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Discussion Paper Series - 5

Drought Proofing in Rajasthan:Imperatives, Experience and Prospects

by

Reetika Khera

The analysis and policy recommendations of this Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of theUnited Nations Development Programme, its Executive Board or its Member States.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This paper is based on fieldwork for a Ph. D. at the Delhi School of Economics. The author would like to thankthe UNDP for a grant that made this possible. During the fieldwork the author was helped by Kavita Srivastava,various NGOs and also by many people in the villages. Without their logistical help and support, this paperwould not have been possible. The author would also like to thank Piers Blaikie, Arudra Burra, Nikhil Dey,K. Seeta Prabhu, Suraj Kumar, Francois Leclercq, Ritu Mathur, Elena Borsatti, Ben Rogaly, Janet Seeley andKunal Sen for helpful suggestions in writing this paper. Finally, special thanks are due to Jean Dreze forguidance during fieldwork and otherwise.

PROLOGUEPROLOGUE

Droughts have affected many people’s lives in Rajasthan. The adverse impact is due to widespread cropfailure, which leads to shortages of food, fodder and drinking water, and migration.

This paper calls for a comprehensive drought policy, as droughts are a recurring phenomenon in the State. Butit also argues that successful policies need a change in the understanding of droughts. The impact on people’slives should be taken into account and diversification of livelihoods in Rajasthan should be promoted. Theanalysis is also based on fieldwork carried out in four districts of the State.

This paper is one of the studies commissioned by the HDRC to have a deeper understanding of the livelihoodsituation in a few States.

Reetika Khera is currently pursuing a Ph.D. (Economics) at the Delhi School of Economics. She is studyinggovernment interventions and their effectiveness during the recent drought in Rajasthan.

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CONTENTSCONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1

I DROUGHT: ITS PERIODICITY AND MEASURES 2

Types of Drought 2

Alternative Indicators 3

II THE DROUGHT OF 1999-2001: METHODOLOGY USED 6

Selection of the Districts 6

Selection of the Villages 6

Selection of the Households 7

The Villages 8

III THE SEVERITY OF THE DROUGHT OF 1999-2001 13

Agriculture 13

Livestock 15

Coping Strategies 16

IV GOVERNMENT POLICY 21

Drought Mitigation 21

Drought Proofing 25

V CONCLUSION 30

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STATISTICAL ANNEXURES 31

Table 1 Some Indicators of Drought in Rajasthan, 1981-2 to 2002-3 31

Table 2 Rainfall and “Famine-affected” Villages, 2001 32

Table 3 Basic Features of the Sample Villages 33

Table 4 Land Owned and Area Cultivated (Bighas) by Various Caste Groups, 2001 35

Table 5 Changes in Area Sown and Total Output of Main Foodgrains 36

Table 6 Change in Total Livestock Wealth of the Sample Households 37

Table 7 Coping Strategies of Households in Order of Importance 38

Table 8 Vulnerable Groups in the Sample Population 39

REFERENCES 40

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ABBREVIATIONSABBREVIATIONS

CRF Calamity Relief Fund

DDP Desert Development Programme

DPAP Drought Prone Areas Programme

GOI Government of India

GOR Government of Rajasthan

IRDP Integrated Rural Development Programme

OBC Other Backward Castes

NCCF National Calamity Contingency Fund

PDS Public Distribution System

SC Scheduled Castes

ST Scheduled Tribes

SWRC Social Work and Research Centre

URMUL Uttar Rajasthan Milk Union Limited

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GLOSSARYGLOSSARY

Anna akaal Food drought

Bajra Pearl millets

Bania Trader caste

Bigha Measure of land

Chana Chick peas

Chowktis Casual labour market

Dhanis Hamlet

Gauna Beginning of effective married life

Girdawari Land-use report

Gram sewak Gram Sabha Secretary

Gwar Cluster beans

Jal akaal Water drought

Jeera Cumin

Jow Barley

Jowar Sorghum

Kasidakari Embroidery

Kharif Monsoon crop

Luhar Caste of blacksmiths

Makka Corn

Mochi Caste of cobblers

Moong Green gram, a kind of pulse

Moth Haricot, or dew bean

Nadi Pond

Nai Caste of barbers

Panchayat An administrative unit comprising of a few revenue villages

Patwar Land Revenue Circle

Patwari Land Revenue Officer

Rabi Winter crop

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Sunars Caste of goldsmiths

Suthars Caste of carpenters

Tanka Underground water storage structure

Til Sesame seeds

Trinakaal Food, fodder and water drought

Tuar Arhar lentils

Urad Black gram

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Executive SummaryExecutive Summary

Droughts are a recurring phenomenonin Rajasthan. This paper discusses vari-ous aspects of this phenomenon: howpeople deal with drastic crop and live-stock losses, especially when coupledwith limited employment opportunitieselsewhere (“Coping Strategies”); gov-ernment policies to provide relief insuch times (“Drought Mitigation”); andgovernment policies to prevent the oc-currence of droughts (“Drought Proof-ing”). Currently, droughts are perceivedas sporadic events so policies are not de-signed in the best possible manner. Thispaper argues that successful policies fordrought mitigation and proofing requirea change in our understanding ofdroughts. Thus a review of drought-re-lated policies must be accompanied bya review of the definitions adopted todeclare a drought.

This paper is partly based on fieldworkcarried out in four districts of Rajasthanfrom May 2002 to February 2003, col-lecting information on the drought of1999-2001. The first section looks athow droughts are defined, and what evi-dence is used to judge their frequency.The second section outlines the meth-odology used and attempts to judge theseverity of the drought on the basis ofvarious indicators. Section III discussesthe drought of 1999-2001, based on datacollected during fieldwork. It also con-tains a discussion of the coping strate-gies that emerged in the sample areas.The concluding section provides a shortoverview of the government’s droughtpolicies, and discusses the policy impli-cations and recommendations thatemerge from the discussions in theearlier sections.

Successful policies fordrought mitigationand proofing require achange in ourunderstanding ofdroughts

2 DROUGHT PROOFING IN RAJASTHAN: IMPERATIVES, EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS

Drought: Its Periodicity and Measures

SECTION I


Currently, droughts are not treated as aregular feature of Rajasthan, but ratheras sporadic events. In this section, welook at various indicators of droughtand their shortcomings. The period un-der study spans approximately two de-cades – from 1981-2 to 2002-3. The dis-cussion will bring out clearly the needto change our perceptions of drought,because these perceptions influencepolicy design.

1.1 Types of Drought

What counts as a drought? Put simply, adrought is a failure of rain, leading tomoisture stress, that in turn leads to ag-ricultural losses and other forms of so-cial and economic hardship. There aremany definitions and classifications ofdrought, including that of the NationalCommission on Agriculture (quoted inBokil 2000) which has defined threetypes of drought:

Agricultural: When crops are affecteddue to moisture stress and lack ofrainfall.

Meteorological: When there is more than25 per cent decrease (from normal)in rainfall in any area.

Hydrological: When recurring meteo-rological droughts result in decreasein surface water and groundwaterlevels.

Droughts are a matter of concern as theyaffect the lives of people. We will focuson agricultural droughts. In keeping withthis focus, we may classify droughts ac-cording to the shortage of three com-modities: water ( jal akaal), food (annaakaal) and fodder (trinakaal).

1.1.1 Rainfall

Rajasthan can be divided into four broadagro-climatic regions and indeedphysiographical regions: the arid regionin the west, the eastern plains (whichare fertile and receive a good deal ofrainfall), the hilly region of the Aravallisextending from the north to the southin the eastern part of Rajasthan, and theplateau in the south-eastern part of theState. Rajasthan receives most of itsrainfall over a period of three months –roughly from July to September. Theaverage annual rainfall is 531 mm,compared to the all-India average of1100 mm. Rainfall is not only low, butalso uncertain. Further, there are widevariations in rainfall across the State –from as little as 193 mm in Bikaner inthe west, to as much as 607 mm in theeastern plains in normal years.

The Indian Meteorological Departmentdefines a failure of the monsoon as ayear in which the actual rainfall has been20 per cent less than the “normal” rain-fall.1 By this definition, in Rajasthan the

A drought is afailure of rain,leading to moisturestress, that in turnleads toagricultural lossesand other forms ofsocial andeconomic hardship

1 Normal rainfall is calculated as the long period average.

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monsoon failed in just two years – 1987and 2002 (Table 1, p. 31).

Rainfall and agricultural operations inRajasthan, and indeed in many parts ofIndia, are very closely related. Therefore,rainfall and land area sown tend to bepositively correlated.2 In Rajasthan, only25 per cent of agricultural land is irri-gated. However, the relationship be-tween rainfall and area sown is quitecomplex and depends on the regionaldispersion, the timing and duration ofeach spell, as well as the gap betweensuccessive spells. These factors are likelyto be as important for agricultural out-put as total rainfall. Meteorologicaldroughts do not take these factors intoconsideration and therefore cannot beused to make judgements about agricul-tural droughts.

The area sown is a slightly better indi-cator of a drought because it reflects oneof the ways in which the lack of rain-fall affects human life. Since most agri-culture in Rajasthan is rain-fed, andpeople’s livelihoods are still quiteheavily dependent on agriculture, fall inarea sown provides us with a good start-ing point to judge the severity of adrought. Table 2 (p. 32) demonstratesthat rainfall data can be misleading be-cause there is only a loose relation be-tween amount of rainfall and area sown.It provides a cross-tabulation betweenthe amount of rainfall and the propor-tion of villages that were declared “fam-ine-affected” in the year 2001. By theState government’s classification, anarea is declared “scarcity-affected”

when it reports crop losses of 50-75 percent, and “famine-affected” when thelosses exceed 75 per cent. If one wereto judge the occurrence of a droughtbased only on whether rainfall wasnormal or not, only 6 districts wouldhave been classified as drought-hit(column 3). However, when we look atcrop losses, we find that in as many as16 out of the 25 districts that receivednormal to excess rain, more than fiftyper cent villages had been declared “fam-ine-hit”. Thus we see that lack of rain-fall (a “meteorological” drought) doesnot adequately capture what actually af-fects people’s lives and we need to usealternative criteria to determine whetheror not a drought has occurred.

1.2 Alternative Indicators

While it is true that meteorological rea-sons have been the cause of the worstdroughts in Rajasthan (1987 and 2002),it is important to separate the “trigger”event from its consequences. Thoughdroughts may be triggered by lack ofrainfall, they affect people in many ways(e.g. loss of home-produced foodgrain,loss of employment, difficulty in gettingwater for daily domestic needs and foragriculture, lack of fodder for livestock,etc.). Change in level of agricultural out-put, availability of fodder, employmentand water are therefore good indicatorsof drought.

When the State government declares adrought, it uses indicators that, in prin-ciple, include those mentioned above. Inthis section, we examine changes in

2 In his analysis of rainfall data for the period from 1877-1986, Sivasami finds that when rainfall hasbeen less than 20 per cent of normal, the area sown in the country can fall by as much as 50 per cent.When the shortfall is between 10-20 per cent, the affected area ranges between 20-40 per cent (Sivasami,2000: 1991).


Lack of rainfall doesnot adequately capturewhat actually affectspeople’s lives


agricultural output and livestock popu-lation, government expenditure on reliefworks, and person-days of employmentgenerated. The analysis relies on second-ary data published by the Governmentof India or the Government of Rajasthan(Table 1, p. 31).

The Scarcity Manual (formerly knownas the Famine Code) for Rajasthan laysout the rules and procedures to be fol-lowed in declaring a drought. In this pro-cess, the girdawari report plays a key role.The girdawari report is a land-use reportand is prepared by the patwari (landrecords official) of each panchayat. Theother criteria in the Scarcity Manual in-clude distress migrations, increase inthefts, news of starvation deaths, etc.

While the Scarcity Manual includes manycriteria, in practice, the State govern-ment has come to rely almost exclusivelyon the girdawari report and the losses insowing and production reported therein.To calculate the losses, the current year’sfigures are compared with area sown andproduction in “normal” years (definedas the average production for the pastfew years). On the basis of this, calcu-lations of affected population are made.

Affected population

Probably the most important indicatorof the severity of a drought is the num-ber of people it affects. In 14 of the 22years between 1980 and 2002-03, agri-cultural operations in more than 10,000villages were declared either scarcity -or famine-hit. Only in three years dur-ing this 22-year period, was the numberof affected villages less than 500.

Labour employed

It has been mentioned that duringdroughts the State government providesrelief for the able-bodied by openingemployment sites in the affected villages.Only in two years over the entire period1981-2003 did the State governmentdeem it unnecessary to provide such re-lief work. In each of the remaining 20years, the government generated, on anaverage, 3.35 lakh person days ofemployment. During the drought of1987-8, nearly 220 lakh person days ofemployment were generated.

Government expenditure

Government commitment to providerelief measures can also be gauged fromits drought relief expenditure (Table 1,p. 31). These funds are used largely toinitiate food-for-work programmes, toensure water availability during adrought, the supply of subsidized fod-der for the conservation of livestockand the provision of gratuitous relieffor the weak, old and disabled. Thegovernment’s commitment is quite clearfrom the financial resources it sets asidefor these obligations. In the period from1981-2 to 1989-90, the State govern-ment expenditure on relief operationswas Rs. 1515 crores and in the periodfrom 1991-2 to 1999-2000, it wasRs. 1057 crores.3

Agricultural production

Given the overall importance of agri-culture in the State, in terms of its con-tribution to the Gross State DomesticProduct (27.4 per cent in 1999-2000),as well as in terms of proportion of

The most importantindicator of theseverity of a drought isthe number of peopleit affects

3 This expenditure is at current prices. If we look at expenditure at real prices, the fall in expenditure in the1990’s is likely to be larger still.

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people who rely on agriculture as theirmain means of livelihood, it makes senseto look at the growth of this sector.Trends in the production figures offoodgrain for the State show that, sincethe 1980’s, in four years, the fall in agri-cultural production was much higher(more than 20 per cent) than that of theprevious peak year.

Livestock population

The Government of India carries out alivestock census every 5 years. The lastcolumn in Table 1 (p. 31) reports thetotal cattle population at various pointsof time. This brings out clearly the im-pact of the drought of 1987-8, whichcaused the total cattle population todecline to such an extent that it had notrecovered to its pre-drought levels evenat the time of the last census in 1997.This probably also has to do with achange in the composition of livestock:

there is a move away from cattle towardssheep and goats, which are known tobe sturdier.

Thus, going by many of the above indi-cators, while there has been a meteoro-logical drought in just two years of the22 years under study, by all the alterna-tive indicators, only three or four years(depending on which criterion one uses)have remained “drought free”.

From the available data it is not possibleto say whether the intensity or severityof droughts has been increasing over theyears, as has been suggested by previ-ous research.4 For doing so, one wouldhave to look not only at the above indi-cators, but also at the duration of eachdrought cycle and at the regional spreadof each cycle. Localised droughts orsingle-year droughts are known to be lesssevere on the human populations af-fected by them.

4 Jodha (1991) and Vidya Sagar (1995) both have suggested that the intensity of droughts has increasedover time.


Localised droughts orsingle-year droughtsare known to be lesssevere on the humanpopulations affectedby them


The Drought of 1999-2001:Methodology Used

The Drought of 1999-2001:Methodology Used

This section discusses the methodol-ogy used to study the impact of thedrought of 1999-2001. Data was col-lected from nearly 400 households ineight villages by means of a question-naire. In addition to collecting dataon the background characteristics ofthe households and individuals, thequestionnaire covered the severity ofthe drought, coping strategies, thepublic distribution system and food-for-work programmes. This wassupplemented by group discussionsand informal discussions with variouspeople in the villages, including thesar panch, ward panches, patwari, gramsewak and others.

2.1 Selection of the Districts

Since the survey could not cover verylarge parts of the State, or provide asample in which all regions got ad-equate representation, it was carriedout in four districts, chosen to reflectregional variations. The sample districtswere Barmer, Bikaner, Jaipur andUdaipur. Barmer and Bikaner are in thesouth-west and north-west of Rajasthanrespectively (along the border with Pa-kistan). Jaipur lies in the north-easternpart of Rajasthan and Udaipur in thesouth. These districts not only give afair geographic spread, but also reflectagro-climatic variations and differinglevels of development in different parts

of Rajasthan. Bikaner and Barmer areboth semi-arid regions with sandy soil.Jaipur is mostly flat, with fertile land,while Udaipur lies in the Aravallis andhas fertile but not level land, and richforest reserves.

2.2 Selection of the Villages

Once the districts were selected, a two-stage random sampling procedure wasadopted. The first stage was a selec-tion of clusters, which were taken tobe revenue villages according to the1991 census.

The household population of the rev-enue villages tends to vary quite a lot-thus smaller villages would standproxy for a small number of house-holds and larger villages (with a popu-lation of more than 1500 persons)would be proxy for a larger number ofhouseholds. But the bulk of the popu-lation lies in villages with a popula-tion of 800-1500. A simple randomsample of villages would give rise tobias in the estimates of populationcharacteristics because it would giveequal probabil ity of selection tohouses in small and large villages as itwould to houses in medium-sized vil-lages. To improve the precision of thesample, such (i.e. medium-sized) vil-lages should have a greater probabil-ity of selection. This suggests that toget unbiased sample estimates for the

SECTION II

The survey was carriedout in four districts,chosen to reflectregional variations

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population, households in mediumsized villages should have a higherprobability of selection than those insmall or large villages. This can beachieved by employing probability pro-portional to size sampling.5

Another consideration in the selectionof villages was whether it would be pos-sible to stay in the village for the dura-tion of the fieldwork. This meant thatonly those villages in which some con-tact was available - mainly throughNGOs working in that district - wereincluded in the final frame from whichthe sample was chosen.6 This gave a listof villages from which the sample vil-lages were chosen.

Replacement villages were also chosenat this stage. In cases where there hadnot been any relief work in the samplevillage during the summer of 2000, a re-placement village where there had beenrelief work during this period was sur-veyed. Three of the villages in thissample are replacement villages. In onecase, the sample village was inaccessiblesince it lay across a river which couldnot be crossed because of the monsoon.In this case, the last accessible villageon the road to the sample village satis-fying the population criterion was cho-sen for the survey. Thus the final sampleincludes 4 sample villages (Biramsar,Dulmera Station, Baasri Jogiyan andSukaliya), three replacement villages

(Morda, Kharad and Badli) and one othervillage (Birothi).

2.3 Selection of the Households

At the second stage, a simple randomsample of 400 households was chosenfrom the voter list of the village pre-pared by the district authorities. Thevoter lists are updated each year andan attempt was made to use the elec-toral roll for 2001 (the latest available).But this was not possible in all cases,in which case an older electoral roll hadto be used. The oldest electoral rollused for selection of sample householdswas from 1998.

While sampling, up to 10 replacementhouseholds were also selected to makeup for missing or unresponsive house-holds. However, all the sample house-holds proved willing to respond; in fact,in most villages, it was those who wereleft out of the sample who were un-happy. In most cases, this was due to themisconception that the households thatwere being surveyed would receive somebenefits, which non-sample householdswould be deprived of. Replacementhouseholds were surveyed when

Members of sample households wereunavailable even after the second visitto the house, or during the investiga-tors’ stay in the village. (This was themost common reason for replacing asample household).

5 See Deaton (1997: 15).6 The NGOs were URMUL in Bikaner, SURE in Barmer, Sewa Mandir in Udaipur, SWRC and Vishaka in

Jaipur. As it turned out, in three cases the NGO did not really work in the sample village but did in aneighbouring one. As a result, they were able to introduce the author to an acquaintance with whom she thenstayed for fieldwork. In the other four villages, Biramsar, Dulmera Station, Birothi and Morda, people knewabout the NGO through whom the author had made contact, and quite often had benefited from it in someway or another. In one village, the local contact did not work for an NGO but for a youth group with whomthe author was acquainted.

The Drought of 1999-2001: Methodology Used

A consideration in theselection of villageswas whether it wouldbe possible to stay inthe village for theduration of thefieldwork


The sample households had migratedfrom the village.7

Due to pressure of time, the samplehousehold seemed too far away tovisit.

There was no surviving member fromthe sample household.

Since the voter lists were slightly out-dated in some cases, it often turnedout that sample households had splitinto more than one household sincethe list was compiled. In such cases,the oldest member of the family, orthe most easily available member, wassurveyed. Finally, the sample alsocontains some households that wereneither in the list of sample house-holds nor in the list of replacementhouseholds. This includes extremelydestitute people who were encoun-tered during the survey.

The interviews were carried out withadult members of each family. Bal-ance was maintained between thenumber of male and female respon-dents. Sometimes an interview wasrepeated with two members of thesame household at different times tocorroborate answers given by the firstrespondent. At other times, the inter-view was carried out in the presenceof more than one adult member ofthe family, with different persons an-swering different questions.

2.4 The Villages

2.4.1 Demographic and SocialCharacteristics

This section provides some back-ground information on the villages thatwere surveyed. Table 3 (p. 33) givesa detailed picture for each village inthe sample.

Caste Structure

The largest caste group in the sample(42 per cent) is that of “other back-ward castes” (OBCs), a category thatincludes a large number of castes.This group is far from homogenous.It includes politically articulate andeconomically powerful castes suchas the Jats, as well as castes lowerdown on the social scale such asNais, Luhars, Suthars, Sunars – smallin number as well as less articulate.In fact, the Jats have managed to havethemselves classified as OBCs inRajasthan precisely because of theirpolitical clout.8 The other large groupin the category of OBCs is that ofthe Muslim castes (nearly 11 per centof the OBC population of 42 per centare Muslim)9.

The Scheduled Castes and Tribes form17 and 19 per cent respectively ofthe population, with the other castes(Brahmins and Rajputs) comprising22 per cent of the population.

7 The greatest number of such cases was in Badli where the migration was not drought-related, but wasrelated to a local feud which had caused all the members of one family to flee from the village. In theother villages, when there were such households, their numbers were quite small and never more thanthree households.

8 As a result of a recent political mobilization, the Jats were able to attain the status of OBCs so that they couldbenefit from the policies of affirmative action, mainly reservations in government jobs. Jats were added to thecategory of OBCs as recently as 1999 (Datta, 1999).

9 Many of the Muslim households said that they too had a caste (e.g. Alisar, Langa, etc.) and attested to ahierarchy among these castes.

It often turned out thatsample householdshad split into morethan one householdsince the list wascompiled. In such cases,the oldest member ofthe family, or the mosteasily availablemember, was surveyed

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Education

More than half of the individuals in thesample households were illiterate.About a third had completed school upto primary level, and just 11 per centhad finished secondary school.

Sex Ratios

The sample villages had a female-maleratio of 913, i.e. 913 women per 1000men. According to the 2001 census, thefemale-male ratio in Rajasthan is 922,which is slightly lower than the All-In-dia figure.

Age distribution

One-fifth of the population was chil-dren aged less than six years and abouta third of the population was in theschool-going age group (7 years to 18years). Another third of the populationconstituted the working age group(19-40 years) and 5 per cent of the popu-lation was aged 60 years and above.

Marital Status

Forty three per cent of the individuals inthe sample households were currentlymarried; another 2 per cent were mar-ried but had not performed the gauna10.Four per cent of the individuals were wid-owed and the remainder (approximately50 per cent) had never been married.

2.4.2 Physical and SocialInfrastructure

Location and Status

The geographic location and administra-tive status of a village is significant interms of providing (or denying) accessto panchayat officials and also to govern-

ment services such as healthcare centres,schools, and especially fair price shops(PDS ration shops). Each panchayat hasup to 10 villages, one of which is theadministrative headquarters for thatpanchayat, and after which the panchayatis usually named. Not belonging to thepanchayat headquarters (the ‘grampanchayat village’) can mean not know-ing when the ration shop will be open orwasting many days to get a signaturefrom the patwari or gram sewak. Only twoof the eight sample villages were alsogram panchayat headquarters: these wereBadli and Birothi, both in Udaipur. Onevillage, Biramsar, had its own ration shopand high school, though it was not a grampanchayat village; these privileges werecourtesy the local MP, who hailed fromit. The other five villages did not haveration shops, so people faced tremendousdifficulty just in getting their monthly ra-tions. Since ration shops were not openon fixed days, they had to make repeatedtrips outside their village, incurring thecost of transport as well as losing wages.

Access to primary schools is no longer aproblem in any of the villages. In fact,except for two, the remaining villageseven had a middle school within 3 km,if not within the village itself.

On the other hand, access to health fa-cilities is still a huge problem. Some vil-lages even lack access to an AuxiliaryNurse Midwife (ANM). For people liv-ing in Sukaliya, the closest PrimaryHealth Centre is more than 10 km away.

Miscellaneous infrastructure

All the villages but one have access to aroad. The exception is Sukaliya, which

10 Gauna is the ceremony after which the bride leaves her natal home to live with her husband.


Access to primaryschools is no longer aproblem in any of thevillages. On the otherhand, access to healthfacilities is still a hugeproblem


is 6 km from the nearest road. Four vil-lages have a direct bus service. Two vil-lages are not electrified and the others,though electrified, have erratic supply.In half of the villages, some homes hadtelephones.

Drinking water

The drinking water problem is mostacute in Bikaner and Barmer, where it isa perennial problem. Here people haveto rely on rain-water harvesting and ongovernment supplies (generally througha pipeline) for their needs. The mainform of rain-water harvesting in thesandy regions is the construction oftankas (underground storage tanks). Incontrast, people in Jaipur and Udaipur,rely mainly on handpumps for water,which is available most of the time, ex-cept occasionally, when handpumps dryup or stop working. Four years of con-secutive drought have lowered the wa-ter table, and some handpumps havegone dry as a result. The quality of wa-ter is also a matter of concern. In west-ern Rajasthan, water salinity is a prob-lem, whereas in Jaipur, high fluoride con-tent in drinking water was reported asthe cause of many health problems.

The worst-off villages were those whichgovernment supply of water did notreach. People had to walk for up to4-5 hours to get their supply of drinkingwater from the nearest governmentsource. In Sukaliya (Barmer), it was com-mon to hear stories of men who left afterthe morning meal and returned with wa-ter when it was time for the evening meal.11

Where water is supplied by the govern-ment, it is generally piped water suppliedto a water tank in the middle of the vil-lage. However, this does not solve theproblem entirely. The water supply re-mains uncertain: when water is not sup-plied to the water tank, villagers are leftstranded. In western Rajasthan, thedominant pattern of settlement is indhanis where only a few families of therevenue village reside near the watertank and the majority live a fewkilometres away. Thus even when wa-ter does come to the village tank, thosewho live in the dhanis (hamlet) still haveto spend some hours each day to get tothe village and fill water. Those who areable to afford it, pay for the water to beput into their private tankas. The costis, however, quite high – in Biramsar,people were paying up to Rs. 250 permonth for their water supplies.

2.4.3 Occupational Structure

A large proportion of the population ofRajasthan relies on agriculture and re-lated activities such as cattle rearing andcollection of forest produce. This is in-dicated by the secondary data on theoccupational structure in Rajasthan andborne out by the present field study. Thedata indicates that more than 60 per centof the population still considers self-em-ployment in agriculture as their primaryoccupation, though this does not meanthat agriculture is their sole activity.There isn’t much variation in this pro-portion either by caste or region.

The share of the population earning aliving from other forms of livelihood is

11 In the same village one woman’s husband was suffering from TB and diarrhoea, and she did not have anyanimal on which to fetch the water. She walked 3 hours each day in the sand dunes to the nearest water sourceto fetch one matka of water on her head for the day’s needs.

Four years ofconsecutive droughthave lowered thewater table, and somehandpumps have gonedry as a result

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quite small. For example, only 5 per centreported being self-employed in non-ag-ricultural occupations. This often meantthat they were employed in their casteoccupation – e.g. working as Suthars,Luhars, Mochis, Sunars, Nais etc. Theother main category was that of casuallabour, where again only 5 per cent re-ported it as their primary occupation.

This is indicative of the lack of devel-opment of occupational choices otherthan agriculture and traditional caste oc-cupations for the rural population. How-ever, it should not be taken as evidenceof lack of diversification in the occu-pational structure. Of the 397 house-holds visited, as many as 379 house-holds (95 per cent) reported a second-ary occupation as well.

The diversification of livelihood strat-egies is best studied at the individuallevel. Only when all members of ahousehold report the same occupationdoes it indicate a lack of diversifica-tion of the occupational structure.Members of a particular householdcould diversify in two ways: a) eachperson does a different job, or b) thesame person may do different jobs atdifferent points of time.

Thus, there may be houses where onemember has a regular job whereas theother members concentrate on agricul-ture. Or, those who report agricultureas their primary occupation may migratein search of work during the lean agri-cultural season. Such examples are notdifficult to find – girls who help in agri-cultural operations, or in grazing cattle,

may supplement the household incomeby doing kasidakari (embroidery).

In households where traditional casteoccupations were reported as the primaryoccupation, close to 60 per cent reportedbeing engaged in agriculture as well.Even for those with regular jobs, wherethe flexibility to move between jobs ispresumably the least, approximately 40per cent reported agriculture as their sec-ondary occupation.

2.4.4 Ownership of Land

It is important to note that the data onlandholding is not entirely reliable. Manypeople seemed to be afraid to state thetotal area of their land holdings. Thismust be due to the fear that if they wereseen to be rich then they would be de-prived of any potential benefits thatcould come as a result of this survey. Inone village we were able to get the landrecords from the patwari. In other cases,two members of the same householdwere interviewed separately on differentdays, or at least at different times to crosscheck the answers, or the same personwas asked some of the questions a sec-ond time, on another day to verify ear-lier claims. Quite often, these cross-checks revealed that there had been un-der-reporting of assets and sometimeseven output of cereals.12

A majority of the sample households(38 per cent) are marginal and smallfarmers, with land holdings of less thanone hectare. The second largest group,comprising nearly a quarter of thehouseholds, have land holdings of morethan 4 hectares. One must bear in mind


In households wheretraditional casteoccupations werereported as the primaryoccupation, close to 60per cent reportedbeing engaged inagriculture as well

12 These crosschecks were not done in a systematic manner – therefore, one cannot say with certainty the extentof measurement errors. Similar crosschecks were also applied wherever possible for the other data collected.The most glaring differences were in the case of land owned.


that in the western part of the State,population density is low and in gen-eral, the size of land holdings tendsto be higher. However, these largerland holdings are accompanied bymuch lower productivity of land in theregion. Thus a high degree of regionalinequality in the distribution of landholdings is offset by the differences inproductivity of land. Table 3 (p. 33)clearly shows that the land holdingsin the four vi l lages of westernRajasthan are the largest, whereasholdings in the villages of Udaipur arethe smallest.To look at inequality in the distributionof land as a measure of inequality inwealth, we would have to delve furtherand study the distribution of land acrosshouseholds. However, since the quality

of land data is slightly suspect, this hasnot been attempted here. To give an in-dication of such intra-village inequali-ties, the average size of landholdingsfor various caste groups has been shownin Table 4 (p. 35). This table providesa clear indication of the favourable po-sition of the “other backward castes”group on the one hand, and of the smallland holdings for the scheduled tribesgroup on the other. However, one mustbear in mind that this category includesa large number of castes, ranging fromquite prosperous farmers belonging tothe Jat and Bishnoi castes, to extremelypoor ones such as the Kumbhars ,Luhars, Nais, Sunars, etc. For example,the average holdings vary from 45 bighasfor the Bishnois, to only 2 bighas forthe Nais.

A high degree ofregional inequality inthe distribution of landholdings is offset bythe differences inproductivity of land

13

The Severity of the Drought of 1999-2001The Severity of the Drought of 1999-2001

There are several ways by which the se-verity of the drought of 1999-2001could be evaluated. Since Rajasthan’seconomy is primarily agrarian, it makessense to look at losses in the agriculturalsector by studying various parameters.The ones that were included the ques-tionnaire related to the area sown andthe fall in agricultural output. The west-ern part of the State, as mentioned ear-lier, is arid. As a result, people here relyon livestock rearing as much as they doon agriculture.13 Thus it is important tolook at changes in the aggregate live-stock wealth of the sample households,as well as changes in the compositionof their livestock assets. Since migrationoutside the village, and in some caseseven outside the State, is not only a cop-ing mechanism to seasonality anddrought in the region, but an importantsource of livelihood, it will also be dis-cussed briefly.

3.1 Agriculture

Land conditions in the sample villagesvary considerably in the four districts.Some of the agro-climatic differenceshave already been discussed. Here wedescribe the main crops and their pro-duction levels, as well as losses in eachof these regions.

Barmer and Bikaner both have sandy soilthat is suitable mainly for bajra. Agricul-

tural operations in this region rely on themonsoon rains. Consequently the kharif(monsoon) crop of bajra, the staple, isthe main crop of the year. The only ex-ception here is Dulmera Station wherebajra cannot be sown because the rainscome very late. Thus no cereals aregrown here in the kharif season. How-ever, there are variations within thesample villages as well. Irrigation facili-ties are available in two of these villages,Kharad (Barmer) and Dulmera Station(Bikaner). In Kharad, some fields are ir-rigated with groundwater, while inDulmera Station a few fields are in thecommand area of the Indira Gandhiwater canal.

Udaipur has fertile soil, but fields are notlevel. Here again, kharif is the main crop,though a small proportion of the popu-lation do have irrigation (river water andgroundwater) and are able to sow a rabicrop as well. The staple in this region ismaize, supplemented with rice. Thosewho do grow a rabi crop sow wheat.

Finally, Jaipur probably has the most pro-ductive soil of the four sample districts,in addition to having level fields. Herethe norm is to sow both the kharif andthe rabi crops. Jaipur does receive somerain in the winter as well, so the secondcrop is not entirely dependent on irriga-tion facilities. The main cereals grownin the monsoon are bajra and jowar,

13 Rajasthan has the largest livestock population in the country, and a substantial part of the State’s economyconsists of earnings from its cattle wealth (Rajesh, 2000).

SECTION III

It is important to lookat changes in theaggregate livestockwealth of the samplehouseholds, as well aschanges in thecomposition of theirlivestock assets


whereas wheat and jow are the main ce-reals grown in the rabi season. The fieldsthat are irrigated are irrigated bytubewells and dug wells.

Other Kharif crops: The other impor-tant kharif crop is gwar. It is used mainlyas fodder and sold on the market. Thekharif pulses include moong and moth inwestern Rajasthan and Jaipur andmoong, tuar and urad in Udaipur. Theseare also generally grown for self-con-sumption, though it is not uncommonfor them to be sold in good agriculturalyears. In Dulmera Station, people areable to sow groundnut in the monsoon,which is harvested in early December.Some people in Biramsar (Bikaner) alsogrow groundnut. Sesame (til) is anothercrop that is widely grown in the regionfor its oil.

Other Rabi Crops: Apart from the rabicereals – wheat and jow – chana, jeera andmustard seed are the other rabi crops. Jeera(cumin) is grown extensively in Kharadand is a highly remunerative crop. Chanais mainly grown for self-consumption.

3.1.1 Crop losses

As discussed above, the rainfall in 2001was quite close to normal and that yearhas been considered as the benchmarkin evaluating the area sown and outputlevels in 2000, which was a droughtyear. Table 5 (p. 36) shows the short-fall in area cultivated for the main ce-real crops. A small shortfall in the areaunder cultivation is not necessarily agood sign. This could just mean thatfollowing a good rain at the beginningof the monsoon season, farmers under-took their sowing operations expecting

that the good rain would continue. If,after an initial good spell, the rains fail,it could mean a double blow for thefarmers – not only do they lose theircrops, they would also have to bear thecosts of the sowing operations whichinclude purchasing the seed, expendi-ture on ploughing the fields, and, insome cases, the cost of fertilizers andpesticides. Over and above this, is theimputed labour cost of their own timespent in the sowing operations. There-fore, the shortfall in area sown must beconsidered in conjunction with the out-put data.

An example of a small fall in area sownaccompanied by a large fall in total out-put is clearly demonstrated in the caseof bajra. Though area under cultivationof bajra fell by just 4 per cent, the fall inoutput was to the tune of 70 per cent!This is in spite of the fact that bajra isamong the most sturdy cereals in termsof being able to tolerate a high level ofmoisture stress. Table 5 (p. 36) suggeststhat the largest decline in output was forbajra, along with rice, jowar and pulses.Makka seems to have been the only cropthat managed to survive in spite of alarge decline (nearly 60 per cent) in thearea under makka.

Overall, one can see that the failure ofthe rain in the year 2000 caused a largedrop in the production of bajra andwheat, both cereals that are widely con-sumed by the population. On the otherhand, makka, which is grown only inUdaipur, did not see much fall in pro-duction. Pulses, which are an importantpart of people’s diet, also saw a drasticfall in output.

If, after an initial goodspell, the rains fail, itcould mean a doubleblow for the farmers –not only do they losetheir crops, they wouldalso have to bear thecosts of the sowingoperations

15

Most households reported using approxi-mately 100 kg (one bori) of cereals eachmonth.14 Using this as a benchmark, wecan look at the average production ofcereals per family to see how manymonths their home-produced cerealswould last them. This also gives us ameasure of their vulnerability. If they areable to produce enough to last them untilthe next harvest (approximately 12 boris)then they are unlikely to be badly affectedby fluctuations in the market price ofcereals that may result from a generalshortfall in total output of cereals. Indeed,many families that were purchasing fromthe market complained about the priceof bajra having increased from Rs. 3 perkg to more than Rs. 7 per kg in a fewmonths; or from Rs. 5 per kg more thanRs. 10 per kg in the case of wheat.

Using this criterion, for the “good” year(i.e. 2001) we find that the worst hit vil-lages are Badli and Birothi (Udaipur) andDulmera Station (Bikaner) in whichpeople were able to get only about 3-4months’ consumption requirementsfrom their own fields and had to rely onthe market for the remaining months. Atthe other end of the spectrum we havethe villages of Jaipur, where farmerswere not only able to produce enoughto last them the entire year, but in thecase of Morda, had enough for 2 years’consumption needs. The remaining threevillages produced enough to last themfor 9-10 months.

When we look at the same figures for2000, the greater vulnerability is imme-diately obvious. Even a village like

Morda, which in the normal year pro-duced enough for two years’ consump-tion, could only produce enough forabout 10 months in 2000. The worst af-fected were the villages of westernRajasthan, which were able to produceenough for nearly 10 months in a goodyear but produced only between one tofour months consumption in 2000. Theproduction of makka did not vary muchbetween the two years as mentionedabove (Table 5, p. 36). There is not muchdifference in the vulnerability of thetribal villages of Udaipur betweendrought and normal years. For them,vulnerability remains high under bothcircumstances. Finally, for Dulmera Sta-tion, the source of vulnerability is not thedrought, but the cropping pattern in thevillage. As we noted above, the bajracrop cannot be sown there because therains come late to the region; while somefields have access to water from theIndira Gandhi Canal, the supply from theCanal is irregular and unpredictable. Inany case, only a small proportion of fieldsdo actually benefit from the Canal.

3.2 Livestock

The main livestock wealth in the samplevillages was in the form of cows, buffa-loes, goats, sheep and camels. Whilecows and buffaloes are important mainlyfor their milk and to a lesser degree asdraught animals, sheep and goats arereared for their wool and meat as well asfor their milk. Camels are found only inthe sandy western regions, where theyare quite useful as draught animals aswell as for transport.

14 The median consumption of cereals is 100 kg whereas the average household consumption of all cereals is114 kg. This has been calculated by summing up the total monthly consumption of wheat, rice, bajra, makkaand jowar.

The Severity of the Drought of 1999-2001

If they are able toproduce enough to lastthem until the nextharvest then they areunlikely to be badlyaffected byfluctuations in themarket price of cerealsthat may result from ageneral shortfall intotal output of cereals


If one looks at the total composition oflivestock wealth in 1999, one finds thatthe smaller animals, i.e. goats and sheep,predominate. Goats and sheep constitute49 per cent and 22 per cent respectivelyof the total holdings. The only changeover the three drought years is that theshare of cows in total holdings increasesto 24 per cent, pushing that of sheepdown to 18 per cent.

Though goats are believed to be thesturdiest of all livestock, Table 6 (p. 37)shows that the population of goatsnearly halved in the three years ofdrought (between 1999 and 2002). Thelargest losses were in the holdings ofsheep (53 per cent).

Death has been the main cause of de-cline in livestock population. This is truefor cows and buffaloes, goats and sheepas well as camels. Between half to two-thirds of the losses can be attributed todeaths, most of which were due to ill-ness or lack of fodder.15 In many cases,the illness was due to the poor qualityof fodder upon which the livestock wasforced to subsist.

The second largest cause of loss hasbeen due to sales. Here too, as in the caseof deaths, sales were mainly due to thelack of fodder, or because fodder wastoo expensive. The need to meet dailyconsumption expenses also figured as amajor cause for livestock sales. Between5-10 per cent of the losses were classi-fied as being due to “other” causes, in-cluding thefts, partitioning of house-holds, gifts, etc. Some of these losses

were offset by an increase due to pur-chases or because of new births.

3.3 Coping Strategies

Apart from diversifying their sources ofincome, households resort to variousother coping strategies to survive thedrought. Some of these are best viewedboth as coping strategies as well as strat-egies to diversify livelihoods. The pri-mary coping strategies discussed hereare migration, credit, distress sale of as-sets, and change in pattern of food con-sumption and level of consumption.

3.3.1 Migration

Nearly half of all households surveyedreported that at least one member oftheir family had to migrate in the sum-mer of 2001 (before the “normal” mon-soon) in search of work. In nearly halfof these households, the reasons formigration were related to the droughtand were not instances of usual sea-sonal migration.16

When one looks at individual data, oneneeds to compare migration in the sum-mer of 2001 with migration in the sum-mer of 2000 to ascertain whether morepeople were driven out of the local ar-eas in the second year of drought. If thenumber of migrants increased in 2001compared to 2000 across the samplehouseholds and within each household,this would indicate that migration wasbeing used as a coping mechanism.

A study of migrants seeking work in thechowktis (urban daily labour market) of

15 It is quite likely that that the lack of water was as important as the lack of fodder. However, none of therespondents mentioned this when asked about the causes of deaths.

16 To distinguish usual seasonal migration from drought-related migration, the respondents were askedwhether they migrated in that particular season every year or whether migration in the summer of 2001was something new.

Death has been themain cause of declinein livestock population.Most of these deathswere due to illness orlack of fodder

17

Jaipur, did in fact find that the numbershad swelled quite considerably eventhough 2001 was closer to being a nor-mal agricultural year (Kerbart andSivakumar, 2002).

The incidence of entire families migrat-ing was quite rare in all the villages vis-ited. When this did happen, it was uni-formly a sign of great distress and im-plied hardship for those concerned. Thedata collected indicates that most often,these families seemed to get work onlyas casual labourers in the cities and vil-lages to which they migrated.

Migration to save cattle was also un-common. When people migrated tosave cattle, they would take the cattleof others in the village with them, sothat fewer people would need to mi-grate. In Morda (Jaipur), in some Gujjarfamilies, one son took the family cattlealong with that of others in the village,and set off towards the Madhya Pradeshborder in the hope of saving them. Quiteoften, those who had sent their cattleaway said that they were as good as lostsince they would not be returned tothem. This seemed to imply that theperson who had taken the cattle wouldsell them but tell the owners that theyhad died.

The most common form of migrationwas when one male member of the fam-ily migrated or commuted to the nearbycity, where he would undertake one of arange of activities. Migrants would beemployed in shops and restaurants, orwould work as casual labourers. In BaasriJogiyan (Jaipur), most young men go toJaipur city each day, where some havejobs at shops and similar establishments,others work in Sanganer at dyeing and

printing factories, and yet others to gochowktis to work as masons, porters ascasual labourers. Migration from Morda(Jaipur) was not a very common feature.Those who did migrate went to the stonequarries in Ajmer district (Morda is inthe southern most part of Jaipur andquite close to the Ajmer border).

Seasonal migration is most common inwestern Rajasthan. In the villages ofBarmer, seasonal migration has be-come a regular feature of people’s lives.Most people (probably even all) mi-grate to Gujarat to earn a living. Theirearnings from migration are not insub-stantial, and generally employmentseems guaranteed for the period of mi-gration. For example, in Sukaliya peoplego to Valsad to work as caretakers onmango orchards in the summer monthsand are able to earn enough for theentire year. But there are other seasonalmigrants who are not so well off. Theyare faced with uncertainty regardingemployment and other adverse condi-tions as well. In Bikaner, men wouldmigrate north towards Punjab to workas agricultural labourers in the wheatharvesting season.

The duration of migration seems directlycorrelated to the distance to the nearestcentre for employment. Thus, in placeswhere the city is easily accessible (BaasriJogiyan), or there is a big market centrenearby (Kharad) the incidence of sea-sonal migration was lower than in vil-lages like Sukaliya, where there is nonearby employment option available andconsequently people go for the entiresummer season. In Dulmera Station, theauthor met one family that had just re-turned from north Rajasthan where they

The Severity of the Drought of 1999-2001

The most commonform of migration waswhen one malemember of the familymigrated or commutedto the nearby city,where he wouldundertake one of arange of activities


had been working as agricultural labour-ers in conditions that seem to have beenquite miserable – camping in the openair, in the middle of nowhere, with noshelter, without social support in termsof friends and family, or any guaranteeof employment.

3.3.2 Credit

Resorting to credit is known to be oneof the most common ways of tidingover shortages that occur in times ofdrought. In this sample of 397 house-holds, 247 (62 per cent) had to bor-row money in the drought year. But wemust bear in mind that householdsborrow for a variety of reasons, not allof which are related to drought. Forexample, borrowing for medical ex-penses or to meet marriage costsshould not be attributed to drought, assuch borrowing can occur in normalyears as well. Besides this, householdsmay borrow to accumulate assets.

In our sample, a majority of the house-holds (50 per cent) that borrowed did soin order to meet their food consumptionneeds (see Box). The other major rea-son why people borrowed was for agri-cultural expenses, which included thepurchase of seeds, payment for tilling theland with tractors, digging wells, etc.

Some of these could be drought-related – e.g. some households may haveneeded to use tractors to till their fieldsbecause their own draught animals died,or were sold, in the wake of the drought.

The reasons given by nearly three-quar-ters of the borrowing households couldbe linked directly to the drought. Theseinclude borrowing for food consump-tion needs, for other daily consumptionneeds (a very small category, with only18 households), to buy fodder and to mi-grate. The remaining 25 per cent bor-rowed for reasons that cannot be linkedso easily to the drought – these includemedical and marriage expenses, and ex-penses for agricultural operations.

More OBCs borrow as a proportion oftheir social group than do members ofany other group; there is not much dif-ference in the proportions of SC andother households who borrow (Table 8,p. 39). The smallest group is that of STs.When we look at the reasons for bor-rowing across the caste groups, the pat-terns do not vary much across house-holds – borrowing for daily needs is fol-lowed by borrowing for other reasons.Table 8 (p. 39) provides some evidencethat borrowing among the “better-off ”households is higher than among poorerhouseholds. This could indicate thathouseholds are borrowing to accumulateassets. However, we have already seenthat daily consumption expenses formthe main reason for borrowing. So itis more plausible to assume that thelarger share of better-off householdsamong debtors reflects their greater cred-itworthiness. For example, for ST house-holds, borrowing from institutionalsources is limited by economic and

Main Reasons for Borrowing

Of the 247 families that did borrow,*

123 borrowed to meet their food consumption needs81 mainly for agricultural operations46 to buy fodder42 to meet medical expenses30 to meet marriage expenses18 to meet other consumption needs1 to migrate* The total for all the households does not add up to 247 because the categories are not mutuallyexclusive, i.e., some households borrow for more than one reason.

Resorting to credit isknown to be one of themost common ways oftiding over shortagesthat occur in times ofdrought

19

non-economic factors (these includesmall land holdings, greater social dis-tance from institutional mechanisms,etc.). Borrowing from friends, relativesand family members is equally diffi-cult as they are likely to be in a simi-lar situation. Other informal sourcesof credit (such as the local bania) areknown to dry up in times of distress.17

As a result, even though the share ofSTs among borrowing households issmall, it is due more to a restriction inthe supply of credit rather than a lackof demand. This also explains to someextent the small proportion of borrow-ing households in Udaipur, which iswhere most of the tribal populationof the sample is concentrated.

The main sources of credit were the lo-cal bania (39 per cent), followed by rela-tives and friends (27 per cent). Only 8per cent of households borrowed frominstitutional sources. The larger shareof informal sources of credit is prob-ably linked to the fact that most house-holds are borrowing for their food con-sumption needs, for which credit is notavailable from formal sources. Themain sources for borrowing for agricul-tural purposes were from institutionalsources (23 per cent) as well as infor-mal sources. Relatedly, one finds thatpeople borrowing from informalsources are being charged usuriousrates of interest. The average monthlyinterest rate is 2.4 per cent, and in somecases, as much as 10 per cent! Thehighest rate of interest is charged bybanias. The advantage of borrowingfrom relatives and friends is that they

sometimes provide interest-free loansfor a flexible time period, which are notavailable elsewhere.

3.3.3 Hunger

A quarter of the houses (101 out of 397)reported that they had been skippingmeals around March 2001. Nearly half(47 per cent) of these were in Udaipurdistrict.When food was short in the house:

105 homes reported eating less thanusual.85 reported borrowing money, buyingfood on credit.18 sought the help of their neighboursand relatives.13 resorted to changing their foodbasket.

There has been a debate on the se-quencing of coping strategies and theirrelation to the level of distress.18 Jodhahas argued that people will try to pre-serve their holdings of key productiveassets rather than protect a certain stan-dard of consumption. This is in directopposition to Corbett’s (1988) position.Chen’s (1991) research in Gujarat vali-dated Jodha’s proposition, and indeedsome evidence for this can be found inthe sample villages as well. The propor-tion of houses that had to resort to dis-tress sales of productive assets (mainlyland and cattle) is much smaller than,for instance, the proportion of house-holds that report skipping meals. Chenlists the following main coping strate-gies in their rough order of sequencing:adapting or diversifying activities,

17 See Chen (1991) for more on this. When asked if they had borrowed during the past year, many householdscomplained vehemently that the bania no longer gave them credit.

18 See Chen (1991), Jodha (1975, 1991), Corbett (1988) and Chambers (1981) for more on this debate.The Severity of the Drought of 1999-2001

People try to preservetheir holdings of keyproductive assetsrather than protect acertain standard ofconsumption


reducing or modifying consumption, re-ducing commitments, participating inrelief programmes, borrowing, migrat-ing, mortgaging or selling assets andother drastic measures such as distressmigration of the entire household andbreakdown of families.

This study does not look at sequencingof coping strategies over a period oftime. Therefore it is not possible to saymuch about sequencing. However, wecan get some clues about sequencing bylooking at the proportion of householdsresorting to the various strategies at aparticular point in time. If the propor-tion of households using a strategy de-clines as we move from strategies ear-lier in the sequence to strategies later on,this may confirm the sequencing of thosestrategies.19 In Table 7 (p. 38), as we movedown the column, we can see that theproportion of households resorting tothat particular strategy falls.

3.3.4 Vulnerable Groups

Based on the discussion above, we tryto highlight some of the particularly vul-nerable groups. In Table 8 (p. 39), someindicators of vulnerability have beentabulated for three socio-economicgroups. These three groups are based onland ownership, primary occupation andcaste group. The most vulnerable groupwhen we use land ownership as the ba-sis of classification, is predictably thesmall or marginal farmers. Whether we

look at incidence of skipping meals orseeking work at relief sites, we find agradual decrease in proportion of house-holds as we move up the land-owningscale. For credit, we see further evidencesupporting the hypothesis that thegroups that do borrow are the wealthierones because they are perceived as cred-itworthy debtors, and that the low pro-portion of borrowing households amongthe small and marginal farmers may berelated to them being perceived as un-reliable borrowers.

When we look at the same indicators ofvulnerability by occupation, there issome evidence to show that agriculturallabourers are the worst affected. This isnot only in terms of having to sleep hun-gry or because the proportion of house-holds seeking work on relief sites is veryhigh, but also because the proportion ofagricultural labourer households thathad to sell or mortgage land is the high-est among the five occupation catego-ries. The other category that looks quitevulnerable by these indicators is that ofcasual labourer households.

When one looks at vulnerability amongthe various caste groups, the ScheduledTribes seem the worst off. The Sched-uled Castes are better off than them, butnot by much. This is further substanti-ated by the fact that they are also over-represented in the class of marginal andsmall farmers, a category that is also veryvulnerable.

19 This assumes that the most frequent strategies are also those that come first, which may not always be true.These results should therefore be interpreted with caution and as something to be explored further.

The most vulnerablegroup when we useland ownership as thebasis of classification, ispredictably the small ormarginal farmers

21

Government PolicyGovernment Policy

This section presents a brief but criticalreview of the government’s droughtpolicy. It highlights some areas wherechange is possible, without giving con-crete recommendations.

Given that large parts of the country aredrought prone, the government has ahistory of policies and programmes todeal with its consequences. This historycan be traced back to the Famine Com-mission Reports of the colonial era.These identified the lack of work andaccess to food as the main cause of suf-fering, but stressed the development ofirrigation facilities as the most impor-tant weapon against drought-related suf-fering.20 Based on this evaluation, the co-lonial government’s solution to droughtswas two-pronged:

Generation of work for the able-bodied with gratuitous relief forthe others.

The development of agriculture inde-pendently from the monsoon.

The government’s response can be stud-ied under two heads – drought proofingand drought mitigation. The two are dif-ferentiated by the duration for whichthey are deemed to have an effect onpeople’s lives. Thus, drought mitigationmeasures are generally treated as short-term measures that evolve to deal witha “crisis” that might develop if these

measures are not undertaken. The food-for-work programmes fall under this cat-egory of drought policy. Drought proof-ing refers to policies and programmes thatare put in place with the hope of evolv-ing a long-term solution to the problemof drought. Such measures might includedevelopment of irrigation facilities or thedevelopment of alternative sources oflivelihood so that dependence on agri-culture itself is reduced. The two typesof measures cannot always be differen-tiated in a clear manner – for example,measures for mitigation include the cre-ation of durable assets. Until recently,drought mitigation measures formed thelarger (in terms of expenditure) and moredominant part of the government’s strat-egy to deal with drought. However, therehas been a gradual shift away from miti-gation measures to the more “perma-nent” proofing measures.

4.1 Drought Mitigation

Government policies for drought miti-gation can be viewed as its short-termresponse to drought. The main respon-sibility of dealing with drought relieflies with the State Government as it istreated as a State subject. The ScarcityManuals play a pivotal role in the fram-ing of drought mitigation policy. Theirrole is important not only in definingwhat counts as a drought, but also inprescribing when a drought will be

20 See Drèze (1990: 15-35) for a description of the evolution of famine policy.

SECTION IV

There has been agradual shift awayfrom mitigationmeasures to the more“permanent” proofingmeasures


declared and how relief will be allo-cated. For example, in the allocation ofrelief work quotas, villages that are de-clared “famine-affected” are given pri-ority over villages that are declared“scarcity-affected”.

The Manuals are very thorough, but werelast revised in 1968. Since then, therehave been many changes in the economy,in politics (e.g. the introduction ofpanchayati raj institutions) and in society.The Manuals, as they exist, do not re-flect this changed socio-political reality.They were designed to provide “objec-tive” criteria on which to base the dec-laration of droughts. In practice, how-ever, the declaration of a drought in-volves a lot of politics as well and thereare various ways in which these criteriacan be subverted. It is possible that acareful revision may still be the best wayto deal with drought-related policy is-sues. The discussion that follows furtherhighlights the need for an immediate anddrastic revision and design of the Scar-city Manual of Rajasthan.

Reliance on the Scarcity Manual isfraught with many problems. First, theManuals have been designed with theunderlying assumption that droughts arenot a regular feature of the economy. Itfocuses on timely identification ofdroughts so that they do not develop intoa crisis. In the first section, we saw thatjudging by various indicators, droughtsare actually a recurring feature of theState, affecting some part or anothereach year, and manifesting themselvesin the form of shortages of drinkingwater, crop losses, etc. Thus droughts

should not be treated as separate and/or occasional phenomena to be dealtwith as and when they occur, but ratheras another constraint in the design ofpolicies. They are a chronic problem thatshould be addressed as such rather thanin an ad hoc manner as is the case atpresent. All development policy mea-sures should be designed with this inmind. The ad hoc treatment of droughtsmeans that the chronic problems that area direct consequence of droughts, suchas unemployment, underemployment,poor health conditions (especiallyundernutrition amongst vulnerablegroups), etc. are ignored by governmentinterventions.21 One clear indicator ofthe permanent nature of drought con-ditions in Rajasthan is that it is difficultto separate people’s coping strategiesagainst drought from their coping strate-gies in general. Migration is a prime ex-ample of this – people migrate not onlybecause of droughts, but also on a sea-sonal basis. Decisions to migrate dependon whether work is available in the vil-lage. People adjust their migration pat-terns to the nearby city or town to fit inwith their chances of getting employ-ment on the food-for-work site in theirown village.

Second, there are problems with theway the Scarcity Manual is used. Thoughthe Manual lays out other indicators thatshould be included in ascertaining theexistence of a drought, in practice mostgovernments have come to rely almostexclusively on the girdawari report, ig-noring other indicators such as cattledeaths, migration, etc. Cattle deaths are

21 One finds the government giving out contracts for various jobs that are as easily done by manual labour tomechanised firms, while people in the same area clamour for work and sometimes in extreme conditions, evendie of starvation.

Droughts should notbe treated as separateand/or occasionalphenomena to be dealtwith as and when theyoccur, but rather asanother constraint inthe design of policies

23

especially pertinent in the case ofRajasthan, which has the largest live-stock population in the country. For alarge proportion of the rural population,livestock is a more important source ofincome than agriculture.

Third, undue reliance on the Manualcauses unnecessary delay in the com-mencement of relief work. Since the as-sessment of land use requires that cropsbe close to harvest and since, in principleat least, each field has to be visited bythe patwari, it becomes a long drawn outand time-consuming process, which canbe started, at the earliest, in August. Be-cause of this, the declaration of droughtis often grievously delayed. For example,in 1999-2000, the second consecutiveyear of drought, the government tookuntil January 2000 to declare it. To makematters worse, relief work does not al-ways begin immediately after the decla-ration of a drought. Quite often there isa further lag of upto two months beforerelief work is initiated. In fact, even in2000-1 relief work began only in Febru-ary 2001 though the drought was declaredin November 2000.

Also, relief work is stopped as soon asthe first monsoon showers come. Thegovernment’s claim in this case is thatpeople no longer need work becausethey prefer to work on their fields any-way. There is some truth to this; but theperiod from the beginning of the mon-soon until the crops are harvested is alsothe period of maximum distress, sinceby then people have exhausted whateverlittle stocks they might have had from

previous years.22 Since, as we noted ear-lier, people do diversify their sources oflivelihood within a household, the con-tinuation of relief work would allowsome members to continue using it as asource of income to tide over this diffi-cult period, while others would be freeto work on their fields.

Fourth, the sincerity with which apatwari may carry out his duty in themeasurement varies tremendously.Quite often the patwaris do not live inthe region they are responsible for. Manyare known to remain absent from theiroffices for long periods of time, are cor-rupt, etc. The girdawari report involvesthe patwari visiting all the fields in hispanchayat to record the area sown, andto provide an estimate of the expecteddamage to the crops. Even if they wantto carry out these measurements prop-erly, the sheer magnitude of the taskbears them down, especially given thefact that the patwaris have numerousother responsibilities as well. Besidesthis, in some villages at least, it has beennoticed that when the villagers areaware of the significance of over-stat-ing their agricultural losses in order toget additional relief, the patwaris areoften under a lot of pressure to exag-gerate the losses.23

The Scarcity Manual also details thetypes of work that should be started inorder to provide relief. This list includestasks that would create durable assets.However, government policy has devi-ated from the Manual’s guidelines. Es-pecially since the implementation of

22 This has been referred to as the “hungry season” by Longhurst (1986). See also Chen (1991: 106). In this studyas well, many households did say that the worst season in terms of food availability was the monsoon.

23 This was noticed in the gram sabha meeting of one of the villages that the author did fieldwork in. Manypeople were asking the patwari to be “meherbaan” (generous) in reporting losses in their village.

Government Policy

Since people diversifytheir sources oflivelihood within ahousehold, thecontinuation of reliefwork would allowsome members tocontinue using it as asource of income, whileothers would be free towork on their fields


Fifth Pay Commission’s recommenda-tions, State Governments have been fac-ing a severe financial crisis. This resourcecrunch, combined with the objective ofproviding employment to as many peopleas possible, has meant that the ReliefDepartment sanctions only thoseprojects where the materials componentin the total cost is close to zero. As aresult, it is common to find that roadsare being laid in sand dunes where theprevious day’s work could be wiped outin a single night. Nadis (ponds) dug inany particular year to harvest the follow-ing year’s rainwater often do not survivethat long.

On the other hand, since Panchayati Rajinstitutions have been put in place, agram sabha takes place four times a yearin each panchayat. At these meetings, theelected representatives of the people areasked to submit proposals for theprojects to be undertaken in theirpanchayat. These proposals are sent reli-giously to the block administration aftereach gram sabha meeting. However, thelist of sanctioned works that comes backfrom the district or block administrationrarely includes the proposed work. Thisis partially due to the above mentionedresource crunch.

There are several problems with this ap-proach. First, the top-down approachmeans that projects that do not alwaysreflect people’s needs and priorities getprecedence, leading to wasteful expen-diture. Second, people’s participation inand ownership of the relief work suf-fers. It is widely recognized that thesetwo factors are vital in ensuring thesuccess of interventions. Third, the

top-down approach is especially detri-mental when it is accompanied by therhetoric of people’s participation.People’s faith in the panchayati raj insti-tutions suffers when their proposals anddemands are not considered. This hasthe effect of reducing their participationin these democratic local institutions.

Though drought is a State subject, theCentral government does play a veryimportant role. Specifically, the financesfor dealing with a drought are providedmainly by the Central government. TheCentre has two schemes for dealingwith “calamities” such as droughts,floods, earthquakes etc. These are theCalamity Relief Fund (CRF) and theNational Calamity Contingency Fund(NCCF). Both were started in 2000-1and have a duration of five years. TheCentre contributes as much as 75 percent of the funds to the Calamity Re-lief Fund (CRF). In the case of NCCF,the entire contribution is made by theGovernment of India, and allocationsto the States are made when the Na-tional Centre for Calamity Management(NCCM) finds that the State govern-ment needs to spend in excess of theCRF to meet the calamity.24

This pattern of funding relief leads todelays of its own. The State governmenthas to prepare a report of the losses andprovide the Centre with estimates offunds required. Once this is received,the Centre sends its team to the Stateto determine the validity of the claimsand only when the Centre is satisfied,are the funds released. Smooth imple-mentation of relief activities requiresthe existence of good Centre-State

People’s faith in thepanchayati rajinstitutions sufferswhen their proposalsand demands are notconsidered

24 See http://ndmindia.nic.in/documents/document.html

25

relations. However, the case of the re-cent drought in Rajasthan illustrateshow relief operations can suffer on ac-count of political rivalries.25

4.2 Drought Proofing

Drought proofing policies can be of twokinds: those aimed at drought prevention,i.e. countering the trigger event, andthose aimed at reducing the impact ofdrought on people. Examples of theformer include attempts to predict theextent of rainfall or devise early warn-ing systems, and extend to reforestationprogrammes (based on the assumptionthat the failure of rain is related to en-vironmental degradation).26

Within the second category of respon-ses, i.e. those aimed at reducing theimpact of drought, policies tended tofocus too much on agriculture andwithin that, on the development of ir-rigation. This has led to the imple-mentation of large-scale irrigationprojects,27 reforestation programmes,etc. From independence until the1970’s the reliance was almost solelyon such large-scale irrigation projects.Over the years, there has been a gradualshift away from such policies. However,the focus on the agricultural sector hascontinued. Later programmes such asIRDP and TRYSEM were included indrought proofing efforts.

There have been other policies aimedat reducing the impact of drought onpeople. These policies include measures

that would strengthen people’s positionwithin their existing livelihood patterns–such as agricultural extension services,veterinary services, access to credit andmarkets, etc. Their failure can be tracedto their flawed design as well as to prob-lems in implementation. Drought-resis-tant varieties of seeds, varieties withshort stalks, short ripening period, etc.have also been tried. What seems to havebeen neglected is the already existentdiversity in people’s livelihood strategiesand the need to focus on them.

4.2.1 Government Programmes

In its attempt to “drought proof ” thedrought prone areas of the country theCentral government has undertakenvarious programmes such as theDrought Prone Areas Programme(DPAP) and the Desert DevelopmentProgramme (DDP).

The DPAP was launched in 1973-4 andcovers 180 districts spread over 16States. Similarly, the DDP covers 40 dis-tricts in 7 States and was launched dur-ing the Fifth Plan in 1977-8. Theprogrammes undertaken under theDPAP and DDP include pasture devel-opment, afforestation, and water re-sources development. The unsatisfac-tory progress of the programmes led toa review in 1993 by the HanumanthaRao Commission. As a consequence,there was a concerted move to bring de-cision-making closer to the beneficia-ries of the programmes as well as carryout decentralisation. This change came

25 For more on Centre-State relations and the fiscal arrangements related to droughts see Mathur and Jayal(1993: 53-62).

26 Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) note that policy responses tend to focus on trigger events even though wehave little control over them.

27 This emphasis can be traced back to British India (Mathur and Jayal, 1993: 31). Baviskar (1995), also commentson this tendency of government policy (see pp. 26-22). See Jodha (1990) for the changing priorities in policy.

Government Policy

What seems to havebeen neglected is thealready existentdiversity in people’slivelihood strategiesand the need to focuson them


together with an exclusive focus onwatershed program-mes. The recom-mendations came into effect in 1995.They also changed the financial ar-rangements from a 50:50 partnershipbetween the State and the Centre to a25:75 sharing arrangement.

The long term objectives of the Centrethat have been laid out in the Contin-gency Plan for Drought 2000, GOI,28 in-clude the development of drought-resis-tant varieties of crops, a greater empha-sis on small and medium scale irrigationprojects, watershed development andrainwater harvesting, implementation ofrelief works that are sustainable, affor-estation, etc.

4.2.2 Government Policies

Water Policy

In discussing water policy, it is usefulto separate issues relating to the supplyof water from issues relating to its de-mand. The problem of supply has to dowith the availability of water for vari-ous purposes, such as agriculture, drink-ing and sanitation. The problem of de-mand has to do with how the water isused: for instance, whether it is usedwastefully or unsustainably, who hasaccess to the water, etc. Governmentpolicy has tended to focus on the prob-lem of supply over that of demand, andhas concentrated on irrigation overother needs. Recent interventions suchas water harvesting and watershed man-agement, though commendable, havealso continued to ignore the demandaspect of the water problem.

We have already noted that Govern-ment water policy has concentrated al-most exclusively on irrigation. The em-phasis here has been on large-scale irri-gation projects: during 1951-85, the In-dian government invested 64 per centof its total irrigation expenditure onmajor and medium projects, eventhough they are more costly than minorprojects.29 The cost of irrigating onehectare of land by a large project isRs. 19,310 compared to Rs. 4,520 whenirrigated by a minor irrigation project(Baviskar, 1995: 27). Even in the dryState of Rajasthan there have been at-tempts to sell the idea of solving thewater problem by linking the State withthe Indira Gandhi Canal in the north andthe Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujaratin the south. There is a need to moveaway from large scale irrigation to smalland medium projects which haveproved to be more efficient.

Since rainfall in India is concentratedduring three months, small-scale effortssuch as water harvesting could also beexplored further. In addition to irrigation,they have the potential to alleviate theshortage of drinking water, and help re-plenish groundwater resources. A num-ber of such initiatives have already beentaken by some local NGOs – these in-clude the building of community tankasin some parts of Barmer. In the Udaipurregion, small-scale irrigation projects suchas the construction of bandhs and anicuts,have been undertaken by Sewa Mandir.However, there does not seem to be anysystematic evaluation of the progress orsuccess of these initiatives. Such an

28 Source: http://ndmindia.nic.in/documents/document.html29 This emphasis on large and medium irrigation projects and the neglect of minor irrigation schemes has been

highlighted by Baviskar (1995) and Mathur and Jayal (1993).

There is a need tomove away from largescale irrigation to smalland medium projectswhich have proved tobe more efficient

27

evaluation would provide useful insightsinto whether such projects work, underwhat circumstances they work and finally,whether or not there needs to be furtherthrust towards such projects.

The focus on supply should not obscurea more fundamental problem with wa-ter policy, which is that it has ignoredissues relating to the management of wa-ter resources. In the drive to immuniseagriculture from the vagaries of themonsoon, there has been an uncon-trolled expansion in the use of ground-water resources. Groundwater is thesingle most important source of irriga-tion for farm-land in Rajasthan. In1998-9, 64 per cent of irrigated landwas irrigated by tubewells and dugwells.30 This has depleted groundwaterresources, making water saline in manyareas, and has also interfered withpeople’s traditional coping mecha-nisms.31 Thus, what was earlier treatedas a scarce resource is now used quiteuneconomically (Jodha, 1991).32

Unrestricted water use is irrational andultimately unsustainable. This has beenhighlighted in the recent literature,which also links food security in the fu-ture to the management of water re-sources today.33 We must explore waysto regulate water use, perhaps by theimposition of charges for different typesof water use, e.g. water meters makevolumetric water pricing straightforward(Johanssan, 2000).

Finally, the management of water re-sources is unfair. First, the benefits ofunrestricted supply flow to rich farmerswho can afford to buy high-yieldingcrops that require extensive irrigation.Second, as the water table drops, onlythose who can afford to bore deeptubewells have access to water in a timeof scarcity.

Diversification of livelihoods

Much of the vulnerability of the popu-lation to drought can be traced to its soleor primary reliance on subsistence agri-culture. Consequently, most of our ef-forts for drought proofing have concen-trated on reducing this vulnerability,which is triggered by an unpredictablemonsoon, and is exacerbated by socialand economic factors. This has meantthat policies have tried to ensure higherand more predictable returns to agricul-ture by the provision of better irrigation,seeds, etc.

What has been ignored is the equallyimportant need for further diversificationof livelihood strategies, especially amove away from sole or primary relianceon subsistence agriculture. If share ofincome from other sources (within ahousehold and across households) canbe raised and made more predictable, theobjective of drought proofing wouldhave been achieved. This may be easiersaid than done, but there is evidence thatpoints to the success of, and the futurepotential for, such interventions. This is

30 Gross area irrigated from wells as a proportion of total gross irrigated area, calculated from data posted onhttp://agricoop.nic.in/statistics/st3.htm.

31 Jodha (1989) explains how technological change, public intervention and the increased role of the markethave encouraged an uneconomical use of water, which was earlier treated as a scarce resource by people.

32 Nor is exploitation of ground water an exclusively rural phenomenon. In Jaipur, tubewells provide 60-70 percent of the city’s water needs (Rajesh, 2000).

33 See Batchelor et al (2003), Economic and Political Weekly (2002), World Bank (2000),http://www.iwmi.cgiar.org/Press/brief2.htm

Government Policy

Much of thevulnerability of thepopulation to droughtcan be traced to its soleor primary reliance onsubsistence agriculture


partially because of the existing diversityin occupations of a household.

If agriculture had been the only sourceof livelihood, any policy interventionwould require a much larger thrust thanis required in a more diversified occupa-tional structure. The pre-existence ofdiversity in the sources of livelihoodprovides us with a wider variety of in-tervention options. Thus, when we knowthat the rural population does sell forestproduce, wool and livestock (for meat)in the market, or migrates to other ar-eas, then policy interventions can worktowards strengthening the position ofpeople in such dealings as they mighthave with the market and ensuring theyget a fair price for the things they sell.On the other hand, if such strategieswere not already a part of their survivalstrategy, then they would either have tobe developed or, it would reduce thescope of interventions only to the fieldof agriculture.

There are already existing examples ofsuccessful interventions in the State it-self. Uttar Rajasthan Milk Union Lim-ited (URMUL) in Bikaner and Saras inJaipur are both co-operative dairies asa result of whose operations even smallfarmers in villages are able to sell milkat least once a day at remunerative andnon-exploitative rates.34 It might be pos-sible to develop a similar institutionalsetup for those who sell wool and sheep(and other livestock such as chicken)in the market but are currently at themercy of the trader who comes to their

village to buy their goods. This wouldalso be helpful in the south-easterntribal region, where reliance on sale offorest products is an important meansof livelihood. Similarly in westernRajasthan, embroidery provides em-ployment to many women but not atremunerative rates. In one village therewere a few women who spun wool intothread and sold it to the Khadi GramUdyog. Spinning provided an importantsupplement to the incomes of thesefamilies. But they also complained thatsupplies from the Khadi Village Indus-tries outlet were irregular.

Another initiative could be the improve-ment of livestock breeds, especiallycows. This is important as an improve-ment in breed of cows would result inimproved milk yields, and therefore theneed to maintain large herds would bereduced. This in turn reduces the pres-sure on fodder requirements.35

Co-ordination of government andnon-government efforts

Rajasthan has a thriving non-govern-mental sector active in developmentwork. Financial resource flows to thissector are not insubstantial. A widerange of initiatives has been undertakenby them – from income generationprogrammes, to environment conserva-tion and water harvesting, education,etc. However, what seems lacking is anoverall vision. Even this sector does notseem to recognise the permanent natureof the drought. As a result, their effortsremain fragmented with other problems

34 See Gurumurthi (1999) and Kurien (1997) for more on the success of the co-operative movement in thedairy sector.

35 Such a suggestion has been made by Mehta (2000) for the region of Kutch, which in agroclimatic terms is verysimilar to western Rajasthan. Society for Uplift of Rural Economy (SURE), a Barmer-based NGO has aprogramme for cattle breed improvement.

The pre-existence ofdiversity in the sourcesof livelihood providesus with a wider varietyof intervention options

29

such as duplication. There does notseem to be a system that would makethem accountable to the people, at leastin the areas in which they work. Gov-ernment efforts are monitored andevaluated systematically at regular inter-vals; such a process should also be putinto place for the activities of the non-governmental organizations that areworking in these areas. Co-ordinationand collaboration with the governmentcould also be taken much further. WhileNGOs play an important role in devel-opment, their area of operation contin-ues to be small. It is possible for thegovernment to learn from this sector.Such learning has taken place in the past.

For instance, Social Work and ResearchCentre (SWRC) initiated relief work insome of its villages and introduced jobcards. The purpose of this exercise wasnot only to provide relief, but also topresent before the government a modelof how the introduction of job cards atrelief sites can counter some of theproblems that are faced by governmentrun food-for-work programmes. Theseinclude false entries in the muster rolls,a small section of people getting workrepeatedly at the cost of others, cheat-ing in the recording of wages, etc. As aresult of SWRC’s work, the governmentof Rajasthan has started issuing jobcards to each household in the village.36

36 The job cards are distributed to everyone according to the type of ration card that they hold. Thus, those whohave a pink ration card (BPL card) are given pink job cards.

Government Policy

While NGOs play animportant role indevelopment, theirarea of operationcontinues to be small


ConclusionConclusion

This paper has argued that droughtshould not be thought of in terms of ashortfall in aggregate rainfall alone, butalso in terms of the various ways inwhich human lives are affected. Whenwe think of drought in this broadersense, it becomes obvious that droughtis a regular feature of life for many inRajasthan. This has important ramifica-tions for the way policy-makers deal withthe issue. Currently, it is largely dealtwith by the provisions made in the Scar-city Manuals. By their very nature, theScarcity Manuals provide ad hoc relief.There are various problems with ad hocrelief, some of which can be addressedby providing a universal Right to Work.The advantages of having the Right toWork are as follows:37

A guarantee of work at minimumwages would ensure that wages inother sectors do not decline or, thatif they do decline, workers have anoption that would protect them fromthese declines.

Guarantee of work would ensure thatenough work is available for those re-quiring it. The way the programme iscurrently designed it generally tendsto fall short of the demand for work.This has the consequence of leading

to tensions and sometimes even quar-rels to get work. It is not surprisingthat the really vulnerable sections tendto get left out or get too little.

The security afforded by the Right toWork is likely to have other positiveoutcomes in terms of reducing theextent of distress migration. Currently,people in the villages have to timetheir movements in and out of villagesto coincide with their chances of get-ting work on relief programmes.

A comprehensive drought policy thattreats drought as a feature of theeconomy and aims at co-ordinating gov-ernment and non-government develop-ment initiatives needs to be devised. Arevision of the drought policy, especiallyin the Scarcity Manuals, is needed, soas to incorporate the popular demandfor the Right to Work, amongst otherthings. Rather than continuing to focusand rely on the agricultural sector, a fur-ther thrust needs to be given to diversi-fication of livelihoods away from agri-culture and to diversification evenwithin the broad category of agriculturallivelihoods. This also entails movingaway from a water policy that empha-sizes the development of irrigation, towater harvesting.

37 For more details see www.righttofood.com

SECTION V

A comprehensivedrought policy thattreats drought as afeature of the economyand aims at co-ordinatinggovernment and non-governmentdevelopmentinitiatives needs to bedevised

31

Statistical Annexures

Table 1: Some Indicators of Drought in Rajasthan, 1981-2 to 2002-3


Source: Rainfall: http://www.rajirrigation.com/Annexure-C5.htm; Affected Villages: Government of Rajasthan (1999); Labour engaged andExpenditure on relief operations: Government of Rajasthan (2000) unpublished data provided by the Department of Relief; Indexof Agricultural production: Vidya Sagar (1995) and Government of India (2000). Cattle population: Government of Rajasthan(1983), (1988) and (1997).

Year Total monsoonrainfall(mm)

Number ofaffectedvillages

Labourengaged(lakh)

Expenditureon relief

operations,(Rs. Crore)

Index ofFoodgrainsproduction(1991-2=100)

TotalCattle(lakh)

-

-

-

-

434

292

523

444

649

463

587

519

665

615

726

588

503

450

-

381

517

173

23246

22606

282

10276

26859

31936

36252

4497

14024

0

30041

4376

22256

0

25478

5905

4633

20069

23406

30583

7964

41000

28.142

28.37

0

4.86

32.05

62.05

125.82

219.50

11.05

0

14.69

1.06

15.75

0

20.75

0.87

21.62

29.84

42.96

27.29

-

15.75

109

102

68

6

91

163

622

323

31

38

6

131

34

167

46

204

5

187

277

566

-

-

90.21

104.00

126.55

98.99

98.99

85.20

60.14

132.82

106.50

-

100.00

143.83

88.40

146.72

119.87

160.64

176.03

162.06

133.88

30.77

-

-

-

135

-

-

-

-

109

-

-

-

-

116

-

-

-

-

121

-

-

-

-

-

1981-2

1982-3

1983-4

1984-5

1985-6

1986-7

1987-8

1988-9

1989-90

1990-1

1991-2

1992-3

1993-4

1994-5

1995-6

1996-7

1997-8

1998-9

1999-2000

2000-1

2001-2

2002-3

Note : 10 lakh = 1 million1 crore = 100 lakh


Table 2: Rainfall and “Famine-affected” Villages, 2001

Note: 1 Excess rainfall means rainfall has been 20 per cent more than “normal”; Normal rainfall means it is between +19 to -19 per cent of normalas calculated over a given period of time; and Deficit means it has been 20 per cent or more below normal rainfall.2 “Famine-affected” villages are those where the area sown has fallen to less than 75 per cent of normal.

Source: Government of Rajasthan (1999), Memorandum on scarcity (Samvat 2056), Relief Department, Jaipur, Annexure 1 and Annexure 6.

Rainfall1 Excess rainfall Normal rainfall Deficit rainfall

> 50 per cent

< 50 per cent

Jhunjhunu Jodhpur, Pali, Sikar

Kota

Ajmer, Barmer, BhilwaraChuru, Dungarpur, Jaipur,Jalore, Nagaur, Rajsamand,Sirohi, Tonk and Udaipur

Baran, Bharatpur, Bundi,Chittorgarh, Dausa, SriGanganagar, Jhalawar,Sawai Madhopur

Banswara,Bikaner,Hanumangarh

Alwar, Dholpur,Karauli

% villages“famine-affected”2

33

Table 3 : Basic Features of the Sample Villages


Kharad

Barmer

Sukaliya Biramsar DulmeraStation

BaasriJogiyan

Morda Badli Birothi

Bikaner Jaipur Udaipur

DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

No. of sample households 50 47 47 49 51 50 43 51

Caste Composition (%)

Scheduled Caste

Scheduled Tribe

OBC

General

34

0

4

62

2

15

72

11

17

0

72

11

0

0

86

14

26

14

31

29

14

2

74

10

14

12

6

68

Religion (%)

Hindus

Muslims

Jains

Tribals

100

0

0

0

19

66

0

15

100

0

0

0

76

22

2

0

94

0

0

6

90

10

0

0

0

0

0

100

78

2

6

14

0

100

0

0

Distance to (in kms)

All weather road

Bus stop

Health facility

Primary school

Middle School

0

0

4

0

4

6

6

3

0

3

2

0

4

0

0

0

4

4

0

0

2.5

0

1.5

0

1.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

6

0

0

15

0

0

0

0

Source of drinking water (%)

Piped water in the compound

Piped water outside thecompound

Private handpump

Public handpump

6

54

0

0

0

40

0

0

2

83

0

0

4

51

0

0

4

2

2

90

40

4

0

52

0

0

26

0

2

0

0

82

PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE


Table 3 (contd.) : Basic Features of the Sample Villages

Kharad

Barmer

Sukaliya Biramsar DulmeraStation

BaasriJogiyan

Morda Badli Birothi

Bikaner Jaipur Udaipur

Covered well in the compound

Uncovered well in thecompound

Covered well outsidecompound

Uncovered public well

Tanka

Surface water (pond, river, lake)

Other

0

30

0

10

0

0

0

2

0

0

53

0

0

4

0

6

0

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

45

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

26

5

40

0

2

0

0

0

0

14

0

2

0

Occupation Structure (%)

Self employed inagriculture

Self employed innon-agriculture

Agricultural labour

Casual labour

Regular employment

74

6

0

8

8

72

2

2

15

6

78

7

0

13

0

33

25

13

25

4

47

10

12

10

10

78

14

2

4

2

98

0

0

0

0

78

6

2

4

8

Average per household landowned (in bighas), 2001

Unirrigated

Irrigated

Total

19

9

28

42

0

42

34

0

34

18

5

23

6

8

14

17

6

24

2

0

2

5

1

6

ECONOMIC

Source: Based on data collected during fieldwork.

35Statistical Annexures

ScheduledCaste

ScheduledTribe

OtherBackward

Castes

General AllCastes

Land area

Table 4 : Land Owned and Area Cultivated (Bighas) by Various Caste Groups, 2001


ScheduledCaste(%)

ScheduledTribe(%)

OtherBackwardCastes (%)

General(%)

AllCastes

(%)

Size of holding (in bighas)

Less than or equal to 5

6-15

16-25

26-35

More than 36

Average owned (in bighas)

Unirrigated

Irrigated

9.0

1.1

4.4

0.4

30.6

5.1

11.1

5.1

17.8

3.6

Average sown (in bighas)

2001

Unirrigated

Irrigated

2000

Unirrigated

Irrigated

10.0

1.8

8.6

1.4

4.3

0.5

4.0

0.5

22.0

2.2

20.6

2.7

8.2

3.7

7.2

3.3

13.8

2.6

12.6

2.2

Land area

42

41

11

1

5

73

21

5

2

0

14

24

17

8

36

39

29

13

6

13

35

28

13

5

19


Table 5 : Changes in Area Sown and Total Output of Main Foodgrains


2001 2000 Shortfall (%)

Total Area Sown(in bighas)

Total Output(in ‘000 kgs)

Makka

Bajra

Wheat

Other cereals

Pulses

Makka

Bajra

Wheat

Other cereals

Pulses

452.0 186.0 59

3913.0 3751.0 4

561.0 325.0 42

1407.0 262.0 81

854.0 417.0 51

24.5 19.8 19

217.4 61.8 72

122.4 74.4 39

25.4 4.4 83

11.8 2.4 80

37

Table 6 : Change in Total Livestock Wealth of the Sample Households



1999 2002Decrease in total holding

(%)

Cows

Buffaloes

Goats

Sheep

Camels

1506 1068 29

526 529 0

3793 2022 47

1710 808 53

143 92 36


Table 7 : Coping Strategies of Households in Order of Importance

Note: When households report both a primary and secondary occupation, they are classified as “adapting or diversifying activities”;if any member of the household sought work on relief sites, that household was treated as “participating in relief work”; ifany member of the household had to migrate out in search of work in the summer of 2001, that household is classified as“migrating”.


Proportion of householdsreporting (%)

Adapting or diversifying activities

Participating in relief works

Borrowing

Migrating

Mortgaging or selling assets

Migration of entire families

95

70

64

48

24

Negligible

39Statistical Annexures

Table 8 : Vulnerable Groups in the Sample Population


Proportion ofhouseholds (%)

In samplepopulation

Reportingskipping

meals

Reporting seekingwork on food-for-work programme

Where at least one member had

to migrate out

Borrowing Selling ormortgaging

assets

All

Female headedhouseholds

Ownershipof land(in hectares)

<1

1.01-2.0

2.01-4.0

>4

Occupationgroups

Self-employed inagriculture

Self-employed in

non-agriculture

Agriculturallabour

Casuallabourer

Regularjobs

SC

ST

OBC

Other

Caste

100 27 70 48 64 24

10 32 76 45 65 24

38 40 77 51 55 22

15 26 71 46 61 19

22 17 69 51 77 28

25 15 55 40 66 28

69 27 77 50 64 25

9 9 41 21 53 15

4 39 79 53 67 33

10 32 66 59 74 28

5 5 18 48 55 14

14 28 79 43 63 24

17 45 93 62 48 23

42 15 64 42 75 29

28 34 53 52 56 17


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