duty and inclination: the fundamentals of morality discussed and redefined with special regard to...

Husserl Studies 1: 307-330 (1984}. �9 1984 Martinus Ni/hoffPublishers, Dordrecht. Printed in the Netherlands.

Book reviews

Hans Reiner, Duty and Inclination: The Fundamentals of Morality Dis- cussed and Redefined with Special Regard to Kant and Schiller, translated by Mark Santos with a Preface by William K. Frankena (Phae- nomenologica, Volume 93). The Hague:.Martinus Nijhoff, 1983. xiv + 306 pages.

Duty and Inclination (DI) is a translation of the first four chapters of Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit (1974). Instead of Chapter Five, which the author describes-as an empirical inquiry into the moral consciousness of the most important civilized nations and culture groups, there are substituted more recent essays by Reiner which briefly illustrate his method and also enable him to present his views on currents in moral philosophy thirty-two years after the original publication of Pflicht und Neigung (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1951), the first shorter edition of Die Grundlagen der Sittlichkeit. i The author is introduced by the distinguished William K. Frankena in his Preface as "the one German moral philosopher of the last fifty years" who should be selected for translation into English. Next to J.N. Findlay, Reiner, who attended Hussed's lectures at Freiburg from 1919-1926, is indeed the foremost living philosopher connected with the phenomenological movement who has wrestled directly with the major issues in traditional moral philosophy. In the work under review the phenomenological tradition of moral philosophy, represented chiefly by Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann and Dietrich yon Hildebrand, becomes a rich and lively scene where in the eidetic dust is by no means settled and the phenomenologlcal project itself is placed in question.

As part of the systematic exploration of duty and inclination, Reiner

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treats us to instructive historical-etymological discussions of "value" and "the Golden Rule." The former is done in connection with a sus- tained criticism of Heidegger's occasional excursions into value-philosophy. The treatises which are central and original are those which deal with value and value perception, duty and inclination, personhood, will, conscience, supererogation, universalization, Socratism (that one does not knowingly do evil), and method. Reiner's discussion of the relation of Schiller and Kant is doubtless a major contribution to this celebrated debate. We leave it to those better versed than this reader to determine whether "not one critique...has yet gone so deeply into Kant's ethics as to test its determining fundamentals" (5).

Chapter One discusses "Kant's System of Ethics in Its Relation to Schiller's Ethical Views." Reiner vigorously attacks the position of Kant that duty and inclination, as they exist in actuality, are essentially incompatible. At the same time he shows that Kant clearly acknowledged that they were capable of a fortuitous combination (6 ft. and 23). Schiller's response to Kant in Anmut und Wiirde, translated as "Grace and Dignity" ("grace" here thereby distractingly suggesting both the beauty of graciousness, gracefulness, charm, etc. and the Re- formation issues of freedom and determinism) charged that Kant's notion of duty frightens away "the Graces" and urged that "man not only may but ought to combine pleasure with duty." Reiner discusses both whether the alleged ultimate agreement confessed to by the protagonists in fact obtained and also the historical sense of the philosophical issues themselves. Kant's view, that duty with (not from) inclination is permissible as a matter of chance, is surely not the same as Schiller's, i.e., that duty and inclination ideally should become one and the same (43). Schiller is wrong in thinking that he is in agreement with Kant for "as soon as morality is one with inclination the (Kantian sense of the) imperative is pointless" (44). Reiner's own move is to break with Kant more radically than does Schiller by radicalizing Schiller's views and seeing in what respect the fundamentals of morality are anchored in humanity's "sensous nature."

For readers of this journal it is of interest to note that Husserl's own ethics is perhaps indirectly a result of Schiller's influence - if, that is, Fichte was indebted to Schiller. For it is Fichte's critique of Kant which fuses the supremely desirable with the absolute ought, especially in the Anweisungen zum Seligen Leben (and here especially Lecture Nine) which Husserl has in mind in his "Lectures on Fichte's Ideal of Humanity" (F I 22) and in his own systematic efforts. 2

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Chapter Two of DI is a critique of the basics of Kant's position. Of special interest is Reiner's critique of the universality and universalizability of the categorical imperative. This discussion anticipates his own theory (in Chapter Three) of universalizability only by induction. Reiner argues that the obligatoriness of a moral law is general in the sense that I assume that others in the same circumstances as I are bound; but my being bound does not depend on whether this assump- tion is born out. My being obligated "will not (as Kant thinks) have to seem reasonable to every rational being" (66). Reiner accounts for universality in terms of a "tendency" (not an actual universal functioning de facto universally) which inserts his thought into social philosophy. The generalness is something wished for by the agent because he or she realizes that the values to be realized are realized more through every- one else helping "each other in accomplishing (them) to the best of our abilities" (78-79, 203-204). For this reader this is a welcome but un- expected, because not intrinsic, development. Although Reiner's discussion here raises numerous issues we confine ourselves to some im- pressionistic observations. 1) Is there not a sense of actual universality in an eidetic value-insight, a "sameness for all," even an "impartial spectator," as in "If W is a value and it holds that if A so also W, then A in regard to W is also a value", 3 which has universal validity independently of my consulting the actual beliefs of particular individuals? 2) Is not the appropriate context for interpreting Kant's universalizability principle his social philosophy? This seems to be the drift of J.N. Findlay's identification of the content of the universal principle as "for agents who are possible patients, whose actions have effects that can be suffered by others who are also possible agents. ''4 Some Neo- Kantians, of course, found the universality aspect of the categorical imperative to be the foundation of social democracy. And more recently Wilfred Sellars has offered a fascinating version of the categorical imperative as necessarily involving a common good. s These too hurried remarks lead to a third: 3) Is not Reiner's whole essay undecided about the primacy of persons and the human community versus the primacy of values? At crucial times community and communalization are introduced to explain fundamental aspects of responsibility and duty (see especially #25); yet because of Reiner's doctrine that objectively important values "exist outside and independently of us" (see below) moral reflection is focused on values; persons in community seem on occasion almost an afterthought. Perhaps for readers of this journal it is

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noteworthy that Husserl held "the good" to be the telos (ideal pole- idea) of transcendental intersubjectivity and everything to have value only in relation to persons. ~

In Chapter Three and the first two of the appended more recent essays it is clear that Reiner is not interested in transcendental phenomenology. Indeed it seems evident that he is skeptical about anything like an eidetic analysis. He espouses the shibboleth of "zu den Sachen selbst" in the manner of the Munich-Goettingen school as a mandate to oppose reductionism and speculative metaphysics. But he is less con- vinced than members of this school that reflection on one's moral experience can deliver essential a priori structures as "the same for all." It is not by eidetic intuition that we can grasp the universality and necessity of essential relations; it is not by free imaginative variation holding for mind as such. Rather what "phenomenological analysis" comes up with seems more like "empirical essences," as, e.g., that of a virus, an automobile, a blue collar worker, a hunting dog, etc. Such a universal is a genuine meaning-whole with component parts enjoying a kind of necessity revealed in critical reflection by an individual. But these essences are most likely historical and the norm derives from the way the reflective community to which the individual belongs regards them. Such a universal does not enjoy necessities whose constitutive ingredients are not conceivably deniable by the reflective mind. Rather we know them always incompletely and presumptively and it is always possible that another perspective will radically modify what we now regard as essential and necessary. 7

This is the reviewer's reading of Reiner's position; Reiner does not say that his work has to do with merely empirical universals. Yet he does hold that Husserl unjustifiably assumes that conscious minds have the same structure, the same faculty of reason, the same moral consciousness; Husserl thereby naively disregards that there might well be differences of a biological ethnical, racial, etc. order (106). Reiner thus makes contact with Critical Theory's critique of phenomenology's "monologic" activity (257-258 and 268). He requires that not only must the "phenomenologist" (like himself) follow up the structural analyses with historical-comparative inductive research, but these analyses must be confirmed in actual dialogue. Only through the actual interchange with others, even other times and cultures, is there a verifi- cation of "the inquirer's own moral consciousness" (254).

It seems clear that strictly speaking Reiner's theory of philosophy (not necessarily his practice) is to be distinguished from the regional-

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ontological and transcendental forms of phenomenology. Ethics "cannot be set up as a science that examines nothing more than certain ideal contents of consciousness. It must also find out about the givenness of these contents" through a general, i.e., inductive, form of empirical research (90-91). But eidetical-regional phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology (as well as the "Critical Theory" of Apel and Habermas) seek "essential necessities" whose negation is, if not incon- ceivable, refuted in exercitu.

Doubtless Reiner's theory has merit in so far as it claims that there are personality and morality types Which are empirical universals and that disciplines like comparative psychology, comparative ethics, comparative religion, etc. are the ways in which these empirical universals of "personality," "morality," and "religion," are brought to light. But this is not yet philosophy and the fundamental "regional" concepts of such studies, if indeed supporting comparisons, need to be founded in a different kind of reflection and analysis. A good demonstration that members of a class are related by merely a "family resemblance" is an essential not inductive argument; it itself is not made up of features generalizable only through "family resemblances." (Cf. Husserl's discussion of empirical universals in n.7 and of Hume in the second of the Logical Investigations.) Finally, it seems by definition impossible to derive an absolute ought from a state of affairs which enjoy only empirical necessity and an induced universality.

Reiner's rejection of certain doctrines of transcendental phenomenology does not prevent his Chapter Four from being the showpiece of this good book and a contribution to the disclosure of the nature ("essence") of moral experience. Rather than attempt a summary of these 135 pages I want to dwell on an issue of central importance which Reiner unfolds in ##18-24. Taking cues from Husserl, Pfaender and Scheler, Reiner offers a theory of "the conscious I" with a distinction between I-center and I-circumground. The I-center arises out of the circumground; it extends as far as the power of the will and therefore of my agency and responsibility. The I-circumground is the possessed surrounding "within me" which is other to my agency; in a sense it is there as an object Or as "it." As I-center I am active and in a proper sense spontaneous. When experiences occur within my wider self I am affected and I am passively activated. The I-circumground extends into the implicit even unconscious experience; but it is also the ground or creative source upon which the I-center's agency is

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dependent and founded. The I-center or I proper corresponds with traditional notions of mind or spirit; I-circumground with the soul. See # 18 for all of this.

The origin, not yet the act, of valuation occurs in the intentionalities loosely called feelings and strivings (cf. Aristotle's orexis) occurring in the I-circumground. "Value" (or "disvalue") is a primitive phenomenon or quality and the objective correlate of the I-circumground's feelings and strivings (or aversions). The act of valuation is a position-taking, positive or negative, by the will (Willensstellungnahme; translated as "judgment by the will"); this is an active wanting or wish- ing (or their opposites) implying approval (or disapproval). This is not yet will as a decision or fiat which is an effective bringing about of the wanted by determining oneself to perform an action to realize what is willed (wanted/wished) in the will's position-taking (126). The will's position-taking is a value-response which qualifies the I through an intentional act: a loving of, being joyful about, being abhorred by, etc.

Reiner here makes central theoretical claims. Because values appear apart from the I's wanting them they are objective (in the same way the sense-qualities of perceptions are). They are also said to be "reasonable" because (!) "they are not decided by my will" (134). In the value- response which is the will's position-taking with regard to the circumground's felt Kenntnisnahme (through feelings and strivings)value apprehension moves from the "reasons of the heart/soul" to those of spirit or intellectual center.

Another thesis here (#20) which we may single out is that values appear either as relatively valuable ("for me," relative to my personal life's interests and desires) or absolute ("in themselves," irrespective of one's personal life's interests and desires). A value is objectively important if it is relative to others and not to oneself; a value is objectively absolute when its importance is "in itself" independent of its value to anyone's personal life. The "value of a man's life rests absolutely in itself whether or not a man's life is of value to him or anyone else" (139). The categorical ought refers to the ought-to-act or ought-to- conduct-oneself vis h vis the value (the ought-to-be) which is objective and absolute.

We see here that Kant's proposed conflict between inclination and duty will be restated by Reiner in terms of whether the inclination in question refers to the intentionalities of the I-center or I-periphery. Whether there will be a de facto conflict will depend on numerous

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considerations not least o f which are the gifts of nature and virtue or the cultivated attitudes (SteUungnahmen) as the enduring dispositions effected by acts of will (see #29-31). But clearly one can conceive of someone being "passionately inclined" to what categorically ought to be, where the Wertkenntnisnahme or Wertnehmen naturally slides over in a continuous way with the will's position-taking value-response, in the manner envisaged as ideal by Schiller, Fichte, Husserl and Reiner.

Our critical pause can begin by noting that for Reiner the important- in-itself as distinguished from what is valuable or important because good for me/us does not take place outside something like the noetic- noematic correlation. Yet because the whole discussion is within the natural att i tude there is nowhere a suggestion that the values are constituted - a consideration which relativizes values to the transcendental community. A Husserlian, or Husserl himself in commenting o n yon Hildebrand's Die 1dee der sittlichen Handlung which is a basic resource for Reiner, must ask in what sense the value evident in Wert-nehmen as a Kenntnisnahme (and not yet a position-taking, Stellungnehmen) is not consti tuted as a result o f passive synthesis. Indeed Wertnehmen is a passive association as well as the passive synthetic result of prior active position-takings in the same way Wahr-nehmung is a passive association building on the founding prior acts (Auffassungen). 8

But the larger issue the reviewer would like to insert into Reiner's discussion is able to be labeled Aristotelian. Our personhood or character or moral hexis (as part o f the I-periphery not ground!), is a result o f position-taking acts (cf. DI, 244-245). Husserl maintains these consti- tute together and correlatively world and self. As an Aristotelian- Husserlian the reviewer would hold our moral perception, Wertneh- mung, is inseparable from the character (hexis) in the sense that the character determines whether we take things as good or bad. But to what extent are we responsible for our hexis and its correlate world into which we are " th rown?" The beginnings of the self's beginnings are through the passive and/or voluntary but non-adult appropriation of position-takings of the surrounding adults which may or may not be conducive to a "blessed life" or rationality. 9

In short, personhood, rationality, and value-reflection have their defining context within intersubjectivity and its ideal realization. This seems to be an inevitable conclusion once value-perception is seen as a result o f self-making and the self inseparable from the communi ty , for bet ter or worse, as the large (but consti tuted) whole in which individual

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acts of constitution find their necessary condition and fulfillment. These, admittedly gratutious-sounding, assertions we believe to be fundamental to transcendental phenomenology. Reiner's fine book is marred in part because of what at first appears to be a prudent skepticism toward transcendental phenomenology; but it does not appreci- ate the radical skepsis which motivates Husserl and which enables him to anchor empirical-universal analyses of personhood and morality in a transcendental synthetic a priori and, at the same time, to be free of those value-frames (see DI, 188 ff.) which are ideological. Such at any rate is the telos if not the eidos (or empirical universal!) of transcendental phenomenology. Reiner's theory of philosophy would not seem to permit him to entertain such aspirations.

James G. Hart lndiana University, Bloomington

NOTES

1. The translation is good. I noted only fifteen typos and/or translation infelicities which is probably better than average in a book of this size. I would be happy to share these with the translator or editor.

2. See the Naehlass Ms. F I 24, 43 a ft. which in part is a transcription of and gloss on F. Jodl's Geschichte der Ethik, II, 97 ff. devoted to Fichte; also F I 28, 200a and F I 20, 260 ff.

3. Husserl, in F I 21, 28; taken from A. Roth, Edmund Husserls Ethische Untersuchungen (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 83.

4. J.N. Findlay, Kant and the Transcendental Ob/eet (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 297. 5. Wilfred Sellars, Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes (New York:

Humanities, 1968), 206-229. 6. For the telos, see, e.g., Roth, 161-163. 7. See Husserl, Experience and Judgment (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973),

~ / ~ i - 8 3 and Robert Sokolowski, Husserlian Meditations (Evanston Northwestern Univer- sity Press, 1974), ~19.

8. The founding stratum of value perception as "passive" is never sheerly "receptive" in the sense intended by Reiner and yon Hildebrand for it always is a result of the passive synthetic "agency." The I-center's being affected by the founding hyletic stratum is clearly centri- pedal; but Husserl rightly insists that von Hildebrand does not see the elemental centrifugal achievement in "being affected" which is at the basis of waking life and founding our active value-responses. See F I 24, especially 64b.

9. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1114b 1 ff., 1103b 21-25, and 1179b 1-1180a 17.

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Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology: A Metacritique. Studies in Husserl and the Phenomenological Antinomies. Trans. Willis Domingo. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983. 248 pages. $27.50.

The aim and purpose of this book are not unambitious. It speaks to a large number of our contemporary theorists from Marxists and Existen- tialists to Poststructuralists and Deconstructionists. Though the book antedates deconstruction as a movement, it holds in common with deconstructionism that Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has been foundationalist and logo-centric in its view that the structure of being and the rules of truth are objectively one and can be dis- covered to hold independently of any societal, psychological, historical or individually idiosyncratic conditions. Western philosophy has been "transcendental" both in its logic and in its metaphysics since its incep- tion. Adorno, on the contrary, wants to show that all the supposed "transcendental" and objectively coercive laws of thought and being are socially conditioned, that none of them are necessary, that all could be otherwise, and that the highest goal we can reach will be more and more continued discussion, not with "eternal truths," but with mortal men. His epigraph is from a fragment by Epicharmus: "A mortal must think mortal and not immortal thoughts."

As a work of polemic the argument of this book is directed primarily against Husserl's attempted refutation of species-specific skepticism. Adorno's purpose is to show that neither Husserl's nor any other philosophy can be a strenge Wissenschaft. He proceeds by first showing that the hypothetico-deductive model used in the physical sciences since Galileo and Newton will not work in the social sciences, and, then, by attempting to show that the eidetic-transcendental method of Husserl is equally sterile for a theory of social reality. Positively, he finds in a version of Hegelian dialectic (which is very much his own but which his translator and editor call that of the "Frankfort School") a means to refute both the realism of Aristotle and the ancients and the idealism of Husserl and the phenomenologists. Following these refuta- tions, which are dispursed throughout the book, he establishes the basis, also dispersed throughout the book, for his own new, non- dogmatic, relativistic, and skeptical social theory which will have nothing to do with "epistemology" in any of its philosophical guises.

There was a time in the history of American philosophy, beginning with William James and earlier, and still continuing through the 1930s

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with American philosophers like John Wild, Charles Hartshorne, Dorion Cairns, Marvin Farber and others, and even taken up after the Second World War for a brief period, when American philosophers went to Germany to study under German professors and tO visit German universities because of their extremely high and demanding standards of scholarship, objectivity and erudition. There were even some American universities, like Johns Hopkins and others, founded on what was taken to be a German model for exacting and universally recognized standards of accuracy in research and argument.

This book, as much or more than other, shows that the grounds for such expectations from German scholarship have for some time since come to an end. Adorno is no impartial expositor or scholar; he is no exact historian o f the period or the views he submits to investigation; he is certainly no philosopher: he does not argue, he proclaims. His is not even your ordinary garden variety hermeneutics; it is inspired by a political and sociological position used as a bludgeon to intimidate the f e w German idealists and their sympathizers who may still be brave enough to walk the streets.

In the first chapter of this book, entitled "Critique of Logical Ab- solutism," one could expect Adorno to give arguments against a position which he was attributing to Husserl even though it is a position which Husserl did not hold. Certainly, as a good logician, Husserl did demand that we distinguish and separate the rules of logic and all o f the formal rules of discourse from actual psychological instances of thinking, as something objectively discoverable independently of any particular historical period or any particular societal conditions. But he certainly did not deny the central place of the thinking subject in cog- nition; subjectivity is, in fact, the necessary condition of the possibility of any "having of objects" at all.

Adorno says (and this is typical) that: "Husserrs theory is absolutist ... because it denies any dependence of logical laws on entities at all as a condition of its possible sense. His theory expresses no relation between consciousness and object. Rather a being sui generis is passed on to i t" (pp. 70-71). There are very few references to Experience and Judgment in this book, and not too many even to Formal and Tran- scendental Logic. It would seem to be a requirement o f fairness that if Husserl's logic is to be studied and criticized, the whole corpus should figure. Can anyone who has read even the Sixth Investigation take the above-quoted sentence seriously?

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Throughout his logical writings Husserl worked to bridge the gap between an independent logicism on the one hand and an experiential psychologism on the other. This is the very basis of his refutation as well as of his fascination with British empiricism, particularlythat of Hume. Even in the Logical Investigations there is a " truth" of psychologism, namely that all of the objective, coercive rules which govern thought can occur only for subjects. And we have to learn how the ideal can live in the real and what their interrelations are. (He writes: "Es muss zu klarem Verstgindnis kommen, was denn das Ideale in sich und in seinem Verhdltnis zum Realen ist, wie das Ideale auf Reales be- zogen, wie es ihm einwohnen und so zur Erkenntnis kommen kann. "' (Hua XVIII, p. 191) Truth is always immanent to consciousness, the achievement of a meaning fulfillment in experience. Husserl, as is well known, several times gives a whole theory of the relation between thinking, the object and the formal rules of objectivity.

All of this escapes Adorno who, without nuance, calls Husserl's philosophy a "logical absolutism." One wonders what he would make of Frege or Wittgenstein, or Carnap or Russell. He quotes one of the passages (p. 49) in which Husserl argues that even great philosophers, like Epicurus and Hegel in actual acts of thinking, could deny the law of non-contradiction, but he misses the point that even though any of us can hold propositions which are self-contradictory, two contradictory propositions cannot, in fact, both be true. Husserl's argument is not ad hominem.

Adorno's book is not really composed of developed chapters but, rather, of short several-page snippets with fascinating but deceptive titles like: "Dialectic in Spite of Itself," "Calculators, Logic and Mech- anics," "The Forgotten Synthesis," "Phenomenology Attempts to Break Out," "The Withering Away of Argument," "The System in Ruins," etc. - sections in which one would expect to learn the essence of Adorno's criticism of Husserl. Instead we f'md only scattered quota- tions from Husserl usually followed by ephithets. Husserl does not stand before him as an opponent to engage in discussion and argument but as a malefactor to be judged. The whole book reads like the "table- talk" of Martin Luther or Sam Johnson.

Let us give a few examples of the author's candor of terminology and style of argument.

Husserrs "logical absolutism" is a "fetishization of the sciences," which takes science to be an entity in itself; that Husserl calls for "a

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division of labor" in its pursuit and criticsm is definitely a negative, as is Husserl's supposed identification of mathematics with pure logic (p. 52). "Husserl does not worry about whether science is true, but whether the sciences are scientific enough" (p. 53). No more than his positivistic opponents does he give a "critique" of science! Mathemati- cians (and Husserl) are resolutely "unconscious" with respect to the "content" of their judgments; they are concerned with "ideal objects" like "the paleontologist is with fossils" (p. 55).

Adorno treats of prima philosophia and philosophia perennis (pp. 14 ff.) as if they were the same thing and frequently writes as if Hussefl's and Heidegger's theories of truth were the same thing. The study of truth is "a residue" which remains after the great destruction of the tradition; it is the "leftover dregs," "thoroughly insipid," "utterly meagre." "For," he writes, "philosophia perennis behaves towards undiminished experience as do Unitarians towards religion, and culture to what it neutralized concept administers [sic]" (pp. 15-16).

Hussefl's prima philosophia builds fences around whatever Cartesian property it believes it holds the title deeds to (p. 17); Max Scheler prac- tices "grotesque manoeuvres" in his discussion of the individual ~go; Plato's "mathematical habits of thought" occasion "monstrous" dis- tortions in the discussion of virtue and his whole methods was de- signed so that this "monstrousness can be obfuscated" (p. 11). Ador- no's polemic becomes diatribe, and continues throughout the book.

In conclusion, we must ask, as with a piece of pornography, whether there is some redeeming social value to this book. The answer: it is instructive as an illustration of a certain contemporary method of doing philosophy.

Adorno began his work on Husserl for his doctorate at the University of Frankfurt and completed it in 1924 at the age of 20. It was a criticism of Husserl's concept of the thing-in-itself from Husserl's Ideas and happily was not published at the time. One would suppose that his return to a study of Husserl from 1934-1937 in Oxford, with the intention of obtaining the Oxford Doctorate in Philosophy, would be much more mature. When he moved to New York in 1938 he had the intention of revising and publishing his Oxford studies but did not do so until 1956 when they were incorporated in Against Epistemology. It is said, for reasons I do not understand, that afterwards he considered it to be one of the most important and comprehensive of his philosophical works.

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One can fairly imagine the reasons for the long delay in the publication of this work. It seems highly possible that the author must have been himself embarrassed by the questionable character, not to say superficiality, of his polemic against Husserl, in which he continously attributes to Husserl positions he did not hold in order the more easily to attack them. One can wonder whether the author might have feared that, given the relatively high level of Husserl scholarship not only in Germany, France and Belgium, but also in America and Great Britain at the time, this book would receive and extraordinarily critical recep- tion. It received no such thing, no doubt largely because of its delayed publication - other philosophers had already judged the sociological works on which Adorno's reputation was primarily founded, and did not take this particular Jugendarbeit very seriously. One can even imagine that a manuscript he had let languish for so long would be urged upon him by his students and admirers and, given his notoriety in other endeavors, he found himself unable to refuse their urgent and flattering suggestions that it also be published, however belatedly.

That many of Adorno's arguments are utterly lacking in philosophical discipline of any kind is perhaps not as serious as the fact that he does not even rise to the level of a sociologist of knowledge which we might otherwise expect from him. His most frequent accusations are against Husserl as a "bourgeois," who had a too highly developed sense of property. In one instance he bases what we may suppose to be his idea of an argument on the conjecture that the reason Husserl so frequently uses a bourgeois word like Einstellung is that it is also used in photography! A lot of this book, particularly in the Introduction, in "Dialectic In Spite of Itself," and "The System in Ruins," is based on a proposed Auseinandersetzung between Husserl and Hegel. He gives all sorts of supposed reasons concerning such things as the irreconciliabil- ity of dialectical mediation with Husserl's "urge" to return to immediate experience through the reduction (p. 4). He writes in these passages as if Husserl had actually undertaken a study of Hegel and attempted to confront him. Such a confrontation would have been highly instructive, particularly for a discussion of the interrelations between formal, transcendental and dialectical logic. But Husserl never undertook such a task and Adorno, in this book, certainly does not fill in this lacuna.

The translation by William Domingo is basically acceptable and seems often to be quite sound, even though the translator holds the very odd notion that Husserl had a penchant for "inventing" [sic] words not only of Hellenic origin but also numerous "Anglo-Saxon neo-

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logisms" (p. 235). Now if there is any Anglo-Saxon in Husserl, which I doubt, I think the translator owes us a list of the terms "invented." There are some grammatical errors and the translator also uses fairly numerous odd locutions, such as "materialistic logic" (on p. 240) where he can only mean, I would imagine, "material logic."

James M. Edie Northwestern University

J.N. Mohanty, Husserl and Frege (Studies in Phenomenology and Exis- tential Philosophy). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. 147 pages. $20.00.

Professor Mohanty's book provides a useful corrective to some recent attempts to "bridge the gap" between phenomenological and "analyti- cal" (or perhaps one should say "semantical") approaches in philosophy. Thus we are not required to dwell on respects in which Husserl's Bedeutungen, or the later noemata, are rather like Fregean Senses, once one has already chosen to regard the latter in primarily semantical terms. Instead, the focus is on respects in which Fregean Senses are (or are at least best viewed as) like their Husserlian counterparts, with the latter viewed in their primary role as "contents," "structures," or what have you, of mental acts. Attention to this aspect of Frege's thought has at least been approximated by some recent analytic commentators, and Mohanty's text and notes are replete with useful references to it. (Apart from the substantive treatment, the book thus provides a value- able service for those with little acquaintance with these discussions.) On the other hand, the recent attention to Fregean Senses as not simply "semantical," but as primarily "cognitive" contents, typically neglects the question of how such contents might actually function, how they might be supposed to stand in relation to the corresponding mental acts. One might be tempted to say that this was simply not a question that interested Frege. But Mohanty's own message seems clear and correct: here Frege could have learned from Husserl and not vice versa, and precisely on account of the former's extremely myopic conception of mental activity in the first place, and hence of the variety of non- psychologistic alternatives that might be involved in a commitment to the contents of mental activity. Practically a third of Husserl and Frege

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is in fact dedicated to the question of psychologism, both historically and systematically.

With respect to t he "great debate" over psychologism, Mohanty defends several counter-claims to some by now widespread views i concerning the relationship between Frege and Husserl. The discussion provides a valuable glimpse into some little known, or at least neglected, aspects of the historical record. Specifically, Mohanty holds that (1) prior to the influence of Frege's review of Husserl's Philosophie der Ari thmetik (PA) the latter had already adopted a position that was anti- psychologistic in the relevant respects; (2) the psychologism under attack in Frege's review is not present in PA; (3) Husserl's mature view of meaning differs from Frege's in several ways. The latter claim primarily unfolds later but also surfaces in the first chapter, where the issue is Frege's relative and (given his "intensionalism") surprising lack of interest in Senses as such (cf. pp. 15, 51, 92-93).

Part of Chapter One was previously published and then reprinted with a reply by Dagfinn F~bllesdal, who argues that Husserl's pre-review presentation/meaning/reference distinction is compatible with psychologism and with the decisiveness of Frege's critique. Mohanty's response (note #45), that the type of psychologism attacked by Frege is one of which Husserl was innocent, touches perhaps a bit too briefly on some of the more basic issues, to which Mohanty then returns in Chapter Two. In any case, it could be made clearer by both parties that even if Husserl did espouse a doctrine of "ideal meanings," this is compatible wi th a psychologistic theory of arithmetic. Psychologism, it seems, "depends on how one conceives of meanings, as psychological processes or as "ideal" entities .. . . It also depends on one's epistemological views on logic and mathematics. ''2 But the force of the crucial second con- junct is seemingly ignored: the question hinges not on the ontological status of arithmetical propositions as such, but on what those propositions assert or express.

Mohanty perhaps does not prove that the "meanings" that Husserl isolated in 1891 are "ideal entities." But if Hussed's failing to take them thus was relevant to an alleged psychologizing of the numerical on his part, one should expect it to have had an equal bearing concerning a// properties and relations, which it did not. Also, though Husserl credits both Bolzano and Frege in his overcoming of whatever psychol- oglsrn was in PA, it remains unclear precisely what in these philosophers may have stimulated him. For example, in Ideas (sec. 94) he says

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Bolzano failed to see that a "proposition in itself" might be two different things: either the "specific essence of the judging process (the noetic idea)" or else "the noematic idea correlative to" it. 3 If, as is arguable, the former corresponds to the ideal meaning acknowledged in Logical Investigations, it is possible that the credit involves the further recognition, unclear in Bolzano's own mind, of such meaning's phenomenological "correlate," not itself called "meaning" (or "noema") until later. It is also arguable that such correlates are "intentional objects" in a sense foreign to Frege. Thus the acknowledged debt does nothing to show that the "psychologism" of PA turned on a psychologistic theory of meaning. The advance may have consisted not in the discovery of ideal meanings shareable by acts (already recognized, though perhaps not clearly enough) but of an expanded iaotion of a meant object already at least sufficiently developed to overcome the limita- tion to acts themselves in PA. 4

Regarding Chapter Two, I think Mohanty is right that, apart from a multi tude of once fashionably ambiguous references to the "contents" of presentations, there is little direct basis for Frege's attack on a presentation/object confusion in PA. On the other hand, Frege no doubt wondered how someone not guilty of such confusion could in- sist, as Husserl did, upon the need for "reflection on the act" of collec- tive unification not only for some unexplicated program of conceptual "clarification," but for the very predicative use of the concepts in question. s Certainly, one might suspect a confusion of the numerical properties of objects (sets) with the presentation of those properties, though Frege himself also notes seemingly contrary assertions. Mohanty in any case moves rather quickly from distinctions drawn in 1913 to the conclusion that "Frege's view attacks, in the main, a variety of psychologism which was not Husserl's" (p. 22). The conclusion would seem warranted only after a distinction, not at least apparent in PA, between psychologistic and non-psychologistic types of "reflection." (Mohanty does distinguish empirical from transcendental psychology, but with reference to Husserrs later work, not PA.) Mohanty also introduces the later treatment of wholes and parts and of categorial intuition (p. 24), claiming in a footnote (#13) that "categorial objects" are indeed present as correlates of acts in PA, though the main text speaks rather of a "drastic change" in position.

Mohanty seems torn between recognizing a psychologistic groping toward a later non-psychologistic position and finding the latter already

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in PA. But even the less ambitious desire would be better served by a more detailed analysis of that work. Of course, one might in any case recognize a Fregean impact. Frege's independent attack, for example, upon an approach reducing numerical statements to "one and one and ..."~ may indeed have led to the abandonment of a program tied so closely, whether psychologistically or not, to the operation of counting. At the same time, a non-Fregean interpretation of Fregean meanings might have led to discovery of the noematic "correlates" of all possible operations.

The remainder of Mohanty's book centers on the claim that, with certain qualifications, Fregean Senses, unlike Husserlian noemata,

(a) are not part of the "structure" of acts (pp. 36, 65); (b) do not involve the "intentionality" of consciousness (pp. 36, 99); (c) are primarily linguistic and conceptual (pp. 62, 66, 75).

Strictly, the last of these seems rather a matter of what Frege ought (for unclarified reasons: cf. p. 55) to have held, although problems arise in his treatment of proper names and indexicals (pp. 53-62, 115). This issue is handled with useful reference to such recent commentators as Burge, Dummett , Perry and Sluga. Husserl is credited with doing more justice to the linguistic expressibility of meanings, but not at the ex- pense of construing noemata as intrinsically conceptual. Rather they are intrinsically conceptualizable (pp. 57, 75, 80). As for the "primarily linguistic" issue, Senses are at least supposed to be linguistic in that they are "what one grasps when one understands the meaning of a word or sentence" as uttered on a certain occasion (pp. 78-79, 113-114). But again, at least in the case of the fftrst-person indexical, the speaker's meaning is never in fact grasped, and Mohanty concludes that Senses are not really linguistic meanings after all (pp. 59, 64). Apart from this, the linguistic portion of (c) seems to reduce it to (a) (pp. 64-65).

Is Husserl any better off?. Here Mohanty repeats Husserl's vague appeal to "the presence of generally graspable, sufficiently reliable clues to guide the hearer to the meaning intended (p. 60) and to the "constituting horizon-intentionality" involved in the grasping of a "typical specific likeness among situations" (p. 62). He also seems too quickly willing, in making this appeal, to concede that "The sense by itself always leaves room for some indeterminacy with regard to the referent" (p. 80), a point which Mohanty claims brings us "closer to

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the perspective of phenomenology than to that of Fregean semantics" (p. 82). The claim is surprising in view of his espousal of a "transcendental" stance according to which intentionality is abandoned when we consider "the mental act as a natural event occurring 'within' the mental life of a person, connected causally to that person's bodily states and environmental conditions" (p. 116). The price to be paid, it seems, for the admission of extra-noematic features in reference is that we no longer consider reference as an intentional phenomenon, but introduce a naturalistic "interpretation of the mental" leading directly to its psychologistic "mundanization" (p. 116). In any case, Mohanty adopts this position after assuming that a Sense/noema consists of sets of descriptions supposedly ascribable to the object of reference (p. 80). One might have supposed his earlier insistence that-noemata are not merely "conceptual" but rather something (infinitely?) susceptible of conceptual "articulation" (p. 57) was meant precisely to support the possibility of "internal," though non-descriptive, determination of reference. As to the question whether Fregean Senses are also to be regarded as (descriptive) "modes of presentation" of the corresponding references (pp. 55-56, 66, 82), Mohanty contrasts such a view, which he claims brings Frege nearer to Husserl, with an alternative interpretation defended by Dummett (pp. 55-56).

Concerning (a) and (b), the latter seems to mean that Frege fails where Husserl succeeds in recognizing a univocal object-directedness for all acts, regardless of apparent "failure of reference." Intrinsic "structure" is then invoked to account for that feature (pp. 36, 65). Unfortunately, Mohanty quotes a passage (p. 110) in which he takes Frege to hold that .the object of "unrealized" perceptual intentions (hallucinations, for example) is really our own sensations, whereas Frege's point is that no object is in question at all. 7 Mohanty then wonders why Frege does not appeal to Senses. After all, "the Fregean should replace the object: in all cases, whether the act is veridical or not, there is a correlative sense, and this is the Husserlian noema." How- ever, I take it that the Fregean "replaces" an object with a Sense only to the extent that the latter is what guarantees that an "unrealized" act is nevertheless a meaningful one and why it at least seems to have the object it seems to have. Sense itself is not regarded as the object. What Mohanty's reading reveals is simply the extent of his own attraction to a Gurwitsch-type interpretation: in some sense the perceptual noema is the very object of perception, not merely some meaningful structure through which reference to an object may be achieved.

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The view of Sense as something "through" which one normally passes toward references is presumably what leads Mohanty to regard it as merely "external" and not part of the "intrinsic structure" of an act. The question of course remains whether the relation in question is not intrinsic enough to do the job required. However, apart from the puzzle of how a relation to some entity external to (and not even, Platonically, instantiated in) an act might account for that act's reference to some completely different entity, the farther we move from a conception of Senses as themselves objects of normal consciousness, the farther we move as well from an intelligible conception of the whole Fregean approach. We seem left with the mystifying picture of mental acts somehow heading, from a foggy sphere of consciousness, toward the distant realm of truth-values or would-be objective states of affairs, but being first required to pass through, or perhaps to bounce off of, a number of entities of a different sort altogether. The story supposes the conceivability of a distinction between the "place" toward which consciousness is directed and the place it needs to pass through in order to get there. But how can we conceive of consciousness as directed, without already supposing it to contain whatever meaningfulness is required for it to be directed in the first place? We seem to be viewing consciousness as, intrinsically considered, a random set of movements vaguely "outward," which then acquire their meaningfulness only contingently upon whatever they happen to bump into in the course of actual movement.

Now, with respect to Husserl and the "structure" of acts, it is often supposed that the transition from the theory of meaning in Logical In- vestigations to the later theory of noemata involved a substantial change in his position. One might suppose the change to be from a view that appeals to internally instantiable features (species) of acts to a view that appeals to their "intentional correlates," a transition that Mohanty himself characterizes as one toward a more Fregean position (p. 15). Mohanty's use of the term 'structure' to characterize both positions is a bit regrettable. In any case, it is not made clear in precisely what sense noemata are supposed to be part of the structure of consciousness. Furthermore, as some of my earlier remarks suggest, there is no reason to suppose that Husserrs mature position does not require a recognition of meaningful structures in both senses. However we construe noemata, they are not only not supposed to be "present" as actual ingredients in mental activity, but they are also not supposed to be present as forms

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or species embodied by way of instantiation in it. Yet how can we avoid the recognition of instantiable and re-instantiable meaningful contents in acts? Any involvement of consciousness with noemata must itself reflect the presence of the "meanings" of Logical Investigations: we need both the "noetic idea" and the noematic. As Mohanty rightly observes, the former are very different from anything tolerated by Frege. The question remains as to just how Fregean the latter might be supposed to be.

Earlier considerations have already indicated some degree of alliance with a position defended by Gurwitsch and others. According to this approach, noemata are the intentional objects of consciousness, considered precisely as such. This of course is a vague formulation. In the case of perception, it seems to require that noemata, are the "things themselves" which we are properly said to perceive. Naturally, such claims will require qualification. However, while there is also a respect in which Fregeans regard their own Senses as "intuitable" or "perceivable," namely, to whatever extent there is an understanding "grasp" of them, Gurwitsch, in qualifying a conception of noemata as objects of ordinary perceptual acts, could of course not retreat to such a minimal position. Now Mohanty himself seems to me to remain a bit ambivalent. At one point (pp. 63-64) he equates noemata with "intentional objects," emphasizing a point that is "often missed by interpreters of Husserl," namely that the whole being of noemata, considered as such, consists precisely in their being objects of consciousness. Here he quotes from ldeas (sec. 98), to the effect that the noema is an entity that is "wholly dependent .... Its esse consists exclusively in itspercipi...". Now Mohanty introduces this point by aligning himself with Frege (and F~bllesdal) on the doctrine that noemata, like Senses, "cannot be sensually perceived" (cf. also p. 72). And Husserl himself continues the passage with the observation that we need to keep our distance f rom any Berkeleyan interpretation of the esse/percipi doctrine as applied to noemata. The observation might of course suggest a Fregean qualification of the sense in which noemata are "perceivable" in the first place. However, it need not do so. The correct reading, I think, is simply to caution against the supposition that noemata, being dependent upon consciousness in so radical a way, must be regarded as actual entities present in consciousness, as Berkeley's "ideas" are often supposed to be. In any case, a Fregean approach concerning the ontological status of noemata seems ruled out precisely on the ground of the radical dependence ascribed to them.

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Mohanty's subscription to Gurwitsch's cause, with regard to the ontological status of whatever "entities" are in question, seems rein- forced by his objection that Frege's Senses are not "constituted" by mental activity but are rather independently existing entities (p. 66). He also speaks of a "productive" power of consciousness in this regard (p. 40). On the other hand, continuing to speak of noemata as entities at all, be they however "irreal" or "ideal" (pp. 40, 79), seems to me to reflect backsliding toward the more Fregean position. (However, Mohanty does later suggest that Husserl, and perhaps even Frege, viewed the items in question as "entities" only in the sense that several acts might share a single one of them, not in anything like the sense, whatever that is, in which Platonic essences are supposed to be entities. Positively put, the items in question are simply the "correlates"'of acts: p. 85). Further, when it comes to specifying the sense in which noemata are and Senses are not perceivable or intuitable (p. 83), the most that Mohanty insists upon is that noemata are not merely "postu- lated entities" but we are immediatly aware of them is some way, and this awareness is effected by means of an activity "analogous" to sense- perception. It is difficult to know how far he is meaning to go in this regard.

This issue, unsurprisingly, finds its most detailed treatment with reference to some of Hubert Dreyfus's recent criticisms of the Gur- witsch approach (pp. 70-80). However, Mohanty's seeming agreement with the latter is weakened by concessions to Dreyfus. In particular, he concedes too quickly the impossibility of reconciling the status of noemata as "ideal meanings" with their construal as perceptually intuitable objects. He considers that such a construal, if not tantamount to an absurd reduction of noemata to sense data, amounts to reducing them to such abstractions as "views" of concrete perceptual objects. This fails to consider what seems to me at least a necessary fftrst step in the right direction, namely the conception of sense perception as an apprehension of objects (not views of objects) that might or might not prove to be concretely existing things. Every concretely existing object of perception must, on such a view, be itself construable in two different dimensions: as a concretely existing object and as an object possibly concretely existing which one happens to have succeeded in identifying as in fact more than merely possible. Thus saying that a noema is an object "as we apprehend it" is not the same as beginning with concretely existing perceptual objects and then considering how those objects in

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fact appear to us (e.g., considering "views" of them). That would make noemata merely adjectival or adverbial sort of things. The crux of Gur- witsch's insistence is precisely that noemata (or at least perceptual noemata) are objects of perception, not merely adjectival or adverbial aspects of either objects or perceptions. On the other hand, the achievement of this perspective can only be a first step. A fuller view of the perceptual noema would then proceed to take it, I think, not simply in the narrow sense of a possibly concretely existing object, qua perceived, but rather in the sense of the total complex of perceived (and imagined) states of affairs involving such an object. This fuller "object," considered precisely as itself an intentional object of perceptual consciousness, and not merely as the mode of appearance of some object, may well qualify as an "ideal meaning," though of course~ as a merely "intentional correlate" of the apprehension of it, not as an ideal entity of any sort.

Mohanty himself is led to conclude that a perceptual noema could not possibly be a "sensible phenomenon" (p. 72), and to suppose that Gurwitsch himself never really took it to be so. The argument, apart from that already indicated, seems to turn on an unjustified restriction of the "sensible" to the realm of psychological and naturalistic consideration. In any case, the more positive conclusion, that the noema could only be "a structure of consciousness," does not receive fuller clarification. Mohanty also turns to Dreyfus's objection that a conception of the perceptual noema as itself the perceptual object could not possibly accommodate Husserl's demand for a distinction within a perceptual meaning between "interpretive" and (relatively) "fulf'dling" components. The perceptual noema, it seems, would be as such all filling, would be totally "incarnate" meaning, with no possible gap between that incarnation and mere signification or intention (p. 73). Rather than face this question head on, Mohanty limits himself to attempting to explain why, at least, Husserl felt the need for the introduction of a "fulfiUing sense" in the first place. So far as I understand his discussion at this point, it turns on the need to recognize a pre- conceptual element subject to conceptual articulation within experience. One might, I think, introduce here the Kantian distinction between concepts and intuitions, and Mohanty himself in fact later devotes some attention to Kantian elements in both Frege and Husserl (pp. 107-'111). This seems to me a useful approach, but only, in the case of Husserl, if one clarifies in advance an intentionalistic notion of

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"intuition" as the apprehension of possible objects for possible conceptual articulation. With that kind of clarification, one might then suc- ceed in facing the issue head on: as a (full) intentional object of perception, every such object will contain aspects that are "correlates" not simply of the sensuous dimension in our apprehension of them (hyletic material) but also of the way in which such objects are judgrnentally (and emotionally) intended or meant. (This of course is not to say that such aspects will be any more than "abstractly" distinguishable, and certainly not to say that they are distinguishable upon mere immediate inspection.) One gets the feeling, from time to time, that Mohanty is heading in the direction of such a view. But despite the virtue of a systematic attempt to counter some recently fashionable Fregean con- struals of Husserl, the upshot is surprisingly conservative. He agrees that noemata are "intensional entities." He agrees that they are never "sen- suously apprehended." The only possible ground for distance between the philosophers (and even here Frege seems to have had his "Husserl- Jan" moments) is that noemata are not merely what is "conceptually understood" and are more directly tied to acts than to linguistic signs (pp. 77-78). In what way they are so tied and in what way they go beyond mere conceptual grasping is left unclear.

I would conclude, finally, by returning to Mohanty's dual emphasis on Frege's lack of interest in Sense, as compared to truth-values, and his attack upon "psychologism." The Husserlian "reduction" of concretely existing to merely "intentional" objects frees us, as suggested above, for the recognition in the objects of consciousness of character- istics corresponding to every aspect of our consciousness o f them. Thus in the object of anger, for example, we may recognize an "objective" reflection of that very anger. Now attention to such a feature ought presumably to shed some understanding on the "meaning" of anger, indeed on the meaning of the term 'anger.' Yet this understanding may be of little use in an analysis meant to "def'me" the truth-conditions of propositions like "X is angry at Y." It would be of little use precisely to the extent that such features are not independently describable: they are simply "correlates" of the corresponding emotional states. Though objective in their own way, they are "deffmable" only by reference to modes of subjective consciousness. Hence they are un- suited to demands for elucidation of the truth conditions of propositions concerning objects inhabiting our "realistically" construed en- vironment. As Mohanty observes, Husserl's position is indeed "psycho-

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logistic," but in a way that Frege himself failed to understand (pp. 32- 35). What is also worth emphasizing is that, had Frege understood the kind of psychologism in question, he would have been equally opposed to any attempt to give it "scientific" respectability.

Now the avowed purpose of Husserl and Frege is an "integrative" one with respect to Fregean and Husserlian insights (pp. vii, 116). As my remarks will have suggested, I found it difficult to see what specifi- caUy non-Husserlian aspects of Frege's thought we are supposed to prize. To my own mind this is not a weakness, insofar as the value of Mohanty's work seems to me precisely to lie in its exposure of what can only be regarded, despite the cogency of "cognitive" approaches to Fregean Senses, as Frege's own myopia with respect to mental acts. Apart from this, and in addition to the wealth of tiseful and learned references to recent commentary on Frege, the book concludes with an appendix of translations from the Frege-Husserl correspondence.

Richard E. Aquila The University of Tennessee

NOTES

1. Mohanty refers (p. 1) to the "careful and pioneering" study by Dagfmn F611esdal, Husserl and Frege (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1958). Two papers by F~llesdal axe also reprinted in Hubert L. Dreyfus, ed., Husserl, lntentionality and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), an anthology centering on the Fregean approach to Husserl.

2. Ftbliesdal, "Response," in Dreyfus, ed., pp. 53-54. 3. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological

Philosophy, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Maxtinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 230, n. 38. 4. This view of the relationship between Logicallnves~'gations and Ideas is one that I elaborate

in "On Intensionalizing Husserl's lntensions," Nous XVI (1982), pp. 209-226. 5. Hua XII, pp. 196-197. Strictly demand for "reflection" is required in cases where the sub-

sumption in question is not merely "symbolic." That such reflection; and the acts supposedly reflected on, axe impossible in cases of larger numbers is precisely what requires the distinction between "authentic" (eigentliche) and merely symbolic presentation and subsump- tion.

6. Cf. ibid., p. 175: "Thus if I say for example that the number of these apples is four, I mean ... precisely that one and one and one and one apple is at hand."

7. The passage is from '~ 'he Thought: A Logical Study," Mind LXV (July, 1956), p. 300.

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