drug court civil suit

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

AT NEW ALBANY

CASE NO. 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB

DESTINY HOFFMAN, NATHAN CLIFFORD, )JOSHUA FOLEY, JESSE HASH, ASHLEIGH )

SANTIAGO, JAMES BENNETT, AMY BENNETT, )

LEE SPAULDING, MICHAEL CAMPBELL, )

AMY TUTTLE, AMANDA CAMPBELL, )

BOBBY UPTON, SHANE BRATCHER )

(formerly “COURTNEY COWHERD”), )

JUSTIN LANHAM, TRENTNEY RHODES, )

JOANIE WATSON )

)

On behalf of themselves and on behalf of )

others similarly situated ))

Plaintiffs ) “Electronically Filed”

v. )

)

JUDGE JEROME F. JACOBI, SUSAN KNOEBEL, )

JEREMY SNELLING, HENRY FORD, CLARK )

COUNTY SHERIFF DANNY RODDEN, DANIELLE )

GRISSETT, STEPHEN MASON, JOSH SEYBOLD )

UNKNOWN CLARK COUNTY WORK RELEASE )

EMPLOYEE(S)), UNKNOWN CLARK COUNTY )

CIRCUIT COURT CLERK AND CLARK )

COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS )

)

Defendants )

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGES

*** *** *** *** *** ***

Come the Plaintiffs, Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua Foley, Jesse Hash,

Ashleigh Santiago, James Bennett, Amy Bennett, Lee Spaulding, Michael Campbell, Amy

Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Bobby Upton, Shane Bratcher (formerly “Courtney Cowherd”),

Case 4:14-cv-00012-SEB-TAB Document 17 Filed 04/08/14 of 58 PageID #: 144



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Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson1 on behalf of themselves and others

similarly situated, by counsel, and for their First Amended Complaint, filed herein as a matter of

right pursuant to FRCP 15, against the Defendants, Judge Jerome F. Jacobi, Susan Knoebel,

Jeremy Snelling, Henry Ford, Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden, Danielle Grissett, Stephen

Mason, Josh Seybold, “Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for

incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013,” “Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk

Responsible for the Erroneous Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16,

2013,” and Clark County Board of Commissioners, state as follows:

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This class action is filed pursuant to 42 USC §1983 due to Clark County’s fundamentally

ingrained and customary policies and practices that have resulted in wholesale constitutional

violations against Named Plaintiffs and those similarly situated.

2. Clark County Circuit Court 2 (formerly “Superior Court II”), by and through individuals

employed in this Court and by other government employees, operated the Clark County Drug

Treatment Court Program (hereinafter “Drug Court”). In the course of said operation, these

government actors knowingly deprived multiple probationers and Drug Court participants of

their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,

among others. The rights of other named, individual Plaintiffs involved with the Clark County

Judicial System were similarly violated.

3. Specifically, Defendants intentionally planned and executed policies, broad in scope,

extended in time, and clearly illegal in nature, that caused the systematic deprivation of these

individuals’ liberty without due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth

1 newly added parties in bold




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Amendments. These constitutional violations included jailing Plaintiffs and those similar situated

for extended periods of time without counsel, notice or hearing before a neutral and detached

hearing officer, and without the corresponding opportunities to appear and present evidence,

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, or receive a written finding as to the evidence

relied upon and the reasons that they were to remain incarcerated. Additionally, certain

Defendants arrested these individuals in the absence of legal authority, resulting in violations of

their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unlawful and unreasonable seizures.

4. As explained in greater detail below, this pattern of unlawful and unconstitutional

conduct was so flagrant, so egregious, and so customary that declaratory and injunctive relief is

necessary to protect the rights of Plaintiffs as well as all other citizens of Clark County, Indiana

who may be under the jurisdiction of Clark County Circuit Court 2 in the future.

5. In addition to the requested relief for each individually named Plaintiff, this action seeks

relief on behalf of the following classes of individuals:

A. All persons who were probationers and/or participants in Clark County

Indiana’s Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2,and who were incarcerated for more than 72 hours without hearing or

other due process of law in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment

rights (as enunciated by Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 US 778 (1973) and

Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App. 2010), among

others), from February 18, 2012 to the date of the order granting class

certification.

B. All persons who are or will be subject to the jurisdiction of Clark County

Indiana’s Drug Treatment Court Program and/or Clark County Circuit

Court 2, as a probationer or Clark County Drug Court participant and who

therefore faces or will face the possibility of being alleged or determined

to be in violation of the rules, terms, and or policies of probation or Drug

Court.

C. All persons who were arrested in Clark County, Indiana by state actors

working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest powers and whose




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arrest was not otherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-33-1-4,

from February 18, 2012 to the date of the order granting class certification.

D. All persons who are or will be subject to arrest in Clark County, Indiana

by state actors working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest

powers and whose arrest is not or will not be otherwise lawful pursuant toIndiana Code § 35-33-1-4.

6. Plaintiffs seek money damages on behalf of Classes A and C, and declaratory and

injunctive relief on behalf of Classes B and D.

II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

7. This action arises under the United States Constitution, particularly under the provisions

of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States, and under federal

law, particularly Title 42 of the United States Code §1983 (“Civil Rights Act”).

8. This Court possesses jurisdiction of this case under the provisions of Title 28 of the

United States Code, §1331 and §1343, particularly §1343(3), which contains no jurisdictional

amount requirement.

9. Venue lies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana

pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code, §1391.

10. Plaintiffs are not required to provide any state agency or state employee with pre-suit

notice of this §1983 class action or otherwise exhaust their state administrative remedies,

pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by Felder v.

Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), and Union Carbide Corp. v. State Bd. Of Tax Comm’rs of the State

of Indiana, 161 F.R.D. 359 (S.D. Ind. 1993).

III. PARTIES

A. Named Plaintiffs




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11. Plaintiff Destiny Hoffman is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and

resident of Lexington, Scott County, Indiana.

12. Plaintiff Nathan Clifford is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and

resident of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.

13. Plaintiff Joshua Foley is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident

of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.

14. Plaintiff Jesse Hash is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident of

New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.

15. Plaintiff Ashleigh Santiago (formerly Ashleigh Hendricks) is, and at all times relevant

hereto has been, a citizen and resident of Clarksville, Clark County, Indiana.

16. Plaintiff James Bennett is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident


17. Plaintiff Amy Bennett is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident

of New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.

18. Plaintiff Lee Spaulding is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident

of Charlestown, Clark County, Indiana.

19.2 Plaintiff Michael Campbell is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and

resident of Scottsburg, Scott County, Indiana.

20. Plaintiff Amy Tuttle is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident of

New Albany, Floyd County, Indiana.

21. Plaintiff Amanda Campbell is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and

resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.




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22. Plaintiff Robert Upton is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident


23. Plaintiff Shane Bratcher (formerly Courtney Cowherd) is, and at all times relevant hereto

has been, a citizen and resident of Jeffersonville, Clark County, Indiana.

24. Plaintiff Justin Lanham is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident

of Clarksville, Clark County, Indiana.

25. Plaintiff Trentney Rhodes is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and

resident of Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky.

26. Plaintiff Joanie Watson is, and at all times relevant hereto has been, a citizen and resident

of Henryville, Clark County, Indiana.

B. Named Defendants

27. Defendant Judge Jerome F. Jacobi is a state Circuit Court Judge and elected official

within the State of Indiana for Clark County Circuit Court 2 (previously Clark Superior Court II)

and Clark County Drug Treatment Court. Judge Jacobi is sued in his official and individual

capacities solely for the purposes of declaratory judgment declaring the rights and legal relations

of Plaintiffs in this actual and “live” controversy herein pursuant to Title 28 of the United States

Code, §2201.

28. Defendant Susan Knoebel (hereinafter “Knoebel”) was, at all relevant times, an employee

of Clark County, Indiana and working as a Probation Officer in Clark Circuit Court 2 (previously

Clark Superior Court II). Defendant Knoebel is sued in her individual capacity for her actions

and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in her official capacity for her

intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional policies,

2 amended paragraphs numbered in bold




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decisions, customs and practices, as well as her unlawful inactions which were the result of and

represented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

29. Defendant Jeremy Snelling (hereinafter “Snelling”) was, at all relevant times, an

employee of Clark County, Indiana and working as a Court Bailiff in Clark Circuit Court 2

(previously Clark Superior Court II). Defendant Snelling is sued in his individual capacity for his

actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity

for his intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional

policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result

of and repr esented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

30. Defendant Henry Ford (hereinafter “Ford”) was, at all relevant times, an employee of

Clark County, Indiana and working as Chief Probation Officer of Clark County, where he

supervised Defendant Knoebel. Defendant Ford is sued in his individual capacity for his actions

and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his

intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional policies,

decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and

represented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

31. Defendant Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden (hereinafter “Sheriff Rodden”) was, at all

relevant times, an employee of Clark County, Indiana and Clark County Sheriff. The Clark

County Sheriff provides law enforcement services in Clark County and operates the Clark

County Jail. Defendant Rodden is sued in his individual capacity for his actions and inactions

which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his intentional

actions in implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions,




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customs and practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented

“deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

32. Defendant Danielle Grissett (hereinafter “Grissett”) was, at all relevant times, an

employee of Clark County, Indiana employed as Clark County Work Release Director and

managed the Clark County Work Release Program. Defendant Grissett is sued in her individual

capacity for her actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations and in her

official capacity for her intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark County’s

unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as her unlawful inactions

which were the result of and represented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of

Plaintiffs.

33. Defendant Stephen Mason (hereinafter “Mason”) was, at all relevant times, an employee

of Clark County, Indiana and employed as Executive Director of Clark County Community

Corrections, where he was responsible for the Work Release Program and supervised Defendant

Grissett. Defendant Mason is sued in his individual capacity for his actions and inactions which

directly caused constitutional deprivations and in his official capacity for his intentional actions

in implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and

practices, as well as his unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented “deliberate

indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

34. Defendant Josh Seybold (hereinafter “Seybold”) was, at all relevant times, an employee

of Clark County, Indiana and employed as a Drug Court Case Manager, where he was

responsible for the management of Drug Court participants. Defendant Seybold is sued in his

individual capacity for his actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional deprivations

and in his official capacity for his intentional actions in implementing and executing Clark




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County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as his unlawful

inactions which were the result of and represented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional

rights of Plaintiffs.

35. Defendant “Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for

incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013,” was, at all relevant times, an employee of Clark

County, Indiana and employed with the Work Release Program. This unknown Defendant is sued

in an individual capacity for actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional

deprivations and in an official capacity for intentional actions in implementing and executing

Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as the

employee’s unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented “deliberate indifference”

to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

36. Defendant “Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk Responsible for the Erroneous

Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16, 2013,” was, at all relevant times,

an employee of Clark County, Indiana and employed as a Court Clerk. This unknown Defendant

is sued in an individual capacity for actions and inactions which directly caused constitutional

deprivations and in an official capacity for intentional actions in implementing and executing

Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, decisions, customs and practices, as well as the

employee’s unlawful inactions which were the result of and represented “deliberate indifference”

to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs.

37. Defendant Clar k County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter “Clark County

Commissioners”), an extension and/or political subdivision of the State of Indiana and/or Clark

County, Indiana, serves as the governing body of Clark County, acts as the County Executive,

and has the capacity to sue and be sued. Clark County Board of Commissioners has supervisory




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authority over and/or is responsible for the following involved entities: Clark County Drug

Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County Controlled Substances

Supervision, Clark County Sheriff’s Department, Clark County Drug Court Advisory Committee

(Team), Clark County Work Release Program and Clark County Community Corrections. The

Clark County Board of Commissioners is sued as an Executive Body for its actions in

implementing and executing Clark County’s unconstitutional policies, ordinances, regulations,

decisions, customs and practices, as well as its unlawful inactions which were the result of and

represented “deliberate indifference” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs. No Clark County

Commissioner is sued individually herein.

IV. FACTUAL, STATUTORY AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Indiana Drug and Alcohol Programs, Problem-Solving Courts, and Drug Courts

38. Near the end of the last century, courts throughout the United States began to recognize

and wrestle with the inherent problems of the traditional judicial approach regarding those

citizens with substance abuse issues that committed non-violent crimes directly related to and

caused by those issues. These problems included the growing recognition by judges and other

experts of the ill-fit and ultimate ineffectiveness of traditional practices of incarceration alone as

applied to those with addiction issues, as these issues commonly resulted from complex

psychological, pathological and genetic origins that could not be overcome by the threat of

punishment alone. Also, courts were concerned with the concurrent and rising economic and

societal problems associated with jail overcrowding that was due, in part, to the extensive

incarceration of non-violent offenders convicted of self-sabotaging crimes committed solely to

feed their own addictions.




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Criminologists and legal scholars began to reach consensus on the application of

theoretical concepts such as “therapeutic jurisprudence” and “restorative justice ,” theories that

offered alternative judicial practices to address the counterbalancing concerns of society as a

whole and those individuals that used and abused substances in violation of the law and due to

disease process. See Richard C. Boldt, A Circumspect Look at Problem-Solving Courts,

University of Maryland School of Law (2009); Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions are not

Enough: Problem-Solving Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1459

(Fall 2004).

39. To address these societal concerns, in 1992 the Indiana Legislature was one of the early

states to create a framework for the establishment of “alcohol and drug services programs” by

any Indiana city or county court having misdemeanor jurisdiction. Ind. Code §12-23-14 et seq. In

1997, the Indiana General Assembly transferred responsibility over these programs from the

executive branch to the Indiana Judicial Center, which established a committee of the Judicial

Conference of Indiana known as the “Court Alcohol and Drug Program Advisory Committee”

(CADPAC). The program’s mission statement is “to develop, train, certify, and support court-

administered alcohol and drug programs operating under the provisions of Ind. Code 12-23-14

and the Rules for Court-Administered Alcohol & Drug Program promulgated by the Judicial

Conference of Indiana.” According to the Indiana Judicial Center, currently there are

approximately 55 Indiana courts with court-administered alcohol and drug programs, including

Clark County Circuit Court.

40. In 2010, the legislature passed statutes amending these frameworks and providing for

additional “Problem Solving Courts,” which it defined as courts “providing a process for

immediate and highly structured intervention for eligible individuals that incorporates,” among




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other problem-solving concepts, “enhanced information to improve decision making” and

“evaluating the effectiveness of operations continuously.” Ind. Code §33-23-16-8.

41. One particular type of “Problem Solving Court” authorized and amended by Indiana law

in 2010 is “Drug Court,” defined as “a problem solving court focused on addressing the

substance abuse issues of defendants…in the criminal justice system by bringing together

substance abuse rehabilitation professionals, local social programs, and intensive judicial

monitoring.” Ind. Code §33-23-16-5(a)(1). Concurrently, the legislature permitted Indiana cities

and counties to establish said drug courts. Ind. Code §33-23-16-11.

B. Clark County Drug Court

42. Pursuant to the authority above, in 2002 Clark County established a drug court under the

jurisdiction of Clark Superior Court II. After the unification of Clark County courts in early

January of 2012, Clark County Circuit Court 2, presided over by Judge Jacobi, maintained

jurisdiction of this drug court.

43. During all relevant times herein, Judge Jacobi served as the supervising drug court judge,

and Defendant Knoebel served as the drug court supervisor, administering same through the

“Controlled Substances Supervision” division of “Clark County Probation and Supervision,”

which was headed by Defendant Ford. The drug court received operating funds through “user

fees” obtained from individual probationers as well as grants and charitable giving. Defendant

Knoebel, as the drug court coordinator, was “responsible for the daily operation and

administration of the drug court.”

44. As described in the Indiana Judicial Center’s May 2013 “Drug Court Certif ication

Review” of Clark Circuit Court, Clark County’s Drug Court “targets non-violent felony

offenders who are determined a high risk to reoffend by the Indiana Risk Assessment System




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(IRAS) and meet the diagnostic criteria for substance abuse or dependence.” While Ind. Code

§33-23-16-13 provides various modes of obtaining jurisdiction over criminal defendants by drug

court, in Clark County this jurisdiction was customarily obtained either through a deferral of

prosecution or as a condition of probation. Clark County Drug Court participants were required,

among other things, to attend AA meetings, submit to random drug screens, and meet regularly

with their probation officer and appear before Judge Jacobi. Additionally, Clark County

established a Drug Court Committee or “Team” which, in theory, was to consist of Judge Jacobi,

Susan Knoebel, Jeremy Snelling, a prosecutor, defense attorney, and representatives of local

substance abuse healing agencies.

45. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current Clark County Drug Court participants and, as

of March 11, 2013, an additional 112 other participants who had successfully completed the drug

court program, according to the Indiana Judicial Center’s Certification Review. Clark County

Drug Court also accepts participants from Indiana counties other than Clark County.

C. Statutory Rights of Indiana Drug Court Participants, Probationers, and Arrestees

46. The United States Constitution provides the following protections to Plaintiffs herein:

A. The Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”

B. The Fifth Amendment right to be free from the deprivation “of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.” The Fourteenth Amendment applies these

protections to the citizens of each and every state: “…nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

C. The Eighth Amendment right to be free from “excessive bail” and “cruel and unusual

punishments.”




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47. Under Ind. Code § 33-23-16-14.5, if a drug court participant is alleged to have violated

any condition of the program, Clark County Drug Court, through Judge Jacobi, could remand

that participant into custody, issue a summons, or issue a warrant for arrest upon determination

that the participant is a flight risk or a risk to himself or others. Once the allegation of violation is

made, the drug court Judge “shall conduct a hearing concerning an alleged violat ion of a

condition” of the program with the following restrictions in place: proof of violation by a

preponderance of evidence; presentment of evidence in open court; and entitlement of the alleged

violator to a) receive written notice of the alleged violation; b) obtain the disclosure of evidence

against the individual; c) confront and cross-examine witnesses; and (d) be represented by

counsel. Ind. Code §33-23-16-14.5(c)(1-3). See also Gosha v. Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind.

2010).

48. Under Section 27 of the “Judicial Conference of Indiana Problem-Solving Court Rules,”

any termination proceedings must provide the drug court participant with: (1) written notice of

the alleged violation(s); (2) a hearing in open court before the problem-solving court judge or

another judicial officer; (3) representation by counsel; (4) disclosure of the evidence against the

participant; (5) an opportunity to be heard and present evidence; (6) confrontation and cross-

examination of witnesses; and (7) a determination that the participant violated one or more

conditions of the participant’s participation agreement or case management plan by a

preponderance of the evidence.

49. Additionally, Indiana probationers have a statutory right, prior to revocation, to the

consideration of a reasonable bail, a release after 15 days for those alleged violators incarcerated

and denied bail unless final hearing has been held, and to a final revocation hearing, consisting of

the proof of violation by the state in open court under a preponderance of evidence standard, with




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the probationer’s entitlement to confrontation, cross examination, and representation by counsel.

Ind. Code §35-38-2-3.

50. Ind. Code §35-33-7-3 requires that a person arrested be brought before a court within 72

hours of arrest for an initial hearing in which a determination of probable cause is made and the

arrestee is informed of the charges and bond is considered.

51. Clark County Circuit Court 2 required criminal defendants to sign an “Agreement to

Enter Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program” which generally provided, among other

items, the following:

If the Court determines that the Defendant has violated a condition of the DrugCourt Agreement, the Court may terminate the Defendant’s participation in the

Drug Treatment Court Program after a due process hearing on a Petition to

Terminate…

…The Defendant retains the right to counsel upon the filing of a Petition to

Terminate from the Drug Treatment Program…

The participant may request the assistance of counsel when the court is

considering ordering sanctions resulting in a loss of liberty…

The Defendant acknowledges that non-compliance with Drug Court requirementsas defined in this Agreement or in the Handbook may result in sanctions from the

Judge, including short-term jail detention for each new incident and the possibility

of termination from the program.

V. SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RE: NAMED PLAINTIFFS

A. DESTINY HOFFMAN

52. On or about April 12, 2012, Plaintiff Destiny Hoffman entered a guilty plea to Possession

of a Controlled Substance, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment of

conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark




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County Drug Treatment Court Program.” Ms. Hoffman’s counsel withdrew further representation

via entry of Order on April 18, 2012.

53. It appears from Ms. Hoffman’s “Chronological Case Summary” (hereinafter “CCS”) that

she was either detained following her April 12 hearing or detained soon thereafter, as the June

14, 2012 entry states “Participant appears from CC jail for DTC Phase I. Next DTC 6/28/12.

Participant waiting on placement.” The following day it appears that a “transport order” was

entered.

54. Over the course of the next 14 months, Ms. Hoffman remained a drug court participant

and appeared to be, in general, successfully complying with its rules and regulations, being

promoted to phase 2 of the program. However, on or about May 1, 2013, Ms. Hoffman appeared

before Judge Jacobi, along with Ms. Knoebel and other drug court officials. Ms. Hoffman was

found to have a “dirty drug screen” and Ms. Hoffman admitted to this rule violation, according to

her “CCS.” On that date, Judge Jacobi ordered “Participant taken into custody pending staffing

of DTC [Drug Treatment Court] on 5/2/13.”

55. Ms. Hoffman remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail and at a hearing on May 16,

2013, Judge Jacobi ordered “Sanction- Continue to hold in CCJ pending placement after June 10,

2013, 500 word essay due by EOB on 5/20/2013. Positive ds [drug screen].” Two weeks later, on

May 30, 2013, another hearing was held in which the Court ordered “hold in CCJ until a

minimum of 30 days sobriety, then until placement at the Bliss is available.” Eventually, Ms.

Hoffman was released to the Bliss House on June 20, 2013, resulting in a total incarceration for

this violation of 51 days.




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56. On or about August 22, 2013, Ms. Hoffman appeared and her corresponding “CCS” entry

provides, in toto: “Participant appears, Phase 1, RB 9/12/2013, Sanction 48 hours CCJ, then hold

pending evaluation and treatment recommendation. Second dilute. ks.”

57. For the next 154 days, from August 22, 2013 until January 24, 2014, Ms. Hoffman

remained incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against her or

the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written

notice of the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations. Despite the fact that her initial sanction only called for a detention of 48 hours,

Ms. Hoffman remained incarcerated for more than five months.

58. During this unconstitutional incarceration, Ms. Hoffman wrote multiple letters to Drug

Court personnel and repeatedly questioned jail deputies about the status of her incarceration

without the benefit of counsel. On or about January 20, 2014, Ms. Hoffman wrote a letter to

Magistrate Judge Dawkins regarding her continued incarceration. Two days later, the State

prosecutor filed its motion for immediate status conference and Ms. Hoffman was soon (and

finally) released.

B. NATHAN CLIFFORD

59. On or about December 16, 2011, Nathan Clifford entered a guilty plea to possession of a

hypodermic needle, a Class D Felony, in Clark County Superior/Circuit 2. Pursuant to a plea

agreement, Mr. Clifford’s “judgment of conviction and term of sentence [were] to be withheld

upon the Defendant entering the Clark County Drug Treatment Court program.” 12 days later,

Judge Jacobi signed an Order allowing Mr . Clifford’s attorney to withdraw.




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60. According to Mr. Clifford’s “CCS,” on or about February 21, 2013, Judge Jacobi

sanctioned Mr. Clifford to “48 hours CC jail effective immediately” for an apparent alleged

violation of drug court rules.

61. On or about March 14, 2013, according to Mr. Clifford’s “CCS,” a court proceeding was

held resulting in an order by Judge Jacobi to “continue to hold in CCJ pending placement.”

Nothing else is stated in this hearing entry.

62. From February 21 to June 5, 2013, a total of 104 days, Mr. Clifford remained in the Clark

County Jail without hearing of the evidence against him or the right to confront and cross

examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations he was

found to have committed or alleged against him, or any other due process considerations, and

despite the fact that his sanction only called for a 48-hour detention. The first entry in Mr.

Clifford’s “CCS” after March 14 was not entered until June 5, 2013, and simply states:

“Transport Order Entered.”

63. On or about August 1, 2013, a hearing journal entry before Magistrate William Dawkins

states; “Susan Knoebel present in Magistrate Courtroom B. Drug Court Program Participant

tested positive for craven on Monday 7/29/13, and the Court hereby issues Warrant for Mr.

Clifford and orders him held on a 48 hour hold.” Mr. Clifford was not present for this

proceeding. On August 5 an arrest warrant was issued to detain with “no bond.” Later that

month, drug court officials filed a formal Petition to Terminate Mr. Clifford from the program.

64. Ultimately, on or about January 16, 2014, the arrest warrant was served on Mr. Clifford

while he was at an area hospital awaiting the birth of his son and on that date he was detained

without bond. However, according to Mr. Clifford’s “CCS” an “initial hearing” was not initially

scheduled until February 13, 2014. In the interim, on or about January 30, 2014, defense counsel




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entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. Clifford and the following day a hearing was held that

“Defendant completed his sentence before termination date, therefore case is completed.

Defendant has served his executed sentence…”

C. JOSHUA FOLEY

65. On or about February 28, 2013, Plaintiff Joshua Foley entered a guilty plea to possession

of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a public park, a Class B Felony, and sentenced in Clark

County Circuit 2 to six years imprisonment with the Indiana Department of Corrections. “The

judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering

into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.” On March 6, 2013, Mr. Foley entered an

appearance representing himself pro se.

66. On or about June 27, 2013, the Court ordered, without further explanation, “Sa nction-

positive for Alcohol on 6/19/2013, 30 days CCJ for third positive drug test, and hold pending

placement.”

67. For the next 68 days, from June 27 to September 3, 2013, Mr. Foley remained

incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against him or the right to

confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the

violations he was found to have committed, or any other due process considerations, and despite

the fact that his sanction only called for a 30 day placement (which in and of itself was

unconstitutional and in violation of state law). The first entry in Mr. Clifford’s “CCS” after June

27 was not entered until September 3, 2013, and simply states: “Order of Transport and Rel ease

granted.”

D. JESSE HASH




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68. On or about July 15, 2013, Plaintiff Jesse Hash was arrested, without warrant, and

charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class C Felony, and released on his own

recognizance. On July 24, 2013 in Clark County Circuit Court 2, an arrest warrant was issued

with “no bond” based on Mr. Hash’s failure to appear . This warrant was served and Mr. Hash

was immediately incarcerated at the Clark County Jail on August 8, 2013.

69. For the next 60 days, Mr. Hash remained in the Clark County Jail without any appearance

whatsoever before a judicial officer, without a probable cause hearing, consideration of bail,

appointment of counsel, notice of the charges against him, or any other due process

considerations.

70. The first entries in Mr. Hash’s “CCS” subsequent to the service of the arrest warrant was

the early October scheduling of an initial hearing on October 7, 2013, at which time Judge Jacobi

entered a plea of denial for Mr. Foley, advised him of the charges against him, and took other

actions customarily performed during an initial hearing and constitutionally required to be

performed within days of detention.

E. ASHLEIGH SANTIAGO (previously Ashleigh Hendricks)

71. On or about July 27, 2012, Plaintiff Ashleigh Santiago (aka Ashleigh Hendricks) entered

a guilty plea to “Possession of a Narcotic Drug,” a Class D Felony, in Clark County Circuit Court

2. “Judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant

entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.” On August 6, the Court ordered

the withdrawal of her criminal counsel.

72. Upon information and belief, on or about May 16, 2013, Ms. Santiago and about fifteen

other Drug Court participants were accused by Drug Court officials of testing positive for

something referred to in her “CCS” as “kratum”. Kratom, or Kratum, is a tropical deciduous and




21

evergreen tree indigenous to Southeast Asia and is ingested by eating the tree’s leaves, which

have medicinal properties. Kratom is not currently regulated by the United States Government

and, according to recent news reports, is only banned in Tennessee and Indiana (Indiana Code

35-31.5-2-321, as amended in 2012). However, in January, 2013 Senate Bill No. 132 was

introduced in the Indiana Legislature which would amend this statute by removing Kratom’s

active ingredients (mitragynine and 7-hydroxymitragynine) from the banned list and thus re-

legalize Kratom in Indiana.

73. Upon information and belief, Defendants Knoebel and Snelling entered the room with

plastic Kroger grocery bags filled with handcuffs and arrested Ms. Santiago and the other

accused participants, even though neither individual had arrest powers under Indiana law. The

accused participants were immediately incarcerated in the Clark County Jail.

74. Ms. Santiago’s “CCS” entries regarding the events of May 16 state: “Participant

appears…Sanction- 72 hours CCJ and 72 hours CCJ total of 6 days, 30/30 1 meeting a day for 30

days, 500 word essay due by EOB on 5/20/2013. Positive DS & Verbal Warning on Dilute. ks.

The second 72 hrs. CCJ on 5/16/2013 was ordered due to 3 missed meetings/appt. and/or group.”

75. Despite this 6-day sanction imposed on May 16, a hearing entry from 7 days later, on

May 23, ordered: “Continue to hold in CCJ pending staffing.” The following week, on May 30,

Ms. Santiago was still incarcerated and appeared for hearing, when it was noted that the “Staffing

team has voted to file Petition to Terminate.” However, this Petition was not actually filed by the

state until June 18, 2013.

76. Judge Jacobi held an initial hearing on this Petition on June 21, 2013, at which time he

entered a plea of denial on behalf of Ms. Santiago, appointed her counsel, set her final pre-trial




22

conference for July 3, 2013, and ordered “no bond,” while noting that she had remained in

custody throughout this period.

77. For a period of 36 days, from May 16 to June 21, 2013, Ms. Santiago remained

incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right to

confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the

violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations. Despite the fact that her initial sanction only called for a detention of six days, in

reality she was detained for 36 days. During this time without the benefit of counsel, she

routinely questioned officials why she remained incarcerated and asked family members for

assistance.

78. After being appointed counsel and receiving notice of the alleged violations and reasons

for her continued incarceration on June 21, Ms. Santiago remained incarcerated until her eventual

release from Clark County Jail on October 25, 2013, more than five months after she was

initially detained on a six-day sanction.

F. JAMES BENNETT

79. On or about December 21, 2011, James Bennett, after being found guilty of possession of

a narcotic drug, a Class D Felony, by Judge Jacobi in absentia, was sentenced by Judge Jacobi in

Clark Superior/Circuit 2 to a total term of six years, four years to be executed and two years

suspended.

80. On or about March 4, 2013, Judge Jacobi signed an Order modifying the sentence to

allow for the remaining portion of the executed sentence to be served in the Clark County Work

Release Program. Mr. Bennett was immediately transported into the custody of the Clark County

Work Release Center.




23

81. On or about August 8, 2013, unknown Work Release officials accused Mr. Bennett of

violating minor terms of his work release and immediately incarcerated him in the Clark County

Jail. To this day, Mr. Bennett is still unaware of the precise violation that he is alleged to have

committed that resulted in his lengthy incarceration.

82. For the next 74 days, Mr. Bennett remained in the Clark County Jail without a probable

cause hearing, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, notice of the charges against him,

or any other due process considerations. In fact, a review of Mr. Bennett’s “CCS” from Clark

County Circuit Court contains no entry even mentioning this August incarceration until October

21, 2013 when the record indirectly reflects: “Letter received from the Defendant.”

83. On October 21, 2013 Mr. Bennett appeared before Judge Jacobi on the Work Release

Center’s Petition to Terminate. Judge Jacobi ordered “no bond” and scheduled a status hearing.

Eventually, on December 9, 2013, Judge Jacobi ordered that Mr. Bennett be reinstated to the

work release program.

G. AMY BENNETT

85. On or about September 11, 2012, Plaintiff Amy Bennett entered a guilty plea and was

convicted of possession of methamphetamine, a Class D Felony. Her imposed sentence was

“withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.”

On or about September 20, 2012, Judge Jacobi signed an Order granting the withdrawal of Ms.

Bennett’s trial counsel.

86. On or about October 26, 2012, Knoebel filed a Petition to terminate Ms. Bennett from the

Drug Court Program and hearing was set for November 1, 2012. On that date, Ms. Bennett failed

to appear for hearing on the Petition to Terminate and Judge Jacobi ordered that she be held on

“no bond.”




24

87. On or about August 9, 2013, at midnight, Defendants Knoebel and Snelling followed Ms.

Bennett’s vehicle to her residence. After Ms. Bennett parked in her home’s driveway,

Defendants Knoebel and Snelling approached Ms. Bennett and her boyfriend, James Lindell.

Mr. Snelling handcuffed Ms. Bennett, informed Mr. Lindell that he had a gun in his pocket and

would use it if necessary, and placed Ms. Bennett in the backseat of his vehicle. Ms. Knoebel

then searched Plaintiff’s purse as she and Mr. Snelling transported Ms. Bennett to the Clark

County Jail, where Ms. Bennett remained in custody for several months. Pursuant to Indiana state

law, neither Ms. Knoebel, as a probation officer, nor Mr. Snelling, as a court bailiff, have arrest

powers. Indiana Code § 35-33-1-1 through 4.

H. LEE SPAULDING

88. On or about March 5, 2013, Plaintiff Lee Spaulding was arrested and charged with

“Possession of Marijuana,” a Class A Misdemeanor in Circuit Court Division 3.

89. On or about July 16, 2013, Mr. Spaulding appeared for a regularly scheduled court date

and signed and entered into a “Misdemeanor Pretrial Diversion Agreement.” Generally, this

agreement provided that the State of Indiana would withhold the prosecution of the misdemeanor

marijuana charge and dismiss the charge after 12 months if Mr. Spaulding paid $330 in “user

fees” to the Clark County Clerk, not commit any criminal offenses during the diversion period,

and report to the Misdemeanor Diversion Coordinator and attend counseling programs “at

reasonable times as directed.” A Deputy Clark County Prosecuting Attorney also signed the

Agreement on July 16.

90. Despite this clear documentation of Mr. Spaulding’s entry into the Diversion Agreement,

inexplicably on this same date, July 16, 2013, Judge Joseph P. Weber entered an arrest warrant

against Mr. Spaulding, without bond, for failure to appear for the July 16 pre-trial conference.




25

91. On or about September 11, 2013, Mr. Spaulding was arrested and incarcerated at the

Clark County Jail solely based on the improperly entered arrest warrant entered two months

prior, and he remained incarcerated until the following day. Mr. Spaulding was then released and

the diversion agreement signed by both Mr. Spaulding and the Deputy Prosecutor was finally

entered with the Court on September 13, 2013, nearly two months after its signing.

I. MICHAEL CAMPBELL

92. On or about June 8, 2012, Plaintiff Michael Campbell entered a guilty plea to Possession

of a Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment of conviction

and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County

Drug Treatment Court Program.” Mr. Campbell’s counsel withdrew further representation via

entry of Order on June 26, 2012.

93. On or about May 23, 2013, according to Mr. Campbell’s “CCS,” he was “sanctioned” a

total of 48 hours incarceration at Clark County Jail for driving without a license and missing an

appointment with “Danielle.” On or about June 13, a hearing entry states “Participant appears,

Phase 1, RB 6/27/13.” The next entry involves a hearing on June 27, 2013 when the Court

ordered “Hold in CCJ pending placement.” A subsequent hearing was held on July 25, 2013 and

the corresponding Order noted that Michael remained in custody: “Hold in CCJ pending

placement.”

94. For a time period between 54 to 59 days, from May 23 until either July 26 or 31 2013,

Mr. Campbell remained incarcerated in the Clark County Jail without a hearing of the evidence

against him or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of

counsel, written notice of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any




26

other due process considerations, despite the fact that his initial sanction only called for a

detention of 48 hours.

95. It is not clear from the record if and when he was released, but on or about August 2,

2013, Drug Court issued an arrest warrant for Mr. Campbell due to his failure to inform drug

court staff of his recent arrest for theft and trespassing. This warrant, issued with “no bond,” was

served on Mr. Campbell on August 7, 2013 by Defendants Knoebel and Snelling, who entered a

fenced-in backyard where Mr. Campbell was playing with his children. Defendant Snelling

handcuffed Mr. Campbell and, along with Defendant Knoebel, drove him to CCJ in Defendant

Snelling’s personal vehicle. The Clark County Jail’s booking sheet lists Jeremy Snelling as the

arresting officer. Pursuant to Indiana state law, neither Ms. Knoebel, as a probation officer, nor

Mr. Snelling, as a court bailiff, have arrest powers. Indiana Code § 35-33-1-1 through 4. The

following day he was ordered to remain in CCJ due to the new charges and the recent filing of a

Petition to Terminate. Mr. Campbell’s “CCS” indicates that he had previously “posted a $3,000

court cash bond” relative to these new charges of theft and trespassing.

96. On or about August 20, 2013, an “initial hearing” was held on the Probation officer’s

Petition to Terminate Mr. Campbell from the drug court program. No bond was ordered and the

public defender was appointed. Mr. Campbell remained incarcerated pending this Motion to

Terminate until February 20, 2014, at which time Mr. Campbell was terminated from the

program and released because “Defendant fully served executed sentence in 365 actual days.

Surplus of 50 actual days is to be used toward Defendant’s probationary sentence in Circu it

Court 3.”

J. AMY TUTTLE




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97. On or about April 12, 2012, Plaintiff Amy Tuttle entered a guilty plea to Possession of a

Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment of conviction and

term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug

Treatment Court Program.”

98. It appears from Ms. Tuttle’s “CCS” that an Arrest Warrant for Failure to

Appear/Violation of Court Order , “NO BOND!” was issued six days later, on April 18, 2012.

However it is entirely unclear what proceeding for which Ms. Tuttle failed to appear, as she had

no scheduled hearing dates in the six-day interim. On May 1, 2012, Ms. Tuttle was in custody

and a hearing was held. “Advise of rights hearing held. NO BOND. Defendant is being held for

Drug Court. Defendant will be staffed on Thursday, May 3, 2012, by Drug Court Staffing.”

99. It is unclear whether Ms. Tuttle’s case was actually “staffed” on May 3, 2012, as there is

no hearing entry for that date. The next entry is from June 14, six weeks later, and states:

Participant appears for DTC Phase 1 from CC Jail. “Participant waiting on placement. Next DTC

6/28/12.” According to Ms. Tuttle’s booking sheet, she was released from the CC Jail on June

28, 2012.

100. Thus, Ms. Tuttle was incarcerated for a total of 58 days on this first occasion without a

hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of

bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations she was found to have committed or

accused of, or any other due process considerations.

101. On May 10, 2013, Ms. Tuttle was once again detained for allegedly testing positive on a

drug screen. (KRATOM) “Court orders Defendant be held in CCJ pending staffing next week.”

On May 16, the hearing entry states: “Sanction- Hold in CCJ pending placement, 500 word essay

due by EOB on 5/20/13. Positive DS.” Two weeks later, an order was entered to continue to




28

hold Ms. Tuttle in Clark County Jail “pending placement.” Eventually, on July 8, 2013, Ms.

Tuttle was released from jail to a “half -way house.” (St. Elizabeth Maternity Home).

102. On this second occasion, Ms. Tuttle remained incarcerated for a total of 59 days, from

May 10 until July 8, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront

and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations

she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process considerations.

K. AMANDA CAMPBELL

103. On or about April 5, 2012, Plaintiff Amanda Campbell entered a guilty plea to Dealing in

Cocaine, a Class B Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment of conviction and term of

the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment

Court Program.” Ms. Campbell’s counsel was withdrawn from further representation pursuant to

the Court’s Order of April 16, 2012.

104. The Court’s journal entry of February 5, 2013, hearing conducted by Judge Vicki

Carmichael, states “Drug Court Participant and Drug Court Staff Member appears before the

Court. Parties sworn. Testimony heard. Participant to be held in the Clark County Jail pending

staffing on February 7, 2013.”

105. On February 7, Ms. Campbell was ordered, based on “staffing recommendation,” to “hold

pending placement.” The next entry of hearing does not occur until May 7, 2013, at which time

an “Order of Transport & Release” was entered and Ms. Campbell was taken by the Sheriff

“from jail to Mattie’s House.”

106. Therefore, Ms. Campbell remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 89

days, from February 7 to May 7, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the right

to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of




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the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations.

L. ROBERT UPTON

107. On or about October 28, 2010, Plaintiff Robert “Bobby” Upton entered a guilty plea to

Resisting Law Enforcement, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “Judgment and

sentence are to be withheld upon the Defendant entering Drug Treatment Court.”

108. According to Mr. Upton’s “CCS” he was sanctioned to serve 6 days in the Clark County

Jail on July 19, 2012. Upon his release on July 25, 2012, Mr. Upton drove to a residence with

his girlfriend while being followed by Defendant Knoebel. Defendant Knoebel confronted Mr.

Upton in the residence’s driveway and informed that he violated a no-contact order between he

and his girlfriend. Defendant Knoebel instructed a police officer to arrest Mr. Upton and place

him in the police car. Defendant Knoebel then entered the residence and conducted a search.

109. According to Mr. Upton’s CCS, he was once again detained on May 16, 2013 for

allegedly testing positive on a drug screen. According to Mr. Upton’s booking sheet from the

Clark County Jail, he remained incarcerated from May 16, 2013 to November 27, 2013.

However, Mr. Upton’s CCS indicates attorney Larry Wilder ap peared on his behalf on June 18,

2013 and subsequently filed a series of continuances which eventually resulted in his August 8,

2013 Drug Court Termination Hearing.

110. Therefore, Mr. Upton remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 33 days,

from May 16, 2013 to June 18, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the right

to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of

the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations.




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M. SHANE BRATCHER (formerly Courtney Cowherd)

111. On or about April 30, 2012, Plaintiff Courtney Cowherd (now “Shane Bratcher ”) entered

a guilty plea to Possession of a Narcotic Drug, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2.

“The judgment of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant

entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.” Mr. Bratcher’s counsel

withdrew further representation via entry of Order on May 22, 2012.

112. Mr. Bratcher appeared to comply with all the rules as well as the numerous and often

undefined payments associated with the Drug Court. On March 21, 2013 Judge Jacobi informed

Mr. Bratcher that he would “graduate” from Drug Court on May 9, 2013. Later that week, Mr.

Bratcher was told by case manager Josh Seybold that his next appearance would be on May 9,

2013 for graduation. However, on or about April 19, 2013, Mr. Bratcher was called into Drug

Court where Defendant Seybold and Defendant Knoebel sanctioned him for 48 hours and

instructed Mr. Bratcher that he will not graduate on May 9, 2013 because he missed a court date

on April 18, 2013.

113. Mr. Bratcher did not graduate and was forced to remain in the Drug Court program and

continue paying significant sums of money until February 6, 2014 when Prosecutor McKayla

Gilbert submitted an Agreed Order to Terminate. “Defendant terminated from his placement in

Drug Court Program and case shall be dismissed with prejudice. (RJO) (Notice) (The State has

the discretion to dismiss any criminal case it chooses).”

114. Therefore, Mr. Bratcher remained on probation and as a court-mandated Drug Court

participant for nearly two years. Upon information and belief, Mr. Bratcher’s executed sentence

of probation well exceeded the sentence originally imposed and the maximum possible length of




31

time outlined in his Drug Court Agreement solely due to his inability to pay the excessive fees

imposed monthly.

N. JUSTIN LANHAM

115. On or about August 1, 2013, Plaintiff Justin Lanham entered a guilty plea to Theft, a

Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 4. “Judgment withheld due to defendant entering Drug

Court Program.” Mr. Lanham’s counsel withdrew further representation via entry of Order on

August 7, 2013.

116. On August 2, 2013, Mr. Lanham was sanctioned and held in CCJ “pending placement.”

He was eventually released to the Serenity House on August 26, 2013.

117. Therefore, Mr. Lanham remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 24 days,

from August 2, 2013 to August 26, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the

right to confront and cross examine, consideration of bail, appointment of counsel, written notice

of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations.

O. TRENTNEY RHODES

118. On or about March 1, 2012, Plaintiff Trentney Rhodes entered a guilty plea to Dealing in

Cocaine, a Class B Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment of conviction and term of

the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the Clark County Drug Treatment

Court Program.” Mr. Rhodes’ counsel withdrew further representation via entry of Order on

April 16, 2012.

119. It appears from Mr. Rhodes’ “CCS” that a bench warrant was issued for Mr. Rhodes’

failure to appear on November 29, 2012. Mr. Rhodes was unable to appear because at the




32

scheduled date and time he was attending a mandated probation meeting in Jefferson County,

Kentucky. Mr. Rhodes had previously informed Defendant Seybold of this conflict.

120. Mr. Rhodes was arrested and incarcerated to the CCJ on December 3, 2012 where he

remained until December 21, 2012 when he was transported to the Serenity House.

121. Mr. Rhodes remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 18 days, from

December 3, 2012 to December 21, 2012, without a hearing of the evidence against him or the


of the violations he was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations.

P. JOANIE WATSON

122. On or about October 27, 2011, Plaintiff Joanie Watson entered a guilty plea to Illegally

Acquiring a Controlled Substance, a Class D Felony, in Circuit Court Division 2. “The judgment

of conviction and term of the sentence is to be withheld upon the Defendant entering into the

Clark County Drug Treatment Court Program.” Ms. Watson’s counsel withdrew further

representation via entry of Order on November 2, 2011.

123. It appears from Ms. Watson’s “CCS” that she was sanctioned to 30 days in the CCJ on

December 8, 2011. “Mag. William Dawkins presiding over Drug Treatment Court. Participant

appear for DTC Phase 1 from CC Jail. Participant given a 30 day, beginning today, sanction for

violation of DTC Rule and Participant to be held pending placement. Next DTC date 12/22/11.”

The next entry into the CCS was dated December 29, 2011, and it simply stated,

“Correspondence received from the Defendant.” Ms. Watson ap peared from the CCJ for some

type of hearing on January 5, 2012, but she was not released from the CCJ until January 25,

2012.




33

124. Therefore, Ms. Watson remained incarcerated in Clark County Jail for a total of 48 days,

from December 8, 2012 to January 25, 2013, without a hearing of the evidence against her or the


of the violations she was found to have committed or accused of, or any other due process

considerations.

125. Ms. Watson was again sanctioned to the CCJ on May 16, 2013. Ms. Watson and

approximately 15 other Drug Court participants were placed in handcuffs by Drug Court staff,

including Jeremy Snelling and Susan Knoebel, and taken to the CCJ for allegedly testing positive

for kratum. Ms. Watson’s CCS indicates she was held in the CCJ “pending further order from the

court.” According to the Clark County Jail’s booking sheet, Ms. Watson was incarcerated from

May 16, 2013 to October 30, 2013. However, Ms. Watson presented to an initial hearing and

was appointed counsel on June 14, 2013.

126. Ms. Watson was incarcerated for another 29 days, from May 16, 2013 to June 14, 2013,

until she was appointed counsel. In total, Ms. Watson was incarcerated for 77 days without a

hearing of the evidence against her or the right to confront and cross examine, consideration of

bail, appointment of counsel, written notice of the violations he was found to have committed or

accused of, or any other due process considerations.

VI. CLASS ALLEGATIONS

128. The Named Plaintiffs seek to pursue claims both for themselves and for the class of those

others similarly situated. Named Plaintiffs submit that the classes should be organized into four

separate classes as outlined below.

129. At the outset, it should be noted that “it is well-settled Supreme Court precedent that

‘[c]lass relief is peculiarly appropriate when the issues involved are common to the class as a




34

whole’ and when they ‘turn on questions of law applicable in a manner to each member of the

class.’” Estate of Vandam v. Daniels, 278 F.R.D. 415 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of

Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982)). Claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 are uniquely

qualified for treatment as a class action. Generally federal courts are encouraged to liberally

construe Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 23 as applied to civil rights’ class actions, as the purpose of 42

USC §1983 is to provide a broad remedy for all who fit the plaintiff’s class. Carey v. Greyhound

Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1380 (5th

Cir. 1974).

130. In summary, the above Plaintiffs, representative of proposed Classes A and/or B, endured

the following sentences as drug court participants without hearing or counsel:

A. Destiny Hoffman (counsel withdrawn April 18, 2012):

1. 51 days (May 1-June 20, 2013): “taken into custody pending staffing,” “hold…

pending placement;”

2. 154 days (June 20, 2013-January 24, 2014): Initially sanctioned 48 hours; “hold

pending evaluation and treatment recommendations.”

B. Nathan Clifford (counsel withdrawn December 28, 2011):

1. 104 days (February 21-June 5, 2013): Initially sanctioned 48 hours; “continue

to hold in CCJ pending placement.”

C. Joshua Foley (represented himself as of March 6, 2013):

1. 68 days (June 27-September 3, 2013); initially sanctioned 30 days (without full

hearing); “hold pending placement.”

D. Jesse Hash (pre-trial detainment; counsel not appointed until October 7, 2013):

1. 60 days (August 8-October 7, 2013).

E. Ashleigh Santiago (counsel withdrawn August 6, 2012):

1. 36 days (May 16-June 21, 2013): initially sanctioned 72 hours x 2; “continue to

hold in CCJ pending staffing.”

F. Michael Campbell (counsel withdrawn June 26, 2012):

1. 54-59 days (May 23- July 26 or 31, 2013): initially sanctioned 48 hours;

“pending placement.”

G. Amy Tuttle

1. 58 days (May 1-June 28, 2012): “Participant waiting on placement.”




35

2. 59 days (May 10-July 8, 2013): “Hold in CCJ pending placement.”

H. Amanda Campbell (counsel withdrawn April 16, 2012)

1. 89 days (February 7-May 7, 2013): “pending staffing;” “pending placement.”

I.

Robert Upton1. 33 days (May 16-June 18, 2013); “Hold in CCJ pending further order .”

J. Justin Lanham

1. 24 days (August 2-26, 2013): held “pending placement.”

K. Trentney Rhodes (counsel withdrawn April 16, 2012)

1. 18 days (August 2-August 26, 2013)

L. Joanie Watson (counsel withdrawn November 2, 2011)

1. 48 days (December 3-December 21, 2012): initially sanctioned 30 days; “to be

held pending placement.” 2. 29 days (May 16-June 14, 2013): “Hold in CCJ pending further order.”

A. Class A

131. Class A, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua

Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Michael Campbell, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert Upton,

Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:

All persons who were probationers and/or participants in Clark County Indiana’s

Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2, and who were

incarcerated for more than 72 hours without hearing or other due process of law in

violation of their 14th

Amendment rights (as enunciated by Gagnon v. Scarpelli,

411 US 778 (1973) and Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App.

2010), among others), from February 19, 2012 to the date of the order granting

class certification.

132. As defined above, Class A meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Particularly:

A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise

number of class members is unknown at this time but is expected to well exceed 40

individuals for the following reasons:




36

1. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current drug court participants, and

obviously many more participants had been either released from the Court prior to

that date or added to drug court subsequent to that date; and

2. The legislatively-known nature of addiction, combined with the consistently

applied unconstitutional practices of Clark County Circuit Court 2, necessitates a presumption that a majority of these drug court participants were alleged to have

violated a rule and consequently were incarcerated for more than 72 hours.

B. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class. Each

prospective class member has sustained the same exact injury, unlawful incarceration

(albeit to varying degrees) and each class member’s claim depends on a common

contention, that the standard practices of detaining Clark County Drug Treatment Court

participants for more than 72 hours without due process is an unconstitutional deprivation

of liberty. Common questions of law and fact include:

1. Whether the practice of Clark County Circuit Division 2, by and through

employees working in its Court and other employees, agencies and bodies of

Clark County, Indiana, of imposing de facto probation revocations of more than

72 hours without providing hearing and/or related due process rights was

unconstitutional;

2. Whether the Court’s customar y and repetitive practices of holding drug court participants in jail well after the sanctioned incarceration period has expired for

the stated reasons of “pending placement,” “pending staffing,” “pending

evaluation and treatment” and similar explanations, amount to partial probation

revocations and/or the deprivation of liberty interests which require due process;

3. Whether the Court’s consistent failure to grant any bond whatsoever or

reconsider bond at any time during these lengthy incarcerations is an

unconstitutional violation of the class member’s due pr ocess rights;

4. Whether the Court’s customary practices of finding that the class member(s)

violated the Drug Court’s rules or probation based on information provided solely

by probation officers at the initial hearing without a second hearing and full

presentment of the evidence, the opportunity of cross examination, written

notification of the allegations and findings, or the right to counsel is a

constitutional violation; and




37

5. Whether each of the named Defendants is liable for said constitutional

violations and the nature of this liability.

C. The Claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. The

eleven named representatives were participants of Clark County Drug Treatment Court

during the relevant time period, were all under the jurisdiction of Judge Jacobi and

Circuit Court 2, and were all incarcerated for a minimum of 18 days for alleged violations

of drug court rules and probation without hearing or bond. As each of the eleven

members’ “CCS” contain nearly identical entries regarding the reasons for incarceration,

such as “sanction,” “pending placement,” “pending staffing,” etc., it is anticipated that

remaining members of the class will have been incarcerated for similar stated reasons and

similarly without bail, hearing, or other due process rights.

D. The eleven representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of

the class. Named Plaintiffs, as well as the class as a whole, all have similar stories to tell,

similar claims to make, and identical interests in a successful resolution of the claims of

each and every other class member. The interests of each representative party are

perfectly aligned with those of every other representative party as well as every member

of the prospective class. Additionally, the named representative parties have retained

counsel to represent the class as a whole that is experienced and uniquely skilled in the

filing, litigation and trial of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and other federal court

actions, and also experienced in the litigation of class action suits. The prospective class

is adequately represented.

133. Class A is seeking remedies in the form of money and punitive damages against

Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(3). This requirement is satisfied, as the questions of




38

law or fact common to the members of the prospective class predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members (see paragraph 132(B) above), and a certification of Class A is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Specifically, there are no known or anticipated interests or concerns of prospective class

members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, there are no known

causes of action that have been filed to date alleging similar claims, all litigation would properly

be concentrated in the Southern District of Indiana, and there should be no extraordinary

difficulty in the management of a class action as the total number of class members will be

manageable and the identities of all prospective class members will be readily accessible.

134. The potential liability of the Defendants “is a common question that can be decided for all

proposed class members, even if the extent of any damages among them varies…The overriding

legal issue is whether the Defendant had a policy, practice, or custom in place that accounted for

the length of the class members’ detentions. The only individualized issues that are apparent at

this stage of the litigation are those related to damages. The significant and common issue of

whether the Defendant is liable for unconstitutional restraints on liberty outweighs individualized

damages issues, and the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) has been met.” Donovan v.

St. Joseph County Sheriff , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63847 (N.D. Ind. 2012).

B. Class B

135. Class B, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua

Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Amy Bennett, Jesse Hash, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert

Upton, Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:

All persons who are or will be subject to the jurisdiction of Clark County

Indiana’s Drug Treatment Court Program, Clark County Circuit Court 2, as a

probationer or Clark County Drug Court participant and who therefore face or will




39

face the possibility of being alleged or determined to be in violation of the rules,

terms, and or policies of probation or Drug Court;

136. Class B meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation for the same reasons

as Class A, as noted in paragraph 132 above. Additionally, it is anticipated that the number of

prospective class members is even higher than those in Class A (although still a manageable

number of easily identifiable individuals) and that each class member shares a precisely identical

motivation, to obtain a declaration that Clark County Circuit Court 2’s incarceration policies,

practices and customs are unconstitutional and obtaining a permanent injunction to ensure that

the class members’ will not be subjected to the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

137. Class B is seeking remedies in the form of injunctive and declaratory judgment against

Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2). This requirement is satisfied, as the

named representative Plaintiffs are seeking are seeking remedies that would enjoin the

Defendants from further unconstitutional action and inaction and declare the actions taken

against all those who are currently under the jurisdiction of Clark County Circuit Court 2 or will

be in the future. Thus, prosecution of separate actions for each member of Class B would create

an identifiable risk of inconsistent orders that would establish incompatible standards of conduct

for the various defendants or be practically dispositive of the interests of all unnamed Plaintiffs.

Additionally, Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied because the Defendants have or will act(ed)/refuse(d) to

act on grounds which are wholly applicable to all members of proposed Class B. Final injunctive

and declaratory relief would be appropriately applied to all those under the Court’s jurisdiction or

who will be in the future.

C. Class C




40

138. Class C, represented by Named Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Michael

Campbell, and Robert Upton, consists of:

All persons who were arrested in Clark County, Indiana by state actors working in

Clark County Circuit Court 2 with no arrest powers and whose arrest was nototherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-33-1-4, from February 18, 2012 to

the date of the order granting class certification.

139. As defined above, Class C meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Particularly:

A. The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. The precise

number of class members is unknown at this time but is expected to well exceed the

requirements of numerosity for the following reasons:

1. As of May 31, 2013, there were 74 current drug court participants, and

obviously many more participants had been either released from the Court prior to

that date or added to drug court subsequent to that date; and

2. While there are only four named Plaintiffs that currently fit in this class, upon

information and belief several other individuals have come forward with similar

stories of unlawful arrest by Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling. Each have made

statements that such practices of arresting (or “escorting” as it has been

improperly and inconsequentially labeled) individuals by themselves withoutcontacting appropriate authorities were “routine.”

B. There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed class. Each

prospective class member has sustained the same exact injury, unlawful arrest by those

without legal authority to do so (and without the commiserate training, supervision and

experience to do it properly), and each class member’s claim depends on a common

contention, that the standard practices of certain employees working in Clark County

Circuit Court 2 to arrest citizens when they had no arrest powers are unconstitutional.

Common questions of law and fact include:




41

1. Whether Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling had the legal authority to arrest under

Indiana Code Indiana Code § 35-33-1-1 through 4;

2. Whether the actions of Ms. Knoebel and Mr. Snelling amount to an arrest

and/or seizure of the person under the Fourth Amendment, defined by the

Supreme Court as “a governmentally caused termination of an individual’sfreedom of movement.” Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989);

3. Whether the state actors named in their individual capacities are entitled to

qualified immunity or whether these actors violated “clearly established”

constitutional rights; and

4. Whether the actions and inactions of other named Defendants sued in their

official capacities amounted county policies, practices, and customs, formal or

informal, and whether any such inactions were caused by “deliberate indifference”

to the constitutional rights of the proposed class members.

5. Whether each of the named Defendants is liable for said constitutional

violations and the nature of this liability.

C. The Claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the class. The

named representatives were arrested by the same two individuals, and presumably all

other Class B members were arrested by these employees as well under similar

circumstances.

D. The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class. Named Plaintiffs, as well as the class as a whole, all have been arrested under very

similar situations and all will have identical interests in a successful resolution of the

claims of each and every other class member. The interests of each representative party

are perfectly aligned with those of every other representative party as well as every

member of the prospective class. Additionally, the named representative parties have

retained counsel to represent the class as a whole that is experienced and uniquely skilled

in the filing, litigation and trial of claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and other federal




42

court actions, and also experienced in the litigation of class action suits. The prospective

class is adequately represented.

140. Class C is seeking remedies in the form of money and punitive damages against

Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(3). This requirement is satisfied, as the questions of

law or fact common to the members of the prospective class predominate over any questions

affecting only individual members (see paragraph 139(B) above), and a certification of Class C is

superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

Specifically, there are no known or anticipated interests or concerns of prospective class

members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate actions, there are no known

causes of action that have been filed to date alleging similar claims, all litigation would properly

be concentrated in the Southern District of Indiana, and there should be no extraordinary

difficulty in the management of a class action as the total number of class members will be

manageable and the identities of all prospective class members will be readily accessible.

Furthermore, the damages sustained by each prospective class member will be very similar, if not

identical.

D. Class D

141. Class D, represented by Named Plaintiffs Destiny Hoffman, Nathan Clifford, Joshua

Foley, Ashleigh Santiago, Amy Bennett, Jesse Hash, Amy Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Robert

Upton, Justin Lanham, Trentney Rhodes, and Joanie Watson, consists of:

All persons who are or will be subject to arrest in Clark County, Indiana by state

actors working in Clark County Circuit Court 2 that have no arrest powers and

whose arrest was not otherwise lawful pursuant to Indiana Code § 35-33-1-4.

142. Class D meets all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

namely numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation for the same reasons




43

as Class C, as noted in paragraph 139 above. Additionally, it is anticipated that the number of

prospective class members is even higher than those in Class C (although still a manageable

number of easily identifiable individuals) and that each class member shares a precisely identical

motivation, to obtain a declaration that the policies, practices and customs of Clark County and

Circuit Court 2 in allowing employees without arrest powers arresting citizens is unconstitutional

and obtaining a permanent injunction to ensure that the class members will not be subjected to

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

143. Class D is seeking remedies in the form of injunctive and declaratory judgment against

Defendants and is brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (2). This requirement is satisfied, as the

named representative Plaintiffs are seeking remedies that would enjoin the Defendants from

further unconstitutional action and inaction and declare the actions taken against all those who

are arrested unlawfully by individuals acting under the color of law or will be in the future. Thus,

prosecution of separate actions for each member of Class D would create an identifiable risk of

inconsistent orders that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the various

Defendants or be practically dispositive of the interests of all unnamed Plaintiffs. Additionally,

Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied because the Defendants have or will act(ed)/refuse(d) to act on grounds

which are wholly applicable to all members of proposed Class D. Final injunctive and

declaratory relief would be appropriately applied to all those under the Court’s jurisdiction or

who will be in the future.

E. Adequacy of Representation

144. Undersigned counsel for the Named Plaintiffs are appropriate and adequate attorneys to

fairly and adequately represent the interests of each of the four classes and should be so

appointed pursuant to Rule 23(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Said counsel have




44

expended considerable hours identifying and investigating potential claims in this action, have

considerable experience in handling class actions, complex litigation, and 42 U.S.C. §1983

claims and vast knowledge of the issues and law applicable herein, and are willing to commit the

necessary resources necessary to successfully prosecute the claims of each of the four prospective

classes.

VII. ALLEGATIONS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS

A. Claims of Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell, Tuttle,

Amanda Campbell, Upton, Bratcher, Lanham, Rhodes, and Watson Re: Due Process

Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or, in the Alternative, Eighth

Amendment Violations of Excessive Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment

145. The aforementioned actions and/or inactions of certain Defendants amounts to the

unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell,

Tuttle, Amanda Campbell, Upton, Bratcher , Lanham, Rhodes, and Watson’s constitutional right

to be free from deprivation of their liberty interests without due process, as well as the rights of

those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.

146. The specific conduct described, which generally consisted of incarceration for lengthy

periods of time without hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or the opportunity to

hear evidence against them and cross examine witnesses, and/or the imposition of probation for a

time period beyond that originally sentenced, is in violation of the Plaintiffs’ due process rights

under the 5th

and 14th

Amendments, as explained in many well settled cases from over 40 years

of jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973);

Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 (1972)), Seventh Circuit (United States v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d

1110 (7th

Cir. 1993)), U.S. District Courts of Indiana (White v. Steuben County, 2011 U.S. Dist.




45

LEXIS 110404 (N.D. Ind. 2011), and Indiana State Court (Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d

432 (Ind. App. 2010)).

147. In the alternative, if Plaintiffs are identified as prisoners without liberty interests, then this

classification implicates the Eighth Amendment protections against excessive bail and cruel and

unusual punishments, which has been violated by the actions and inactions of certain Defendants

amounting to “deliberate indifference” to the rights of Plaintiffs.

148. Judge Jacobi is sued herein for the sole purposes of obtaining a declaration that all current

and future Clark County Drug Treatment Court participants and probationers have a

constitutional right to be free from incarceration without due process of law and that Judge

Jacobi’s current policies, practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional rights.

149. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold, and Ford are each liable in their individual

capacities because each was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the

above-named Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. The four state actors

were all responsible for the administration of drug court and monitoring of participants, and their

actions and inactions in incarcerating these Plaintiffs and in failing to prevent, address or stop the

lengthy incarcerations and failing to insure that the Plaintiffs received due process prior to

incarceration directly caused these constitutional deprivations and amount to deliberate

indifference to the rights of the Plaintiffs named above. None of the four Defendants are entitled

to qualified immunity as the constitutional violations that each committed were clearly

established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 146 herein.

150. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold, and Ford are each liable in their official

capacities as employees and agents of Clark County because each had policymaking authority

with regards to the incarceration and adjudication of drug court participants and/or each




46

implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were

unconstitutional, and each was “deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs

named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.

151. Defendant Clark County Sheriff Danny Rodden is liable in his individual capacity

because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the above-named

Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the

management of the Clark County Jail and the care and custody of those inmates incarcerated in

the Jail, including the Plaintiffs named above. Sheriff Rodden’s actions and inactions in failing to

address the lengthy incarcerations of the Plaintiffs named above and/or notify the Court and court

administrators of the continued custody of these Plaintiffs directly caused the constitutional

deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not entitled to qualified immunity as s

the constitutional violations that he directly committed were clearly established in this

jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 146 herein.

152. Defendant Sheriff Rodden liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of

Clark County because he has policymaking authority with regards to the continued incarceration

and custody of drug court participants and/or he implemented or executed policies, practices and

customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was “deliberately indifferent” to

the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs

similarly situated.

153. Defendant Clark County Commissioners, as a body politic and the county executive of

Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiffs named above, and those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly

situated, because it has policymaking authority over the treatments of its citizens, the operations

of Clark County Drug Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County




47

Controlled Substances Supervision, Clark County Sheriff’s Department and Clark County Drug

Court Advisory Committee/Team, and the hiring, supervision, and training of Clark County

employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and

customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was “deliberately

indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of

unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.

154. Plaintiffs Hoffman, Clifford, Foley, Santiago, Michael Campbell, Tuttle, Amanda

Campbell, Upton, Bratcher, Lanham, Rhodes, and Watson, on behalf of themselves and those

similarly situated, are respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of compensatory,

consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining

further violation of their constitutional rights against Defendants Knoebel, Snelling, Seybold,

Ford, Sheriff Rodden, both in their individual and official capacities, and Clark County

Commissioners in its official capacity.

B. Claims of Plaintiff Jesse Hash Re: Violations of the Fourth Amendment for

Unreasonable Seizure of the Person and Due Process Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments


unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff Jesse Hash’s constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable seizure of the Person, protected by the Fourth Amendment, and from deprivation of

his liberty interests without due process, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

156. The specific conduct described, which consisted of the significant incarceration of this

pretrial detainee, who was charged without warrant, for 60 days without finding of probable

cause, hearing, notice, counsel, the consideration of bond, or the opportunity to hear evidence

against him and cross examine witnesses, is in violation of Plaintiff Jesse Hash’s due process




48

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as explained in many well settled

cases from over 40 years of jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court ( Gerstein v. Pugh,

420 U.S. 103 (1974), Seventh Circuit (Sivard v. Pulaski County, 959 F.2d 662 (7th

Cir. 1993))

(“The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial

determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a

warrantless arrest”); Coleman v. Fantz , 754 F.2d 719 (7th

Cir. 1985) (holding that an 18-day

detention without appearance before a judge or magistrate is a deprivation of liberty without due

process of law)), and the Southern District of Indiana ( Holloway v. Del. County Sheriff, 2012

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804 (S.D. Ind. 2012).


and future Clark County Circuit Court 2 pretrial detainees arrested without warrant have a

constitutional right to a prompt probable cause hearing and to be free from a significant

deprivation of liberty without probable cause and other requisite due process considerations and

that Judge Jacobi’s current policies, practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional

rights.


because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by Plaintiff Jesse

Hash. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the management of the Clark County Jail and the care

and custody of those inmates and pretrial detainees incarcerated in the Jail, including Mr. Hash.

Sheriff Rodden’s actions and inactions in failing to address the lengthy incarceration of the

Plaintiff and/or notify the Court and court administrators of the continued custody of Jesse Hash

directly caused the constitutional deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not




49

entitled to qualified immunity as s the constitutional violations that he directly committed against

Jesse Hash were clearly established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 156 herein.

159. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of


and custody of inmates and pretrial detainees and/or he implemented or executed policies,

practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was “deliberately

indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Jesse Hash.


Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiff Jesse Hash because it has policymaking authority over

the treatments of its citizens, the operations of Clark County Jail, Clark County Sheriff’s Office

and Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of

Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was “deliberately indifferent” to the

constitutional rights of Plaintiff Jesse Hash.

161. Plaintiff Jesse Hash is respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of

compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive

relief enjoining further violation of his constitutional rights against Defendant Sherriff Rodden,

in his individual and official capacities, and Clark County Commissioners in its official capacity.

C. Claims of Plaintiff James Bennett Re: Due Process Violations of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments, or, in the Alternative, Eighth Amendment Violations of Excessive

Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment


unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff James Bennett’s constitutional right to be free from

deprivation of his liberty interests without due process.




50

163. The specific conduct described, which generally consisted of incarceration of this

individual probationer on work release for 74 days without hearing, notice, counsel, the

consideration of bond, or the opportunity to hear evidence against him and cross examine

witnesses, is in violation of Plaintiff James Bennett’s due process rights under the 5th

and 14th

Amendments, as explained in many well settled cases from over 40 years of jurisprudence of the

United States Supreme Court (Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer ,

408 U.S. 471 (1972)), Seventh Circuit (United States v. Kirtley, 5 F.3d 1110 (7th

Cir. 1993)),

U.S. District Courts of Indiana (White v. Steuben County, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110404 (N.D.

Ind. 2011), and Indiana State Court (Gosha v. State of Indiana, 931 N.E.2d 432 (Ind. App.

2010)).

164. In the alternative, if Plaintiff, as a convicted individual on work release, is identified as a

prisoner without liberty interests, then this classification implicates the Eighth Amendment

protections against excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishments, which has been violated by

the actions and actions of certain Defendants amounting to “deliberate indifference” to the rights

of Plaintiff James Bennett.


and future Clark County Circuit Court 2 probationers on work release have a constitutional right

to be free from incarceration without due process of law and that Judge Jacobi’s current policies,

practices and customs are in violation of those constitutional rights.

166. Defendants “Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for

incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013,” Grissett and Mason are each liable in their

individual capacities because each was directly responsible for the due process violations

sustained by James Bennett as described above. The three state actors were all responsible for the




51

administration of the work release program and monitoring of work release participants, and their

actions and inactions in incarcerating Mr. Bennett and failing to prevent, address or stop his

lengthy incarceration failing to insure that Mr. Bennett received due process prior to

incarceration directly caused his constitutional deprivations and amount to deliberate indifference

to the rights of the Plaintiff James Bennett. None of the three Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity as the constitutional violations that each committed against James Bennett were clearly

established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 163 herein.

167. Defendants “Unknown Clark County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for

incarcerating James Bennett on August 8, 2013,” Grissett and Mason are each liable in their

official capacities as employees and agents of Clark County because each had policymaking

authority with regards to the incarceration and adjudication of work release participants and/or

each implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were

unconstitutional, and each was “deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs

James Bennett.


because he was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by Plaintiff James

Bennett. Sherriff Rodden is responsible for the management of the Clark County Jail and the care

and custody of those inmates incarcerated in the Jail, including Mr. Bennett. Sheriff Rodden’s

actions and inactions in failing to address the lengthy incarceration of the Plaintiff and/or notify

the Court and court administrators of the continued custody of James Bennett directly caused the

constitutional deprivations detailed herein. Defendant Sheriff Rodden is not entitled to qualified

immunity as the constitutional violations that he directly committed against James Bennett were

clearly established in this jurisdiction, as evidenced in Paragraph 163 herein.




52

169. Defendant Sheriff Rodden liable in his official capacity as an employee and agent of


and custody of work release participants and/or he implemented or executed policies, practices

and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and he was “deliberately indifferent”

to the constitutional rights of James Bennett.




of Clark County Work Release Program, Clark County Probation and Supervision, Clark County

Community Corrections, and Clark County Sheriff’s Department, and the hiring, supervision,

and training of Clark County employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed

policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and the body was

“deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiff James Bennett.

171. Plaintiff James Bennett is respectfully seeking monetary damages in the form of

compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent injunctive

relief enjoining further violation of his constitutional rights against Defendants “Unknown Clark

County Work Release Employee(s) responsible for incarcerating James Bennett on August 8,

2013,” Grissett, Mason and Sheriff Rodden, both in their individual and official capacities, and

Clark County Commissioners in its official capacity.

D. Claims of Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Santiago, Michael Campbell, and Upton Re:

Unlawful Arrest in Violations of the Fourth Amendment


unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Robert Upton, and




53

Michael Campbell constitutional right to be free unreasonable searches and seizures of their

persons, as well as the rights of those unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.

173. The specific conduct described, which consisted of the termination of freedom of

movement through means intentionally applied by certain Defendants acting under the color of

state law, but without lawful arrest powers, is in violation of the Plaintiffs’ rights under the

Fourth Amendment, as explained in Brower v. City of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989); Malone v.

County of Suffolk, 968 F.2d 1480 (2nd

Cir. 1992) (“whether officers have valid authority to arrest

pursuant to state law affects the constitutionality of the arrest”); Ross v. Neff , 905 F.2d 1349

(10th Cir. 1990) (“warrantless arrest executed outside of the arresting officer’s jurisdiction is

analogous to a warrantless arrest without ‘probable cause’ which is ‘presumptively

unreasonable’”); and United States v. Foster , 566 F. Supp. 14003 (D.D.C. 1983) (“concept of

reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment logically presupposes an exercise of lawful

authority by a police officer”).

174. Judge Jacobi is sued herein for the sole purposes of obtaining a declaration that his

policy, practices and custom of authorizing, instructing or permitting those individuals employed

in Clark County Circuit Court 2 is in violation of the constitutional rights of all current and future

individuals under his jurisdiction and that all said individuals have a constitutional right to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures performed by individuals without lawful arrest

powers.

175. Defendants Knoebel and Snelling are each liable in their individual capacities because

each was directly responsible for the due process violations sustained by the above-named

Plaintiffs, as well as unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated. These state actors were the ones who

actually arrested Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, and Michael Campbell and neither




54

had the authority to arrest under Indiana law, thus both Knoebel and Snelling directly caused the

constitutional deprivations complained of herein. Neither Defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity on these claims of Fourth Amendment violations because the right to be free from

unlawful arrest was clearly established, as evidenced in Paragraph 173 herein.

176. Defendants Knoebel, Snelling and Ford are each liable in their official capacities as

employees and agents of Clark County for the claims made by Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh

Santiago, Robert Upton, and Michael Campbell above because each had policymaking authority

with regards to the arrest of drug court participants and/or each implemented or executed

policies, practices and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional, and each was

“deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the

rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.




of Clark County Drug Treatment Court, Clark County Probation and Supervision, and Clark

County Controlled Substances Supervision, and the hiring, supervision, and training of Clark

County employees. Clark County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices

and customs of Clark County which were unconstitutional and allowed those employees to arrest

citizens without legal authority, and the body was “deliberately indifferent” to the constitutional

rights of Plaintiffs named above, as well as the rights of unnamed Plaintiffs similarly situated.

178. Plaintiffs Amy Bennett, Ashleigh Santiago, Robert Upton, and Michael Campbell, on

behalf of themselves and those similarly situated, are respectfully seeking monetary damages in

the form of compensatory, consequential and punitive damages, and preliminary and permanent




55

injunctive relief enjoining further violation of their constitutional rights against Defendants

Knoebel and Snelling both in their individual and official capacities, and Defendants Ford and

Clark County Commissioners in their official capacities.

E. Claims of Plaintiff Lee Spaulding Re: Violations of the Fourth Amendment for

Unreasonable Seizure of the Person and Due Process Violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments


unconstitutional deprivation of Plaintiff Lee Spaulding’s constitutional right to be free from

unreasonable seizure of the Person, protected by the Fourth Amendment, and from deprivation of

his liberty interests without due process, protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

180. The specific conduct described, which consisted of an apparent wrongful entry in the

court record directly resulting in the subsequent issuance of an arrest warrant against Mr.

Spaulding for failing to appear, when in fact he had appeared on the day in question and entered

into a pretrial diversion agreement, ultimately resulting in Mr. Spaulding’s unlawful arre st, is in

violation of Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

181. Defendant “Unknown Clark County Circuit Court Clerk Responsible for the Erroneous

Entry Alleging that Mr. Spaulding Failed to Appear on July 16, 2013” is liable in his or her

individual capacity because (s) he was directly responsible for the due process violations

sustained by Plaintiff Lee Spaulding. This unknown Defendant is not entitled to qualified

immunity as the constitutional right of a citizen to not have an invalid warrant of arrest placed on

them without reason has been clearly established in this jurisdiction.


Clark County, Indiana is liable to Plaintiff Lee Spaulding because it has policymaking authority

over the treatments of its citizens, had supervisory authority over its employees, and Clark




56

County Commissioners implemented or executed policies, practices and customs of Clark

County which were unconstitutional, and the body was “deliberately indifferent” to the

constitutional rights of Plaintiff Lee Spaulding. Clark County Commissioners is sued in its

official capacity only.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, pray for

judgment from the Defendants as described in greater detail above and as follows:

1. Declaration of their rights and legal relationships;

2. Preliminary and permanent injunctive relief;

3. The certification of the classes as outlined above;

4. The establishment of a common fund(s) be established to compensate them and

their attorneys and to reimburse all expenses in connection with obtaining this

relief;

5. That the undersigned be named as class counsel for all classes;

6. Compensatory, consequential and actual damages;

7. Punitive damages;

8. Medical Expenses, past and future, if any;

9. Trial by jury on any and all issues so triable;

10. For their costs herein expended, including a reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

of suit; and

11. For any and all other relief to which they may otherwise be properly entitled.




57

Respectfully Submitted By,

By: /s/ Michael A. Augustus

James M. Bolus, Jr.

Michael A. AugustusBrennan Soergel

BOLUS LAW OFFICES

600 West Main Street, Suite 500

Louisville, Kentucky 40202

(502) 584-1210

(502) 584-1212 - Facsimile

[email protected]

[email protected]

[email protected]


mailto:[email protected]











CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This will certify that on April 8, 2014, I electronically filed the foregoing FIRST

AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF,

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AND DAMAGE with the clerk of the court by using the CM/ECF

system, which will send a notice of electronic filing to the following:

Rosemary L. Borek

Wayne E. Uhl

STEPHENSON MOROW & SEMLER

3077 E. 98th

Street, Suite 240

Indianapolis, Indiana 46280

[email protected]

[email protected]

R. Jeffrey Lowe

KIGHTLINGER & GRAY, LLPBonterra Building, Suite 200

3620 Blackiston Boulevard

New Albany, Indiana 47150

[email protected]

David A. Arthur

Office of the Attorney General

Indiana Government Center South

302 W. Washington Street, 5th

Floor

Indianapolis, Indiana 46204

[email protected]

/s/ Michael A. Augustus














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