dp61 the challenges of free education png · 2019. 9. 22. · the challenges of providing free...
TRANSCRIPT
Thechallengesofprovidingfree
educationinPapuaNewGuinea
GrantWalton,TaraDavdaandPeterKanaparo
Abstract
Introducedin2012,theTuitionFeeFree(TFF)policyhasbecomeaflagshippolicyofthePapuaNewGuinea(PNG)government.Since2012,furtherchangestothispolicyhavebeenintroduced;thesechangescontinuetoreducefinancialbarrierstoschoolattendanceandattempttorecentralisecontrolofeducationfunding.Whathavethesepolicychangesmeantforschools,administrators,non-governmentalserviceproviders(suchasthechurch),andotherkeystakeholders?Thispaperdrawsonqualitativeandquantitativeresearchconductedin2012and2016inEastNewBritainandGulfprovinces–theformerperformsrelativelywellindeliveringservices,thelatterrelativelypoorly.Interviewswereconductedwitheducationrepresentatives,communitymembers,governmentandchurchofficialsandotherstakeholderstoassesstheimpactofPNG’sfourthandmostenduringattemptatprovidingfreeeducation.Researchersvisited10schools,fourdistrictadministrationsandtwoprovincialadministrations.Theresearchapproachallowsforacomparisonofprogressandregressintheseschoolsbetween2012and2016.ItisarguedthatwhiletheTFFpolicyhashelpedimproveaccessandstrengthenedschoolautonomy,recentpolicyreformshavethreatenedschool-communityrelations,underminedschoolqualityandweakenedconditionsforeffectiveserviceprovision.ThepaperwillproviderecommendationsabouthowPNGpolicymakersandothersmightaddresssomeofthechallenges.
DevelopmentPolicyCentreDiscussionPaper61
August2017
SERIESISSN2206-303X
Thechallengesofprovidingfreeeducationin
PapuaNewGuinea
GrantWalton
TaraDavda
PeterKanaparo
GrantWalton is aResearch Fellow andTaraDavda aResearchOfficer at the Development Policy Centre, Crawford School ofPublic Policy, The Australian National University. PeterKanaparo isa lecturerat theUniversityofPapuaNewGuinea'sSchoolofBusinessandPublicPolicy.1
Walton,G,Davda,T&Kanaparo,P2017-“ThechallengesofprovidingfreeeducationinPapuaNewGuinea,”DevelopmentPolicyCentreDiscussionPaper#61,CrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,TheAustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra.
TheDevelopment Policy Centre is a research unit at theCrawford School of Public Policy, The Australian NationalUniversity.Thediscussionpaperseries is intended to facilitateacademic and policy discussion. Use and dissemination of thisdiscussion paper is encouraged; however, reproduced copiesmaynotbeusedforcommercialpurposes.
The views expressed in discussion papers are those oftheauthors and shouldnot be attributed to anyorganisationwithwhichtheauthorsmightbeaffiliated.
FormoreinformationontheDevelopmentPolicyCentre,visithttp://devpolicy.anu.edu.au/
1ThisresearchwasconductedthroughapartnershipbetweentheUniversityofPapuaNewGuineaandtheAustralianNationalUniversity’sDevelopmentPolicyCentre,andfundedbytheAustralianAidProgram.Wethankthefollowingindividualsfortheirinvolvement:DeniseLokinap,TatiaCurrieandColinWiltshire.WethankMichaelCooksonandHusniaHushangformanagingfundingandlogisticalsupport,andAnthonySwanforhisassistancewithdataprovisionandcommentsonanearlydraft.ThanksalsotothetworeviewersandMatthewDornan,theeditorofthisdiscussionpaperseries.AndtoAshleeBetteridgeforediting.Wealsothanktheadministrators,schoolsandcommunitieswhoansweredourquestionsandmadeourvisittosomeofthemoreremotepartsofthecountryfruitfulandenjoyable.Authorcontact:[email protected].
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AbusyclassroominEastNewBritain
1. Introduction
ThePapuaNewGuinea(PNG)government’sTuitionFeeFree(TFF)policywas
introducedin2012andhasbecomeaflagshippolicyofthePNGgovernment.Inits
presentform,thepolicyprovideselementary,primaryandsecondaryschoolswith100
percentsubsidiesforstudents’tuitionfees.Anearlyevaluationofthispolicy
(conductedin2012),whichfeaturedinNationalResearchInstituteofPapuaNew
Guinea(NRI)andAustralianNationalUniversity’s(ANU)LostDecade?Report(Howeset
al.,2014)foundthatitwasmostlydeliveringonthepromisessetoutbytheNational
DepartmentofEducation(NDoE),althoughconcernswereraisedabouttheimpacton
schoolqualityandmonitoringofsubsidypayments.
SincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,therehasbeenamovetofurtherreducethe
feesassociatedwithschoolinginPNG.Atthestartof2015,thegovernmentbanned
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schoolsfromchargingprojectfees(feesleviedattheschoolleveltofundparticular
projects)andsubsequentlybannedchurchagencyfees(feeschargedbychurch
administeredschools).Therehavealsobeenmovestorecentralisesomefunds.What
havethesepolicychangesmeantforschoolsandsub-nationaladministratorsinPNG?
TheLostDecade?Reportprovidedaquantitativeassessmentoftheinitialrolloutofthe
firstyearoftheTFFpolicy.Thispaperexaminestheimpactofrecenteducationpolicies
byprovidingamorein-depthandqualitativelookattheissuesfacingschoolsintwo
provinces:EastNewBritain(ENB)andGulf.
Whyexaminethesetwoprovinces?TheLostDecade?Reportprovidedanassessmentof
schoolsandhealthfacilitiesineightprovinces,includingGulfandEastNewBritain.It
foundthatGulfperformedpoorlyacrossanumberofindicators,whileEastNewBritain
toppedthetablesforschoolqualityandinfrastructure.Forexample,between2002and
2012,theproportionofparentsclaimingthatmostchildreninthecommunityattended
schoolrosefrom37to90percentinEastNewBritain;yetinGulfitfellfrom63to37
percent(Howesetal.,2014:ix).Theaimoftheresearchinformingthispaperistobetter
understandthereasonsforthesedifferences.WhydoesEastNewBritainout-perform
Gulf,particularlywhenbotharefacedwithsignificantremotenessissues?Wealso
examinethedifferentwayschurchandstateschoolshaverespondedtotheimplications
ofthesepolicies.
Thesequestionsareapproachedthroughacase-studymethodology,whichdrawsdata
fromselectschoolsinbothprovinces.Thepaperproceedsasfollows.Thefirstsection
providesabackgroundonPNG’srecenteducationpolicies2,whilethesecondpresents
themethodologyguidingtheresearch.Thethirdsectionpresentsthekeyfindingsfrom
theschoolsvisitedinbothGulfandEastNewBritain.Itexaminestheimpactoffree
educationpoliciesonstudentenrollmentsandattendanceaswellasteacher
availability;evaluatesthefalloutfromthegovernment’sbanonschoolandprojectfees;
considersthechangingimportanceofnationalfundingovertime;examinesoversight
2Theobjectiveofthispaperistohighlightthefindingsoftheresearch,andpresentpolicyrecommendations.Giventhis,wehavenotprovidedaliteraturereviewinthispaper;forthoseinterestedinabroaderbackgroundoneducationpolicyinPNGwepointthereadertoHowesetal,2014.
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andcommunityengagement;andconcernsaboutthe‘re-centralisation’ofeducation
fundstoDistrictDevelopmentAuthorities(DDAs).Finally,thepaperconcludeswitha
reflectiononthesignificanceofthesefindingsforthoseseekingtoimproveeducation
standardsinPNG.
2. Background
Introducedin2012,PNG’sTuitionFeeFreepolicyisoneofthefewgovernment
initiativesthathaveshownsignificantsignsofsuccess–particularlyduringitsinitial
rollout(Howesetal.,2014).Morerecentlyhowever,questionshavebeenaskedabout
whetherthepolicyisunravelling,asaccusationsofmismanagement(Robinson,2016)
andquestionablepolicychangesemerge.
OneofthekeyfeaturesoftheTFFpolicyisthatsubsidiesaresentdirectlytoschool
accounts,bypassingprovincialanddistrictadministrations.Whenthepolicywas
introduced,eachprimaryschoolwasallocatedfundingequivalentto270kinaper
student,allowingschoolstodecidehowitshouldbespent.Oncesubnational
administratorshadapprovedtheirbudgets,schoolswereabletodirectlyaccessthis
funding.Thismeantschoolscontrolledmorefundingthanbefore.
TheLostDecade?Reportfoundthat,in2012,mostprimaryschoolswerereceivingTFF
subsidypayments,andbothschooladministratorsandthecommunityhadmoresayin
howthefundswerespent(althoughfewreportedreceivingvisitstomonitorspending).
Sincethen,therehavebeenattemptstoreducethelevelofinvolvementschoolshavein
themanagementofsubsidies.
Atthestartof2016,thePNGGovernmentissuedadirectiveannouncingitwouldsplit
theTFFpaymentintothreecomponents:acashadministrationcomponentof40per
cent;ateachingandlearningcomponentof30percent(forthepurchaseofschool
materials);andaninfrastructurecomponentof30percent(Kuman&Kombra,2016).
Accordingtothedirective,schoolswouldonlybepaidthecashadministration
component,leaving60percenttobedistributedbydistrictandnationallevel
governmentofficers.Whilethegovernmenthashadapolicyofretainingfundsfor
teachingandlearningmaterialswhichpre-datesthisdirective,thenewpolicymeans
thatadditionally,fundingforinfrastructureistobeheldinatrustaccountindistrict
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treasuries,withthedistributionofthesefundsdeterminedbydistrictofficersthrough
newlyestablishedDistrictEducationImplementationCommittees(DEICs)(Kuman&
Kombra,2016).
Atthetimeofwriting(April2017),thispolicyhadnotbeenfullyimplemented.
ConversationswithofficialsfromtheNDoErevealedthatthedepartmenthadyetto
implementtheproposedfundingdissection.Theroll-outofDEICshasalsostalled,with
theMinisterforEducationNickKumanrecentlysuggestingthat,whileapprovedby
Cabinetinlate2015,administrativestructuresandaccountingmechanismsareyetto
befinalised(StaffReporter,2016).Despitethis,personalcommunicationswith
departmentofficialsconfirmedthatprogresshadbeenmadeintheNationalCapital
District(whichcoversthenation’scapital,PortMoresby)andCentralprovince.By
coincidence,thepilotfortheresearchinformingthispaperwasconductedinCentral
provinceandresearchersconsultedwithdistrictofficials,parents,andschool
managementandteachingstaffabouttheimpactofthisnewinitiative.Sectionthreeof
thispaperincludesfindingsfromCentralprovinceabouttheirexperiencewithDEICs,
alongwithimpressionsofthenewinstitutionfromstakeholdersinGulfandEastNew
Britain.
In2015,thePNGgovernmentwentevenfurtherinitsobjectivetomakeschoolingmore
affordableandbolsterenrolments:itabolishedprojectfees,inadditiontopreviously
abolishedschoolfees.MinisterKumanreasonedthatthegovernmentalreadysubsidises
schoolsandthatitwouldmeanfewerchildrenwouldbeturnedaway.Thepenaltyfor
non-complianceisostensiblyharsh.Duringamediaconference,Kumanthreatened
schoolsthatfailedtocomply,saying,“Anyschoolthatimposesprojectfeeswillnotbe
giventheTFF[subsidy]”(Walton,2015).
Sincethisinitialpolicychangetherehavebeennumerousbackflips–forinstancea
circularpublishedinnationalpapersinJanuary2016allowedforprojectfeestobe
charged(Kuman&Kombra,2016).However,inJanuary2017,MinisterKumanand
EducationSecretaryUkeKombramadeitclearthatthechargingofprojectorschool
feeswasnotpermitted.Theystressedthat“Nofeesofanysortrelatingtostudent
enrolmentbeimposeduponparents”(LoopPNG,2017).Kombrahassaidthatiffound
tobechargingfees,schoolswouldbesuspended,theaccusationsinvestigated,and“the
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TFFpaymentfortheschoolwillbewithhelduntilsuchtimeastheinvestigationsare
completedandthefindingsarepresentedtotheDepartmenttodecideonwhichaction
tobetaken”(LoopPNG,2017).
TheTFFpolicyisnodoubtfragile.Inrealterms,theallocationfortheTFFsubsidyhas
beendecliningsince2012,andthereareconcernsthatthecurrentfiscalcrunchcould
squeezesubsidiesfurther(SwanandWalton,2017).TherearenumerousreportsofTFF
paymentsbeingreleasedlate,resultingintheMorobe(PNG’slargestprovince)
EducationBoardannouncingthatallschoolsintheprovincewillberequiredtoimpose
schoolfeesin2017tomakeupforshortfallsinTFFfunding(Badui-Owa,2016;Swan&
Walton,2017).Atthisstage,itisdifficulttoknowiftheTFFandassociatedfree
educationpolicieswillcontinuebeyond2017,butthesignsarenotgoodgivenPNG’s
worseningfinancialsituation.Despitethesechallenges,theTFFpolicyremainsthe
longestrunningofthecountry’sfourattemptstoinstitutefee-freeeducation(Walton&
Swan,2014).
3. Aimandmethodology
Thissectionoutlinesthemethodologyframingtheresearchundertakentoinformthis
paper.Itfirstoutlinestheaimsandresearchapproach;itthenoutlinestheresearch
questions,locations,researchinstrumentsandprovidesaprofileofrespondents.
3.1Aimsandresearchapproach
ThispaperformspartofacollaborationbetweentheUniversityofPapuaNewGuinea’s
SchoolofBusinessandPublicPolicyandtheAustralianNationalUniversity’s
DevelopmentPolicyCentre.Broadly,thiscollaborationaimedtoenableabetter
understandingoftheimpactofdecentralisationpolicyandexpenditurereformson
schoolsandeducationsystems,aswellashealthfacilitiesandsystems.Thispaper
focusesonfindingsfromresearchintothecountry’seducationsystem;itprovidesa
multi-scaledanalysisofprovincialanddistrictadministrationsthroughtoschoolsand
theircommunities.
Theresearchbuildsontheresultsoftwopreviousquantitativesurveys.Ina2001/02
survey,researchersfromtNRIandtheWorldBanksampledrandomlyselectedschools
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acrosseightprovincesofthecountry.Theresultantreporthighlightedthechallenges
facedbyschoolsandhealthfacilities(WorldBank&NationalResearchInstitute,2004).
Adecadelater,in2012,theNationalResearchInstituteandANUDevelopmentPolicy
Centrereplicatedthissurveybyvisiting,wherepossible,thesameschoolsandhealth
facilities.TheresultwastheaforementionedLostDecade?Report(Howes,etal2014).
Theresearchinformingthispaperprovidesbothqualitativeandquantitative
approachestounderstandtheimpactofpolicychangesforschoolsandsubnational
educationadministrators.Researcherswenttotenschools(allofwhichwereapartof
the2012survey),acrossfourdistrictsintwoprovinces.Thisallowedformoreindepth
studyoftheissuesfacingschoolsandtheeducationsystem.Allsubsequentdiscussions
thatreferto‘thesample’makereferencetoasampleoftenschools,fiveinGulfandfive
inEastNewBritain,whichwerevisitedinboth2012and2016.
Theresearchinformingthispapertakesamultiplecasestudyapproach,whereschools
andeducationsystemsarecompared.Attheschoollevel,schoolsofdifferenttypes
(churchversusstate),andindifferentlocations(GulfversusEastNewBritain)are
compared.Thismeanstheanalysisdoesnotprovideastatisticallyrepresentative
sampleofschools,ratheritallowsforamorein-depthlookathowschoolsandthe
educationsystemoperateindifferentcontexts,andhaverespondedtokeypolicy
changes.
Theresearchinvolvedadesignandpreparationphase,whichwasconductedinearly
2016andincludedapilotinCentralprovince.Thedatacollectiontookplaceoveratwo-
monthperiod,betweenMayandJune2016.AnalysisofresultstookplacebetweenJuly
2016andMarch2017.
3.2Locationsandselectionprocess
TheresearchwasconductedinEastNewBritainandGulf(Image1).Withinthese
provinces,twodistrictsincludedinthe2012studywerechosen(PomioandGazellein
EastNewBritain,andKeremaandKikoriinGulf).Ineachprovince,fiveschoolswere
sampled(tenintotal).
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Image1:MapofGulfandEastNewBritain
Theresearchsoughttounderstandhowschoolsperformedinbetterandworse
performingdistrictsinGulfandEastNewBritain.Tochoosewhichdistrictstovisit
researchersdrewupona‘qualityindex’–acompositionofperformanceindicators3.
Dataonschoolperformance(compiledthroughthe‘qualityindex’)wascollectedin
2012asapartofresearchfortheLostDecade?Report(Table1).
Table1usesthe‘qualityindex’toshowtheaveragescoreatprovinceanddistrictlevel
ofschoolsvisitedin2012.Atprovincelevel,ithighlightsthatschoolsinENBgenerally
performedbetterthanschoolsinGulf.Atdistrictlevel,itshowsthatschoolsinGazelle
performedbetterthanthoseinPomio,whileschoolsinKeremagenerallyperformed
betterthanthoseinKikori.AsGulfonlyhastwo‘open’districts,itwasaneasydecision
tovisitboth(KikoriandKerema).InEastNewBritain,researcherschosetogotothe
3Thequalityindexisacompositescoreofschoolperformancein2012.Itcomprises:qualityofclassroomsandteachers’houses,otherschoolinfrastructure,percentageofteachersregularlyworking,effectivenessoftheschool’sBoardofManagement,timeteachersspendteaching,attendance,andsufficiencyoftextbooks.Ahigherscoreindicateshigherquality.WethankAnthonySwanforprovidinganalysisforthisindex.
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bestperformer(Gazelle)andtheworst(Pomio).Thisapproachallowedtheresearchers
toanalysegoodandpoorperformingdistrictswithinthesameprovinces.
Table1:Districtqualityindexscores(datacollectedin2012)
Province District
Average
Quality
ENB Gazelle 0.69
Kokopo 0.67
Pomio 0.61
Gulf Kikori 0.46
Kerema 0.50
Table2usesthesameindextoprovideaprofileofindividualschoolsvisitedinEast
NewBritain,whileTable3profilesthosevisitedinGulf.Bothtablesshowhowschool
qualityandadministrationvaried.Churchschoolsinbothprovinceswererunby
CatholicorUnitedchurches.
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Table2:Schoolprofiles,EastNewBritain(datacollectedin2012)
School DistrictQuality
index
Administeredby
church?
1 Pomio 0.66 No
2 Pomio 0.52 Yes
3 Pomio 0.81 No
4 Gazelle 0.71 Yes
5 Gazelle 0.81 No
SchoolsinGulfprovinceweregenerallypoorerinquality(Table3)thanthosesampled
fromEastNewBritain(Table2).Thisisareflectionoftheprovince’soverallpoor
performanceintheeducationsector.Inbothprovincesschoolswerelocatedinboth
accessible(forexamplenearamajorhighway)andremote(forexampleaccessibleonly
byboat).
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Table3:Schoolprofiles,Gulf(datacollectedin2012)
School DistrictQuality
index
Administeredby
church?
1 Kerema 0.51 Yes
2 Kikori 0.55 No
3 Kikori 0.36 No
4 Kikori 0.41 Yes
5 Kerema 0.63 Yes
Thesetwoprovinceshaveverydifferenthistoriesandcapacitiesforservicedelivery.In
sum,EastNewBritainhasbeengivenaheadstartbyitscultureandhistorical
engagementwiththeWest,asanthropologistsErringtonandGewertz(1993)have
highlighted.Itisoneofthefewprovinceswheregovernmentisrelativelyeffective,and
generallyindicatorsofservicedeliveryarehigh(Howes,etal,2014),comparedtoother
provincesinPNG.Gulf,ontheotherhand,hasfacedenormousgeographic,historicand
socialchallenges(WaltonandJones,2017;Errington&Gewertz,1993).Asaresult,
thereisevidenceofdifferentdevelopmentoutcomesinthesetwoprovinces,andhence,
theyarecasestudiesthatprovideverydifferentcontexts4inwhichtostudythe
implementationof‘national’educationpolicies.
4KeydifferencesbetweenEastNewBritainandGulfarefurtherexploredinWaltonandJones(2017).
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3.3Researchinstrumentsandrespondents
Theresearchinthispaperdrewuponfourdifferentresearchinstruments.Thefirst
comprisedstructuredinterviewswithprovincialanddistrictadministrators,andhead
teachers.Thequestionnairefortheserespondentswassimilartothoseutilisedin2012,
withmostofthesamequestions.Essentially,questionshelpedtoquantifythechanges
thathavetakenplaceinschoolsbetween2012and2016.Eighteenindividualstructured
interviewswereconducted,withtencarriedoutinEastNewBritainandeightinGulf
(Table4).Moremalesthanfemaleswereconsultedasmoremaleswereemployedin
administrativepositions;respondentsincludedheadteachers(actingandpermanent),
standardsofficers,andprovincialeducationadvisors.
Table4:Respondentstoindividual-structuredinterviews
Interviews Total
GenderMale 13
18Female 5
Position
Actingheadteacher 2
18Headteacher 8
Standardsofficer 6
Provincialeducationadvisor 2
ProvinceEastNewBritain 10
18Gulf 8
Thequalitativecomponentconsistedofaseriesofsemi-structuredinterviews(the
secondresearchinstrument)andfocusgroupdiscussions(thethirdresearch
instrument)withkeystakeholdersfromthegovernment,church,communityand
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school.Thisincludedprovincialanddistrictbureaucrats,headteachers,teachers,
membersofschoolmanagementboardsandschoolParentsandCitizensCommittees,
andchurchadministratorsorrepresentatives.Forty-foursemi-structuredinterviews
wereconducted,withroughlytwo-thirdsofrespondentsinGulf,andone-thirdinEast
NewBritain(Table5).Themajorityofrespondentsweremale,reflectingthegender
distributionencounteredinadministrativeandschoolpositions.
Table5:Respondentstosemi-structuredinterviews
Interviews Total
GenderMale 35
44Female 9
Position/
Occupation
Teacher 6
44
HeadTeacher 9
Communityrep 6
LLG,districtorprovincialgovernment
administratororchurchadministrator 23
ProvinceENB 18
44Gulf 26
Giventhegenderimbalanceofsemi-structuredinterviews,additionalfocusgroupswere
conductedwithwomen.Atotalofeightwereconducted-threewithmales,fivewith
females–withthesamenumberconductedinbothprovinces(Table6).Allwere
conductedinTokPisin(PNG’slinguafranca),audiorecordedandsubsequently
transcribedintoEnglish.
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Table6:Numberandlocationoffocusgroupdiscussions
Focusgroups Total
GenderMale 3
8Female 5
ProvinceEastNewBritain 4
8Gulf 4
Theseresearchinstrumentsweresupportedbyanumberofinformalinterviews(the
forthresearchinstrument)withavarietyofstakeholders.
4. Results
Asdescribedintheprevioussection,sampledschoolsweresituatedwithinvery
differentsocial,economic,culturalandadministrativecontexts.Schoolswerevisitedin
both2012and2016,providinginsightsintohowtheyhavebeenshapedbypolicy
changesoverthatperiod.Again,itshouldbenotedthatthesetrendsarenotstatistically
representativeofschoolsacrossthenationorindividualprovinces(thiswouldrequire
randomisationandalargersample);however,thiscase-studydoesprovideanin-depth
understandingofthewayschoolsandadministratorshaverespondedtorecentpolicy
changes–insightsthatlargersurveyscanoverlook.
4.1Theimpactoffreeeducationpoliciesonenrolmentsandattendance
ImprovingaccesstoschoolinghasbeentheTFFpolicy’sfirstobjective(PapuaNew
GuineaDeparmentofEducation,2012).Figure1showsthatonaverage,thetenschools
sampledin2016hadexperiencedastabilisingofperschoolenrolmentssince2012,
withanaverageof211studentsenrolledin2016.SchoolsvisitedinEastNewBritain
hadexperiencedasubstantialriseinenrolments,whileenrollmentsinGulfschoolshad
declined.
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Figure1:Averageenrolmentsperschool(2012-2016)
SchoolsinEastNewBritainwereacutelyawareofthechangestoenrolmentstheyhad
experienced.Adistrictofficerintheprovincesaid:
BeforetherewasnoTFF,youcouldnotseecrowdedclassrooms…andthen
peoplesawthemoneycome.Assoonasitwasmentionedthateducationwas
free,allourclassroomsbecameovercrowded.Wehavetobuildextraclassrooms
everyyear.
Therewasmuchevidencetosuggestthatclassroomswerebeingbuiltacrossthe
province,fromGazelletoPomio.ForexampleinoneschoolinPomio,EastNewBritain,
constructionwasunderwaytoaccommodatenewstudents(seeImage2).InGazelle,
researcherssawacrewofbuildersconstructingnewclassroomspaidforbyTFF
subsidies.
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
All(10schools)
ENB Gulf Church Government
%ch
ange-2012-16
Stud
ents 2012
2016
%Change
15
Image2:Classroomconstruction,Pomio,EastNewBritain.
SchoolssampledinGulfreportedaveryadifferentexperienceundertheTFFpolicy,
withenrolmentnumbersdeclining.Somerespondentssuggestedthiswasaproductof
poorqualityfacilities.OneboardmemberinKikoridistrictsaid:
Ourchildrenarenotbeingprevented[fromgoingtoschool]….Butlookatthe
facilities…mostofthechildrenhavelefttheschooljustbecausethelearning
roomhereisverysmall.Theyarejustsqueezed.
InoneschoolinKerema,ateacherreportedthatteachingstaffandcommunity
membershadbuilttablesandchairs,tocompensateforinadequateresourcesatthe
school.Theteacherhimselfhadmadethreetables.Teachersinotherpartsofthe
provincealsosuggestedthatpoorinfrastructuremeantthatstudentswerelosing
interestinschools.AteacherinKeremacommented:“[Somestudents]quitbecause
therewerenomaterials.Soenrolmentshavereallydropped”.Inanotherschool,one
teachersaid,“wehavesomeclassesthatstoppedaltogetherbecausethere’snoteacher”.
Giventhereductionsinenrolments,inanattempttoencourageparentstoreengage,
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someschoolsweretryingtopromotegreatercommunityparticipation.Oneteacherin
Keremasaidtheschoolhadstarted“Pikinini[child]sportsjusttomakethingshappen
andget[parentsreengaging]”andtoencouragethemtoconsiderenrollingtheir
children.
TheTFFpolicy’semphasisonincreasingenrolmentshasalsoreshapedthelearning
environmentwithinschools.AstheTFFpolicyisopentoallcitizens,regardlessoftheir
age,manyolderstudentshavecomeintothesystem.OnestandardsofficerinGulfsaid:
Theolderkids,wediscouragethem.Thereisonewhois36yearsold.Itmakesa
lotofdifference.Theyarenotmotivated;theydon’tstaytoolonginschool.They
comeatthestartoftheyear,butmanydropout.
Anotherstandardsofficercommentedthatolderstudentsoftenstartedatalowergrade,
andweresometimesacceleratedquicklybecauseoftheirage,whichcouldbedisruptive
tootherstudents’learning.
Asenrolmentshavestabilised,sotoohasthepercentageoffemaletomalestudents,
withanaverageofjustfewerthan50percentoffemalestudentsinboth2012and2016
(Table7).
Table7:Percentageofenrolledstudentswhoarefemale
2012 2016
All(10schools) 48% 49%
ENB 49% 51%
Gulf 43% 47%
Religious 51% 47%
Government 46% 54%
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Classroomattendanceimprovedinthesampledschools:in2012,67percentofgrade5
and6studentswerepresentaweekbeforeresearchersvisited,in2016thathadrisen
to79percent.
Thishadbeenachieved,inpart,throughtheeffortsoftheschoolsthemselves.In
Keremaoneteacherexplainedhowtheyworkedtoimproveattendanceattheirschool:
Wehavetheattendancelistwiththeheadteacherandtheteachers.Ifthereisa
consecutive21-dayabsence,parentsmustcomeandexplain…ifthere’snogood
reason,[thematteris]handedovertotheBoM[BoardofManagement].Orthey
areaskedtotransfertoanotherschool.
InKikorioneheadteacherexplainedtheirschool’sprocessforcheckingattendance:
Theteachersareencouragedtohavechecklistforallstudentsonadailybasis.
Theattendanceclearlytellsuswhichstudentsarekeentolearnandcomingto
schooleveryday,andwhichstudentsarenotattendingclasses.
Whileanumberofschoolssawattendancefiguresrise,somehadsignificantproblems
inkeepingstudentsinschools.InPomiodistrict,EastNewBritain,studentswereabsent
duetoopportunitiesforemploymentinoilpalmplantations.Inacommunityfocus
group,researchersweretoldthatsomechildrenwereskippingschooltoworkwith
theirparentsinthenearbyoilpalmplantation.Therewereconcernsaboutattendance
inotherareastoo.InanotherschoolinPomio,aBoardofManagement(BoM)chairman
said:“Somestudentsstartatschoolanddonotattendfortherestoftheyear”.InGazelle
district,onedistrictadministratorsuggestedthatthereasonforpoorattendancewasa
resultofparentsnotvaluingtheTFFpolicy,andbecause:
Theyaretooengagedwithotheraspectsoflifeintheircommunityandtheydo
notsendtheirchildrentoschool–oftenitisbecausetheyarefocusedonvillage
customs…Childrenattendsingsingsbetweenone-twotimespermonth.These
arerelatedtomarriages,weddings,feastsanddances.
Thereweresignsthatmoreteacherswereregularlyworkinginschoolsvisited.
Interviewswithheadteachersrevealedthatoveralltherewereathirdmoreteachers
nowworkinginschools:in2012atotalof46teacherswere‘regularlyworking’at
18
schools,by2016thathadincreasedto73,anaverageofjustover7teachersperschool.
Thishasmeantthattherehavebeenimprovementsinenrolledstudent-to-working
teacherratios,overalltherewere46studentstooneworkingteacherin2012,and29
studentstooneworkingteacherby2016.Thisimprovementwasreflectedintheratios
ofworkingteacherstothoseposted(i.e.theproportionofpostedteacherswho
regularlyattendschool).Figure2showstherewasanoverallimprovementacrossthe
sampledschools;withtheproportionofworkingteachersimprovingfrom85to104
percent.Itislikelythatthisfigureishigherthan100percentduetoschoolsengaging
temporaryteachers(becausethenumberofofficiallyallocatedteachershasnotkept
pacewiththeincreaseinenrolmentssincetheTFF),andmisallocationby
administrators(exploredfurtherbelow).GovernmentschoolsandthoseinEastNew
Britainweremorelikelytohavemoreworkingteachersthanthoseofficiallyposted.
Figure2:Percentageofworkingteachers-to-posted(2012-2016)
Theavailabilityofteacherswasaproductofremoteness.WhilesomeschoolsinGulf
hadseenmoreteachersenterschools(onaveragetherewasonemoreteacherper
schoolin2016comparedto2012),inthemostremoteschoolsstruggledtoattractstaff.
AdistrictofficialinGulfconfirmedthisproblem;reflectingonthepaucityofteachersin
Kikori,shesaid:“teachersarenotteachinginremoteschoolsandmostofthemareand
wanttoteachinandaround[therelativelylessremote]Kikoristation”.Yetthereare
signsthatGulfistryingtoturnthisproblemaround.Aprovinciallevelofficialsaidwhile
staffingdifficultiesintheprovincehadbeenacuteoverthepastfewyearstherewere
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
All ENB Gulf Church Government
Percen
tage 2012
2016
(10schools)
19
effortstotrainmorelocalteachers.Theprovincialgovernment,theEuropeanUnionand
theAustralianaidprogramhadsupportedlocalstudentstostudyteachingaroundthe
country.Hewashopefulthatthiswouldcontinuetobolsterstudentnumbers,sothat,
“schoolsclosingdownbecauseofalackofteacherswillbeathingofthepast”.Without
teachersregularlyturninguptowork,somesampledschoolsinGulfhavehadnochoice
buttocancelgrades.
InEastNewBritain,issuesaroundstaffingweresignificantlydifferent.Astandards
officernotedthat:
Someschoolsareoverstaffed,meaningtheheadteacherandoneortwosenior
teachersmightnothave[toteach]aclass.Icheckedagainstthenumberof
classesandstartedpullingoutpositionsandreallocatedteachers[todifferent
schools].Thereisnoaccuracyabouthowmanystaffareneeded.TheNDoE
figuresarewrong.
Thisshowsthecriticalimportancethataccurateinformationplaysinallocating
resourcesinPNG.
4.2Theimpactofbanningschoolandprojectfees
Asdescribedinthebackgroundsectionofthispaper,thePNGgovernment’sbanonboth
schoolandprojectfeeswasinplacewhenthe2016researchwasconducted.Didthis
leadschoolstorefusetocollectmoneyfromparents?Theresultsoftheresearch
suggestsnot:by2016onlyonechurchschool,inGulfprovincedidnotchargeparents
projectorschoolfees.Figure3showsthatamongschoolsinthesample,although
officialschoolfeeshalvedfrom24kinato12kinaperstudentbetween2015and2016,
projectfeesmorethandoubled–from19to47kinaperstudent.Atthetimeofdata
collection,eightoutoftenofthesampledschoolswerecharginganaverageof59kina
perstudent(intotal),thehighestfeelevelsincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicyin
2012.
20
Figure3:Schoolandprojectfees,2011-2016(2016prices)
Table8showsthatamongthesample,schoolfeeswereslightlyhigherinGulfand
churchschools,thaninEastNewBritainandgovernmentadministeredschools.
Table8:Officialschoolfees,perstudent(2016prices)
Schoolfees 2011 2012 2015 2016
All(10schools) 115.67 12.42 23.56 12.00
ENB 68.79 0.00 21.20 10.00
Gulf 174.26 24.83 26.50 14.00
Church 77.88 24.83 26.50 14.00
Government 145.90 0.00 21.20 10.00
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2011 2012 2015 2016
Kina
Schoolfees Projectfees
21
IncreasesinchargesforprojectfeesweredrivenbyschoolsvisitedinEastNewBritain
andgovernmentschools(Table9).
Table9:Officialprojectfees,perstudent(2016prices)
Projectfees 2011 2012 2015 2016
All(10
schools)
9.74 24.18 18.97 47.22
ENB 5.19 14.90 25.44 55.00
Gulf 17.31 38.80 10.60 37.50
Church 21.63 30.16 27.09 38.75
Government 3.25 24.83 11.66 54.00
Table8and9(above)presenttheamountschoolsvisitedofficiallycharge,butthe
amountactuallycollectedfromparentsisanothermatter.Itwasnotpossibletocollect
dataforasufficientnumberofschoolstomakeameaningfulcomparisonofthefunding
receivedfromparents(which,bythetimetheresearchwasconducted,wasillegalfor
manyschools).However,anumberofqualitativeinterviewshighlightedthedifficulties
manyschoolsnowfaceinvolunteeringandcollectingmoneyfromparents,asaresultof
governmentpolicybanningthecollectionoffees.
Indeed,manywereconcernedthatfreeeducationpolicieshadreducedthewillingness
ofcommunitiestovolunteertheirtime.ThiswasthecaseeveninEastNewBritain,
whereprovincialadministratorspermittedschoolstocontinuechargingprojectfees
arguingthattheEastNewBritainProvincialEducationActallowsthemtocircumvent
thenationalgovernmentimposedbanonprojectfees–thisisthereasonofficialproject
feesarehigherinEastNewBritainthanGulf.Despitethis,eveninEastNewBritainthe
nationalbanappearstohaveshapedparents’willingnesstocontribute.Thiswas
illustratedbyadistrictofficial,whosaid:
22
Thereistalkfromthegovernmentthattheywillsubsidisetheprojectfeetoo.
Thisismakingsomeparentsbecomeverylazy.Theyrelytoomuch[on
governmentfunding].Theydoabitofcommunityservice[and]cleaningup,but
anythingtodowithfinancetheyarestartingtoconsiderthegovernment’s
responsibility.Theybecomemorerelaxedsothat’snotgood.
InoneschoolinEastNewBritain,theheadteacherandcommunityrepresentatives
complainedtheywerenotabletoraisefundsfromparentsforthesamereason.In2015,
theschoolhadraised12,000kinathroughfundraisingefforts,butasparents
increasinglyperceivedthegovernmentaswhollyresponsibleforschoolfunding,by
mid-2016parentshadcontributedjust200kinafortheyear.Theheadteachersaidhe
didnotthinkparentswouldbeforthcomingwithanymoremoney.Thiswas,he
believed,adirectconsequenceofthegovernment’spromotionof‘free’education.
SchoolsinGulffacedadifferentproblem.TheydidnothaveaProvincialEducationAct
topushbackagainstthenationalgovernment’sbanonprojectfees,leavingsome
schoolstofindcreativewaystogeneratesupportfromparents.Afemaleteacherfrom
Kikoridistrictdescribedhowtheschoolhadreframedprojectfeestomakethemmore
palatabletoparents:
Lastyearparentswerepayingprojectfees.Thentheeducationdepartmentdidnot
allowustochargethese,sowehadtochangethat‘projectfee’nametoanothername…
Wecalledit‘maintenancefees’atthestartoftheschoolyear[in2015].[Thiswas
important]becausewearenotreceivingtheTFF.
Chargingprojectfeeswasimportantforschoolsfacinglateornon-arrivalofTFF
payments.Reflectingonfundsreceivedin2015,onememberoftheBoMinPomiosaid:
“weonlyreceivedtwooutofthefourpayments”,makingtheraisingoffundsfromother
sourcesallthemoreimportant.
Freeeducationpolicieshavealsoaffectedchurches,andthereforethebanonproject
feeshasotherimplicationsfortherelationshipbetweentheStateandchurch
administrators.TheCatholicChurchiscurrentlyindisputewiththegovernmentand
DepartmentofEducationovertheActingSecretaryforEducation’sCircularNo.6of
2016whichordersschoolsinreceiptoftheTFFsubsidynottoimposeanyfees,
23
includingprojectfeesandchurchagencyfees.Alettercontestingthiscircularwas
addressedtothePrimeMinister,signedbythePresidentoftheCatholicBishop’s
ConferenceofPNG,BishopArnoldOrowae,andpublishedinthePostCourierinMay
2016(Orowae,2016).ItarguedthatthecirculartransgressedtheNationalEducation
Act,andProvincialEducationActsinthe13provinceswheretheseareinplace.Astable
8and9illustrate,thebanonagencyfeeshasnotstoppedchurchschoolsfromcharging
parents(althoughchurchschoolsvisitedchargedlessprojectfeesthangovernment-run
schools,suggestingchurchschoolsmayhaveadheredmorecloselytothebanonproject
fees).
4.3Officialpaymentstoschools
TheTFFpolicyhasmadefundingfromthenationalgovernmentmoreimportantfor
schoolsthaneverbefore.Beforethispolicy,fundsfromthenationalgovernmentwere
directedthroughprovincialordistrictadministrationsandcollectedbyschoolofficials.
Sinceitsintroductionin2012,fundshavebeendelivereddirectlytoschoolbank
accounts.Thismeantthatin2012,schoolsacrosseightprovincesreliedonnational
subsidiesfor80percentoftheirfunds,comparedtoonly52percentin2011(Howeset
al.,2014).In2012,provincialgovernmentswereprovidingjust2percentofschool
funds,downfrom9percentintheyearbeforethepolicywasintroduced(Howesetal.,
2014).
ThisraisesquestionssuchashowmuchoftheTFFsubsidyhasreachedschools,and
whetherschoolsarestilldependentonthenationalgovernmentforfunding?Inthe
schoolssampled,incomefromthenationalgovernment’sTFFsubsidyincreased
substantiallybetween2011and2012,thefirstyeartheTFFpolicywasintroduced
(Figure4).By2015,evenmorefunding-per-studentwasreachingschoolsvisited–on
averageschoolsreceived272kinaperstudent,twokinamorethantheofficialnational
subsidy.ThisincreasewasdrivenbyschoolsvisitedinGulf.Atthesametime,schools
visitedinEastNewBritainexperiencedareductionofalmostonethirdinperstudent
funding.
24
Figure4:Averagefundingfromnationalgovernment,perstudent(2016prices)
Thereasonsforthedivergentfortunesoftheseschoolsoverthepastfewyearsis
evidentininterviewswithkeyschoolstakeholders.AheadteacherinGazelledistrict,
EastNewBritain,commented,“WhatweseeishighenrolmentsbuttheTFF[policy]is
notmatchingup[withenrolments].”Adistricteducationofficer,whoalsonoticedthis,
said:
Wedon'tknowhowtheyarecalculatingtheTFFtoourschools…itwassupposed
tobebasedonenrolments.But[eventhoughenrolmentshaveincreased],the
TFFisbecomingsmaller.Wedon'tknowhowtheycomeupwiththatamount.
WithschoolsreceivinglessTFFsubsidythanexpected,ithasbeennecessaryforthemto
fallbackonsurroundingcommunitiestogetthingsdone.AsoneBoMchairmanfrom
Pomiosaid,“Sometimesteachershavenomaterialandbecauseof[the]TFF[policy]we
havenomoney.Butthevillageworkstogethertohelp[theschool]”.Atoneschoolin
EastNewBritain,scarcityoffundshasledtheschooltomoveawayfromengagingwith
contractors,insteadfavouringcheaperlabourfromwithinthecommunity.Amemberof
theBoardofManagementsaidthatpreviouslytheschoolhadpaidcontractorsfor
schoolbuildingwork,butmorerecentlyitpaidcommunitymembersonekinaperday
toworkonschoolbuildingsandmaintenance.This,hesaid,hadsubstantiallycutlabour
costs.
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government
Kina
2011 2012 2015
25
Towhatextentcanschoolsrelyonfundingfromotherorganisations?Overall,school
incomefromprovincialandnationalgovernmentandotherorganisations(suchas
NGOsandbusinesses)increasedbetween2011and2012,butremainedconstant
between2012and2015(Figure5).However,thereweresignificantvariations,with
schoolsvisitedinEastNewBritainandchurchschoolsreceivinglessfundsonaper
schoolbasisbetween2012and2015.
Figure5:Combinedschoolfunding–fromnationalandprovincialgovernments
andotherorganisations(2016prices)
Intermsofthetotalfundingschoolsreceived(fundingfromallsources),onaper
studentbasis,schoolsacrossthesampleexperiencedanincreaseinfundingbetween
2011and2012.In2015,fundingalsoincreasedto294kina(seeFigure6).However,
schoolssampledinEastNewBritainsufferedareductioninperstudentfundingof
approximatelyone-thirdbetween2012and2015,whilethosevisitedinGulf
experiencedanincrease,likelyduetoadeclineinenrolmentsthroughouttheyear.In
thesameperiod,fundingtochurchschoolsinthesampleincreasedslightly,while
governmentschoolsinthesamplewitnessedasmalldeclineinoverallfunding.
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government
Kina
2011 2012 2015
26
Figure6:Totalfundingfromnational,provincial,othersources;perstudent
(2016prices)
Figure7showstheextentofschoolrelianceonnationalgovernmentfunding.While
schoolsvisitedreceivedfundsfromprovincialgovernmentsin2011and2012,by2015
thissupporthadcompletelydriedup,andtherewerenoexamplesofschoolsreceiving
fundingfromprovincialgovernments.Between2012and2015,over90percentof
officialschoolfundscamefromthenationalgovernment(comparedtofundingfrom
otherorganisations,suchasprovincialordistrictfunds,ordonors/NGOs).
Figure7:Perstudentincomebyofficialfundingsource(2016prices)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government
Kina
2011 2012 2015
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2011 2012 2015
Kina
Nationalgovernment Provincialgovernment Othersources
27
Acrossthesample,churchschoolsweremostreliantongovernmentfunding(Figure8).
Inboth2012and2015,allofficial(andlegal)fundingreceivedbychurchschoolscame
fromgovernmentsources.Schoolswereluckyifthechurchprovidedsmalldonations.In
2015,onlyonechurchschool(inGulf)received100kinainfundingfromthechurch,out
ofatotalincomeofover36,000kina.
Figure8:Percentageoffundsreceivedfromnationalgovernment(2012and
2015)
Dependenceongovernmentfundinghasshapedhowlocalcommunitiesviewtheroleof
thechurch.BeforetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,fundingforchurchschoolswas
channeledthroughthechurchadministration.Nowthatsubsidiesaretransferredto
individualschoolbankaccounts,schoolshavefarmoreautonomyoverhowthesubsidy
isspentandmanaged.Asaresult,thechurchplaysadiminishedroleinschool
administration.Asoneseniorchurchadministratorsaid:
Before[governmentfunding]wascomingtothechurchandwemonitored[it],
andtherewasimprovement.Nowwhen[fundsgo]intotheschools,thehead
teacher,theboard,andthecommitteetocontrolinfrastructure[theproposed
30%infrastructurecomponentoftheTFFpolicy]andeverythingelse…wehave
nosay…
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
100%
All(10schools) ENB Gulf Church Government
Percen
tage
Typeofschool
2012 2015
28
Hesaidthatthishasledtomoreinstancesofmisappropriationbecausethechurches
havelesscontrolandoversightoffunds.Itisdifficulttoknowhowextensive
mismanagementattheschoollevelis.Whatisclear,however,isthatsampledschools
werefarmoreempoweredtomanagetheirownfundsthaninthepast,and
consequently,thechurchadministrationhasbeensidelinedfromschoolmanagement
(althoughindividuallocalclergyplayanimportantroleinotherareas).Thislossof
controlislikelyreflectedintheCatholicChurch’srecentlegalchallengeofthe
government’s2016freeeducationpolicy,(Orowae,2016)5.
Sincetheintroductionoffreeeducationpoliciesandthedecisiontorelayfundsdirectly
fromthenationalgovernmenttothebankaccountsofrecipientschools,someschoolsin
thesamplehavebeguntoquestionthebenefitsofbeinglabeleda‘churchschool’.InGulf
province,oneheadteacherinchargeofaschoolrunbyachurchsaid:“[Thisschool…]
canbe[classifiedas]agovernmentschoolbecausethere’sno[financial]contribution
from[thechurch]”.
Thiswasacommonrefrainwithinchurchschoolsinthesample,withsomesuggesting
thattheintroductionoftheTFFpolicyhadsignificantlyreducedthechurch’srole.This
suggeststhatgovernmentpoliciesmayhavestartedtoerodethestandingofthechurch
insomecommunities.Whilethechurchcontinuestoplayanimportantroleinproviding
religiousinstruction,choosingteachersandprovidingextraoversight,theyarefarless
engagedwithdeliveringandoverseeingschoolfundingthanbeforetheintroductionof
theTFFpolicy.
Thesideliningofthechurchadministratorsposesanumberofproblemsnotleast
becausechurchschoolshavespecificadvantagesovergovernment-runschools.For
example,thepresenceofpriestsandpastorsinschooladministrationprovidesanextra
checkonschoolneeds,andcanexpeditethereportingofproblemstochurch
administration.Inaddition,teachersarechosenbythechurchthemselves,often
5Asoutlinedinsection4.2thechurcharguedthatthegovernmentbanonprojectandchurchfeestransgressedtheNationalEducationAct,andProvincialEducationActsinthe13provinceswheretheseareinplace.
29
resultinginchurchschoolshavinghigherqualitystaff(Howesetal,2014).The
governmentcouldbeinadvertentlymarginalisingoneofthefewinstitutionswitha
proventrackrecordofqualityeducation.
4.4Monitoringandcommunityengagement
StandardsofficersareemployedbytheNationalDepartmentofEducationtooversee
andmonitorschools.Theyarestationedatdistrictadministrations,andreporttosenior
standardsofficerswhoarebasedattheprovinciallevel.Onaverage,theschoolsinthe
samplereceivedtwovisitsfromstandardsofficersin2015,slightlyupfromtheaverage
numberofinspectionsin2011(1.6peryear).Standardsofficersdotheirbestto
performphysicalinspectionsofschools,butmanyfacesignificantchallengesin
travellingtoandaccessingthemostremoteschools;somerequireofficerstowalkfor
severaldays.InEastNewBritain,somecomplainedthatstandardsofficerswerenot
performinginspectionsregularlyenough.InoneschoolinPomiotheheadteachersaid:
Thereisashortageofstandardsofficers.Thereshouldbemore...Somestandards
officersspendmoneyonvisitingKokopoorRabaulinsteadofperforming
inspections.Iftheydocome,theydon’thavetimetoaudittheTFF[subsidy]–
theirvisitistooshort.
TheproblemwasevenmoreacuteinschoolsvisitedinGulf,wherestandardsofficers
werefacedwithenormouschallengesingettingouttotheprovince’smostisolated
schools.AstandardsofficerinGulflamentedthattherewasnotenoughfundingtoget
outtothemostremoteschools:
Wearesupposedtovisitfourtimesperyear,butmostschoolsareonthecoast
anditisveryexpensivetogetthere.Forexample,[named]schoolhasnotbeen
visitedinthelastsixyears.Ivisitedlastyear.Ittookthreeorfourhourstoget
therebyroad.Thetripisquiterugged,andtherearenofunds.
Thisrespondentreportedthatstandardsofficersonlyreceived2,000kinaayeartopay
fortheirschoolinspections.However,thecostoftravellingtojustoneremoteschool
oftenexceededthisallowance,aresultofthehighcostofboatfuel.Somestandards
officerseconomisedwherevertheycould,sleepinginschoolstosaveonaccommodation
30
costsandwalkingasmuchaspossible.Buttravellingtoallschoolsintheprovincewas
beyondeventhemosthardenedandcommittedstandardsofficer.
Giventhis,thefrustrationfeltbystandardsofficersatnotbeingabletovisitschoolswas
palpable.Onesaid:
I'vecomeaverylongway,butIgiveup.Ihavethewillpowerbutnotthemeans
togointomyschools.Itisveryfrustrating.Iamnot[supposedtobe]anoffice
worker,yetIsithereallday.IhavetheSLIP[SchoolLearningandImprovement
Plan]butIcan'tgetouttoteachersorschools.Thereisnomoneyfortravelling,
normoneyforphotocopyingtheplanorsharingit.
InGulfprovince,astandardsofficerbrokedownandcriedwhendescribingthe
difficultiestheyfaced,whilesomereportedtakingonpersonaldebtinordertovisit
remoteschools.Anotherstandardsofficer,whowasresponsibleforsomeofGulf’smost
remoteschoolscommented:
Ispent1,400kinaofmyownfundsin2015togettoschools.Ihaveappliedfor
reimbursementbutithasn’tbeengiven[back].
Thisshowsthattheemotionalandfinancialcosttostandardsofficers,particularlyin
Gulfprovince,issignificant.Notonlyarestandardsofficersconstrainedbylimited
resources,buttheirmoraleisgraduallybeingeroded.
WhileschoolsnowreceivethemajorityoftheirincomethroughtheTFFsubsidy,the
abilityofstandardsofficerstomonitorthesepaymentshasbeenseverelyundermined
byalackofinformation.InEastNewBritain,onedistricteducationofficersaid:“We
havenoideahowmucheachschoolisreceiving…howdoImonitorschools[when]I
don'tknowhowmuchtheschoolisreceiving?”Inotherwords,thedistrictand
provincialadministratorsdidnotknowhowmuchfundingeachschoolwasmeantto
receiveeachquarter,northeactualamountreceived.Tosolvethisproblem,the
province’sadministratorswerelookingtoemployaTFFpolicyofficertomonitorthe
fundsgoingtoeachschoolandrelaythisinformationtothedistricts.
Giventhechallengesfacingstandardsofficers,churchesandcommunitiesplayan
increasinglyimportantroleinprovidingoversight.AheadteacherinKeremanotedthat
31
whileinspectionsbystandardsofficerswerenotregular,“Theparishpriestvisitsus
everydaybecauseheresideshereinthecommunity”.Yet,asnotedintheprevious
section,localclergyareplayingadiminishedroleinthemanagementofsomeschools.
Localclergyalsoapplypressuretotheprovincialgovernmentandchurchofficialsto
addressschoolchallenges.Oneseniorchurchadministratorexplained:
Ifthere’snoteacherthereinthatschool,parishpriestswillbetheonetosay:
“Heyman,lookatthis.Myschooldoesn’thaveaheadteacher,orthere’sone
vacantposition.Whatareyoudoingaboutthat?”
Somechurchessupplytheirownprovincialadministratorstovisitschoolsandprovide
oversight–althoughthereisevidencetheirinfluenceinschoolsisonthewane.One
churchadministratorsaidthathehadreceivedreportsfromgovernmentstandards
officers,butinrecentyearsthesereportshadbecomelessfrequent.
4.4.1Challengestocommunityengagement
UndertheTFFpolicy,theschoolcommunityhasostensiblybecomeempoweredlike
neverbefore.Thepolicycallsforfundingdecisionstoinvolvetheheadteacher,the
BoardofManagement(BoM)andtheParentandCitizenscommittee(P&C).Thehead
teacherandBoMareresponsiblefordecisionsinvolvingthespendingofschoolfunds,
whilethroughtheP&Ccommittee;parentsareresponsibleformonitoringandagreeing
tofundingallocations.TheTFFManagementManualcallsforquarterlymeetings
betweenparentsandtheBoM,andnotesthat:
Parents,guardiansandcommunityleadersareresponsibleformonitoringthe
headteacherandBoardofManagementtomakesuretheyspendthe[TFF]
moneycorrectly(PapuaNewGuineaDepartmentofEducation,2012:5).
AllschoolsinthesamplereportedhavingaP&CcommitteeandaBoM;manyreported
thattheBoMandheadteacherconsultedcitizensaboutthebudget.However,on
averageschoolswerenotquitemeetingthemandatedtargetofconveningfour
meetingsperyear.Table10showsthatin2011and2015,theaveragenumberofboth
P&CandBoMmeetingsinsampledschoolsremainedunchangedatthreeperyear.
32
Table10:Communityengagementinschools(10schools)
2011 2015
AveragenumberofBoMmeetings 3 3
AveragenumberofP&CMeetings 3 3
UndertheTFFpolicy,theamountofmoneymanagedbytheBoMandheadteacherhas
significantlyincreased.Thishaslikelybeenacontributingfactorintheincreasein
peopleinvolvedintheBoM(insampledschools),withanaverageof11membersin
2016,comparedtoeightin2012(Figure9).Therehasalsobeenashiftinthegenderof
BoMmembers:in2016,34percentofBoMmemberswerefemale,comparedto22per
centin2012.
Figure9:NumberonBoM;Percentagefemale(2012,2016;10schools)
Unfortunately,largerBoMshavenotalwaysresultedinmoreharmoniousdecision-
making.WiththeBoMplayingacentralroleindetermininghowfundsarespent,the
headoftheBoM–thechairperson–hasbecomeahotlycontestedposition.Insome
schools,thishasledtodisputes.InGulf,apreviouschairmansaid:
IamtryingtobetheBoMchairman.Iwasonce,butwassidelinedbythe
treasurerandsecretary.IamacaretakerBoMchairman,thereisnoformal
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
2012 2016
%ch
ange
Numbe
r
Year
AveragenumberonBoM
%ofBoMmembersfemale
33
positionbutthereisaverbalunderstandingwiththeschool.Thereis[ongoing]
conflictoverwhowantstobethechairman.
Asaresulttheschool’sBoMdidnotmeetin2016.AccordingtothespurnedBoM
chairman,thisresultedinafundinggridlock:
Theschoolhasfundsbuttheyhavenotbeenused.[Becauseoftheongoing
disputeoverBoMpositions]ourtreasurerdoesn’twanttoapproveteachers’
spendingoffunding.Teachersneedmaterials,andwe’dliketowithdrawfunds
butthetreasurerwon’tletus.Sometimestheteachersusetheirownfundsand
complaintome.
Anassistantteacherfromthesameschoolexplainedthatthestruggleforcontrolofthe
BoMhadtodowithclanrivalries,withtheBoMSecretaryandthechairpersonfromone
ward(thelowestadministrativeunit)excludingthosefromanotherward.Healleged
onlythetreasurerandchairman:
haveasayinmanagementof[TFF]funds.Notthecommunity,nottheother
membersoftheboardofmanagement,notteachers,notchildren,notchurch,not
otherstakeholders.
Suchconflictswereasimilarthemeinconversationsinanumberofotherschools
visited,particularlyinGulf.
4.4.2Otherpressuresoncommunityinvolvement
Schoolsrelyheavilyonthesurroundingcommunitytoprovidearangeofservices.For
instance,inoneschoolinGulfprovince,theheadteacherexplainedthateveryTuesday,
thecommunityhelpedtofixfencesandtoilets,andtidytheschoolgrounds.Poor
relationsbetweencommunitiesandschoolscanleadtoahostofproblems,asoneBoM
chairmaninGulfexplained:
Therelationshipbetweenschoolandthecommunityisverypoor.The
communitystealsdesks,tablesandchairsfromtheschool.Thecommunityisnot
willingtoallowtheschooltoexpandbybuildingmoreclassrooms…Allinall,the
34
community’sattitudetowardstheschoolisnotgoodandtheyare[only]
expectingsomething(i.e.,money)fromtheschool.
Inturn,thequalityofschoolingcanbesignificantlyshapedbythenatureofcommunity-
schoolrelations.
Acrosstheschoolssampled,landissuesalsoposedasignificantthreattocommunity-
schoolrelations.InbothEastNewBritainandGulf,anumberofschoolsfound
themselvesinconstantnegotiationwithsurroundingcommunitiesoverownershipof
schoolland.Somehadmanagedtoplacatelandownersbyensuringtheywere
representedontheBoM,however,externaldevelopmentscouldigniteconflictover
land,leadingtocompensationclaimsandhostilities.InGulf,thepromiseofroyalties
fromapromisedLiquidNaturalGasprojectchangedthewaythesurrounding
communityperceivedthevalueoflandusedbytheschool.Aseniorteacherexplained
thatlandownersnowexpectedtheschooltopaythemroyalties.
Suchdisputesneededtobehandledwithcare.InKikori,landdisputesforcedthe
closureofaschoolforanumberofyears;whileinneighbouringKerema,conflictover
whoownedschoollandresultedinitsclosurein2013.Inthelatterexample,
landownershadrecentlyunsuccessfullypetitionedtheDepartmentofEducationfor
compensationfortheschoolusingtheirland,eventhoughtheschoolwasfoundedinthe
1950s.
InPomio,EastNewBritain,landownerdisputeswereexacerbatedbyloggingandoil
palmoperations.Onemalerespondentcommented:
Whenthe[oilpalm]companycamein,landdisputesbecameacommonissueinthe
community.Priortothecompany,weallwerelivingpeacefully,butwhenthesepeople
gotaccesstoroyalties…[theydevelopeda]royaltymentalityandwantotherservicesto
paythemroyalties[suchastheschoolandhealthfacility]likethecompanyisdoing.
Therewasaperceptionthatthedisputewasperpetuatedbytheyoungergeneration;
withthisrespondentsaying:
[Whentheschoolwasestablished]theeldersandthosewhojoinedforcesto
establishtheschoolworkedtogetherandagreedthatthislandwouldbecomea
35
stateland.However,theseyoungergenerationshaveadifferentmentality…
resultinginthedispute.
Communitymembershadcalledforthegovernmenttomediate,buthadyettoreceivea
rulingonthematter.
Insum,thissectionhashighlightedthepotentialsandpitfallsofcommunity
engagement,thefollowingexaminesthepotentialforchannelingeducationfundingto
districtadministrations.
4.5DDAsandeducationfunding:‘de-centralisation’or‘re-centralisation’?
Thenationalgovernment’sproposaltodivert30percentoffundsfromschoolsto
districtadministrations–DistrictDevelopmentAuthorities(DDAs)–hassomepotential
benefits.Itpromisestopooleducationalresourcessothatgovernmentadministrators
areabletobuildlarge-scaleinfrastructureprojects–projectsthatschoolswouldbe
unabletootherwiseafford.DDAsaretoestablishnewDistrictEducation
ImplementationCommittees(DEICs)todecideonprojectsindistricts.TheseDEICs
havebeenestablishedinPortMoresbyandCentralprovince,butnotinotherprovinces.
ThissectiondrawsondatafromCentralprovince(wherethepilotstageofthisresearch
wasconducted)aswellasEastNewBritainandGulf,tohighlightthepotentialand
pitfallsoftheseproposedinstitutions.
4.5.1TheDEICinCentralprovince
InCentralprovince,thenewlyestablishedDEICwaschairedbytheadministrativehead
oftheDDA(knownasaCEOordistrictadministrator),whowasappointedbytheopen
MP6.Asaresult,somerespondentswereconcernedthisnewlyestablishedstructure
couldbepoliticallycompromised.Inthewordsofonedistrictofficer,“TheCEOwill
neversaynototheMP.Ifhesaysno,heisatrisk[oflosinghisjob]”.Districtofficersalso
notedthattheDistrictServicesImprovementProgram(DSIP)fundingwasbeing
directedtoshoreupsupportfortheMPandLLGpresidentsinthe2017elections.Given
6OpenelectorateMPstypicallycoveroneadministrativedistricts
36
thepowerMPshave,itispossibletheycouldwieldinfluenceoverspendingdecisions,
andthusshapethedistributionoffundschanneledthroughDEICs.
InthetwoprimaryschoolssampledinCentralprovince,therewasapprehensionabout
whattheDEICswouldmeanforfundingallocations.Oneteachersaidthateventhough
theythoughttheTFFpolicyhadimprovedschools,theDEICswere“notagood
initiative,aswemaynotgetthemoneywearesupposedto.”Giventhatin2015,district
funding(allocatedtoeducationinfrastructureandchannelledthroughthe‘District
EducationImprovementProgram’7),andwhichpromisedtoprovideanextra3million
kinaperdistrictreportedlyneverarrived;thisfearisjustified.
Insomecases,puttingdecision-makingpowersinthehandsofdistrictofficersalso
increasestheriskofsubstandardinfrastructureormaintenanceworks.Atoneschoolin
Centralprovince,acontractingcompanyemployedbythedistricttobuildaclassroom
in2012wasallegedlyconnectedtoamemberoftheDDA.The
contractorreportedlyreceived200,000kinabutfailedtofinishthejobandvanished,
forcingtheschooltouse15,000kinaofitsownmoney.Thebuildingwascompletedbut
poorlybuilt.
Incomparison,bothschoolshadexamplesofthesuccessfulindependentmanagement,
fundingandbuildingofteachers’housesandclassroomswithfundsTFFsubsidies.They
hadengagedcommunitymembersinthebuildingworks.Inoneexample,thepresident
oftheschool’sBoMwasinchargeoftheconstruction.Inbothschools,thesebuildings
wereinbetterconditionthanthosebuiltbyoutsiders.Thus,withoutsignificantchanges
togovernancepractices,poolingeducationalfundingatthedistrictlevelisunlikelyto
leadtocheaperorbetterinfrastructure.Indeed,itmaypushpricesupandreduce
quality.
7Setupin2015tofundeducationprojects–thiswasaseparateschemeandnotassociatedwithDEICs
37
4.5.2ResponsestopromisedDEICsinGulfandEastNewBritain
InGulfandEastNewBritain,manypublicservantsandschoolofficialshadlittle
knowledgeabouttheproposedpolicy,butthosethatdidwereworriedthatitwould
preventfundsfromreachingneedyschools.Forexample,achurchadministrator
expresseddoubtthatthedistrictadministrationwouldreleasethesefunds,givenpast
promisesaboutincreasestoeducationfundingthathavefailedtomaterialise.One
churchadvisorsaid:
Overtheyears,fundshavebeenreleasedtothedistricts[suchasthe3million
districtfundingin2015],butschoolshaveneveraccessedanythingfromthose
funds.
WhiletherewasscepticisminbothEastNewBritainandGulfaboutthepotentialof
DEICs,thoseinGulfexpressedthemostincredulitytowardsit.There,district
administrationswereonthevergeofdysfunction.MPsoftendominateddecision-
makingwithinDDAs,renderingthosedesignatedtokeepthemaccountablepowerless,
andtransgressingthe2014DistrictDevelopmentAuthorityAct(whichsetsout
proceduresforkeepingMPsandotherdecisionmakersaccountable).Asonesenior
districtofficial,withextensivefirst-handexperienceofdistrictadministrationnoted:
“Theopenmembers[MPs]directthemoneythemselves–theyspenditwheretheygot
theirvotes”.Inotherwords,districtfundingwasbeingdirected,notwhereitwas
needed,buttobuildpatronagenetworks.Giventhis,thereisariskthatchannelingmore
fundstodistrictadministrationwillmeanthatthemostvulnerableschoolsarenot
prioritised8.
8Foramorein-depthexaminationofthedifferencesinadministrativecapacitybetweenEastNewBritainandGulfseeWaltonandJones(2017).
38
5. Discussionandconclusions
Policiesaimedatreducingthecostsofschoolinghavechangedsignificantlysince2012.
InitialassessmentsoftheTFFpolicyintheLostDecade?Reportwerecautiously
optimistic(Howes,etal2014).Theresearchundertakenanddiscussedheresupports
thissanguineassessment,withtheTFFpolicy(inparticular)receivingpraisefroma
numberofdifferentstakeholders.However,ashighlighted,since2012policychanges
haveledtoanumberofnegativeconsequenceschallengingthebenefitsoftheoriginal
2012TFFpolicy.
AkeyobjectiveoftheTFFpolicyandthegovernment’sdirectivetobanprojectfeeshas
beentoimprovestudentaccesstoschooling.YetinschoolsvisitedinGulf,enrolments
declinedasstudentsandparentswereputoffbythepoorqualityofschooling.This
suggeststhatfreeeducationpoliciesthatfocusongettingstudentsintoschools,without
concurrentlyimprovingqualityeducationandmonitoring,aretakingatollinsome
provinces.Inturn,improvingaccesstoeducationisnotonlyaboutreducingschooland
projectfees,itisalsoshapedbythewayteachersaresupportedandmonitored,the
abilityofstandardsofficerstoinspectschools,andthequalityofclassrooms,teaching
resourcesandotheramenities.Ensuringqualityeducationisalsoaboutimprovingdata
collectionandanalysis.InEastNewBritain,poordatahadledtoamisallocationof
teachers.Thishighlightstheimportanceofensuringthatdataheldbynationaland
subnationaladministratorsisaccurate.Intherushtoincreaseaccesstoschooling
acrossPNG,theseissueshavebeenoverlooked.Thesefindingssuggestitisnowtimeto
placethemattheforefrontofeducationpolicies.
TheTFFpolicyeliminatesschoolandprojectfees;however,manyschoolsarecharging
thesedespitegovernmentdirectives.Thisispartlyaresultoflateanderraticdeliveryof
governmentsubsidies,butalsoareflectionoftheabsenceofotherfundingsources.
Withschoolsmorereliantonnationalgovernmentfunding,delaysplaceschoolsina
vulnerablesituation.SincetheintroductionoftheTFFpolicy,churchschoolshave
becomemorereliantnationalgovernmentfunding,andchurchadministratorsnowplay
diminishedroleinschoolmanagementandoversight.Freeeducationpolicieshavealso
changedthewaysomecommunitiesviewthechurch’sroleinserviceprovision.Since
churchschoolsnowreceivefundingdirectlyfromthegovernment,manyinvolvedinthe
39
schoolsvisitedconsideredthem‘governmentschools’.Enforcedrelianceongovernment
fundinghasresultedinanationaldisputeovertherightofchurchschoolstochargefees
(seeOrowae,2016).Giventhatchurchesplayasignificantroleintheprovisionof
educationalservices,andthegovernmentsubsidyisnotoriouslylate,thereactionof
churchadministratorsisunsurprising.
Asreportsofschoolsdefyingthedirectiveonchargingfeescontinuetosurface,itis
recommendedthatthegovernmentofficiallyreinstatebothprojectfeesandagencyfees
toallowschoolstomanagefundingshortfalls–manyschoolsarechargingthesefees
anyway.Asperpreviouspolicyguidelines,provincialgovernmentsshouldsetupper
limitsonthesefees.Compliancewiththelimitsshouldbemonitoredbystandards
officers,andinthecaseofchurchschools,churchofficials.
TheTFFpolicy’sdevolvementoffiscalmanagementtoschoolshasempowered
communitiestodesignandimplementprojectsthatbenefitstudentsandteachers.It
allowsforfundingtobemoreeffectivelyallocated,ascommunities,notbureaucrats,
haveabetterunderstandingofwhatschoolsneed.Occasionally,ithasencouragedthrift.
Insomelocations,schoolshavedrawnoncommunityskillsandlabourtocutdownon
buildingcosts.Thisdevolutionhasalsolikelyencouragedmorepeopleand
encouragingly,women,tojointheBoM–akeyinstitutionforschoolgovernance.These
grassrootsinitiativesareastrengththatshouldbefurthersupported.
Indeed,nearbycommunitiescanplayaroleinhelpingschoolstoovercomeanumberof
theproblemsidentifiedinthispaper.SchoolsvisitedinGulfwereabletoimprove
studentattendancebyensuringteachersandcommunitymembersjointlymonitored
studentsandreprimandedparentsontheirchildren’snon-attendance.Thisisonearea
whereEastNewBritainadministratorsandschoolscanlearnfromthoseinGulf.Inthe
absenceofofficialoversight,thelocalcommunitycanprovideaneffectivealternative.
Localclergyalsoplayanimportantroleinthisregard:theyhelptoprovideasenseof
disciplineandethicsthroughtheirengagementwithschools.Theyoccupyaunique
moralpositionwithincommunities,andcanprovideguidancewhenthereislittle
bureaucraticorofficialinput.
However,schoolsstillneedoversightfromoutsiders.Standardsofficersplayacrucial
roleinmonitoringspendingandpedagogy.Theycanalsomediatedisputesaboutthe
40
BoM–whichappeartobeincreasing,giventheriseinfundingassociatedwiththese
positions.Thispaperhasreportedonfunding-constrainedstandardsofficerswhoare
unabletoperformessentialoversightandmonitoringroles.Withoutthesubnational
feedbackprovidedbythisrole,itisnotpossibleforthenationaladministrationtoknow
howschoolsarefaring.
Standardsofficersneedtwothings:resourcesandinformation.Resourcesaremost
desperatelyneededinGulf,wherestandardsofficersfaceenormouschallengesin
visitingschoolsandarebecomingincreasinglydemoralised.Therearealsosignsthat
themostbasicinformationaboutschoolfundingisfailingtomakeitswaytoschools,
andvice-versa.Ifstandardsofficersarenotabletovisitschools,theyarenotableto
inspectandmonitorfundinguse,norcantheyrelayinformationontheimpactof
governmentpoliciestoadministrators.InbothGulfandEastNewBritain,senior
administratorsandstandardsofficersdidnotknowhowmuchfundingeachschoolwas
supposedtoreceive.Thisneedstoberectified.TheNationalDepartmentofEducation
shouldalsobeworkingtoimproveinformationsharingwiththesubnationallevel.Itis
hearteningthattherehavebeensomestepsmadetowardachievingthis,withSecretary
forEducation,UkeKombra,announcinginlate2016thatTFFcoordinatorshadbeen
appointedinprovincesacrossthecountry(Naime,2016).Itisimportantthatthese
coordinatorsareproperlyresourced,andhaveappropriateinformationaboutschool
paymentsandschoolsintheirprovince.
Theproposedrecentralisationoffunds–fromschoolstoDEICs(with30percentof
fundssettobeadministeredbythisinstitution)andfromschoolstothecentral
government(withanadditional30percentoffundingsettobeadministeredbythe
NDoE)–isstillslatedtooccur.Findingspresentedheresuggestthattherearethreekey
problemswiththispolicy.First,itmayinadvertentlyincreasethecostofinfrastructure,
particularlyifcontractorsratherthancommunitiesareinvolved.Second,itislikelyto
furtherempowerMPsandleadtoastrengtheningofpatronagepolitics,particularlyin
provincessuchasGulfwheretheadministrationsystemisalreadystretched.Third,
thereisgrowingsuspicionthatdistrictsareunwillingtoredistributefundingintended
fortheeducationsector.Itisadvisabletherefore,thattherolloutofthispolicyis
delayeduntilDDAsarebetterestablished,andthereisgreaterseparationbetween
administratorsandpoliticians.
41
Insummary,thisresearchhighlightstheimpactofrecentpoliciesinverydifferent
contextsforservicedelivery.Whilethesearecasestudies,theypointtothetypesof
challengesthatschoolsandsubnationaladministratorsarelikelytofaceacrossthe
country.Theresearchsuggestspolicymakersnowneedtofocusonthelesspolitically
popularaspectsofeducationpolicy,suchasimprovingteacherqualityandoversight
andmonitoring.Italsomeansbeingbraveenoughtorollbackpoliciesthatwillharm
educationoutputs,particularlymovestotakeevenmorefundingawayfromschools
throughestablishingDEICs.
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