, or group of symbols, is understood to represent,

and therefore has no way of inferring the meanings of the computational processes

themselves beyond the rules of its programmed syntax (see the Chinese room

argument, Searle, 1990; Leman 2008; Dreyfus, 1979). Nevertheless, the computer

has provided the dominant modelor metaphor (Costall, 1991; Lakoff & Johnson,

1999)for the mechanics, grammar, or language of thought.

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Information processing, modularity and the adapted mind

As I have just discussed, for most of its existence cognitive science has focused

almost exclusively on the idea of representations produced by syntactic operations

on physical symbol systems as the best way to understand the mind as an

information-processing machine. By this view, mental operations are understood

to proceed in a hierarchical process where increasingly complex representations of

the world out there are generated at each stage according to the syntactic rules of

mentalese (Fodor, 1983). Outputs (representations) from lower levels of

processing (mental abstractions of raw sensory input) feed inputs to higher levels,

where representations of form, structure and, eventually, reference and meaning

are generated (Pinker, 2009; see also Fodor, 2003).

In order to account for the incredible processing capabilities of the human

mind, many theorists have enhanced the information processing approach with a

modular conception of the mind/brain relationship. Fodors (1983) initial theory

proposed that functionally specified cognitive systems (i.e. modules) exist only in

localized lower levels of processing. Two of the principle features of such modules,

according to Fodor, are domain-specificity and information encapsulation

meaning that each module works on a specific type of information and that the

processing in a given module cannot be affected by information in other areas of

the brain not directly associated with its input/output path. The modular approach

has been greatly expanded by the field of evolutionary psychology, which, contra

Fodor, understands the brain to be massively modular across all levels of

functioning (Tooby & Cosmides, 1989, 1992; Pinker, 2009). This view attempts to

explain the diversity of human thought, behaviour, and culture in terms of the

evolution of a large array of such modules, each adapted by natural selection to

serve a specific function related to survival:

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The mind is a system of organs of computation, designed by natural selection to

solve the kinds of problems our ancestors faced in their foraging way of life, in

particular, understanding and outmaneuvering objects, animals, plants and other

people [...]. (Pinker, 2009)

Indeed, evolutionary psychology understands the vast majority of human

psychological activity in terms of adaptations that occurred early in the

evolutionary development of human beings, when the species as we know it today

was forming through the process of natural selection. Thus, by this view, an

essentially stone-age mind is at the core of our modern day thoughts and activities.

The influence of evolutionary psychology has been substantial. Much of its

appeal, as Pinkers words clearly demonstrate, is due to the fact that it sets up a

clear parallel between the cognitivist and adaptationist programs, where the origin

and structure of human cognition are explained in terms of adaptation by natural

selection. Like cognitivism, the central tenets of the adaptationist (or neo-

Darwinian) approach can be stated fairly clearly. At the core of Darwins original

theory is the idea that biological evolution occurs through a process of

modification by descenti.e. through mutation and the recombination of

hereditary material through reproduction. The mechanism responsible for this

process is known as natural selection, which chooses the phenotypes that

function most effectively within a given environment; organisms are selected on the

basis of how optimally they fit the environment at handhence the famous phrase,

survival of the fittest (Sober, 1984).

The neo-Darwinian program emerged in the 1930s in order to synthesize

new knowledge from the developing field of genetics with the concerns of classical

Darwinism (Dawkins, 1976; Pinker 2009; see also Hecht & Hoffman, 1986; Ho &

Saunders, 1984). This led to a focus on changes in the fitness of genes as the

quantitative basis for understanding the adaptive traits organisms exhibit in relation

to the environments they inhabitwhere the fitness of a given gene, and its

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associated phenotypic trait, is understood in terms of abundance (optimization of

surplus offspring and the growth of an interbreeding population) and/or

persistence (optimization of reproductive permanence; long term survival)

(Dawkins, 1976).

[] the dominant orthodoxy in evolutionary thinking over the last few decades saw

evolution as a field of forces. Selective pressures [...] act on the genetic variety of

a population producing changes over time according to an optimization of the

fitness potential. The adaptationist or neo-Darwinian stance comes from taking this

process of natural selection as the main factor in organic evolution. In other words,

orthodox evolutionary theory does not deny that there are a number of other factors

operating in evolution; it simply downplays their importance and seeks to account

for observed phenomena mainly on the basis of optimizing fitness. (Varela et al.,

1992: 187)

Thus the cognitive capacities of the human phenotype are understood to have

emerged from adaptive processes associated with fitness optimization that occurred

over an evolutionary timescale. This drives evolutionary psychologys central

claims that the human mind evolved towards fitness optimizationi.e. towards the

capacity to create representations that optimally correspond with a stone-age

hunter-gatherer environmentand that many of the perceptions, thoughts,

behaviours, and desires associated with modern life (a life we are supposedly not

biologically adapted for) are largely parasitic, invasive or otherwise dependent

on mental (computational) processes and structures (modules) that developed deep

in human prehistory (Sperber, 1996; Sperber & Hirschfield, 2004). It is one of the

central projects of evolutionary psychology to discern just what human activities

and thoughts can be understood as properly adaptive from those that are

biologically irrelevant (see Pinker, 2009).

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Some preliminary concerns

I have offered here only a brief outline of the cognitivist and adaptationist

programs. There is, of course, much more to be said about both. Nevertheless, I

believe I have clearly outlined the central tenets of these two approaches and have

demonstrated the clear theoretical connection they share in explaining the origins

and functioning of the human mind. In Section Two I will consider their influence

on music cognition research more closely. Before I go on, however, I should

introduce a few critical concerns associated with the cognitivist-adaptationist point

of view. Most importantly, I would like to draw attention to research that

demonstrates a more dynamic and interactive relationship between genome and

environment; and to discuss problematic issues surrounding perception, knowledge

and consciousness associated with the cognitivist approach. These matters will be

developed in the context of the embodied, bio-cultural, and enactive approaches to

music cognition I discuss further on.

While the neo-Darwinian approach remains influential in psychological circles,

other scientific fields appear to be moving away from such a strict adaptationist

understanding of biological evolution (Gould, 1982; Gould & Lewontin, 1979;

Sober, 1984; Ho and Sunders, 1984). An increasing number of evolutionary

biologists have emphasized that the processes by which evolution proceeds are

multiple and must be subject to levels of explanation (Sober, 1993; Oyama, 1985

Oyama et al., 2003). Indeed, it has been argued that the strict adaptationist

approach does not properly take into account epigenetic factors and the important

role of ontogenetic and environmental processes (Jablonka & Lamb, 2005;

Goodwin et al., 1983). For example, one might consider here the discovery of

polygenic traits, as well as the phenomenon of epistasiswhere the regulation and

expression of a given gene is dependent on, and contributes to, the activity of other

genes in the intra/inter-cellular environment via epigenetic processes;

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environmental and bio-chemical factors (e.g. hormones) play an important role

(Lambert et al., 1986; Ridley, 2003).

These insights and observations, among others, have led to a more dynamic

understanding of how genes and environment interact (Lewontin, 1983; Oyama et

al., 2003; Bateson & Mameli, 2007). Rather than focusing on the gene (Dawkins,

1976) or the individual as the fundamental unit of selection, researchers are turning

their attention to how phenotypes develop via complex interactions and couplings

across a range of units:

DNA short sequences, genes, whole gene families, the cell itself, the species

genome, the individual, inclusive groups of genes carried by different individuals,

the social group, the actually interbreeding population, the entire species [...], the

ecosystem of actually interacting species, and the global bio-sphere. (Varela et al.

1992: 192; see also (Meaney, 2001; Eldridge & Salthe, 1984)

This substantially expands the orthodox Mendelian understanding of genetic

inheritance, which posits an additive one directional schema (genes cells environment phenotype). By the classical view, genes trigger protein production, this guides the functioning of cells, which, with some influence from the

environment, produce identifiable traits (Moore, 2003). This older approach works

well when explaining so called single-gene disorders like Huntingtons disease, or

certain elementary physical features like eye colour, especially as they develop in

relatively static and homogeneous environmental contexts (e.g. Mendels pea

plants). And there are also certain basic biological features that may still be

understood in terms of a neo-Darwinian comparative fitness scale (e.g. oxygen

consumption; see Varela et al., 1993). However, a growing number of biologists

find classical theories of genetics and evolution lacking in the context of more

complex physical, behavioural, and psychological attributes such as personality or

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cognitive, athletic and musical ability, which increasingly appear to be heavily

influenced by environment, motivation, activity and experience (Bateson, 2003;

Bateson & Mameli, 2007; Meaney, 2001; Ericsson, et al. 2006; Sternberg, 2005).

Furthermore, evolutionary psychology's conception of the massively modular mind

has come under fire in recent years, most notably from Fodor himself (2001; see

also Besson & Schn, 2012). This has resulted in more plastic and self-organizing

conceptions of both the genome/phenotype and the mind/brain relationships

(Maturana & Varela, 1987; Lewontin, 1983; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Pigliucci,

2001, Uttal, 2001).

I should make it clear that it is not the idea of a genealogy of species that is

in question. Rather, it is the mechanism by which this process occurs that is

contentious. Darwin himself did not believe that adaptation through natural

selection should be the sole force driving evolution. And indeed, it has been

argued that natural selection (i.e. the constraints of reproduction and survival) may

not be sufficient to shape genomes and organisms towards optimal fitness; and that

survival of the fittest may not be the goal of evolutionary processes after all

(Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini, 2010; Gould & Lewontin, 1979; Lewontin, 1983;

Varela, et al., 1993; Sober, 1984, 1993; Ho & Saunders, 1984).

In brief, the dynamic-interactive approach that has developed over the last

few decades (genome!cells!environment!phenotype) is dedicated to better understanding the complex ways in which genes, proteins, and environmental

factorsincluding behaviour and experienceinteract with each other to guide

the functioning of cells and the formation of phenotypes (Lewontin, 1983; Bateson

& Martin, 2001). This view seeks to dismantle the classic nature/nurture dichotomy,

preferring instead to examine the interaction between genes and environment as a

dialectical phenomenon (Pigliucci, 2001) where no single unit or mechanism is

sufficient to explain all processes.

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In Section Three I will make use of this dynamic understanding in order to give a

biological grounding to the concept of structural coupling between organism and

environment that is so central to the enactive approach to cognition (and that

distinguishes it from other ecologically inclined theories, e.g. Gibsons, 1966). For

the moment, however, it should be noted that despite the developments in

evolutionary biology I have sketched above, evolutionary psychology and the

cognitivist approach in general remains committed to the orthodox adaptationist

conception of biological evolution (see Pinker, 2009).

For the strict cognitivist there must be a means of optimizing

representational correspondence between inner mental processes and a pre-given

environment out there. This capacity is found in the modular computational mind

provided by the selective constraints associated with survival and reproduction.

Evolution is often invoked as an explanation for the kind of cognition that we or

other animals presently have. This idea makes reference to the adaptive value of

knowledge, and is usually framed along neo-Darwinian lines. [] Evolution is

often used as a source of concepts and metaphors in building cognitive theories.

This tendency is clearly visible in the proposal of so-called selective theories of

brain function and learning. (Varela et al. 1992: 193)

Both the cognitivist and adaptationist programs depend on the notion of optimal fit

(or correspondence in cognitive terms) with a pre-given environment. The key issue

here is the notion of optimization between the otherwise autonomous categories of

inner (genes, mental processes) and outer (environment).

This division between mind and environment is, of course, nothing new. It is

one of the central problems of modern philosophy, which often understands the

mind as the mirror of nature (Rorty, 1979). As can be seen most famously in the

mountain of critique surrounding the work of Descartes and Kant, such a dualistic

perspective not only draws the ontological relationship between mind and body

- 21 -

and into question, it also introduces serious epistemological issues regarding how,

and to what degree, true objective knowledge of the world outside of our minds is

possible. The thought of Descartes and Kant are often understood as precursors to

the cognitivist philosophy of mind and I will have more to say about both of them

below.

Initially, cognitivism may seem to bypass many of the traditional

philosophical problems associated with consciousness and knowledge of the world

(Block et al., 1997). As I have discussed above, cognitivism adopts an a posteriori

conception of knowledge as the result of symbolic representations that are

physically instantiated in the brain through causal processes beginning with raw

sensory input. Cognitivisms naturalizing approach is unconcerned with a priori

representations and thus appears to avoid the metaphysical antinomies and

transcendentalism, as well as the solipsism and skepticism that emerge in

traditional debates. This has led strong advocates like Pinker (2009) to triumphantly

claim not only that the cognitivist approach is wholly empirical and objective, but

that it has neatly solved the mind/body problem as well. But while the classic

substance dualism associated with Descartes is essentially a non-starter in current

debates, a modern version of it is indeed at the core of the cognitivist approach to

mind. As Damasio points out, the dominant idea is that mind and brain are related

but only in the sense that the mind is the software run in a piece of computer

hardware called the brain; or that the brain and body are related but only in the

sense that the former cannot survive without the life support of the latter (1994:

247-48).

This ingrained notion of the (rational-cognitive) mind as a disembodied and

autonomous category (Leman, 2008) implies a number of other potentially

troubling concerns. For example, a central aspect of the cognitivist model of mind

is that the operations it describes must be played out at the sub-personal level

(Dennett, 1978; Pinker, 2009). This means that not only are we not aware of such

- 22 -

processes, but that we can never be aware of them. The understanding is that

because these processes must occur rapidly there is no time for them to be parsed

consciously (lest our ancestor fall prey to the lion that is about to spring from the

bushes). This has prompted the obvious question of just how representational

outputs of proposed innate cognitive modules are meaningfully recognized by the

system beyond the mechanics of syntax, leading to homunculus metaphors and

philosophical problems of infinite regress (Searle, 1990; Dreyfus, 1979; Clarke,

2005; Still & Costall, 1991; Potter, 2000). The cognitivist response follows that the

characterization of these sub-personal systems in fanciful homunculus

metaphors is only provisional, for eventually all such metaphors are discharged

they are traded in for the storm of activity among such selfless processes as neural

networks or AI data structures (Varela et al., 1992: 50; see also Dennett, 1978;

and Pinker, 1997: 79).

It has been argued, however, that this response (i.e. retreating into the

complexity of mental activity) does not properly explain consciousnessi.e. how

the computational world of symbols and representations emerges into the daylight

of phenomenal experience (Jackendoff, 1987). As cognition is clearly directed

towards the world as we experience it (Varela et al., 1992: 52; see also Johnson,

2007: 4-6) it would seem that conscious awareness should be accounted for by any

empirically based theory of mind. However, the issue of consciousness is often

sidestepped because, for the strict cognitivist, consciousness and cognition are not

synonymous: all that cognition requires is the ability to produce representations

and intentional states; conscious awareness is not a prerequisite for cognition to

occur. Thus the cognitivist program is generally not concerned with accounting for

phenomenal experience. Rather it discusses notions of access-consciousness and

executive functions, with only vague suggestions of how this might correlate with

consciousness as sentience (see Pinker, 2009: 131-148).

- 23 -

This said, some supporters of computational-representational cognition have

refused to let the problem of consciousness slip away altogether. As Jackendoff

(1987) has argued, explaining cognition must involve more than describing the

relationship between a brain and a computational mind that is inaccessible to

consciousness (the mind-brain problem). One must also account for the

relationship between what he terms the computational mind and the

phenomenological mindthe mind-mind problem (1987: 20). Jackendoff

attempts to deal with this issue by developing a theory of intermediate-level

representations that are understood to support or project conscious awareness.

An important implication of this approach is that it puts phenomenological

constraints on computational models:

The empirical force of this hypothesis is to bring phenomenological evidence to

bear on the computational theory. [] Thus, if there is a phenomenological

distinction that is not yet expressed by current computational theory, the theory

must be enriched or revised. (Jackendoff, 1987: 25)

This insight appears to highlight the open-ended approach necessary in including

conscious awareness in the study of human cognitionwhere the structural

analysis of our minds and the development of cognitive theories are continually

enriched by a disciplined examination of phenomenological distinctions.

Another important and challenging insight offered by Jackendoff concerns

the disunity of conscious experience. Indeed, our awareness of the world is modal

we have distinct forms of awareness that correspond to our sensory capacities:

visual, auditory, tactile and so on. His theory attempts to account for this by

claiming, each modality of awareness comes from a different level or set of levels

of representation. By this view, the disunity of experience arises from the fact that

each of the relevant levels involves its own special repertoire of distinctions.

(1987: 52). What is notable here is that instead of beginning with the notion that

- 24 -

consciousness is unified and ultimately traceable to some unique locus, Jackendoff

suggests that consciousness is fundamentally not unified and that one should seek

multiple sources (1987: 52).

This insight into the fundamental disunity of the cognizing subject is cause

for a good deal of tension as it goes against the common assumption that there

should be such a thing as a stable unchanging I at the centre of experience.

Furthermore, the recognition that a proper theory of cognition (in its full blown

consciously aware state) requires an ongoing discourse with direct experience also

poses a challenge to modern sciencesince the demise of the psychological

movement known as 'introspectionism', the study of experience has been

essentially ignored in psychological circles in favour of an objective approach to

theory and research (Varela et al., 1993). This return to experience is also an issue

for the dominant objectivist trends in analytic Anglo-American philosophy, which,

after Frege (1970), understands rule-based logical propositions to be at the

foundation of all meaningful thought and cognition (see Johnson, 1987, 2007;

Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

Unfortunately, in the end Jackendoff glosses over the kind of disciplined

and open-ended examination of conscious experience his theory appears to

demand. As Varela et al. point out,

Jackendoff assumes that everydaylargely mindlessexperience provides access

to all relevant phenomenological evidence and that the phenomenological quest is

limited to just that largely mindless state. He considers neither the possibility that

conscious awareness can be progressively developed beyond its everyday form (a

strange omission given his interest in musical cognition) nor that such development

can be used to provide direct insight into the structure and constitution of

experience. (1993: 54)

- 25 -

Jackendoff is a committed cognitivist. And while his assertion that the

computational theory of mind must account for experience is a clear advancement,

this does not mean he understands consciousness as having any causal influence

over sub-personal computational processes. This leads him to the rather unpleasant

conclusion that consciousness may not be good for anything (1987: 56).

Neverthless, the observations Jackendoff offers are important and deserve further

investigation, problematic though they may be for prevailing approaches. As I will

discuss in Section Three, the issue of the non-unified subject and the (seemingly

vicious) circularity between scientific objectivity and subjective experience are not

problematic from the enactive point of view. To the contrary, these insights lie at

the very heart of this approach, which also offers useful responses and alternatives

to the bio-cognitive issues I have discussed here. To conclude I will return to the

issues of phenomenal experience introduced above and consider what the enactive

approach and its relationship to the Buddhist mindful-awareness tradition may offer

in terms of understanding music's relationship to human consciousness and the

experience of self. For now, however, I go on to consider the influences and

implications of cogntitivism and adaptationism on the understanding of music

cognition and meaning, and to explore alternative embodied and bio-cultural

approaches.

- 26 -

Two

Music and Meaning

From Information-Processing and the Music as Language Metaphor

to Embodied Action and Bio-Cognitive Ecology

In the opening pages of Ways of Listening: An Ecological Approach to the

Perception of Musical Meaning (2005), Eric Clarke discusses the influence of

information-processing theory on how we understand musical meaning. He

demonstrates how the notion of cognition-as-representation is often accepted as a

given in music cognition studies; and he offers an alternative ecological approach

drawn from the work of Gibson (1966; see Section Three). Clarke identifies an

ubiquitous view whereby music cognition is understood to proceed in a

hierarchical and rule-based fashion from more basic to more complex levels of

information-processingi.e. from the processing of basic sound attributes such as

timbre, pitch and rhythm; to more explicitly cognitive functions such as the

perception of form, tonality, meter, and melody; to advanced levels that deal with

aesthetic value, and reference. According to Clarke, this perspective suffers from

the same problems associated with the strict cognitivist approach to mind I

discussed in Section Onei.e. the question of the actual existence of sub-personal

representations beyond theory; the homunculus problem; and the fact that the

information-processing account of musical cognition tends to be disembodied

(2005: 11-16).

As Clarke argues, the cognitivist approach reduces musical experience to a

kind of abstract "reasoning or problem-solving process" where "perception is

treated as a kind of disinterested contemplation with no connection to action

- 27 -

which bears little relationship to the essentially exploratory function of perception

in the life of an organism" (2005:15). He further questions the validity of this

approach as it appears to contradict direct experience. Indeed, we tend to

understand music first in terms of its meaning in our lives and how it makes us feel

(Langer, 1953, 1957; Johnson, 2007), only teasing apart its constituent structural

elements post factoan activity that often requires difficult (and conscious)

analysis if not sustained training.

Such concerns notwithstanding, the idea that musical cognition should be,

most fundamentally, a hierarchical and rule-based process remains a central

assumption in music cognition studies. And perhaps not surprisingly, this has

prompted much research into the relationship between music and language as

cognitive systems. As I discussed in the last section, the computational approach to

mind sees cognition proceeding according to the non-conscious language (i.e.

syntax) of thought or mentalese (Fodor, 1983). This process is thought to have a

conscious correlate in spoken and written language, which is generally understood

to function via the organization of symbolic representations into hierarchical

structures according to syntactic rules (Chomsky, 1975, 1980; Pinker, 1994, 2009).

Music is discussed in terms of its relationship to language at structural, perceptual,

and neuro-biological levels (Patel, 2008; Rebuschat et al., 2012); and a music as

language metaphor often pervades common understandings of musical meaning

(Johnson, 2007). Furthermore, because language is understood to be the adaptation

par excellence of the human species, the evolutionary origin of the musical mind is

examined largely in terms of comparisons to language in a neo-Darwinian context

(Pinker, 2009; Patel, 2008). As a result, debates over musics biological meaning

and origin are often carried out within a dichotomous adaptationist nature or

culture frameworkwhere, in comparison to language, musicality is often

understood to be irrelevant from an evolutionary perspective (Pinker, 2009).

- 28 -

As I will discuss below, such views may depend on rather reductive and culturally

biased notions of what the words music and meaning imply (Cross, 2010;

Johnson, 2007). Indeed, when musicality is considered in the context of human

development, socio-cultural ecology and lived experience a much broader view

emerges. Further on I will discuss how related research may move our

understanding of musical meaning well beyond its relationship to language,

syntactic rules and abstract representations so that we may see it, first and foremost,

as a primary means by which we enact meaningful embodied relationships with

the physical and socio-cultural environments we inhabit. First however, in order to

better understand the dominant perspective, I begin with a brief review of music

cognition research that demonstrates the strong influence of the cognitivist-

adaptationist conception of mind.

Music and the computational mind

Today the understanding that music cognition should be a fundamentally iterative

and representational phenomenon is supported by the dominant computational

approach to the mind, which understands sub-personal syntactic processes (i.e.

rules) to be at the core of all mental activity. As Deutsch writes,

[] we shall examine the ways in which pitch combinations are abstracted by the

perceptual system. First we shall inquire into the types of abstraction

[(representation)] that give rise to the perception of local features, such as intervals,

chords, and pitch classes []. We shall then examine how higher-level

abstractions [(representations)] are themselves combined according to various

rules. (Deutsch, 1999: 349; also quoted in Clarke, 2005: 12-13)

While this cognitivist approach has been greatly advanced by the introduction of

the computational theory of mind, it should be noted that a rule-based conception

- 29 -

of musical cognition has been a central aspect of systematic musicology since its

beginnings (e.g. Seashore, 1938). To a degree, the emergence of this approach

reflects the long lasting influence of Gestalt psychologyi.e. the idea that musical

meaning emerges as a global pattern from the processing of information patterns

contained in sound (see Leman, 2008: 30). And Indeed, the brilliant pioneering

work of Helmholtz in psychoacoustics was central to the early development of the

information-processing approach to music cognition as he demonstrated that the

input/output functions of psychological mechanisms could be represented

mathematicallythus providing the "grounding for gestalt psychology in the first

half of the twentieth century, and for the cognitive sciences approach of the second

half of the twentieth century" (Leman, 2008: 30).

The introduction of behaviourism in psychological circles was also

influential as it introduced a strictly empirical and quantitative approach to

psychological research that aspired towards complete objectivity and the

development of lawful conceptions of human psychological functions. The

behaviourist approach considered the mind to be a black box whose processes

could not be studied directly, only inferred via the relationships between inputs

(stimuli) and outputs (responses and behaviours).

More recently, rule-based approaches have received support from a number

of developments that suggest correlations between linguistic syntax and musical

cognition. Perhaps most well known is the discussion over the apparent similarities

between the Shenkerian approach to musical analysis and Chomskys Universal

Grammar Theory (Pinker, 1994; Sloboda, 1985, 1988). This has led to so-called

generative theories (Lerdahl & Jackendoff, 1996) whereby a given musical work is

parsed into hierarchies of pitch, intervals, phrases and rhythm, which are then

compared and analyzed in terms of their psychological effects on listeners with the

hope of developing normalized correlations (Large et al., 1995; Patel, 2008; see

also Pinker, 1997).

- 30 -

The interest in musics relationship to language has also been greatly expanded by

recent technological developments in cognitive sciencemost notably in the areas

of computer modelling (Wiggins, 2012) and neural imaging (Grahn, 2012). Among

other things, research in this area has suggested an overlap between brain areas

associated with linguistic syntax and those thought to be involved with the

processing of tonal music (Koelsch, 2005, 2012; Koelsch et al., 2002; Maess et al.,

2001; Patel, 2003, 2008, 2012).

Interestingly, the results of such studies stand in contrast to research in

neuro-psychology with patients suffering from amusia and aphasia (Peretz. 1993,

2006, 2012; Patel, 2012) that suggest disassociations between brain areas thought

to process pitch and those related to language (see also Van Orden et al., 2001).

This has led a number of well-known researchers to posit a cognitive resource-

sharing framework for tonal music and language based on the idea that linguistic

and musical cognition employ domain-specific representations that may be shared

when necessary (Patel, 2012; Koelsch, 2012). Put simply, this theory argues that the

cognitive processing of both music and language requires the ability to compute

mental representations of structural hierarchies between sequential elements

(Krumhansl & Kessler, 1982; Koelsch, 2012). Thus, in music cognition, the

representational outputs from the domain of pitch processing may be shared with

those from language (i.e. syntax) at higher levels of processing. In this way, the

perception of musical sounds (e.g. sequences of pitches, simultaneously occurring

pitches) is thought to be transferred into a cognitive representation of the location

of tones and chords within the tonal hierarchy of a key" (Koelsch, 2012: 226). As

Koelsch writes, "establishing a representation of a tonal centre is normally an

iterative process (2012: 225; see also Krumhansl & Toivainen, 2001).

Along similar lines, there has also been a good deal of attention placed on

how structural variations may set-up and break musical rules, creating tension-

resolution patterns that allow emotions to be perceived and/or felt by listeners

- 31 -

(Koelsch et al., 2008; Stenbeis, Koelsch, & Sloboda, 2006; Steinbeis & Koelsch

2008). This view generally assumes that musical emotions rely on the

computational processes discussed above, as well as on cognitive mechanisms

adapted to process responses associated with the satisfaction and violation of

expectation (Scherer & Zentner, 2001; see also Huron, 2006; and Meyer, 1956).

Modularity and the biological origins of music

The research discussed above is not to be taken as a comprehensive account of

music cognition studies. Such an undertaking is well beyond the scope of this

paper. Nevertheless, this work is central to the field and, as such, demonstrates the

key interests and general approach rather well. While these studies are all very

interesting and useful in their own right, they maintain a rather disembodied

perspective where the focus remains on structural appraisals and iterative processes

(whether conscious or 'sub-personal') as the basis for musical cognition: whatever

music expresses through its structural relationships is thought to mirror rule-based

(syntactic) processes in the brain thereby producing representations that correspond

intelligibly with an aesthetic environment (i.e. the world out there). This clearly

shows the influence of information-processing theory and the computational model

of mind on our understanding of music cognition.

Not surprisingly, this approach also relies heavily on the modular

conceptions of the mind-brain relationship I considered in Section One. Indeed,

the notion of domain-specific representations refers to the outputs of

computational processes that are thought to occur within the confines of

functionally specified cognitive modules (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Peretz, 2012).

As I discussed earlier, such modules are generally understood to be adaptations

selected to perform specific mental computations that contribute to the fitness of

the organism. Thus the notion of modularity is a central factor in the ongoing

- 32 -

debate over the biological origins of music. For example, Peretz's (1993; 2006;

2012) research in acquired amusia has led her to (cautiously) posit the existence of

an innate music specific module for pitch processing, prompting her to suggest that

music may be as natural as language is (2006). This view is far from being

universally accepted, however, and a large number of influential researchers and

theorists have argued that because music appears to have no immediate relevance

for survivaland because it draws on such a wide range of cognitive faculties and

brain regionsclaims for any music-specific adaptations are premature (Huron,

2001; Justus & Hutsler, 2005; McDermott & Hauser, 2005). Rather, music is often

understood as parasitic, on modules whose adaptive (naturally selected) values are

thought to be functionally specified.

For example, Pinker (2009) has famously asserted that although music draws

on cognitive processes that do have clear adaptive valuelanguage, auditory

scene analysis, emotion and motor controlmusic is nevertheless parasitic on

these domains and has no biological value of its own whatsoever. For Pinker,

music is a hedonistic invention of human culture, a pleasure technology, or

auditory cheesecake (2009: 528-38; see also Sperber 1966; Sperber &

Hirschfield, 2004).

Less radical modularists, such as Patel (2008; 2010) acknowledge the bio-

cultural benefits associated with music but also remain skeptical about whether it

can be properly understood as an adaptation in the same way language can. Patel

argues that the rate of learning musical structure is slower than it is for language;

that humans are far more uniform in their linguistic abilities than in their musical

abilities; and that, unlike language, there is no visible biological cost associated

with the failure to develop musical abilities or as a result of musical deficits, such

as tone or rhythmic deafness. Thus, for Patel, while the domains of music and

language may share cognitive resources (see above), their origins are quite

differentmusic is a product of culture that employs cognitive adaptations that

- 33 -

evolved to support language. Pinker (2009) offers a similar argument when he

suggests that musicality can have no biological significance because, unlike

language, it is largely the result of training and is unevenly distributed in the

population.

Moving beyond biased, reductive, and reified notions of music

It may be argued that the positions taken by Pinker, Patel, and music cognition

studies in general, reflect a rather narrow and culturally biased perspective on

music. A range of studies have demonstrated that humans from all walks of life and

regardless of training exhibit a precocious inclination for music (Peretz, 2006: 2;

see also Shepard & Jordan, 1984; Tillmann, Bharucha, & Bigand, 2000; Bigand,

1990) and continually engage in musical activity beginning in infancy. This stands

in contrast to the often rarified and elitist notions of musical development and

competencies associated with the Western classical tradition. More research is

needed in other cultures and milieus where musical activity is a larger part of

everyday life, and where the acquisition of musical skills appears to occur much

more rapidly (see Cross, 2012). Furthermore, in Western society it is thankfully

much easier for people with a wide range of physical and cognitive deficits to

flourishin this environment musical deficits are far less relevant to survival and

may go almost completely unnoticed. Thus, while Pinker's 'cheese cake' model

may match up within the hedonistic 21st century consumer culture, it is important

to recognize that the wide rage of activities associated with the word music may

have much more immediate and far-reaching implications for survival and

socialization for other peoples of the world (as they may have had for our

prehistoric ancestors) (Blacking, 1973; Nettl, 1983, 2000; Mithen, 2005).

I bring up these issues not simply to argue for the relevance of music in the

biological evolution of the human species. More to the point, these concerns

demonstrate how cognitivist-adaptationist conceptions of the human mind demand

- 34 -

a dichotomous nature or culture framework that accommodates only rather shallow

(i.e. Western academic) conceptions of what is implied by the word music. I have

already touched on the fact that the cognitivist preoccupation with iterative

processes tends to ignore the embodied aspects of musical experiencethe main

focus is on explaining the syntactic-representational processes and computational

brain structures associated with appraisal in Western tonal music (i.e. musical

structure and representational correspondence). A problematic consequence of this

rationalizing approach is that it tends to place the locus of musical meaning within

the 'intrinsic' structural properties of the 'work' itselfa perspective associated

with so called absolutist conceptions of musical expressivity and the related

'autonomous' status of Western classical music (see also Meyer, 1956; Denora,

2011; Small, 1999; D. Clarke, 2012; Cross, 2010). Indeed, it may be argued that

this perspective often assumes a reified notion of music and therefore imposes a

reductive and linear conception of musical communication: there is a musical

object that possesses certain objective formal qualities, a performer who interprets

and transmits them, and an anonymous subject who perceives them; a view from

nowhere and nobody (see Cross, 1998; Dibben, 2012). This approach tends to

reduce 'music' to an objective thing; and it creates a boundary between some

notion of what the music is on one hand, and the living environments in which it is

created and the individuals who experience it on the other (Clarke, 2012).

The influence of evolutionary psychology (Section One) on music cognition

studies takes this reductive view of music one step further. This is especially

apparent with Pinkers perspectivebecause of his rather strict adherence to the

cognitivist-adaptationist program he cannot entertain the possibility that musicality

might in fact span the (perhaps not so exclusive) domains of nature and culture and

thereby play a significant role in our bio-cognitive and bio-cultural development,

on both evolutionary and ontogenetic scales. Thus the cognitivist-adaptationist

approach leaves us with a perspective that, in a nutshell, sees music as a product of

- 35 -

culture that is largely dependent on rule-based cognitive processes and brain

structures that evolved to support languagewhere little attention is given to

musics significance as a bio-cultural phenomenon, nor to musics relationship to

fundamental developmental and embodied processes.

Ian Cross writes what we know of music in neruobiological and

neuroscientific terms is constrained by a conception of music that is narrowly

shaped by historical and cultural notions of what constitutes music (Cross, 2010:

2). Such narrow views have received a good deal of criticism in recent decades,

most notably perhaps from educator, Christopher Small (1999), and sociologist, Tia

DeNora (2000, 2011). DeNora sees musical meaning as a process that plays out in

the evolving ecological, socio-cultural and bio-cognitive contexts of lived

experiencemusic as action, as a therapeutic force for bio-cognitive

organization, and as part of an enacted aesthetic environment through which

cultural and individual identities may be constructed and deconstructed; music is a

"resource for meaning-making" (see, for example, the discussions of Hendrixs

famous Woodstock performance of The Star Spangled Banner in Denora, 2011;

and Clarke, 2005; see also Willis, 1978). Small (1999) argues that music is best

understood as a verb rather than a noun; his theory of musicking considers human

musicality as a multi-faceted activity.

The fundamental nature and meaning of music lies not in objects, not in musical

works at all, but in action, in what people say and do. [] To music is to take part,

in any capacity in a musical performance, whether by performing, by listening, by

rehearsing or practicing, by providing material for the performance (what is called

composing), or by dancing. (Small, 1999: 9)

In most musical activity around the world music is functionally enmeshed with the

activities of lifewith work, play, social life, religion, ritual, politics and so on

- 36 -

(Blacking, 1976, 1995; Berliner, 1994; Nettl, 1983, 2000). Music is also often

associated with, and often inextricable from, other modes of expressive behaviour

like dance and storytelling; it is often improvised and changes with the culture

(Small, 1999; Mithen, 2005; Cross, 2010, 2012). In these environments, music

retains its status as an embodied activity-experience and is meaningful in terms of

its enmeshed and evolving relationship to the environments in which it functions.

With this in mind, it is now time to consider approaches to music cognition that go

beyond language and the adapted modular-computational notion of mind in order

to better understand the deeper corporeal and socio-cultural aspects of musical

meaning-making as it arises in human development, embodied action and socio-

cultural ecology.

Human development and the bio-cultural meaning of music

A growing number of researchers are developing integrated bio-cultural

approaches to the musical mind that go beyond the rather narrow perspective

associated with the orthodox approach (e.g. Cross, 2012). This is driven, in part, by

the growing acceptance of the musilanguage theory, which posits that both music

and language (as we experience them today) emerged from a common proto-

musical ancestor. This represents a rather drastic turn from the adaptationist

language first approach (Mithen, 2005; Brown, 2000; see Pinker 2009; Sperber,

1996; and Patel, 2008, 2010 above); and it asserts the deep biological roots of

human musicality.

In addition to comparative studies with primates, birds and other animals,

support for this approach is drawn from the archaeological record and studies of

socialization and human ontogenesis (Wallin, Merker & Brown, 2000; Fitch, 2006).

The last two areas are perhaps most often cited in connection with the adaptive

function of music (Balter, 2004; Cross, 2003; Dunbar, 1993, 1996, 2003; Falk,

2000, 2004). What is interesting about such studies is the emphasis they place on

- 37 -

musics deep connection to other modes of expression, such as movement (dance;

see Dissanayake, 2000), as well as the role musicality plays in enacting the shared

socio-cultural bonds and environments that have been so crucial to human

survival. As Tolbert points out, music arises in social situations that are

emotionally motivatedsituations that are the product of both subjective and inter-

subjective processes of meaning formation (2001: 85; see also Blacking, 1973;

Nettl, 1983, 2000; Small, 1999; and DeNora 2000, 2011).

Such musical-developmental processes are thought to begin very early on in

life (Parncutt, 2006). Researchers have demonstrated the universal and seemingly

intuitive way parents create both stimulating and soothing musical environments

for infants through prosodic speech, lullabies and the like (Trehub & Trainor, 1998;

Trehub, 2000; H. Papousek, 1996; M Papousek, 1996; Dissanayake, 2000; Falk,

2004; Fernald, 1992). Along these lines, Trevarthen (1998; 1999; 2002) has

demonstrated that humans possess an in-born communicative musicality that is

related to the necessity for embodied inter-subjectivity in highly social beings such

as ourselves. This, he argues, is mediated more by imitation and co-ordination of

movement with others than solely through faculties associated with language (see

below; Leman, 2008; Johnson, 2007). Similarly, Cross argues that "Music is a

cognitive capacity arising from an infant's propensities to search for relevance in,

and mastery over, itself and its world [] particularly [in] the interactions with the

primary caregiver" (1999; see also M. Papousek, 1996). He suggests that because of

its multiple potential meanings music affords a means by which social activity

may be explored in a risk free environment; its transposable aboutness (2001),

or floating intentionality (1999), is employed in infancy and childhood to

explore, create meaning, and develop competencies between different domains of

embodied experience; music is a play-space for developing cognitive flexibility

and social understanding. This perspective sees musicality as an integral part of the

- 38 -

ongoing process of how we enact the worlds we inhabitone that begins with

embodied interactions with the socio-cultural environment (Cross, 2010, 2012).

On an evolutionary scale, this perspective may find support in dual

inheritance theories of human cognition (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 2005;

Richerson & Boyd, 2005)where the question of whether either biology or culture

should account for deeply social and universal human activities that require

complex cognitive functions (such as music) is replaced by a perspective that

integrates the two. Along these lines, Cross argues that music facilitates the

development of individual minds and structures for their interactions in society

(1999). And he concludes that musicality was crucial in precipitating the

emergence of the cognitive and social flexibility that marks the appearance of

modern Homo sapiens sapiensit is an evolutionary engine he claims, without

which it could be that we would never have become humans (2001). Such

insights move the study of musical meaningand cognition in generalwell

beyond its relationship to abstract syntactic processes and into the more

fundamental areas of lived social, ecological and embodied existence.

The musical brain: a dynamic and interactive perspective

The expanded view of musical meaning I have been considering implies a more

dynamic and interactive approach to the organism-environment and mind-brain

relationships than the orthodox view is capable of providing. And indeed, the

notions of modularity and mind associated with dual-inheritance and bio-cultural

theories of human cognition are considerably less radical (and far more flexible)

than those associated with the strict adaptationist approach of evolutionary

psychology. Important concepts include the idea of representational redescription

and Theory of Mind (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; see also Cross, 1999)which is

sometimes understood as a single cognitive adaptation that permits recognition of

the cognitive-emotional states of conspecifics; it is thought to have allowed for the

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development of complex cultural behaviours including forms of affective

communication that rely on a variety of cross-domain, multimodal channels of

expression (Livingstone & Thompson 2009: 86; see also Tomasello et al. 2005).

While most researchers remain committed to explaining musical cognition

in terms of modular computational components in some way or another, a growing

number of scholars are beginning to question whether the notion of modularity

continues to have much relevance for understanding the complexities of the human

mind-brain relationship, which is increasingly discussed in terms of its plasticity

(Gregory, 1987; Doidge, 2007; Lickliter & Honeycutt, 2003; Sur & Leamey, 2001,

Panskepp, 2009; Van Orden et al. 2001; Uttal, 2001).

Fodor (2000) himself has argued that applications of the modular-

computational theory of mind have been greatly overestimated. It has also been

suggested that brain regions that appear to consistently correlate with specific

processes, such as Brocas area and syntax, represent vast areas of the cortex that

may in fact develop multiple overlapping or interlacing networksthe manifold

functions of which may appear evermore fine-grained, interactive and plastic as

neural imaging technology becomes more refined (Grahn, 2012; Uttal, 2001;

Poldrack, 2006). In relation to this, recent research and theory (see Besson &

Schn, 2012) has suggested the existence of global systems that function in a

flexible and context dependent manner; these systems do not work independently

of any other information available to the mind and are thus non-modular. Besson

and Schn argue that,

The theory of modularity did provide a useful framework []. However evidence

has accumulated at the micro (genetics and molecular biology) and macro-levels

(cognitive psychology, neuroscience, cognitive neuroscience) that, in our view,

point to the limits of modularity [] advancement of knowledge at various levels

of biological organization increasingly shows that biological and cognitive

processes are largely influenced by environmental factors [] the expression of

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genes depends on epigenetic factors [] and cognitive processes unfold as a

function of context []. It becomes consequently more and more difficult to

consider brain and behaviour as linear systems [] that can be decomposed into

independent modules and functions. Rather, these functions seem to be highly

interactive (Besson & Schn, 2012: 289-90; see also Uttal, 2001).

And similarly Panskepp writes,

Most cortical specializations (including seemingly genetically preordained cortical

processes such as vision and hearing) are currently explained better by epigenetic

regulatory influences on cortical specializations arising from lower brain functions

[]. Most neocortical functions seem to emerge during brain development, guided

by many poorly understood environment-sensitive processes. (Panskepp, 2009:

233-35).

Panskepp concludes that the human neocortex may in fact contain no evolutionary

determined modules for either music or language; that the neural origins of

musicality are largely sub-cortical; and that the emergence of emotional proto-

musical communications may have led to the development of both music and

propositional language. Thus it may be that the ancient emotional core of the

limbic system provides the actual instinctual energetic engines that still motivate

our music-making, and continue to be the tap-roots that allow the rich foliage of

cultural invention that is modern music to assume the impact it does on our minds

(2009: 237). Observations like these have contributed to the view that music

cognition is the result of more general, poorly understood and possibly non-

modular cognitive developmental processes that are supported by an innate

attraction to musical behaviour (see above; Trehub & Hannon, 2006; Drake, Jones,

& Baruch, 2000; Jones, 1990, 2004; Large & Jones, 1999).

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The insights provided by the developmental and bio-cultural approaches, as well as

more plastic conceptions of the mind-brain relationship, resonate with the more

dynamic and interactive conception of evolution and bio-cognitive development I

began to sketch out in Section Oneone that embraces multiple levels of

explanation "across a range of units" (from gene to individual to social group); and

where behaviour, experience and environmental factors (culture, socialization) are

central to the process. This notion of genomic plasticity and dynamism may, as I

have suggested, be paralleled in the brain, where ancient sub-cortical areas may

contain more determined functions that are linked, in massively parallel ways, to a

largely plastic neocortex whose most remarkable function may be its creativity

that is, its capacity to continually transform itself in order to enact the meaningful

but contingent and protean relationships we experience year to year, day to day,

and moment to moment between the diverse modalities of our being-in-the-world

as active embodied creatures.

Clinical and empirical studies (e.g. music therapy) have demonstrated

musics deep effects on the body as well as its capacity to transform or reorganize

biological structures in the brain (Bunt, 1994; Patel, 2010; Standley, 1995; Bunt,

1997; Nayak et al., 2000; Jovanov & Maxfield, 2011; Tomaino, 2011; DeNora,

2000). Strong associations have also been noted between neocortex size and the

sociability of a given organismwhere the ability to navigate more complex and

changing social environments appears to have a great deal to do with the

development of a large plastic cortex (Dunbar, 1993, 1996, 2003). This may open

up promising areas of research with regard to the deep connection between human

musicality, bio-cognitive development, socialization (above) and more plastic

conceptions of the mind-brain and biological-environmental relationships. As

Benson writes, human beings create a uniquely human social space when their

nervous systems are coupled through interactional synchrony [via music and

dance] (2001: 28; see also Becker, 2011; Cross, 2012; Mithen, 2006). Again, more

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neurological research is needed over a range of cultures, types of musical activities

and developmental periods that extend beyond pitch and structural processing in

Western tonal music and in Western adult brains.

Movement and the corporeal origins of musical meaning

While structure, representation and rule-based processes surely play an important

role in music cognition, these are clearly not the only relevant aspectsnor are

they the most fundamental. As I have argued above, the wide range of social/bio-

cultural processes and behaviours we associate with the word music play a

central role in being (and becoming) the kinds of creatures we are (Cross, 1999;

2012). Given this deep interactive relationship between biology, culture and

cognition, our conception of what constitutes mind, music, and 'meaning' will

clearly have to move beyond standard notions in order to include the corporeal

actions, emotions and feelings, as well as the organism-environment interactions

and transformations from which all bio-cognitive processes, aesthetic responses,

and meaning making emerge. Indeed, what is required are action-based and

ecological ways of accounting for cognition that embrace an embodied conception

of mind.

This, however, is easier said than done. The cognitivist focus on rule-based

and propositional-conceptual (i.e. logical-linguistic) meaning is deeply ingrained; it

reflects the long-standing objectivist and rationalizing approach to knowledge and

aesthetics that emerged in the Enlightenment and that has remained with us ever

since (Johnson, 2007). Kant's work in aesthetics is particular