duke east asia nexus 1.1

DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUSA Pacific Dragon? 21st Century Chinese Foreign PolicyJENNY LIN

Taiwan’s Political Transformation ANgELA ChANg

A Million Voices Against CorruptionhSUAN LI

Taiwan Relations Act and the Swinging of Pendulum PowerJACk ZhANg

Social Movement in Taiwan

Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reform

Democratization in Taiwan

Ma Ying-jeou’s Election

U.S.-Taiwan Arms Sales

History of China- Taiwan Relations

Volume 1 Issue 1 2009

U.S.- China Relations

A TaiwanesePerspective

Book Review: Social States

U.S.- Taiwan Relations

DUKE EAST ASIA nexusVol 1 Issue 1

Linda Zhang President

Jack Zhang Editor-in-Chief

Alice Ren Graphics Editor

Sarah Smith Webmaster

Mario Parks Secretary

Angela Ryu Chief of Public Relations

Youngsoo Kwon Chief of Finance

Editorial Board Pablo Vasquez, Alice Ding, Linda Peng, Bruce Xu

AdvisorsRalph Litzinger

Bai Gao Yan Li

Anne Allison

Alumni Review BoardAndrew Cheon, Muyan Jin, Xiameng Sun,

Mai Li, Soyoon Sung, Neinei shirakawa, Yue Yin, Yi Xiang, Paul Zhao, Roxanna Goudarzi

Special thanks to James Wong for the original DEAN logo design, and to Vice Provost Gilbert Merckx and Dean and Vice Provost Stephen Nowicki for their generous support.

Copyright © 2009 by Duke East Asia Nexus (DEAN) at Duke University

DEAN receives support from the Asian Pacific Studies Institute and from the John Spencer Bassett Memorial Fund.

DEAN publishes full-length academic papers related to East Asia. The journal is released biannually. DEAN also publishes continuously on its website:

www.dukenexus.org.

Duke East Asia Nexus


I am excited and honored to present to you the inaugural edition of Duke East Asia Nexus - the beginning of a new journey for our organization, DEAN. Since our launch in 2007, we have dedicated ourselves to enriching Duke University’s understanding of East Asia, a region with a rich cultural history, one of the fastest growing economies of the 21st century, and a growing presence in the global community.

Inspired by a conversation between Andrew Cheon, our first founder and President, and Ning Ai of the Harvard Asia Pacific Review, DEAN has grown as an academic organization in many ways. First, in 2007, DEAN initi-ated its online journal and forum, Dukenexus.org, dedicating it to publishing academic writing on East Asia and providing connections for others from other institutions across the world to participate in dialogues about East Asia. Since then, we have also committed ourselves to bringing these dialogues to campus by sponsoring speaker events, on topics such as Sino-Japanese relations, East Asian economies, and East Asian cultural art forms. This journal that you see before you now is the next effort in our initiative to enrich Duke academic life and to raise awareness of East Asian affairs. The first journal focuses on the re-lationship between the People’s Republic of China, the United States of Amer-ica, and The Republic of China (Taiwan). In the future, we wish to also focus on other countries of East Asia as we have done on Dukenexus.org. We hope to bring to you some of the most intriguing discussions and academic work on East Asia explored here at the Duke community.

Cheers, and enjoy,

Linda Chen Zhang Trinity College 2011President of DEAN


Table of Contents

Letter From the Editor5

Essays

A Pacific Dragon? 21st Century Chinese Foreign Policy

JennyLin 6

Taiwan’s Political Transformation

AngelaChang15

Taiwan Relations Act and the Swinging Pendulum of Power

JackZhang29

A Million Voices Against Corruption: The Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan

HsuanLi38

Disentanglement: A Case to End U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan

JackZhang45

Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reformist Policies and the Ensuing Legitimacy Crisis

SoyoonSung55

4 DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS Vol 1 Issue 1

Letters to the Editor

Taiwan: Ma Ying-jeou and the Revolutionary Status Quo

MuyanJin63

What Taiwan’s Closer Ties with China Means to Me

HerngLee65

Book Review

Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000

AndrewCheon68

Classroom

Understanding China-Taiwan Relations

MuyanJin82

5DUKE EAST ASIA NEXUS 2009

Dear Reader,

This inaugural edition of Duke East Asia Nexus explores the complex trilateral relation-ship between the People’s Republic of China, the United States of America, and The Republic of China (Taiwan). Having emerged from the global financial crisis relatively unscathed, China now appears poised to play a central role in the international arena. As academics and policy makers in the U.S. worry abstractly about China’s emergence as a potential peer competitor with the United States, the people and government of Taiwan have are immediately impacted by the reality of shifting geopolitics.

The political status of Taiwan and U.S. arms sales have historically been a major stum-bling blocks in Sino-American relations. Since democratization, Taiwanese domestic politics also play a significant role in cross strait relations. US-China-Taiwan relations en-tered a particularly strained period when Chen Shui-Bien of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party became president in 2000 and raised the contentious issue of Taiwanese Independence.

However, now with Chen discredited, and the Kuomintang back in power, cross strait relations have taken a more cooperative turn. President Ma Yingjeou of Taiwan have worked with the mainland to establish the “three-links” (direct flights, mail, and trade) between China and Taiwan. The current Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement being negotiated is set to ease trade restrictions across the strait even further.

The shifting balance of power between the U.S. and China puts cross strait relations are at a critical new juncture. Even as economic relations across the Taiwan Strait continue to improve, questions regarding Taiwan’s political status and the nature of U.S. security commitment in the region continue to linger. The essays featured in this issue explore different facets of cross-strait relations through the lenses of policy, politics, and history. Our aim was to unpack some of the nuance in cross-strait relations by examining critical issues ranging from the implications of the rise of China, to the significance of democratization in Taiwan, to the consequence of the Taiwan Relations Act. Those who are unfamiliar with the topic of China-Taiwan rela-tions may learn more in the Classroom section (p.80).

All of the articles of this issue along with many other essays on East Asia can be found on our website: www.dukenexus.org. Thank you for reading this edition of Duke East Asia Nexus.

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang Trinity College 2011Editor in Chief



Introduction

As an autocratic state, the People’s Republic of China reaches its foreign policy strategy through the decisions made and general framework set by its top leadership—the paramount leader and the core nucleus of a few government officials formally a part of the Chinese politburo standing committee. Currently, the politburo consists of nine government officials who determine the overall direction of Chinese foreign policy through recommendations by various spe-cialized departments and offices (Kahn 2007). Although it may ap-pear that China’s foreign policy is a combination of work by numerous

government branches, in reality, the politburo sets the ultimate direction of Chinese policy which is eventu-ally realized, adjusting for reality, by the “lower” offices. In order to fully represent the administrative support the politburo receives throughout the decision making process, this com-mittee includes important govern-ment officials from branches like the military who are key in putting over-arching foreign policy ideas as deter-mined by the politburo into practice.

History

Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the bipolar inter-national structure, the People’s Re-

Jenny Lin

Jenny Lin is a junior at Duke University, double majoring in Political Science and Environmental Science and Policy.

Abstract: With China poised to overtake the United States as the next superpower, the inter-national community is captivated by Chinese progress and concerned by its foreign policy. Policy decisions made by the politburo in the past few years reveal that the Chinese government has consistently focused on economic development and has thus oriented all policy measures to that end. In recent years, China has pursued cooperative relationships with many states and complied with various international protocols to ensure continued growth. Fundamentally, Chinese foreign policy can be categorized by four fundamental goals—establish a multipolar system; minimize the power contest; address national security concerns; and promote an image as a responsible pow-er—all aimed towards unobstructed Chinese economic growth and prosperity.


public of China has risen to promi-nence in the international system. While some continue to suspect Beijing of embarking on its own quest of imperialism in the develop-ing world, the entirety of Chinese foreign policy can be summarized to be following one primary goal—the strengthening of Chinese economic power and consequently increasing China’s clout on the international stage (Suzuki 2009). “The rise and fall of great powers are based on economic power that grows within states at different rates”(Li 2004). In order to foster a favorable environ-ment for China’s national goal of economic growth and rise to power, the Chinese government has pursued a foreign policy promoting multi-polarity as well as international and regional stability.

As the People’s Republic of China reaches its thirty-first year since initiating market reforms, the state continues on its quest for economic development and modernization (Scissors 2009). However, unlike Mao’s original emphasis on inde-pendence and autarchy, the Chinese leadership has realized that eco-nomic growth cannot be sustained in isolation from global politics and has therefore undertaken policy measures that further secure and stabilize the political environment for Chinese

growth. The national economic goals have been maintained as the “over-riding consideration” throughout the state’s policies, as Deng had origi-nally recommended (Zhang and Yao 2004).

Foreign Policy Goals

One of the main policy measures undertaken to ensure unobstructed economic growth and development has been a promotion of multipolar-ity in international politics—a system that would allow China more politi-cal influence and economic oppor-tunity. During the Cold War, China enjoyed a unique position as the “swing” power between two duel-ing superpowers. Without significant investment in the national military, China was able to impact global politics at the level of a global power simply by aligning with either the United States or the Soviet Union (Zhao 2004). However, after the collapse of the USSR, the People’s Republic of China suffered from a political identity crisis. Without the bipolar power dynamic, Beijing’s role in global politics diminished signifi-cantly. Recently, China has started to re-assert itself in global affairs “by increasing its trade, peddling arms, attracting foreign aid and invest-ment, and exporting construction workers” (Zhao 2004). As long as



the world order progresses towards multipolarity, China would remain relatively free to build the perfect base from which to modernize while gaining greater economic and politi-cal power.

To further clear the path for its eco-nomic modernization, China has been actively working towards sta-bilizing its immediate surroundings and other areas of interest, like the oil supplier countries of the Middle East. While such policies directly secure Chinese economic pursuits by ensuring a safe and stable envi-ronment for Beijing’s operations, such international involvement also adds to the image of China as a responsible power—working within the realms of the United Nations to promote progress and world peace. Such beneficent behavior, however superficial, works to abate inter-national concern and suspicion of China as an aggressive revisionist state out to upset the status quo and replace liberal democratic ideals with the “Beijing model” of communism and autocracy (Suzuki 2009).

Multipolarity

In the pursuit of a hospitable en-vironment for Chinese economic development, Beijing has worked diligently to construct a stable and

multipolar world. Especially after the experiences of the Tiananmen incident, China has come to realize the constraints of active and power-ful American-led interference. China has since strongly advocated for “the development of constructive relations of mutual trust and cooperation” with a number of nations. Following Deng’s principles of independence and self-reliance in regards to nation-al and foreign policy, China has been able to establish partnerships with the world’s major powers without forming a binding political alliance (Cheng and Zhang 2004). Examples include a cooperative partnership with Russia established in 1996, and comprehensive partnerships estab-lished with France, Canada, and Mexico the following year (Cheng and Zhang 2004). This insistence on non-alignment has given Beijing a high degree of diplomatic flexibil-ity. Relations with one state can be pursued without affecting China’s relationship with another. Such a configuration allows China access to various sources of trade and tech-nological exchange—diversifying in case of future opposition from one nation and further aiding in the na-tion’s modernization. This resulting system of international relationships also sets a precedent for a future co-operative multipolar world order.

Jenny Lin


Specifically, Chinese elites foresee a future power configuration with Chi-na and the European Union as two of the major poles. China and the EU share a concern over American aggression and possible hegemony, as well as issues concerning nuclear pro-liferation and international organized crime, like human trafficking. Beijing is supportive of the consolidation of the European Union and seeks to preserve the valuable partnership (Bezlova 2009). Over the last decade, there have been eleven China-EU summits as a part of the comprehen-sive strategic partnership to address a variety of international issues and policy concerns. During the 2007 summit, both sides appeared to agree on the importance of economic co-operation, and the European Union has offered diplomatic support of the PRC’s One-China policies (Faiola and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, European apprehension regarding China’s human rights record has resurfaced following the Tibetan uprising. However, considering the current condition of the world econ-omy, the European Union cannot be too demanding of one of the fastest growing economies in the world—the 11th summit finally took place in Prague after its initial cancellation over the Dalai Lama’s visit to France. Even though China and the EU have reached a tentative understanding

based on mutual economic goals, China’s greater economic clout may not be as effective as the EU grows and consolidates.

Minimize Power Contest

A similar problem is present in the bilateral relationship between China and the United States—although the US is the uncontested superpower, China’s economic prosperity grants it a certain degree of leverage. In September of 2008, China officially surpassed Japan in becoming the owner of the largest portion of the US debt; the American trade deficit with China amounted to an aston-ishing $268,040 million in the same year (Morrison and Labonte 2008). In order to keep the Chinese Yuan undervalued against the dollar—sus-taining high export levels of Chinese goods—the Bank of China has been purchasing large amounts of US dollars. Rather than simply hold on to American currency, the Chinese central bank has converted them into US securities as an investment strategy (Barroso and Socrates 2007). Along with over $585 billion of US Treasury securities, China has es-sentially purchased the ability to alter the monetary policy of the United States (Bezlova 2009). Although the Chinese leadership have consistently restated the intention to maintain the



status quo, possible worst case sce-narios continue to haunt the Ameri-can government. If the Chinese cen-tral bank decided to suddenly unload a large portion of its bond holdings, a cascade of consequences would follow leading to an eventual collapse of the American economy.

Logically, the Chinese leadership would hesitate to pursue such a policy because a defunct Ameri-can economy would mean a much smaller market for Chinese goods and a slowing of export-lead growth. However, the possibility remains and the American government will only become more anxious as the PRC gains greater political power (Faiola and Goldfarb 2008). Unfortunately, the US economic model is structured to remain heavily reliant on foreign investment and credit—until that changes, the Sino-American relation-ship will be a tenuous one. The US may look to extend its power in other forums to check growing Chinese power.

Considering such complications in the forum of international pow-ers, China has chosen to a pursue a path under the radar and relo-cated its focus onto its immediate environment—striving for regional power status as opposed to that of an international superpower. For

the first time in years, China has a clearly formulated periphery policy. China has reached out to India to mitigate security concerns regard-ing the shared border area, as well as to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the same month to address economic cooperation measures. Formal agree-ments aside, China has also assumed the posturing of a regional leader as seen in the way Chinese elites re-sponded to the Asian financial crisis during the summer of 1997. Beijing’s “stand-by-Asia” policy garnered it acceptance and influence in South-east Asia along with improved re-lations, especially economic ones, with nations in the area (Morrison and Labonte 2008). The Chinese leadership has even pursued a level of friendship with Taiwan. Unfortu-nately, despite progress in the realms of finance, air travel, and cross-strait crime, peace and stability will not be possible or permanent until the island of Taiwan is officially declared as a part of the People’s Republic of China. As much as the Chinese lead-ership is content with the economic benefits and the current progression of events, Chinese cultural history and current popular sentiments say otherwise. As one Chinese scholar so eloquently put it, “the day when Taiwan declares independence will be the day war begins” (Zhao 2004).

Jenny Lin


A part of the Chinese Communist Party’s revitalization of nationalism is the current fervor and popular de-mand for the reunification of Taiwan with mainland China. However, the Chinese leadership has been able to downplay cross-strait concerns in light of other, more pressing issues.

Security Concerns

Towards the north, China has fos-tered the spirit of cooperation with the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a secu-rity focused arrangement, in 2001 with some countries of the former Soviet Union including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as well as the Rus-sian Federation (Brown 2009). While the Shanghai Pact addresses select concerns, Beijing has also been in pursuit of a more evolved partner-ship with Moscow to secure econom-ic and security interests. Not only is Russia one of the main suppliers of energy for the ever-growing Chi-nese industries but it also shares an extensive border with China posing a possible threat to China’s national security.

Even though the strategic triangle arrangement of the Cold War is no longer in use, a ghost of the old relationship remains alive today. Efforts have been in place since the

early 1990s to coordinate both trade and security arrangements between the two powers. Although the two countries regard each other with wariness, both governments acknowl-edge the importance of this partner-ship. While a friendly Russia ensures China’s energy supply and security along its northern border, a coopera-tive China is the biggest customer of the Russian military industrial complex. As the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations comes to pass, leaders from both nations are busy coordinating responses to the current financial disaster, and the respective militaries are contemplating a possible joint ex-ercise (Liu 2004). As the oil pipeline from Skovorodino to northeast China is finally being constructed—15 years after its proposal—China has yet an-other source of petroleum to fuel its growing industrial complex and, as President Medvedev said, “minimize negative effects of the world crisis on [both] economies” (Zhao 2004). In analyzing this particular develop-ment with the Russian Federation, it is important to note the lack of ap-peal to a common ideological tradi-tion of either nation (Zhao 2004). Contrary to Western sentiment, the partnership is established predomi-nantly in pursuit of mutual economic interests rather than the beginning of a communist world order seeking to



supplant the current ideals of liberal democracy.

Image as a Responsible Power

Outside of the immediate region, Beijing has recently pursued a more mainline, popular approach in deal-ing with the third world. As exem-plified by its involvement in Africa as a part of UN aid forces, China is very keen on cultivating its image as a responsible global power. Chinese foreign policy makers like to em-phasize China’s fundamental beliefs in “multilateralism, peaceful coex-istence, mutual benefit, and com-mon development” (Dittmer 2004). Although China’s commitments in countries in the Middle East and Africa are logical from an economic standpoint—countries like Sudan and Saudi Arabia are some of the biggest supplies of petroleum to the PRC—Beijing is also involved in UN efforts in countries like Cote d’Ivoire from which China receives no ap-parent benefit. Some observers have labeled such altruism as the Chinese attempt to extend its sphere of in-fluence in countries that have yet to adopt the Western model. However, a large number of these peacekeep-ing operations have had the explicit purpose to establish liberal democra-cies in unstable nations modeled after Western states (Suzuki 2009). Even in

countries where Chinese economic interests do exist, Beijing has imple-mented policies consistent with that of the international community—like pressuring Sudan to respect basic human rights conventions despite the possible damage on the petroleum trade relationship between the two states. While such seemingly worth-less acts of kindness may actually result in the “excessive responsibili-ties” that Beijing has been worried about since joining international organizations, it ultimately adds to the image of the PRC as undergo-ing a “peaceful rise” that other states need not be wary of (Zhao 2008). It is simply a way for the People’s Re-public of China to demonstrate that it is capable of undertaking the great power responsibilities of promoting international stability and develop-ment (Suzuki 2009).

A similar theme of a “responsible” and “peaceful” rise to power can be seen in the Chinese administration of Hong Kong since its return to the PRC in 1997. Instead of strictly im-plementing the rule of the Chinese Communist Party as some feared, the Chinese leadership actually chose to implement the “one country, two systems” approach in order to main-tain the foreign investments flowing into the mainland from Hong Kong (Li 2004). Although leaving Western

Jenny Lin


capitalism in full functioning force may pose security challenges to the PRC, the foreign investment in the area is crucial to China’s moderniza-tion process which is, after all, the overriding national interest regard-less of the circumstances. The estab-lishment of Hong Kong as a Special Administrative Region further dem-onstrates the commitment to national economic development of Beijing, even at the expense of national secu-rity.

Undeniably, it is within China’s best interest to continue its course of economic development and rise to power. However, in order to achieve future power status, the People’s Republic of China must pay great attention to the balance between its various foreign policy interests. First and foremost, Chinese economic in-terests must be considered regardless of the political agenda.

As the People’s Republic of China pursues its quest for economic suc-cess and influence, its policy of fo-cusing on the economy while adopt-ing a non-threatening appearance should last well into the 21st century. However, despite Beijing’s attempts at ensuring a peaceful rise to power, the future of China will not be as unobstructed as the leadership would like. China has not been spared its

share of damages and set-backs with the current economic conditions. In the near future, the Chinese leader-ship may also have to make a deci-sion between petroleum and human rights in places like the Middle East and Africa, finally settle the Taiwan situation, and strategically deal with the trade balance contention with the US. Considering the recent internal issues brought about by unrest in Xinjiang, the Chinese government will also need to discover a domes-tic policy framework that will both maintain national stability and ap-pease international human rights concerns. While the numerous part-nerships with other major powers should ameliorate the situation, any US- or EU- led Western opposition in the international forum could pose a formidable challenge. Within the context of China’s thousand-year po-litical history, this is merely the tran-sitional phase before China secures its spot as one of the influential poles in the international political system.

References

1. Barroso, J. M., J. Socrates, et al. (2007). Joint Statement of the 10th China-EU Summit China-EU Summit. Beijing.

2. Bezlova, A. (2009). “China-EU: Summit Redefines Diplomatic Boundaries.” Inter Press News.

3. Bin, Y. (2009). “China-Russia Relations: Be-



tween Crisis and Cooperation.” Comparative Connections.

4. Cheng, J. Y. S. and W. Zhang (2004). Pat-terns and Dynamics of China’s International Strategic Behavior. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 179-206.

5. Brown, D. G. (2009). “China-Taiwan Rela-tions: New Economic Challenges.” Compara-tive Connections.

6. Dittmer, L. (2004). Ghost of the Strategic Triangle: The Sino-Russian Partnership. Chi-nese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe. 207-223.

7. Faiola, A. and Z. A. Goldfarb (2008). China Tops Japan in U.S. Debt Holdings. The Wash-ington Post. Washington, The Washington Post Company.

8. Li, R. (2004). Security Challenge of an Ascendant China: Great Power Emergence and International Stability. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 23-57.

9. Liu, J. (2004). Making the Right Choices in Twenty-first Century Sino-American Rela-tions. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 243-255.

10. Kahn, J. (2007). Politburo in China Gets Four New Members. New York Times, The New York Times Company.

11. Morrison, W. M. and M. Labonte (2008). China’s Holdings of US Securities: Implica-tions for the US Economy. C. R. Service. Washington.

12. Scissors, D. (2009). “Deng Undone: the Costs of Halting Market Reform in China.”

Foreign Affairs 88(3).

13. Suzuki, S. (2009). “Chinese Soft Power, Insecurity Studies, Myopia and Fantasy.” Third World Quarterly 30(4): 779-793.

14. US Census Bureau. (2009, 06/10/09). “Trade in Goods (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance) with China.” Foreign Trade Statistics Retrieved 06/20/09, from http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2009.

15. Zhao, S. (2004). The Making of China’s Periphery Policy. Chinese Foriegn Policy: Prag-matism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe: 256-275.

16. Zhang, J. and Y. Yao (2004). Traditional Chinese Military Thinking: A Comparative Perspective. Chinese Foreign Policy: Pragma-tism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M.E. Sharpe:128-139.

17. Zhao, S. (2008). “Chinese Foreign Policy in Hu’s Second Term: Coping with Political Tran-sition Abroad.” Retrieved 06/18/09, 2009, from http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20080510.zhao.chineseforeignpolicyhu.html.

18. Zhao, S. (2004). Beijing’s Perception of the International System and Foreign Policy Ad-justment after the Tiananmen Incident. Chi-nese Foreign Policy: Pragmatism and Strategic Behavior. S. Zhao. New York, M. E. Sharpe: 140-150.

Jenny Lin



Angela Chang

Introduction

In the global arena, Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is forever intertwined with China, or the People’s Republic of China; how-ever, Taiwan’s democratization has distinguished the island from the authoritarian mainland. Alongside Taiwan’s economic miracle, the world witnessed a political miracle, which lends support to the idea that economic and political developments are mutually reinforcing (Copper 1996, 50). In the 1980s, the seeming-ly stable and unchallengeable Kuo-mintang Party (KMT) gave way to a

number of variable pressures which liberalized the party and led to the democratization of Taiwan. Some claim that Taiwan’s transition has been “one of the smoothest…among newly democratized countries” (Hood 1997, 10). Did the KMT’s unprecedented political openness simply reflect Taiwan’s moderniza-tion, or were there other contribut-ing factors? Furthermore, why did the KMT decide to “transition” into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s when it had claimed the status of a democratic party since founding? This paper adopts Joseph Schumpter’s minimalist definition of democracy – a procedural definition

Angela Chang is senior at Duke University majoring in International Comparative Studies.

Abstract: Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation the-ory, this paper argues that, although preconditions for democracy were present in Taiwan, they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but instead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of democratic forces defeating KMT one-party rule, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberal-ized autocracy into a democracy. By initiating it from the top, the elites within the party were able to control the process in such a manner that renewed the KMT’s legitimacy and preserved it in a high level of power. As a one-party system, the KMT not only transformed the national govern-ment but also the party by default. The KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for themselves (Keating 2006, 143).


for free, fair, and competitive elec-tions of governing officials. Taiwan is defined as a one-party system of the KMT between the time of its transition from a Japanese colony in the mid-40s to its transition into a democracy in the late 80s and early 90s. Utilizing the modernization theory and Samuel P. Huntington’s transformation theory, this paper presents the argument that although preconditions for democracy were present they did not necessarily lead directly to democratization, but in-stead helped to liberalize the KMT. Contrary to the idealized vision of a KMT defeat, the actual transition process was a conscious decision by the party elite to transform the party from a liberalized autocracy into a democracy.

Theoretical Arguments

This paper applies modernization theory to study preconditions before political transition in Taiwan and transformation theory to examine the process of transition itself. The modernization theory postulates that democracy is a consequence of a progression of socioeconomic changes, such as urbanization, indus-trialization, rising per capita income, education, mass communication, mobilization, and political incor-poration, which ready society for

the final step (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2; Przeworski et al 2000, 88-9) However, socioeconomic growth does not guarantee democratization, as famously exemplified by Singa-pore, and can lead to more severe policies when the government sees its legitimacy irrevocably bounded to economic growth. As Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard argue in Political Change in Taiwan (1992), “The crucial political processes that constitute democratization are either not articulated or are assumed to follow a simple model of increasing demand for democratization eventu-ally yielding its supply” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2). Nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that socioeco-nomic change increased democratic pressures on the KMT which re-sponded by gradually liberalizing the party, preparing it to assume democ-ratization.

Taiwan’s democratization process is broken down by Samuel P. Hunting-ton’s transformation theory, found in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Hun-tington’s exploration of the global ‘wave’ of democratization concludes that there is no single explanation or cause for democratization; the break-down of authoritarianism does not equal the emergence of democracy; and differences among authoritarian

Angela Chang


regimes shape the transition pro-cesses to a democratic regime. Of Huntington’s four transitions, Tai-wan is best explained through trans-formation, a top-down approach, where the elites within the authori-tarian regime “take the lead and play the decisive role” to change into a democratic system (Huntington 1991, 124). Such a process, however, requires the support of either a well established military or economically successful regime, lending support to modernization influences (Hunting-ton 1991, 125).

Huntington differentiates five phases of transformation, four of which oc-cur within the authoritarian regime (Huntington 1991, 127-41). In the first phase, reformers emerge within the authoritarian regime viewing the party’s liberalization as a desirable or necessary “way of defusing opposi-tion to their regime without fully de-mocratizing.” In the second phase, the reformers gain power over the conservatives within the party, and this often happens when a reformer succeeds the death of an authori-tarian ruler. In the third phase, the liberal reformers realize their failure since a liberalized autocracy is an un-stable equilibrium that needs to move towards one of two directions. In the fourth phase, democratically oriented reformers succeed the liberal reform-

ers but must now effectively counter conservative forces and establish its own legitimacy within the context of the old party. In the fifth and final phase, the democratic reformers must act quickly to begin negotia-tions now that they have gained pow-er. The reformers and opposition must reach moderate agreements to ensure a successful transformation, but if the reformers are particularly adept, they will utilize their relation-ships to coopt the opposition and guide the negotiations in their favor. While Taiwan’s opposition arguably played an active role in the transi-tion, the strategic transformation was always carefully controlled by the KMT leadership.

Preconditions Lean Towards Liberalization

Many variables contribute to an authoritarian regime’s decision to shift its balance of power, but the most crucial are those affecting the regime’s legitimacy. As a one party system, the KMT’s rule was “le-gitimated” with its ideology, allow-ing it to achieve “a relatively high level of political institutionaliza-tion” (Huntington 1991, 110). Sun Yat-sen founded the KMT in 1912 according to San Min Chu I, or The Three Founding Principles, of nationalism, democracy, and liveli-



hood (socialism). He believed that “Once China’s sovereignty had been established, the livelihood principle could be introduced which would develop the country economically and pave the way for the realization of democracy” (Hood 1997, 5). This period of tutelage was undefined, but democracy was understood to be the end goal; however, should the KMT achieve its goal of democracy, it would lose legitimacy, but its inabil-ity to effect change would also cause loss of legitimacy. When the KMT fled to Taiwan during the civil war, it brought a continental sized admin-istration and constitution with “pro-visions for political representation, mass participation, democracy, and civil right…already written into [it]” (Copper 1996, 19). These provisions were canceled out in 1949 under Martial Law (Temporary Provisions) for the sake of security. The KMT relied heavily on the idea, or myth, that it was the rightful government of all China, and until then, any support for an independent Taiwan would be seen as “subversive” (Hun-tington 1991, 119). Taiwan would re-main under a KMT emergency dic-tatorship for the next four decades, for democracy and civil liberties are a luxury in the face of security.

Does the economy come first and then democracy, as Sun Yat-sen

claimed, or vice-versa? It is gener-ally agreed that a new democratic regime experiences greater stability if economic development precedes democratization. Taiwan’s economic miracle was realized under a KMT leadership striving to actualize its promise to develop economically and to win Taiwanese support, whom outnumbered the transplanted re-gime. A number of economic re-forms were initiated in the 50s and 60s which destroyed the old feudal land system and dispersed indus-trialization throughout the island. Due to these reforms, Taiwan expe-rienced one of the highest growth rates in the world from the 60s to 80s, and its relatively equal income distribution eased pressures for de-mocratization (Huntington 1991, 71). Nonetheless, economic growth has created independent sources of power, exemplified by the govern-ment’s decreasing control in Taiwan’s industrial production: 56% in 1952, 19% in 1972, and less than 10% in 1992 (Huntington 1991, Foreword x). Although economic factors are not the deciding factor in democra-tization, the likelihood of democ-ratization increases once a country reaches a certain mid-level of income stability. The emergence of a strong middle class entailed many features “common to a modernizing capital-ist society…[which] undermined

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the KMT’s institutional capacity for mobilization and control” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 8-10). Economic development was necessary for KMT legitimacy, but it also promoted de-mocratization by changing the social structure and values of the populace and its interaction with the rest of the world.

Interestingly, the populace experi-enced local democratic participation during this period of KMT dictator-ship. Economic reform dramatically affected rural politics, “bringing grassroots democracy to Taiwan” (Copper 1996, 4). The new middle class had the economic and intel-lectual clout to form civic associa-tions and demand political rights. In truth, Green Island Prison Camp quickly filled with political prisoners, but the KMT concurrently allowed the cultivation of a civil society con-trary to the conditions of Martial Law (Keating 2006, 69). The KMT believed that local politics was “fac-tion ridden and undemocratic” thus not a threatening factor, utilizing local elections to divert the public’s attention from a lack of national elections (Copper 1996, 182). None-theless, they turned out to be quite democratic and a good training ground in constitutionalism and de-mocracy (Cooper 1996, 182). Fur-thermore, the efficiency of the local

government satisfied the majority of the public with their level of politi-cal participation, believing, like Sun Yat-sen, that democracy must come slowly and in stages (Copper 1996, 182). This was important for the KMT, since “Delegates to the na-tional elected bodies of government could not be chosen by the people of China, since most of China (the mainland) was controlled by the Chi-nese Communist Party. Changing status quo would be tantamount to declaring a two-China policy” (Cop-per 1996, 182-183). Martial Law delayed meaningful national elec-tions, but the KMT’s support of civil society fostered a political culture that would eventually challenge its appropriateness.

Despite the KMT’s control over Taiwan’s internal affairs, it could not control international relations as eas-ily due to the tenuous China-Taiwan relationship. In 1973, Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations in favor of mainland China under the one-China policy. Even though the US withdrew official diplomatic relations, its continued support and security, in particular the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, allowed for the first competitive national elec-tions in Taiwan (Copper 1996, 129). Furthermore, there is the often un-mentioned subject of the Republic



of China’s ability to tell allies “that it could privately live with a two China settlement, but did not want to let this policy known back in Taiwan” lest it lose its claim to legitimacy and dictatorship (Keating 2006, 59). Tai-wan’s status as a top exporter com-pelled continuing relationships with the majority of the western coun-tries. Its cosmopolitan culture was consequently not only penetrated by western commerce, but also cultural understanding of the capitalist-dem-ocratic relationship and the “interna-tional pressure to improve its human rights record and to put into practice the democratic rights in its constitu-tion” (Copper 1996, 130). Within this context, the KMT could not deny such demands lest an impacted economic trade also influence its legitimacy with the people.

By the early 80s, the rules in Taiwan had changed. Although the KMT still dictated the actions of the gov-ernment, its legitimacy was eroding under the pressures from civil society, a growing opposition (to be ex-plained below), international actors, and even from within the party itself. Taiwan’s political development mod-el had always placed preconditions to democratization, including security and socioeconomic stability, but it had never refuted democracy. Now that it had achieved its desired levels,

with few excuses left, could Taiwan resist democratization any longer? The preconditions which had served to delay the transition process had also served to familiarize the public with a certain level of western demo-cratic culture. As the viability of an authoritarian regime is in large part a function of its society, the KMT gov-ernment could no longer ignore the gap between ideology and practice (Huntington 1991, 64). However, full democratization would require “a fundamental transformation of the ruling party from an entity closely in-tertwined with the state apparatus to an independent political organization competing equally for electoral sup-port” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 2).

Taiwan’s DemocraticTransformation

How did the KMT react to the pres-sures for democratization? In its po-sition as an authoritarian one-party system, the KMT could have cracked down and removed the internal pressures; however, that would have openly flaunted its own party ideol-ogy, destroyed its international rela-tions, and left the problem unsolved. The other choice would be to modify its position within the party, even if that meant democratizing.

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Emergence of Reformers

Reasons for the emergence of re-formers within an authoritarian party remain unclear, but reform is ultimately seen as a desired and nec-essary outcome. A growing and edu-cated middle class was able to bring western organization and mobiliza-tion techniques to the opposition (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 10-11). Their demands centered upon the full implementation of the constitu-tion and Sun Yat-sen’s principles, questioning the KMT’s martial law, the legitimacy and competency of the “Long Parliament” (frozen into the administration since 1949), and domestic society. The KMT showed initiative by reversing agricultural policy, subsidizing rural economies, and recruiting Taiwanese elite into the party and government, but it became increasingly “difficult for the ruling party to define the terms of political participation unilaterally” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 11-12). The older, more conservative party cadres were dying out, and the new Taiwanese recruits joined with the younger members of the KMT to form a more moderate faction within the party. Many scholars point to the Kaohsiung Incident on Decem-ber 19, 1979 as a decisive moment in Taiwan’s democratization. The

Human Rights Rally planned in Ka-ohsiung set the stage for both opposi-tion and KMT to prove their point. For the opposition it drew attention to the KMT’s human rights abuses and for the KMT it proved the op-position’s threat as a communist force (Keating 2006, 21, 72). The bloody riot and ensuing trials drew domestic and international attention, forcing both sides to reassess towards mod-erate methods. Within the KMT, the younger reformers and the older conservatives reached an agreement to “gradually ‘normalize’…political process while maintaining various constraints on the activities of the opposition” (Cheng and Haggard 1992, 13). The costs of maintain-ing power had become too high for the KMT and the party needed to reduce the risks of losing legitimacy and liberalize.

Acquiring Power

The KMT’s reaction in the Kaoh-siung Incident largely reflected the influence of Chiang Ching-kuo who had assumed the presidency in 1978, shortly after the death of his father, longtime ruler Chiang Kai-shek. Ac-cording to Huntington, “authoritar-ian rulers could seize the bull by the horns and take the lead in ending authoritarian rule and introducing a democratic system…but it almost



always first required a change of leadership within the authoritar-ian system” (Huntington 1991, 57). When Chiang Ching-kuo assumed power during an increasingly tumul-tuous period, he had to respond to the momentous changes accordingly. Although he had proved himself as a loyal and able member of the KMT, he eventually came to understand that continuing the harsh authori-tarian ways of his father would be “dangerous to KMT survival and harmful to both his and his father’s personal legacy” (Hood 1997, 84). Consequently, the KMT needed to accommodate political change now, and he proved that commitment with an anti-corruption drive and the “Taiwanization” of the party (Cop-per 1996, 78). After the Kaohsiung Incident, the emerging reformist leaders of the party “calculated that democracy was the key and that only competitive national elections would prove that democratization was in progress” (Cooper 1996, 183). Aside from the implications of electoral fallacy, elections are the “principal mechanism through which changes in the social structure that have been brought about by rapid industrial-ization are translated into a political force for weakening the entrenched authoritarian order and for pushing the democratization process forward” (Hu and Chu 1992, 177). Elections

would prove especially meaningful for the KMT reformers by legitimiz-ing their constitutional ideology and government.

Taiwan’s 1980 elections set prece-dence as the first competitive na-tional elections. New election laws resulted from agreements between both sides, but ultimately stemming from the KMT, to allow independent candidates to organize and compete as an opposition party (Copper 1996, 80, 183). The fact that the KMT still performed remarkably well is proof of Chiang Ching-kuo’s leadership and the party’s mass popular support (Cooper 1996, 80). However, in the mid-80s, the KMT suffered a brief “crisis of confidence” which renewed its commitment to reform. In March of 1986, Chiang appointed a special task force within a newer and young-er Central Standing Committee to design a plan that would “implement the KMT’s goal of constitutional democracy” (Clark 2000, 27-28). He ordered the task force to study mar-tial law, the ban on the formation of new parties, aging in the National assembly, and ways to improve lo-cal government (Copper 1996, 228). The “centrist path” ensured that the KMT could set the parameters for change and increase popular sup-port with its nonviolence. Chiang’s use of the constitution to determine

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succession furthered popular support by showing the extreme conserva-tives as unconstitutionally plotting for his seat. In the end, Chiang’s skill-ful political maneuvering could not maintain the balance of a liberalized autocracy for the KMT, and a deci-sion needed to be made.

Failure of Liberalization

According to Huntington, liberal reformers retain power only briefly, since they are caught between the desire to change and to preserve, and “a liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington 1991, 134-137). Chiang’s actions reflected that of a dying man, who in his last years orchestrated a num-ber of reforms which seemingly decreased the KMT’s monopoly but overall ensured that his succes-sor could carry on the democratiza-tion process without accidentally losing the party’s legitimacy and power. The Central Standing Com-mittee’s special task force proposed that political parties could legally form given that three conditions: 1) to abide by the constitution 2) to renounce communism 3) to deny supporting independence (Copper 1996, 230). The opposition was determined to not be seen “cooperat-ing” with the KMT resulting in the

early, but illegal, formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on September 28, 1986, for as Chu Kao-cheng, the leader of the motion, said “if we are going to be hung for a sheep, we might as well be hung for a cow” (Keating 2006, 74). Chiang could have crushed this illegal party, but he accepted the DPP as a con-testant in the upcoming elections and evaded the potential charges of subversion under martial law by announcing its imminent termina-tion (Huntington 1991, Foreword xi). In reality, Chiang had no alterna-tive option, since blocking the DPP would have sent the wrong signals to all the observers. Consequently, the 1986 National Election was another watershed moment in Taiwan’s history, marking the first two party election in a Chinese nation. Ac-cording to some political observers, this was “proof that the Republic of China had made the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democracy” (Copper 1996, 225). Regardless of whether or not this was the definitive action, the election served to advance the political mod-ernization of both the KMT and the Taiwanese government.

The fact that the KMT still re-mained in power after the elections demonstrated that liberalization of the one-party system would not lead



to its demise. Further proof of the “failure of liberalization” came with the official ending of martial law on July 15, 1987 after nearly four de-cades of emergency rule. With the constitution in full effect, the KMT no longer had authoritarian control to detain democratization. Martial law had affected the legal system, allowed military influence in national politics, and served as a psychological deterrent to democratization (Cop-per 1996, 97). Nonetheless, it is important to remember that political development had occurred before the abolition of martial law, and this was just one of the many steps taken by the KMT to alter the do-mestic and international perceptions of the party and government. With Chiang’s death in 1988, the power passed on to his Vice-President, Lee Teng-hui, a respected and well edu-cated native born Taiwanese who had been groomed for the presiden-cy. Lee “accepted the inevitability of democracy” and rose as the leader of the moderate faction, changing the image and views of the KMT dra-matically and smoothing its path into democracy (Hood 142, Clark 47).

Backward Legitimacy

During a transformation, the reform leaders within the party often experi-ence a “two steps forward, one step

backward” progression as it struggles to counter opposing forces within, often requiring a “concentration of power in the reform chief executive” (Huntington 1991, 137). Lee Teng-hui was officially elected chairman of the party at the KMT’s 13th Party Congress in July 1988, signaling the transfer of power from a native-born Chinese to a native-born Taiwan-ese (Copper 1996, 135-6). Within the party, a triple alliance formed between moderate and conservative forces, with Lee Teng-hui as Presi-dent, Lee Huan as Premier, and Hau Pei-tsun as Chief of General Staff (Leng 1996, 22). The Party Congress also agreed upon new rules and poli-cies which enhanced the overall co-hesiveness of the party and boosted their morale, and this sentiment was carried through the 1989 elections where the DPP did well enough to be considered a win but not a seri-ous challenge to the KMT (Copper 152, 184). However, in early 1990, senior National Assembly members (“Long Parliament”) meeting to elect a new president took the opportunity to increase its own salary and privi-leges, sparking a public protest that served as a “necessary catalyst for Lee’s reforms” (Leng 1996, 27). The resulting National Affairs Confer-ence in 1990 was an “unprecedented forum” between party and opposi-tion elites that “[broke] the gridlock”

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and set a timetable for constitutional reform (Clark 2000, 27-9). Most notable was the decision to remove senior members of the national parliament. 1990 also witnessed the split of the KMT. An anti-Lee, conservative alliance headed by Lee Huan challenged Lee’s legitimacy, but Lee was able to manipulate the conflicts within this mainlander al-liance by exposing them to public attack and utilizing his status as a native Taiwanese to mobilize support (Leng 1996, 24). Although the split diminished the overall size of the party, and aired internal conflicts to the public, Lee was able to then build a much stronger and cohesive party without resorting to violence. Hun-tington claims that during backward legitimacy the party “legitimate[s] the new order because it was a prod-uct of the old, and it retrospectively legitimate[s] the old order because it ha[s] produced the new.” (Hunting-ton 1991, 138) Thus, throughout the various events, the KMT was able to maintain legitimacy by appeal-ing to Sun Yat-sen’s three principles while also setting itself apart as a new, moderate party representing the interests of the Taiwanese.

Coopting the Opposition

Once Lee Teng-hui emerged victo-rious from this period of backward

legitimacy, he worked quickly to begin the final processes of democ-ratization, reaching agreements between all viable groups. More-over, as the reformers increasingly “alienated” the remaining conserva-tives within the KMT, they had to “reinforce themselves by developing support within the opposition and by expanding the political arena” (Huntington 1991, 139). According to John F. Copper, many in Taiwan assumed the superiority of a US modeled two-party system, and the KMT “demanded party competition because it associated it with democ-racy” (Cooper 1996, 369). The rapid strengthening of the opposition in 80s allowed for the growth of a true competitive democracy. While the organized political opposition gained greater status and legitimacy through elections, it is important to remember that these elections, and the formation of the opposi-tion party themselves, were carefully controlled by the KMT. The KMT had the advantage of setting limits on the debate by committing to the ultimate goal without further defin-ing its commitment and by tying the transition to already scheduled events (Chen and Haggard 1992, 16-17). The opposition on the other hand was able to specify alternative transition paths by raising the “cost of doing nothing,” but in reducing



the risk of outpacing public opinion it had to further confine itself within the parameters of the “benign nature of KMT rule and prosperity” (Chen and Haggard 1992, 17).

Once the KMT allowed the opposi-tion into the political arena, it had to take responsibility for the types of permissible negotiation. The Na-tional Affairs Conference in 1990 provided grounds for such nego-tiation over the method to select a president, with the KMT supporting an indirect election and the DPP a direct election (Leng 1996, 29). Al-though Lee Teng-hui submitted to the DPP’s pressure, its willingness to submit served to ally the moder-ates within the KMT with moder-ates at large, furthering its general support base and distinguishing the moderates from the conservative faction. With both the opposition and the public on his side, Lee was able to “buy time” before having to finally decide on the issue of popu-lar elections for the presidency and vice presidency. The 1991 and 1992 National Assembly elections oversaw the “stepping down” of senior mem-bers of the “Long Parliament” and a full election of all members which silenced criticism over its unrepresen-tative, and thus undemocratic, nature (Cooper 1996, 184). Consequently, when Lee faced further challenge

within by Hau Pei-tsun’s unconsti-tutional actions to interfere with the powers of the presidency, Lee could ally with the DPP against a common enemy to force Hau’s resignation and minimalize the remaining conserva-tives (Leng 1996, 31).

The KMT’s 14th Party Congress in 1993 served as a critical moment to match the democratization within the governmental system with the KMT’s own party structure, officially making Taiwan into the “democratic, pluralized society” it had evolved into (Copper 1996, 161). The final transfer of national leadership from the conservatives to the moderates also served as the final consolida-tion of Lee’s power. Constitutional revisions in 1994 provided for both the direct election of the president and the reduction of the premier’s endorsement power, perhaps as a reflection of the factional difficulties Lee had faced with his two premiers (Leng 1996, 32). The ensuing gov-ernor and mayoral elections served as a training ground for the legisla-tive elections of 1995 and presiden-tial elections of 1996. The tense competitive electoral atmosphere fully tested the national democratic system, since the candidates had to campaign at the national level, and it was “bigger and more complicated in many ways than most national elec-

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tions” (Copper 1996, 343). Political democratization had come, and even if it had not always been a linear progression, the skillful reformers within the KMT had always kept it under control, finalizing it with the co-option of the opposition.

Consolidation

In March of 1996, Lee Teng-hui became the first president elected by popular election. Although many felt that this election cemented Taiwan’s track of democratization, others felt that democratization would not be complete until the KMT lost the power of the presidency. Tse Kang-leng makes the distinction between liberalization and democratization with “the latter [as] an ‘institution-alized’ liberalization” (Leng 1996, 19-20). Liberalizations were in-stitutionalized with constitutional reforms. The last major constitu-tional change in 1996 occurred at the National Development Conference, where the powers of the President were increased with a corresponding decrease in the provincial govern-ment (Clark 2000, 31). This also reflected a remarkable confidence by the KMT in both the powers of democracy and the party itself. Sub-sequent elections would demonstrate the strength of the democratic pro-cess, but the KMT’s decades long

monopoly would come to an end in 2000 with the presidential election of Chen Shui-bian from the DPP. The peaceful transition of 2000 and the subsequent 2004 reelection of Chen would prove that democracy had come and Taiwan’s voters were increasingly sophisticated in their approach by focusing on the issues of economy, localization, and respect (Keating 2006, 90). Although the actual transition process for Taiwan’s political transformation occurred within roughly the span of a decade, it would not have been possible to comprehend without looking at its overall political development. The very preconditions that the KMT had set to maintain an authoritar-ian hold over the island ultimately resulted in the liberalization of the party. Following Sun Yat-sen’s ideol-ogy, the KMT’s economic reform led to the modernization of society, sponsoring the many changes which allowed for a democratic transition. When the party realized that the in-evitable could no longer be delayed, it decided that it would preempt the opposition but taking charge of the process. By initiating it from the top, the elites within the party were able to control the process in such a man-ner that renewed its legitimacy and preserved it in a high level of power. As a one-party system, the KMT not only transformed the national



government but also the party by default. Democracy is the antithesis of absolute control, but the KMT ensured that should they one day be voted out of office, as exemplified in 2000, they would have the ability to be voted back in through the very channels they had created for them-selves (Keating 2006, 143). Thus, Taiwan has achieved the minimalist definition of democracy, with free, fair, and competitive elections, vot-ing one party out in favor of another. What lies ahead for this “political miracle” are the societal problems which may serve to break down democracy, but Taiwan may proceed with the assurance that formal de-mocratization, however imperfect, has been achieved.

References

1. Cheng, Tun-jen and Stephan Haggard. “Regime Transformation in Taiwan: Theoreti-cal and Comparative Perspectives.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

2. Clark, Cal. “Major Developments in Tai-wan’s Democratization.” Taiwan and Mainland China: Democratization, Political Participation and Economic Development in the 1990s. Ed. Thomas J. Bellows. New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University, 2000.

3. Copper, John F. The Taiwan Political Miracle: Essays on Political Development, Elec-tions and Foreign Relations. Lanham: UP of America, 1996.

4. Hu, Fu and Yun-Han Chu. “Electoral Competition and Political Democratization.” Political Change in Taiwan. Eds. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

5. Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: De-mocratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: U of OK Press, 1991.

6. “Foreword.” Political Change in Taiwan. Ed. Tu-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992.

7. Hood, Steven J. The Kuomintang and the Democratization of Taiwan. Boulder: West-view Press, 1997.

8. Keating, Jerome F. Taiwan: The Struggles of a Democracy. Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2006.

9. Leng, Tse-Kang. The Taiwan-China Con-nection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Straits. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.

10. Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. Democracy and Development: Political Institu-tions and Well-Being in the World, 1950- 1990. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.

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Jiakun (Jack) Zhang

Introduction

In 1979, monumental US policy changes were made in East Asia that would shape the future of the region for decades to come. In January of that year, President Carter officially established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, bringing about a normalization of US-China relations that began with Nixon’s policy of rapprochement. Only a few months later, Congress would pass the Taiwan Relations Act, which would unofficially establish US-Taiwan diplomatic and security

agreements in almost contradictory terms to the normalization agree-ment. The unresolved status of Tai-wan created by the US-China nor-malization, coupled with the Taiwan Relations Act, left the triangulated relations between the US, China, and Taiwan as a potentially vola-tile source of international conflict. The events of these short months illustrate what James M. Lindsay describes as a “pendulum of power” swinging between the Legislative and Executive branches of the United States government (Lindsay 2008).

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang is a junior at Duke University majoring in Political Science.

Abstract: This paper examines the shift of control over US-China relations away from the Executive branch towards the Legislative branch during the Carter Administration as signified by the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. Conditions of low threat, an absence of domes-tic consensus, a high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, and the bipartisan nature of the issue allowed Congress to be active and pass the TRA with an overwhelming majority. From the perspective of domestic politics, The TRA represented the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy. By holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Executive objections, and requiring Executive decisions to be approved by Congress, Congress ef-fectively checked Presidential power and subjected future Presidential decisions to the Congressio-nal power of the purse. From the perspective of foreign policy, by officially establishing diplomatic relations with China and simultaneously establishing unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States was able to maintain the status quo of Taiwan independence and deny China the concessions it desired.


While foreign policy traditionally rests under the control of the Ex-ecutive, Congress acted to actively challenge the Carter administration’s weak China policy. The process of drafting the Taiwan Relations Act and language of the legislation rep-resent the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy by holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Execu-tive objections, requiring Executive decisions be approved by Congress and thereby checking presidential power through oversight, and sub-jecting future Executive decisions to the Congressional power of the purse. It was able to do so due to the relatively low threat level, the rela-tively high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, the lack of do-mestic consensus within the Execu-tive branch, and the bipartisan na-ture of the issue.

The Decline of Executive Power Relative to Congressional Power

The Nixon administration initiated a process of giving the Executive branch exclusive control of rap-prochement with China. Due to both the politically sensitive nature of a strategic realignment with China and its importance to national security, Nixon’s administration acted with

great secrecy while slowly preparing the domestic ground for the unveiling of rapprochement (Garrison 2005, 34). The important foreign policy decision to adhere to the One China Policy was made unilaterally through the Shanghai Communiqué without consultation of Congress. The early negotiations and initial trips to China were a secret to all but Nixon and his top aides in order to circumvent Congressional opposition. When he finally announced rapprochement officially, he did so by dramatically framing his China policy as part of “the structure for peace” and using media coverage to boost domestic support (Garrison 2005, 36). The Nixon administration commanded a high degree of power relative to Congress; rapprochement with China proved highly popular with the American public and his China policy received little Legislative op-position. In spite of the success of rapprochement, the subsequent nor-malization would “directly impinge on Taiwan’s interests (and thus mem-bers of the Taiwan lobby and their sympathizers in Congress)” (Gar-rison 2005, 38). With the death of Mao and Zhou Enlai in China and the Watergate scandal in the United States, normalization was stalled. Nevertheless, diplomatic exchanges with China increased during the Ford administration, even as the Taiwan

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang


lobby stepped up its efforts to under-mine normalization.

Thus, the Carter administration inherited the White House in the midst of a complex China policy, under conditions of growing do-mestic opposition and declining Presidential power, and was only further weakened by Carter’s adop-tion of an open advisory structure in place of the hierarchical Execu-tive structure of the Nixon admin-istration. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski held different policy agendas and beliefs about the possibilities of when and how nor-malization should be approached (Garrison 2005, 48). Though Carter supported the One China Policy, “normalization was not a top priority for [Carter]. In these circumstances the policy issue was open to differing interpretations. What began as a col-legial advisory system devolved into a classic case of bureaucratic politics, as policy discussions turned into a big turf war” (Garrison 2005, 49). Carter’s open advisory system made competing policy priorities much more open than they had been in the Nixon administration, making room for Congressional challenges to Ex-ecutive power. The Chinese favored Brzezinski over Vance, and Brzezins-ki was able to push for normalization

vigorously by framing his China pol-icy in anti-Soviet terms. When Deng Xiao Ping showed interest in cutting a deal with the U.S. over Taiwan, the Carter administration was ready to officially recognize China and an-nounced on December 15, 1978 that the United States and China would begin reciprocal recognition on Janu-ary 1, 1979. The process of normal-ization, specifically the unresolved status of Taiwan, would subsequently allow the exertion of Congressio-nal power in foreign policy with the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. It would be Congressional rather than Presidential power that would define US-China relations for years to come.

The Expansion of Congressional Powers

In the aftermath of the Normaliza-tion Communiqué, Congress effec-tively outmaneuvered the President to wrest control of US-Taiwan-China relations from the Executive and set the tone for these relations for decades to come. Congress had already begun to actively exercise its power before Carter took office. The amendment to the International Security Assistance Authorization Act of 1978 represents a clear ex-ample of the use of Congressional oversight to check Presidential power



by requiring the President to seek “prior consultation” on “any pro-posed policy changes affecting the continuation in force” of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan (Javits 1981, 55). Congress attempted to limit the ability of the President to unilaterally negotiate any agree-ments with the Chinese government over the fate of Taiwan. Aware of the potential for domestic challenge to his China policy, Brzezinski ad-vised Carter to emulate Nixon and negotiate secretly and decisively with China in 1978 in a sudden push for normalization (Garrison 2005, 59). Their announcement of normaliza-tion took the public and Congress by surprise.

Unfortunately for Carter, the an-nouncement for normalization did not inspire the same degree of popularity as Nixon’s dramatic visit to China, and in fact his secret ne-gotiations were perceived as an act of cowardice by the American pub-lic. Carter, wanting to adhere to the terms negotiated with China while responding to domestic criticism that he was abandoning Taiwan, introduced the Taiwan Enabling Act, which sought to create informal exchange structures with Taiwan but made no provisions for future secu-rity arrangements (Garrison 2005, 59). Carter wanted simply to reassure

Congress that China would not be given a free hand to attack Taiwan in the foreseeable future. Thus he was initially happy to allow Congress to strengthen his proposed bill, feeling that China would have fewer objec-tions if the Legislative Branch rather than the Executive Branch dealt with U.S. security relations with Taiwan.Congress used this opportunity to project its power in this important foreign policy matter, and subse-quently held hearings that gave a wide range of China specialists, businessmen, military officers, and government representatives opportu-nities to criticize and amend the bill. These hearings allowed Congress to frame public opinion to favor the Legislative rather than the Execu-tive agenda. Congress effectively made the bill its own, changing its name to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and significantly strengthen-ing US relations with Taiwan, ignor-ing Executive worries that China may be angered by elements of the bill that appeared to contradict the agreement originally negotiated. It also extended direct support by visit-ing Taiwan over the objections of the State Department (Tucker 1994, 153). However, even more effective than this gesture of defiance towards Executive authority, Congress put its power of legislation to use in the pas-sage of the TRA to check the power

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of the Executive Branch. The opera-tive words they used were clear and contradicted the thrust of the Execu-tive branch’s draft (Bush 2004, 153). Congress established the American Institute of Taiwan (AIT) and cre-ated oversight for AIT’s operations. The TRA set forth a security policy that essentially renewed the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty of Taiwan by allowing the US to maintain capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopar-dize the security, or the social or eco-nomic system, of the people of Tai-wan” and “directed” the President to report to Congress “promptly” if such a threat was to arise (Bush 2004, 154). Furthermore, it establishes that Congress—not the President—would “in accordance with constitutional processes” determine the appropriate US response. With regard to arms sales in particular, the TRA repre-sents a clear effort of Congress to assert itself in an area traditionally dominated by the Executive Branch. The TRA made provisions for con-tinued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan by stating that the U.S. would “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such a quantity as may be necessary to en-able Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability” (Bush 2004, 157). According to Richard C. Bush, the wording of the legislation was

originally designed to “constrain the flexibility of the Executive Branch” with many members of Congress de-siring to “state explicitly that the U.S. should supply to Taiwan” and “give Congress a voice in determining Tai-wan’s defensive arms needs earlier in the decision-making process” (Bush 2004, 158). By creating the mecha-nism for Executive oversight, Con-gress also made it easier to exercise its power of the purse on future arms sales with Taiwan, further improving its relative power to the Executive Branch on this foreign policy issue. With these provisions Congress not only set the tone for US-Taiwan for years to come, but also put the mat-ter in Congressional, rather than Executive, control. As a participant in the Congressional deliberations that led to the Taiwan Relations Act, the late Senator Jacob Javits recalled that the passage of the TRA demon-strated, “the central role of Congress in foreign policy” (Javits 1981, 55).

Why Congress acted – the competitive Congress

The political conditions during Cart-er’s administration largely favored Legislative action according to the theories of Congressional behavior. President Carter entered office at a time when the pendulum of power



described by Lindsay was swinging away from the Executive branch and towards the Legislative. Carter’s decision to normalize relations with China occurred in an era of “com-petitive congress” that was “both active and assertive in foreign policy and thus quite willing to challenge a president’s lead,” according to Hast-edt. As Arthur Schlesinger observed in The Imperial Presidency, the Nixon administration reached the highest degree of Executive power, and with the ruin of the Nixon ad-ministration in Watergate, Congress had begun to reassert its own foreign policy power. The news of President Carter’s decision to diplomatically recognize China hit Congress on December 15 like a bombshell. Con-gress was shocked that its “efforts to curb the ‘imperial presidency’ and reassert constitutional checks and balances between Legislative and Executive branches, upset during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, had failed” (Tucker 1994, 135). Congress was therefore eager to renew its ef-forts to check Presidential power, especially in the arena of his China policy.

The vagueness of the Communi-qué regarding the form of future U.S.-Taiwan relations allowed room for Congressional influence. The Normalization Communiqué negoti-

ated by the Carter administration definitively established US-China relations. But it was ambiguous re-garding the status of Taiwan: though it reaffirmed the One-China Policy established by the Shanghai Com-muniqué, it also promised that “the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official representation and without government diplomatic relations” (Javits 1981, 55). The late Senator Javits recalled:

Neither on the manner and timing of the decision nor on the substance of the understandings reached had there been effective consultation. Thus, the situation contained the seeds of possible serious differences between the Congress and the Exec-utive, and the possibility of the U.S. government as a whole not being able to arrive at a coherent ultimate position that would deal with all the elements of the problem…It became very clear quickly that although President Carter was serious about maintaining “extensive, close, and friendly relations” with Taiwan, his Administration had given very little thought to the shape and substance of our future relations and to the legal framework necessary to carry it out. For most of us in Congress, therefore, the acceptability of the ar-

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang


rangements worked out with Beijing depended upon the establishment of a viable basis for our future relations with Taipei (Javits 1981, 56).

Reading between the lines of Javits’ statement, it becomes apparent that Congress saw the ambiguity of fu-ture relations with Taiwan as an opportunity to reverse some elements of Carter’s agreement with China that ran contrary to Congressional interests.

In accordance to theories of Con-gressional behavior, several impor-tant domestic factors at the time of normalization can be identified as central conditions for the Congres-sional challenge to the President’s lead on foreign policy. First, public attention was directed at the Taiwan issue by a powerful Taiwan Lobby. When normalization grew increas-ingly likely, the Nationalist govern-ment of Taiwan stepped up its lob-bying efforts in the United States. In 1977, for example, the Nationalist government paid for twelve residents from the President’s hometown to tour Taiwan so that they could “re-mind Carter of the friendly people and wealthy ally he was abandoning” (Tucker 1994, 133). These campaigns were effective in elevating American public opinion in favor of Taiwan. A February 1979 poll showed that 60

percent of Americans rated Taiwan favorably, while only 30 percent rated the PRC favorably (Garrison 2005, 62). In a climate of public support for Taiwan, Congress was embold-ened to become more involved on this issue. Second, there was a lack of domestic consensus amongst the experts and within the Executive Branch regarding the importance of Taiwan’s security. Brzezinski and his camp were labeled “China Zi-onists” because they saw China as strategically necessary to balance an increasingly threatening Soviet Union. Vance and his supporters, however, did not see the severity of the Soviet threat and instead consid-ered China an obstacle to improving U.S. relations with the Soviet Union (Garrison 2005, 62). There was also significant domestic disagreement regarding whether the strategic im-portance of China was worth losing Taiwan as an ally. Finally, no domes-tic consensus could be reached as to the likelihood of mainland invasion of Taiwan in case the U.S. did step aside. In the absence of domestic consensus, normalization with China faced challenges from a Congress that was more attentive to the do-mestic support for Taiwan than the strategic importance of China.

Third, as there was relatively low threat in the climate of detente with



the Soviet Union, normalization with China was not seen as a pressing national security issue. Despite the Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa, the U.S.-Soviet detente would hold for another year. The threat of Soviet aggression would be perceived as low until its Invasion of Afghanistan in December. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of normalization, Carter could not effectively utilize national security to justify his China policy.Finally, the opposition to Carter’s China policy was bipartisan. Though partisanship could have divided Con-gress on other issues, on this issue it stood unified against the President. Both Democrats and Republicans in Congress were outraged that the President did not seek Congressio-nal approval to abrogate the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan (Garrison 2005, 62). Conservatives especially and some moderates openly criti-cized the President’s failure to con-sult with Congress. Barry Goldwater and other conservative Senators even challenged the President in the courts on these grounds but the courts up-held that the President did not need Congressional approval to abrogate the treaty. These four factors spurred Congress to challenge the admin-istration’s agreement with the PRC by passing the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on March 13, 1979, with a 90 to 6 Senate vote and a House vote of

345 to 55 (Garrison 2005, 62).

Conclusion

The Congressional response to Presi-dent Carter’s decision to normalize relations with China through the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 rep-resented a swing of the pendulum of power away from the Executive towards the Legislative. In the af-termath of the Nixon administra-tion and the expansion of Executive power, Congress responded deci-sively to the weaknesses of the Carter Administration’s China policy and reasserted its own power in formu-lating foreign policy. Conditions of low threat, an absence of domestic consensus, a high degree of public opinion in favor of Taiwan, and the bipartisan nature of the issue allowed Congress to be active and pass the TRA with an overwhelming majority. The TRA represented the exercise of Congressional power to influence foreign policy. By holding hearings and framing public opinion, visiting Taiwan over Executive objections, and requiring Executive decisions to be approved by Congress, Congress effectively checked Presidential pow-er and subjected future Presidential decisions to the Congressional power of the purse. The conditions under which Congress acted, as well as the actions it took, are all in line with

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the theory of the competitive con-gress established by Hastedt (Hastedt 2009).

As Roy noted, “the TRA makes it possible for [US] agreements with Taiwan, which had been agreements with a sovereign government, to continue in effect even though we no longer recognized Taiwan as a sov-ereign government. The TRA also provided for a special US office in Taiwan that would be staffed by US government employees who had offi-cially left their government positions. The American Institute in Taiwan is thus an unofficial organization, even though it is, in effect, a surrogate embassy there. This agreement was a subterfuge, but it is an open subter-fuge designed to be consistent with the principle of unofficially dealing with Taiwan” (Stapleton 2003, 113). A new era of East Asian security, marked by the triangulated relation-ship between the United States, Chi-na, and Taiwan, began in 1978. By officially establishing diplomatic rela-tions with China and simultaneously establishing unofficial diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the United States was able to maintain the sta-tus quo of Taiwan independence and deny China the concessions it desired. However, as an unpleasant consequence of the US “subterfuge”, tension and mistrust remain between

the US and China over Taiwan to this day.

References

1. Bush, Richard C., At cross purposes : US.-Taiwan relations since 1942. Armonk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c2004.

2. Hastedt, Glenn P. “Congress and Foreign Policy”. American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future Seventh Edition. Pearson Educa-tion, 2009

3. Lindsay, James M., “The Shifting Pendulum of Power: Executive-Legislative Relations on American Policy” Domestic Sources of Ameri-can Foreign Policy: Insights & Evidence. Row-man & Littlefield Publishers,2008.

4. Javits, Jacob K. “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), pp. 54-62

5. Stapleton, Roy, J. “Opportunities and Chal-lenges for U.S.-China Relations” US Taiwan Relaions in the Twenty-first century, ed. Chris-topher Marsh and June T. Dreyer, Lexington Books, 2003.

6. Tucker, Nancy B., Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994



A Million Voices Against Corruption: The Anti-Corruption

Movement in TaiwanHsuan Li

Introduction

Movements throughout the ages and around the world have been subject to the studies of sociologists who wish to find a coherent explanation of how movements form, expand, continue or decline. But as soci-ologists have come to comprehend, social movements are so complex that it is not possible to confine each movement to a certain set of process-es and reasoning. In my reflection of the 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement of Taiwan, I realized that for this specific case, a synthesis of resource mobilization and political process theory was useful for understanding what had happened and why. But those were not the only important

theories involved; as Nick Crossley very astutely asserts, “some social movements can be explained with the resource mobilization theory, but cannot be fully understood without considering the cultural side of the analysis”. He goes on to say, “without grievances of the public and tension between the larger society and rul-ing class, even a well-resourced and networked organization would not be able to mobilize” (Crossley 2002, 102). That was very true of the anti-corruption movement. With the con-cepts above in mind, I will attempt to explain the formation and decline of the movement known as ‘A Mil-lion Voices Against Corruption,’ and my experience as a social protester in high school.

Hsuan Li is a junior at the University of Pittsburgh. She is an international student from Tai-wan majoring in political science.

Abstract: ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ arose out of a synthesis of political and cul-tural opportunities with resource mobilization. This essay examines the significance of various factors that create and shape social movements through a brief study of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’, the most stirring and audacious phase of the 2006 Anti-Corruption Movement in Taiwan. Though this movement occurred in a particular Taiwanese historical and cultural context, I believe its analysis can offer general insight into how and why social movements in other locales come to be, and how they reflect and impact society.


Political and Cultural Oppor-tunities

Collective Grievances

“Grievances may do little to explain the timing of a movement’s emer-gence, but without a grasp upon these grievances we would find it very difficult to make any sense of what the movement was attempt-ing to do or of the moral nature of their actions” (Crossley 2002, 84). The political climate in 2006 was particularly auspicious for mass mobilization in terms of both politi-cal context and public grievances. Principally, the country underwent a surge in crime and unemployment rates starting from the late 1990s after the Asian Financial Crisis; this was difficult for a society that had experienced decades of wealth and social stability. Moreover, the nation’s pro-independence president was constantly infuriating the People’s Republic of China across the strait and antagonizing the United States (Taiwan’s biggest ally) in the process. The Administration’s anti-China policies not only hurt the economy but caused widespread unease as well, for it is widely acknowledged that China has a legion of missiles aimed directly at the island of over twenty million people. Finally, it was six years into Taiwan’s success-

ful party rotation during which the Democratic Progressive Party (pro-independence) seized the presidency from the Kuomintang Party, ending the latter’s five-decade reign. The Kuomintang (KMT), or Chinese Na-tionalist Party, which had relocated from China after losing to Mao Ze-dong’s communist regime, had long been seen by the native Taiwanese as a corrupt party of non-native elites with roots in China. In contrast, the native party, the Democratic Progres-sive Party (DPP) vowed to rid Taiwan of decades of corruption and bring power to the people. To demonstrate its commitment, in 2000 the party established an anti-corruption inves-tigation unit in the government (Free-dom House 2008). Thus, the exposés of corruption committed by those in the chief executive household, in addition to discoveries of widespread corruption in the DPP itself, disil-lusioned and angered the Taiwanese public, driving them to become open to mobilization.

Political Context

2006 marked the nineteenth anniver-sary of the abolition of martial law in the Republic of China (Taiwan). Taiwan experienced nearly forty years of strict adherence to martial law from 1949 to 1987; throughout that period, “residents of Taiwan



were not permitted to organize, as-semble or march publicly in support of social causes that were not offi-cially endorsed by the ROC govern-ment.” In Hsiao’s words, “the lifting of martial law and the establishment of the DPP… gave popular forces a great opportunity to influence the legislature and the people’s repre-sentative”; it also “legitimized and legalized” street protests by the revi-sion of the Civic Organization Law (Hsiao 2001, 169). This fostered a good environment for social mobi-lization efforts, for the public now had open and legalized access to the government. The absence of repres-sion ushered in two decades of social change prior to the 2006 anti-cor-ruption campaign.

Tactical Lessons from Precedents

Since the early 1980s, Taiwan has experienced waves of social welfare movements which all had moderate to high degrees of success. Three waves of social movements brought issues ranging from disabled persons rights to child prostitution to the foreground and concluded with the maintenance of newly established programs and centers operated by movement organizations and the government (Hsiao 1996). How did they achieve these results? All forms

of lobbying, petitioning, fundraising were used, but the most conspicu-ous symbol of public support were the staged street protests, including street marches and sit-ins that existed in every successful case — these acts ensured media attention and sym-pathy that transgressed to the public via television and newspaper. This certainly served as precedents to the biggest street protest Taiwan would see in 2006.

Resource Mobilization

Leadership and Elite Support

According to James Jasper, leaders serve both as the symbols of orga-nizations and movements, which means in each case the public looks to them to get a grasp of a move-ment’s intentions, power, tactics — and to a great extent — legitimacy (Jasper 2007, 91). The movement entrepreneur at the center of ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ campaign was Shih Min-Teh, who was the former chairman of the DPP and a long-time political dissident. With his credentials as a champion of democracy, he was able to gar-ner supporters from constituents of both parties, but especially the KMT party supporters and middle-of-the-road voters who had shifted towards the KMT during Chen’s increasingly

Hsuan Li



disappointing presidency. As to the elite, many KMT party members could not publicly endorse him with respect to party alliance, but some maverick legislators went as far as to publicly support and participate in the protests. Shih caused uproar within his own DPP party; the party split was between those who wished to show solidarity with the president and those who were ready to disown Chen. I think elite support was fun-damentally essential to the organiza-tion’s mobilization efforts. Unlike the Civil Rights Movement in America, which relied heavily on the orga-nization and networks of the black churches, ‘A Million Voices Against Corruption’ lacked a default sup-port system for mobilization (Morris 1984). Thus the movement wel-comed prominent politicians and ce-lebrities to partake in the sit-ins and speak on its behalf to increasingly solicit the public to join the protests. Overall, Shih and his movement ben-efited from good elite backing, even if some of it was clandestine.

Mass Mobilization and the Zealous Media

Not only do movement organizations frame issues, but the mass media also plays an active role, often distort-ing the messages of movements in the process. In the ‘Million Voices

Against Corruption,’ the movement’s message was simple enough that it was hard to misrepresent it. Regard-less of Shih’s motives for deposing the president, the movement’s aim was uniformly transmitted to the public as an anti-corruption cam-paign with the ultimate goal of over-throwing Chen. However, because “media organizations have their own interests and routines that influ-ence their coverage,” there was still a discrepancy in the collective action frames of the movement and the media (Staggenborg 2008, 39). For instance, the media began to portray the movement as a party battle be-tween the constituents of the DPP and the KMT. This was a frame that the movement neither crafted nor endorsed; nevertheless, it became the main focus of the media, and thus a major focus of the people (Zu 2006). Moreover, some critics com-plain that other news was given, if any, lukewarm attention — even the incident regarding a policeman who had died of exhaustion from greatly overextended on-duty hours due to the protests (Wu 2006). Viewers also became tired of the subject, a result of watching broadcasts of similar protest scenarios week after week on television. I think it is plausible that these issues, to an extent, contributed to the premature end of the move-ment.


Despite these shortcomings, the movement would never have taken off without the help of the media; its initial success was made possible by media attention (Smith and Fetner 2007). talk about the need of orga-nizing effort to channel a sustained flow of resources and energy into the movement; the campaign headquar-ters did just that, while the media served as the most effective form of promotion that Shih knew it would be. On August 12, 2006, Shih held a press conference in Taipei announc-ing his intentions and the establish-ment of the ‘Million Voices Against Chen Campaign.’ He pleaded for every citizen to each donate 100 NTD to the cause, a mere equiva-lent of 3 USD; the goal was to ac-cumulate a hundred million NTD to symbolize the support of a hundred million people. Within ten days, the movement headquarters halted the collection: the combined sum in the three bank accounts that accepted the donations far exceeded the asked amount (Hwang 2008).Most adherents to the anti-corrup-tion movement became constituents, simply because it was virtually ef-fortless to become one. People were not required to make donations; and physical participation involved going to scheduled sit-ins or marches that were announced on television. More-over, the sit-ins appealed to people,

whether they were KMT sympathiz-ers, opposed to Chen, or opposed to corruption in general. Oliver ex-plains ‘…how events are understood (as successful or not, as promising, as fun) influences whether they are likely to be repeated” (Jasper 2007, 95). And the demonstrations were indeed perceived as fun and low-risk by the viewers, as they flocked to the scenes in red to join the protest-ers. Live broadcasts overlooked the sea of red supporters as they sang movement songs led by celebrity musicians, and enjoyed free food and drinks, courtesy of the enthusiastic movement supporters. The success of the sympathetic media brought out crowds that filled the seats, curbs, and pavilions at all times of the day: the housewives and the elderly who sat-in during the daytime, and stu-dents and workers who arrived in the evening to join the social event.The goal of the movement could not be reached: Chen simply refused to step down. This was clear by mid-October when the campaign came to an abrupt halt after two months of rigorous protests. The movement’s lack of a steady default mobiliza-tion base and inability to convince all sectors of society that deposing Chen was both “urgent and subject to change” was central to the failure (NOW News 2006; Jasper 2007, 29). The corporate community had re-

Hsuan Li



fused to participate in the proposed work strike; the majority of the public refused to disrupt the inter-national airport as the Red Shirts in Thailand’s protest against had done; the legislators refused to support the impeachment of Chen and the DPP legislators that refused to sup-port the government. But those were only external factors. There were internal questions of how the $111 million that the campaign collected was spent and conflict within the leadership that separated Shih and the key Red Shirts at the campaign headquarters.

Outcomes

Despite the inability of the move-ment to unify both supporters of the DPP and KMT to rally against Chen for a prolonged period of time with fresh tactics and successful develop-ments towards the movement’s goals, the campaign has, in effect, incited a new wave of anti-corruption activity. In 2008, the DPP lost footing both in the legislative elections and the presi-dency; KMT won by a landslide, and is currently under the same degree of scrutiny by the opposition and the media (and thus the public). Chen and his family were indicted for all their corruption crimes, and have been on trial since; his wife, son and other members of his family have

pleaded guilty to embezzlement and fraud. In the years subsequent to the movement, Taiwan has elevated its government transparency and ac-countability, perhaps owing much to the awareness and mass-scale ani-mosity towards corruption that the movement aroused within the people.

Conclusion

‘A Million Voices Against Corrup-tion’ was a culmination of political and cultural opportunities that were shaped into a force of social change, made possible by the leadership of prominent political figures and their organization of all the resources that became available to them once the plea was made for caring citizens to take to the streets. Mass mobilization would not have been possible with-out the degree of public resentment, which included much of the elite, geared towards the government and especially the president; underscoring the significance of political and cul-tural opportunities and its synthesis with resource mobilization in social movement theory.

References

1. Crossley, N., 2002. Making Sense of Social Movements. Buckingham: Open University Press.

2. Freedom House, 2008. Freedom in the World – Taiwan, [Internet], 2 July. Available


from:http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,CHN,,487ca262c,0.html [Ac-cessed 21 Mar 2009].

3. Hsiao, H.H., 1996. Social Movements and Civil Society in Taiwan. In: The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. Available: http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/society/edown/chart/chart-3.htm [Accessed 19 Mar 2009].

4. Hsiao, H.H., 2001. Taiwan’s Social Welfare Movement Since the 1980s. In: Aspalter, C., ed.Understanding Modern Taiwan: Essays in Economics, Politics, and Social Policy. Burling-ton, VT: Ashgate, 169-204.

5. Hwang, Y., 2008. A Resistance? The Anti-Corruption Movement in 2006 in Taiwan. Available from:http://www.al-lacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_re-search_citation/2/6/7/4/9/p267496_index.html[Accessed 18 Mar 2009].

6. Jasper, J.M., 2007. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements. In: Klan-dermans, B. and Roggeband, C., ed. Hand-book of Social Movements Across Disciplines. New York: Springer, 59-110.

7. Morris, A.D., 1984. The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organi-zation for Change. New York: The Free Press.

8. NOWnews, 2006. . NOWnews, [Internet],

15 Sept. Available from: http://www.nownews.com/2006/09/15/185-1991634.htm[Accessed 21 Apr 2009].

9. Smith, J. and Fetner, T., 2007. Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Move-ments. In: Klandermans, B. and Roggeband, C., ed. Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines. New York: Springer, 13-57.

10. Staggenborg, S., 2008. Social Movements.

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

11. Wu, Z.P., 2006. Liberty Times, [Internet], 4 Oct. Available from:http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/oct/4/today-o1.htm [Accessed 29 Mar 2009].

12. Zhou, J.W., 2006. Liberty Times, [Internet], 18 Sept. Available at:http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2006/new/sep/18/today-fo10.htm [Accessed 29 Mar 2009].

Hsuan Li



Jiakun (Jack) Zhang

I. Introduction

The Taiwan Strait is one of the few places in the world where the United States may be drawn into an armed conflict with an existing nuclear power. Though it is in the U.S. na-tional interest to reduce the possibil-ity of armed conflict with China and thereby reduce the risk nuclear es-calation, U.S. foreign policy regard-ing Taiwan will not yield stability in the Taiwan Strait in the long term. Since the abrogation of the formal defense treaty between the United States and Taiwan, the U.S. has con-tinued to sell arms to Taiwan under the guidance of the Taiwan Rela-

tions Act (TRA), an act that serves as a de facto defense treaty (Austin 2002, 35) U.S. arms sales to Taiwan play a defining role in this post-1979 defense agreement. Section 2 of the TRA requires that the United States provide Taiwan with the necessary defense assistance to maintain Tai-wan’s self-defense capability (Bush 2004, 155). The People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s dissatisfaction with the terms of the TRA spurred the Reagan administration to issue the 1982 Joint Communiqué which reas-sured that:

The United States Government states that it will not seek to carry out a long term policy of arms

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang is a junior at Duke University majoring in Political Science.

Abstract: Despite the increasing level of interdependence between the United States and Chi-na over the past two decades, the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan continues to be a contentious issue in Sino-American relations. This paper urges the U.S. to abandon its policy of arms sales to Taiwan because arms sales create a destabilizing arms race with China, embolden the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment, and create incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties. I first outline the strategic aims of U.S. and China in the Taiwan Strait and the potential areas where these aims may conflict. Next, I elaborate upon the consequences of U.S. arms sales to American foreign policy. Finally, I argue for the abandonment of regular arms sales to Taiwan as part of a comprehensive East Asian diplomatic strategy and discuss the implications of this policy reversal.


sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of dip-lomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution (Marsh 2004, 120).

Despite the reassurances of the Joint Communiqué, U.S. presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush have greatly elevated, rather than reduced U.S. arms sales to Tai-wan. McClaran reflects, “The con-tradictions between the TRA and the Joint Communiqué have thus been revealed as a major source of PRC ire toward the U.S…[placing] the U.S. squarely in the middle of what the PRC leadership believes is an un-settled issue of civil war” (McClaran 2000). With the growing cooperation and exchange between Taiwan and mainland China, the time is ripe for the United States to reverse its prob-lematic policy of arms sales to Tai-wan. The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan escalate an arms race with China, entraps the United States in Taiwan’s defense, and creates the in-centive for Taiwan to shirk its defense responsibilities. Reversing the policy of arms sales would ameliorate many

of these negative consequences while not compromising U.S. strategic aims in East Asia.

II. U.S. Aims and the Policy of Arm Sales

The United States has adopted the policy of arms sales to Taiwan, as part of its China strategy, to achieve three major strategic objectives in the Taiwan Strait. Deterrence Theory guides the policy of arms sales to Taiwan. The United States is a na-tion of credible military capabili-ties that has clearly communicated its willingness to use force to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan” (Bush 2004, 155). Specifically by committing to Taiwan’s defense, the United States practices deterrence by denial, elevating the cost of action so much as to deter China from seizing Taiwan by military force.

Most specifically, U.S. seeks to deter China from attempting to reunify Taiwan by military force. The U.S. has maintained a steady resolve over the past fifty years that it will not tolerate the forceful reunification of Taiwan. By providing Taiwan with modern weapons, the U.S. effectively raises the cost of attack by China

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang



and makes it less likely that they will be able to accomplish their goals.

More broadly, the United States wishes to protect the democratic in-stitutions and the free market econ-omy of Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the “Asian Tigers” and is the eighth largest trading partner of the United States (Needham and Tkacik 2006). Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has repealed martial law and democra-tized. Therefore, it is central to U.S. interest to maintain both Taiwan’s economic and political structure.

In addition, the United States seeks to prevent China from becoming a hostile rival in the Pacific. This com-plicates its two other aims in the Tai-wan Strait, however, because while it wishes to protect Taiwan, the U.S. is also dedicated to avoiding war with China, a nuclear power. Thus, the policy of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan becomes a classic case of the security dilemma in the Taiwan Strait. On one hand the U.S. wishes to provide Taiwan with weapons to deter Chi-nese aggression; on the other hand, these efforts are perceived as a U.S. attempt to divide China and result in greater arms buildup in China. The consequence is an even more unstable Taiwan Strait with a greater accumulation of weapons on both sides. The U.S. aim of deterrence

through arms sales therefore produc-es severe consequences and security challenges.

III. China’s Aims and Response to Arm Sales

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) views the U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan as a threat to its na-tional sovereignty and prestige. The PRC perceives U.S. efforts to arm Taiwan as an attempt to undermine China’s sovereignty. From Beijing’s perspective, “Taiwan is the last un-resolved territorial issue (after Hong Kong and Macao) dating back to the pre-communist period of China’s national weakness and territorial dismemberment” (Lampton and Ew-ing 2002, 72). Most Chinese agree that reunification is a central national objective. As such, the Taiwan issue has become a rallying point for Chi-nese nationalism. Thus, “anything that occurs on Taiwan that suggests permanent separation from China and any U.S. policy that could be construed as aimed at this outcome, in essence, becomes a severe security threat to Beijing and what remains of the compact between the regime and its citizens” (Lampton and Ew-ing 2002, 72). Given the domestic consensus on the Taiwan question, the cost of capitulation for the PRC in the event of Taiwanese indepen-


dence would be very high and thus shift the balance of resolve away from the United States. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s asymmetri-cal military modernization program signals of its resolve to risk war with the U.S. over Taiwan. The PLA has invested in submarines, Sovremenny-class destroyers, as well as medium and short range ballistic missiles that are area denial weapons designed to destroy the power of U.S. aircraft carriers (Austin 2002). These weap-ons would effectively raise the costs of deploying a carrier group in the Taiwan Strait and act as area denial deterrence.

Additionally, U.S. arms sales to Tai-wan represent a challenge to China’s sense of national prestige. As China’s economy grows, “Many of Taiwan’s traditional arms suppliers have stopped out of respect for China’s position and the prospects for more lucrative commercial trade with the mainland.” The report continues, “This has effectively isolated the U.S. as a major threat to China’s national prestige and sovereignty, and hence made it the de facto focus of the PLA’s strategic and military modernization effort” (Kan 2009). China’s aims in the Taiwan Strait are reinforced by a greater balance of resolve than those of the United States. China is more committed to

the cause of Taiwan and has demon-strated willingness to use asymmetri-cal warfare. Thus, in the collapse of the “One-China” consensus, the policy of arms sales places Washing-ton uncomfortably in the middle of Beijing and Taipei and may draw the U.S. into an unwanted war with China.

The U.S. policy of arms sales creates a Chinese security paradox parallel-ing the U.S. security paradox. “The PRC’s motivation to push Taiwan onto a path toward unification in-creases in direct proportion to the degree to which Beijing perceived Taipei to be drifting away. To de-ter that drift’s reaching the point of independence, the PRC increased its military projection…this, of course, induced Washington to enhance its own deterrence” by pushing Taiwan to accept more U.S. weapons (Lamp-ton and Ewing 2002, 72).

IV. Consequences of Policy of Arm Sales

In recent years, the United States seems to be caught in a foreign policy dilemma. On one hand it wants to preserve its security agreements with Taiwan while on the other it wants to avoid provoking the PRC. The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan as outlined in the Taiwan Relations Act

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang



(TRA) lies at the crux of its security dilemma. The policy of arms sales produces three major consequences for the U.S. First, it creates a desta-bilizing arms race with China. Sec-ond, it emboldens the Taiwanese to be more aggressive in their foreign policy and may lead to entrapment. Third, it creates incentive for Taiwan to shirk its defensive duties.

The Arms Race Problem

The U.S. policy of arms sales to Taiwan empowers PLA hardlin-ers and creates a destabilizing arms race across the Taiwan Strait. “U.S. arms sales to Taiwan significantly reduce Beijing’s options in dealing with Taipei and greatly increase the prospects of military confrontation. The net effect is that these arms sales have become the single biggest obstacle to establishing fully nor-mal relations between the U.S. and China and narrow the options for both sides to either conflict or coop-erate” (McClaran 2000, 639) The policy of U.S. arms sales reinforce Beijing’s suspicion that separation is Washington’s scarcely concealed agenda (McClaran 2000, 628). This is because U.S. weapons in Taiwan undermine the credibility of China’s threat to use military force in re-sponse to Taiwanese independence. Thus, it induces China to modernize

its military to continue to make cred-ible its threat of military force. This security dilemma gives the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) strong politi-cal influence over the PRC’s Taiwan Policy, allowing hardliners more sway within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Bush 2000, 155). These hardliners have pushed for Chinese military modernization in order to challenge the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese modern-ization in turn provokes the U.S. to approve of even larger arms sales to Taiwan. According to the spiral model of arms races this will increase tensions across the Strait as the build up in arms increases mutual hostil-ity and fear. This nascent arms race, if continued, could lead to greater instability in the Taiwan Strait and lead to war between the U.S. and China.

The Entrapment Problem

While U.S. arms sales to Taiwan may deter the use of military force by China in the short run, it also makes the U.S. vulnerable to entrap-ment in the long run. McClaran writes, “With the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress came within a micron of committing the U.S. to Taiwan’s defense” (McClaran 2000, 628). The role of arms sales in U.S. com-mitment to Taiwan were outlined


when the TRA ensures that the U.S. will provide Taiwan with weapons it deems necessary for “defense”. However, since 1979, a number of Taiwan’s procurements have been more closely allied with U.S. foreign trade prerogatives and lacked cred-ible links to its real military needs (Austin 2002). A major portion of U.S. arms received by Taiwan since 1979 were primarily made to satisfy the influential advocates and benefi-ciaries of the U.S. domestic arms in-dustry and for political gains. From Taiwan’s perspective, this indicated an increased level of U.S. support for its de facto independence. This perceived deepening of U.S. commit-ment to Taiwan’s defense compro-mises U.S. strategic aims in the Tai-wan Strait by creating the problem of entrapment. Arms sales that go beyond Taiwan’s real defense needs may encourage Taiwan to pursue an aggressive foreign policy objective such as independence. In this event, China will be forced to retaliate with military force as it has committed itself to do, and the United States would be drawn into the war due to its defensive commitment to Taiwan. The U.S. came dangerously close to being entrapped by Taiwan when China made its outrage over Chen Shui-bian’s campaign for diplomatic and U.N. recognition of Taiwan known through military exercises.

Chen deviated from his campaigned platform of 2000, in which he pledged the Five No’s (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76), because he per-ceived strong U.S. support in 2001 when President Bush approved the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992. The strong support of Taiwan by the Bush administration was capitalized upon by the Taiwanese president to adopt otherwise overly ambitious for-eign policy objectives with impunity.

The Shirking Problem

The Bush administration entered office with a more pro-Taiwan Policy than any of his predecessors. He sought to reverse the policy of stra-tegic ambiguity in regards to Taiwan and was in favor of “declar[ing] unambiguously that [the U.S.] would come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or a blockade against Taiwan”(Lampton and Ew-ing 2002, 76). The logic was that this would clarify America’s commit-ment to protect Taiwan, decrease the potential for miscalculation by Bei-jing, and reduce Chinese interest in military conflict over Taiwan. Presi-dent Bush significantly reduced U.S. strategic ambiguity by stating that the U.S. will “do whatever it takes” to protect Taiwan (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 75). In 2001, the Bush administration coupled its rhetoric

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang



with action by approving the largest Taiwan arms sale since 1992, a pack-age which included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 ASW aircraft, and 4 Kidd class destroyers (weapon sys-tems designed to offset the Chinese superiority in submarines). Though this may have heavy-handedly achieved its intended goal of reduc-ing Chinese miscalculation, it also created room for Taiwanese politi-cians to shirk in their own defense. In 2001, Taiwan’s defense budget would suffer a reduction from $12.9 billion to $8.0 billion and continue to be reduced to $7.5 billion in 2003. Taking advantage of the guarantee of American support provided by the Bush administration, the Taiwanese legislature sought to shirk defense spending, to the great frustration of U.S. policy makers. In 2004, Richard Lawless, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, made it clear to Chen Chao-min, Taiwan’s vice Defense Minister, that Taiwan “should not view America’s resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for investing the necessary resources in its own defense” (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 75). The Bush administration recog-nized the problem of shirking pro-duced by their arms sales. The fear was that Taiwan would be unwill-ing to adequately provide to its own defense and thus shift the burden of

deterring Chinese aggressing to the United States. In 2004, the rhetoric of the Bush administration reversed almost completely. Assistant Secre-tary of State James Kelly clarified U.S. policy by making it clear that the U.S. “does not support” Taiwan-ese independence, that it would be “irresponsible” to treat the PRC’s statements as “empty threats” and that U.S. efforts to deter the PRC “might fail” if Beijing is convinced that Taiwan is embarking on a course of independence and con-cludes that Taiwan must be stopped (Kan 2009, 40). President Bush had seemingly put a freeze on Taiwan’s arms requests in 2006 and delayed notifying Congress of eight pending arms sales (Kan 2009, 38).

V. Alternative Policy

The policy of U.S. arms sales to Tai-wan generates instability in the long run: sparking an arms race across the Taiwan Strait, while at the same time enabling Taiwan’s shirking of its own defensive responsibilities and making the United States vulnerable to entrapment. Taiwan’s aggres-sive diplomacy may provoke a Chi-nese response and draw the United States into a war that it wishes to avoid. Ceasing annual arms sales with Taiwan would eliminate the consequences of the policy without


necessarily endangering U.S. aims. It would actually create a new op-portunity that may enable the United States to achieve more of its aims in East Asia such as the disarmament of North Korea.

Ceasing regular arms sales does not mean eliminating the U.S. deterrence against a Chinese attempt to unify Taiwan by force. In fact, it should be coupled with a reiteration of U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan if China seeks a military solution. The conventional strength of the U.S. navy serves as a powerful deterrent for China not to invade Taiwan. Additionally, China and Taiwan are making great diplomatic progress through the Three Links, which make Taiwan and China even more interconnected and decrease the risk of armed conflict in the Strait. In other words, China would have no incentive to change the status quo even if the U.S. ceased arms sales to Taiwan because it can more effec-tively entice Taiwan towards reunifi-cation economically. In fact, a reiter-ation of the 1983 Joint Communiqué would be a gesture of goodwill that could enlist Chinese cooperation on tough issues in which it also has a stake, such as North Korea.

Along the same lines, the U.S. aim to preserve the democratic govern-

ment of Taiwan and its free market would not be jeopardized by ending arms sales. Taiwan is now the biggest investor in China, trade across the strait have grown and will continue to grow with the Three Links (Lamp-ton and Ewing 2002, 76). The PRC has stated that it is more than willing to allow Taiwan to maintain its own way of governance as a democracy if it was to become reunified with Chi-na (Lampton and Ewing 2002, 76). It has also made clear that Taiwan would be allowed to keep its own defense force in the event of unifica-tion. Chinese conduct in Hong Kong makes this promise credible. The return of Hong Kong to China has not resulted in the collapse of Hong Kong’s democratic government and economy.

Most importantly, the U.S. objective to avoid the rise of a hostile power in the Pacific will be realized if arms sales to Taiwan end. China’s eco-nomic growth and consequent power cannot be wished or ignored away; they are realities that the United States is living with and will continue to live with. The key for U.S. foreign policy therefore should be to pre-vent China from becoming a hostile power.

Some would see ceasing arms sales to Taiwan as a form of appeasement

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang



for China that will result in Chinese “salami slicing”. These fears are largely unfounded; the reunification with Taiwan will end China’s “Cen-tury of Shame” and most likely force it to address festering internal prob-lems. A military solution to Taiwan is highly unlikely, given the success of China’s diplomatic and economic overtures to Taiwan. Additionally, if the U.S. ends arms sales on the condition that China toughens up its policy towards North Korea, regional allies will be placated. South Korea and Japan’s concern over North Ko-rean nuclear program dwarfs their concern over the security of Taiwan. The overture to end arms sales can be part of a tit-for-tat bargaining strategy with China to enlist its help with the otherwise unsolvable prob-lem of North Korea. If China fails to cooperate, then the U.S. would still have the freedom to resume arms sales in Taiwan. In the spirit of the 1982 communiqué, a halt of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would allow all three U.S. objectives in the Taiwan Strait to be achieved without any of the consequences.

The major obstacle facing arms sale reduction is US domestic politics. The TRA places the issue of arms sales to Taiwan in the jurisdiction of Congress. The Taiwan lobby is a powerful force in Washington and

among its advocates are large U.S. weapons contractors who may be forced to cut production even fur-ther in this state of the economy. In fact it has been clear since the 1980s that “Taiwan does not need more arms form the U.S…. the U.S. must shift its policy from pro-viding arms overtly to a discreet strategy of advice and assistance designed to improve and rational-ize Taiwan’s force structure with its military objectives”(McClaran 2000). Nevertheless the policy of arms sales continued because contractors such as Lockheed Martin and Ray-theon make massive profits from this unique form of trade with Taiwan. Even though the policy of stopping U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation on North Korea is a sound foreign policy, it will face significant opposi-tion in Washington.

VI. Conclusion

Ending U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on the condition of Chinese cooperation with North Korea is consistent with American aims in the region. Arms sales simply are not a sustainable long term policy, impetus for change should come sooner rather than later. The current climate of cooperation between the PRC and Taiwan reduc-es Chinese reliance of military coer-


cion and offers a unique opportunity to end U.S. arms sales at the lowest possible cost internationally. Taiwan’s sagging economy means that the Taiwanese military budget is under pressure domestically and demand for U.S. arms is low. Additionally the belligerence shown by North Ko-rean’s ballistic missile testing means that South Korea and Japan are more eager acquiesce to a deal where ending arms sales to Taiwan would increase Chinese pressure on North Korea. This policy reversal sacrifices none of the major U.S. goals in the Taiwan Strait and eliminates all the unpleasant consequences. The U.S. would avoid escalating the arms race with China and at the same time protect itself from Taiwanese entrap-ment and shirking. The U.S. will be much freer to maneuver diplomati-cally in East Asia as a result and even have the potentially opportunity enlist China’s cooperation in other major objectives such as counter-pro-liferation and counter-terrorism.

References

1. Austin, Kevin Cox, Sr. “U.S. MILITARY ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN: DETER-RENCE OR PROVOCATION”, NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Thesis, 2002.

2. Bush, Richard C., “Scared Texts” of United States –China- Taiwan Relations”. At Cross Purposes- U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942\

3. Lampton, DM and Ewing, RD, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-September 11 World” Nixon Center.

4. Kan, Shirley A, “Taiwan: Major Arms Sales since 1990” Congressional Research Service, 2009

5. Marsh, Christopher and Dreyer, “Appendix 1”, U.S-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century.

6. McClaran, John P, “U.S. Arms Sales to Tai-wan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship” Asia Survey, 2000

Jiakun (Jack) Zhang


Deng Xiaoping’s Dual Reformist Policies and the Ensuing

Legitimacy CrisisSoyoon Sung

Abstract: Post-Mao China experienced unprecedented improvements in economic and social conditions: the standard of living drastically improved and the Chinese people now had open access to foreign markets. The opening of the economy led to the integration of the Chinese economy into global markets, and ushered in the introduction of new cultural and political ideas. Surprisingly, political reforms did not accompany this widespread liberalization of economic policies. This created dissatisfied elite on opposite sides of the spectrum, with conservatives in opposition to the economic liberalization and with intellectuals in opposition to the lack of politi-cal reforms. This led to a legitimacy crisis in that the party-state leadership may not have had the consent of its two most important constituent parties. Without the consent of the governed, the legitimacy of the government deteriorates. Fortunately, the legitimacy crisis did not lead to the deterioration of the Deng regime because, although Deng did not satisfy all the desires of either elite group, he still managed to gain a substantial amount of support.

In an attempt to regain control of the Communist Party, Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution following the disastrous power strug-gles and party infighting that char-acterized the Great Leap Forward. Instead of regaining control, how-ever, the revolution spurred social and political chaos. The decade of horror shattered the Chinese peo-ple’s faith in championed ideology and left them questioning the verity of Marxism. It was this fear of un-predictable change and ideological politics that ultimately provided the basis of legitimacy for the Deng era.

Deng embraced his rise to power by implementing economic reforms that would push China towards global integration and greater economic prosperity. The gradual decline of communist institutions in many eco-nomic areas and the ascendance of market-economy policies, however, did not deter continued party-state domination. This dual policy of encouraging economic reform while preventing political reform nearly precipitated a legitimacy crisis from both the ruling and intellectual elites. Justifying this policy in the eyes of both the ruling political elite and the

Soyoon Sung is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (Interna-tional Relations).


Soyoon Sung

increasingly powerful intellectual elite proved increasingly difficult as interests began to clash and ten-sions began to increase. Nevertheless, Deng’s success in satisfying the inter-ests of most of his constituents led to the institutionalization and ultimate success of his policy reforms.

Economic Reform, Political Stagnation

In the late 1970s when Deng and his allies returned to office, the country was in a state of total political and economic crisis. Politically, major sectors of Chinese society still lived in the shadow of the great terror of Maoist “class struggle” campaigns. Economically, the urban population suffered from declining income and shortages of essentially all kinds of consumer goods. Deng’s program to undo many of the Maoist economic policies and to reopen China to the outside world was inconsistent with Mao’s policies of self-sufficiency and market closure—Deng and the re-formers openly argued that market liberalization and reliance on foreign help were vital to stimulate growth. Under his leadership, the govern-ment extricated itself from a legacy of massive economic problems and began a sustained program of eco-nomic reforms that initiated a period of explosive economic growth, bring-

ing the country out of isolation and into the modern world economy.

The goal of Chinese economic re-form was to generate the surplus needed to finance the modernization of the mainland Chinese economy. Previous attempts to generate this required surplus failed: neither the socialist command economy favored by conservatives nor the Maoist at-tempt at a Great Leap Forward from socialism to communism in agricul-ture succeeded in developing this suf-ficient surplus value. Deng sustained Mao’s legacy to the extent that he emphasized the need to prioritize agricultural output and advocated decentralization of decision mak-ing in the rural economy teams and individual peasant households. How-ever, he deviated considerably from Mao’s policies in opening China to the outside—Deng argued that this measure was necessary to admit the new technology and capital that would spur the development needed to generate the required surplus for the economy. China, he said, was in the primary stage of socialism and the duty of the communist party was to perfect “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This policy, which was essentially a redefinition of many of the terms and theories of Marx-ism to accommodate China’s new open economic system, transitioned


socialism from an economy based on public ownership of means of pro-duction to an economy that allowed for the simultaneous operation of publicly and privately owned enter-prises. To Deng and the reformers, any economic means were accept-able as long as “public ownership” remained dominant. Thus, a variety of market mechanisms flowed into the Chinese economy—these includ-ed quasi-private farming, “special economic zones,” joint ventures and foreign-capital businesses, and mar-ket pricing. The greatest push toward market allocation occurred when local municipalities and provinces were allowed to invest in industries that they considered most profitable. These reforms shifted China’s devel-opment strategy to emphasize light industry and export-led growth (Shen 1993, 412).

The early stages of economic re-form gained wide support around the world for Deng and his allies. The Western world was delighted with China’s introduction of new liberalizing reforms and some ana-lysts even speculated that China had abandoned Marxism altogether. Deng was honored twice as Time Magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1978 and 1985, and even Gor-bachev’s government in the Soviet Union looked to China as a model

of reform (Kluver 1996, 71). This level of support, however, was not experienced at home. Hard-line conservative leaders, many of whom had been displaced by the reform-ers as part of Deng’s reform policy, complained about the intrusion of negative influences from the West, while citizens and intellectuals sought more far-reaching reforms in the political system. To the students and intellectuals, the economic reforms had substance only if they were ac-companied by far-reaching legal and political changes.

The widespread economic reforms were not accompanied by political changes, however. Deng’s movement to “emancipate the mind,” which was launched in the late 1970s, was one of the few political reforms implemented during his regime. The movement encouraged the de-ideol-ogization of public life and opened Chinese society to the outside world by increasing exposure to foreign current events. Many Chinese began to compare their own institutions against those of other nations, espe-cially those of Taiwan. Seeing the freedoms associated with a democra-cy whetted the appetites of Chinese intellectual elites and encouraged them to pursue greater political re-forms within the Deng regime (Ding 1994, 114).



Soyoon Sung

Unfortunately, greater political re-forms were not granted. Those in the mainstream of the post-Mao ruling elite refused to carry out parallel reforms in government and refused to open up the political system in spite of allowing quasi-capitalistic economic reforms. The ruling elite argued that all reforms should be executed under the party commit-tee’s organization and leadership and that the CCP must hold a monopoly over all political power in order to ensure order and stability. While the intellectual elite used horizontal com-parisons between China and other nations to support its arguments for greater political reform, the ruling elite used favorable vertical compari-sons between contemporary China and the past to prove how well com-munist China was performing with-out the political reforms.

Legitimacy Concerns

Having witnessed the failure of the Maoist method, which was to en-hance productivity through class struggle, Deng reinstated experts to former positions to carry out profes-sional activities. After being disillu-sioned by the party’s discriminatory and destructive policies during the Cultural Revolution, intellectuals reemerged as a force and believed that they had a responsibility to the

Chinese people for taking back the rights they had been deprived of by the party-state during the tumultu-ous decade (Ding 1994, 78). With their reform objectives being rejected by the communist leadership time and time again, Chinese intellectu-als increasingly saw themselves as an “independent socio-political force engaged in competition and confron-tation with the ruling Communist party elite” (Shambaugh 1993, 462). This change in perspective regard-ing their own role within Chinese government and society transformed intellectuals from being “repairers” of the existing system to being an-tagonists to the system as a result of the lack of legitimate political means of opposition within the communist system.

The increasing tension that arose between the ruling and intellectual elite was exacerbated by Dengist reforms—while the ruling elite disap-proved of the liberalization of the economy, the intellectual elite pushed for further political reforms to fol-low economic reforms. Because both constituencies were dissatisfied with the Deng regime and posed threats to it, a legitimacy crisis ensued in which consent of the elite was ques-tioned. The primary goal of Deng’s reform policies was surely to receive and maintain the consent of his


constituents as he strove to maintain harmony between economic plural-ism and communist dictatorship. Despite the cries from the intellectual elite for greater political reforms, Deng was left with little choice in his options of creating or pursuing such reforms, hence leading to the adop-tion of a contradictory reform policy. Political restructuring meant abdicat-ing some power and sharing it with others. Abandoning the commitment to “public ownership” was unaccept-able because it would surrender the reason for Communist rule. If this principle were abandoned, the le-gitimating foundation of communist rule would crumble with it—Deng was not ready to abdicate this power. Thus, he pursued a “dual-traffic policy”: anti-Stalinist in economic issues, anti-liberalization in political ones.

In the face of the legitimacy crisis generated both by Mao’s cultural revolutionary policy and the post-Mao reform program, the commu-nist regime under Deng attempted to win support from different political and social groups by making various appeals to them. Instead of garner-ing support, however, these appeals created the political space for the intellectual elite to make opposing arguments against the government, deepening the regime’s legitimacy

crisis and accelerating the potential for political instability. The intel-lectual elite was angry about Deng’s retreat from the commitment to “ma-terial civilization” and protested that the preservation of “social unique-ness” would only stifle the growth recently generated through economic openness. To the politically conscious groups, the Deng regime had to justify its legitimacy as a government acting in the interests of the people in order to secure their conformity and cooperation and to prevent possible opposition and rebellion. Meanwhile, privileged groups in the party-state were offended by the widespread liberal economic reforms—they believed that the lib-eralization of the economy and the commercialization of Chinese society opened up too much room for “in-congruous practice and incompatible elements” that would undermine the party-state’s control of the popula-tion and degrade the uniqueness of Chinese communism (Shambaugh 1993, 470).

When a democratic system experi-ences a legitimacy crisis, it can renew itself through the process of elec-tions. Because authoritarian regimes do not have similar institutions to renew politicians and policy makers, the legitimacy of its regimes rests almost entirely on performance. If



Soyoon Sung

politicians within an authoritarian re-gime fail to deliver what they prom-ise, there exist no mechanisms of self-renewal, and the regime will face the deterioration of its legitimacy. Realizing this impending danger, the party leadership began a campaign of “building socialist spiritual civi-lization” in order to counteract the challenge to its legitimacy. The pro-gram was designed to deemphasize the issue of performance in regime legitimation by excluding political and moral spheres from analysis and change. Deng wished to keep the delicate balance between the changes he pursued in the economic domain and the continuity he wished to preserve in the political domain by matching the “material civilization” with “socialist spiritual civilization” (Shambaugh 1993, 475).

The socialist China we are building should have a high level of material civilization as well as a high level of spiritual civilization. When I speak of high level of spiritual civilization, I refer not only to education, science, and culture (which are of course indispensable) but also to communist thinking, ideals, beliefs, morality and discipline, as well as a revolutionary stand and revolutionary principles, comradely relations among people, and so on. – Deng, 1984

Once again, this device of maintain-ing regime legitimacy and stability in a changing environment proved ex-tremely difficult to implement. Ten-sion arose once more between those placing emphases on the political dimensions of “spiritual civilization” and those stressing the importance of the educational and cultural dimen-sions of the same notion. Hard-line conservatives wanted to keep China a Maoist state with strict party-state control of society, no economic liber-alization, no global contact, no pro-fessionals in government ranks, and no freedom for intellectual life. Intel-lectuals and professionals wanted to push China in the opposite direction toward more money enterprise free-dom, enhancement of intellectuals’ and professionals’ social statuses, social autonomy, and unrestricted personal and intellectual exchange between China and the capitalist world.

The Dengist campaign of building two civilizations was introduced as a compromise measure, but instead of being pacified, each group cham-pioned their own ideas beyond what Deng had hoped. Because of the sep-arate ideologies of the two influential elites, the communist government under Deng had to fight a two-front war to win legitimacy. Popular belief would indicate that an authoritar-


ian regime only need to respond to the ruling elite. The dilemma typical of communist regimes in transition, however, is that the regime has to solicit not only the traditional power centers for recognition and support but must also gain the support of the other influential groups in society for recognition and cooperation.

Intellectuals accepted the legitimacy of the economic reforms but ques-tioned the continuing ability of the CCP to lead the nation toward more far-reaching reforms. Those on the left did not question the leadership or the abilities of the Party but instead questioned the legitimacy of the reforms—to appease the conserva-tive constituency, reformers had to reaffirm their commitment to the principles of Marxist political cen-tralization and communism, which led to louder criticisms as intellectu-als called for more political openness. As Roderick MacFarquhar noted in “Deng’s Last Campaign,” “The crux of the Chinese political argument has been over whether or not there is a ‘contradiction’ between Deng’s two basic points: will economic change solidify or pervert Party leadership and other Communist values?” The Party was legitimate or the reforms were legitimate, but it seemed incon-sistent that both could be so.

Despite having to fight a two-front war to gain the recognition and cooperation of two elite groups, the legitimacy crisis did not lead to the collapse of the Deng regime. Instead, the post-Mao reforms led to a legacy of great expansion and growth. This success stemmed from the fact that although the Dengist regime was not able to satisfy the fundamen-tal desires of either elite group, the political and economic climate was undoubtedly far better than under Mao’s regime. “If we focus atten-tion on only the upper echelon of the CCP establishment, we will see that, although legitimation difficulties existed within that circle, the lead-ers could overcome these difficul-ties, reach agreements, and achieve institutional integration at their level most times and on most important issues” (Ding 1994, 18). Deng’s re-gime also succeeded because he was far more consensus-oriented than his predecessors and because his deci-sions were taken more collectively. Deng never sought the absolute authority that Mao possessed and wielded because he was convinced that Mao’s dictatorial style and cult of personality were the principal rea-sons China endured economic and political crisis for much of the period after 1957 (Chan 2001, 285). Instead, as evidenced through policies that aimed at maintaining harmony be-



tween economic pluralism and Com-munist dictatorship, such as “build-ing socialist spiritual civilization,” Deng focused on trying to appease both groups—his goals of appease-ment, particularly to the intellec-tual elite, were sometimes impeded, however, by the need to maintain the legitimacy of the communist regime. Nevertheless, no one could dispute the great economic and social trans-formation that had taken place under Deng’s regime and thus, although the ruling and intellectual elite groups often listed their grievances to the party leadership, neither took actual action to undermine its authority.

References

1. Lucian W. Pye, “An Introductory Profile: Deng Xiaoping and China’s Political Culture,” The China Quarterly, 135 (Sept., 1993), 412.

2. Raphael Shen, China’s Economic Reform (Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), 39-75.

3. Kluver, Alan R., Legitimating the Chinese Economic Reforms (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996), 71.

4. X.L. Ding, The decline of communism in China: Legitimacy crisis, 1977-1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 114-123.

5. Alfred L. Chan, Mao’s Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China’s Great Leap Forward (Oxford University Press), 285.

6. David Shambaugh, “Deng Xiaoping: The

Politician,” The China Quarterly, 135 (Sept., 1993), 462.

7. Felix E. Oppenheim, “’Facts’ and ‘Values’ in Politics: Are they Separable?,” Political Theory, 1 (Feb., 1973), 54-69.

8. John McMillan & Barry Naughton, Reform-ing Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michi-gan Press, 1996).

Soyoon Sung


Letter to the Editor

Taiwan: Ma Ying-jeou and the Revolutionary Status Quo

Muyan Jin

The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou won a landslide victory on March 22, 2008, defeating Demo-cratic People’s Party (DPP) candidate Frank Hsieu and ending eight years of DPP rule over Taiwan. His victory has largely been attributed to two closely related campaign planks—(1) improvement of Taiwan’s stagnant economy and (2) increased economic and cultural ties with the mainland. However the strength of Ma’s victory belies the existing tensions within Taiwan it-self. Ma’s political platform is diametrically opposed to the DPP’s values of national identity and Taiwan independence over economic gains. These tensions leave Ma little room for error as he navigates the fine line between internal and external dangers.

Three societal rifts in Taiwan make Ma’s job exceedingly difficult: the Mainland-Taiwanese rift, the economic and developmental North-South rift, and the ideological (and generational) reunification-independence rift. As one can imagine, these rifts are interrelated and, in most cases, insepara-ble—for example, most aboriginal ethnic Taiwanese live in the comparably underdeveloped South, and of these, most support independence and the DPP. Yet, although overlap is expected and prevalent, lines of distinction are not so clearly drawn. Although many urban Northerners may not have roots in the South, they make up a substantial portion of the independen-ceminded political constituency. At the same time, these urbanites may shift to a more moderate KMT position in times of economic difficulty or during a period of corrupt governance, both characteristics of the Chen Shui-bian era. Thus, Ma’s political “mandate” of easing tensions along the Taiwan Strait may not be as powerful as hoped by either Beijing or Washington.

Muyan Jin is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (Internation-al Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).


Muyan Jin

Consequently Ma’s Taiwan Strait policy of “three no’s”—no to unification, no to independence, and no to military action— is more of a throwback to the 1992 China-Taiwan agreement of a constructively am-biguous One-China than a progressive, revolutionary step toward a new era of reconciliation. The warm welcome given to Ma from Beijing is largely a byproduct of a collective sigh of relief—relief that the 2008 Olympics won’t be used as a staging ground for Taiwan independence. The true test begins after the Olympics, as goodwill becomes less of a valued political commodity. Similarly, the U.S. praise comes at the heels of the inflammatory and gaffe prone Chen—praise that, closely examined, points to less and not greater support from an overburdened superpower wishing for the status quo.

When President Ma Ying-jeou is inaugurated on May 20th, the re-gional and international community can expect a honeymoon period where many of Ma’s Taiwan Strait policies will reap economic and political div-idends—direct flights allowing 650,000 Taiwanese businessmen living on the mainland convenient travel, increasing mainland tourism in Taiwan to a million visitors per year, and the creation of an economic market for China-Taiwan trade. However, loftier goals set by the hopeful media, including a peace treaty officially ending the civil war between the CCP and KMT, will be difficult if not impossible to meet, barring drastic domestic and interna-tional changes. Even correctly implemented, Ma’s policies will do much to restore the status quo circa 1992 but little to move beyond it. Hopefully these evolutionary and not revolutionary steps will be enough to fulfill the promise of such a heralded new leader.


Letter to the Editor

What Taiwan’s Closer Ties with China Means to Me

Herng Lee

I’m going to be frank—I don’t have any elaborate theories lined up. Instead, I hope to offer a perspective or two from my own experiences.Having grown up in Taiwan and received the bulk of my education there, there is no doubt that I view Taiwan as my country, and China as a related yet distinctly separate entity. UN Recognition or not, I grew up in a demo-cratic state that functions just as well/badly as any other one. Unlike earlier Taiwanese generations who may have had roots in the mainland, my genera-tion possessed much more similar experiences as we all grew up in a distinct-ly Taiwanese context where we were persistently reminded that our national identity was being challenged. Of course, my generation was educated under a framework that was less politicized, that was more realistic and rational about China-Taiwan re-lations. For example, my parents grew up in an era where mainland Chinese people were referred to as “gong fei”—or “Communist bandits” literally—and their textbooks never lacked propaganda that reminded them how “re-covering” mainland China was just a matter of time. I have trouble recalling any of those overtly hostile themes appearing in any of my textbooks, and gone are the days where it seemed like war could happen any given day. I don’t think it’s too far-fetched to claim that Taiwan is less disillusioned about China than it used to be. However, as Taiwan has become much more open and democratic over the past 20 years, so have the stark contrasts between the two political systems across the strait been further augmented. I will be the first to admit that the Taiwanese government is anything but perfect; nonetheless, like any Taiwanese citizen in my generation, I grew up enjoying a certain set of

Herng Lee is a junior from Taiwan majoring in Economics at Duke University.


Herng Lee

rights, and it is not hard to see why I or anybody in my shoes would not react vehemently if such rights were to be muted. For that very reason alone, I find it hard to picture China, given its current political structure, attempting to intrude on Taiwan’s de facto independence in any way without expecting great, great turmoil.

This is not to say that I am so naïve as to be fully disillusioned about the possibility of Taiwan being less and less autonomous in the long-run; with cross-strait economic relationships swiftly developing and tensions eas-ing, I can certainly see how Taiwan’s gradual reliance on Chinese markets may slowly lead to more and more concessions on Taiwan’s behalf. But to what extent will this reliance distort the status quo, and how long will it take? Given the experiences of the current Taiwanese population, I highly doubt that any form of internal political autonomy will be traded off for some eco-nomic benefits in the near future, as there are certain sentiments that are dif-ficult, if not impossible to subdue. We continue to experience exclusion from major international bodies, we observe our Olympic athletes being unable do don our own flag, and most importantly, we are constantly reminded why. We have family or friends who sacrificed their lives to promote democracy and human rights during Taiwan’s authoritarian era, and those memories and values will continue to live with us as we cherish the political freedom we possess today. I can’t (or perhaps I’d rather not) imagine the current Taiwan-ese population easily letting go of such experiences and forgetting what a long way we’ve come. To claim that closer ties with China will obliterate all of that, in my opinion, not only seems fairly unrealistic, but also somewhat cheapens the Taiwanese experience. Therefore, like most Taiwanese people, I am of course more or less apprehensive about Taiwan’s new relationship with China. However, know-ing what makes us unique and what values we treasure, I am not so worried as to fear that Taiwan’s current relationship with China will inevitably lead to the total submission of Taiwan by China. Yet what about the possibilities in between, such as the frequently cited Hong Kong model? Again, notwith-standing issues of national pride and culture, the mere notion that a non-democratic nation will have some sort of reign over another one—especially one whose values center around its remarkable transformation from authori-tarian rule to democracy—is enough to call the most apathetic Taiwanese


citizen to action. I am not trying to be dramatic—I just don’t see how the average citizen, who has enjoyed his rights for so long and seen them as inherent, can feel comfortable with any proposal that does anything less than fully guaranteeing the continuation of those rights. The Taiwanese people want autonomy (whether via the status quo or full independence), and not “granted autonomy”—especially when the potential granter could easily flip-flop given its overwhelming power.

Note that my views predicate upon the assumption that China main-tains its current political structure. Will Taiwan’s stance against China af-fect the Chinese and spur other waves of changes in the Mainland? Could China’s political system eventually change so as to reduce the many negative connotations that inevitably accompany the notion of being a part of China? Will the Taiwan issue still be China’s priority then, assuming such changes? I don’t know for sure, and your guess is as good as mine. I do know, however, that we need to keep talking about these issues and, even more importantly, make sure that we also listen. There will never be a shortage of opinions and interest regarding the China-Taiwan issue, but we will always need more people that are willing to do away with prejudices and to really listen.

What Taiwan’s Closer Ties to China Means to Me


Book Review


Andrew Cheon

Abstract: In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions: 1) whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198) and 2) why Chinese foreign policymakers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooper-ate in multilateral security institutions (37). First, I summarize Johnston’s chapter on mimicking, discuss the theory’s inability to address states’ decisions to join international institutions, and de-rive from his empirical work a hypothesis that an increase in demand for mandatory information by international institutions may generate domestic “sunk costs” potentially conducive to cooper-ation. Second, I provide an overview of Johnston’s chapter on social influence, question whether China is a “hard case” for socialization, and cite the popularization of the term “responsible major power” as evidence that material reality may actually aid socialization. Third, I summarize Johnston’s work on persuasion, question whether international institutions are attracting multilat-eralists rather than persuading skeptics, suggest an alternative method of assessing how participa-tion in international institutions may be influencing Chinese discourse on “cooperative security,” and finally, employ the power transition logic to question whether China will remain bound to international institutions when it approaches parity with or dominance over the United States.

Introduction

In Social States, Alastair Iain Johnston sets out to investigate two related questions. The central theoretical question concerns whether realpolitik state preferences and practices are a function of material conditions or realpolitik norms (198). The empirical question concerns why Chinese foreign policy makers, in a threateningly “unipolar” environment of 1980-2000 and in the absence of positive or negative incentives, chose to cooperate in multilateral security institutions (37). Though Johnston’s questions seem to spring from his perceived limitations of the rational choice framework employed by real-ists and institutionalists, it is notable that Johnston also finds existing social constructivist explanations to be unsatisfactory.

Andrew Cheon is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (Inter-national Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).


In fact, Social States is Johnston’s systematic attempt to address the variance in state behavior left uncaptured by the cost-benefit framework emphasized by rational choice theorists and the internalization of pro-social norms emphasized by social constructivists. Between these “end[s] of the spectrum,” Johnston believes, exists a vast amount of important pro-social behavior, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion (22). Johnston employs these three micro-processes, which he labels “socialization,” to ana-lyze Chinese foreign policy behavior within international institutions—where material conditions of anarchy and pro-social norms and discourses of mul-tilateralism are said to present divergent observable implications (29).

Johnston’s method of analysis is primarily qualitative, as he process-traces select cases to illustrate how socialization operates. His criteria for case selection are the presence of relative power concerns and the absence of other material incentives (40). For evidence, Johnston relies on data from a wide range of sources—scholarly works by regional specialists, papers writ-ten for NGO conferences, documents circulated in international institutions by Chinese actors, and some internal circulation documents. A constraint, Johnston concedes, is China’s policy of “asymmetric transparency,” which restricts access to data on security issues (40). Nevertheless, Johnston has conducted over 120 interviews with diplomats and arms control experts from China and various countries, most of whom had exposure to Chinese foreign policy processes (42). Johnston claims to account for interviewees’ potential incentives to misrepresent with careful attention to their positions in the policy-making process and other surveying techniques (42).

Mimicking: Overview

Johnston describes mimicking as a process by which the agents of a new signatory state, in order to cope with the uncertainty and technical demands of joining an international institution, mechanically adopt its pro-cedures and work habits. This may involve creating domestic agencies to better develop and articulate national interests within the institution as well as adopting the institution’s behavior routines and discursive practices (51). Interestingly, Johnston labels mimicking a “path-dependent lock-in” process, where it becomes increasingly costly for the actors to back out, ignore, or defect from the norms of the institution (51). Analyzing China’s involvement



in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) from 1980, he observes that the CD arm of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) expanded from a small division in 1982 to an Arms Control Disarmament Department in 1997 (55). Johnston also observes the formation of an interagency process involving the MOFA, a community of weapons scientists, and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to aid Chinese diplomats within the CD (62). He supplements his analysis by graphically comparing an increase in the num-ber of working papers Chinese diplomats submitted to the CD and a similar increase in the number of studies conducted by China’s weapons scientists from the 1980’s to 1994 (65). He also presents some evidence of changes in Chinese discourses.1

Critical Engagement

First, it is notable that mimicking, as a micro-process, cannot explain a state’s initial choice to join an international institution. Because Johnston claims to limit his “units of analysis” to the interactions between “international insti-tutions” on the one hand and “individuals and small groups” on the other (27), states leaders’ decisions to join an institution in the first place—and the preferences therein—are essentially exogenous to the mimicking framework. Thus, in his empirical analysis, Johnston falls back on ideas from his next chapter, “Social Influence,” to argue that China’s decision to join the CD “seems to have been a spillover effect” from joining other UN agencies. Chi-nese leaders believed that as a “great power,” China should join this institu-tion (53). Since this is beyond the scope of his mimicking theory, it seems fair that he provides little evidence for this prediction.

In my view, it may be interesting to ask how much agency state leaders enjoy over mimicking and its consequences. In other words, mimicking of agents may be a product of conscious choice on the part of the principal. Why did state leaders choose to place diplomats within the particular environment in the first place? To what extent did Chinese leaders foresee the growing ex-pansion of their arms control community and the changes in discourses prior to joining the CD? In other words, it may be interesting to investigate the accuracy with which state leaders make ex ante calculations about not only the initial costs and benefits of joining an international institution, but also the potential costs and benefits of staying in it. One would begin by obtain-

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ing data on state entrances to international institutions and then identify-ing cases where no material incentives or sanctions were present. The latter step simplifies calculations of costs and benefits (since issue linkages can be complicated) and controls for the role of coercion in states’ decisions to join. Having identified such a limited set of cases, one could then turn to primary and secondary sources to qualitatively assess the accuracy of state leaders’ ex ante calculations of potential costs and benefits of joining an institution.

Second, it seems that Johnston’s work uncovers another potential coopera-tive effect of the mandatory exchange of information within institutions. Johnston limits the observable implications of institutionalist theories to “side payments, sanctions, reputational gains or losses linked to other issue areas, and information that indicates the costs of cooperation were lower than expected” (40). Setting aside this “market-failure” definition of information for the moment, it seems that the Committee for Disarmament is an environ-ment where an increase in demand for mandatory information forces actors to invest more heavily in the institution or the issue area. Such information may include technical annual declarations, mandatory presentations, or even working papers. From this perspective, one could argue that China expanded its arms control division within the MOFA and brought in a scientific com-munity into its policymaking to process the increasing amount of informa-tion required for participation in the CD.

Though data may be difficult to obtain, one could potentially conduct a cross-national study of the extent to which an increase in demand for infor-mation by an international institution affects states’ domestic spending in that particular issue area. Ideally, one would identify a large group of “nov-ice” states within the same institution whose domestic structures are similarly unsophisticated to deal with the increased demand in information. A good place to start may be within international institutions whose issue areas are relatively new or require substantial research and development. This is to minimize the number of leading states in the issue area, whom we should drop, and maximize the number of “novice states,” whom we can proceed to test. The goal is to control for any exogenous variable that gives any state a competitive edge, i.e. reduces the amount of spending necessary to adapt to the increased demand for information. With this square circled, we can pro-ceed to investigate under what conditions an institution’s increase in demand



for information leads (or does not lead) to an increase in states’ investment in that issue area. The next, but separate, question is whether these “sunk costs” actually bind states to these institutions.

Social Influence: Overview

Johnston’s theory of social influence begins with the assumption that actors in world politics value image and status as ends in themselves and that they often make difficult trade-offs between status and material power or wealth (76). From this angle, he argues that normative pressures, such as backpat-ting and opprobrium, can induce cooperative behavior. For these pressures to operate, however, there must both be a normative consensus on “good be-havior” and a forum that makes such behavior observable (86). Given these conditions, an increase in the size of cooperating audience should, ceteris paribus, increase backpatting benefits if the actor cooperates, and increase “shaming markers” if the actor free-rides (91). For this chapter, Johnston seems to blur the distinction between the principal and the agent by assum-ing that state leaders and publics take criticism and praise of the state within institutions personally (96).

For his empirical analysis, Johnston process-traces China’s participation in Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations within the CD from 1994 to 1996.2 Fearing that its nuclear capability would be frozen in inferior-ity (99), China initially insisted on two “treaty killers,” No First Use (NFU) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) (104). China also insisted that all 8 nuclear powers sign before entry into force (EIF) (106). After the Chinese language on PNE came under heavy criticism of 20 states in March 1996 (104), China abandoned its NFU and PNE positions in May and abandoned its position on EIF in August (106). The realist explanation, which Johnston rejects, is that the CTBT was costless to sign anyway because China had finished testing its second-generation warheads by July (107). Johnston argues that forgoing tests was costly to relative security (107) and that China did so because mounting accusations of “moral hypocrisy”—for not upholding its commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty and the CTBT—jeopardized its image as a “responsible major power” (114). On a separate note, Johnston graphs China’s voting behavior in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to illustrate its fear of public isolation (136).

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Critical Engagement

First, Johnston states that China is a “hard case” for socialization due to the prevalence of realpolitik views within the country (33). This is a valid claim. Since Johnston makes no assumption of unitary states, their internal fea-tures should “matter” to the extent that they influence the behavior of his units of analysis, “individuals and small groups.” However, there may also be other cultural factors within China actually coexisting with realpolitik views. Though I make no claim to explain its origins, the concern for one’s own image may be one such cultural factor. For example, the Chinese word “mianzi”, meaning “face,” figures quite prominently in Chinese discourses. In conversations, Chinese people often say “ni bu gei wo mianzi” to convey that one has lost face because of something another person has said or did. Closing the black box for the moment, it seems worthwhile to ask whether there may be variance in states’ sensitivity to status concerns. To be sure, this possibility does not undermine the logic of social influence theory. It does open up the possibility that China may not be a hard case, and thus lend only limited support to the theory.

In fact, I found the same UNGA graph Johnston uses to support his social influence theory to be instructive in this regard (See Figure 3.8 from Social States reprinted below). Given that the UNGA employs roll calls as a vot-ing procedure, Johnston predicts that China’s tendency to abstain should vary with size of the yes majority on resolutions it does not support. Indeed, the difference in rates of abstention when the majority is 1/2 or less and when the majority is more than 2/3 is inordinately high. In fact, Johnston calls China on this graph a “clear outlier” (136). My first question concerns whether there is variance in states’ starting positions (in terms of their sen-sitivity to self-image) when they enter an international institution. If data is available, we could plot voting behavior similar to Johnston’s for each state in its first year of participation in the UNSC. My second question concerns whether social influence affects all states evenly over time. If we were to com-pare states’ UNSC voting behavior in their first year and say, five years later, would we observe similar movements in the residuals? Both these suggestions point out the limitation of this graph, which simply aggregates voting behav-ior from 1989 to 2000. One would need to disaggregate the data to capture the potential dynamic elements of social influence.



Second, in explaining China’s decision to drop its positions on NFU and PNE, Johnston states that condemnations of China’s nuclear tests from 1993 to 1996 by most developing states and middle powers stressed themes that had negative resonance with Chinese leaders’ increasing self-identification as a “responsible major power” (113). In support of this claim, Johnston uses line graphs to show an increase in frequency of articles using the term “responsible major power” in People’s Daily and academic journals (147). Indeed, Johnston is right that these terms have significance, since they rep-resent a new feature of Chinese foreign policy, a concept related to image, and a concept associated with participation in multilateral institutions (149). However, the words “major power” also imply that certain material condi-tions have already been met for this actor to actually care about this particu-lar status marker. This may be indicative of a change in normative consensus as to what constitutes a major power (87), but the fact remains that its mate-rial capability allows this particular actor to place a premium on this status marker in the first place.

This question becomes more interesting when we consider whether similar discourses exist for middle powers or small powers. Using the same criteria Johnston uses to judge that “responsible major power” is a significant term (new feature of foreign policy and associations with image and multilateral-ism) (149), if Johnston can provide evidence of increasing frequency in the

Andrew Cheon


use of similar terms in discourses of non-major powers, then he could plausi-bly claim to have removed the significance of “major” from the “responsible major power.” In other words, the goal is to demonstrate that normative markers that only international institutions reward can have meaning even divorced from realpolitik notions of prestige. Another interesting line of inquiry is whether the popularization of the term “responsible major power” may itself be a product of material conditions of anarchy. Consistent with the soft-balancing literature, it may be possible that middle and small powers are using such discourse to further bind and constrain major powers to inter-national security institutions (See Pape 2002).

Persuasion: Overview

Johnston views persuasion as the internalization of norms (22). He theorizes that persuasion works in an environment where a persuadee is highly cogni-tively motivated, autonomous from principal, exposed to the argument re-peatedly, or has few prior or ingrained attitudes. It also helps if the persuader is an authoritative member of a high-affect group the persuadee wants to join (159). According to Johnston, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and related Track II activities (which provide new ideas and filter controversial is-sues for the ARF) are fairly conducive to persuasion on these counts and em-body “counter-realpolitik ideology” such as “cooperative security” (164-166). On the other hand, China is said to have been deeply ingrained in realpolitik norms when it joined the ARF in 1994 (167). Johnston observes an increased interest in “cooperative security” among Chinese officials from 1996 on, expressed through papers, unofficial channels, commissioned studies, public speeches, and references to the Five Power Treaty on Confidence Building Measures (a more intrusive and formal security institution) as a model for the ARF to follow (170-171). Johnston supplements his analysis with graphs showing increases in references to “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily and an increase in references to the ARF in articles (168). The argument is that the ARF and the Track II led to an emergence of a constituency of Chinese policymakers and analysts who internalized the norm of multilateralism (179).



Critical Engagement

Granted that realpolitik preferences and practices are changeable, what I consider is the possibility that persuasion within institutions may not be do-ing all of the explanatory work. In fact, there may be other variables inform-ing the preferences of Chinese policymakers before entering these interna-tional institutions.

First, Johnston assumes that the composition of the staff at the Compre-hensive Division of the MOFA in charge of ARF activities remained con-stant over the years (179). This is to be expected, since persuasion, which takes time, cannot take place if there is a regular turnover of actors (179). Moreover, it seems intuitive that there may be greater transaction costs as-sociated with regularly replacing staff, since diplomats would be forced to spend the time and the energy they could otherwise have spent on negotia-tions on adjusting to new institutions. However, Johnston’s empirical analysis in the mimicking chapter also provides evidence to the contrary. From 1980 to 2000, Johnston tells us, the MOFA rotated 60 ministry officials through the CD delegation to acquaint them with multilateral negotiations. Includ-ing personnel from the Chinese military and other research institutions, the figure is as high as 110 (54). If China was willing to experiment with such rotations in its delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, an institution that often requires highly technical knowledge, one could predict that similar turnovers happen during the ARF negotiations as well.

Thus, it seems plausible to argue that Chinese diplomats and analysts, al-ready favorably disposed toward multilateralism, may have gradually se-lected themselves into the ARF negotiations over time. What we arrive at is an endogeniety problem. It seems unclear whether the ARF is creating a so-called multilateralist constituency within China or whether a pre-existing multilateralist constituency is selecting itself into and driving the ARF. Since Johnston interviewed many who are close to the policymaking process in China, acquiring data on rotations may not be difficult. If borne out by em-pirical evidence, this would mean that there is little by way of persuasion that takes place within the ARF itself, since the preferences of Chinese diplomats are shaped and formed elsewhere. Some candidates include formative ex-periences, favored scholarly works (as I will suggest later on), cultural bonds

Andrew Cheon


with other nations, and other international institutions (which would support Johnston). This would explain the Chinese ARF diplomats’ ready willingness to adopt the “mutual security” discourse (170-171). If multilateralists had se-lected themselves into the ARF and related processes, we would not be very surprised to find that they indeed favor regional security.

Second, the causal link between participation in the ARF and an increase in references to multilateralism is less than conclusive. Johnston writes: “From the mid-1990s on, however there were some noticeable changes in the dis-course” (167). Johnston further develops this claim with two graphs showing “exponential increases” in the mention of “multilateralism” in academic journals and People’s Daily and a third graph showing an increase in the fre-quency of articles with references to the ARF (168). The causal implication is there, but not very convincing at first (See Figures 4.2 and 4.3 from Social States reprinted below). The ARF was established in 1994, but the frequen-cies of articles on “multilateralism” only take off in the early 2000’s. More convincing is the small, but similar increase in references to the “ARF” in the early 2000’s. However, it is still possible to argue that there could have been some exogenous shock near the 2000’s, which increased references to both multilateralism and the ARF.



In addition, the breadth of the term “multilateralism” makes it more difficult to argue for a direct causal linkage between an increase in references to the ARF and an increase in references to “multilateralism.” For example, the in-creasing use of the term “multilateralism” starting in 2000 could be a prod-uct of an increase in publicity enjoyed by economic institutions and their in-fluence on the Chinese economy. It could also have to do with an increase in publicity enjoyed by multilateral security efforts conducted outside the ARF framework. Last but certainly not least, one could legitimately argue that the anticipation for and the publication of Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony in Chinese, ba quan zhi hou (2001), caused the observed increase.3

To strengthen Johnston’s causal argument, then, one could utilize similar documentary methods to measure the frequency of references to “coopera-tive security” (instead of “multilateralism”) in Chinese journals and People’s Daily, which would more readily associate itself with ARF, a regional security institution. If Johnston is right that the concept of “cooperative security” is a relatively new one for policymakers in China, our findings should reflect this. The references should gradually increase from 1996 (or soon afterwards) when the ARF policymakers and analysts are said to have begun writing on this concept (170). If we indeed observe such a trend, we would be more like-ly to accept Johnston’s causal argument that it was the ARF at the forefront of this trend (179), since this institution is one of the few directly involved in the so-called “cooperative security” issues. As it stands, however, a causal link

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between an increase in the talk of “multilateralism” and an increase in that of the ARF remains weak.

Third, “material conditions,” as expressed through the power transition logic, may have aided the “persuasion” of Chinese policymakers. When setting up observable implications for his competing theories, Johnston’s ac-count of realism suggests that in a “unipolar world” we should observe “can-didate poles,” such as China, “trying to balance against the United States, eschewing arms commitments that might place constraints on relative power capabilities” (37). This is a fair articulation of one realist prediction. Another interesting realist prediction, initially entertained (but soon discarded) by AFK Organski, is that a “wise challenger, growing in power through internal development,” may “hold back from threatening the existing international order until it had reached a point where it was as powerful as the dominant nation and its allies” (Organski, 333). In this light, international security institutions may serve as vehicles for China to keep other states at bay, while continuing its own internal buildup. Thus, it may actually make sense for China to uphold “cooperative security” within the ARF, since China’s cur-rent priority is maintaining stable conditions for its economic growth and development. It seems that “material conditions” may have actually aided China’s rhetorical turn toward multilateralism.4

It is important to note, however, that the power transition logic remains ag-nostic as to whether institutions impose independent constraints—social or material—on state behavior. For example, joining an institution and subject-ing its diplomats to pro-social processes, such as mimicking, social influence, and persuasion, may be costly for the state and its relative security. It may still make sense to join if the costs of joining at the time are outweighed by the perceived benefits, such as the potential avoidance of a “preventive war” launched by the dominant power (Organski, 333). Thus, a more rigorous test of Johnston’s socialization theory may rest on whether the social benefits of cooperation and social costs of defection within a security institution are suf-ficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or domi-nance over the current hegemon. Another interesting test may ask whether an increase in the number of diplomats who have “internalized” norms of a security institution will be sufficient to bind a rising power to it even after it reaches parity with or dominance over the current hegemon. I do not mean



to imply that these institutions will somehow prevent states from ever engag-ing in military disputes or wars. Nonetheless, it seems socialization will have worked if it makes defecting costly enough for China to remain in an inter-national security institution even after reaching material dominance.

Closing Remarks

Overall, Johnston’s Social States is a successful effort to systematically ana-lyze socialization, an understudied phenomenon in World Politics. This book helpfully outlines how three important processes—mimicking, social influ-ence, and persuasion—may operate. During the process, Johnston has also led me to ask several interesting questions. How accurately do leaders of states calculate not only the initial but also the future costs and benefits of joining an international institution? Can an increase in demand for informa-tion by an international institution affect a state’s domestic spending in that issue area? Does China present a special case for socialization in its unusu-ally strong concern for national self-image? To what extent is this concern for self-image grounded in the material reality of the international system? Do international institutions teach participating diplomats the inherent value of multilateralism, or do they simply attract multilateralists in the first place? How has participation in a security institution influenced China’s domes-tic discourse on “cooperative security”? Last but not least, can socialization continue to bind a rising power to an international institution after it reaches parity with or surpasses the dominant power in capability? By directing our attention to and laying the groundwork for further theorizing about inter-national institutions and their socializing effects, Johnston has undoubtedly made a novel contribution to the field of World Politics.

References

1. Angell, Norman. 1913. The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons), chapter 3.

2. Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2008. Social States: China in International Institutions: 1980 – 2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 3. Pape, Robert. 2002. “Soft Balancing Against the United States.” International Security 30 (1): 7-45

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Footnotes

1. For example, he graphs changes in the ratio of Chinese statements on superpowers to statements on arms control issues within the CD to suggest that the Chinese adoption of the CD’s discursive practices forced them to tone down their anti-Soviet rhetoric (68, 69). He also draws from primary sources to argue that previously “Western” terms, such as “verification” and “arms control,” entered the Chinese discourse through the CD over the 1980’s (70).

2. He actually presents three cases, though I review only the first. As his second case, Johnston analyzes China’s participation in negotiations to revise the landmine Protocol of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (1981) from 1995 to 1996. Despite the PLA’s reservations that further restrictions on landmines would undermine security of sparsely manned borders and lucrative transfers/exports of dumb mines (123,125), China not only announced a moratorium on exports on dumb mines in April, but also signed the revision in May due to an emerging anti-landmine “bandwagon” that threat-ened China’s image (128, 129). The third case is the Ottawa Treaty of December 1997, which sought a de-facto ban of landmines (138). Despite overwhelming support within UN, China never signed because of PLA’s reservations (137). Instead, Canada and China struck a deal—Canada would not pressure China to join and China would not pressure Asian states to oppose the treaty (139). China also sent an observer to Ottawa to minimize criticism (140) and abstained from UN resolutions demanding non-signatories to accede the treaty (140).

3. This is a representative work of political science on the importance of multilateralism and international institutions.

4. In Johnston’s ARF case study, it seems that Chinese diplomats have indeed “internal-ized” the instrumental value of multilateralism, but not quite its normative value. This helps explain Johnston’s finding that Chinese multilateralists, who strongly support region-al cooperative security, actually oppose the expansion of US-Japanese security coopera-tion (177).




Muyan Jin

The history of China and Taiwan begins in the Republican Era (1910s-1920s). In 1927, Kuomintang (KMT) General Chiang Kai Shek’s at-tempt to purge Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members sparked civil war shortly after the fall of the Qing Dynasty. The Chinese Civil War, interrupt-ed by World War II and Japanese invasion, lasted until 1949 when the KMT was defeated and fled to the island of Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established. As the PRC moved to invade Taiwan and eliminate the KMT in 1950, the Korean War broke out and PRC strategic focus was diverted away from Taiwan by its intervention on behalf of com-munist North Korea.

Shortly after the end of the Korean War, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 ensued. Because the stated goal of the KMT was to reoc-cupy the mainland and overthrow the CPP, Chiang Kai Shek sought to take advantage of heightened U.S. animosity toward the CCP to begin military occupation and fortification of two islands between mainland China and Taiwan: Matsu and Quemoy. As Taiwan fortified these islands and called on U.S. support to re-invade the mainland, Premier Zhou Enlai of the CCP announced bombardment of Matsu and Quemoy. Thus, the First Taiwan Strait Crisis erupted, with the U.S. threatening to use nuclear weapons to destroy CCP military potential. Upon China’s failure to gain assurance from the Soviet Union to also use nuclear weapons if the U.S. did so, both the CCP and KMT backed down—the PLA stopped bombardment on May 1st—although no issues were resolved.

Muyan Jin is a 2009 Duke University graduate who majored in Political Science (Internation-al Relations) and Asian & Middle Eastern Studies (Chinese).


In August of 1958, bombardments across the Taiwan Strait began anew. The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, much like the first, was a test of the resolve of the United States to oppose an invasion of Quemoy and subse-quently Taiwan. Again, a stalemate followed, although this time bombard-ment continued, with the CCP and KMT bombarding on alternate days until 1979. In total, approximately 450,000 shells were fired on Quemoy.

Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the United States and much of the world recognized the KMT government on Taiwan as the sole representa-tive of China, and Taiwan held China’s seat at the United Nations. Howev-er, a growing rift between China and the Soviet Union was becoming more and more apparent, and the Soviet’s seemingly unstoppable edge in the Cold War prompted a realignment of powers. Thus, with Kissinger’s visit to China in 1971, the PRC found its seat at the UN and with Nixon’s visit in 1972, Taiwan’s quest for reinvasion of the mainland went from a distant goal to an unattainable fantasy. In the aftermath of US-China rapproche-ment, Taiwan had to struggle for its diplomatic survival against the political gravity of its mainland neighbor.

After formal U.S. withdrawal of diplomatic relations in 1979, Taiwan remained in political limbo and the status quo remained relatively un-changed as China was content to adopt a “wait and see” attitude while fo-cusing on its own economic development. After the…and Taiwan began its ascent into the economic powerhouses of East Asia along with its movement to democratize. In 1986, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) became the first opposition party to the KMT, forcing the KMT and its successive President Lee-Teng Hui to reform. On the international stage, Taiwan be-gan to switch its policy, becoming more politically flexible and not requiring other nations to recognize it over the PRC.

In 1995 and 1996, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was much differ-ent from the first two. Sparked by Lee’s visit to Cornell in 1995, in which he described Taiwan as “sovereign”, the Crisis consisted of PRC missile tests off the coast of Taiwan, followed by the sending of the U.S.S. Nimitz air-craft carrier to the strait by the U.S. Later, in 1996, on the eve of Taiwanese elections, China again conducted missile tests. The economic and political



Muyan Jin

cost to Taiwan was great, but the third crisis also showed U.S. willingness to protect Taiwan, as well as increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.

In 2000, the DDP candidate for President, Chen Shui-bian won election in Taiwan, a sign seen as ominous by the PRC. Chen Shui-bian is seen by many as an independence-leaning politician. In 2004, Chen was re-elected amidst strong condemnation by the mainland, which passed the Anti-Secession Act, authorizing the use of force against Taiwan or any prov-ince which declares independence. Chen’s presidency has seen increased U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, a higher international profile, and a greater discourse among Taiwanese for independence.

Sovereignty and Strength

To the PRC and Chinese on the mainland, the role of Taiwan as a province of China should be a given. The fact that in reality this is not a given is seen as yet another challenge and humiliation to China’s national integrity posed by an imperialist and hegemonic West, particularly the United States, as well as regional interlopers, particularly Japan. To an estab-lished country with a government that has run relatively smoothly for over two hundred years, the idea of such measures to save face may seem absurd; however, for a country newly emerging from over a century of strife and weakness, the loss of Taiwan would be not only symbolically and ideologi-cally ruinous to China’s projected strength, but also poses a very real threat to the domestic stability of China. Furthermore, on the foreign front, the loss of Taiwan would be a disastrous national security failure, as Taiwan serves not only as a stronghold for the United States in the Pacific, but could ally with both the U.S. and Japan to create an offensive coalition hostile to Chi-nese interests.4

China’s strategy to engage Taiwan is twofold, and is easily recogniz-able to any purveyor of history. China uses incentive and coercion in step to tempt and force Taiwan’s return, or what China expert Suisheng Zhao calls “peaceful offense” and “coercive strategy”.5 In 1979, China first began with accommodation, offering a “one country, two systems” solution, which would allow Taiwan to keep its autonomy in all respects save name. Further-


more, China engaged in the “three links, four exchanges” system, attempting to bridge the Taiwan Strait through commercial, postal, and travel links and academic, cultural, economic, and sports exchanges.6 The incentives to Tai-wan were great—China’s vast low-tech market is perfectly suited to Taiwan’s high tech economy. Because Taiwan’s cultural ties to China are so great, cul-tural exchange would help to enrich both countries and lessen hostility. The incentive system of China’s attempts to woo Taiwan were meant to allow for Taiwan to naturally re-integrate into the mainland, and attempt that, for all purposes, failed in 1996.

With the more adventurous statements of Lee in the 1990’s, as well as policy actions to remove mainland influence in Taiwan (disbanding of National Yuan and National Assembly of mainland constituents), China became ever more desperate, as Taiwan was not drifting further toward the mainland, but rather further away. Strong showings of force reaffirmed the PRC pledge to use force if necessary, prompting a new stalemate in which both the PRC and, ironically, the U.S. wished for a continuation of the status quo, whereas Taiwan, under Chen, sought more room to maneuver for inde-pendence.

Struggle for Recognition

Taiwan’s struggle throughout its short lifetime has not always been for independence in the political sense, although this has manifested itself quite prominently recently, but rather recognition as a state unto itself, along with its astonishing record of achievement despite overwhelming odds. Taiwan’s goal is not lost to China, yet it is a goal China cannot accept. Thus, Taiwan must play a game of acquiescence to a much more powerful mainland, yet at the same time draw on support from reluctant allies.

To counter China’s incentive strategy of “three links, four exchanges”, Taiwan used its own “lenient out, strict in” policy. In short, exchange to the mainland was accepted and even encouraged, but any exchange into Taiwan was kept to a minimum (from 1988, 50,000 mainlanders visited Taiwan as opposed to 7 million visits by Taiwanese to the mainland).7 Also, whatever exchange did occur was kept officially non-political, frustrating the PRC ef-forts to build political rapport with the ROC officials.



Muyan Jin

Internationally, it is no secret that Taiwan relies almost exclusively on U.S. support to back its policies, although the United States nominally sup-ports the “One-China Rule” as named in the Shanghai Communiqué. Much has been made of the Taiwan lobby in Washington and its donations of mil-lions of dollars, and also of Taiwan’s “money diplomacy” to gain recognition of other countries by monetary means.


Recommended Works:

Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. Coming conflict with China. New York: A.A. Knopf, Distributed by Random House, 1997. Print.

Bush, Richard C., At cross purposes : US.-Taiwan relations since 1942. Ar-monk, N.Y. : M.E. Sharpe, c2004.

Hunt, Michael H. Genesis of Chinese Communist foreign policy. New York: Columbia UP, 1996. Print.

Javits, Jacob K. “Congress and Foreign Relations: The Taiwan Relations Act” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Fall, 1981), pp. 54-62

Lieberthal, Kenneth. Governing China from revolution through reform. New York: W. W. Norton, 2004. Print.

Spence, Jonathan. “The Search for Modern China” New York : W.W. Nor-ton & Co., c1990.

Stapleton, Roy, J. “Opportunities and Challenges for U.S.-China Relations” US Taiwan Relaions in the Twenty-first century, ed. Christopher Marsh and June T. Dreyer, Lexington Books, 2003.

Tucker, Nancy B., Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992. New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994

Zhao, Suisheng. Across the Taiwan Strait Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.

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