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1/30

ALTERNATIVESTO

THE

COGITO

LOUIS

DUPR?

F

rom

various

thinkers

and

in

different

languages

we

have

been

receiving

an

identical

message:

the

philosophy

of

the

subject

ini

tiated

by

Descartes'

cogito

has reached

a

definitive

impasse.

Criti

cal

reactions

range

from

attempts

to

dispose

of

the

subject

alto

gether

(Foucault

and

some

structuralists)

to

efforts

to restore

pre

Cartesian theories

(most interestingly,

those of

early

Humanism).

The

authors

here

presented adopt

positions

different

from

either

of

those

extremes.

Fully

aware

of the modern

predicament

they

ad

vocate

neither

a

return to

a

pre-Cartesian

past

nor

do

they

dismiss

outright

the

post-Cartesian

subjective

starting

point.

Theoretical

attitudes

once

adopted

cannot

simply

be

discarded:

philosophy

has

to

work

its

way

through

them.

Still,

the

proposed

answers

vary

substantially. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard

Rorty

advocates

abandoning

traditional

truth

claims

in

favor

of

a

rational conversation carried

on

between incommensurable

posi

tions.1

Francis

Jacques's

Diff?rence

et

subjectivit?

reverses

the

tra

ditional

priority

of

subject

to

relation.2

In

G?n?alogie

de

la

psy

chanalyse

Michel

Henry

attempts

to

reclaim

a

theory

of

pure

subjectivity

from

the wild

growth

of its

objectivist

deviations.3

Alasdair

Maclntyre

exposes

the disastrous moral

consequences

that have

resulted

from

the

primacy

of

an

autonomous,

isolated

subject

and

proposes

a

program

for

a

socially

and

historically

more

1

Richard

Rorty,

Philosophy

and the Mirror

of

Nature

(Princeton:

Princeton

University

Press,

1979).

All

subsequent

references

to

Philoso

phy

and the

Mirror

of

Nature

will

be

signified

by

the initials

'PMN\

2

Francis

Jacques,

Diff?rence

et

subjectivit? (Paris:

Aubier-Mon

taigne, 1982).

All

subsequent

references

to

Diff?rence

et

subjectivit?

will

be

signified

by

the initials 'DS\

3Michel

Henry,

G?n?alogie

de la

psychanalyse

(Paris:

Presses univer

sitaire

de

France,

1985).

All

subsequent

references

to

G?n?alogie

de la

psychanalyse

will

be

signified

by

the initials 'GP\

Review

of

Metaphysics

40

(June

1987):

687-716.

Copyright

?

1987

by

the

Review

of

Metaphysics

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2/30

688 LOUIS

DUPR?

integrated

ethical

reconstruction.4

No

idea has of

late

more con

sistently

come

under fire than that of the subject

as

sole source of

meaning

and

value.

Heidegger

attributed

it

to

Descartes,

and

three

of

the studies show the direct

impact

of

his

reading.

Yet

similar

tendencies had been

at

work in

analytic

philosophy.

Rorty

presents

pragmatic

anti-subjective interpretations

of

language

(and

of

thought) going

back

to

Wittgenstein;

Francis

Jacques

sup

ports

his

attack

by

Russell's

theory

of

relations.

I

The first thesis

in

Descartes'

theory

to

draw criticism

was,

of

course,

the substantialization

of

the

ego.

Already

Kant

concluded

that

it

lacked

proof.

How

much it has

remained

a

critical

problem

appears

in

Gilbert

Ryle's

The

Concept

of Mind,

which

forcefully

articulates

the

insurmountable difficulties

created

by

a

dualism

of

two

substances?one

spiritual

and the other

corporeal (res cogitans

and res extensa). Yet an even more serious epistemological prob

lem,

caused

by

this

substantialization,

consists

in

the mind's

re

moval

from

the real.

This,

according

to

Rorty,

is what has created

the

mirror idea of

knowledge

which

dominates

modern

thought.

Where

lies

the

root

of this

conception?

Does it

begin

with

Descartes'

theory

of

the

two

substances?

Or should

we

trace

it

to

Plato's definition

of

knowledge

as

idea?

Rorty

follows

Heidegger

in

assuming

the

earlier

origin. Only

because the classical tradition

had declared

the immediate

object

of the

mind

to

be

ideas,

could

Descartes

create

a

chasm between that

object

and the real.

That

no

such chasm

appears

in

Plato himself is

due

to

the

fact that

for

Plato the idea is

the

truly

real.

Much of this

realism

of the

idea

survived

Aristotle's attack

and,

in

a

modified

form,

entered

into

scholastic

philosophy.

Medieval

thinkers,

however

anti-idealist,

nevertheless continued

to assert

that it

is

through

the ideal

species

(id

quo

cognoscitur)

that

we

know the real

(id

quod

cognoscitur).

The

issue

which divides

the Platonic

from

the Aristotelian tradi

tion,

whether

universal ideas

possess

an

independent

existence

or

4

Alasdair

Maclntyre, After

Virtue

(Notre

Dame: Notre Dame

Univer

sity

Press,

[1981]

1984).

All

subsequent

references

to

After

Virtue

will

be

signified

by

the initials

'AV\



3/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO

689

whether

they

exist

only

within

the

particular

realities

of the

physi

cal

world,

matters

far less

than

the

distinction,

first

clearly

made

by

Descartes,

between ideas and their

truth,

that

is,

their

capacity

to

relate

to

the real world

at

all.5

Here

the

distance

implied

in

the

visual

metaphor

of

knowing

(idea)

becomes

compounded

with

that caused

by

the

idea

being

no more

than

a

representation,

a

mirror of the real which

cannot

be

directly

trusted. Even

in the

Aristotelian tradition

eye

and

mirror

had remained united

in

an

intellect which becomes

all

things

(fieri

quodammodo

omnia).

In

Descartes'

theory,

on

the

contrary,

the intellect

inspects

entities

modeled on retinal images (PMN, 45). Rorty's analogy of the eye

and the mirror

is

particularly appropriate.

He could have

quoted

Gassendi's Fifth

Objection

to

the

Meditations

where it

appears

ex

plicitly.

Why

do

you

think that the

eye,

incapable

of

seeing

itself

in

itself

nevertheless

sees

itself

in

a

mirror?

Unquestionably

be

cause

there is

a

space

between

the

eye

and the

mirror. 6

Gassendi

then

urges

Descartes

first

to

provide

a

mirror,

if the

ego

is

to

recognize

itself.

The

entire

theory

of

representation

is

contained

in

this

argument.

To be consistent

with

the

theory

Descartes

would have had

to

subject

the

ego

to

the

same

rule

as

all the

rest.

If

he did

not

do

so,

we

must

perhaps

assume,

with

Michel

Henry,

that

other,

even

more

important

considerations

played

a

role.

We

shall

have occasion

to

weigh

their

significance

later.

A

mind that

represents

all

things

rather than

becoming

all

things

remains

removed from

the

real.

Having

separated

cer

tainty

from

truth,

it

experiences

the

need for

a

method

to

reunite

them.

The burden for

attaining

truth

comes,

thereby,

to

lie

en

tirely

on a

deliberate,

clearly

conscious effort of the

subject.

To be

5

No

one

stated the

problem?both

its

modern

version

and its classical

ancestry?more

succinctly

than

the

eighteenth century

Scottish

philoso

pher,

Thomas Reid:

Modern

Philosophers,

as

well

as

the

Peripatetics

and

Epicureans

of

old,

have

conceived

that

external

objects

cannot

be

the

immediate

objects

of

our

thought:

that

there

must

be

some

image

of

them

in

the mind

itself,

in which

as

in

a

mirror,

they

are

seen.

And

the

name

Idea

in

the

philosophical

sense

of

it,

is

given

to

those

internal and immedi

ate

objects

of

our

thoughts.

The

external

thing

is

the remote

or

mediate

object;

the

idea,

or

image

of that

object

in the

mind,

is the immediate

object,

without

which

we

could

have

no

conception

(Essays

on

the

Intellec

tual

Powers

of

Man in

The Works

of

Thomas

Reid,

ed.

by

William Hamilton

[Edinburgh,

1985],

Vol.

I,

p.

226;

see

also Vol.

IV,

p.

369).

6

Charles

Adam

and

Paul

Tannery,

eds.,

Oeuvres de

Descartes,

(Paris:

Librairie

Philosophique,

1974),

vol.

8,

p.

292.



4/30

690

LOUIS

DUPR?

sure,

ideas

may

still be adventitious

and

any

reliability

of ideas

requires

the foundation

of

a

veracious,

good

God.

But

without

careful attention

to

the

self's

own

cogito,

the

one

indubitable,

au

tonomous

source

of

truth,

and

a

carefully

controlled

attitude

to

ward

all other

ideas

(which

includes

abstaining

from

premature

judgment,

methodically

bringing

ideas

to

full

clarity

and

distinct

ness),

the mind

possesses

no

warranty

of truth

whatever. To

guide

consciousness

to

truth,

its entire

content?including

all

sensations

?must

be

detached from the external

causality

of the

body

and

reduced

to

full

immanence

within the

purely

ideal realm of

subjec

tivity.

No idea, except the

privileged

cogito,

is in itself endowed

with

epistemic

security.

Contrary

to

ancient and medieval

theories,

Descartes

had

to meet

ideas

with

distrust.

We know how

even some

of his followers

protested

against

such

a

hypercritical

attitude.

Spinoza

pointed

out

what

an

impossible enterprise

it is

to

generate

truth from universal

doubt. The

new

rationalism

to

orig

inate

in

Descartes'

school

certainly

resulted

not

from

an

initial

confidence in

reason,

but

from

a

cautious

trust

in the

subject's

ability to circumvent the obstacles in the path of reason by means of

the

more

fundamental

power

of the

will.

The

separation

between

representation

and

reality

continued

to

haunt

Descartes,

and he

never

ceased

looking

for

ways

to

reunite

them.

The distinction between the

objective

and the

formal

status

of

an

idea

presents

a case

in

point.

But,

if to

be

for

an

idea

is

to

be

objective,

as

the

concept

of

representation

implies,

the distinc

tion

itself

must

remain ineffective.

Scepticism,

so

manfully

con

fronted

by

Descartes,

grows

another head

for

each

one

he

lops

off.

The

nominalist

philosophy

of the fifteenth

century

had

already

caused

a

rift between

concept

and

reality.

Rather

than

attempting

to

close

it

forthright,

Descartes

set

up

the

mediating

science of

epistemology

which would

bring

out

the

truth of the idea

within

the

idea. But the

privileged

idea of the

cogito

secures

no more

than

a

tangential

contact

with the

real,

ever

to

be renewed and

never

expandable

beyond

the immediate

present.

The

principle

of

a

good

and veracious

God,

deduced

from

it,

suffered

from all the

problems

one

would

expect

of such

a

circuitous

way

to

the truth?and

then

some.

The truth

of all other

ideas,

which

was

based

on

it,

remained

shaky.

At

last

Kant

attempted

to

remedy

the

situation

by

defining

the

objectively

real

itself

in

conceptual

terms.

Unfortunately,

there still remained

the residual

reality

of the

thing-in-itself

His



5/30

ALTERNATIVESTO

THE

COGITO 691

idealist

successors,

more

consistent,

eliminated

epistemology

itself

as

a

philosophia

prima

altogether

and

unqualifiedly

assigned

the

origin

of the

objectively

real to the

subject.

Thus

they

solved the

problem by denying

its

existence.

To

appreciate

the

significance

of the

recent

developments

in

linguistic

analysis

described

by

Rorty,

we

should

be

aware

of those

persistent

difficulties caused

by

the

epistemological

turn.

In at

tacking

the substantial

dualism

between the

psychic

and the

physi

cal,

Ryle

identified

one

of the

most

problematic

areas

of

modern

thought.

Yet

Ryle's position

remains itself

epistemological

in

a

manner in which that of some contemporary American thinkers is

not.

When

Wilfred

Sellars overthrows the

dualistic

schema of the

given

and its

conceptual framing,

he

rejects

far

more

than

Kant's

presuppositions.

His criticism aims

directly

at

the

heart of

repre

sentational

thinking

itself.

For

Rorty,

the merit

of Sellars's and

Quine's

interpretations

lies

not

in

their

epistemological

achieve

ments,

but in

their

complete

refusal

to

present

yet

another

episte

mology. Rationality

no

longer

consists

in

conforming

to

an

ulte

rior standard either inside

or

outside the

idea,

but

in

a

behavioral

attitude

of

constant

self-correction. The rules of what

counts

as

valuable

knowledge

within

a

particular

linguistic

community

thereby

replace

the

correspondence

theory

of

truth

(PMN,

187).

Scientific

justification

becomes

a

matter

of

raising

behaviorist

questions

(PMN,

173)?and

of

doing

so

without

granting

any

pri

vileged

treatment to

empiricist

assertions,

as

analytic

philosophers

in the

past

were

wont

to

do.

Of

course,

to

overcome

Cartesian

dualism,

the

linguistic

turn

alone does

not

suffice.

For

language

may

become as much a mirror of nature as

ideas

once were.

In

itself

a

theory

of

linguistic

meaning

merely

converts

the

dualism

between

idea

and world

to

one

between

language

and

world.

In

Rorty's

judgment

the

search for

a

method

that

would

definitively

secure

the

relation

between

language

(or

ideas)

and

reality-in-it

self,

should be

abandoned

altogether.

Instead,

philosophy

should

devote its

efforts

to

the

praxis

of

linguistic

communication.

We

may

wonder

whether

by

now

the

discussion has

not

some

what strayed away from the original question: are we justified in

assuming

an

autonomous

subject

at

the

origin

of

meaning

and

truth?

In itself

the existence of

an

epistemology

does

not

decide

that

issue.

Epistemology

as

reflection

upon

the

process

of

knowing

long

predates

the

Cartesian

philosophy

of

the

subject,

and

stub



6/30

692

LOUIS

DUPR?

bornly

survives

in

post-subjective

philosophies?including

Rorty's

own.

The question about the relation between the knower and the

known

began

with

Plato,

if

not

before. The scholastic tradition

contains

extensive

discussions of the

species through

which

we

know.

Yet

none

of

that

implied

a

representational

theory

of the

real.

The

predicament

of

modern consciousness does

not

result

from

the reflection

on

the relation between knower and known

(whether

that relation

be

conceived

as

seeing

or

otherwise),

but

from the seventeenth

century

theory

of

a

mirror-type

representa

tion which renders the

very

possibility

of

a

coincidence

of the

known

with the real

problematic.

When

Rorty

describes

Des

cartes' role

as

consisting

not

so

much

in

making

epistemology

the

foundation of

philosophy

as

in

inventing something

new?episte

mology?to

bear

the

name

of

'philosophy'

(PMN,

262),

he

gives

a

somewhat

misleading

account of the matter.

Descartes

never

meant

to

replace philosophy

by epistemology:

he remained

fore

most,

as

Alqui?

has

shown,

a

metaphysician.

But

he first had

to

free

the

path

of

metaphysics

blocked

by

nominalist and

sceptical

theories. The need to

develop

for this purpose a somewhat ne

glected

branch

of

philosophy

may

have inclined him

to

convey

to

it

a

disproportionate

weight,

and

certainly,

his

way

of

acquitting

him

self

of

his

self-imposed

task threw

new,

possibly

more

formidable

obstacles

on

that

path.

But that he

invented

the

idea

of

an

epistemology

is

contradicted

by

the

fifteenth

century

disputes

which had

led

to

the

very

scepticism

Descartes

confronted.

All of

this would

scarcely

matter

were

it

not

that

in

holding

Descartes alone responsible for epistemological questioning

we

tend

to

attribute all

the

problems

inherent

in his modus

operandi

to

the

field itself.

Rorty's

critique

of

the

Cartesian

development

eventually

comes

to

include all

earlier theories of

knowledge.

Un

doubtedly, Rorty

clearly

distinguishes

between

Descartes and

his

predecessors:

the

analogy

of the

eye

and the

mirror

convincingly

separates

the modern

theory

of

representation

from

earlier

theories

of

knowledge.

Nevertheless,

I

fear that he

unduly

moves

a

typically

modern

problem

up

to

the

beginning*

of

Western

thought

and

projects

too much

of the

concept

of

representation

upon

the

classical and

medieval theories

of

knowledge

as

vision.

It remains

unproven

that all Western

philosophies

of

truth

fundamentally

suf

fer from the

same

defect

as

their modern versions.

Rorty's

short

range

attack aims

at

these modern

versions,

but

beyond

this

more



7/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO

693

vulnerable

target

he is

clearly

after

philosophy

as

it has

developed

since

its

origins.

Now

it

may

well be that the modern

turn to

the

subject

inevitably

and

irreversibly

follows from this

development,

but

such

momentous

implications

deserve

to

be

spelled

out in

de

tail.

I

find

it hard

to

believe

that the

root

of

the

problem

is the

ancient

notion of

theoria,

or

the

visual orientation of idea. The

real

issue,

the

primacy

of

the

subject,

was

wholly

absent

from

ancient

theoria

as

well

as

from medieval

contemplatio.

On

the

contrary,

the

Bildung

ideal

which

Rorty

advocates

is

a

direct descendent

of

the modern

mind?perhaps,

despite

its

fragmentary

character,

its

most ambitiously subjective one.

The

ambiguity

surrounding

the

nature

of Descartes' contribu

tion?whether

this

theory

of the

subject

genuinely

innovated

or

merely

radicalized

the

Greek

tradition?goes

back

to

Heidegger.

In the Introduction

to

Metaphysics,

quoted by Rorty,

Heidegger

de

rives

the

epistemological

notion

of

objectivity

from

Plato's identi

fication

of

physis

with idea

(its

presence

before

us).

In

his

1962

study,

What Is

a

Thing?,

Heidegger

interpreted

the Cartesian

turn

to the

subject

as

the universalization

of

what

the Greeks

only

did

for

mathematical

knowledge,

namely,

to

allow

thought

to

ground

itself

in

the

sense

of

its

own

inner

requirements. 7

Descartes'

specific

contribution,

then,

would

have

consisted

in

rendering

the

rule

of mathematics

the

standard of

all

thought.

The

grounding

principle,

Descartes'

ego,

is

not

the

psychological

self,

but the

sub

jectum

(das Zugrundeliegende)

of

the

positing

itself,

whereby

mod

ern

thought

establishes

its

own essence

as

the

ground

of all knowl

edge.

This

interpretation

of Descartes' revolution

heavily qualifies

the earlier one insofar as the Greek attitude created no more than

the

possibility

of the Cartesian

turn to

the

subject.

I

suspect

that

we

still

may

have

to

qualify

further.

Of

course,

in

Being

and

Time

Heidegger

himself

replaces epis

temology by

a more

foundational

study

of

Dasein. But

what Hei

degger

rejects

is the

procedure

(still

customary

today)

of

setting

up

knowing

as

'a relation

between

subject

and

object'?a procedure

in which

there

lurks

as

much 'truth'

as

vacuity. 8

The

neglect by

7

Martin

Heidegger,

What Is

a

Thing,

trans,

by

W. B. Barton

and Vera

Deutsch

(Chicago:

Henry

Regnery, 1967),

p.

275.

8

Martin

Heidegger, Being

and

Time,

trans,

by

John

Macquarrie

and

Edward

Robinson

(New

York and Evanston:

Harper

and

Row,

1962),

p.

87.



8/30

694

LOUIS

DUPR?

various

epistemologies

of

any

existential

analytic

of

Dasein

has

kept

them

from

obtaining

any

basis

for

a

well secured

phenomenal

problematic. 9

But does

this

critique

eliminate

epistemology

it

self?

Does it

not

rather

imply

that the

problem

of

knowledge

should

be

studied

more

fundamentally

after

we

have

taken

account

of the

subject-object

criticism?

To

regard epistemology

as

super

fluous

on

historical

grounds

is

to

deprive

oneself

of

any

theoretical

justification

of

knowledge.

When

Rorty

rejects

any

normative

treatment

of the knower-known

relation,

he discards

the

tradi

tional

notion of

truth

altogether.

The

question

arises whether

one

thereby

overcomes

the Cartesian

predicament

of modern

philoso

phy.

Finding

himself

in

an

intellectual

situation

where truth and

certainty

had

become

disjoined,

Descartes

opted

for

truth,

even

if

it

meant

relativizing

certainty.

The

new

linguistic pragmatics

would,

if

I

understand

Rorty correctly,

be satisfied

with

a

relative

certainty

alone?thus

sacrificing

even more.

Nor

can one

call

this

approach

epistemologically

neutral

in

the

manner

of

some

mod

ern

theories

of

language.

For

Rorty

does

take

a

clear

stand

on a

crucial epistemological issue?the representational theory of

knowledge?and

offers

an

alternative10?the

rational

conversa

tion.

One

may

wonder

whether

that

alternative, assuming

that it

can

be

consistently

maintained, successfully

escapes any

allegiance

to

idealist

epistemology.

To

be

sure,

nothing

is further

removed

from

Rorty's

theory

than

a

philosophy

of

spiritual

entities.

But

does idealism

not

consist

first

and foremost

in

a

theory

of

knowing

that

refuses

any

discussion

of

reality

independently

of

the

knower?

Rorty

has

not

definitively

closed the

question

of

episte

mology

in

general;

at

most,

he

has

postponed

it. What

renders

a

theory

behaviorally acceptable ?

Is

it

not

its

correspondence

to

certain

norms?

How could there

be

a

conversation

without

at

least

the

possibility

of

a

common

ground?

All

contributions

to

a

dis

course

may

not

be

actually

commensurable

(PMN,

316),

but

the

search

for

commensurability

remains,

nevertheless,

an

essential

9

Ibid.,

p.

250.

10

It should

be

pointed

out

that

Rorty

himself

does

not

consider

the

rational conversation

he

proposes

to

be

an

alternative

of the

phenomenon

called

knowing.

He

offers

no

theory

of

conversation

which

would

claim

to

answer

the

questions

here

raised,

nor

any

others

about

rationality

in

general.



9/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO 695

condition

for

carrying

on

the

conversation

in

a

rational

way.

Granting

that

Galileo

invented the

norms

of

rationality

on

which

his own claims

rested,

the fact that these norms came to be

accepted

and

to

determine

the

entire

nature of modern culture

requires

an

explanation.

Could it

not

be that

this

particular

pursuit

of

ra

tionality

was

itself?rightly

or

wrongly?perceived

as more ra

tional

than

any

of

the

previous

ones? If

Galileo

won the

argu

ment,

there

must

have

been

some

rational

merit

to

his

case,

what

ever

his

personal

motives

may

have

been

for

presenting

it.

I

wonder whether these difficulties do

not

stem

from

the

same

source as the ones mentioned before, namely, Rorty's approxima

tion of

the Cartesian

turn to

the critical

investigation

of truth

itself.

Perhaps

we

must

distinguish

further,

between the

turn

to

the

subject

as

such,

and the

representational

function

of

that sub

ject.

Perhaps

the

cogito

should

not

be identified with what has

become its dominant function

in

modern

thought.

The

idea

of

the

subject

as

center

of

interiority

had

reached Descartes

via

Christian

and Stoic

sources

(as

Gilson

and

Gouhier

have

shown).

Two recent

French

studies

reject

the modern

priority

of

the

subject

as

ground

of

meaning

and value

essentially

for

the

same

reasons

as

Rorty.

Yet

both,

in different

ways,

end

up

defending

a

non-objectifying

subjectivity

of which

they

claim

to

find elements

in

Descartes.

II

Such is

particularly

the

case

for

Michel

Henry.

In

his

recent

G?n?alogie

de la

psychanalyse (1985),

he

argues

for a

subjectivity

that

consists

in

pure

self-manifestation and that

precedes?indeed

grounds?any

objectifying

process.

Henry

follows

Heidegger's

basic

critique

of

Western

metaphysics:

the

loss

of

the

distinction

between

the ontic and

the

ontological

consideration of

reality.

While the

source

of the

ontic,

ecstatic

theory

of

knowing

through

ideas

may

be found

in

Plato,

only

the modern reduction of

the

known to

a

perceptum

has

rendered Western

thought

fully

repre

sentational.

Unlike

Heidegger

and

Rorty,

however,

Henry

defends

the

mod

ern

turn to

the

subject.

Descartes'

original

cogito

is

neither

representational,

nor,

as

Heidegger claims,

anthropologically

re

ductive,

but rather the

very

locus

where

Being

manifests

itself,

the



10/30

696

LOUIS

DUPR?

concrete

possibility

of

its

appearance.

Far

from

obscuring

the

lighting of Being, the subject enables it to become manifest.

Heidegger,

Henry

claims,

has misunderstood Descartes' essential

intuition.11

Yet

Heidegger's critique fully applies

to

Descartes'

sub

sequent

interpretation

of his

own

discovery.

For

the

father of

modern

philosophy

betrayed

his

original

insight

by equating

the

subject

with its

projective,

ecstatic

activity.

Only

in

his

Treatise

of

the

Passions did he

partly

recover

it.

But

by

then

modern

philos

ophy

was

set

on

its

course,

straying

far

away

from

where

it

should

have been.

Not until

Schopenhauer's

theory

of

will

and

Nietzsche's

doctrine of

the will

to

power

would

an

attempt

be made

to

free the

subject

from its

representational

function.

According

to

Henry,

only

philosophies

that have

concentrated

on

the

will,

on

feelings,

and

on

passions

have

succeeded

in

recapturing

that

immediate

presence

of

the

subject

to

itself?the

essence of

manifestation ?

which

modern

philosophy

first

revealed

but then

instantly

con

cealed

again

in

its

theory

of

representation.

Henry's

attitude,

however,

remains

as

ambivalent with

respect

to

Schopenhauer

and

Nietzsche as with

respect

to Descartes. A discussion that

began

with

high

praise

concludes

with

charges

of

inconsistency

and

re

peated

lapses

into

ecstatic

interpretations.

A

definitive

evaluation

of

Henry's

idea of

subjectivity,

ex

pressed

in

a

form

as

stylistically

elegant

as

conceptually

elusive,

requires

more

reflection than

a

first

acquaintance permits.

The

following

appears

clear:

after

late medieval

thought

had

thoroughly

undermined

the

identity

of the idea and

the

real,

Descartes reunited

them in

a

privileged

moment

of consciousness. Indeed,

in the

co

gito,

for

the

first

time,

Western

metaphysics

discovered the in

stance where

Being,

before

and

beyond

all

beings,

reveals itself.

In

his

subsequent theory

of

objective

representation, however,

Des

cartes

converted

that

immediate

presence

into

a

questionable

pro

jection.

The

original

cogito

contains

no

representation,

not

even

that

of

the

subject's

own

empirical

being.

It is

pure

eidos, primeval

unity

of

affecting

and

being

affected,

of

thought

and

ipseitas.

Michel

Henry distinguishes

two

layers

in

the

cogito,

both

apparent

in

Des

11

Gadamer

made similar

charges

about

Heidegger's

interpretation

of

Plato,

and Grassi

about

that

of Italian

humanism.



11/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO 697

cartes'

expression

videor videre? I

seem

to

see. While

Heidegger

reduced Descartes'

entire

cogito

to

cogito cogitatum,

that

is,

its

ec

static,

representational

form,

Henry

separates

the videor from the

videre

as a

totally

immanent mode

of

consciousness,

a

purely

inte

rior

feeling.

The

pure ego,

transcendental

condition of all

tran

scendent

seeing,

contains

no

seeing;

it

consists

entirely

of

an

ap

pearing

to

oneself,

a

phenomenality

that

precedes

all

intentional

objectification.

This videor that determines the

modality

of all

modes of

thought,

becomes

manifest

in

the consciousness

of

will,

feelings,

and

passions,

more

than

in

objective

cognition.

Descartes

himself never granted this immediate appearance its specific iden

tity.

In

fact,

when he

declared

thought

dubitable in its

entirety,

he

virtually

suppressed

the transcendental condition of

knowing.

The

epoche

of

doubt

places

the

original

intuition

of

the

videor

on a

par

with what it

conditions,

the

mere

videre. Mind itself

becomes

reduced

to

intellectus,

sive ratio

(Meditation

I),

that

is,

intentional,

ek-static

seeing.

Nevertheless,

underneath Descartes'

reduction

we

still

detect

the

presence

of

the

other,

more

fundamental

consciousness

of

the

videor. At the

origin

of

the

doubt,

and

continuously determining

it,

stands

the

will

to

doubt.

In

the

awareness

of

its

own

power

to

decide,

the

mind reaches

the

root

of

all

representational

conscious

ness?the

point

where it becomes

immediately

manifest

to

itself.

The

immediacy

apparent

in

the consciousness of

will

inheres

to

all

affective

status of

mind

(such

as

the

ones

Descartes

discussed

in his

Treatise

of

the

Passions),

as

well

as

to

the

feeling

that

underlies

all

representation?the

sentio

me

sentir?.

In

the

Meditations

Descartes

assumes all these modes of consciousness under the

general

name of

idea ?that

is,

objects

of the

intellectus,

sive

ratio?though they

have

nothing

in

common

with the kind of

representational

thought

to

which

we

generally

reserve

that

term.

The

immediate

presence

of

the

mind

to

itself is

anything

but

an

idea

of the

understanding,

anything

but

that

aspect

which

reveals itself in

the

ek-stasis,

any

thing

but

the

intelligible

(GP,

64).

The

foundational

awareness

of

affective

states

need

not

be

brought

to

clarity

as

ideas

(in

the

strict

sense) require. Their being coincides with their appearance: even

obscure

feelings

hide

nothing

that

further reflection

could

re

veal.

The

experience

of

a

feeling

contains

no

representation

what

ever.

In

it

I

directly experience

myself. Henry

calls it

a

self



12/30

698

LOUIS

DUPRE

manifestation

of

Being

itself,

as

opposed

to

the

ontic

quality

of

representation.12 Precisely in having uncovered this immediate

presence

of the

mind

to

itself consists the

remarkable

originality

of

Descartes'

philosophy.

But

no

sooner

had he

made

the

discovery

than he denied

it,

as

the confused

content

of

the

concept

of

idea

shows.

A final

echo

of Descartes'

original

message

may

be heard

in

his

distinction

between the formal

and the

objective

quality

of ideas.

Yet,

as

I

pointed

out,

where

the entire function

of ideas

consists

in

representation,

that distinction itself

becomes ineffec

tive.

The

weight

has

shifted

from

cogito

to

cogitatum,

from

videor

to

videre.

Descartes

already anticipates

Kant for whom the

unity

of

apperception

has

no

other function

than

establishing

the conditions

of

representational

thought. Subjectivity

has

lost all content of its

own.

It

must seek outside itself what

it

no

longer

finds

within

itself.

Yet,

Henry

claims,

what it seeks is the mind's

own

ontologi

cal

reality?the

self-manifestation of

Being.

An

absolutely general presupposition

of

Western

philosophy

sud

denly

appears:

deprived

of

the

dimension

of

radical

interiority,

re

duced to a

seeing,

to a condition of

objectivity

and

representation,

constituting

this

structure

and

coinciding

with

it,

the

subjectivity

of

the

subject

is

no more

than

the

objectivity

of

the

object. (GP, 61)

That reduction

of

subjectivity

to

the

power

of

representation

would

mark all

of

modern

thought.

Indeed,

it became such

an

integral

part

of that

thought

that

only

a

radical

questioning

of the entire Western tradition?from

the

Greeks

on?would

be able

to

shake

it.

That

is

precisely

what,

according to Henry, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche intended. Re

jecting

the

primacy

of

representational

knowing, Schopenhauer's

philosophy

of

will

reopened

the road

to

a

full

recognition

of

con

sciousness'

fundamental

presence

to

itself.

Representation

for

him,

far

from

exhibiting

the

real,

is the

very

sphere

of

illusion.

The

will

precedes

all

representation

and stands

at

its

origin.

But,

in

Henry's

view,

Schopenhauer

in the end

betrays

his

original

in

sight. Having separated

life

(the

real)

from

representation

(the

illusion), he nevertheless assigns to representational thought the

12

The

Heideggerian

distinction

between

the ontic

and the

ontological

runs

throughout

Henry's

work,

as

it

ran

throughout

his earlier L'essence

de la

manifestation

(1953).



13/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO 699

task

of

transforming

life. The

body,

the will-to-life's self-mani

festing

presence,

he reduces

entirely

to

a

principle

of

intentional,

ek-static action.

Having

thus

been

deprived

of

its

immanence

to

itself,

the

will

becomes

a

stranger

to

itself.

Consciousness,

once

again,

lowers

a

veil

over

the

real. The

paradox

of

modern

thought

reasserts

itself;

the

more

the claims

of

representational knowledge

become

contested,

the firmer hold it

acquires

on our

thought

(GP,

194).

As

long

as

will

emerges

from

wanting,

how could it

fail

to

seek outside itself what it does

not

possess

within itself?

Repre

sentation

appears

to

follow

directly

from the will's

own

insuffi

ciency.

The

general

direction

of

Schopenhauer's

thought

toward

a

pri

macy

of will

over

representational thought

originally

attracted

Nietzsche.

Later

Nietzsche

attempted

to

escape

its

multiple

in

consistencies

by

a more

radical

theory

of

life

as

the

primeval

power

of

consciousness.

In

doing

so,

he

came

to

challenge

the

concept

of

epistemic

truth

itself?the

principle

that

a

thing

would differ

from

another

by

being

true

or

false. Nietzsche establishes

a

new

cogito

on

the basis of affective

appearance (GP, 297).

In

this

ap

pearance,

life

remains

purely

immanent,

referring

to

nothing

beyond

itself and

refusing

to

allow

its

original

manifestation

to

be

objectively

transformed.

What

appears

is

now

the

appearing

it

self

in the

original

auto-affection of

its

affectivity

(GP,

298).

This

new

cogito

keeps

the

being

of

life

united

to

its

appearance

in

one

indissoluble

manifestation.

In

it life

understands

life

with

out

submitting

to

any

external

ob-ject:

life knows

no

ek-stasis

beyond

itself.

Nor

does

its

self-manifestation

remain

static,

for

life

deploys

itself

in

a

constant

movement of

self-increase.

In

that

expansive

drive,

not

(as Schopenhauer

had

claimed)

in

a

want of

otherness,

lies the

meaning

of

desire.

Schopenhauer's

will-to

live dissociates will

from life.

In

qualifying

will

as

will-to-power

Nietzsche,

in

Henry's

reading,

does the

opposite:

rather than

giving

it

a

teleology beyond itself,

he

grounds

the

powerful

will

in

an

ulterior,

coherent

reality

that

precedes

and

eventually

overcomes

the

emerging

dichotomy

between

life-assertiveness

(power)

and

life-denial (weakness). At this level of undisrupted, self-sufficient

immanence

power

tolerates

no

choice.

To the

primacy

of

representational

thought

based

on

the sub

ject-object

relation,

Michel

Henry

substitutes

that of

pure

subjec



14/30

700

LOUIS

DUPR?

tivity

manifest

in

inner

experience.

Contrary

to

modern

philoso

phies that base truth upon transcendent, objective being, Henry

seeks

it

in the

being

that

coincides

with

appearance?the

purely

immanent

ego

manifest

in

the direct

experience

of

feeling

and af

fect. At the

same

time he

argues

against Heidegger

(and,

im

plicitly,

Rorty)

that the

subject

does

possess

a

content of its

own,

independently

of,

and

prior

to,

the constitution of the

object.

For

support

of his thesis he has turned

to

those

philosophers

who

base

truth

upon

the direct

experience

of life:

Schopenhauer

and

Nietzsche.

Many questions

could be raised about

his

interpreta

tion

of their

thought;

but

a more

fundamental

one concerns

the

alleged

primacy

of

feelings

on

the

ground

of their

direct,

non-refer

ential

character.

Do

feelings

and the entire affective

sphere

of

consciousness

(including

emotions,

passions,

etc.)

possess

the kind

of

immanence

which

could

support

an

independent,

non-transcen

dent

subjectivity?

To

be

sure,

the

notion of

an

immanent

subjec

tivity

is

not

without

precedent

in

our

tradition. Etienne Gilson

drew

attention

to the

Augustinian

idea of

interiority

present

in

Descartes'

thought.

Moreover,

some

influence

of the French

School

of B?rulle

appears

certain, though

hard

to

define.

Already

in L'essence

de

la

manifestation

Henry

elaborated

a

concept

of

im

manent

subjectivity,

traces of which he

found

in

Eckhart's interior

ity.

One

may

wonder, though,

whether the

religious

idea of interi

ority

of

the late

Middle

Ages

could be

called

immanent

in

the

sense

in

which

Henry's

subject

is. However much

it

may

have

become

detached

from external

relations,

it

nevertheless

retains

a

permanent reference to a transcendent pole. Even in the more

extreme

descriptions

of

the

state

of union

in

Western

mysticism,

God

and the soul

remain

distinct.

That

relation

may

be non-ob

jective,

but

the

subject

is

certainly

not

purely

immanent.

In

deed,

we

may

doubt

whether,

before

Nietzsche,

there has been

a

single

thinker

to

develop

a

purely

immanent

theory

of the

subject.

My

critical

remarks

are

not

intended

to

question

the

possibility

of

an

interior life

as

Rorty

and,

in

a

different

manner,

Jacques

do. Indeed,

the conclusion

of this

essay

will

support

the need for

reexploring

the

concept

of

a

non-objectifying

subjectivity.

But

are

we

justified

in

conceiving

such

a

subjectivity

as

purely

imma

nent ?

More

specifically,

does

the existence

of

affective

states

of

consciousness

suffice

for

legitimating

such

a

concept?

I

fear

that

Henry's

efforts

to

render

the

immanence

pure

risk

depriving

the



15/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO

701

subject

of

all

content.13

How could there

be

non-intentional

states

of

consciousness?

Henry

affirms it

on

the basis of

a

reduction

of

consciousness

to

sheer

appearance.

That reduction

by

which

phe

nomenology

claimed

to

find the

only

indubitable basis

of

truth

extends Descartes'

cogito

to

all

forms of

knowledge.

But

should

we

consider

that

pure appearance

totally

non-ecstatic?

If

non-ec

static

means

non-intentional,

that

thesis would find

scant

sup

port

in

the

phenomenological

camp.

Even

Sarte,

who in

Being

and

Nothingness

attempts

to

provide

the

pure

appearance

with

an

onto

logical

foundation,

would

deny

that the

se//-consciousness

of the

cogito

constituted more than a moment of the intentional conscious

ness.

Even

assuming

that the

e#o-consciousness

may

be thus

legit

imately

detached,

are we

justified

in

identifying

this

sphere

of

im

manent

appearance

with

Being

in the

ontological

sense

of

the

term?

To

this

question

I

find

no

answer

in

G?n?alogie

de

la

psych

analyse;

but

to

have raised it

may

well

be

one

of the

major

merits of

this

original

work that

at

once

criticizes the entire

modern

philoso

phy

of

the

subject

and

yet

defends

the

idea of

an

interior life.

Ill

Contrary

to

Michel

Henry,

who

provides

an

alternative

inter

pretation

of

the

subject,

Francis

Jacques

views the

isolated

subject

13

One

significant

instance confirms

my

fear.

In

his

discussion

of

Schopenhauer,

Henry

relegates

the

experience

of

time

to

the level

of

repre

sentation. The

ipseitas,

the

self-impression

of

the

original

life

force,

he

claims, remains free of temporal distention. The will remains totally

present

to

itself.

In

sharp

contrast

with

this

position

Husserl

in

the

Phenomenology of

Inner Time

Consciousness

declares

time

to

be

the

es

sence

of

consciousness. Kant

himself

distinguished

time

consciousness

from

the

representations

of

which it

constitutes

a

transcendental

condi

tion.

Precisely through

the

sense

of

time

I

place

the

represented

object

in

an

inner

space

where it

becomes mine. Nor

is the time

consciousness

exclusively

tied

to

external

representations

(as

space

is). Non-ecstatic,

inner

experiences?feelings,

emotions,

passions,

etc.?are

also

temporally

determined. Even what

Henry

calls

Descartes'

original

cogito

bears

traces

of

temporality.

For

we

enjoy

its

indubitable

certainty

only

as

long

as

we

remain

actively

aware

of

the

cogito-sum equation.

Hence

an

aware

ness

of

the

present

as

present

plays

a

decisive

role

in

uniting

certainty

to

truth,

and

in

this

respect

it

differs

from

a

memory

of

past

certainty.

Time

belongs

to

that

fundamental

structure of

consciousness

which

de

termines

all its

acts?the

internal,

allegedly

non-intentional

ones no

less

than the

ecstatic.

In

rejecting

this

most

immanent

dimension of

con

sciousness

Henry

may

well

have

deprived

the

subject

of

a

concrete

content.



16/30

702

LOUIS

DUPR?

of

modern

thought

to

be the

very

cause

of

philosophy's predica

ment. In several respects his position invites comparison to

Rorty's.

Jacques

also has heeded

Heidegger's

critique

of the

pri

macy

of the

subject

and the

equation

of

the

real with

the

objective.

Like

Rorty

he has used

current

studies

in

linguistic

analysis

as

a

launching

pad

for his

anti-subjectivist

project,

and he also shares

Ryle's

diffidence

for

any

substantialist

theory

of the self. Yet the

intellectual

mood of

Diff?rence

et

subjectivit?

differs

considerably

from

both

Ryle's

and

Rorty's

work. Nor does its

critique

of the

romantic illusion of

a

pure subject originate in the kind of objec

tivist,

scientistic

thinking

from

which

we

have

come

to

expect

such

attacks.

Instead,

Jacques

bases much of

his

argument

upon

the

very

religious,

aesthetic,

and

affective

experiences

from which the

advocates

of

a

pure

subject

drew,

and

draw,

theirs. He

supports

his

careful

linguistic analyses

by

discussions of Trinitarian

theol

ogy,

dramatic

literature

(the

Greeks, Shakespeare, Racine),

auto

biographies,

Bildungsromane,

and the

writings

of the

French

mora

listes.

His

splendid

style

and

the

broad

range

of his

competence

have

secured

this

very

non-traditional

philosopher

of

the

new

gen

eration

instant

recognition.

Understanding

of

oneself

as

well

as

of the

other

originates,

he

asserts,

not

in

introspective

reflection,

but in

communication.

At

the

origin

of

consciousness

stands

the

interlocutionary

relation.

Before the actual

communication

takes

place,

there

exists

only

a

communicative

ability,

a

sheer

potency

or,

at

most,

the dizziness

of

its

own

possibility (DS,

365).

Communication

alone

generates

personhood, that source of identifying activity which unites all re

lations.

Outside

communicative

praxis

the

subject

possesses

no

identity

of its

own.

This

position

reverses

much of modern

philoso

phy

which

posits

the

subject

as

the

prior,

determining principle.

For

Jacques,

instead of

being

the

cause

of

communication,

the self is

its

outcome.

He bases

most

of

his

argument

on

the

primeval

form

of

communication?speech.

The

individual

begins

to

speak only

because

of

the

pre-existing

linguistic

relatedness

into which

he

or

she enters. Need the subject not at least initiate the dialogue?

No,

Jacques

answers,

because

the child

is

spoken

to,

and

spoken

about,

before

being

able

to

speak

itself.

Life

begins

not

by

acting,

but

by being

acted

upon.

Even desire

which

the

philosophy

of the

subject

has

recently

invoked

for

support

awakens

only

in

the

form

of

a

mutual

invitation.



17/30

ALTERNATIVESTO

THE

COGITO

703

Not

everyone

is

likely

to

be

converted

by Jacques'

interpreta

tion. Yet

his

argument

draws additional

strength

from

perceptive

analyses

of

feelings

and

emotions,

especially

from his

fascinating

account

of

the

origin

of

love.

Already

Pascal detected

a

paradox

in

the fact that

we

do

not

love the other

because

of

his

or

her

qualities,

and

yet

that without these

qualities

there

remains

nothing

to

love.

For

Jacques

this

means

that love

must

coincide

with

the relation

itself,

rather than

with

an

independent

choice

or

feeling

of the

ego.

That

position,

it

should be

noted,

essentially

differs

from

the kind

of

allocentric

thesis

held

by

Levinas and

some

personalist

philoso

phers.

To

value the other

merely

because of otherness

presents

no

more

convincing

motive

for love than

a

choice

for one's

own

sake.

Only

the

relation

renders the other

truly

lovable.

To

love,

then,

consists

not

so

much in

loving

what the other

is,

as

what

he

or

she

may

become within

the

relationship.

The

ego

is

not

someone;

he becomes

someone

when

loving

or

speaking

with someone

(DS,

99).

Not

even

autobiographies

or

intimate

journals

succeed

in

re

vealing a subject detached from its communicative relations. The

literary

mirror

reflects

no more

than

the

narcissist

illusion

that

one

uses

language

in

order to

report

as

remembrance what

in

fact

belongs

to

the

order

of

enunciation

(DS,

199).

On ?crit

pour

savoir

ce

qu'

on

est,

et

pour

cela

on

le feint

(DS,

203).

The

auto

biographer

vainly struggles

to

convert

the I

of the

interlocutionary

relation into

a

single

me.

Nor

does

introspection

ever

attain

sub

jectivity

as

such.

Most

noteworthy

about

the

more

memorable

attempts

to

capture

the

essence

of

selfhood

is

their incompatible

diversity. Augustine,

Rousseau,

Kierkegaard,

and Maine de

Biran

have

little

in

common

except

an

ability

to

convey

a

certain

idea

of

subjectivity

in

and

through

verbal

communication.

To

be

sure,

the

argument

against

introspection

is

an

old

one.

Psychology

has used

it

for

over a

century.

But

Jacques

directs his

attack

not

so

much

against

introspection

itself

as

against

the

assumption

of

a

subject

existing

independently

of

any

communicative

praxis.

Self-con

sciousness

is

never a

primitive datum,

nor

is

the

ego

ever

capable

of

capturing

itself

in

an

immediate intuition

(DS,

125).

The

objections

here

formulated

against

defining

the

self

on

the

basis of reflection

alone

appear

solid

enough,

but do

they

justify

considering

reflection

posterior

to

locutionary

communication?

Jacques'

reexamination

of

Descartes'

cogito

fails

to

decide that

ar



18/30

704

LOUIS

DUPR?

gument.

In

his

view,

the evidence of the

cogito

results not

from

an

immediate,

internal

experience,

but from the

pragmatic

conditions

of

a

particular

language

game.

The

speech

act

involved

in

stating

cogito:sum

should

not

contradict

the

message.

Deriving then,

its

force

entirely

from

metalinguistic rules,

the

cogito

affirms

as

much

the existence

of

others

(partners

in

communication)

as

of the self

(DS,

244).

I find it

hard

to

believe that Descartes

would

ever

have

accepted

this

interpretation.

But

if he

had,

such

an

explanation

of

evidence

would

have

failed

to

accomplish

what

he

needs

it

for,

namely,

to

reunite ideas with truth.

Such

a

reunion

could be

achieved

only

if,

independently

of

any

conventions

we

choose

to

adopt (such

as

in

a

particular language

game),

we are

able

to

iden

tify

a

point

of consciousness

in

which idea and

reality

co

incide.

Jacques

extends

his

linguistic

interpretation

to

all

so-called

private

experiences,

such

as

pain,

sadness,

etc.

Even

for

the indi

vidual who

feels

them,

he

claims,

they

lose

their

private

character

in

the

course

of

acquiring

public

expression.

From

the

latter alone

they derive their meaning. Only communication renders experi

ence

meaningful.

That

only

/

can

feel shame

or

pain

contains,

in

Jacques'

view,

no

more

than

the

linguistic rule,

It

is

grammatically

impossible

for another

to

have

my

shame

or

my

pain

(DS,

256).

Even

the

feeling

of

suffering

displays

no

decisive

evidence until it

attains

linguistic expression (DS,

255).

That

private

experiences

elude

the self

to

the

same

extent to

which

they

escape

others,

and

that the

difference

between

private experience

and

public

events

amounts

to

no more

than

a

grammatical proposition appears

to

me

an

unproven

and

unprovable

assumption.

Jacques

sees

the

primacy

of

communication confirmed

by

Freud and Marx. Had

psychoanalysis

not

taught

that

the

idea

the

subject

has of itself

cannot

be trusted?

More

radically

than

Des

cartes'

doubt,

Freud's

theory

has

separated

thinking

from

truth.

To

reunite

them he

proposes

not

private reflection,

but

psychoana

lytic

dialogue.

Marx's

critique

of

ideology similarly

distrusts

any

private

form

of

awareness.

The mode in which

the

individual

views himself

or

herself

depends

entirely

on

the

relations

created

by,

and

within,

a

social situation.

But,

unlike

Marx,

Jacques

refuses

to

reduce

interpersonal

relations

to

those social relations

which

are

established

in

the

process

of

production.

Being

more

fundamental,

interpersonal

relations

ground

both

production

and

social

relations.



19/30

ALTERNATIVES

TO

THE

COGITO

705

In

the

interlocutionary

relationship

the

subject,

instead

of

constituting

the

relation, emerges

as

a

constitutive element

within

the

relation itself.

The

subject

thereby

ceases

to

function

as

sole

source

of

meaning

and

values.

At

this

point

Jacques

meets

Hei

degger's critique

of

modern

thought.

He

adopts

the distinction

between

the

ontic and the

ontological

But

he

immediately

rede

fines

the

meaning

of

Being

(Etre)

and

beings

(les

?tants).

Par

Etre

j'entendrai

la relation

primordiale

de

chaque

?tant

avec

les

autres

et

avec

lui-m?me

(DS, 152).

The

relation

thereby

becomes

founda

tional with

respect

to

all

beings

in the

same

way

in

which

Being

is

in

Heidegger's

philosophy.

Unfortunately,

he fails

to

substantiate

this

equation

of

Being

with

relation.

Of

course,

each

philosopher

is

free

to

define

his

terms,

but,

unless

he

eventually

cashes in

on

borrowed

definitions

by

some

evidence

of

his

own,

the

advantage

derived

from

them

is

bound

to be

modest,

especially

when

they

remain

unsupported by

the tradition.

Jacques

reinterprets

Hei

degger's

self-revealing

openness

of

Being

as

the

outcome

of

interlo

cutionary

relatedness. If

man

is

capable

of

discourse

...

it is

because he is able to enter the primordial interlocutionary rela

tion.

If

meaning

emerges,

it

is

because

this

relation

is

constitutive

of

Being

itself

(DS, 153).

What

precisely

does

constitutive

of

mean?

That

only

human

existence

(Dasein)

reveals

Being,

and

that

Dasein is

Mitseiril

Even

such

a

restatement

in

Heidegger's

own

language

would still

not

determine

relatedness

itself

as

con

stitutive

of

Being.

Jacques

explicates:

If

the

relationship

to

Being

is

constitutive of

human

existence,

and

if

this

Being

is

rela

tion,

then all

in

man

will

depend (rel?vera de)

in

some

way

on

this

relationship (DS, 141).

Indeed

so,

but

how

do

we

prove

the

secon

dupre¦ü - alternatives to the cogito

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