US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Approach to Counterinsurgency
USA/USMC COIN CenterCOL Daniel S. Roper, Director
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Agenda
• COIN Center Overview• Insights into the COIN Environment• COIN Resources
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Mission Statement: USA/USMC COIN Center provides oversight of ground force COIN integration in order to improve US ground forces’ capability to operate in a full spectrum/COIN environment.
Integrate COIN initiatives
Research best practices
Improve Doctrine
Improve Education
Advise leaders and organizations Conduct Outreach to other military &
civilian entities
COIN Center Origin & Mission
• Founded Summer 06 – GEN Petraeus and Gen Mattis, USMC
• Assist with FM 3-24 Integration and Implementation
• “Connect the Dots”
Lines of Effort
Assist Army/USMC in implementation/application of the body of thought in FM 3-24
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Vision
Goals
Objectives
Premier military institution for developmentand integration of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational
counterinsurgency expertise and capability
Premier military institution for developmentand integration of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational
counterinsurgency expertise and capability
Ground forces learn,understand and
apply COIN
Expanded joint andmulti-national coordination
ImprovedWhole-of-Government
approach
Shared understanding of capabilities and limitations
of other government agencies and how each contribute to successful
COIN efforts.
Established coordination means to pass lessons,
observations and insights and improve
interoperability amongst partners.
COIN Doctrine and applicable tasks / learning objectives integrated into
PME and institutional training.
COIN Center Direction
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
COIN Center Organization
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AdminAssistant
Director(COL)
Dep, Director(Col)
Advisory/Analysis Branch Integration/Outreach Branch
Project Lead
Analyst(CW – 3/4)
Plans Officer
STRATCOM/Outreach
KM Officer
Ops Officer
XO(LTC)
ABCA
Advisor(MAJ)
Advisor(MAJ)
Advisor(Maj)
Advisor(Maj)
Advisor
Advisor(Maj)
JFCOMLNO
Advisor, SF(SFC)
InteragencyRepresentative
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
*Note• Monthly COIN Integration MTG attendees: Afghan & Iraq COIN Centers for Excellence, PKSOI, USMC IW Center, USAF
Coalition IW Center, USJFCOM IW Center, USSOCOM J10, Asymmetric Warfare Group, JCISFA, NTC/JIEDDO IED-D Center for Excellence, JRTC, BCTP, CTD, CGSC, International Officers and Coalition LNOs.
• Monthly COIN SITREP
*Note• Monthly COIN Integration MTG attendees: Afghan & Iraq COIN Centers for Excellence, PKSOI, USMC IW Center, USAF
Coalition IW Center, USJFCOM IW Center, USSOCOM J10, Asymmetric Warfare Group, JCISFA, NTC/JIEDDO IED-D Center for Excellence, JRTC, BCTP, CTD, CGSC, International Officers and Coalition LNOs.
• Monthly COIN SITREP
COIN Center Engagement
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
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COIN PartnersCOIN CFEs
IraqAfghanistan
CFLDTS
CTCsNTCJRTCJMRC
29 PalmsJWFC
FORSCOM/1AFT Dix
FT RileyFT McCoyCP Shelby
CP Atterbury
Think TanksRANDUSIP
McCormickFoundation
CNASPNSR
Small Wars Journal
MediaNPR
McClatchyWSJ
Chicago TribuneCQ
al-Sharq al-Awsat
Service/GCC COIN/IW CentersUSA/USMC COIN Center
USJFCOM JIW CenterSOCOM J10
USMC IW CenterUSAF IW Center
USCENTCOM IATF
USGS/CRSUSAID
TreasuryDoJNSC
AcademiaHarvardUSMAJHU
PrincetonStanfordPKSOIPritzker
Kings College
Europe
UK – LWC: 6(UK) DIV
NATO – ARRC
Netherlands - Doctrine
France – Joint Staff
Poland - JFTC
War CollegeSOF School
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09Relationship with in-Theater Centers
COIN TrainingCenter–
Afghanistan(CTC–A)
Principal modes of interactionPersonal communications / networking
Monthly COIN Integration MeetingCOIN CFE Triad
COIN Center for Excellence (CFE),
Camp Taji, Iraq
PURPOSE: provide COIN training for…•Coalition combat forces•Transition Teams•HN Security Forces
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Insights into the COIN Environment
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09Understanding the Operational Environment
* Observations from theater visit (AUG – NOV 07)
Not … what to think
Or even . . . how to think
In COIN & IW, focus on …how to think about:
environment in which you operate & how to influence both environment & actors in it.
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09COIN Environment: A “Wicked Problem”
Approach• Involve stakeholders—communication + documentation• Define the corporate identity• Focus on action as experimentation• Feed forward orientation
The counterinsurgent is not distinct from the environment, but is integral to it.
Wicked: Traditional problem
solving does not workMultiple stakeholdersRoots are tangledChanges with every actionNo precedentNo way to evaluate fixes
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09COIN as a Multiple-problem Set
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Fragile State Capacity-Building (incl. Governance, Law + Order)
TerrorismCT
Fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information.Fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information.Fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information.Fundamental problem is CONTROL – of people, terrain and information.
Communal ConflictPeace Enforcement
CriminalityRule of
Law
InsurgencyCOIN
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
How we tend to view things How the insurgent views things
© A Coord PowerPoint Ninja Graphic 2008
Legitimacy is main objective
Political factors are primary
Long-term commitment
COIN Principles
* FM 3-24
Manage information
Use appropriate force
Empower lower levels
COIN Imperatives
Compression of Strategic, Operational, & Tactical levels
The Challenge to the Way We Think
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
If the population is the battleground, what must be our
method? How do we separate the insurgent from his base?
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Information as the “Lens” in COIN
Coherency in word, actions, images & outcome
What is your compelling narrative?
Decisive Points
Decisive Points
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
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Insurgents
Prerequisites
Lack of Government Control Vulnerable Population
Leadership for Direction
Insurgency Dynamics
External SupportPhases
EnvironmentObjective
LeadershipIdeology
Organization
External(Non)State
Actor
ResourcesSanctuary
PoliticalMoral
Military
Political
COIN Principles
Intelligence Isolate Insurgents
Understand the EnvironmentPolitical is Primary
LegitimacyUnity of Effort
Security under Rule of LawLong term Commitment
AlternateStatePsychological
Physical
Psychological
Physical
Framework for Counterinsurgency:“War Amongst the People”
Approach to Counterinsurgency
3. Transform Environment to be inhospitable to Insurgents
1. Separate insurgents from Population2. Connect Population to Government
Partner UnitTT/OMLT
PRTs
PeoplePsychological
Physical
Psychological
Physical
External(Non)State
Actor
External(Non)State
ActorMilitary
Civ
Coalition
Motivations
FearGreedHonor
Insurgents
HN Gov.
HN SecurityForces
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Impressions
• Context. Much more than Intelligence.
• Militants. More opportunists than ideologues.
• “Whole-of-Government” approach not realized (more
like an All-Star team than a Championship team).
• Politics (& security) is local. Empower leaders – de
facto government -- with understanding of basic machinery
of local governance.
Warrior-Statesmen. Leading hybrid CONOPS analogous to FBI/Treasury/police & military task force disrupting competing criminal/military syndicates.
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Ongoing Challenges
• Target Fixation. Solving problems we should solve (mentor Iraqi Security Forces), not just those we can solve (take down HVT).
• Blind spots. Recognizing & adapting to unforeseen changes.
• Inadequate Resources:
– Building & then working by, with, & through HN Security Force.
– Address root causes of instability through PRTs.
– Dilemma: commit troops to population centers or to sanctuary areas?
• CONOPS Evolution. Changing battlefield geometry during thinning of Coalition forces & thickening of HN security forces.“The busier the Commander’s engagement
calendar is, the fewer IEDs we get hit with.”
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Amnesty & Reconciliation
Demobilization, Demilitarization, Reintegration
PRT/Military Synchronization
Ops Intel Fusion
Criminality
Targeting & Lethal Ops
Targeting & Lethal Ops
FM 3-24 “Next”
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FM 3-24 (Next)•Form Writing Team
•Call for Papers
•Research/Conference
•SME Engagements
•Peer Review
TimelineTimeline
Religion & Ideology
Religion & Ideology
1QFY091QFY09 2QFY092QFY09Ft.
LeavenworthConference
(June)
3QFY093QFY09Final Draft
(February)
1QFY101QFY10
Publish(April)
2QFY102QFY10FormTeam
(December)
Pub ProgDirective
(December)
TransitionsTransitions
D.C.Conference(November)
IA AfghanAssess(July)
4QFY094QFY091st
Draft(October)
Call for Papers
(January)
FM Development
Workshop(April)
Detainee Ops
Detainee Ops
Metrics
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
COIN Resources
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5Level: Operational/TacticalScope: Army/USMC COIN Signed: December 2006
JP 3-24, COIN OperationsLevel: Theater Strategic/OperationalScope: Joint COINDeveloping Doctrine Estimated Release: September 2009
Irregular Warfare JOCScope: IW Joint Operating ConceptSigned: September 2007
AFDD 2-3Level: Operational/TacticalScope: US Air Forces Published: Aug 07
AJP 3.4.4: CounterinsurgencyLevel: Theater Strategic/OperationalScope: NATO COINFirst Study Draft: Nov 2008
Strategic/Operational Level
USG COIN GuideScope: US GovernmentA Work in ProgressSigned: January 2009
DRAFT NATOPUBLICATION
AJP 3.X
Counterinsurgencyand the Military
ContributionFM 3-0 Level: OperationalScope: Army Published: Feb 08
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Tactical/TTP Level
FM 3-24.2: Tactics in COINLevel: TacticalScope: Army Brigade and belowEstimated Release: February 2009
Level: TacticalScope: COIN TTPPublished: Beginning Jan 09
USA/USMC COIN Center
COIN Handbook
FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5Level: Operational/TacticalScope: Army/USMC COIN Signed: December 2006
CALL PRT HandbookLevel: TacticalScope: PRTsPublished: Sep 07
Training SFA TeamsLevel: TacticalScope: Transition TeamsPublished: Draft Feb 06
CALL First 100 Days CMD & Staff HandbookLevel: TacticalScope: BDE and BelowPublished: January 2008
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09Future Engagement Opportunities
• COIN SITREP• Monthly Integration Meeting (DCO)• COIN Center Virtual Brownbags• COIN Center Colloquium• http://coin.army.mil
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
COIN Center Blog
COIN Center Blog
Knowledge Center
Knowledge Center
COIN Collaboration
Sites
COIN Collaboration
Sites
COIN Center Media EventsCOIN Center Media Events
External PartnersExternal Partners
http://coin.army.milhttp://coin.army.mil
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Questions?
http://coin.army.mil
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
What are best practices of the strategy By/With/Through the Host Nation?
Current model of training and educating Soldiers and leaders for COIN: Is it adequate? How should the Army improve?
How should units approach detention operations in COIN? What are best practices for fusion between operations and
intelligence? How are transitions between combat operations and stability
operations managed? How is effectiveness measured in COIN operations? What is the impact of religion and ideology on COIN operations? What
are best practices for the engagement of religious leaders? What is the relationship between crime and insurgency? How does communal conflict affect the COIN environment? Role of Development in COIN Psychology of Participation in Insurgency Insurgency and Counterinsurgency as a Competition in Governance Understanding Insurgent Intelligence Operations Case Studies in the implementation of Rule of Law in COIN- Lessons
Learned. Case Studies in amnesty and reconciliation- Lessons Learned. Case Studies in PRT/Military Synchronization- Lessons Learned. Case Studies in Demobilization, Demilitarization, Reintegration-
Lessons Learned. Geographical Areas of Interest: Colombia, Philippines, Uganda, Nigeria,
Sudan, India, Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Israel
Research Topics
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Security Force Assistance
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SFA is a capability comprised of specific skills applicable throughout the SFA is a capability comprised of specific skills applicable throughout the spectrum of conflict focused on assisting foreign security forces in support spectrum of conflict focused on assisting foreign security forces in support of US and Coalition interests regardless of operating environment or threatof US and Coalition interests regardless of operating environment or threat
At the macro level, the military provides only a portion of a
whole-of-government or multinational
effort in the application of
national power to achieve strategic
ends associated with developing foreign
security forces
For Example,
CT UW
BPC
FID
Full Spectrum Operations
Defense Offense
Stability Ops
SFA
US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09
Foreign Internal Defense vs. Security Force Assistance
Security - Military
Security - Civilian
Economic
Governance - Political
Governance - Social
External ThreatInternal Threat
Security - Military
Security - Civilian
Economic
Governance - Political
Governance - Social
External ThreatInternal Threat
FID SFA
FID depends on origin of the threat - (internal lawlessness, subversion, insurgency) and that it must support Internal Defense and Development.
SFA depends on the activity (organize, train, equip, rebuild, advise Foreign Security Forces).
Grey area not included in the term.Red is included with the term.
FID is conditionally
based and does not depend upon
function;
SFA is functionally based and does not depend upon
condition.
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09State and DoD Areas of Responsibility
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09CAC CG COIN Guidance, FY09 (1 of 2)
Major Responsibility and Assigned Proponency Priorities – COIN
– Provide subject matter expertise to Operational Army unites embarked on the Road to Deployment or engaged in COIN operations, and work to infuse proven COIN doctrine and TTP throughout the Generating Force.
– Priority Efforts for FY 09.• Doctrine development: ICI COIN Guide v2; FM 3-24.2;
JP 3-24; NATO COIN & FM 3-24 (Update) & Symposium.
• Leader Training: Non-BCTs/1st Army Leader Workshops; Assistance Visits.
• Training Development: Training Support Packages; COIN Training Strategy.
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US Army Combined Arms Center
UNCLASSIFIED As of 27 JAN 09CAC CG COIN Guidance – FY09 (2 of 2)
Additional Tasks in Core Functions, Major Responsibilities, Assigned Proponencies and Enduring Efforts (Encl 2) – COIN
• COIN engagements w/Multi-National Partners: COIN CFE Triad (Taji/Kabul/Leavenworth); Canadian Land Forces
• Interagency Engagements: Interagency Symposium; Consortium Complex Operations; National Security Council.
• Outreach efforts: Media; Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization; USAID; Think Tanks; Academia; COIN Colloquium. 31