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DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic Policy Forum 22 nd October, 2010 [email protected]; www.dsgasia.com

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Page 1: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

DSGAsiaPost Crisis Financial Regulation and

Macro Stability in Asia

Simon OgusSingapore Economic Policy Forum

22nd October, [email protected]; www.dsgasia.com

Page 2: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

2 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Deleveraging in the West is a multi-year process and there is scant evidence as yet of credit multipliers re-starting. A square-root “recovery” seems likely

The Square-Root “Recovery”

-2%

0%

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6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

-2%

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14%

84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Global Nominal Money and Credit Growth% YoY 3MMA

Private Domestic Non-Financial Credit

Broad Money

Global includes US, Euroland, UK & Japan

Page 3: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

3 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Rebalancing has been only partial. Current account dispersion remains historically wide in the context of a deleveraging (?) world

0%

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85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10F 11F

% GDP

Source Data: IMF

Non-Intervention

Capital

* Sum of the absolute size of global current account balances

Intervention Capital = Change in Global FX Reserves

Global Capital Flow Requirement *

Global Cross Border Capital Requirement as a % of Global GDP

-8%

-6%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

-8%

-6%

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12%

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10F 11F

Current Account Balances as a % of GDPUSA Eurozone ex Germany

Germany Japan

China Asia ex Japan & China

Page 4: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

4 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

This is partly thanks to unreconstructed mercantilism. The dollar is cheap against the majors and in line with Asia, but the real divergences remain within continents

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85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Real Unit Labour Cost-Based Trade-Weighted Exchange Rates

January 1990 = 100

JapanNon-Germany

Euro Area

Korea

Germany

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85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Real Unit Labour Cost-Based Trade-Weighted Exchange Rates

January 1990 = 100

Japan

Euro Area

USA

China

Asia ex China ex JapanUSA, Japan and Euroland IMF Calculations;

Asia* and China DSGAsia Calculations* ULC-based where available, WPI-based otherwise

Page 5: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

5 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Japan is the champion government debtor but a unique ownership pattern suggests that Europe is the likelier catalyst for bond market mayhem

Central Bank7.9%

General Government11.3%

Postal Savings20.8%

Public Life Insurance9.8%

Public Pension Funds and CMTs

10.6%

Public Financial Institutions

0.3%

Private Sector39.3%

Sectoral Holdings of Central Governement Debt (Jun 2010)

Source: Japanese Government Flow of Funds DataSource: Japanese Government Flow of Funds DataSource: Japanese Government Flow of Funds Data

(of which Foreign holdings 6.1%)

Sectoral Holdings of Central Government Debt (June 2010)

0%

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240%

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100%

Government Debt as a Percentage of GDP

Asia ex-Japan* Asia ex-Japan, China & India*USA** EurolandUK Japan (RHS)

* Excluding central bank paper** USA 2008 84% of GDP if State and GSE debt is Forecasts from the IMF

A 2009 Rogoff-Reinhart study notes that if public debt exceeds 90%, median growth rates fall by 1% and average growth rates by more

Page 6: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

6 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Where was the decoupling? An early 1990s earnings trajectory seems likely though this may not preclude market re-ratings at times of global calm

-18%

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-9%

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86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Asia Exports and OECD Industrial Production

Asia Ex-Japan Exports (LHS)

OECD Industrial

Production (RHS)

USD %YoY, 3MMA %YoY, 3MMA

Asia Ex-Japan Exports Volumes (LHS)

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86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10F11F

Asia ex-Japan Exports (LHS)

US ISM Manufacturing

PMI (RHS)

Exports USD %YoY, 3MMA, EPS market cap/MSCI weighted %YoY Index 3MMA

Asia ex-Japan EPS Growth (LHS)

Asia ex Japan Exports & EPS Growth and the US ISM Manufacturing PMI

Page 7: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

7 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Year-on-year export comparisons are easy but volume levels will tell us whether sustainable final demand is really returning

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04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Export VolumesJapan KoreaTaiwan China

Index 2004=100, 3MMA20

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04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Export Volumes

Hong Kong (Domestic) Singapore (Non-Oil Domestic)Malaysia Thailand

Index 2004 = 100,

Page 8: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

8 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

Real interest rates have been structurally declining and in China’s case especially, are well below the real expected return on capital

-21%

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-9%

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90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

China Real Interest Rates

Mortgage Rate Corporate Rate

3-Month Deposit Rate

%

-4%

-2%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

-4%

-2%

0%

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90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Asia ex-Japan, China & India Real Interest Rates

Mortgage Rate

Corporate Rate

3-Month Deposit Rate

%

Page 9: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

9 DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

This all suggests that Asian property can still get a whole lot more bubbly

0

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80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Ratio of House Prices to Household Disposable Income

Japan

USA

UK

Australia

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85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

Ratio of House Prices to Household Disposable Income

Korea

Taiwan

Singapore (HDB)Hong Kong

(Mass)

China (35 Major Cities)

India (Mumbai -HDFC estimates)

Page 10: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

10DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis

NPLs will eventually rise across the region but this should not for the most part hinder the ability of banking systems to lend. Multipliers work out here

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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

China

Asia ex Japan (Average)

Korea

Asia ex Japan (GDP Weighted)

Australia

Loan Deposit Ratios Adjusted for Reserve and Statutory Liquidity Requirements

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0%

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270%

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Japan Asia ex-Japan

Asia ex-Japan, China & India ASEAN-4

Net Non-Perfoming Loans as a Percentage of Total Bank Capital

Page 11: DSGAsia Independent Asian Economic & Political Analysis DSGAsia Post Crisis Financial Regulation and Macro Stability in Asia Simon Ogus Singapore Economic

11

Conclusions Real interest rates in the developed world are both too low and too high at the

same time. Too high to allow deleveraging economies to fully recover, yet too low to encourage capital to exit and/or transfer from weak to strong hands

In Asia, real interest rates are unequivocally too low and way below expected rates of return on capital. Healthy financial systems are intermediating credit to generally underleveraged consumers and corporates. Bubbles threaten

Interest rate normalisation is being constrained by atavistic exchange rate targeting tendencies and a valid fear of excessive capital inflows. Trade wars and capital controls loom

Nevertheless, with external demand likely to remain relatively constrained, such Mercantilist tendencies need to be junked once and for all. Exchange rate manipulation is a hard habit to break for all too many though….

China is more able to achieve the holy trinity than most and thus it can perhaps afford to believe that the RMB is everyone else’s problem. In the words of Spiderman, “with great power comes great responsibility”

DSGAsiaIndependent Asian Economic & Political Analysis