TO :FROM :DATE : 15 September 2015RE : Duty of the Prosecution is to Administer Justice

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this Court is averse to any form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Mr. Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one."

[Suarez vs. Platon et al., 69 Phil. 556(1940). J. Laurel.]

The above defects in the decision of the Sandiganbayan were stressed by the Solicitor General, who has asked for the petitioner’s acquittal. While his office ordinarily sustains the respondent court as a matter of policy, he has seen fit to deviate from this policy because he is convinced that the petitioner is innocent. So is this Court.

For adhering to the ethical canon that the primary duty of a public prosecutor is not to convict but to see that justice is done, the Solicitor General deserves the commendation

of the Court. It is truly to his credit that while a conviction could have been another feather in his cap, he did not seek it at the expense of the petitioner’s honor and liberty.

We repeat our counsel against ill-considered convictions based only, as in this case, on unfounded surmises or, in other cases, prejudgments and prejudices. Although these errors may at times be corrected and undone on appeal, the stigma of a criminal conviction, even if ultimately reversed, is never quite washed away and remains to soil the innocent man’s name to his dying day.

[Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 640(1986). J. Cruz.]

And the Solicitor General had this to say:

“Ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial.

“However, the sworn statement of Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.

“The people is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother’s affidavit in the interest of justice and fair play.

“Under Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, prosecutors who represent the People of the Philippines in a criminal case are not duty bound to seek conviction of the accused but to see that justice is done. Said Rule 6.01 of Canon 6 states:

‘Canon 6—These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

‘Rule 6.01—The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see

that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.’

“The above duty is well founded on the instruction of the U.S. Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, that prosecutors represent a sovereign ‘whose obligation to govern impartially is [as] compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”

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It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances considering that the “People” does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General’s finest hour, indeed.

[Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 485(1995). J. Francisco. Citations omitted.]

At the outset, We give due credit to the Solicitor General and his staff for upholding the time-honored principle set forth in perspicuous terms by this Court in Suarez vs. Platon, et al., that a prosecuting officer, as the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation and interest in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case but that justice shall be done, has the solemn responsibility to assure the public that while guilt shall not escape, innocence shall not suffer. The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial.

[Jose vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 257(1976). J. Muñoz Palma.]

Thereafter, on April 19 of this month, a Manifestation in lieu of Brief was filed by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the People of the Philippines recommending “the reversal of the decision appealed from and the acquittal of the appellant on the ground that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio.” He was quite emphatic about the matter too: “Much as it is to be desired that the author of the alleged abominable offense, were it committed, be penalized and given the corresponding punishment he deserves, punishing appellant herein, who may be really innocent thereof, will not serve the ends of justice but rather subvert it, which is worse than the crime itself.” A careful study of the evidence of record yields the same conclusion. We accept such recommendation.

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It is thus easily understandable why counsel for appellant in the able brief he submitted was quite vehement in his denunciation of the decision rendered by the lower court. It is a fair appraisal that the guilt of his client was not shown beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence was thus not overcome. The Solicitor General, after a thorough study of the record, reached the same conclusion, it could not be otherwise. He had to recommend the acquittal of appellant. As mentioned at the outset, we are in agreement.

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It goes no further than to accept the plea of the Solicitor General after a careful study of the record that the accused is entitled to acquittal, his guilt not having been shown beyond reasonable doubt. He is thus entitled to the protection afforded by the constitutional presumption of innocence.

[People vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634(1977). J. Fernando.]

The report of Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza was submitted to this Court on April 30, 1976. The dismissal of the case was recommended.

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It was his considered view therefore “that there can be no valid reason for proceeding with the investigation of the case.” Relying further on “the legal presumption that a lawyer is innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved and that he regularly performed his duty as an officer of the Court in accordance with his oath.” [H]e recommended “that the complaint should be dismissed.”

Such a recommendation merits approval.

[Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA 527(1977). J. Fernando.]