drugs and democracy programme - transnational institute"the arms the taleban are buying today...

T R A N S N A T I O N A L

D E B A T E P A P E R S

D E C E M B E R 2 0 0 1

no 3

T N I B R I E F I N G S E R I E SNO 2001/2

Drugs and Democracy P rog ramme

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Afghan i s tan ,Dr ugs and Terror i sm

M e r g i n g Wa r s

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C O N T E N T S

� Editorial 3

� The Two Wars 4� Irreconcilable Wars

� Colombia, the Hemisphere’s Threat

�� Box1: Taleban & Opium Economy

� War & Opium in AfghanistanUNDCP’s ill Fated Interventions 9� Alternative Development

� Negotiating the Ban

�� Box2: Drugs Trafficking in the Region

� Security Belt

� Biological War on Drugs

� Drugs, Terrorism and War

�� Box3: The Opium Ban

�� Box4: The Market Responds

� References and Useful Websites 19

EDITORS:Amira ArmentaMartin JelsmaTom BlickmanVirginia Montañés

TRANSLATION:Anabel Torres

EDITORIAL SUPPORT:Antonio Carmona Báez

DESIGN:Jan Abrahim Vos, MEDIOZlatan Peric (DTP)Logo Drugs & Conflict:Elisabeth Hoogland

PRINTING:Drukkerij Raddraaier, Amster-dam

FINANCIAL SUPPORT:Rubin Foundation (U.S.)AICE (Belgium)

CONTACT:Transnational InstituteMartin [email protected] Potterstraat 201071 DA AmsterdamThe NetherlandsTel: -31-20-6626608Fax: -31-20-6757176www.tni.org/drugs

Contents of this booklet maybe quoted or reproduced, pro-vided that the source of infor-mation is acknowledged. TNIwould like to receive a copy ofthe document in which thisbooklet is used or quoted.

You can stay informed of TNIpublications and activities bysubscribing to TNI’s bi-weeklye-mail newsletter. Send yourrequest to [email protected]

Amsterdam, December 2001

Europe and Plan ColombiaDebate Paper No. 1, April 2001

Fumigation and Conflict in ColombiaIn the Heat of the DebateDebate Paper No. 2, September 2001

All editions of the series are available online inEnglish and Spanish at:www.tni.org/reports/drugs/debate.htm

D r u g s a n d C o n f l i c t n o 3 - D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1 3

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"The arms the Taleban are buyingtoday are paid for with the lives ofyoung British people buying theirdrugs on British streets. That isanother part of their regime that we

should seek to destroy," British Prime MinisterTony Blair said, in one of his attempts tosell the war in Afghanistan. His statement isan example of the distorting declarationsmade nowadays, inspired by media spindoctors to rally public opinion to support acontroversial war. Everything nasty is com-bined to paint a black image of the ‘evil’enemy, never mind reality.

Actually, it is Mr. Blair’s ally in Afghanistan,the Northern Alliance, who may have prof-ited more from the illicit drugs economythan the Taleban. While opium poppy culti-vation went down in Taleban controlledterritories last year, it flourished in areasthat were under control of the NorthernAlliance at spring harvest time. The rapidadvance of opposition forces due to themassive bombing campaign and their take-over of Kabul, by no means will end theopium economy. On the contrary, ourexpectation is rather a re-surgence ofpoppy cultivation across the country. How-ever, Mr. Blair’s statement is indicative ofthe new context of the war on drugs, afterthe terrorist attacks of September 11.

In this issue of TNIs Drugs & Conflict we tryto put this new context into perspective.The aim of these debate papers is to high-light issues involving the global drugs phe-nomenon, foster public debate on anti-drugs strategies and search for alternativepolicies. An intention more needed nowthan ever, given that the new found linkbetween drugs and terrorism may be usedto justify an escalation of the war on drugsas a proxy in the one against terrorism.

Drugs, terrorism and covert warfare havebeen close allies ever since World War II.Not only do ‘evil’ rebels use drug money tofinance their operations. Cocaine profitshave also been exploited by State officialsto support the Contra’s against the Sandi-nista Government in Nicaragua and heroin

money to finance the Mujahedeen thatfought Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

Today, the two major producers of opiumpoppy and coca, Afghanistan and Colombia,are in the midst of shifting counterdrugstrategies. In this issue we will look at thecase of Afghanistan, analysing the UN Inter-national Drug Control Programme’s(UNDCP) ill fated interventions. And whileinternational attention is focused onAfghanistan, the linkage of drugs and ter-rorism is endangering the troubled peacetalks between the government and theFARC guerrilla in Colombia.

The US State Department has identifiedthe FARC as a terrorist organisation and asa ‘narco-guerrilla’, because they control alarge part of the coca growing areas andtax coca production. Consequently,Colombians will have less opportunities todefine their armed conflict in politicalterms and be pressured into redefining it incriminal terms, and face military escalation.

Both countries have been subject toattempts to start a biological front againstdrug cultivation. Sponsored by the UNDCP,the US and the United Kingdom, scientistshave developed killer fungi to destroyopium poppy and coca bush. In Colombiathe attempt was stalled due to wide spreadresistance, because of risks for the environ-ment, legal crops and human health.

In Central Asia the fungus is ready for use.The war against the Taleban might improveconditions for fungus protagonists to pur-sue their agenda. Spraying the spores fromhigh altitudes might be presented as aneffective weapon to prevent a resurgenceof opium poppy cultivation in Taleban terri-tories, deriving them of a source of incomeby harvest time next spring.

In brief, the linkage of drugs and terrorismcan lead to scary scenarios. And, as a Euro-pean Commission official once speculated,maybe the present illegal nature of thedrugs trade is making the situation worse.

4 D r u g s a n d C o n f l i c t n o 3 - D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1

In a press conference held a day after theSeptember 11 attacks, Secretary of StateColin Powell urged the need to coun-teract terrorism by attacking “its branch-

es and roots”; that is, by attacking those whosupport terrorist activities as well as theirfinancial sources.

While, until some years ago, the generalassumption was that some states financed ter-rorism, with the end of the Cold War and thefall of the Soviet Bloc, terrorism has sought itsfunding from other sources, among them thetrade in illicit drugs. Today, within the newinternational context of the ‘war on terrorism’,

the ‘war on drugs’ moves to centre stage. The recent drugs-terrorism connection beganwith the opium of the Taleban. Referring to theresponsibility of Bin Laden’s network for theterrorist attacks in Washington and New York,Prime Minister Tony Blair pointed out that BinLaden and the Taleban “jointly exploited thedrugs trade”. In an effort to rally support forthe war in Afghanistan, Blair warned to be pre-

pared for a ‘new invasion’ of Al Qaeda’s opium.

Smoke still billowed from the ruins of the TwinTowers as Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S.House of Representatives, announced the cre-ation of a task force to combat drug traffic, themain financial source for many terrorist organ-isations. After releasing a new list of interna-tional terrorist organisations, the U.S. StateDepartment formally denounced the linkbetween terrorism and illicit drugs. Testifyingon October 10 before the House Committeeon International Relations' subcommittee onthe Western Hemisphere, James Mack, DeputySecretary of State for International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs, noted that “... thesame criminal gangs involved in narcotics smugglinghave links to other criminal activities and to ter-rorist groups”.

Although in several cases direct links betweendrug money and groups classified as terroristhave been substantiated (in Northern Ireland,Kosovo, Chechnya, Uzbekistan and Colombia),

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T H E T W O W A R S

Golm

Hotan

Karamay

Kashi

Korla

Qiemo

Aswan

Bakhtaran

Aktyubinsk

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Balqash

Rudnyy

Sabhah

Ho

Bilma

Orol

Voronez

Makkah (Mecca)

Waw

Al Jawf

Saratov

Urumqi

Agra

Ahmadabad AllahabadCalcutta

Jaipur

Madras

Nagpur

Pune

Surat

Esfahan

Shiraz

Basra

QaraghandyKrakow

Constanta

Krasnodar

Kuybyshev

Volgograd

AdanaIzmir

Frunze

Lviv

Bombay

Cochin

Gdansk

Multan

aples

Tol Yatti

Varanasi

Nicosia

Cairo

in

Bishkek

Khartoum

Kabul

Dhaka

Minsk

Addis Abbaba

Asmara

Athens

New Delhi

Tehran

Baghdad

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Alma Ata

Tripoli

Kathmandu

Muscat

Islamabad

Warsaw

Bucharest

Ar Riyad

Colombo

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Ankara

Ashgabat

Kiev

Tashkent

Sanaa

N'Djmena

AUSTRIA

NY

HUNGARYROMANIA

BULGARIA

TURKEY

POLANDBELARUS

UKRAINECZECH

SLOVAKIA

GREECE

CYPRUS

SERBIA

ALBANIA

MOLDOVA

MONTENEGRO

BOSNIA

CROATIAVENIA

MACEDONIA

ETHIOPIA

ERITREA

SUDAN

EGYPT

SOMALIA

LIBYA

CHAD

CENTRAL AFRICANREPUBLI

UNISIA

OON

DJIBOUTI

JORDAN

ISRAEL

LEBANON

ARMENIAAZERBAIJAN

GEORGIAKYRGYZSTAN

TAJIKISTAN

KUWAIT

QATAR

U. A. E.

YEMEN

SYRIA

IRAQ IRAN

OMAN

SAUDI ARABIA

RUSSIA

AFGHANISTAN

PAKISTAN

INDIA

CHINA

KAZAKHSTAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

NEPALBHUTAN

SRI LANKA

BANGLADESH


Al Qaeda’s alleged funding with Taleban opiumis less evident, or at least it was until Septem-ber 11. Figures on Afghanistan’s illicit econo-my reveal that the proceeds from opium salesnetted by the Taleban plummeted between1999 and 2001 (see Box 1), while the North-ern Alliance’s proceeds from opium tripled dur-ing the same period. “We will bomb their poppyfields”, proclaimed Blair, oblivious of the factthat hardly a single hectare of poppy was leftin Taleban-controlled regions, due to the banissued by the regime the previous year.

Unconcilable Wars

The anti-terrorist strategy with respect todrugs is: less drugs, less resources for terror-ists. As a result, the anti-terrorist war wouldrequire escalating the war on drugs. In prac-tice, though, the two wars are not very com-patible. Addressing a leg-islative panel in mid Octo-ber, DEA-Chief, AsaHutchinson, complainedthat the U.S. government’semphasis on terrorism wasallowing South Americandrug dealers to introducemore drugs into the U.S.through the Caribbean.Both the DEA and the USCoast Guard have had todisplace staff from anti-narcotics duty to thestrike against terrorism. Other state officialsand independent analysts alike have also notedthat the Pentagon’s military actions inAfghanistan and the war against terrorism onU.S. soil may hamper anti-drugs efforts.

The anti-terrorist strategy may even be antag-onistic with respect to the anti-drug strategy.Within the framework of the anti-drug pro-gramme for Afghanistan, the U.S. and theUNDCP threatened the Taleban with measuresand sanctions against them if they did not putan end to the production of opium, heroin’sraw material. The ban on growing poppyimposed by the Taleban in July 2000 – whichreceived such high praise from UNDCP Exec-utive Director Pino Arlacchi – is likely to havecome about chiefly as a result of this pressure.Now that their territory is under repeated

bombing, rumour has it that the Taleban havelifted their ban. This would mean an enormousstep backwards in what has been regarded asa success in the anti-drug effort. According torecent United Nations reports, peasants inAfghanistan are planting or preparing to plantpoppy in two main agricultural regions. Con-sequently, a resurgence of the Afghan drugtrade is to be expected.

On October 23, The Washington Post statedthat the main casualty of the war on terrorismagainst Afghanistan is the war on drugs. Thisnewspaper and other media have alleged thatthe price of heroin has dropped drastically, andthat the flow of opium and heroin into theWest through the various existing drug traf-ficking routes has increased. Meanwhile, theU.S. seeks out tribal leaders willing to opposethe Taleban regime, ignoring the links theseleaders have forged with the drug trade over

decades. BernardFrahi, UNDCP Repre-sentative in Pakistanand Afghanistan, stat-ed in an interview thatthe resurgence ofheroin traffic mightbecome an obstacle inthe war against ter-rorism: “Before this war,Osama had enoughmoney. Now that his

bank accounts have been frozen, what will he do?Turn rapidly to drug trafficking through networksthat exist already”. For Richard Davenport-Hines, an expert on the history of narcotics,the drug trade will survive no matter how thewar against terrorism turns out.

As a matter of fact, the U.S. Congress is reduc-ing the budget it had previously allocated to thewar on drugs in the Andean countries. Of theUSD 731 million requested for the AndeanRegional Initiative (an extension of the con-troversial Plan Colombia), the Congressapproved only USD 625 million on November15. It is worth noting that this cut in the bud-get basically affects what relates to the drugtrade directly, at least in the short term – thisis what the Head of the DEA criticises – but itdoes not modify one iota in what pertains toproduction itself.

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“So if you are a drugtrafficker, you might see

this as a moment ofopportunity.”

(Michael Shifter, Inter-American Dialogue)


Aerial spraying, forced eradication and thecriminalisation of those growing illicit crops arestill being carried out as if nothing had changedin the rest of the world. This is bound to con-tinue unless the position taken by some mem-bers of the U.S. Congress is honoured. Theyinsist that U.S. aid to Colombia be conditionedon that country’s performance on human rightsand demand that the impact of aerial sprayingbe assessed before deciding whether to con-tinue or suspend fumigation. They also insistthat funding of fumigation be suspended untilan alternative development programme forthe areas sprayed is drafted. However, only aminority in the Senate is advancing this posi-tion and it is yet to be seen whether these rec-ommendations will be taken into account.

Drug consumers, on their part, are being stig-matised for “contributing to terrorism” byusing drugs. The U.S. administration’s capacityto view reality from different angles has neverbeen very sophisticated. It divides the worldinto good and bad. Among the latter, drugs, ter-rorism and criminality are one and the samething. Not surprisingly, domestic policies havealso changed since September 11. The penal-ties for heroin consumption have increased,with the argument that each dollar paid forheroin is a dollar that goes into Al Qaeda’spockets: a contribution to terrorism that welldeserves more severe penalties.

Colombia, the Hemisphere’s threat

In the Western Hemisphere, Colombia is thebest example of this new interrelation of wars.After President Bush’s speech announcing thelaunch of a new crusade against terrorism,there were no doubts that the crusade wouldhave repercussions for Colombia. ThreeColombian armed groups appear on the newlist of foreign terrorist organisations. Thiscountry is also the largest producer of cocaineand its heroin production supplies a substan-tial part of the US market. Most importantly,Colombia resembles Afghanistan in one keyaspect, the fact that drugs are exchanged forweapons.

Towards mid October, Ambassador Francis X.Taylor, U.S. State Department Co-ordinator for

Counter-terrorism, confirmed U.S. intentionsto dismantle the Colombian terrorist net-works, announcing that Colombian guerrillaswould get the same treatment as any other ter-rorist group. The FARC were singled out as themost dangerous terrorist group in the West-ern Hemisphere, together with the extremistIslamic organisations present at the ‘TripleBorder’ area where Argentina, Brazil andParaguay meet. On October 10, in his testi-mony before the subcommittee on the West-ern Hemisphere, James Mack specificallyreferred to the FARC, the ELN and the para-military AUC as groups that “... all benefit sub-stantially from their deep involvement in drugtrafficking”. Washington is therefore propos-ing a new anti-terrorist plan for Colombia. Theidea of the military defeat of Colombia’s ter-rorist groups, with U.S. support in the form ofcounter-insurgency actions, had already beengaining ground in Washington before Septem-ber 11.

Other high-ranking U.S. government officialsare following the same lead. The strategy forthe hemisphere is very similar to the globalstrategy, implying the use of all U.S. forces,including the military. Recently, conjectureshave been made about the Pentagon’s plans tocreate a ‘military Commando for the Americ-as’ in charge of defending the Western Hemi-sphere. This task is currently in the hands ofthe Southern Command, but its role andresources have been limited until now. The U.S.has also announced its renewal of militaryassistance to the Nicaraguan Army, which is nolonger controlled by the Sandinista Party.

After the events of September 11, the FARChave more relevance for the U.S. as a terror-ist group than as a drug-dealing one. Fromeither perspective, what is sought is its elimi-nation. But if the emphasis is laid on the FARC’sterrorism, with funding clearly channelled inthis direction, the war on drugs, particularly inwhat pertains to drug trafficking, could sufferthe consequences. Annihilating the FARCwould not mean annihilating Colombia’s drugtraffic; not by a long shot. It is not the FARCbut the various drug cartels operating in thecountry that are the true motor behind thedrug business. No definite proof linking thisguerrilla group with the international drug

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trade exists, although some evidence doespoint in that direction.

At the end of October, in a public address enti-tled “The New Relations between U.S. andColombia”, the U.S. Ambassador in Colombia,Anne Patterson, stated directly and unequivo-cally that her country’s new global strategywould have serious repercussions on its rela-tions with Colombia. The Ambassador high-lighted Plan Colombia as “... the most effectiveanti-terrorist strategy we could possiblydesign”. Patterson expressed concern aboutthe existence of the demilitarised zone underFARC control and the presence within it of for-eigners linked with ter-rorist organisations. Shealso warned that heroinproviders might move toColombia because of thecrisis in Asia, in order tokeep supplying theirinternational clients. Withher speech, the NorthAmerican Ambassadorbluntly erased the dis-tinction between thecounter-narcotics effortand counter-insurgency,which had been officialpolicy up until then.

In addition to this change in US policy there isthe sudden shift of the European Union withregard to the peace process in Colombia. Twoevents caused serious irritation with EU coun-tries, jeopardising their previous constructiveattitude to Colombia’s peace process. First,there was the kidnapping of three GermanGTZ technicians (now released), which wasconsidered as a slap in the face. Then, the cap-ture of three IRA members who allegedly hadtaken part in training activities in the demili-tarised zone, erased doubts about links of theFARC with international organisations consid-ered as terrorist groups. It is worth pointingout that the IRA has been excluded from theState Department list of terrorist organisa-tions, because it has agreed to a cease-fire andis in the process of a peace negotiation.

The announcement by the U.S. that it wouldrequest the extradition of Colombian guerril-la leaders currently involved in the peace nego-tiations with the Colombian government wasanother cold shower for the already frail andproblem-ridden peace process. The key argu-ment is that a peace process cannot be viableif one of its spokespersons is in danger of beingextradited to the U.S. The guerrilla rejectsextradition. Simply reducing the guerrilla to acriminal organisation and expose them as drugtraffickers, will not encourage basic conditionsof trust in the peace process. As a result, thethreat to extradite the guerrilla leadership asdrug traffickers reduces the possibility of

involving the guerrilla infinding a solution to thedrug problem.

Now, more than ever,war and peace inColombia are in thecrossfire of the U.S. anti-terrorist war. If therewere any doubts, themeasures taken by theU.S. government and themany statements issuedby high-ranking govern-ment officials during thepast weeks abruptly dis-pelled them. The 11th of

September has encouraged hard-line sectors inboth Washington and Bogota in their effort toshift the general perception of the FARC as aninsurgent movement to that of a terroristorganisation financed by the international drugsmarket.

The role of Colombia in the international waragainst terrorism, as well as the advances,obstacles and implications of the peaceprocess, will be important topics of discussionbetween the Colombian and the U.S. govern-ments. The pressure on Colombia to abandonits peace talks in favour of a military solutionis mounting. Colombia has turned into the mainthreat to hemispheric security. Colombianswill have less and less time to define theirarmed conflict in political terms and be pres-sured, instead, into redefining their conflict incriminal terms in the midst of a military esca-lation.

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"One of the biggestbastions of terrorism isnot a world away, but

right under our nose. Atwo-hour flight south

from Miami will land youin Colombia, the most

dangerous and terroristiccountry in the world."

(Zell Miller, US Senator)

The extent to which the Taleban regimerelied on the opium economy has oftenbeen overestimated. ‘Best guesstimates’about Taleban earnings are based onUNDCP figures on number of hectaresplanted, yield per hectare, price per kgopium, and the imposed tax rules. None ofthese are hard facts. Yield figures vary wide-ly per region and huge differences existbetween irrigated and rain-fed poppy fields.Price per kilo in the North is never the sameas in the South and easily doubles or halveswithin each district according to quality.

1999 holds the record in Afghan opium pro-duction of 4600 tons, harvested from 91,000planted hectares with a national averageyield estimated at 50.4 kg/ha and sold at anaverage of US$ 58 per kilo. Total farmgatevalue of opium production came at US$ 251million. The Taleban has levelled the ‘usher’10% tax on all agricultural productionincluding opium, and sometimes managesto collect additional taxes from traders. Thiswould bring Taleban earnings for the topyear at somewhere between US$ 30-45 mil-lion. The following year, in 2000, productionwas down to 3300 tons from 82,000 hectareswith yields dropped to an average 35.7kg/ha (rain-fed fields only reached 18.5kg/ha) and prices had fallen to US$ 30 perkilo. Total farmgate value in 2000 amount-ed thus to only US$ 91 million. With pro-duction down to only 185 tons in 2001, butvery high prices, UNDCP still estimatespotential gross income from the sale of freshopium by farmers around US$56 million,but most of that was earned and taxed inNorthern Alliance controlled territory. Sincethe ban, Taleban earnings from opium werepractically down to zero.

The figures are very low compared to themany billions that are earned higher up inthe commodity chain with trafficking andstreet sale of processed heroin. There are noexamples documented that connect theTaleban directly with international heroin

trafficking. Such allegations do exist againstJuma Namangani of the Islamic Movementof Uzbekistan, and against Hajji Bashar,both operating in Afghanistan in alliancewith the Taleban. On Northern Alliance side,similar allegations have been reportedagainst ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul RashidDostum, who joined the alliance earlier thisyear. To what extent other heroin traffickingrings might support any of the factions in asubstantial way, like what happened duringthe anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s with clear-ance from the CIA and Pakistan intelligence,is today a largely unknown factor. Includingthe DEA has to rely on very vague languageto argue an alleged connection betweendrugs and terrorism in the case of Taleban,Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network:“Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirmthat Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, therelationship between the Taliban and Bin Ladenis believed to have flourished in large part due tothe Taliban’s substantial reliance on the opiumtrade as a source of organizational revenue.While the activities of the two entities do notalways follow the same trajectory, we know thatdrugs and terror frequently share the commonground of geography, money, and violence. In thisrespect, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Ladenis based on the existence of the Taliban’s supportfor the drug trade. This connection defines thedeadly, symbiotic relationship between the illicitdrug trade and international terrorism.”

Taleban opium earnings are also low whencompared to their other main illicit sourceof income: large scale regional contrabandof regular goods, either flown in directlyfrom duty-free Dubai and then smuggled toneighbouring countries, or diverted fromtax-exempted transit shipments throughPakistan under the Afghan Transit TradeAgreement (ATTA). A World Bank study esti-mated this contraband trade to be worthUS$ 2.5 billion in 1997 and that the Talebanderived at least US$ 75 million from it.


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Box 1

Taleban & Opium Economy`

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9D r u g s a n d C o n f l i c t n o 3 - D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 1

W A R & O P I U M I N A F G H A N I S TA NU N D C P ’ S I L L F AT E D I N T E R V E N T I O N S

Afghanistan has been the centreof attention for the UnitedNations International Drug Con-

trol Programme (UNDCP) since it becameclear that the country had gained the status ofthe world’s largest source of opium. Since1994, the Annual Opium Poppy Survey ofUNDCP’s Crop Monitoring Programme is themost reliable source for figures on poppyhectares and opium production potential. Tounderstand the complexities of the Afghanopium economy, UNDCP’s Strategic Study Seriesis indispensable. It has documented the expan-sion of poppy fields in Afghanistan and the rea-sons behind it; the role of opium as a sourceof credit and in livelihood strategies of smallfarmers and war refugees; the role of womenin the opium economy and the rural dynamicsbehind the illicit trade.

Unfortunately, this accumulated wisdom seemsabsent in the planning and implementation ofUNDCP projects that aimed to stem the flowof illicit drugs from Afghanistan. The policyinterventions have been highly politicised andevery one of them has been plagued by con-troversy. The following reconstruction ofUNDCP’s troubled efforts casts serious doubtabout the ability of this agency to play a con-structive role in the crucial political momenttoday, where the drugs-and-war nexus inAfghanistan has come to the attention of theentire international community.

Alternative Development

By 1989, once Soviet troops had leftAfghanistan on February 15, UN agencies wereconscious of the potential increase of illicitopium production. It had grown steadily overthe past few years already reaching an outputof 1200 metric tons, roughly one-third of glob-al production. The countryside was devastat-ed and millions of refugees were starting toreturn to their home villages. Integration intothe established opium economy was their bestoption to survive. To counter this threatUNDCP launched its first Alternative Devel-opment project in June 1989. This AfghanistanDrug Control and Rural Rehabilitation project(AD/AFG/89/580), with a total budget of

US$9.2 million, would last until March 1996.Across the major poppy growing provinces,over 200 small drug control development pro-jects were initiated as part of the overall inter-national rehabilitation and reconstructionefforts in Afghanistan. The only common ele-ment in the package of scattered projects andthe only difference with the many other ruralreconstruction efforts implemented by otheragencies, was the ‘poppy clause.’ Prior to thestart of a project communities had to sign anagreement to end opium cultivation. Enforcingthis clause, however, proved to be impossible.Between 1989 and 1994 opium productionnearly tripled to 3400 tons. Evaluations of theprogramme did recognize its contribution tooverall rehabilitation of the countryside, butacknowledged its failure in terms of reducingpoppy crops.

In March 1997 a second initiative was launchedin the form of a pilot project: the Poppy CropReduction Project (AD/AFG/97/C28), with atotal budget aim of US$ 12.5 million for the1997-2001 project period. It was financed byGermany, Italy, The Netherlands and the USA,but never reached the target amount. A morefocussed intervention was planned in four spe-cific districts (three in Qandahar and one inNangarhar province), aiming to improve con-ditions for alternative incomes for farmersthrough a range of activities: “Activities willinclude introduction of alternatives to poppy basedcropping systems, rehabilitation of karez and canalirrigation systems (including the Nangarhar canal),road improvement, flood protection, introduction ofa rural credit system, improvement of veterinaryand animal husbandry services, rehabilitation of theQandahar wool factory and electricity substation,promotion of opportunities for self-employment andsmall-scale commercial enterprises, skill enhance-ment through an apprentice scheme, establishmentof schools and health, drinking water supply andimproved sanitation facilities and training pro-grammes for women in basic family health and live-stock production.”

The ‘poppy clause’ in this programme wasimplemented through Drug Control ActionPlans (DCAPs). Local authorities and commu-nity representatives had to commit themselvesto full elimination of illicit crops in the project

period. “Under its conditionality policy, UNDCP willprovide development assistance only if a ban onopium poppy cultivation has been declared at dis-trict level and that the concerned authorities atprovincial, district and village levels have commit-ted themselves to enforce such ban.” The DCAPsrecognized the necessity of a four year grad-ual reduction scheme, but failed to specify anyrelationship between achieving developmenttargets and diminishing illicit crops. In spite ofthe pilot status of the programme, the DCAPreduction timetables did not allow any flexi-bility to build confidence with the involvedcommunities. Instead they pressured them -invain- to comply with schedules that did nottake into account survival necessities or lessonslearned elsewhere. In Pakistan, similar effortshad taken 8-12 years to reach sustainableresults. While the UNDCP Strategic Study Seriescollected data and new insights about house-hold decision making on poppy planting, therole of women in the opium economy and theimportance of opium as a credit facility, this didnot lead to any adaptations in the programme.

Towards the end of 2000 the project wasabruptly ended. Only about US$ 3 million hadactually been spent in the four districts. Donorenthusiasm had ran out because of criticalreviews about its impact, political inconve-nience about dealing with Taleban authorities,and an internal management crisis in UNDCPinvolving Executive Director Pino Arlacchi. At

the time evaluations concluded that opiumpoppy was indeed significantly reduced by2000, particularly in the Qandahar districts.However, no causal relationship with the pro-ject activities could be confirmed. A severedrought was the main cause of the fall in plant-ed area and yield, a pattern shown as well indistricts outside of the project coverage.

The pilot project failed to meet its original keytargets, one of which was stated as: “The pro-ject will demonstrate to the Afghan authorities thata poppy ban can be sustained without due hard-ship when supported with a programme to helppoppy growing areas along an alternative path ofsocio-economic development.” Rising productionpatterns, disappointment over drug controlimpact of Alternative Development pro-grammes, donor reluctance and a change inleadership shifted UNDCP closer to a depen-dency on law enforcement. Emphasis was laidon developing an efficient method of forcederadication, negotiate a complete opium banwith Taleban authorities and close offAfghanistan’s borders. Alternative Develop-ment became a negotiating tool to achieve areduction through repressive means.

Negotiating the Ban

In the one-year lapse between ending the firstAlternative Development programme in 1996

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Wa r & O p i u m i n A f g h a n i s t a nU N D C P ’ s i l l F a t e d I n t e r v e n t i o n s


Afghanistan - Opium Production & Poppy Hectares - UNDCP Figures

and starting the second, the Taleban gainedcontrol over Nangarhar province and the cap-ital Kabul. The southern opium producingprovinces were already under their controlsince 1995. Given the ‘conditionality principle’ inthe pilot project, this meant entering intonegotiations with the Taleban as the de-factoauthorities. In November 1996 the new gov-ernment in Kabul issued its first statement onthe issue. The Taleban declared their opposi-tion to the production, processing, traffickingand abuse of opium and pledged their deter-mination to take all necessary measures, in thecontext of regional cooperation and interna-tional assistance. The delicate mission to nego-tiate the terms of this pledge was assigned toGiovanni Quaglia who represented UNDCP intalks with Taleban authorities in 1997. UNDCPmade clear that it was willing to channel aid andinvestment into Afghanistan but that it wouldget the green light only if the Taleban leader-ship would issue a public edict declaring thatopium cultivation is a violation of Islamic law,and would co-operate actively in eliminatingpoppy crops in areas under their control. MrQuaglia explained to the press: "We have toldthem, 'We give you one, and you give us one back’.This is the language of business. Taleban areAfghans and all Afghans are traders. This is the lan-guage they understand. Taleban has been told thatsilence is complicity. It already has a serious inter-national image problem, and the time has nowcome for the leadership to make clear to the worldits policy on drugs."

On September 10, 1997, the Taleban Ministryof Foreign Affairs issued the required declara-tion: “The Islamic State of Afghanistan informs allcompatriots that as the use of heroin and hashishis not permitted in Islam, they are reminded onceagain that they should strictly refrain from grow-ing, using and trading in hashish and heroin. Any-one who violates this order shall be meted out apunishment in line with the lofty Mohammad andSharia law and thus shall not be entitled to launcha complaint.” It was amended by a clarificationissued on October 20 which specifically bannedcultivation and trafficking of opium.

When Pino Arlacchi was appointed ExecutiveDirector of UNDCP in September 1997, hetook the issue as his first priority and imme-diately travelled to Afghanistan to personally

pursue the negotiations. “In Afghanistan it is amatter of helping the Taleban do something theywant to do anyway as strict Moslems,” Arlacchitold reporters during his visit to Helmand inNovember. He offered the Taleban authoritiesa potential amount of US$ 250 million over adecade for Alternative Development if theywould fully cooperate in eliminating opiumpoppy cultivation. Leaving Afghanistan, Arlac-chi announced that he had solved the Afghandrug problem. It was to become the new Exec-utive Director’s trademark to spread aroundpromises without having secured any donorcommitment, leaving a trail of failed promisesand frustrated (non-)recipients.

The 1998/99 winter season productionreached the enormous record of an estimat-ed 4565 tons of opium, while negotiations toenforce the pledge continued. In March 1999,UNDCP organised a high-level meeting in Pak-istan with nine Taleban drug control officials,fifteen Islamabad-based Drug Liaison Officersfrom around the world and representatives ofPakistan Anti-Narcotics Forces. Experts inIslamic Law were brought in to discuss legalissues of poppy cultivation under Taleban juris-diction and to argue for practical steps towardsenforcement of an opium ban. In September1999, just prior to the new planting season anda month before a Security Council meetingabout actions against the Taleban regime, Mul-lah Omar issued a decree to decrease poppycultivation by one-third and the UNDCP wasinvited to witness an eradication-show of somepoppy fields in Nangarhar. In fact, UN moni-toring confirmed after harvest season in spring2000 a significant 28% production decline to3276 tons of opium. In terms of the numberof hectares dedicated to opium, however, thedecline was only 9%, the lower average yieldper hectare was caused by the drought. TheTaleban had hoped that by showing willingnessto co-operate with the international commu-nity on the drugs issue, the Security Councilmight take a softer stand in its accusation thatthe Taleban were supporting terrorism. But itdid not prevent the Security Council fromimposing the first sanctions in October 1999.

Then, on July 27, 2000, Mullah Omar issued histotal ban on opium planting for the next sea-son. Conditions at that moment were much

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more favourable to effectuate such a ban.Prices were still low after the over-productionin the previous seasons and the continuingdrought made poppy planting a risky enterpriseanyhow. Initially, few international observerswere convinced the ban would be for real thistime. However, it was clear to most farmersthat this time planting might be punished andalthough widespread repression did not occur,several examples of arrests and destruction offields were reported. Given the reputation ofrigidity the Taleban had gained, the ban defin-itively contributed to the spectacular crash ofthe Afghan opium economy in the 2000/2001winter season. The almost complete disap-pearance of opium poppy from Taleban con-trolled areas could only be confirmed by May2001.

The gesture came too late for the Taleban tocash in on the basis of Quaglia’s 'We give youone, and you give us one back’ or Arlacchi’s hol-low carrot of US$ 250 million. Instead of areward or compensation, Arlacchi announcedin September 2000 to close down all opera-tional activities in Afghanistan. The decisioneven took UNDCP staff in the country by sur-prise, who learned about it when listening tothe BBC. The Taleban expressed anger: “Weare wondering how the [UN] can step out of itsprogramme on the pretence of not having the fund-ing,” said Abdel Hamid Akhundzada, directorof the Taleban’s High Commission for DrugControl. “We have fulfilled our obligations. Wedemand that the agreement we made should befulfilled up to the end.” But political develop-ments internationally had turned into anotherdirection, towards confrontation with the Tale-ban regime. In that climate, Arlacchi had notbeen able to enthuse donors for major devel-opment investments and he already was mov-ing along other paths, for which he no longerneeded the Taleban.

Security Belt

While the Taleban renewed their threat to pun-ish all Afghan farmers who grow opium poppyor cannabis, UNDCP was proposing to set upa ‘Security Belt’ around Afghanistan to containthe flow of drugs by strengthening border anddrug control capacities of neighbouring coun-

Roughly between one-third and half of the opiumfrom Afghanistan is consumed in the region itself.Apart from widespread traditional opium smoking,the region is experiencing a major crisis of heroinabuse. UNDCP estimates the number of heroin usersin Pakistan at 1-1.5 million and in Iran at 1.5-1.8 mil-lion, figures that roughly equal the total heroin userpopulation in Western Europe. Most of Afghanistan’sproduction leaves the country in the form of opium ormorphine base, the first step towards heroin process-ing which takes place largely in Turkey and Pakistanand more recently in the Central Asian republics.Heroin laboratories inside Afghanistan are on the riseas well. This is demonstrated by the interception ofprocessed heroin at the Iranian and Tajik borders andthe seizure of acetic anhydride shipments destined forAfghanistan, a crucial chemical precursor in the refin-ing process from morphine base to heroin.

The Balkan route has been the most significant traf-ficking route towards Europe. Huge quantities ofopium and morphine base, passing through Pakistanand Iran, are refined in Turkish laboratories, trans-ported via the Balkan, and sold on the Western Euro-pean market in the form of crude heroin, ‘brownsugar.’ On a small scale further refinement takes placeinto high grade ‘number 4’ heroin, similar to the qual-ity of South-East Asian heroin. The Silk route throughCentral Asia is gaining importance, primarily to sup-ply the expanding heroin markets in Russia and East-ern Europe. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have turnedinto substantial processing, storage and transit coun-tries. Transshipment also takes place through Turk-menistan, into Iran or across the Caspian Sea, into theCaucasus to Turkey or up north into Russia.

The border regions have become virtual war zones,where heavily armed trafficking groups are confront-ed by militarized police forces. Especially in Iran,where over the year 2000, Iran drug control agenciesreported 1500 armed clashes and more than 900smugglers killed. In total over the past two decades,more than 3000 Iranian police and military have losttheir lives in such confrontations. Insecurity hasreached dramatic levels also because of many kid-nappings by traders to settle disputes or for ransomin order to repay debts after traders have lost cargo topolice seizure. According to the drug control chief ofKhorasan province: “If we built the Great Wall ofChina, the traffickers would still find a way to get in.We shoot one today, and tomorrow there are two.”

Box 2: Drugs Trafficking in the Region


tries. Arlacchi announced the plan at the Inter-national Conference on Enhancing Security and Sta-bility in Central Asia: An Integrated Approach toCounter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism,in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in October 2000.

The next day he travelled to Dushanbe, Tajik-istan, to inaugurate the new Drug ControlAgency which had been set up with UNDCPassistance. “The Tajikistan projects were from thevery beginning shrouded in secrecy,” according toMichael von der Schulenberg, who accompa-nied Arlacchi in his first mission to Tajikistanin April 1999 as Director for Operations andAnalysis. “Mr. Arlacchi promised the President tofinance a Drug Control Agency and to pay nation-al salaries for three years of all law enforcementofficers. Later he added a commitment of US$ 2million for Russian border guards stationed alongthe Afghan-Tajik border. (..) The crucial recruitmentof four international inspectors has been haltedleaving the Drug Control Agency with virtually nointernational supervision.”

The money largely came from UNDCP’s verylimited General Purpose Funds. The Dutchgovernment was not pleased when they dis-covered that about US$ 300,000 of a Dutchdonation to UNDCP earmarked for demandreduction projects, was actually used to buyarms and equipment for this paramilitary elitepolice unit of a repressive state in the highlyunstable Central Asian region. Arlacchi had aletter drafted to convince the Dutch donorthat this project would contribute to demandreduction, but was convinced by his advisorsthat it was wiser to re-allocate the money toa Caribbean drug abuse prevention project.

The Security Belt programme was intended togather funds totalling US$ 87 million. Due tolack of donor support only the Tajikistan pro-jects and -since May 2001- a UK supportedeffort to strengthen drug control efforts in Iranhave been approved so far. Again Arlacchi hadbeen quick in promising money, but poor in col-lecting it. Arlacchi gathered a team of intimate-largely Italian- friends around him for hisefforts in Central Asia, who only reported tohim. Responsibility for or even informationabout anything to do with activities inAfghanistan or Central Asia was taken awayfrom Michael von der Schulenberg (Director

Operations) and Anthony White (Head Sup-ply Reduction), who both left the agency inutter frustration at the end of 2000.

An important forum at the background of theSecurity Belt programme is the so-called "SixPlus Two" Group, a regular meeting to coordi-nate policies towards Afghanistan of repre-sentatives from six neighbouring countries(Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turk-menistan and China) plus the United States andthe Russian Federation. In February 2000, thisSix-Plus-Two group took up the question ofillicit drugs coming out of Afghanistan and itsdestabilizing impact on the region. UNDCPwas asked to assist in identifying a jointresponse. One month later, Arlacchi briefedthe UN Security Council and a statement wasissued encouraging the Six-Plus-Two Group toaddress drug-related issues in a coordinatedmanner, with the support of UNDCP. TheSecurity Council statement also urged otherMember States to increase their support forefforts aimed at strengthening the drug controlcapacities of countries bordering Afghanistan.In May 2000 UNDCP convened a meetingbetween experts from the Six-Plus-Two Groupand major donor countries to discuss the drugthreat from Afghanistan and regional insecuri-ty. A Regional Action Plan was approved onSeptember 13, 2000, largely a wish list toincrease international security and border con-trol assistance to the Central Asian republics.

Biological War on Drugs

In February 1998, UNDCP signed a $650.000contract with the Institute of Genetics inTashkent, Uzbekistan, for a 3.5 year researchprogramme to develop “an effective, reliable andenvironmentally safe agent for the eradication ofopium poppy.” A pathogenic plant fungus wasidentified capable to infect and kill opiumpoppy. The project (AD/RER/98/C37), fundedby the US and UK governments, was referredto for the first time in the Strategy for Cocaand Opium Poppy Elimination (SCOPE).SCOPE was meant to become the Grand Mas-ter Plan to free the world of cocaine and hero-in within a decade by combining AlternativeDevelopment and eradication interventions.Pino Arlacchi promoted SCOPE heavily but

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failed to have it endorsed at the UN GeneralAssembly Special Session on Drugs in 1998.The fungus project, however, proceeded asplanned.

UNDCP called upon the 1996 Memorandumof Understanding on Drug Control Coopera-tion, signed by all Central Asian governments,providing the legal basis for cooperation ineradication of illicit opium poppy in the region.However, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstanrefused to collaborate in the fungus experi-ments. The government of Uzbekistan waswilling to host the programme and after labo-ratory testing, field experiments started in2000 in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistanwith the fungus Pleospora papaveracea. Theresearch phase of the programme has recent-ly been concluded. The next step is to installa scientific panel to review its results, evaluat-ing potential risks for environment, legal cropsand human health. Taking into account the con-clusions of the review panel, UNDCP and theproject donors will decide whether or not toproceed to the next stage: the deployment ofthe fungus in Central Asia to destroy poppyfields by triggering an epidemic of the fungal dis-ease and making the soil unfit for poppy plant-ing for many years. The real target for the pro-ject, however, lies next-door in Afghanistan.Arlacchi allegedly considered to get the UNrecognized Afghan Government in exile, toagree to massive application of the Pleosporafungus in Afghanistan.

A similar project that was intended to devel-op the Fusarium fungus to destroy coca cropsin Colombia, triggered so much resistancefrom scientists, environmental groups, indige-nous peoples and governments from theregion, that the Colombian government decid-ed not to allow field testing on its territory.UNDCP had to withdraw the project plans.The controversy sparked unrest worldwideabout the idea that a UN agency might start abiological front in the War on Drugs, prompt-ing also several European countries and theEuropean Parliament to denounce such plansstrongly. This now forces UNDCP, the US andthe UK to consider very carefully the future ofthe Uzbek project, which has become politi-cally a highly sensitive issue.On the other hand, the current war against the

Taleban regime might improve conditions forthe protagonists of the now ready-to-use fun-gus to pursue their agenda. Spraying Pleospo-ra spores from high altitudes might be pre-sented as an effective weapon to prevent or tocounter a resurgence of opium poppy cultiva-tion in Taleban controlled territories, derivingthem of a potential source of income for theirwar treasure by harvest time next spring.

Drugs, Terrorism and War

By May 2001 the absence of opium poppy inTaleban controlled territory was confirmed byUNDCP. “We have done what needed to be done,putting our people and our farmers throughimmense difficulties. We expected to be reward-ed for our actions, but instead were punished withadditional sanctions,” the Taleban’s High Com-mission for Drug Control complained. UNSecurity Council sanctions against the Talebanwere re-inforced in January, because of USpressure to get Osama Bin Laden extraditedfrom Afghanistan. The international communitybegan to focus on the “increasingly interweavingthreats of drug trafficking, organized crime and ter-rorism.” The Tashkent Conference in October2000 had been the first initiative in the regionexplicitly making the connection betweendrugs, crime and terrorism. According to Schu-lenberg “the outcome of this meeting has beenquestioned repeatedly ever since, due the lack ofdefinition of what constitutes ‘terrorism’ in theregional context.”

The UN panel installed to recommend ways ofmonitoring an arms embargo on the Talebanquestioned the motives of the opium ban. “IfTaleban officials were sincere in stopping the pro-duction of opium and heroin, then one would expectthem to order the destruction of all stocks existingin areas under their control,” the panel said in itsreport to the UN Security Council. The panelalso stated that the proceeds of the sale ofstockpiled opium were being used to buy armsand “finance the training of terrorists and supportthe operations of extremists in neighbouring coun-tries and beyond.” The team of experts touredthe six neighbouring states to assess how bor-der controls might be further tightened.The Afghanistan Support Group, a regulardonor conference under the UN to coordinate

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aid to the country, recognizes the humanitari-an drama caused by the opium ban and notedat its meeting in Islamabad in June 2001 that its“members were unanimous in their recognitionthat it was imperative the international communityresponds as soon as possible to alleviate the sufferingof those farmers and labourers most affected by theban.” In response, UNDCP prepared an assis-tance plan and in August a pilot project for theNangarhar province was launched. A meetingwas prepared for early October to seek the sup-port of the donor community. However, asArlacchi explained in October: “The tragic eventsof September 11 changed the situation. UNDCPdecided to put all its activities in Afghanistan on holdfor the time being. This included the closure of therecently launched project in Nangarhar.”

On October 16, UNDCP convened a meetingwith representatives of seventeen donor coun-tries, of nine countries in the region aroundAfghanistan and of the European Commissionto assess the situation following the terroristattacks of September 11. “Participants recog-nized that the importance of the fight against drugsin Afghanistan had gained increased urgencybecause of connections between drug trafficking andthe financing of terrorism. Despite the Taliban’seffective ban on poppy cultivation last year, traf-ficking in Afghan heroin, drawing on importantstockpiles, continued unabated. Participants in themeeting expressed their joint commitment tostrengthening cooperation in order to reinforce bor-der control capacity in the region, both of the coun-tries in the first and second ‘lines of defence’ andto fight against drug trafficking.”

Looking to the future, Arlacchi has pleadedbefore the Organization for Security and Coop-eration in Europe (OSCE Permanent Council,1 November 2001) to apply the UNDCP’s ‘con-ditionality principle’ to all reconstruction efforts:“The millions that will be spent on the reconstruc-tion of Afghanistan will diminish greatly in value ifthey do not include a guarantee that opium poppycultivation and heroin production will no longer beallowed. [..] I call on you to join us in an action toprevent the return of opium poppy. This will con-tribute to security in all OSCE countries. A reduc-tion in the availability of illicit drugs will address animportant threat to human security in the region andin Europe. In addition, the removal of the profits fromillicit drugs will make it more difficult for terrorists

and organized criminal groups to threaten bothhuman security and national security.”

Conclusion

Afghanistan today is at the centre of the world’sattention now that the ‘alliance against terror-ism’ is engaged in a full-blown war against theTaleban regime. The importance of under-standing the illicit drugs economy as a cross-cut-ting issue touching on security and developmentissues is more and more recognized. Policymaking to address the endemic conflict insideAfghanistan, the severe developmental crisisand the refugee drama, has to incorporate thedrugs factor. Reconstruction of the countryand prevention of recurring armed conflict willhave to be accompanied by considerate policyapproaches towards the reality of the opiumeconomy as a component of survival strategies.Implementing unsound Alternative Develop-ment strategies, a repressive ban, risky andineffective biological eradication methods, orstrengthening the repressive apparatus of neigh-bouring authoritarian regimes, may well deteri-orate the crisis even further. The internationalcommunity has to look beyond applying theblunt instrument of a ‘conditionality principle.’Given the history of UNDCP’s ill fated inter-ventions in the region and the current mal-functioning of the agency in terms of manage-ment and evaluation mechanisms, it seems wiseto consider an institutional UN framework forthe reconstruction of Afghanistan without aleading role of UNDCP in the process. A widerdevelopment and conflict resolution and pre-vention context will have to prevail, accompa-nied by drugs policy approaches based on learn-ing from past failures, in which many ofUNDCP’s dogma’s need to be re-thought.

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Herat

Farah

NimrozHelmand

Qandahar

Zabul Paktika

India

Pakistan

TajikistanChina

Uzbekistan

Turkmenistan

IranGhazni

Wardak

BamyanParwan

Kabul

KapisaKunar

Laghman

Nangarhar

Paktia

Logar

Uruzgan

Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

JawzjanBalkh

Samangan

KunduzTakhar

Baghlan

Badakhshan

Herat

Farah

NimrozHelmand

Qandahar

Zabul Paktika

India

Pakistan

TajikistanChina

Uzbekistan

Turkmenistan

IranGhazni

Wardak

BamyanParwan

Kabul

KapisaKunar

Laghman

Nangarhar

Paktia

Logar

Uruzgan

Ghor

Badghis

Faryab

JawzjanBalkh

Samangan

KunduzTakhar

Baghlan

Badakhshan

Total Area (ha)

0 - 2021 - 100101 - 1000Over 1000

Total Area (ha)

1-200201 - 500501 - 10001001 - 30003001 - 5000Over 5000

Based on UNDCP data

Based on UNDCP data

Afghanistan: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2000

Afghanistan: Opium Poppy Cultivation, 2001

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On July 27, 2000, the Taleban authoritiesbanned opium poppy. The UNDCP AnnualOpium Poppy Survey for 2001, released inOctober, confirms in detail the near total suc-cess of the ban in eliminating poppy cultiva-tion in Taleban controlled areas. “An estimat-ed 7,606 hectares (Ha) of opium poppy was cul-tivated in Afghanistan during the 2001 season.This represents a reduction in total poppy areaof 91% compared to last year’s estimate of82,172 Ha. Helmand Province, the highest cul-tivating province last year with 42,853 Ha,recorded no poppy cultivation in the 2001 sea-son. Nangarhar, the second highest cultivatingprovince last year with 19,747 Ha is reported tohave 218 Ha this year. (..) In Badakhshan, therehas been an increase from 2,458 Ha to 6,342 Hacompared to last year.” The survey revealed thepolitically inconvenient reality that this year80% of the total 185 tons of opium fromAfghanistan came from territories controlledby the Northern Alliance. In absolute terms,however, this only represented a small amountcompared to previous years’ production.

Much has been speculated about the existenceof huge stockpiles of opium remaining fromthe record harvests of previous years. Manycommentators alleged that the ban also wasintended to restore market prices. There is nodoubt that the 1999 and 2000 figures repre-sented an over-production for the opium andheroin markets. Indeed, by harvest time 2000,fresh opium prices had bottomed to US$ 30 perkilo, indicating a saturation of demand. Thedynamics of the opium market, however, makeit unlikely that substantial stocks were undercontrol of the Taleban and that they wouldbenefit much from restoring prices.

One of the reasons behind the over-productionof 1999 can be found in the role opium has asa grassroots banking system, providing creditto farmers through the salaam system of pre-harvest sale to traders. As explained in “TheRole of Opium as a Source of Informal Credit”(UNDCP Strategic Study #3): “The dramaticfall in the yield of opium in 1998, has led tomany households, particularly the most vul-nerable, facing considerable problems repayingtheir seasonal debts and servicing their long-term debts. Given the substantial increase in the

post harvest price of opium in the south in1998, those who purchased opium on the openmarket to repay their salaam debt, were foundto be paying as much as four times the value ofthe original advance given.” Many farmersmanaged to reschedule their repayments tothe next season. The study illustrates with anexample of a sharecropper: “In order to repayhis marriage expenses(..) he had obtainedsalaam from a trader for 14 kg of opium. Unfor-tunately, poor yields in 1998 meant that he onlyreceived 7 kg as his fifth share of the final opiumcrop. The trader agreed to accept the 7 kg ofopium (..) on the understanding that the cur-rent 7 kg deficit would be supplemented with afurther 7 kg in 1999.” “Increasing opium poppycultivation was cited by all socio-economicgroups as a means of repaying their loans.”Especially in the south, much more was plant-ed at the end of 1998. Combined with the goodyield in 1999 this led to the record production.Much of the over-production thus went direct-ly to traders. The next harvest season showeda downfall of prices caused by market satura-tion, leading many farmers to keep part oftheir opium stashed on their farm awaitingbetter prices. The likely owners of the stocksare opium traders and heroin producers–largely outside of Afghanistan- and farmersthemselves.

One of the dramatic consequences of the ban,is the breakdown of this informal credit systembased on opium. At the end of 2000 and early2001, some 200,000 refugees moved towardsPakistan and Iran, amongst them many indebt-ed former poppy farmers unable to obtainsalaam to live through the winter and default-ing on their longer term loans. The suddenending of poppy cultivation has wreaked havocon local economies. Bernard Frahi, head ofthe UNDCP office in Pakistan, applauded thesuccess of the opium ban. “This is the firsttime that a country has decided to eliminate inone go - not gradually - these crops on its terri-tory,'' and called it "one of the most remarkablesuccesses ever" in the UN drug fight. SandeepChawla, head of UNDCP research, howeveracknowledges that “in drug control terms itwas un unprecedented success, but in human-itarian terms a major disaster,” casting doubton the sustainibility of the implosion.

Box 3

The Opium Ban

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The illicit drugs market in and aroundAfghanistan, has been highly unstable thisyear. This is due firstly to the impact of theopium ban and more recently because ofthe military intervention. When it becameclear that little opium would be produced,prices for fresh opium increased 10-foldcompared to last year to some US$ 300 perkg around spring harvest time, and greweven higher to US$ 700 by early Septemberbefore the attacks in the US. Theseunprecedented high prices indicate that nohuge stockpiles of opium remained in thecountry. After September 11, traders andfarmers who still had stocks began to selland move opium and morphine base outof the country, anticipating the counterat-tack against Afghanistan and forecasting are-bound of poppy cultivation. Pricesdropped rapidly. Several sources mentiona price fall inside Afghanistan to about US$100 by October. This is still above the levelof the past decade, when prices per kgaveraged between US$ 35-70 per kg.Opium prices in Pakistan showed a similarpattern of strong growth between Marchand September and a decline after Sep-tember 11. In comparison, heroin whole-sale prices in the region seem to haveremained more stable, indicating that traf-ficking groups are still able to provide themarket with a steady supply from stocksheld outside of Afghanistan. Street pricesin Europe and the US have not been affect-ed at all so far.

Apart from the chaotic fluctuations in theregion caused by the panic of the war, thebig question is how the global market willrespond in the mid and longer term to thecrash of opium production in Afghanistan.

The global supply, combining the figuresfrom South-West Asia with South-East Asiaand the smaller amounts from Mexico andColombia, is compared to last year downfrom 4700 tons to 1700 tons. Such a down-fall is impossible to sustain. Either heroinprices will rise steeply and many con-sumers and addicts will run into seriousdifficulties maintaining their habit and beforced to find chemical substitutes, or sup-ply will restore itself.

It is likely that opium production inAfghanistan will resume to a certain extent.Taleban authorities maintain that all therumours stating that they would reversethe ban are fabrications. “When the author-ity of a Muslim land asks the community toobey a religious decree, even if they arestarving or facing a difficult situation, theyhave to obey and they have to be patient.”In case the opium ban would be lifted, thereturn of poppy in territories until recent-ly under Taleban control will be massive, asa farmer was quoted: “When Mullah Omartold us not to plant poppies, we did notplant them. And when he tells us it's per-missible, we will plant it again. He is ourCommander of the Faithful.” But even if theban will be formally upheld, conditionsfor enforcing it have definitively changed.In spite of the drop after September 11,prices are still good and are likely to riseagain, providing a strong incentive to farm-ers for planting. The Taleban regime clear-ly has other priorities at the moment andneeds its security forces for defence tasksinstead of preventing poppy planting oreradication operations. The planting sea-son is in October/November and observersin Afghanistan have indeed spotted

Box 4

The Market Responds

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farmers preparing fields in severalprovinces.

There will be also market pressure toincrease opium production in otherplaces. On a small scale, poppy culti-vation exists already in Central Asia.Border areas in Pakistan were signifi-cant producing regions especially untilthe 1979 Hadd Ordinance prohibitingproduction and consumption of alldrugs, which shifted cultivation intoAfghanistan. The same holds true forIran, but both countries seem to beaware of the threat and are determinedto repress any re-bound. Global deficitmay also increase prices far away inBurma, Laos, Mexico and Colombia,providing incentives for growth. So far,however, there are no indications ofrising prices there and the farmgateraw opium price levels have over thepast years already been much higher incomparison with Afghanistan: inBurma around US$ 200 per kg, inColombia between US$ 300-400.

Supply reduction efforts over the pastdecades have failed on a global scale.One way or another, the marketarranges the displacement of crops. Asalso Arlacchi has come to understandafter four years of UNDCP director-ship and in spite of his policy prefer-ence for law enforcement and a ‘goingto the source’ approach: “If demanddoes not decrease, then any successagainst illicit supply will not be sus-tainable.”

REFERENCES AND

USEFUL WEBSITES

http://www.tni.orgSite of the Transnational Institute, with a special issues sec-tion dedicated to the War in Afghanistan (www.tni.org/wtc).It includes articles on the war on drugs in the context of thewar in Afghanistan. The website of the TNI Drugs & Democ-racy programme (www.tni.org/drugs) contains special sec-tions on Drugs & Peace in Colombia, chemical fumigations,the biological War on Drugs, UNDCP drug control and anextensive list of links and documentation.

www.tni.org/drugs/research/threats.htmRicardo Vargas; A New World Era: Threats and Incidents Con-cerning the Colombian Case, TNI/AA Briefing, November2001.

www.undcp.orgThe United Nations International Drug Control Programmeis the UN agency responsible for coordinating activitiesrelating to the international control of narcotic drugs and psy-chotropic substances. The UNDCP collects data and pro-duces analysis on all dimensions of the drugs issue. OnAfghanistan, excellent data can be found in Global Illicit DrugTrends 2001(www.undcp.org/global_illicit_drug_trends.html), AnnualOpium Poppy Survey and the Strategic Study Series (both atwww.undcp.org/pakistan/publications.html).

www.mapinc.org/drugnewsSite of the Media Awareness Project (MAP). MAP is a fea-ture of DrugSense. Extensive information and links. TheDrugnews Index provides on-line news from major Englishlanguage press and press agencies about drug policy, mostlyon consumption issues and domestic U.S. law enforcement,but also international news. Daily update, free access andinteractive.

www.mycoherbicide.netA site dedicated to the open investigation of mycoherbicides,by Sharon Stevenson and Jeremy Bigwood. This site attemptsto consider many aspects of the proposed and actual use ofmycoherbicides against drug crops: i.e. marijuana, coca, andopium, including issues of mutability and toxicity.

www.sunshine-project.orgThe Sunshine Project is a nonprofit bringing information tolight on potential abuses of biotechnology. The Project is con-cerned misuse of some science may undermine agreementson peace, disarmament, and the environment. Throughresearch, awareness building, and advocacy, the Sunshine Pro-ject stands for international consensus that advances inhealth, agriculture, and microbiology should not be used toharm people or their environment.

http://www.tni.org

The connection between terrorism and the illic-it drug trade has made the headlines after the ter-rorist attacks of September 11. In their publicstatements, leaders of the international allianceagainst Osama Bin Laden and the Taleban repeat-edly stressed that not only were innocent civil-ians terrorised, but poisoned with heroin as well.What is more, drug profits were also used tofinance terrorist attacks.

With the new international context of the waragainst terrorism, the war on drugs moves cen-tre stage as well. While drugs and terrorism arenow shoved together to demonise the ‘evil’enemy, reality is the victim. Blending the two warsto one seriously endangers the advances made tofind a solution to the drug problem. In this issueof Drugs & Conflict an attempt is made to restorethe facts and separate these merged wars again.

Today, the two major producers of opium poppyand coca, Afghanistan and Colombia, are in themidst of shifting counterdrug strategies. We willlook at the case of Afghanistan, analysing the UNInternational Drug Control Programme(UNDCP) ill fated interventions. And while inter-national attention is focused on Afghanistan, thelinkage of drugs and terrorism is endangering thetroubled peace talks between the governmentand the FARC guerrilla in Colombia.

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The Transnational Institute(TNI) is a decentralized fel-lowship of scholars,researchers and writers fromthe Third World, Europe andthe U.S. committed to createand promote internationalco-operation in analysing andfinding possible solutions tosuch global problems as mil-itarism and conflict, povertyand marginalisation, socialinjustice and environmentaldegradation.

Since 1996, the TNI Drugs &Democracy programme hasbeen analysing trends in theillegal drugs economy and indrug policies globally, theircauses and their effects oneconomy, peace and democ-racy.

The Drugs & Democracy pro-gramme conducts field inves-tigations, engages policydebates, briefs journalistsand officials, coordinatesinternational campaigns andconferences, produces arti-cles, publications and briefingdocuments, and maintains adaily electronic news serviceon drugs related issues.

The aim of the project and ofthe Drugs and Conflict seriesis to stimulate a re-assess-ment of conventional prohib-itive and repressive policyapproaches and to argue forpolicies based on principlesconsistent with a commit-ment to harm reduction, fairtrade, development, democ-racy, human rights, environ-mental and health protec-tion, and conflict prevention.

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drugs and democracy programme - transnational institute"the arms the taleban are buying today...

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