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This is the final section of a draft TS on SidgwicksMethods of Ethics. Comments

welcome!

3. The Dualism of Practical Reason

In his Concluding Chapter, Sidgwick draws together the strands of his argument

with a view to making a final decision on the relation of the three methods with

which he began theMethods: egoism, intuitionism, and utilitarianism.1He begins by

reminding us of the (philosophical) intuitionist basis of utilitarianism, and the lack of

it for (dogmatic) intuitionism, noting that the virtues of (dogmatic) utilitarianism can

be seen partly through reflection on the comparative history and origins of

morality -- as grounded in impartial benevolence or prudence (CC 1.1/496-7). The

question, then, is that of the relation between egoistic and universalistic hedonism,

and the challenge for anyone who wishes to argue for the rationality of morality is to

demonstrate a harmony between those two views (CC 1.2/497-8).

C.D. Broad, in an influential discussion of the dualism, claims that harmony is

unachievable, since the two views are logically inconsistent (Broad 1930: 158-9, 244-

5, 253; see Irwin 2009: 528-9). Broad focuses first on 4.2.1.3/420-21, where Sidgwick

claims that an egoist who claims that she ought to take her own happiness as her

ultimate end is immune to any argument from the utilitarian that her own good can

be no more important a part of the total good than that of any other. For she will

deny that her own good is good from the point of view of the Universe.

Later, Broad characterizes the inconsistency in terms of different degrees of

concern, the utilitarian claiming that I ought to be equallyconcerned about good

states of mind wherever they occur, the egoist that I ought to be moreconcerned

about a good state in my own mind than a state of the same value in some other

mind. This is not an unreasonable view to attribute to Sidgwick, but it is one that he

1For an excellent discussion of the weight Sidgwick placed on systematizing reasons for action, see

Richardson 1991.

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should have been reluctant to accept. What matter are the ultimate principles of

utilitarianism and egoism, not the decision-procedures or patterns of concern they

recommend. Broads first characterization of the inconsistency, then, is more

fundamental:

E: I ought to aim at the good that is, what is good for me.

U: I ought to aim at the good that is, what is good overall.

As Broad goes on to point out, no assumption about the world can remove the

inconsistency between the two views.2So what is going on in Sidgwicks

Concluding Chapter? Why does Sidgwick not suspend judgement on both egoism

and utilitarianism, and work further on the question of which is correct?

The answer, I suggest, lies in the metaphor of points of view.3We can

remove the contradiction between Eand Uas follows:

E*: From my own point of view, I ought to aim at what is good for me.

U*: From the point of view of the universe, I ought to aim at what is good

overall.

2See Frankena 1974: 457-8: It seems to me that two ethical principles cannot both be regarded as self-

evident if it is in principle possible for them to come into conflict, and that even a postulate of

coincidence in practice cannot save them both. For the coincidence might obtain only because of a

fortunate accident about the constitution of our world, and not be true of other possible worlds. But

this is a hard question and Sidgwick does not consider it.3See Skorupski 2001: 71. Skorupski might object to my formulations here that they should also

include a statement of whatgivesme the reason in question, and that once this is included the two

principles will contradict one another (2001: 69). If the egoist claims, for example, that the fact that -

ing promotes my good gives me a reason to , then the utilitarian will just deny t his. But this is to

ignore the perspectival context. The egoist is reporting what can be seen from the agents own, self-

regarding point of view, while the utilitarian is speaking of what can be seen from the impartial point

of view. It is from the third perspective of actual agency that these principles become practical, and

indeed they can become practical in a world in which they do not recommend conflicting courses of

action.

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So this is why it becomes so important to demonstrate the practical

consistency or harmony of thetwo perspectives. If each perspective were correct,

then I always have reason to promote my own good (and not doing so would be

unreasonable) and I always have reason to promote the good impartially (and not

doing so would be unreasonable). For me to be reasonable, I must6always promote

both my own good and the overall good: I have ultimate reason to do both.7

arriving at this conclusion. Indeed we find that almost any method may be connected with almost any

ultimate reason by means of some---often plausible---assumption. Hence arises difficulty in the

classification and comparison of ethical systems; since they often appear to have different affinitiesaccording as we consider Method or Ultimate Reason. In my treatment of the subject, difference of

Method is taken as the paramount consideration: and it is on this account that I have treated the view

in which Perfection is taken to be the Ultimate End as a variety of the Intuitionism which determines

right conduct by reference to axioms of duty intuitively known; while I have made as marked a

separation as possible between Epicureanism or Egoistic Hedonism, and theUniversalistic or

BenthamiteHedonism to which I propose to restrict the term Utilitarianism (1.6.3.1). This passage

does raise the question of why Sidgwick puts such weight on methods rather than principles (see 1.4

above). But nothing here implies that there is only one ultimate principle. I can find no other passage

on p. 84 that implies this. On p. 174, Sidgwick says that complete abdication of self-love is not

possible for a sane person who still regards his own interest as thereasonable ultimate end of his

actions (2.5.4.6; my italics). But he is speaking here of the egoist, who of course holds that there isonly one such end. On p. 403, Sidgwick is seeking to explain the aversion of common sense to the idea

that happiness alone is our sole ultimate end and standard of right conduct (3.14.5.4/402). He notes

that people usually take this idea to be that one should seek ones own individual happiness at the

expense, if necessary, of that of others, but goes on to claim that this supreme aim is in various ways

unsatisfactory. Sidgwicks point here is against egoism, but also against a dualistic view that

combines egoism with universal benevolence. There is once again no implication that ethical theories

must state a single right-making characteristic. Further, since egoism and utilitarianism might

anyway be combined into a single principle, the characteristic of an action that it promotes ones own

happiness and general happiness can be seen as single. (Brink also refers to two passages which he

sees as potential counter-evidence to his interpretation. But I can see no such evidence in 77n. On p.

421 (4.2.1.4), Sidgwick does indeed draw a distinction between the claim that rational benevolence is

one principle among others, and the utilitarian claim that it is the soleor supreme principle. But this

distinction seems consistent both with Brinks single right-making characteristic interpretation and

its denial.)6I am avoiding, then, any significant contrast here between what is reasonable and what I must do; cf.

Phillips 2011: 118. Phillips uses the notion of reasonableness to construct a permissive interpretation

of the dualism, according to which it is rationally permissible to promote ones own good and

rationally permissible to promote the overall good. Phillips admits that the textual evidence is against

the permissive interpretation, but suggests that we should adopt it on the ground that Sidgwicks

own arguments for egoism and utilitarianism exclusively interpreted fail and provide stronger

support for a qualified version of the permissive view. As Phillips himself says, a proponent of the

standard view, stated in terms of musts, can respond that, even if this is what Sidgwick oughtto

think, it is not what he (on the whole) does think (2011: 140). I would add that I think there is less

evidence than Phillips claims for a permissive interpretation (Crisp 2014: 000). 1. Phillips cites a

http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.htmlhttp://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.htmlhttp://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.htmlhttp://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.htmlhttp://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.htmlhttp://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/sidgwick/me/me.b01.c06.s03.n01.html

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Sidgwick implicitly recognizes a third perspective of practical reason: that

which takes the deliverances of both points of view into account and then leads to an

intention to act.8The notion of a point of view here, then, is epistemological. It is not,

for example, as if I have a reason to promote my own happiness only when I am

attending to the distinction between individuals. Why did Sidgwick not consider a

third perspective which, in cases of conflict, weighs the strength of each reason

against the other (see Phillips 2011: 132-3)? So, for example, I might conclude in one

case that I have strongest reason to promote the overall good at some small cost to

myself, and in another that I have strongest reason to promote my own good to a

large degree at some small cost to the overall good? This position, according to

which we have both egoistic and utilitarianpro tantoreasons for action, strikes me as

very plausible (Crisp 2006: ch. 5; see Irwin 2009: 528; Phillips 2011: 140-51). My guess

passage from the first edition of theMethodswhich expresses the axiom of justice with reference to

what is right, reasonable, the dictate of reason, and my duty (ME1470, cited at 116), and notes

that reasonable in ordinary language tends to suggest permission. But if Sidgwick were heremixing concepts of requirement with a concept of permission, he would of course be deeply confused.

Reasonable for him is, in such contexts, a technical term: the reasonable action is the one there is

strongest ultimate reason to do. Nor does it make a difference that he uses reasonable elsewhere in

the ordinary sense (Phillips ibid.).

My own view (see 1.3 above) is that Sidgwick tends to use too many concepts to express his

position, the passage here quoted by Phillips being an excellent example of that. That position could

be stated purely in terms what we have ultimate reason to do, with no reference to permission,

requirement, ought, duty, or whatever. So pacePhillips 2011: 153 n17 I would not want to

attribute a permissive interpretation to Sidgwick, nor even to advocate myself such a version of a

dual source view of practical reasons. For me to know what to do, all that is required is that I know

what I have strongest ultimate reason to do. To ask whether I am permitted or required to act in that

way is to ask an unnecessary and potentially confusing question.7Roberts 1969: 62; Schneewind 1977: 373; Mackie 1992: 170; Frankena 1992: 193-4. Also Richardson

1991: 196n26; McLeod 2000: 280. Parfit (2011: 1.131) understands Sidgwicks dualism constructively:

one always has reason to do what is best impartially, unless some other act would be best for one, in

which case one has sufficient reason to act in either way; see also Baier 1991: 202. According to Parfit

(2011.1.131), Sidgwick held that impartial and self-interested reasons are not comparable, and so,

when these reasons conflict, we have sufficient reason to act in either way. I agree that these reasons

are incomparable in that they cannot be weighed against one another. This is a consequence of the

universal application of the relevant principles. But Sidgwick clearly believed that any conflict led not

to suffiency of reason to act in either way, but to practical chaos: so far as two methods conflict, one

or other of them must be modified or rejected (1.1.3.6/6; see 1.1.5.2/12; Seth 1901: 176; McTaggart

1906: 413; Irwin 2009: 521; Nakano-Okuno 2011: 158).8PaceParfit 2011: 1.134.

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is that Sidgwick would have rejected it as a version of aesthetic intuitionism, since it

relies on practical judgement at the meta-level to weigh egoistic and utilitarian

reasons against one another. So the antipathy to such judgement that led Sidgwick to

miss the strengths of a pluralistic and reflective moral view such as that later

developed by Ross also caused him to miss a way to avoid practical reasons

becoming chaotic.

Because complete coincidence between egoism and utilitarianism is required

for the harmony Sidgwick sought, it is not enough to point out that both E*and U*

recommendgeneraladherence to the rules of common-sense morality (CC.2/498-9).

Sidgwick goes on to discuss the claim by some utilitarians that this coincidence is

ensured by the priority of sympathy as a component of human happiness (CC 3/499-

503). Sidgwick refers to Mill in a note (499-500n), and reiterates his distinction

between sympathys role in producing pleasures and pains and its role in causing an

impulse to action. As he points out, for sympathy to guarantee the coincidence of E*

and U*, it must not merely motivate altruistic action but provide maximal happiness

for the agent.

Sidgwick recognizes that sympathy can be a source of happiness, and that

such sympathy tends to play a role, in the mind of a utilitarian, in the moral

feelings that concern social conduct. This enables the utilitarian to avoid the

objection (often made against Kantian theories in particular) that her theory requires

her to sacrifice herself to an impersonal law rather than for others she cares about.

He claims also that most peoples happiness would in fact be promoted were they to

cultivate a greater degree of sympathy in themselves:

[T]he selfish man misses the sense of elevation and enlargement given by

wide interests; he misses the more secure and serene satisfaction that attends

continually on activities directed towards ends more stable in prospect than

an individual's happiness can be; he misses the peculiar rich sweetness,depending upon a sort of complex reverberation of sympathy, which is

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always found in services rendered to those whom we love and who are

grateful. He is made to feel in a thousand various ways, according to the

degree of refinement which his nature has attained, the discord between the

rhythms of his own life and of that larger life of which his own is but an

insignificant fraction.9(CC 3.2/501)

But even this is insufficient to provide the complete coincidence required

between E*and U*(CC 3.3/501-2), since the claims made about conscience (2.5.4/170-

75) carry across to sympathy. A sacrifice of ones life for the general good, for

example, could not plausibly be said to advance ones happiness, and the fact that

our most intense sympathy is for those close to us increases the motivational

opposition to impartial utilitarian duty (nor should we think that attempts to

increase the impartiality of our sympathy would be themselves recommended by

utilitarianism). The same is true in less unusual cases. Alleviating the suffering of

others, for example, will be required by utilitarianism, but sympathy here will be if

anything a source of pain rather than pleasure to the agent, and, though it may be

counterbalanced by the pleasures of benevolence and so on, an alternative life would

often be hedonistically more valuable for the agent.

Sidgwick then moves to another argument put forward by utilitarians of his

day: that utilitarianism is the law of God, to be enforced through a system of divine

reward and punishment that will underpin the practical consistency of E*and U*

(CC 4/503-6). This raises the question of what justifies such beliefs. Sidgwick sees the

issue of revelation as beyond his remit, though he cannot resist pointing out that

most arguments from revelation have been to non-utilitarian conclusions. But

whether reason itself can give us knowledge of God is a matter for philosophical

ethics as well as theology. Sidgwick rejects the view that moral rules should be seen

9Characteristically, Sidgwick qualifies this passage in a note (501n): Some few thoroughly selfish

persons appear at least to be happier than most of the unselfish; and there are other exceptional

natures whose chief happiness seems to be derived from activity, disinterested indeed, but directed

toward other ends than human happiness.

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merely as the commands of a divine lawgiver on the ground that God himself is

understood as a moral agent bound by the rules, though Sidgwick is prepared to

entertain the view that through intuition we may learn that God commands us to

obey certain moral rules independent of his commands or to pursue the same end as

he himself pursues that is, universal happiness.

At this point the problem of evil arises. If God is good and omnipotent, and

morality is utilitarian, why is there so much suffering in the world? Whether it is

because of certain limitations which do not detract from Gods omnipotence as

ordinarily understood is a question Sidgwick again refers to theology. But he is

concerned to point out that it is not only pleasure which is mingled with its opposite

in the world as it is; perfection is balanced by imperfection, virtue by vice. So no

objection to hedonism can be mounted in natural theology.

So can belief in the existence of such a God be justified on purely ethical that

is, rational grounds alone (CC.5/506-9) ? Sidgwick has to confess, with some regret,

that he does not see it as self-evident that performance of duty will be rewarded and

violation punished, whether by God or in any other way. Thus he feels forced

to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent

intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would

seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason,

manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory. (CC 5.1/508)

In other words, if egoism and utilitarianism, when construed in the light of

the facts, contradict one another, neither of them can in the end be said to be self-

evident.10This explains the pessimism of the famous final sentence of the first

edition: the Cosmos of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos: and the prolonged

10See Frankena 1974: 457-8; 1992: 194; Nakuno-Okuno 2011: 158.

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effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct is seen to

have been fore-doomed to inevitable failure (M1: 473).

Later editions were less pessimistic.11Having made the claim above Sidgwick

swiftly notes that he is not to be taken as suggesting that it would become

reasonable for us to abandon morality altogether (CC 5.2/508). But, it has to be

pointed out, it is hard to see how he is not suggesting that it would not be

unreasonable to do so.12Sidgwick himself admits that, though we might still be

prompted to do our duty on the basis of self-interest and sympathy, any conflict

between self-interest and duty would have to be decided (in practice) by the weight

of the non-rational impulses in play.It is especially interesting that at this crucial

point Sidgwick fails to discuss the possibility of rational judgement about individual

cases based on balancing the considerations assessed from each of the impartial and

personal points of view. Such a view of judgement will seem plausible to many. In

some cases, it seems obvious that a small cost to me is justified by a huge gain to the

11Note what Sidgwick said in a frank letter of 1880 to an old school-friend: *I+f I am asked whether I

believe in a God, I should really have to say that I do not knowthat is, I do not know whether I

believeor merely hopethat there is a moral order in this universe that we know, a supreme principle

of Wisdom and Benevolence, guiding all things to good ends, and to the happiness of the good. I

certainly hopethat this is so, but I do not think it capable of beingproved.All I can say is that no

opposed explanation of the origin of the cosmosfor instance, the atomistic explanationseems to

me even plausible, and that I cannot accept life on any other terms, or construct a rational system of

my own conduct except on the basis of this faith.

You will say, perhaps, the question is not whether we should like,or find it convenientto

believe in a God, but whether such belief is true. To this I answer, What criterion have you of the

truth of any of the fundamental beliefs of science, except that they are consistent, harmonious with

other beliefs that we find ourselves naturally impelled to hold.And this is precisely the relation that

I find to exist between Theism and the whole system of my moral beliefs. Duty is to me as real a thing

as the physical world, though it is not apprehended in the same way; but all my apparent knowledge

of duty falls into chaos if my belief in the moral government of the world is conceived to be

withdrawn.

Well, I cannot resign myself to disbelief in duty; in fact, if I did, I should feel that the last

barrier between me and complete philosophical scepticism, or disbelief in truth altogether, was

broken down. Therefore I sometimes say to myself I believe in God; while sometimes again I can

say no more than I hope this belief is true, and I must and will act as if it was. (Sidgwick &

Sidgwick 1906: 347-8)12At 200n2, Sidgwick appears to agree with Butler that someone under two conflicting obligations is

in fact under no obligation.

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overall good, and in others that the gain is insufficient to justify the loss. But matters

are often finely balanced, and this is where judgement is required.

In the final paragraph of theMethods, Sidgwick raises the question of whether

the very fact that some hypothesis is required to avoid a contradiction in an

important area of thought is itself reason for accepting that hypothesis. Once again,

however, he refers the issue elsewhere, this time to general philosophy. Despite the

fact that the outcome of his ethical project depends fundamentally on this issue,

there is no extended discussion of it in his other works.13This is especially odd given

the coherentist elements already in place in Sidgwicks moral epistemology.

Sidgwick was leaving the development of his project to posterity, and the words of

his friend F.W.H. Myers, written shortly after Sidgwicks death, seem especially

apposite:

[H]e pointed to a definite spot; he vigorously drove in the spade; he upturned

a shining handful; and he left us as his testament, Dig here.14

13Schneewind 1977: 378. The issue is briefly mentioned again in NET: 605.14Myers 1904: 108; cited in Schultz 1994: 719.