THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY DURING THE ERA OF THE
COMINTERN (1919-1943)
TONY SAICH
Daewoo Professor of International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University
Article prepared for Juergen Rojahn, “Comintern and National Communist Parties
Project,” International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam
The rise to power of the Chinese Communist movement has shaped the history of China
for most of the twentieth century. Almost from the founding of the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) in 1920 to its seizure of state power in 1949, its struggle with the
Guomindang (GMD, Nationalist Party) dominated the domestic stage of Chinese politics.
The main elements of this history are well-known but the period of reform in China
launched in 1978 has been accompanied by the release of an unprecedented amount of
new documentation that has enabled a refinement of key components of the story. This
newly available documentation shows how the CCP interpreted the revolution in which it
was a key player, how its policies evolved to meet the changing circumstances, how
policy was communicated both to party members and to the public at large, and how the
CCP dealt with its complicated and crucial relationship with the Comintern. The message
was not always the same, not even for party members. How much one was entitled to
2
know or which particular interpretation of an event one was entitled to see depended on
party rank.
The precise details of the Chinese revolution during the twentieth century are, of
course, unique but there are a number of general features that will be familiar to students
of revolutions elsewhere. First, the traditional system under the Imperial household and
hybrid successors had ceased to “deliver the goods” for its citizens and crucially for key
groups such as the urban elites and intellectuals. Disillusionment set in and the imperial
system lost its monopoly over feasible alternatives, allowing disaffected intellectuals to
challenge the premises of state power. Second, the communist movement was able to
thrive where the bases of power of local elites had been destroyed or lost the capacity to
repress alternatives to its rule. In these environments the communists could establish
local military superiority. Third, for the revolutionaries, the organization and
organizational ethos were crucial in terms of providing the movement with its direction
and purpose. This gave the activists their frame of reference. It enabled them to channel
the energies of other social forces when necessary and to overcome the resistance and
apathy of the local population.
This chapter will cover three issues. First, some general problems in the
relationship between the Comintern and the CCP are discussed. Second, a detailed
overview of the development of the CCP and its relationship to other social forces is
provided. This traces the development of the CCP from a small group of clandestine
plotters to an armed force ruling over significant sovereign territory. Third, a review of
some of the key sources available for the study of the CCP within its socio-economic and
political contexts is provided.
3
The Comintern and the CCP: Some General Observations
During the fifties, the assumption in the West that the CCP was under the tutelage of
Moscow led to attempts to see Comintern influence on the CCP in earlier phases of the
revolution. It was not difficult to find.1 Indeed some western scholars saw the
destruction of the first united front in China between the CCP and the GMD (1924-27) as
amounting to a failure of Soviet policy or even more particularly that of Stalin himself.2
Interestingly, this is also the conclusion of more recent scholarship by historians in the
People’s Republic of China.3 Soviet writings also had a vested interest in claiming a
major role for the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern in the Chinese revolution and most
historiography was directed towards this end.4 The massive defeat of the Chinese
revolution in 1927 formed a key element in the struggle for power in Soviet Russia
between Stalin and Trotsky. Trotsky himself offered a penetrating analysis of the failure
of the CCP through its slavish adherence to Stalinist policies in the United Front, an
analysis that affected the writings of his followers in the West.5 While perceptive in his
analysis of the failings of the United Front, his exhortations for the CCP to break with the
bourgeoisie and rely on the power of the working-class was as equally ill-conceived in a
country where the working-class was weak and barely formed.6
In terms of Western scholarship, the work of Schwartz and Schram has stood out
as an exception to the idea of a revolution inspired by the Soviets. While Schwartz
acknowledged the debt owed by the Chinese communists to Bolshevik theory and
organization, he was aware of traditional influences and the “originality” of Mao Zedong
and his supporters that was of increasing importance after 1927.7 The indigenous
4
elements that had gone into Chinese communism became major objects for retrieval
particularly after the Sino-Soviet rupture became apparent in the early sixties. Some
researchers, such as Schram, began to explore the “sinification of Marxism” and to stress
that much had happened in spite of Comintern influence rather than because of it.8
Materials that have become available through the eighties and nineties show that
there was a continual tension between the CCP and the Comintern resulting from China’s
perceived position in the world revolution and Moscow’s perception of Soviet geo-
political interest. Comintern influence was of major importance in the party’s founding
and development but its authority was not always accepted nor decisive in all periods.
Yet it was a voice that could not be ignored and up until 1938, when the Comintern could
articulate its message clearly and get it through the communication network to the CCP
leadership it had a reasonably decisive say. The legitimacy of the Comintern to dictate
policy in China became a key point in the struggle between the pro-Soviet group in the
CCP under the leadership of Wang Ming and those who under Mao Zedong who were
closer to the indigenous roots of the revolution.
The historian Dirlik is the most recent scholar to argue that the role of the
Comintern was crucial for forging together the party in its nascent period.9 His work
shows the influence of the Comintern in bolstering Leninism and the party at the expense
of anarchism, which was more influential initially, and other forms of Marxism.10 By
contrast, van de Ven highlights the indigenous roots of the communist movement. He
shows that not only did the localism have a strong impact on the first decade of the CCP
but also there were regional groupings, such as that in Sichuan, which came into existence
without reference to the Comintern and even without contact with the “founding fathers,”
5
Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao. He shows just what a long, hard process it was to construct a
Bolshevik organization in the Chinese cultural soil.11 Yeh Wen-Hsin also stresses the
indigenous nature of the movement’s origins and she has contributed significantly to our
understanding of its initial diversity. Her study of the Hangzhou radicals who comprised
many of the initial members of the Shanghai communist small group shows how disgust
of the old world rather than the revelations of the new led them to adopt radical
alternatives. However, she takes issue with van de Ven’s analysis of the party’s
evolution evolved to a Leninist form during the twenties. In her view, there was no
evolution but rather the CCP was totally reconstituted at the expense of most of its
earliest members. Those such as Shi Cuntong, the key figure in Yeh’s work, withdrew
from the party, rejecting its Bolshevization. By the end of the twenties, the party was
built on a new membership, while those who remained members had been significantly
radicalized by their experiences.12
As noted above, for the Comintern, China was also a crucial area for the
worldwide revolution and thus policy became embroiled in the polemics between Stalin
and Trotsky. The CCP had a permanent mission at the Comintern and until the mid-
thirties, the Comintern tried to coordinate its activities through the Far Eastern Bureau in
Shanghai.13 The Comintern tried to enforce its will through the agents and
representatives that it sent to implement policy in China.
Comintern agents in China enjoyed high prestige but had to find Chinese party
members through whom they could transmit their orders and the Comintern’s strategic
and tactical visions. At the very best, they were always one step removed form the
realities they were trying to influence and interpret. A stream of Comintern
6
representatives from Maring (Sneevliet) through Borodin and Roy to Vladimirov were
frustrated in their attempts to apply Comintern policy to China.14 Frequently, they
discovered that the ideologically derived, policy positions of the Comintern were too
simplistic to deal with the complex realities of the revolution on the ground in China.
While Comintern agents in the field could enjoy considerable short-term freedom aided
by the difficulties of communication with Moscow, over the long-term room for
maneuver was limited. The ideological predilections of the Comintern set strict
constraints on the extent to which policy could be moderated in the light of local
conditions. Overloaded with details and information sent to Moscow from the periphery,
the Comintern center in Moscow tried to catalogue information and provide policy
prescriptions in terms of simple formulae based on the shifting class alignments. A good
example was Maring’s attempts to turn Lenin’s prescriptions for revolution in the
colonial countries into a viable strategy for China. Not only did it lead Maring to try to
interpret reality to fit a prescriptive, ideologiucal framework but also it caused him to
push the CCP into collaboration with the GMD. Attempts by field agents to redefine
their mission in the light of reality did, on occasion, bring them into conflict with
Comintern leaders who interpreted such redefinitions as “ideological deviation.”
Problems for Comintern agents were increased by the fact that not only were
they in an alien environment but also had to interpret it through the views and experiences
of others. Comintern agents did not speak Chinese and had no prior experience of
working in China. As a result, they relied on the Chinese leaders for their information
about the local situation. Thus, Maring depended on Liao Zhongkai for information
about the GMD and the potential for cooperation with the CCP. Liao was a member of
7
the left-wing of the GMD and a strong supporter of such cooperation perhaps leading
Maring to adopt a positive assessment while underestimating opposition within the GMD
to cooperation with the communists.
Further, to get their message across, Comintern representatives had to find local
“carriers” to propagate their views within the CCP. In some cases this worked well but in
others it did not. For example, Pavel Mif was able to work through Wang Ming and Bo
Gu in the early thirties to repudiate the policies of Li Lisan and keep the focus of official
policy on revolutionary activity on the urban areas. By contrast, Maring was often
frustrated in his attempts to push cooperation with the GMD and to establish a viable pro-
CCP labor movement. Even Chen Duxiu, who supported Maring’s view of the need for
cooperation with the GMD at the CCP’s Third Congress, had originally rejected Maring’s
ideas. In fact, it was only after Maring appealed to Comintern discipline that he was able
to get Chen and other key CCP leaders on his side, albeit only briefly.
Two areas where Comintern representatives were particularly successful in
instilling their ideas among CCP members were on the need for strong organization and
the role that ideology played in inner-party debates. Bolshevik organization was
attractive to a number of CCP leaders from an early stage.15 The collapse of the
Confucian bureaucracy after the 1911 Revolution left an organizational vacuum that
many CCP leaders felt could be filled by a modern party organized along Bolshevik lines.
This kind of party was expected to provide an institutional form that transcended the
personal authority of an individual leader16 and a rational hierarchical structure that would
facilitate decision-making and policy implementation.
8
A number of the CCP’s leaders who emerged during the twenties were attracted
to the Bolshevik form of organization because they felt that it would challenge what they
saw as a traditional Chinese political culture that stressed obedience to the powerful
individual leader.17 To some extent, they simplified the analysis of the past as comprising
a traditional system that culminated in an institution centered on an individual, the
“Emperorship.” However, previous Chinese rulers had been aware of the role played by
“abstract” institutions and a relatively sophisticated bureaucracy had been developed. In
their search for a suitable organizational form, these early CCP leaders overlooked the
fact that while, in theory, Bolshevik organization would transcend the individual, from
the outset it was inseparable from the role of Lenin. Subsequently, this tendency towards
the domination of the organization by the supreme leader became more apparent under
Stalin.
In addition, Bolshevik organization seemed to offer an alternative to the rule of
individual warlords or the GMD, which from its reorganization in the early twenties,
combined Leninist organization with leader worship. Sun Yat-sen was a supreme leader,
a function subsequently taken over by Chiang Kai-shek. In the CCP, the reemergence of
a leader dominate organizational system took longer and came with the assumption of
supreme power by Mao Zedong in the Shaan-Gan-Ning communist base area in
Northwest China in the forties.18
A number of factors combined to instill the notion of the Bolshevik party among
CCP members. First, there was the translation of key works and the promotion of the
Bolshevik form of organization in the party press. Secondly, there was the influence of
the Comintern emissaries such as Voitinsky and Maring who already had experience of
9
such party organization and devoted considerable time to propagating their views. Indeed
Maring was appalled by the lack of discipline that he witnessed in the early CCP. Maring
provided information on the idea and importance of party organization and of propaganda
as a political weapon.19 Further, he stressed that the CCP’s struggle was linked to and
formed an integral part of the much wider worldwide struggle against imperialism.
Within this context, according to Maring and subsequent Comintern agents, the interests
and policies of the national party were subordinate to the Comintern.
Third, in the twenties there was the gradual return of influential individuals such
as Cai Hesen who had studied in Europe and had become acquainted with both
communist ideology and organization as well as the modern labor movement. As the
twenties progressed, the idea of a Bolshevik party was strengthened through the visits or
training of key CCP figures in Soviet Russia. The first group of Chinese students went to
Soviet Russia for study as early as spring 1921 and some 1,000 were trained in the
twenties and thirties at the Communist University of the Working People of China.20
While the students who returned from Soviet Russia were a very varied group they had all
received a thorough training in concepts of party organization and discipline. Of
particular importance for the subsequent development of the CCP were Wang Ming, Bo
Gu, Zhang Wentian, Wang Jiaxiang and Chen Yun.21
The Comintern was also influential in shaping the discourse of the CCP and the
form of its inner-party struggle. The existing influence of the Comintern and the use of
ideology as a weapon in inner-party struggle was increased by the removal of Chen Duxiu
as party leader at the 7 August Emergency Conference of 1927. Chen’s removal was a
potentially traumatic event in CCP history. For many, Chen had been a symbol of
10
progress not just from the May Fourth Movement (1915-19), but from his earlier
struggles against the Imperial system. A number of the early leaders had been drawn into
the party because of personal connections and loyalty to Chen. In terms of the Chinese
tradition, to turn on a respected senior and elder was an event of major significance.
Chen’s removal was legitimized not merely through criticism of his “mistakes”
but also through the invocation of ideological symbols to justify the attack. Adherence to
the correct ideological line came to legitimize policy, and understanding of the “line” was
a necessary condition for leadership. This had the effect of strengthening Comintern
control over party leadership as the Comintern was thought to possess a “higher wisdom”
and vision of the revolutionary process than a mere national party. Concurrently, debate
in the party became governed by the manipulation of ideological symbols with the result
that genuine debate about policy disputes became even less feasible than had previously
been the case. As the resolution of the Second Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee
(CC) of the CCP pointed out (June 1929), there was no such thing as peace in the party.22
Erroneous tendencies always had to be fought against. All too often policy dispute was
raised to the level of line struggle. Thus, the 7 August Emergency Conference (1927)
ushered in ideological correctness as a key element in control, leadership and cohesion
within the CCP. With this many of the debates within the Soviet Communist Party and
the Comintern were imported into the Chinese party. Those who opposed party policy
were labeled as “Trotskyites,” “Anarchists,” “Right Deviationists,” “Left Deviationists,”
etc. Once labeled their objection to policy was more easily dealt with by the Party Center.
The idea of “correct line” also had consequences for the Party Center itself. It could not
11
recognize faults in its own leadership and thus policy failure was followed by the hunt for
“scapegoats” who had sabotaged the party’s correct line.
The tendency toward the dominance of an organizationally derived ideological
truth was inherent in the choice of a Bolshevik form of organization from the beginning.
Yet in the early stages it was not so readily apparent. The CCP had been organized before
there had been any serious discussion of Marxism in China, and indeed the choice of a
Bolshevik organization removed the need for theoretical analysis. As a result “an
organizationally defined analysis became for them [the original founders] a substitute for
theoretical analysis.”23 Naturally, it was presumed that those from Soviet Russia or their
emissaries had a greater understanding of this problem and the relevant policy needs.
One last general question that deserves our attention is the relationship between
the Comintern and the rise to power of Mao Zedong. Some previous analyses viewed
Mao Zedong’s rise to power within the CCP as occurring in spite of the Comintern,24 but
more recently available materials suggest that the Comintern was at least willing to
acquiesce in Mao’s rise and his victories over rivals within the party such as Zhang
Guotao and Wang Ming (Moscow’s own trainee). In the conflicts with Zhang and Wang,
the actions and words of the Comintern tended to favor Mao over his opponents.25
Whether the Comintern perceived so clearly what was at stake is another matter. Further,
on a number of occasions the Comintern called for the CCP not to ape Soviet experience,
but to develop its own policy, and the Comintern’s Seventh Congress (1935) accepted
that individual parties should have more freedom. Whether the Comintern approved of
what was finally developed is a different question. In September 1938, the Comintern
informed the CCP that it approved of the united front policy during the previous year, a
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year during which the party had been under the control of Mao Zedong and during which
he had been in competition for dominance with Wang Ming. Further Dimitrov, the
person responsible for Chinese affairs at the time, let it be known that Mao Zedong
should be the party’s senior leader in preference to Wang Ming (the man thought of as
Moscow’s closest ally).26 Thus, the Comintern was not anti-Mao nor was Mao inevitably
opposed to the Comintern.27
Periodization
A) 1920-1927: From Intellectual Groups to Organized Party
The early years of the CCP is period is marked its development from a set of disparate
small intellectual groups to a more rigorously organized Leninist party. This process did
not go uncontested and resulted in the departure of most of the original members and their
replacement by those tempered in the urban struggles of the twenties. The question of
collaboration with the GMD proved contentious. However, following Comintern
promptings, there were increasingly desperate attempts to justify the continued
collaboration through providing class-based analyses of the internal forces within the
GMD.
The CCP was a direct product of the intellectual ferment that accompanied the
anti-imperialist demonstrations commonly referred to as the May Fourth Movement
(1919).28 Its longer term origins lay in the collapse of the imperial system and the social
and political vacuum that followed its fall. The seemingly innocuous Wuchang Uprising
brought down the Qing dynasty and despite attempts at restoration, the imperial system
was finished. The question for intellectuals interested in the nation’s future was now
13
what sort of system should govern China and bring into the “modern world?” This has
been the key question underlying the upheavals and events of twentieth century history in
China. With the collapse of the dynasty and with no obvious successor, the logic of the
situation demanded a Republic. However, initial attempts under Yuan Shikai failed to
establish a predictable and effective system of parliamentary rule. At the same time, the
authority of the center fragmented and warlordism increased.29 The nominal government
in Beijing continued to rule and was accorded the respect of the foreign governments but
it was influenced by the shifting fortunes of a number of powerful political cliques. At
the time of the May Fourth Movement, Beijing politics was dominated by Duan Qirui and
the Anhui Clique. Duan and his supporters enjoyed the full support of the Japanese, a
fact that further undermined Duan’s credibility during the nationalist May Fourth
Movement that marked a high point of anti-Japanese sentiment. This movement broke
out with protests against the Versailles agreement ceding the German concession of
Shandong to Japan. The indignation that this aroused led to a 3,000 strong demonstration
on the streets of Beijing on 4 May 1919. The demonstration began peacefully but ended
with the arrest of 32 demonstrators. Duan’s embarrassment was increased when it was
revealed that the Versailles decision was based partly on agreements signed between his
government and the Japanese. Concern about Duan’s growing power also caused his
enemies in the Fengtian and Zhili cliques to combine forces to act against him and ouster
him. Thereafter power in Beijing was generally shared between these two cliques.
During this same period, Soviet Russia stepped up its interest in China.30
However, from summer 1918 to early 1920, Siberia was the main theater of war against
its remaining opposition and this hampered attempts at contacts. In fact, it was not until
14
early 1920 that Russia sent its first representative to China to conduct investigations and
make contacts. The 1919 Karakhan Declaration, which appeared to renounce the former
czarist privileges in China, was particularly influential in China. It was easy for the
Russians to make such sweeping generous gestures as, given the situation in the east of
the country, they were in no position to carry out any of their promises. However, the
propaganda gain was evident as Soviet Russia distanced itself from the old imperialist
powers that were still intent of dismembering China.
For a number of Chinese intellectuals, such gestures and the intellectual
attraction of Marxism led to a desire to understand more about the October Revolution.
For such people, the Bolshevik revolution demonstrated the possibilities for radical
change in the context of underdevelopment. Within this essentially favorable
predisposition towards Soviet Russia, the Comintern began to press its interests in China
and to promote the idea of the development of a revolutionary party to guide and control
future actions.
The Comintern laid down the framework of a policy relevant to China at its
Second Congress (July-August 1920) with its discussion of how the national struggles in
colonial countries could be integrated with the strategy for world revolution. Lenin
recognized the importance of national movements in the east but was not willing to
accept the views of Roy that appeared to shift the responsibility for overthrowing
capitalism from the “advanced” west to the “backward” east.31 In Lenin’s view
movements to overthrow imperialism were an integral part of the broader struggle of the
proletariat. The national struggle could only succeed by destroying the colonial system
and this was an integral part of the broader struggle of the proletariat. To carry out these
15
movements, Lenin felt that in the colonial countries it would be necessary to enter into a
temporary alliance with bourgeois democracy while remaining distinct, and maintaining
the independence of the proletarian movement. It was clear that for a time at least the
bourgeoisie would be in control of the revolutionary movement. This was the strategic
framework that Comintern representatives had to apply to the concrete realities of China.
In April 1920, Voitinsky visited China as the head of a group sent by V.D.
Vilensky-Sibiryakov, one of the leaders of Vladivostok Branch of the Bolshevik’s Far
Eastern Bureau. This was decided upon with the agreement of the leadership of the
Comintern. Beyond familiarization and establishing contacts, the Mission had the task to
study the possibility of setting up an East Asian Bureau of the Comintern in Shanghai.
He and his fellow visitors found fertile soil in which to plant the seeds of a Bolshevik
organization.32 According to Dirlik, the timing was fortuitous as the radical movement in
China had reached a point of crisis because the previous ideological and organizational
premises appeared to have run into a dead end.33 Voitinsky’s group established contacts
with radical intellectuals such as Li Dazhao in Beijing and Chen Duxiu in Shanghai. Out
of their discussions emerged the idea of founding a Communist Party in China.34 Later, a
meeting of Soviet communists working in China was held in Beijing from 5 to 7 July
1920. The meeting was presided over by V.D. Vilensky-Sibiryakov and it highlighted the
possibility of establishing a communist in China.35
As has been noted, the early communist organizations in China did not just
emerge out of the blue nor were they summoned up by Voitinsky’s visit but evolved from
the study societies set up during the May Fourth period. Many of China’s later
communist leaders were schooled in groups such as the “New People’s Study Society,”
16
the “Awakening Society,” and the “Social Welfare Society.”36 They were products of the
radicalization that had accompanied the collapse of the Qing dynasty and some of the
early members were among the most radical thinkers during the May Fourth Movement.
While interest in socialism pre-dated the May Fourth Movement, it is fair to state that
during and after the Movement it increased in popularity and it became a fashionable
topic in intellectual circles.37
The May Fourth Movement represented the culmination of the attack on
traditional Chinese culture developed in the previous century. Marxism was not the only
mode of thought to influence China’s intellectuals during the movement, indeed it was
not even the most important. However, a number of key intellectuals were sympathetic to
its ideas. The best known are the two founding fathers of the CCP Li Dazhao and Chen
Duxiu, but there were others such as Li Da, who played a key role in promoting the study
of Marxism.38 The prestige these intellectuals enjoyed among the young people of China,
especially those at the universities, meant that marxism was able to gain a sympathetic
hearing earlier than would have been the case otherwise. One point worth emphasizing is
that most of these intellectuals were primarily nationalists, and ironic as it may seem in
the internationalist credo of marxism, and its subsequent Leninist variant, they saw the
possibility of China’s national salvation. This is important for understanding subsequent
developments and the ultimate form that Marxism-Leninism took in China.
The key magazine in the May Fourth Movement was New Youth (Xin
qingnian), which later became the organ of the CCP.39 It was set up in 1915 and edited
by Chen Duxiu and contained regular contributions not only from those who were moving
closer to marxism such as Chen himself and Li Dazhao but also from liberals such as Hu
17
Shi. All writers shared a desire to replace the principles of Confucianism with political
and social practices to bring China into line with the modern world. The crux of the
difference between the liberals and the marxists was the question of political power.
Response to the October Revolution drove a deeper wedge between them. Hu Shi and the
liberals rejected its value for China but Chen and Li were sympathetic and wished to
know more. As Meisner has shown the fundamental difference revolved around whether
China’s problems should be resolved by political revolution or by slow, evolutionary
change.40
A growing interest in labor also helped promote sympathy towards Marxism.
During the May Fourth Movement, a more politically conscious urban proletariat began
its emergence onto the political stage. Although the workforce remained small, its
members were increasing dramatically, primarily as a result of the First World War.
China’s tardy industrialization had been propelled forward as many foreign imports
disappeared as a result of the war. A number of radical students such as Zhang Guotao
and Luo Zhanglong became interested in the workers’ movement and its further
development. Both began organization work among the railway workers around Beijing
and were among the earliest members of the CCP. The power of labor in Shanghai
during the May Fourth Movement greatly impressed later CCP leader and labor activist Li
Lisan. Chesneaux and a number of writers have interpreted the development of the labor
movement in terms of its fit with the interests of the CCP and viewed the movement as
having followed the CCP’s lead.41 However, especially in Shanghai the labor movement
did not begin with the arrival of communist organizers and the CCP had to struggle to
adapt to this reality. As Perry has noted, Shanghai labor was the heir “to a tradition of
18
collective action that did not always fit easily with plans of outside organizers.”42 Her
detailed study shows how workers’ reactions to CCP and GMD overtures and response to
their policies varied “along lines that long predated” the two parties and their respective
political regimes.
The pre-cursors to the communist oriented organizations were the marxist study
societies that were established in a number of urban centers during the May Fourth
movement. The group in Shanghai was the first communist organization to be set up,
most probably in August 192043 and, very loosely it functioned as the provisional Party
Center until the First Congress was convened the following year. The Shanghai group
was instrumental in the establishment of groups in Wuhan (September 1920), Jinan
(November/December 1920), and Guangzhou (Canton, January 1921). In addition, there
were groups that called themselves communist in Beijing (October 1920), Changsha (end
1920/early 1921), Tianjin (before May 1921), Hong Kong (before May 1921), and
Chongqing (March 1920).44 While they called themselves communist, this did not meant
that they operated with communist organizational principles or even that the majority
viewpoint within tehm was communist. For example, the group in Guangzhou before
Chen Duxiu’s arrival had nine members of whom seven were under the influence of
anarchism. The only two who were not anarchists were the two members of the Rosta
News Agency, Stoyanovich and Perlin. In January 1921 when Chen arrived in
Guangzhou his first task was to reorganize the group and challenge the influence of the
anarchists. Similar problems were confronted in Beijing where the communist group also
had very strong anarchists tendencies about which early communists Li Dazhao and
Zhang Guotao complained bitterly.45
19
Although the precise structure and names varied from place to place, by the
time of the First Party Congress the communist organizations functioned in a three-fold
structure. Operating illegally at the core were the communist small groups; then there
were units of the Socialist Youth Corps operating semi-openly and providing a
recruitment pool for the party; and finally the marxist study societies presented a public
face, trying to reach the widest possible audience.46
Before the First Party Congress, the work of the groups varied from place to
place as did its intensity. However, in general, with varying degrees of success, the
nascent groups involved themselves in the labor movement and propaganda work. For
example, to facilitate this work, the Shanghai organization was divided into two sections:
one for propaganda and one for labor work. Work was patchy at best, and even in
Shanghai during the first half of 1921 work began to fold. This was a result of the lack of
funding, the lack of personnel to carry out the workload, as well as emerging
disagreements over how activist the nascent party should be. This environment formed
the back-drop to the First Congress that opened in Shanghai on 23 July 1921. It was
attended by 13 Chinese delegates representing 53 members and by Maring on behalf of
the Comintern, and Nikolsky representing the Irkutsk Bureau of the Comintern.
Despite the policy of the Comintern and the presence of its representatives, the
First Party Congress adopted a sectarian, pro-proletarian line and was extremely hostile to
any notion of cooperation with the bourgeoisie. The views of those who felt that the
proletariat was too immature and that the party should concentrate on education and study
alternatives such as social democracy was rejected. The “Program” passed by the
Congress called for the "revolutionary army of the proletariat to overthrow the capitalistic
20
classes" and for the adoption of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The “Program” and the
“Resolution” are uncompromising in their hostility to collaboration with other parties,
groups or the "yellow intellectual class."47 The workers’ movement was confirmed as
the core of party work with the chief aim being the creation of industrial unions.
The party itself was to adopt a secretive, hierarchical structure based on local
Soviets. Supreme power was vested in a Central Executive Committee (CEC) that still
had to be set up, thus rejecting pleas for a more decentralized organization. It would have
the right to supervise and direct the finances, publications and policies of any local
Soviet. The final session of the Congress elected the central leadership. As party
membership was still small, it was decided to set up a Provisional Central Executive
Bureau to maintain liaison etc. with the various branches. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao
and Li Da were elected members with Chen as secretary. Zhang and Li were in charge of
organization and propaganda respectively.48 In Chen Duxiu’s continued absence, Zhou
Fuhai was to deputize for him.
Despite the high sounding phrases adopted by the Congress, party work was slow
in getting off the ground because of continued differences of opinion, financial
difficulties, and the fact that the newly elected party Secretary, Chen Duxiu, did not return
to Shanghai until late August-mid September. By November 1921, however, a
preliminary work plan was agreed upon and circulated to the localities.49 It tried to
formalize party structure by calling on the five major districts to set up district executive
committees, each recruiting some 30 members. This would allow a "formal CEC" to be
set up in accordance with the party program. Labor work was stressed and each district
21
was instructed to have at least one labor union under its control. The focus was on
organizing railway workers with the objective of creating a national railway union.
The exclusive focus on the working-class and hostility towards the bourgeoisie
ran counter to the policy line that was evolving in the Comintern and the subsequent
period was dominated by attempts to force on the CCP a policy of cooperation with the
bourgeoisie in the nationalist revolutionary movement. It fell to the Comintern
representative Maring, to attempt to persuade the CCP
The pressure on the CCP to collaborate with other class forces was increased by
Maring’s generally negative assessment of the party and his positive response to the
GMD that was based in the South of China.50 This led Maring to propose that CCP
members join the GMD to form a bloc within. The ideological complication of the
proletariat joining a bourgeois party was swept aside with the assertion that the GMD was
not a bourgeois party at all but a combination of four groups, the intelligentsia, the
Chinese patriots overseas, the soldiers and the workers.
Initially, the idea was totally unacceptable to the CCP leaders as Chen Duxiu’s
letter of 6 April 1992 to Voitinsky clearly shows.51 Yet by June 1992 signs of a shift in
attitude were apparent. Presumably the influence of both Maring and the Youth
International representative, Dalin, was beginning to take effect.52 CCP propaganda
began to refer to the GMD as “revolutionary” and the CCP’s Second Congress (16-23
July 1922) confirmed the party’s decision to join the democratic revolutionary movement
in a temporary alliance.53 It is important to note that this decision referred to “all the
nation’s revolutionary parties” not just the GMD. However, since the “democratic
elements” did not represent the interests of the proletariat, the CCP was to promote an
22
independent class movement. Work in the labor movement was still seen as the CCP’s
main focus. Congress documents called for labor unions to represent all workers
regardless of belief but to educate them to accept socialist and communist principles. The
party, though, was seen as embodying the class-conscious elements of the proletariat who
understood that the objective was to overthrow capitalism. The Congress also called for
organization to be tightened to overcome anarchist tendencies and the CEC was enshrined
as the party’s most powerful body entrusted to enforce party decisions. Reality was very
much different and the small band of communists continued to be deeply divided over
key issues of strategy and tactics, especially the question of collaboration with the GMD.
The Congress favored a horizontal alignment alongside the GMD rather than a
“bloc within” as had been proposed by Maring. On his return to China (from his
consultations in Moscow) in the summer of 1922, Maring found major opposition to his
policy. Four of the five members of the party’s CEC belonged to a “small group” under
Zhang Guotao. This “small group” was based on the Labor Secretariat and was hostile to
the idea of cooperation with the GMD.54
To get his ideas accepted, Maring convened the Hangzhou Plenum (28-30
August 1922), the first Plenum ever held by the CCP. To overcome the opposition of the
majority, Maring was able to cite the “ Instructions for the ECCI Representative in South
China.”55 This document, drafted by Radek on the basis of Maring’s statements, was an
endorsement of the latter’s views. This imposition of Comintern discipline was intended
to move the CCP away from its idealism and exclusionist positions to embrace the
bourgeoisie in a tactical alliance. Moreover, Maring used the document to argue that
CCP members accept his view that they join the GMD to form a “bloc within.” The
23
Plenum called for individuals to join the GMD while retaining their CCP membership.
The CCP was to give directions for work within the GMD and was to lead the work of
organizing trade unions. As far as Maring was concerned the necessary freedom for the
communists existed and the Guide Weekly was to criticize the GMD and to try to prompt
it toward stronger anti-imperialist actions. The Third Party Congress did eventually pass
resolutions in favor of cooperation with the GMD on the lines suggested by Maring but
substantial opposition remained within the party.56 It was left to Borodin, who was sent
as Maring’s replacement to implement the policy.
The party was in bad shape by the time it convened its Third Congress (12-20
June 1923) in Guangzhou.57 Not only was it divided on the issue of cooperation with the
GMD58 but also the brutal crushing of the February 1923 Zhengzhou railway workers’
strike had shattered the party’s high hopes for the workers’ movement.59 The destruction
of the railway union, the best communist organization, and the ensuing crackdown on
labor in general, made many party members realize that the strength of the proletariat
alone was too weak. Chen Duxiu's work report to the Party Congress reflected the
depressed atmosphere within the party as did Maring’s reporting to the Comintern.60
Membership of the CEC was increased to nine but, at its first session, it was to
elect a five person Central Bureau to exercise power on its behalf. The Bureau was to
meet every week while the CEC was only to meet every four months. Thus, effective
power was to remain centralized in a few hands. The CEC also elected a chair to preside
over both organs, a secretary to handle party correspondence and documentation, and a
party accountant.61
24
Despite the passing of resolutions for cooperation with the GMD, the
policy was not smoothly implemented immediately afterwards, indeed it was hardly
implemented at all. The Central Bureau of the party decided to move back to Shanghai as
it felt that not much could be achieved with Sun Yat-sen. In addition, it wanted to create
new organizations in the north either to bring about a radical change in the dominant
opinions within the GMD, or to create a new nationalist party. This was quite contrary to
Maring's intentions although even he was moved to muse about a GMD without Sun at its
head.
The disillusionment with Sun stemmed from his obsession with a military
solution to China's problems and his resistance to the reorganization of the GMD. This
was fueled by what the communists saw as his inactivity concerning the situation in
Beijing. In June 1923, through the intrigues of Cao Kun, Li Yuanhong was dismissed as
President of the Republic. The CCP saw the resultant power vacuum as providing Sun
with the perfect chance to place himself at the head of the national movement by going to
Shanghai and convening there a National Assembly. However, Sun rejected these
overtures, claiming that the Assembly was an impossibility and that when the merchants
understood this they would rally to him.
Mistrust persisted in the relationship with the GMD with Gunagdong being the
main exception. Borodin's arrival in Canton had put life back into the process of
expanding cooperation between the CCP and the GMD. This was helped by promises of
even greater Soviet financial support and the reorganization of the GMD that finally took
place in January 1924. Borodin worked within the general framework sketched out in the
Comintern’s decisions on the China question of January and May 1923. According to the
25
Comintern, the main targets of the revolution were imperialism and its Chinese
supporters. While fighting these enemies, the CCP was to strengthen its position within
the GMD and more broadly within the nationalist movement through CCP control of the
peasant and labor movements. To use Stalin’s metaphor, the GMD-right would be
squeezed like a lemon and flung aside. All acknowledged that a time would come when
the interests of the bourgeoisie at the head of the nationalist movement would clash with
those of the proletariat. At this point, the representatives of the proletariat were to cease
the temporary cooperation and take over leadership. Deciding when this time had come
proved difficult and it was Chiang Kai-shek who acted first putting down the CCP-led
workers’ movement in Shanghai in April 1927.
Initially, the united front had proved very successful for the small group of
communists. Between January 1924 and May 1926, communist influence in the GMD
grew steadily and CCP membership grew from just under 1,000 in January 1925 to
almost 58,000 by April 1927. Communist influence in the urban areas received a boost
from the nationalist demonstrations of the May 30th Movement (1925). The protection of
the nationalist armies in the south helped the CCP to develop its influence among the
peasantry. Of special importance in this latter respect was the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet set up by
Peng Pai.62
The CCP’s success was one major reason for its undoing. Some GMD leaders
came to see it as a real threat to their leadership of the revolution. The increasing
revolutionary activity in the countryside unsettled those GMD leaders who did not favor a
complete break-up of the traditional power structure. In fact, the CCP was caught
between the consequences of conflicting objectives. On the one hand, it was trying to
26
promote the national revolution in cooperation with the GMD while also pursuing a
social revolution that brought it into conflict with powerful elements within the GMD.
As the CCP tried to restructure the GMD in order to attain its own goals, opposition
within the GMD to CCP membership strengthened. This conflict with the CCP and a
reassessment of cooperation were accompanied by a growing rift between the left and
right wings of the GMD and the concentration of military power in the hands of the
emerging leader of the GMD-right-- Chiang Kai-shek.
The CCP also remained divided on the policy of cooperation with the GMD as
documents from a succession of party meetings show. However, attitudes to cooperation
varied depending the specific environment under which CCP members were working.
The situation looked quite different to Chen Duxiu, Voitinsky and the Party Center
working illegally among the proletariat in Shanghai than it did to Borodin and the
communists working openly in Canton under GMD protection and developing the peasant
movement. Borodin spoke of this conflict in Moscow in 1930 during his self-defense
against accusations of counter-revolutionary behavior. He remarked that here had been
“two lines in the Chinese Revolution,” one in Shanghai and one in Guangzhou.63 Friction
between these two rival centers undermined the party’s capacity to act coherently when
threatened by opponents in the GMD. While Chen Duxiu, on a number of occasions,
called for the withdrawal of CCP members from the GMD and the creation of an open
GMD-CCP alliance, the Guangzhou party organization called for the takeover of the
GMD leadership. The situation was complicated by the Comintern’s repeated insistence
that the CCP remain within the GMD while, at the same time, strengthening its
independent position among the mass movements.
27
Communist influence within the GMD was helped by the aid Soviet Russia was
willing to donate and by the reorganization of the GMD into a Leninist-style party.
Borodin had been sent to monitor this work. Unlike Maring, he was not merely a
Comintern representative but was sent by the Soviet Government and also represented the
Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik).64 Arriving in Canton early in October 1923,
Borodin immediately set to work. His first task was to bring about the reorganization of
the GMD and in this endeavor he found Sun Yat-sen’s willing support. Borodin acted as
adviser to the Provisional CEC of the GMD set up in late-October by Sun Yat-sen to
draw up plans for party reorganization and to prepare for the national GMD congress. It
was Borodin who provided the draft of the GMD Constitution.65
In the latter part of 1924, a major power shift in Beijing appeared to offer a
favorable opportunity for the nationalist movement in general and for Sun Yat-sen in
particular to exert influence on the national stage. In October 1924, a subordinate of Wu
Peifu, Feng Yuxiang, disobeyed orders to march against Zhang Zuolin, the head of the
Fengtian clique. Instead Feng formed an alliance with Zhang and together they seized
power in Beijing. This resulted in the fall of Wu and the collapse of the Zhili clique in
north China. Sun Yat-sen was invited to the capital to participate in discussions about
China's reunification. Sun's intention was to establish a National Assembly composed of
delegates from mass organizations, chambers of commerce, and armies opposed to Wu
Peifu, something that the CCP had tried, to no avail, to impress on Sun in June 1923.
However, the negotiations did not go well. On 24 November 1924, Duan Qirui had taken
over the government replacing Cao Kun. Instead of the National Assembly, Duan favored
convening a "National Rehabilitation Conference." This was opposed by Sun because it
28
would exclude representatives from the mass organizations and would favor the militarists.
On 1 February 1925, the Conference was convened and led to a break between Duan and
the GMD.
Sun's trip to Beijing created divisions in the CCP. Chen Duxiu and the Party
Center opposed the trip feeling that Sun should remain in Guangzhou to consolidate the
achievements of the revolution. Borodin and the Guangzhou communists thought that by
going to Beijing, Sun would expand the movement's influence. Borodin’s view prevailed
and the CCP began publicly to support the calls for a National Assembly.
These tensions notwithstanding the tone of the Fourth Party Congress (11-22
January 1925) that convened in Shanghai was much more optimistic than that of its
predecessor and delegates seemed to anticipate a rising revolutionary tide.66 In particular,
the Congress sought to clarify the relationship of the CCP to the national revolutionary
movement, to define more clearly labor and peasant policies and to adjust the party's
organizational structure.
The Congress reviewed the national revolutionary movement to date and tried to
outline the correct policy for the CCP with respect to the GMD.67 Many CCP members
were finding it difficult to strike a balance between developing the GMD in the nationalist
movement while not ignoring the CCP's own agenda. This tension persisted until the two
parties split in 1927. The resolution reflects Chen Duxiu's caution about CCP involvement
with the GMD. While “leftist” mistakes included continuing to promote the proletarian
revolution and opposing entry into the GMD and the nationalist revolution for fear that the
CCP would become a “yellow” party, “rightist” mistakes were defined as being more
dangerous. The tendency among members to think that concentration on the nationalist
29
movement and the GMD meant ignoring the CCP's own work was criticized as was the
belief that a policy of compromise between capital and labor should be pursued.
In contrast to the CCP’s earlier May 1924 division of the GMD into a left and a
right, a center was now discovered. The left comprised the workers, peasants and radical
intellectuals, the right was composed of the military, bureaucrats, politicians and capitalists,
and the center consisted of the revolutionary elements in the “petty bourgeois intellectual
class.” This center was deemed important because although numerically weak, its members
occupied leading positions in the GMD. The CCP’s task was to expand the GMD-left.
However, this was not to lead to the neglect of opposition to imperialism and the economic
struggles of the peasantry and working-class.
The Congress decided that CCP strength still lay with the labor movement, a
movement said to be entering a new phase that would offer opportunities for expansion.
Although the labor movement was seen as the key component in the nationalist revolution,
the resolution adopted made it clear that preservation of its independence was most
important.68 In fact, the Guangzhou communists were criticized for allowing the labor
movement to lose its independence, a problem that was claimed to have been corrected at
the May 1924 enlarged CEC meeting.
The creation of a strong, independent labor organization would ensure CCP
dominance of the nationalist movement as it was, by self-definition, “the leader of the
working-class.” Thus, the CCP's primary task was to organize labor unions and promote
class-based propaganda. The use of party branches at the work place was stressed. They
were to ensure that party policy was carried out and to guide work in the labor unions and
30
the small groups in the factories. In future, all factories etc. would be able to form a party
branch where there were three or more members.
The development of the peasant movement in areas under GMD control in south
China caused the Congress to adopt the party's most extensive resolution on the peasantry to
date.69 However, it still did not provide a concrete plan of action. The special place of the
peasantry in the Chinese revolutionary movement was acknowledged and its participation
was seen as vital for success. While expressing support for GMD policy in the south, the
resolution criticized the GMD for using the peasantry for its own ends. It claimed that the
GMD organized peasant associations in areas where it needed their support but did not force
landlords to give way to the peasantry nor did the GMD sufficiently protect the economic
and political rights of the peasantry. The resolution provides a good example of the
ambiguity concerning work within the united front. At one moment it is calling for the use
of the GMD's organization, the next it is chiding the GMD and then calls for independent
action. It is not surprising that some comrades were confused about the exact relationship
of their work to that of the GMD. The resolution also criticized the policy of the
Guangzhou communists. It claimed that their stress on the role of the GMD had caused the
peasantry to doubt its own strength and to fail to understand its own class position. This
had caused the peasantry to become disappointed in the CCP.
The CCP continued to take organization seriously and stated that this was the most
important question concerning the party's “survival and development.” Party leadership
hoped that improvements in organization would enable the party to break out from being
merely a collection of “small propaganda groups.” In particular, the “Resolution on
Organization” stressed the role of the branches as the basic units of party organization.70 To
31
recruit more workers and peasants, membership procedures were to be relaxed. In future, it
would not be necessary for prospective members to pass through the SYL and “class
conscious elements” would be able to join the party directly. The party was to be enlarged
at the local level by changing the requirement that five members were necessary to form a
cell (xiaozu) to only three being needed to form a branch (zhibu). This emphasis on the
branch marked an attempt to change the party from being area based to being occupation
based. To control party activities in other organizations such as the GMD, the formation of
party fractions (dangtuan) was confirmed.
The Congress provided a set of resolutions and organizational changes that it hoped
would help the party cope with the expected upsurge in the revolutionary movement.
Despite the collapse of the talks in Beijing and Sun Yat-sen's death (12 March 1925), events
took an even more radical turn than expected. The May 30th Movement (1925) witnessed a
massive upsurge in nationalist sentiment and provided the party with a chance for rapid
expansion, particularly in urban Shanghai. However, the movement brought with it new
headaches as the Party Center tried to grapple with the new situation and the influx of
members. The period from 1925 to April 1927 marked a high point in the development of
influence in the labor movement and with the development of communist-influenced
organizations in Shanghai. Crucial in pushing CCP influence in the labor movement was
Shanghai University that had been established in October 1922. Under the subsequent
protection of the united front, key figures such as Deng Zhongxia and Qu Qiubai were able
to train cadre for the labor movement. Shanghai University was also important for the
mobilization of women’s organizations during the May 30th Movement.71
32
The May 30th Movement had its origins in a February 1925 strike against the
Japanese-owned textile mills in Shanghai.72 After simmering for a few months, it exploded
on 15 May when a factory guard killed one of the strikers and wounded others. Incidents
spread as did injuries and arrests and on 28 May, the CCP together with other organizations
called for coordinated demonstrations to take place on 30 May. International Settlement
police opened fire on the demonstration killing ten and wounding and arresting many
others. In an attempt to gain control of the movement, the CCP set up the Shanghai General
Labor Union. It was established on 1 June and was chaired by Li Lisan. The Movement in
Shanghai continued until July when it began to wind down and by mid-September the
General Labor Union had been forcibly closed down and the CCP leadership had gone
underground. The movement spread to other cities and caused the Hong Kong-Guangzhou
strike that lasted from June 1925 until October 1926. Communist influence spread as a
result of the Movement and party membership increased from 994 at the time of the
Congress to some 3,000 in October 1925.
The CCP responded by trying to expand its role and to transform itself from a
“small group” into a “central mass political party.” A CEC meeting in October 1925
decided to relax membership procedures even further. Knowledge of marxism was no
longer required while anyone who was a factory worker was considered a natural member.
However, collaboration with the GMD was to be continued but it was stated that now the
GMD contained only a left and a right wing and that the right wing was becoming
increasingly reactionary. The meeting also addressed the question of the peasantry at some
length.73 The proclamation for the peasantry stated that the fundamental solution to the
problems they faced was land confiscation. However, only the land of big landlords,
33
warlords, bureaucrats and the churches was to be taken. An eight-point program for the
peasantry’s minimum demands was outlined. It was based on experience in the south, and
developed the ideas put forward earlier by Chen Duxiu in November 1922. It called for
recognition of peasant associations and the establishment of elected self-governing bodies in
the countryside, the setting of maximum rents and minimal grain prices by the associations
and self-governing bodies, the provision of interest-free loans to the peasantry, special
funding for river control and the creation of armed peasant self-defense corps. The
importance of the peasantry was recognized by splitting the former worker and peasant
committee into two.74 Despite this stress on the peasantry, the main revolutionary force was
still the working-class. The proclamation for the peasantry made it clear that to achieve its
aims it must ally with the working-class.
The success of the CCP and its more aggressive attempts to organize and
expand brought concern within the ranks of the GMD and as the right began to gain control
of the movement, clashes became inevitable.
The tensions were particularly highlighted after the “Zhongshan Incident” of
March 20, 1926. Chiang Kai-shek ordered martial law claiming that a gunboat under
communist command, the Zhongshan, was planning to kidnap him. Whether the plot was
real or not it provided Chiang with the chance to clip the wings of the communists. He
placed some 50 together with the soviet advisers under house arrest. Borodin was able to
negotiate their release but at a price. This included restricting CCP activity within the
GMD, providing a name list of all its members in the GMD, and abandoning its separate
organizations in the GMD. Further, CCP members could no longer serve as bureau head
in nationalist organizations. This last point meant that the communist, Tan Pingshan, had
34
to give up the powerful post of head of the organization department to Chiang Kai-shek.
Borodin was also forced to support the Northern Expedition to which he had previously
been opposed in return for Chiang’s promises to curb the GMD-right.75 Chiang was still,
of course, dependent on Soviet arms and aid for the Northern Expedition and made it
clear that his original actions had not been against the alliance with Soviet Russia as such.
The Northern Expedition was officially launched at the beginning of July 1926 even
though some units had gone north earlier.
These events caused the communists further confusion. Publicly, they accepted
the new regulations passed by the GMD CEC in May but privately there were conflicts
about the way forward. It appears that the Guangzhou area proposed an immediate
counter-attack against Chiang and the take over of the GMD from within while Chen
Duxiu proposed withdrawal. In June, a compromise was suggested, cooperation would
continue but as a bloc without rather than a bloc within.76 However, this alternative was
blocked by the Comintern.
Withdrawal from the alliance with the GMD or some elements of it was
consistently rejected by the Comintern even after the massacre of the communists by
Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927. The tenure of Comintern policy was set in the “Theses
on the Chinese Question” adopted at the Seventh Plenum of the ECCI (November-
December 1926). This called for continued CCP cooperation with the GMD-left to bring
about the success of the nationalist revolution.77 The GMD-right was not to be allowed to
turn the GMD into a bourgeois party. At the same time, the “Theses” called for the CCP
to take control of the social revolution. The agrarian revolution was defined as the central
component in the revolutionary struggle and the communists were to gain “real power” in
35
the rural areas through the peasant associations.78 According to the “Theses,” the fear
that intensification of class struggle in the village would weaken the united anti-
imperialist front was unfounded. The approach may have seemed feasible for those
situated in Moscow but the CCP was unable to act on these conflicting demands. The
CCP alienated the radical peasant leaders by trying to check the “excesses” but at the
same time it still aroused the hostility and suspicion of the GMD-left.
The CCP tried to grapple with the repression and slaughter of the communists at
its Fifth Congress (27 April - 9 May 1927) held in Hankou.79 Far from ordering a break
with the GMD, delegates argued about how to push ahead with the peasant movement
without upsetting cooperation. Chiang’s “betrayal” was met head on and was treated as a
positive sign for the revolution. In a long and interesting review of party work since the
Fourth Congress, Chen Duxiu said that Chiang’s betrayal had brought the Chinese
revolution to a new stage.80 According to Chen, the bourgeoisie had now deserted the
revolutionary front reducing its numbers but improving its quality. The four-class bloc
had been reduced to a “united front of workers, peasants and petty bourgeoisie.” Thus,
the future task was to strengthen these three classes and CCP work in the military. The
small number of bourgeois elements who remained could be expelled if they displayed
“counter-revolutionary tendencies.”
Future party policy was to concentrate on creating a “revolutionary democratic
regime” in the areas held by the GMD, although it was acknowledged that this objective
was still far away. According to Chen, the party was to discuss preparations for seizing
power and he described it as “no longer an opposition party” but one that was really going
to lead the revolution.
36
However, despite such bold words, the CCP was still going to have to work
through its cooperation with the GMD. This meant that its policy towards the peasantry
still erred to the side of caution and ideas of confiscation of all land were rejected. Chen
commented that while policy towards the peasant movement had been “too rightist” in the
past, it would be wrong to adopt now radical proposals to confiscate the land of all
landlords.
The re-definition of the revolutionary forces and the moderate land policy did
not help pull the party out of its dilemma. Despite the restrictions placed on the peasant
movement, “excesses” continued to occur. The CCP finished up pleasing no-one, the
GMD government in Wuhan blamed the communists for the excesses and the peasant
leaders blamed it for not supporting their radical actions and leaving them prey to the
military force of warlords and GMD troops. Suppression of the communists continued
and the events of summer 1927 seemed to make a mockery of the CCP leadership’s
decision to continue the alliance with the GMD. The communists suffered blow after
blow as one group after another of nationalist generals and politicians “betrayed the
revolution.”
The possibility of breaking with the GMD-left was reduced further by the
messages coming from Moscow. Given his struggles with Trotsky, it was impossible for
Stalin to acknowledge the folly of continued cooperation with the GMD. In May 1927,
the ECCI also interpreted the break with Chiang Kai-shek in a positive light. It re-
emphasized the need to place the rural revolution at the center of the stage but only within
the context of the continued alliance with GMD.81
37
The high-point in CCP compromise came with the adoption by an enlarged CC
meeting on 30 June of an 11-point resolution on relations between the two parties. The
resolution acknowledged that the GMD was the leader of the national revolution.
Communists in government functions were to work only as GMD members. To
minimize conflicts, communists holding government positions would give up their posts.
Further, mass organizations were instructed to submit to the leadership and control of the
GMD authorities.82 At a late stage, the party was stumbling towards the formation of a
“bloc without” rather than a “bloc within,” something that had been suggested by Chen
Duxiu on a number of occasions.
Submissive gestures did not resolve the conflicts with the GMD-left in Wuhan.
Wang Jingwei’s suspicions of the communists had been aroused further in early-June
when the Comintern delegate, M. N. Roy, had shown him the contents of a telegram from
Stalin. It called for the communists to reorganize the left and expel “reactionary leaders”
and to prepare concrete steps for a revolutionary army, albeit still under nationalist
leadership.83
An uneasy truce prevailed until mid-July and then events moved rapidly. Under
pressure from the Comintern, Chen Duxiu resigned his position as General Secretary.84
On 12 July, a new five-person temporary standing committee of the Politburo was chosen
and the following day it issued an open statement critical of the Wuhan government. On
15 July, the Wuhan GMD Political Affairs Committee announced the end of cooperation;
on 1 August, the CCP’s Nanchang Uprising was launched;85 and on 5 August, Wang
Jingwei began a large-scale purge of communist activists. Cooperation was ending in
tragedy and it was clear that a new strategy had to be found by the CCP.
38
During the early part of the twenties, CCP capacity to develop the labor
movement and move out of isolation was hampered by a lack of finances and personnel.
Work in Shanghai was made even more difficult by the foreign presence. In addition,
CCP organizers had to compete with other organizations that had already established a
presence among the working class in Shanghai. Communist access was frequently
blocked by the Green and Red gangs and even by the YMCA, while in Guangzhou the
GMD and the anarchists enjoyed greater popularity and influence. In May 1924, the
Shanghai party committee summed up results to date in labor organization as “nil.”
The May 30th Movement and the launch of the Northern Expedition had provided
the CCP the chance to break out of this isolation. However, problems persisted. The
party remained short of skilled personnel to organize on the ground and to develop
extensive grass-roots support. Many of the recruits, because of relaxed membership
requirements, did not understand CCP principles. As a result of its lack of labor power at
the grass roots, the party attempted to gain control of the movement generated by nationalist
sentiment from the top down. Thus, the CCP set up the Shanghai General Labor Union at
the start of the May 30th Movement but this had to be closed down in mid-September 1925
partly because of lack of revolutionary momentum and partly because of attacks on it by
various groups in Shanghai. Indeed, Chen Duxiu was later to admit that despite the
rhetoric, the movement in Shanghai had been really coordinated by the Shanghai Chamber
of Commerce and genuine communist influence seems to have been slight. This
opportunism was combined with attempts to take over leading positions in existing
organizations rather than building up solid grass roots support.
39
The apparent initial success of this strategy lulled party leaders, particularly those in
Shanghai, into a false sense of security. A CCP-led revolution on the back of a swelling
nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution seemed to be a possibility. Thus, in May 1926, Chen
Duxiu was moved to claim that 1.25 million workers were under CCP leadership. This
claim was based on a head count of members in organizations whose representatives had
attended the Third Labor Congress. However, the CCP had constructed no colossus but
rather a Buddha that turned out to have feet of clay. As the strength of the movement
ebbed, familiar problems resurfaced with labor work in Shanghai: the persistence of the
guild tradition and the influence of the Green and Red Gangs.86
In the twenties, the CCP did not develop the necessary support base in urban China
nor was it able to build up solid support in the southern countryside. During this period,
the CCP did not develop a coherent policy for the rural areas and moved from indifference
through a radical plan for land confiscation to retreat once this alienated the GMD right.
Mao Zedong, however, remained impressed with the power of the peasantry and would later
combine rural organization with military power.87 Unlike the Party Center, Mao saw
“excesses” in the peasant movement as necessary in order to overcome the
counterrevolutionaries and the power of the local gentry. Mao provided a critique of
revolutionary strategy as a whole. He does not explicitly renounce proletarian leadership
but his report concentrates on the role and the strength of the poor peasantry.
The main developments in the peasant movement were all in the south in Hubei,
Hunan, Guangdong and Jiangxi. As the Northern Expedition moved out from the GMD
strongholds in the south, large rural areas came under joint GMD-CCP control. Here
peasant associations were established, often under the leadership of professionally trained
40
peasant organizers. CCP supporters ran many of the associations and the party leadership
saw this as a way to gain control over the peasant movement. However, as in urban China,
the CCP lacked sufficient local cadres. A July 1926 report on the peasant movement in
Guangdong outlined the problem. While some 800,000 peasants were members of peasant
associations in 60 counties, there were only 600 party members working in 20 counties.88
Thus, the party had weak links to many local communities. The CCP adopted the same
head-counting, top-down approach to controlling the peasantry as they had used with
respect to the working-class in urban China. Thus, at the CCP’s Fifth Congress, Chen
Duxiu spoke of almost 10 million peasants being organized in the countryside via the
peasant associations and seemed to count this as being synonymous with CCP control.
Yet, the communist presence was kept in place only by GMD military power. Once
attacked by the GMD, CCP members had very little alternative other than to retreat into
more inhospitable rural areas. Given the short history of the CCP and its small size, it was
most unlikely that a sufficient base of support could have been developed. Building up an
independent armed force was also out of the question, not only because of the lack of
numbers and financial resources, but also because it would have inevitably speeded up the
clash with the GMD, especially the powerful GMD right.
The failure of the “First Revolution” was not caused directly by either rigid
implementation of a misguided Comintern policy or the “capitulationism” and
“opportunism” of Chen Duxiu vis-à-vis the GMD. It was more closely related to the CCP’s
inability to develop genuine support in urban and rural China and to develop a military force
with which to defend itself. The CCP tended to follow behind events in China, interpreting
positive signs as the next revolutionary wave that would cause history to flow in the right
41
direction. When the waves came, the party was unable to channel the flow to its own
benefit.
B) 1927 – 1937: From Urban Revolution to the Construction of Rural Bases
This period is marked by two diverging tendencies. The first is the failure of continued
attempts at urban-based revolution. In these attempts, the Comintern was able to exert a
tighter grip over the central party apparatus in Shanghai. The second is the increasing
autonomy of the CCP leaders in the base areas that were set up in the late-twenties and
early thirties in parts of central and south China. Comintern control of the Party Center
was a two-edged sword. On the one hand it enabled the organization to appoint leaders
sympathetic to its policies while on the other hand it had to extricate itself from the blame
each time policy failed.89 This resulted in a stream of missives from the Comintern
blaming individual CCP leaders for incorrectly applying or even betraying its correct
policy line. Life in the base areas offered a learning experience independent of
Comintern agendas. The lessons from these experiences informed the policies of Mao
Zedong and the other survivors after they arrived in Northwest China after the Long
March.
Remarkably, initial policy after Chen Duxiu’s dismissal was a radicalization of
policy towards the peasantry. In July 1927, the CCP announced that the revolution had
entered another new phase and that, despite all evidence to the contrary, the revolutionary
tide was rising.90 This tendency to ignore reality and to see the revolutionary tide as
turning in the CCP’s favor was a constant refrain throughout the remainder of the
twenties.
42
The 7 August Emergency Conference of 1927 resulted in a tightening of the
Comintern’s grip over the CCP’s central leadership. It convened in Hankou to evaluate
past policy, devise a new strategy, and elect a new party leadership.91 The Conference
marked the formal transition from a strategy of cooperation with the GMD to one of
opposition. Mistakes were blamed on the previous leadership of the CCP. This is clearly
to be seen in “The Circular Letter” sent to party members after the meeting and in the
comments of Lominadze to the Conference itself.92 The letter denounced the
“opportunist” mistakes made in attitude towards to GMD and the mass movement,
particularly stressing the failure to support fully the rural revolution. It had little to say
about future strategy, emphasizing the sole leadership of the CCP yet still calling for
collaboration with GMD leftists. It is worth pointing out that this appeal for continued
cooperation derived not only from Stalin’s need to show infallibility in his political
struggles with Trotsky but also from the situation within China. Significant members of
the GMD still supported the CCP and it was hoped that they could be rallied to the
communist cause. In the GMD central leadership there was Song Qingling (Sun Yat-
sen’s widow) and Deng Yanda, in the military He Long and Ye Ting. A number of
grassroots GMD branches and troops also favoured the communists.93 The Comintern’s
need to place the blame on the CCP leadership is apparent in Lominadze’s speech to
Conference. According to Lominadze, far from having given had advice, the fault lay in
the failure of the CCP to carry out Comintern instructions among the masses.94
In terms of organization, the party prepared itself for a life underground and
instructed members to “forge strong, secret” organizations. Priority was still given to the
conservation of party cells within labor unions. A new nine-person temporary Politburo
43
was elected pending the convocation of a Congress and it in turn elected a three-person
Standing Committee of Qu Qiubai, Li Weihan, and Su Zhaozheng.95
The new Conference strategy of rebellions, inciting army mutinies and initiating
peasant uprisings was not successful leading to a further depletion of the communist
forces. However, failure did not dampen the CCP’s enthusiasm (particularly that of Qu
Qiubai). In November 1927 policy for the rural and urban areas was radicalized.
Landlords, big and small, were to be shown no leniency and workers were to take power
in the factories into their own hands. This decision led to the disaster of the Guangzhou
Commune uprising in December 1927.
The defeat of the Guangzhou Commune coming so swiftly after the defeats of
the communists in the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings, made it clear that a shift
in tactics was necessary. It was impossible for the Party Center under Qu Qiubai to
continue with its “putschism.” The party had lost contact with the working-class in
major centers such as Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou. The insurrectionary policy even
where the peasantry had been mobilized had been intended to restore the initiative to the
proletariat under the CCP’s leadership by seizing major urban centers. The failure of this
approach signalled the effective end of the proletariat as the main force of the revolution.
Over time this would also lead to a drastic reduction in Comintern influence over real
policy implementation in the CCP.
A National Congress was needed to reassess the past and sanction a shift in
policy direction. Thus, preparations began for the Sixth Congress and for reasons of
security it was held in Moscow (18 June to 11 July 1928).96 The Congress had two points
of departure. First, that while the policy of military confrontation with the GMD was now
44
inevitable, second, the reckless “putchism” pursued under Qu Qiubai’s leadership had not
shown any tangible success. Not surprisingly, Comintern influence was dominant. The
“Political Decision” described the revolution as being in a trough between two waves.97
The first revolutionary wave had receded because of “repeated failures” and the new wave
had not yet arrived. This notion allowed the “putchism” of Qu Qiubai to be attacked
while supporting future insurrections.98 Judging the waves was a difficult business and it
is not surprising that the new Chinese leadership would seize upon any sign of heightened
activity as the arrival of a new crest.
The notion of the movement developing in waves was not an innovation of the
Congress but had been put forward by the ECCI in February 1928. While criticizing the
previous “excesses”, in particular the Guangzhou Commune, the ECCI maintained that a
further revolutionary upsurge was possible. However, such upsurges would be irregular
and thus the party must take care not to allow the movement to run out of control. Instead
the mass organizations were to be built up to ensure coordination.99
A major contribution of the Congress was its designation of the soviet as the
governmental system to be established in the wake of the armed uprisings to replace the
old political system. While the Congress saw this as the form of government throughout
the entire country, in practice it meant the soviet would rule the rural base areas. While
the Congress retained the intention of recapturing the CCP’s urban base, social reality led
to a greater emphasis being placed on the revolutionary role of the peasantry.100 The
party was to form a united front with as many of the peasantry as possible, including
middle peasants. Rich peasants were to be “neutralized” and the poor peasants were to be
placed in charge of the peasant associations. The Congress stressed the importance of
45
guerrilla warfare carried out by the peasantry. It was hoped that this would lead to a
steady expansion of rural reform and the worker-peasant revolutionary Red Army.
However, it was clearly stated that the peasantry would remain under the hegemony of the
proletariat.101
The Congress also installed a new leadership with a new CC of 23 members
and 13 alternates and a Central Control Commission with three members and two
alternates. The new Politburo elected by the CC had seven full members: Su Zhaozheng
(22 votes), Xiang Ying (22), Xiang Zhongfa (21), Zhou Enlai (21), Qu Qiubai (16), Cai
Hesen (16), and Zhang Guotao (10). There were seven alternates, one of whom was Li
Lisan. The Standing Committee comprised Xiang Zhongfa, Zhou Enlai, Su Zhaozheng,
Xiang Ying, and Cai Hesen with Li Lisan, Xu Xigen, and Yang Yin as alternates. Xiang
Zhongfa was elected Chair of the Politburo and the CC. Despite the claim that party
congresses would be held every year, a congress would not be held again until 1945.
On the surface, the Sixth Congress appeared to have produced an appropriate
long-term program. In reality, it presented the CCP with an intractable problem. The
central issue of the revolution was to be the agrarian question while it was of paramount
importance that the CCP recapture its proletarian base in the urban areas. The chance of
fulfilling these objectives was further complicated by the more radical turn of events both
in China and the Soviet Union shortly after the Congress.
In China, the situation was improving somewhat for the CCP. In the urban
areas, the CCP was slowly recovering from the GMD suppression and failed uprisings,
while in the rural areas from 1928 on there was a steady growth of the Red Army and the
soviet areas. The latter were beginning to emerge as dynamic new forces in the
46
communist movement. However, the socio-economic conditions varied from soviet to
soviet resulting in different policies and compromises with local groups to ensure
survival.
Of immediate direct influence on the new party leadership was the factional
struggle between Stalin and Bukharin. Although rumors of differences had circulated at
the Sixth Party Congress, Bukharin supervised the Congress on behalf of the Comintern.
Indeed, the “Political Resolution” was based on the nine hour (sic!) speech that he
delivered to the Congress and the new Politburo was put together on his instructions. By
the end of 1928, Bukharin had become the main target of Stalin’s attacks for his “rightist”
or “rich peasant line.”
This caused the CCP to adopt an increasingly “left” policy that culminated in
what the Comintern was itself to denounce as the Li Lisan line. On 8 February 1929 the
ECCI issued a letter to the CC of the CCP claiming that signs of a new revolutionary
wave were clearly detectable in China. As a result the ECCI warned that at the present
time, the “rightist trend” was particularly dangerous.102 Shortly after the letter arrived,
the Politburo drafted a formal resolution on how the party should apply the Comintern
line in its practical work.103 Indeed, the period until April 1930 marks a distinct phase in
the shift of party policy.
The anti-rightist drive in Moscow continued to affect the Party Center in
Shanghai. On 26 October 1929 the ECCI sent another letter to the CCP CC, this time
announcing “the beginning of the revolutionary wave.”104 The party was to take over the
leadership of this new revolutionary wave by overcoming its “petty bourgeois
waverings.” Once again the Comintern reinforced the view that at the present time,
47
“rightism” was the most dangerous trend in the party. The Politburo responded to this
letter by adopting resolutions on 20 December 1929 and 11 January 1930 that fully
accepted the Comintern’s position and that heralded a louder criticism of “rightism.”105
One of the first victims of the attack on “rightism” had been Chen Duxiu who
was expelled from the party in 1929. His expulsion and that of many others were carried
in the pages of the party’s theoretical journal Red Flag. He was denounced viciously for
what were decreed to be his “Trotskyite” and liquidationist” tendencies. While Chen was
in power before July 1927, he had no particular association with Trotsky and had adhered
to the position of accommodation with the GMD as approved by Stalin but opposed by
Trotsky. After the left-wing of the GMD also turned on the CCP, his analysis of the
revolution did move closer to a Trotskyite position. His conversion, given his enormous
prestige in the party, created a crisis in the party and the major purge was launched. The
Trotskyites who were expelled formed their own organization called the “Left
Opposition.” The organization was, however, bitterly divided into four main factions and
it took a Unification Conference in May 1931 to bring agreement to form only one group,
the “Chinese Oppositionists.” Despite this, it remained a very fractious group and its
impact was very limited. The Trotskyites as a whole, despite the assessment of their main
chronicler Gregor Benton that they were the first and weightiest movement of radical
democratic dissent within China, enjoyed little sustained influence within the party or
among the Chinese working-class. In addition to the ideological differences, the
movement was best by intense personal friction. The “Chinese Oppositionists” became
the targets of not only the GMD but also the CCP and indeed suffered worst at the hands
of the latter than the former. A number of those who did not escape to Hong Kong, such
48
as Liu Renjing, spent most of the subsequent period in GMD jails followed by re-arrest
after the CCP came to power in 1949.106
Unfortunately the revolutionary tide that the Comintern thought it spotted did
not exist, at least in the urban areas. The Comintern’s insistence on political strikes and
preparation for armed insurrection served to alienate the proletariat rather than to rally it
to the communist cause. The CCP leadership decided to use the rising soviet movement
in the countryside as means of recapturing its influence in the cities. This policy reached
its fruition under Li Lisan’s direction and was spelled out in the Politburo decision of 11
June 1930. The current stage was seen as one of revolutionary upsurge and it proposed
that Wuhan be seized as a part of the take over of one or more provinces.107 The
resolution sought to implement the Comintern’s wishes in China but the failure of the
strategy caused it to become the focus of critical attention in the Soviet Union some
months later.
The resolution was sent to the Comintern for approval but the Comintern
delayed making a formal reply, possibly because of the link made by Li Lisan between the
Chinese and world revolutions.108 Later the Comintern was to criticize the efforts made
in the resolution to show the interdependence of the Chinese Revolution and the world
revolution. The 11 June resolution claimed that because China was the weakest link in
the ruling chain of world imperialism, the Chinese revolution could occur first setting off
the world revolution and the final class war. While such an analysis could be justified in
terms of the Comintern’s view that the stability of world capitalism would soon erode,
though at an uneven pace depending on place, the Comintern may not have been happy to
have Li Lisan lecturing them on the world revolution. The resolution also hinted at the
49
need for Soviet aid, something that Li Lisan would soon openly ask for. This was ignored
by the Comintern. It was not in a position to call on the Soviet Union to support the
Chinese Revolution. This appeal was later denounced as an error of “semi-Trotskyism.”
The prediction that a successful bourgeois-democratic revolution would soon be
transformed into a socialist one was also cited later as proof of Li’s Trotskyite tendencies.
However, this too had been a prediction in line with Comintern analysis at the time.
On 16 July, the Party Center sent another letter to the Presidium of the ECCI
calling for approval of the strategy outlined in the resolution of 11 June. Two days later,
the National Conference of CCP Organizations opened in Shanghai. The Conference
announced that the general task of the party was to organize armed uprisings to seize
political power and that the party was one preparing to take power. Further it called for
action committees to be established at the central and local levels. In the “red areas,”
workers’ and peasants’ revolutionary committees were to be established. These would be
the sole leading organs.
Eventually the Comintern replied in a letter dated 23 July 1930 to the CCP CC.
The letter has produced different interpretations.109 The letter contained no substantial
disagreement with Li Lisan either in the general policy or even with respect to practical
strategy. What was indicated between the lines, however, was worry over Li Lisan’s
operations and shirking of responsibility, which fully accorded with the position of the
Comintern leaders in the early thirties. The Comintern leaders were not so foolhardy as
Li to claim world revolution was imminent nor did they dare to exclude the possibility of
a successful revolution in China. The letter did not oppose the idea of taking over Wuhan
50
and one or more provinces but it seemed to oppose Li’s notion of an “immediate
nationwide revolution.”
It is a moot point as to when Li Lisan and the Party Center knew of the
Comintern’s views. Letters could take up to one or two months to arrive and the full text
probably did not arrive until early September. However, CCP leaders were already
informed of its contents by late-July from telegraphic messages received by the ECCI Far
East Bureau in Shanghai.110
While it is uncertain just how much Li knew and when, he certainly rejected
Comintern concern. On 6 August, Li Lisan chaired the first meeting of the Central Action
Committee calling the whole party to mobilize for immediate revolution. By this time,
the Comintern was more clearly of the opinion that Li had gone too far. Qu Qiubai and
Zhou Enlai were sent back to China to moderate Li’s excesses but not yet to repudiate his
policy wholesale. This is not surprising given that it would be difficult to extricate the
Comintern from sharing the blame.
While the Comintern refrained from criticism of Li Lisan while the strategy was
in operation, as soon as it failed harsh condemnation followed. Between the Third and
Fourth Plenums (September 1930 – January 1931), factional conflicts and power
struggles within the CCP increased. Li Lisan’s strongest opponents were Wang Ming and
the “returned students” group. They had as their principal supporter Pavel Mif, the
Comintern representative in China.111 Yet, opposition had little to do with current or
future policy and was not based on opposition to a “leftist” line. Wang Ming, in an article
published four days after the 11 June resolution, only differed from Li in his assessment
51
that the Chinese Revolution could occur immediately without depending on world
revolution as its precondition.112
Also, the Comintern began to toughen its stance as Pavel Mif and his supporters
in the Comintern became dissatisfied with the decisions of the Third Plenum. In October
1930, the ECCI sent members of the CC a letter stating that Li Lisan’s mistakes were
ones of line.113 It labelled Li Lisan “anti-Comintern” and a “semi-Trotskyite.” Mif
himself arrived in China in mid-December 1930 and proposed that the Fourth Plenum be
convened as soon as possible. The Plenum was held in Shanghai on 7 January and was
dominated by Mif and his protégé, Wang Ming.
The resolution of the Fourth Plenum drafted under Mif’s guidance was harsh in
its condemnation of Li Lisan.114 Li was accused of betraying the correct instructions of
the Comintern and bringing havoc to the party. Li’s “line” was summed up as being
contradictory to that of the Comintern and comprising “a policy of opportunism under the
camouflage of ‘leftist phrases,’ and an opportunistic passivism in regard to the task of
organizing the masses in a practical and revolutionary way.” Betraying the Comintern
line was true to the extent that the Comintern itself had abandoned the idea of using the
Red Army to seize the urban areas.
For its new leadership in China, the Comintern did not turn to the Soviet areas
but to Wang Ming and the “returned students.” There were substantial changes in the
Politburo with Wang Ming, who had not even been a CC member before the Plenum
becoming a full member. While Xiang Zhongfa remained General Secretary, real power
lay with Wang Ming.115 Several months after the Plenum, the strength of the “returned
students” was increased with the promotion of Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian. Excluded
52
from the new leadership was the group gathered around the workers’ activists He
Mengxiong and Luo Zhanglong. They felt that the policies were destroying the labor
movement that they had been intimately involved in developing. They set up an
opposition organ and demanded that an emergency congress be convened and Mif
recalled. In still unexplained circumstances, the group was betrayed and arrested by the
British police. The police turned them over to the GMD and they were executed.116
Wang Ming denied involvement in the betrayal but it was certainly convenient as it
removed the group within the CCP that had the best links with labor.
However, the failure of the Li Lisan strategy fatally wounded the strength of the
CCP in the urban areas and many key figures in the communist movement were rounded
up and almost all of the underground branches were rolled up. The story of the CCP in
these years in Shanghai reads like an adventure story with spies, Chinese and foreign
police, safe houses, and deals with gangsters. The problem is that it was reality and it was
often CCP members who lost out. After the communist-directed insurrection in
Shanghai had handed power to Chiang Kai-shek, party history was one of almost
continual repression after Chiang turned on the communists on 12 April 1927. While
party membership in Shanghai had been around 8,000 in April 1927, it had fallen to a
mere 300 in 1934.117 The damaged to the communist dominated labor movement was
equally severe. In 1930, communist sponsored organizations had 2,000 workers, a
number that declined to 500 in 1932, and a mere handful in 1934.118
The most devastating blow came when Gu Shunzhang, the head of the CC’s
special services unit was caught in April 1931 and turned by the GMD. His information
led to the break-up of CCP organizations in Hankou, Nanjing, Tianjin, Beijing, and
53
Shanghai. There ensued the start of what is referred to as the “white terror.” Although
Zhou Enlai was tipped off and escaped from Shanghai, others were not so lucky. Xiang
Zhongfa119 was caught in June and some 40 other high-ranking CCP members were
caught along with 800 others at the local level.120 In June, the crack-down also led to the
arrest of Noulens who was actually Chief of the Department for International Liaison (the
communications and intelligence organ) of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. he
worked under the cover of his formal position as secretary general of the Pan-Pacific
Trade Union. Noulens and his wife were arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Police and
this seriously hampered the work of the Comintern in China, even if it did not cause it to
stop completely.121
However, as Stranahan has shown, while badly wounded the party did continue to
function to the best of its ability in Shanghai.122 The onset of Japanese aggression and
GMD repression gave it a chance to survive and develop very limited support and it
began to network with a number of multiclass organizations that it was able to infiltrate.
These were the “Red Mass Leagues,” organizations such as the Chinese Association to
Relieve Distress, the Self-Defense Committee and the Cultural Committee. Infiltration of
these organizations provided the first concentrated attempt to adapt the Shanghai party’s
goals to the socio-political environment of the city. While capacity was limited, this work
enabled the party to gain experience and develop contacts that would stand it in good
stead when the National Salvation Movement developed following the Beijing anti-
Japanese demonstrations of 1935. This meant that when the united front with the GMD
was reactivated in 1937 there was the remnants of an organization for Liu Xiao to work
with on his appointment to run the Shanghai apparatus.
54
These developments increased the relative importance of the party organizations
in the base areas that had been set up. The Party Center in Shanghai was reduced to little
more than a liaison organization relaying instructions from the Comintern to the soviets.
Indeed, it appears that in early 1931 the Comintern made the suggestion that the Party
Center consider a move to the rural Soviets.123 The departure of the CC for the Jiangxi
Soviet in 1933 had left the Shanghai party without effective leadership. It is also
debatable to what extent and how often the rump in Shanghai was in contact with the CC.
While the Party Center became more involved in the work of the soviets,
transferring key personnel, it was not until early 1933 that Bo Gu and the Party Center
arrived at the Central Soviet.124 The conditions under which the Party Center began its
move to the soviets meant that in reality legitimate leadership of the revolutionary
movement had passed to the soviets. However, the process inevitably produced conflicts
and frictions. Yet this is not to say that Mao and his supporters were an immediate
conscious target of the “returned students” who dominated the Party Center when it began
its transfer to the Jiangxi Soviet.
Despite the repression in the urban areas, 1931 saw the CCP in a much better
position. At one point in 1927, membership had dipped as low as 10,000. By the end of
1930, membership had grown tenfold but the momentum had shifted from the urban to
the rural soviets. The way forward now for the CCP was to rely on the steady expansion
of the soviet bases and the Red Army. In addition to the Jiangxi Soviet125 under Mao,
important bases had been developed in west Hunan-Hubei (Xiang-Exi) under He Long,
and in Hubei-Henan-Anhui (E-Yu-Wan) under Xu Xiangqian.126 The soviets had been
provided a breathing space to develop by Chiang Kai-shek’s conflict with Feng Yuxiang
55
and Yan Xishan. However, the respite did not last long as Chiang was victorious in
November 1930 and in October he had already launched the first of five “suppression”
campaigns to annihilate the communists. Despite the failure to take over a major city or
win a victory in one or more provinces, the military capacity of the Red Army had
generally increased.
In November 1931, the First All-China Soviet Congress was convened in Ruijin,
Jiangxi and it founded the Chinese Soviet Republic as a national regime and established
separate state and military structures to operate at the national level. While direct control
over the military was taken away from Mao Zedong, he was appointed to the new post of
Chair of the Soviet government.127 Xiang Ying and Zhang Guotao were appointed as his
deputies. Zhu De was appointed chair of the newly established Central Revolutionary
Military Commission, with Peng Dehuai and Wang Jiaxiang as his deputies. The
Congress also adopted a Constitution for the Republic that designated it as a “democratic
dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.” However, there was no pretence that
the Soviet was anything other than a communist one-party dictatorship. In the remote
rural area there were no industrial workers, the proletariat consisted almost entirely of
village artisans, handicraftsmen, and farm laborers. This notwithstadning, the
Constitution acknowledged that “only the proletariat can lead the broad masses to
socialism,” and thus they were to have extra representation in the Soviet.128
The most important piece of legislation passed was the Land Law.129 This
moderated previous policy but radical swings in policy towards peasants alienated many
and provides a good example of how policy driven by ideology could undermine support
for the CCP in specific contexts. On arriving in Jiangxi, the party had adopted a radical
56
policy that had alienated groups such as the middle and rich peasants who were crucial to
CCP survival. The CCP had decided that land redistribution was crucial to ensuring peasant
support in their resistance to the GMD, but changes in land ownership based on strict class
definitions caused unforeseen economic and social problems that in turn led to further
readjustment. Thus, the Soviet Land Law contained prescriptions more liberal than
previous policy and did not mention land nationalization and collectivization. It represented
a deliberate attempt to woo back the alienated “middle classes.” However, later, between
June and September 1933, many “middle peasants” were reclassified as “landlords” with
serious consequences for them. This was between the fourth and fifth suppression
campaigns launched by Chiang Kai-shek. This re-radicalization of policy began with the
Land Investigation Movement that was again intended to ensure peasant support in the
conflict with the GMD. The CCP sought to use the Movement to create a favorable
revolutionary atmosphere that would serve their political and military purposes. However,
constant changes in land ownership caused social and economic problems within the base
area, and excesses would often occur. This required periodic retrenchment and the adoption
of a mild or “antileftist” policy. Thus, between October and December, the new “landlords”
were demoted to the ranks of “middle peasants.” Finally, in early 1934, policy was
radicalized once again with attacks on the “rich peasants.” This merry-go-round was only
halted with the expulsion of the communist forces from their base area.
The Fourth Suppression Campaign reached the Jiangxi Soviet in January 1933 just
as the remainder of the Party Center headed by Bo Gu was moving in. The E-Yu-Wan
Soviet had been lost in September 1932 and the Xiang-Exi Soviet in October 1932.
Although, the Jiangxi Soviet held out, a better organized fifth campaign began in October
57
1933.130 This came at a bad time for the CCP as it was not only engaged in the Land
Investigation Movement but also a major inner party struggle usually referred to as the anti-
Luo Ming line. The attacks on Luo and his supporters were intended to strengthen the
resolve of party cadres in face of the GMD attacks. Luo had been acting secretary of the
Fujian CCP Committee since March 1932 and had claimed that the GMD attacks had
caused panic and fatigue in west Fujian. He blamed the party leadership for its mechanistic
approach to resisting the GMD, applying the same tactics in all areas, and called for flexible
military tactics to be adopted that were tailored to suit the varying conditions. While Luo
was clearly referring to the local situation, it served the Party Center’s interests to interpret
his view as an attack on party policy as a whole. In February 1933, Bo Gu and the Party
Center attacked what it called the Luo Ming line and their success in resisting the Fourth
Suppression temporarily strengthened their position and allowed them to use the situation to
attack their enemies.131 In the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao’s brother, Mao Zetan, was criticized as
was Deng Xiaoping.132
With the Fifth Campaign slowly encircling the soviet, from 15 to 18 January 1934,
the party convened the Fifth Plenum of the Sixth CC in Ruijin. It was attended by full and
alternate CC members and some delegates from provincial party committees. Given the
context, Bo Gu’s political report was a stunning example of being divorced from reality.133
For Bo Gu, the revolutionary situation at home and abroad was excellent, and he deemed
the policies of the Comintern and the CCP infallible. Amazingly, there was no formal
report on military affairs to the Plenum and all Bo had to say was that the major task was
simply to continue the fight against the “right opportunists” who refused to see the
excellence of the situation. Work in the GMD areas was not forgotten about and party
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organizations were requested to strengthen work in key industrial centers and to make the
greatest efforts to “prepare, organize, and lead the working-class in strikes.” The party’s
entire strength was to be concentrated on “strikes in factories and trade unions.” In addition
the Plenum listened to a report by Chen Yun on the workers’ economic struggle and trade
unions in GMD-held areas and a resolution was adopted on this question.134 The Plenum
elected a new Politburo that included Mao Zedong, contrary to what most studies have
suggested.135
Immediately following the Plenum, the Second All-China Soviet Congress was held
and it provided a chance for the leadership to boost morale. A giant auditorium was
constructed, and the ceremonies included a military parade and gunshot salute. No effort
was spared to portray the Soviet as a formal, national state rather than as a shaky local
rebellious base area. This aspiration to statehood was reflected in the election once again of
a full complement of people’s commissariats, including one for foreign affairs. Further, the
Congress proposed that all the soviet bases be designated as provinces, no matter that their
size nor the fact that they were small islands in a large sea of GMD-controlled waters meant
that they hardly deserved the appellation. The Congress did at least refer to the war and
called for the Red Army to adopt positional defense as its central task and basic strategy.
The meetings did little to address the crucial problem facing the CCP, namely the
GMD Suppression. Effective military control of the Soviet was under Otto Braun, who had
arrived in Ruijin in October 1933. After initial attempts to defend the base areas from
within, Braun pursued a strategy referred to as “Short, Swift Thrusts” that also engaged the
GMD through attacks in the “white areas.” The hope was to pull troops away from the
encirclement of the Soviet. However, this tactic also failed and a plan for the evacuation of
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the Soviet in late-summer of 1934 was drawn up by Bo Gu, Zhou Enlai and Braun. The
plan was drawn up in great secrecy and leaders were only informed gradually and on a need
to know basis. The idea of withdrawal was made public through the splendidly titled
article “All for the Defense of the Soviet” written by Zhang Wentian and published in Red
China on 29 September 1934. The article put forward the notion of retreating from and
surrendering a soviet in a particular place in order to gain victory for the soviet movement
throughout the country as a whole.136 In October, the CCP began to move out on what it
called the “strategic transfer” or what later became known as the Long March. They left
behind a party organization under the leadership of Xiang Ying who was also in control of
military affairs. In addition, the Office of the Central Government of the Chinese Soviet
Republic was established under Chen Yi’s leadership. This Office was to direct the struggle
of the guerrilla armies left behind in the former base areas of South China.137 Initially, the
withdrawal did not go well. The CCP had no idea where it was going and by late-
November military engagements had caused its personnel to be reduced from the 86,000
who set out to around 30,000.138
In January 1935, the Red Army reached northern Guizhou and found some
time for a break. Vitally, during these days from 15 to 18 January the most important
meeting of the Long March was held at Zunyi and it marked the start of Mao Zedong’s rise
to preeminent power in the CCP.139 While the meeting was probably called to discuss the
current situation and where the Red Army should go, it turned into a major review of past
policy and heralded a shift in the party leadership. While Bo Gu and Zhou Enlai started off
the meeting, the most decisive event was Mao’s speech that criticized military policy. On
the basis of subsequent debates and very much in line with Mao’s speech, Zhang Wentian
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drafted the meeting documents.140 The Resolution criticizes Bo Gu and Braun for their
previous errors but adopts a compromise. Braun firmly rejected all criticism of himself and
Bo Gu was only willing to admit to partial errors in judgment. While it approved the
political line of the party, the military failures were ascribed to the erroneous military line of
“pure positional defense” promoted by Bo and Braun.141
Mao was promoted to the five-person secretariat and joined Zhang Wentian
(general secretary), Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and Bo Gu. Along with Zhou and Wang
Jiaxiang, Mao was to serve on the CCP Central Military Leadership Group. While Zhou
was to be the chief decision-maker, Mao was to be chief assistant. This broke Braun’s
control over military affairs. Mao did not become chair of the Military Council or the
Politburo as some historians have suggested, but he did become one of the top five leaders
of the party and had the right to be involved in all party and army decisions.
During the Long March, Mao was a major challenge from Zhang Guotao for
leadership of the party. Zhang did not accept the decisions taken at Zunyi as binding and
had not attended the meeting. At the time he commanded a far larger military force than
those soldiers with Mao, some 80,000 to Mao’s 20,000 at best. Yet Zhang was thoroughly
outmaneuvered142 and came under severe criticism in Yan’an in early 1937 and in March a
party resolution was passed criticizing his past mistakes. With renewed collaboration
between the GMD and the CCP, Zhang decided to flee the communists new home in
Yan’an and joined the GMD in April 1938.143
While the Red Army was on the Long March the last decision taken by the
Comintern to impact on the CCP was beginning to take effect. This led to a second
period of alliance with the GMD in 1937. The Comintern’s Seventh Congress (July-
61
August 1935) adopted a new policy that called for a united front of all elements, classes
and nations in the fight against fascism. This policy shift came primarily as a result of
Soviet Russia’s awareness of the increasing threat to its security posed by Germany and
Japan.
This new policy line was applied to China by Wang Ming, the head of the CCP
Mission to the Comintern in Moscow. However, it should be pointed out that Wang
Ming’s own ideas had been evolving from the notion of a united front from below to a
united from above.144 Indeed, the Japanese occupation of Northeast China had caused the
CC to suggest a shift in policy in the Manchuria region in January 1933.145 This letter
from the CC to the local party organization indicated that it would be possible to
cooperate with the national bourgeoisie if a solid united front from below had been
assured. This, according to the letter, would ensure proletarian leadership in the united
front.
The “August First Declaration” (1935) issued in Moscow in the name of the
CCP and the Chinese Soviet Republic, was a clear signal that the CCP was to make the
strategic shift from civil war to a new united front.146 The declaration claimed that it was
the “sacred duty of everyone to resist Japan and save the nation.” It then criticized the
actions of “scum” and “traitors” such as Chiang Kai-shek, Yan Xishan and Zhang
Xueliang who had not adopted a policy of resistance to Japan. If the GMD would stop its
attacks, the CCP and the Soviet Government pledged that it would cooperate closely with
them to defend the country against the Japanese no matter what their other differences
might be. The CCP declared its willingness to cooperate with all those prepared to join a
62
government of national defense that would pursue a ten-point programme to expel the
Japanese. The suggestion was clearly for a united front from above.
It is not entirely clear when this news reached the Party Center as
communications with Moscow had been severed during the Long March. Certainly
communications were restored in November 1935 when Zhang Hao, an envoy of the CCP
Mission to the Comintern, arrived in north Shaanxi but evidence suggests that its contents
were known earlier. A CC secret directive in October 1935 reflected the thrust of the
declaration.147
In December 1935, an enlarged Politburo meeting was convened at Wayaobao
to discuss the implications of the united front strategy.148 The meeting decided to adopt
the widest political front possible to oppose Japanese imperialism and Chiang Kai-shek.
This front would include workers, peasants and the petty bourgeoisie and even members
of the national bourgeoisie, rich peasants and small landlords. The party was to strive for
leadership of this coalition. The highest manifestation of this new united front would be
the government of national defense and the united anti-Japanese army that would be
united on the basis of the ten-point program. This conciliatory approach was reflected in
the change of name of the Worker and Peasant Soviet Republic into the People’s Soviet
Republic and in policy shifts. Policy was moderated, rich peasants were to enjoy the
same rights as others and not have their property confiscated while industrial and
commercial entrepreneurs would be welcomed to invest in the area.149 In line with this
new approach, the meeting also adopted a resolution on military affairs that called for
combining the civil war with the national war against Japan. The main task for 1936 was
to gather strength to fight against Japan. The base areas were to be expanded and to link
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up with the Soviet Union as would the two armies link to fight the Japanese. Widespread
guerrilla warfare was to be used in a shift from the emphasis on regular warfare.150 In
addition, criteria for party membership were relaxed and “left closed-doorism” was cited
as a greater danger than “right opportunism.” The need to respond flexibly to changing
circumstances was stressed, probably in a veiled criticism of Bo Gu, Wang Ming and
their supporters.
Despite this new approach, it would take another two years before the CCP
accepted Chiang Kai-shek as a partner in a new united front and then only after his arrest
by his own officers in what is commonly referred to as the Xi’an Incident. The CCP
reached a secret agreement with the Northeast Army under the command of Zhang
Xueliang that was threatening them in the Northwest base area that was now home to
Mao and his supporters.151 With this cooperation secured, the CCP toned down its
criticism of Chiang Kai-shek and on 17 September 1936, the Politburo passed a
resolution that suggested an agreement be reached with him.152 This was clearly a
delicate business and the resolution was carefully framed. Criticism of the GMD was not
to be stopped nor was the ultimate goal of socialism to be abandoned but it noted that the
rising tide of anti-Japanese sentiment would force the GMD to join the struggle. The
CCP proposed the formation of a democratic republic, a form of government that would
have a more universal form of democracy than that practised in the soviets and more
progressive than that under the GMD.
For Zhang Xueliang such conciliation must have contrasted strongly with
Chiang Kai-shek’s insistence on dealing with the communists first. Thus, in December
1936 while Chiang was on a visit to pursue the campaign to eradicate the communists, he
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was kidnapped by Zhang and held for one week before being released. It is worth
pointing out that it seems that the Comintern applied what pressure it could to persuade
that the incident be resolved peacefully and that Chiang be released to head the national
resistance to Japan.
The incident did provide the link between the phases of Civil War and the
National War of Resistance. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident in Beijing on 7 July 1937
and the Hongqiao Airport Incident in Shanghai on 9 August clearly revealed Japan’s
aggressive intentions towards China. The subsequent invasion and communist
concessions finally pushed Chiang to collaboration and in August 1937, the GMD
accepted communist troops as part of the nationalist army. The Red Army was renamed
the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army. In November, the
remaining guerrilla forces in central China were renamed the New Fourth Army.
C) 1937-1943: The Politics of Collaboration and the Reinforcement of the Base Areas.
The formation of the second united front brought a much needed respite to the communist
troops scattered across a number of base areas.153 It enabled them to operate openly,
develop administrative structures, and most importantly receive revenues from the GMD.
However, tensions within this new alliance arose very quickly as the mistrust on both
sides was too difficult to wish away.
Once collaboration with the GMD was decided upon, Mao’s main concern was
how to use communist troops in the War of Resistance. While the CCP was prepared to
make declarations about the democratization of the GMD regime, Mao’s concern was
how to preserve military strength, avoiding needless sacrifice. Some were concerned,
65
however, that too passive a response would undermine sympathy for the CCP. Ultimately
a policy of self-preservation and expansion was accepted.
The adoption of the united front did bring the simmering conflict between Mao
and Wang Ming to a head and this was the last major inner-party struggle before Mao
exerted power over the party as a whole. Mao working within China felt that the GMD
was incapable of leading the War of Resistance and that the CCP must retain its
independence and initiative. By contrast, Wang Ming was much more amenable to the
policy of collaboration and was denounced for promoting the policy of “All Through the
United Front.” On 29 November 1937, Wang Ming and seven other members of the CCP
Mission to the Comintern, including Kang Sheng and Chen Yun, arrived in the CCP
headquarters at Yan’an. Wang was given a warm welcome. Mao meeting him for the
first time, purportedly said Wang was “a blessing from the sky.”154 But Wang also
immediately challenged Mao as the dominant ideological force in the party. When Wang
reported on what kind of position ought to be taken vis-à-vis the united front, Mao is
supposed to have voted to accept the report in part since it appeared to reflect Stalin's
views. But Mao had quite other ideas about how the united front ought to be conducted.
Mao had to defeat Wang Ming politically and then present an approach to theory
that would not only appropriate the united front as his but also undermine Wang Ming's
credibility. This latter objective was difficult to achieve because “Stalin had instructed
Wang Ming to overcome the ‘leftist deviation’ in the Party without directly contesting
Mao's authority.”155
To deal with the situation created by these new arrivals, the Politburo held a
Conference from 9 to 14 December, at which Wang Ming won the support of the majority
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and established his influence, although his power base remained weak. Wang delivered
the keynote speech to the conference while Mao remained silent. Wang’s 27 December
article called for improving the unification of all work in what became to be known as the
policy of “everything through the united front.”156 This contrasted with Mao's calls for
“independence and initiative.” Wang clearly felt that his was the best way to develop
CCP activities outside of the Border Region. While Wang acknowledged that problems
still existed with the GMD, he felt that the foundations had been laid for a solid anti-
Japanese national united front. This cooperation would be long-term, continuing after the
war during a period of national reconstruction. He also called for the united front to be
extended beyond the two parties to mobilize effectively other groups for resistance.
Although Wang accepted that CCP members could join the GMD government, he
maintained that the Eighth Route Army must retain its independence.
The conference’s resolution congratulating the CCP Mission to the Comintern for
its work in formulating the new policies for the anti-Japanese united front appeared to
boost Wang's pre-eminent position. In fact, organizational changes strengthened Mao's
position. The conference adopted a resolution to convene the Seventh Party Congress as
soon as possible. A twenty-five person committee was set up to prepare the congress to
which Mao was appointed Chair, with Wang Ming as Secretary. This reflected the power
relations at the time as Wang, despite his prestige, must have realized that he could not
take over from Mao. Further, on the Comintern's instructions, it was decided to abolish
the post of General Secretary to encourage collective leadership. Thus, Zhang Wentian
lost his position and a Secretariat was formed consisting of Zhang Wentian, Mao Zedong,
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Chen Yun and Kang Sheng.157 Mao retained his influential position as Chair of the
Military Council.
After the conference Wang Ming, accompanied by Zhou Enlai and Bo Gu, left
Yan’an for Wuhan to take up his position as Secretary of the party's Yangtze Bureau.
This removed him from the Party Center, leaving Mao to run it together with the Army
Headquarters. In Wuhan, Wang Ming began to develop an approach to the united front
that was seriously at odds with Mao’s. Initially dictated by the vastly different conditions
in Wuhan, Wang’s policy of cooperation and taking advantage of opportunities to work
legally and to expand communist influence paid off.
The conflict between Mao and Wang reached a high point at the Politburo
meeting held in Yan’an in early March 1938. The key issues discussed were the role of
the CCP in the Sino-Japanese War and the relationship between the CCP and the GMD.
As in December, Wang Ming delivered the key-note address while Mao made no formal
speech. However, Mao’s opposition meant that no formal resolution was adopted,
although a written version of Wang’s report was published and circulated widely.
Wang’s report stated that the united front was to be consolidated in the form of a
“national revolutionary alliance”158 that would resemble the first united front or would be
a confederation within which all parties would have political and organizational
independence. He stressed the need for a “united army, united assignment, united
command, united combat.” He also stressed the need for the GMD to formalize the legal
activities of other groups. He proposed establishing a national assembly so that other
parties could be consulted and that the government legalize and encourage the
development of mass organizations. Finally, Wang stated that the correct military
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strategy was to use mobile warfare as the main form of combat coordinated with
positional warfare. Guerrilla warfare was relegated to a support function.
The downgrading of guerrilla warfare was at odds with Mao's approach and the
question of military strategy took on increased importance in the following months
especially after the fall of Xuzhou to Japanese forces in late May led to Wuhan being
threatened. Throughout April, Mao called for the development of guerrilla bases in north
China and in May, Mao stressed that the main task of the Eighth Route Army was to
engage in guerrilla warfare and only to engage in mobile warfare where the conditions
were favorable.
This clash of approaches became crucial as Wang Ming began to participate in the
defense of Wuhan. On 14 May, the Party Center sent out instructions to the New Fourth
Army and the Party’s Yangtze Bureau instructing them to shift their work to the rural
areas where they were to set up guerrilla forces.159 This was followed on 22 May 1938,
by instructions to the Hebei, Hunan and Wuhan party branches that, after the fall of
Xuzhou, they should focus their work on guerrilla warfare in the countryside and the
creation of bases there. To this end, the majority of students, workers and revolutionary
elements were to return to their home villages to help with this process. The instructions
peripheralized party work in Wuhan.
In stark contrast, Wang Ming in his public statement of 15 June, while
acknowledging that Wuhan might fall, mooted Madrid as an example of heroic defense.
Wang favored a massive mobilization under the GMD's leadership to engage the Japanese
in mobile warfare before they could reach Wuhan. The Eighth Route Army, operating in
the enemy’s rear was to be used to destroy supply lines.
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These proposals backfired. As always, the GMD was suspicious of CCP calls for
mass mobilization and, on 5 August placed restrictions on the activities of the local mass
organizations. A number were closed down and the activities of the CCP came under
close scrutiny by the GMD secret police. Wang Ming’s attempt to expand communist
influence through legal means ended in failure. His prestige in party circles received
another major blow when Wuhan fell to the Japanese on 25 October 1938.
Mao then used the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC held from 29 September to 6
November 1938 to press home his advantage.160 His dominance was enhanced by news
brought from Moscow by Wang Jiaxiang. Wang relayed information contained in a
September Comintern directive and Dimitrov’s ideas. The directive approved of the
political line of the CCP during the past year in its united front work while Dimitrov fully
endorsed Mao's leading position in the party. This stripped any claim that Wang Ming
could have made to be the “Comintern’s man.” Indeed, many believe that it was only
after receiving this news that Mao decided to convene the Plenum.161 The loss of Wuhan
during the Plenum shifted things further in Mao’s favor. By the end of the meeting, Mao
made his differences with Wang clear. The sharpness of Mao’s tone in his concluding
speeches was aided by the fact that Wang had left the meeting early to attend the National
Political Consultative Assembly apparently believing that he and Mao had reached a
compromise. Wang obviously had not made a very good study of Mao as a political
strategist.
Mao had no intention of wrecking the united front and he realized that it was vital
to the CCP’s interests. Thus his opening speech praised both the GMD and Chiang Kai-
shek personally.162 Mao even stated that the GMD played the dominant role in the united
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front. Class struggle was not to detract from the task of national resistance. Mao still
proposed that the “new democratic republic” would be based on Sun Yat-sen’s “Three
Principles of the People,” rather than on those of socialism. These were all sentiments
that Wang could wholeheartedly endorse and he even praised indirectly the pivotal role
which Mao played in the CCP.
However, with Wang gone and Wuhan fallen, Mao told a different story. Mao
blamed the GMD for not allowing the united front to assume a proper organizational form
and harshly criticized Wang Ming’s slogan of “everything through the united front.”163
Mao went on to criticize Wang Ming’s idea of using legal channels to develop the
communist movement and Wang’s strategy of moving from the cities to the countryside,
a mistake, Mao clearly implied, that derived from the influence of the Soviet revolution
on Wang Ming. Mao made it clear that China’s revolution would move from the
countryside to the cities.164
The political resolution did not include harsh condemnations of Wang Ming’s
approach. It was not yet necessary to risk upsetting the situation by informing the rank
and file. It was enough that Mao had told the party’s inner-circle. Having dealt Wang a
serious blow at the Plenum, immediately afterwards, the party’s regional bureau system
was reorganized resulting in an undermining of Wang Ming’s organizational position.165
On 9 November, Wang’s Yangtze Bureau was abolished and its former area of
jurisdiction was placed under two new bureaux, the Southern Bureau headed by Zhou
Enlai and the Central Plain’s Bureau headed by Liu Shaoqi. Both were loyal to Mao.
With the Party Center reunited in Yan’an, it was decided to bring order to the ad
hoc decision-making that had taken place during the years of dislocation. In addition, it
71
was important to outline rules for how the party organizations should function in the
different environments they inhabited. As a result, three resolutions were adopted on
concrete organizational questions. The united front meant that the CCP could come out
of its secret existence and engage in a wide range of activities. Such activities were to be
used to expand party influence, independence was to be retained and “capitulationism”
resisted. A resolution on work rules and discipline sought to regularize the channels
through which decisions were made and information was circulated. Thus, individuals
were forbidden from speaking on behalf of the party or distributing documents in its name
unless entrusted to do so by the CC or other leading organs.
The Resolution reconfirmed that the CC was the highest organ of the party when
the National Congress was not in session but then went on to outline where real power
lay. When the CC was not in session, the Politburo elected by it would guide work. The
Politburo was to meet at least once every three months. The section on the Secretariat
indicates the growing power of this organization in party affairs. The Secretariat was to
convene Politburo meetings and prepare the issues to be discussed. It was to meet at least
once a week. This placed it in an extremely powerful position by allowing it to control
the flow of information and effectively control the agenda. Most importantly, between
Politburo meetings, if a new emergency arose and the Politburo could not be convened
immediately, the Secretariat could make new decisions and issue them in the name of the
CC. Only afterwards would the Secretariat have to seek the approval of the Politburo.166
The Plenum placed Mao Zedong in control of the daily work of the Secretariat.
The renewed cooperation between the CCP and the GMD also allowed work in
the urban areas of China to pick up once again. As shown above, despite a devastated
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organization, the few remaining communists in Shanghai had kept alive some activities
through a number of front organizations and through the infiltration of other groups
engaged in patriotic resistance to Japanese aggression. Liu Shaoqi, who had been placed
in charge of work in the “white areas,” used the new situation to launch a devastating
critique of earlier CCP policy.167 While his views were strongly refuted at the time, they
anticipated Mao’s later assessment of the “leftist” trend in the party under Wang Ming
and Bo Gu’s control.
CCP historians view the moderately successful strike in Shanghai at Japanese-run
cotton mills in October 1936 as vindicating Liu’s new policy of shifting from class
actions to those of national resistance. The strike was led by the National Salvation
Association that had been set up some time earlier as a part of the process of the
formation of a number of specific Salvation Associations drawn from different sectors of
the population. In fact, the CCP had a minimal role in the Association but the actions
fitted with its new strategy and the Association was to be the focus of CCP rebuilding
activities during the war years.168 This approach was given a boost by the December
1936 anti-Japanese demonstrations that began in Beijing and soon spread to Shanghai.169
However, the Japanese invasion of the city meant that progress was slow and it was very
difficult for the party to act in a concerted way. However, important links were laid for
the later struggle against the GMD once the civil war erupted in 1945. Party membership
grew from 130 in November 1937 to over 2,000 by the time of the Japanese surrender in
August 1945.170
It was not long before the new relationship began to sour. As the CCP began to
spread its influence, it came into conflict with local GMD troops culminating in what
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CCP historians refer to as the “first and second anticommunist upsurges” (December
1939-March 1940 and January 1941). While these clashes did not end the united front
they did reinforce Mao’s view that not all CCP resources should be channelled via the
GMD. For Mao, the united front was more than an alliance with just Chiang Kai-shek.
CCP policy turned towards isolating Chiang while trying to win over to its side
significant sections of the anti-Japanese alliance.
This combined with the removal of GMD financial support affected policy within
the CCP-held base areas. Policies were adopted for power-sharing and to moderate
economic policies to win over other groups in the united front. For the party faithful,
Mao stated that the “three magic weapons” that would bring victory were the united front,
armed struggle, and party-building.171 For the broader public, Mao put forward his ideas
on New Democracy.172 However, this document stated publicly the CCP’s claim to lead
the revolution. According to Mao, the bourgeoisie had both revolutionary characteristics
and a tendency toward compromise. As a result, the proletariat would have to assume
leadership in China’s struggle against imperialism and feudalism by default. During this
first stage there would be a “revolutionary democratic dictatorship” of several classes. In
the second stage, the non proletarian classes would be transformed gradually and the new
democratic revolution would progress into its socialist stage. Although Mao said that the
first phase would last for a long time, he was vague about when the change of stages
would come about and criticized as “leftist” those who thought that socialism could be
implemented before the new democratic revolution was completed. However, the article
did return the attainment to the CCP’s political agenda.
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In line with the view that it would be a long time before socialist construction was
on the agenda, Mao outlined a moderate economic policy that would appeal to non-CCP
elements. Private capitalist production would be allowed so long as it did not dominate
the “livelihood of the people on a national scale.” In the countryside, a rich peasant
economy was proposed, with only “big landlords” having their land confiscated and
redistributed. This economic program was depicted as being in line with Sun Yat-sen’s
ideas.173
This more open and conciliatory external policy was accompanied by an extensive
set of internal party campaigns that were intended to weed out opponents to current
policy, tighten party discipline, and crush dissent while building adherence to Mao and
his supporters’ analysis of the past and visions for the future. The disciplining of the
party that began in earnest in 1941 carried on through until 1945.
During this period, Comintern direct influence on the CCP was slight and, as
argued above, was not necessarily detrimental to Mao’s ascendance to power within the
party as many authors have suggested previously. The decline in the influence of the
Comintern is clearly seen in the manner of interpretation by the CCP of key Comintern
decisions during this period. As noted above, it was on receiving news from Moscow of
the Comintern’s tacit support that Mao decided to convene the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth
CC at which he defeated Wang Ming politically.
The war with Japan did not exist in isolation and the CCP leadership in Yan’an
could not afford to ignore the Comintern totally. Just as publicly Mao and the CCP gave
full support to the Soviet-Nazi Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, so they
supported the neutrality pact the Soviet Union concluded with Japan on 13 April 1941.
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However, both events allowed the CCP to pursue its own course independent of
Moscow’s aims. Thus, for example, the CCP’s comments on the neutrality pact stated
that it marked another triumph of the Soviet Union’s peace policy.174 It was claimed that
this pact had in no way compromised Soviet support for China’s war effort, a view quite
different to that of Chiang Kai-shek. However, the CCP used the pact as a chance to put
forward the view that it was up to China itself to recover all the Chinese territories south
of the Yalu River by itself. Despite this, the CCP was being forced into defending a
position that was clearly not going to push forward its nationalist claims. From the
CCP’s point of view, the German invasion of the Soviet Union that began on 22 June
1941 came as a fortunate relief. Overnight the Soviet peace policy in the midst of a
capitalist war was changed into a position of the Soviet Union as the leader of the fight
against fascism.
Now, the “capitalist powers” such as Great Britain and the US who had been
“conspiring” to encourage a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union to preempt a Japanese
push southward had to be courted as a part of the international united front against
fascism. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the US into the war and enabled
the CCP to call for international involvement in the war to push forward the united front.
The CCP had moved swiftly from the view of recovering all its territories on its own.
The CCP’s 9 December 1941 declaration called for the formation of an anti-
Japanese and anti-fascist front in the Pacific that would include all the governments and
peoples who were opposing Japan.175 Now the USA and Great Britain were seen as
having an important role to play in defeating Japan and bringing about unity in China.
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“Left” deviation was to be avoided and all party members were to cooperate with the
British and Americans.
The dissolution of the Comintern (15 May 1943) freed the CCP from any need
to bow in its direction and re-affirmed what was already a reality for Mao and his
supporters that the CCP should get on with creating its own revolution on its own terms.
Also, it undercut any last possible support base for Wang Ming and his followers.
Combined with other internal factors, it contributed to the build up of a cult around Mao
Zedong.
On 26 May, after the CCP had received the information, the Politburo met to
discuss the issue and in the name of the CC issued a decision on the matter.176 Not
surprisingly, the decision wholly agreed with the Comintern’s abolition pointing out that
this would strengthen the local communist parties by making them “even more
nationalized.” Such a leading center was no longer considered necessary and,
interestingly, the decision points out that the Comintern had not interfered in CCP affairs
since 1935. The need to assert the continued and strengthened role the CCP would play
without the Comintern was further necessitated by the calls by some CCP domestic critics
that it could now disband.
Sources
There is an abundance of sources for the study of the CCP during the years from 1919
until 1943 but still many areas of the relationship remain murky. Some of the outstanding
questions may be resolved by the opening of the archives in Moscow and research that is
now in progress.
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a) Archives
Extensive collections of materials concerning the Chinese revolution are held in Moscow,
especially in the Comintern Archives at the Russian Center for the Storing and Study of
Documents of Contemporary History (formerly the Central Party Archives).
1) The Central Archives (Zhongyang dang’an), Wen Quan Village, Beijing. These
archives comprise the main holdings of the CCP. Among other material, it contains
archives and related documents since the founding of the CCP from the CC and its
affiliated organizations, their agencies, as well as from revolutionary groups and front
organizations from different periods. There are 202 complete files with approximately 8
million pieces. Among the materials is the archive of the CCP delegation to the
Comintern. This contains important documents of the Comintern, and resolutions,
decisions, announcements on China by the ECCI, the Far East Bureau, and the Eastern
Department, as well as by the Youth Communist International and the Workers’
International. Alas, entrance is highly restricted even for Chinese researchers and
virtually impossible for foreigners. It is important to note that there are relevant archives
held at all administrative levels in China that are relevant to the history of the CCP.177
2) The Sneevliet Archives, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam. One
section of this archive covers the period of time that Sneevliet (Maring) spent working for
the Comintern in Moscow and in China. The most important materials are Sneevliet’s
reports to the Comintern on the situation in China, the relationship between the CCP and
the GMD, and the state of affairs within the party. In addition, there are interesting notes
on key events either made by Sneevliet himself of for Sneevliet by his interpreters. Of
particular interest in this respect are the notes concerning the Third Party Congress. The
78
archives are entirely open. The most important materials concerning Sneevliet’s period in
China are published in Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China. The
Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring).
3) The Archives of the Bureau of Investigation, Taibei, Taiwan. These archives contain
materials captured by the GMD and taken to Taiwan after 1949. There is a wealth of
documentation concerning CCP activities underground during the late-twenties and early-
thirties and also on the base areas. These sets of documents were captured by the
invading GMD armies. Finally, there are complete sets of party newspapers and
periodicals that contain articles about the CCP, the Comintern or that transmit its
decisions. The archives are now completely open for researchers.
b) Contemporary CCP Newspapers and Magazines
Below the most important CCP journals and newspapers are listed for the period covered
in this essay.
Balujun junzheng zazhi (Military and Political Journal of the Eighth Route Army). Began publication on 15 January 1939 and ceased publication on 25 March 1942. It was the organ of the General Political Office of the Eighth Route Army. Buersheweike (The Bolshevik). Began publication in Shanghai on 24 October 1927 as
the organ of the CCP CC. Originally, it was a weekly but changed to a bi-monthly and finally a monthly. It was a secret journal, and it ceased publishing in July 1932.
Dangbao (The Party Paper). The CCP’s first internal party paper. It began publication
on 30 November 1923 with an unspecified publication regularity. It is unclear when it ceased publication, but one issue appeared on 1 June 1924.
Douzheng (Struggle). A weekly that began publication in February 1933 as the organ of
the Central Bureau, it was widely disseminated among the base areas. Issue 73 was published on 30 September 1934.
79
Gongchandang (The Communist). The publication of the first party cell in Shanghai. It began publication on 7 November 1920 as a monthly. Issue six was published on 7 July 1921.
Gonchandangren (The Communist). Began publication in Yan’an on 20 October 1939 as
an internal CCP paper. It was published nineteen times, ending publication in August 1941.
Hongqi ribao (Red Flag Daily). An organ of the CCP CC that began publication on 20
August 1930 in Shanghai. Starting on 9 March 1931, its name was changed to Hongqi zhoubao (Red Flag Weekly).
Hongqi zhoubao (Red Flag Weekly). The successor publication to Hongqi ribao (Red
Flag Daily), it began publication on 9 March 1931. In August 1933, it became a bi-monthly. It ceased publication on 1 March 1934 with issue no. 64. Because it was a secret publication, it often had a fake cover.
Hongse Zhonghua (Red China). Began publication on 11 December 1931 at Ruijin as the
organ of the Central Soviet government. After the evacuation of the base area its publication effectively stopped (October 1934), to be revived in the Shaan-Gan-Ning base area. From 29 January 1937 its name was changed to Xin Zhonghua bao (New China).
Jiefang (Liberation). Began as a weekly of the CCP CC that was later changed to a bi-
monthly. It began publication in Yan’an on 24 April 1937 and ended in May 1941. In all, 134 issues were published.
Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily). Set up as a publication of the CCP CC on 16 May 1941.
It was the major paper for the base areas, and many other publications were halted to allow concentration of news reporting. It ended publication on 27 March 1947.
Laodongzhe (The Laborer). Began publication on 3 October 1920 and continued
publication until 2 January 1921. Liening shenghuo (Lenin Life). Was the theoretical organ of the Party Center in Shanghai
under Bo Gu and ran from 1932 until 1934. Litou (The Plow). Began publication in Canton on 25 January 1926 as the organ of the
Guangdong Peasant Association. Initially, its was published every ten days but subsequently was changed to a weekly. The last issue (no. 23) was published on 7 January 1927. It was generally pro-CCP.
Qianfeng (The Vanguard). First published on 15 July 1923. Not a success, only three
issues were published before it ceased publication in early 1924.
80
Qunzhong (The Masses). An open weekly CCP publication for the GMD-ruled areas and Hong Kong. It began publication on 11 December 1937 in Hankou and later was moved to Chongqing. In June 1946, it began publication in Shanghai but was forced to stop by the GMD in March 1947. In Hong Kong its was published as a weekly from January 1947 until it voluntarily ceased publication on 20 October 1949.
Shihua (True Words). The organ of the CC, its was set up in Shanghai in October 1930.
It was superseded by Hongqi ribao (Red Flag Daily). Xiangdao zhoubao (The Guide Weekly). Began publication in September 1922 in
Shanghai. In all, 201 editions were published, with publication ending on 18 July 1927.
Xiaoqu (The Pioneer). The fortnightly journal of the SYL, it began publication on 15
January 1922 and ceased publication on 15 August 1923. Xin qingnian (New Youth). Launched in September 1915 in Shanghai, it had a major
impact on progressive thinkers during the May Fourth Movement. Originally called Qingnian zazhi (Youth Magazine), its name was changed in September 1916. From September 1920 it was operated as a publication of the Shanghai communist small group and was an organ of the CCP after its foundation. In July 1922 it temporarily stopped publication, reappearing in June 1923 as the party’s theoretical organ. It finally ceased publication in July 1926.
Xin Zhonghuabao (New China News). A publication of the Central Soviet government
published in Yan’an as a successor to Hongse Zhonghua (Red China), it began publication on 29 January 1937. In January 1939, it became the publication of the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region Government. It published a total of 230 issues, ending publication on 15 May 1941.
Zhongguo nongmin (The Chinese Peasant). Published by the Central Peasant Department
of the GMD, it began publication as a monthly on 1 January 1926. The general editor was Mao Zedong. In December 1926, it temporarily ceased publication but revived briefly in Hankou in July 1927.
Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture). A theoretical journal published in Yan’an, it began
publication as a monthly on 15 February 1940 but only ran until 20 August 1941.
c) Publications of Documents
An indispensable collection of CCP documents is to be found in the two volumes Liuda
yilai – dangnei mimi wenjian (Since the Sixth Party Congress – Secret Inner-Party
81
Documents) and Liuda yiqian (Before the Sixth Party Congress) (Beijing, 1952 and1981).
These two volumes were originally compiled and distributed by the Secretariat of the
CCP CC between December 1941 and October 1942. They were produced as study
materials for high-ranking cadres in preparation for the Rectification Movement (1941-
44). The collections were re-issued after 1980 in connection with the writing of the new
Resolution on Party History (1981). The main drawback of this reissue is that pieces by
Mao Zedong were withdrawn and readers are referred to the official works. These
official works contain heavily edited versions of Mao’s speeches.
Based on these two publications and their own holdings, the Central Archives published
their 14 volume selection of central party documents intended for internal use only –
Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP CC) (Beijing,
1982-1987). This collection provides a massive amount of previously unavailable
material. More recently, an open (gongkai) version of the collection has been published.
A total of 18 volumes have been published (1989-92), covering the period 1921 until
1949. In terms of information about original publication details etc., this latter series is
more useful than the neibu series. However, not all materials are included. The most
important set of original documentation on Comintern-CCP relations is the three volume
series Gongchanguoji youguan Zhongguo geming de wenxian ziliao (Materials of the
Comintern Concerning the Chinese Revolution), Vol. 1 1919-28, Vol. 2 1929-36, and
Vol. 1936-43 (Beijing, 1980, 1982 and 1989). It is edited by the Institute of Modern
History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
In recent years, the CCP has been releasing complete collections of Mao’s
writings before 1949. Important have been the five volume series Mao Zedong wenji
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(Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) (Beijing, 1993) covering the period from 1921 to
1949. In addition, there is the monumental 20 volume collection edited by Takeuchi
Minoru, Mao Zedong ji (Collected Writings of Mao Zedong) (Tokyo, 1983), 10 volumes
and Mao Zedong ji. Bujuan (Supplement to the Collected Writings of Mao Zedong)
(Tokyo, 1983-86). In English there is the huge undertaking by Stuart Schram and his
collaborators at the Fairbank Center, Harvard University to publish all Mao’s pre-1949
writings. Four volumes have been published covering the period from 1912 to 1934 by
M.E. Sharpe. The general title of the series is Mao’s Road to Power. Revolutionary
Writings 1912-1949.
In English, the most extensive collection of documents of the CCP during this
period Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party: Documents and
Analysis (Armonk, NY, 1996).
In Chinese there are collected documentary series for virtually all the major events
discussed in the essay above. Most, but not all, are edited by the Committee for the
Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Archives and published in
Beijing by the Party Materials Publishing House of the CC.
d) Memoirs, biographies, and handbooks
Unfortunately, most of the important Chinese participants died before the recent fad for
memoir writing got off the ground in China. However, there are a number of sources that
are useful.
M.N. Roy’s memoirs are interesting to read (My Experience in China, Calcutta,
1945) while those of Otto Braun are far less so A Comintern Agent in China, 1932-39
83
(Stanford, 1982). Wang Ming’s quasi memoirs are worth a dip into although the reader is
advised to read carefully, Mao’s Betrayal (Moscow, 1979).
The memoirs of Zhang Guotao are the most extensive available but also have to
be treated with care. Chang Kuo-t’ao, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist
Party, 2 Volumes (Lawrence, Kansas, 1971-72). Others of interest are Li Weihan, Huiyi
yu yanjiu (Reminiscences and Research) (Beijing, 1986). This work is particularly
interesting for party development and high-level politics such as were played out at the 7
August Emergency Conference. The memoirs of Wu Xiuquan, which provide valuable
information on how the influence of the pro-Soviet group in the party was broken up, are
important. Wu had been an interpreter for the CCP in many of its dealing with Comintern
representatives in the thirties.178 There are numerous short reminiscences of key events or
individuals that are either published in special collections or in the various journals on
party history.
For CCP and related Comintern personnel, the most extensive new guide is the
series that was launched by Professor Hu Hua before his death Zhonggong dangshi
renwuzhuan (Biographies of Historical Personages of the CCP) (Xi’an, 1980-present).
Originally a projected series of 50 volumes, to date 55 have been published. In general
the quality of the biographies improves as the series progresses but it is uneven. This
series can be used in conjunction with Chen Yutang’s Zhonggong dangshi renwu
bieminglu, ziming, biming, huaming (Pseudonyms of CCP Personalities in the History of
the CCP, Original Names, Pen Names, Aliases) (Beijing, 1985). The dictionary contains
192 entries on key figures in the Communist movement. Each entry provides brief
biographical details and a list of aliases etc. and where and when they were used. Most
84
useful is the index of aliases. For a good one volume source on people there is the 900-
page Zhongguo gongchandang renming cidian (Dictionary of CCP Personages 1921-
1991) (Beijing, 1991), which contains brief biographical sketches for some 10,000
luminaries.
For party organizations several indispensable books have been published. There
is Wang Jianying, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi shi ziliao huibian: lingdao jigou yange
he chengyuan minglu (zengdingben cong yidai dao shisida) (Compilation of Materials on
the Organizational History of the CCP--The Evolution of Leading Organs and Name-Lists
of Personnel (Revised Edition from the First to the Fourteenth Party Congress) (Beijing,
1982). This reference book should be used in conjunction with Zhao Shenghui’s,
Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhi gangyao (Outline History of CCP Organization) (Hefei,
1987).
85
NOTES
1 See, for example, Robert C. North, Moscow and the Chinese Communists (Stanford, 1953). 2 Conrad Brandt, Stalin’s Failure in China (Cambridge, Mass, 1958). An earlier analysis published in 1938 that laid the blame at Stalin’s feet was Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1961, second revised edition). 3 These accounts acknowledge the general correctness of the Comintern’s line on China during the period but claim that mistakes were made during the period from 1925 to 1927. PRC official historians claim that these mistakes derived from the rightist tendency within the Comintern at the time and General Secretary, Chen Duxiu’s “slavish adherence” to the instructions from the Comintern. 4 For example, R. A. Ulyanovsky (ed.), The Comintern and the East (Moscow, 1979) and Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East (Moscow, 1990). 5 See, for example, L. Evans and R. Block (eds.), Leon Trotsky on China: Introduction by Peng Shu-tse (New York, 1976). For an analysis of the failure of the communists in China see Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, 1961, second revised edition). 6 For the most complete analysis of the labor movement during this period see Jean Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement 1919-1927 (Stanford, 1968). For an analysis that has made use of recently available sources to draw a nuanced picture of Chinese labor in Shanghai see Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike. The Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, 1993). 7 Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, 1979). 8 Schram has analyzed in detail the process of the “sinification of Marxism” and the interplay of the traditional and Marxist in the persona of Mao Zedong. See, for example, Stuart R. Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York, 1969). For a more recent views see The Thought of Mao Tse-tung (Cambridge, 1989). For a sustained account that sees the relationship between the CCP and the Comintern in terms of conflict see John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations 1937-1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (Oxford, 1988) and “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party,” The China Quarterly, No. 113, March 1988, pp. 29-59. 9 A Chinese scholar who reaches a similar conclusion is Huang Xiurong, Gongchan guoji yu Zhongguo geming guanxi shi (A History of the Relationship between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution) (Beijing, 1989), especially pp. 95-96.
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10 Arif Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism (Oxford, 1989). For his work on the influence anarchism see particularly Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991). Chapter five discusses the influence of anarchism in the May Fourth Movement and chapter six analyzes the anarchist alternative in Chinese socialism during the twenties. 11 Hans van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade. The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1991). 12 Wen-Hsin Yeh, Provincial Passages. Culture, Space, and the Origins of Chinese Communism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996). 13 Most probably, the Comintern effectively ended its activities in Shanghai in 1934. See Frederick S. Litten, “The Noulens Affair,” The China Quarterly, No. 138, June 1994, p. 508. 14 For an account of the role of Maring and the problems he encountered see Tony Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China. The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring) (Leiden, 1991) and “Interpreting China: The Case of Maring,” in Kurt Werner Radtke and Tony Saich (eds.), China’s Modernisation. Westernisation and Acculturation (Stuttgart, 1993), pp. 59-82. The best account of Borodin’s work in China is Lydia Holubnychy’s uncompleted work Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-25 (New York, 1979). Otto Braun has written his own account of his work in China and the frustrations he encountered, A Comintern Agent in China, 1932-39 (Stanford, 1982). See also the memoirs of M. N. Roy, My Experiences in China (Calcutta, 1945) and M. N. Roy’s Memoirs (Bombay, 1964), and finally the frustrations encountered by Vladimirov when he was in Yan’an, The Vladimirov Diaries: Yenan, China, 1942-45 (New York, 1975). 15 On the introduction of Bolshevism through the twenties in addition to Dirlik and van de Ven see Michael Y. L. Luk, The Origins of Chinese Bolshevism. An Ideology in the Making, 1920-1928 (Hong Kong, 1990). 16 On this issue see Lawrence R. Sullivan, “The Evolution of Chinese Communist Organization and Leadership Doctrine, 1921-1949,” paper presented to the conference “New perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution,” Leiden and Amsterdam, January 1990. 17 See Sullivan, ibid. The tension created between the party norms and Mao Zedong’s rise to supreme power is interestingly handled in Frederick C. Teiwes with Warren Sun, “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party: The CCP’s Changing Leadership, 1937-1945” in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.), New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (New York, 1995), pp. 339-87. 18 David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s China (Cambridge, Mass., 1994).
87
19 Apart from his regular contact with early party leaders and his briefings at meetings, Maring also published many articles in the Chinese communist press under one of his pen-names, Sun Duo (Sentot). He published regularly in Xiangdao (The Guide). For an English translation of these articles and others written while he was in China see Saich, The Origins of the First United Front, 2, pp. 737-836. 20 This latter figure also includes those from the GMD. From 1925 to 1928 the university was called the Sun Yat-sen University of Working People of China. The first batch of 14 students to go to Soviet Russia were from the Foreign Language School in Shanghai, a communist stronghold. For details of the training programs see M. F. Yuriev and A.V. Pantsov, “Comintern, CPSU (B) and Ideological and Organizational Evolution of the Communist Party of China,” in R. Ulyanovsky (ed.), Revolutionary Democracy and Communists in the East, pp. 283-333. The authors estimate that of the 118 top leaders in the CCP during the period before 1949, some 70 percent were trained in Soviet Russia. 21 One might add Kang Sheng who was trained in the ways of the Soviet secret police and oversaw its Chinese equivalent until his death in 1975. On Kang Sheng see Zhong Kan, Kang Sheng pingzhuan (A Critical Biography of Kang Sheng) (Beijing, 1982) and John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon: Kang Sheng—The Evil Genius Behind Mao—and his Legacy of Terror in People’s China (New York, 1992). 22 An English translation of this document can be found in Tony Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party. Documents and Analysis (New York, 1996), pp. 386-400. 23 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p. 269. 24 John E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935 (Stanford, 1966). 25 This is convincingly argued by Teiwes and Sun in “From a Leninist to a Charismatic Party.” 26 Wang Jiaxiang relayed this information to a Politburo meeting held on 14 September 1938. It is claimed that it was after receiving this news that Mao decided to convene the Sixth Plenum of the Sixth CC (September-November 1938). See “Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui zhuxituan de jueding” (Decision of the Presidium of the ECCI), September 1938, in The Central Party Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP CC) (Beijing, 1985), 10, pp. 574-75. See also, Zhao Shenghui, Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi gangyao (An Outline Organizational History of the CCP) (Anhui, 1987), p. 145. Dimitrov, a Bulgarian communist, was appointed Secretary General of the Comintern at the Seventh Congress in 1935. 27 Mao himself felt that the Comintern had played a progressive role up until 1927 and again between mid-1935 and its dissolution in 1943.
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28 The demonstration of 4 May from which the Movement draws its name was a protest against the decisions of the Versailles Conference but it developed into a broad based moment for political and cultural renewal. For the classic account of the incident that sparked the demonstrations and the broader intellectual and social environment around it see Chow Tse-tsung, The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China Cambridge, Mass., 1960). For an analysis that looks at the impact of the Movement on intellectual inquiries about enlightenment see Vera Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment. Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986). 29 For the best study of Yuan see Ernest P. Young, The Presidency of Yuan Shih-kai. Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor, 1977). On warlordism see John E. Sheridan, “The Warlord Era: Politics and militarism Under the Peking Government, 1916-28,” in John King Fairbank, The Cambridge History of China. Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 12, pp. 284-321. 30 The best account of Soviet interests in China during this period remains Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China 1917-1924 (New York, 1954). 31 For the relevant materials see, The Second Congress of the Communist International (New York, 1977), 1 and 2. This is a translation of Der Zweite Kongress der Kommunistische Internationale Protokoll der Verhandlungen (Hamburg, 1921). For an analysis of the Congress in terms of its relevance to China see Saich, The Origins of the First United Front, pp. 12-22. 32 Konstatin Shevelyov, “On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China,” in Far Eastern Affairs, No. 1, 1981, p. 129. 33 Dirlik, The Origins of Chinese Communism, p. 253. 34 It would appear that Voitinsky had no specific brief to establish a Communist Party but that he suggested it after observing the situation in China. It is also probable that the idea of establishing a party had already been discussed prior to Voitinsky’ arrival by Li and Chen. According to one account they had already discussed this in January 1920 while traveling from Beijing to Tianjin just before Chen was to travel south. They pledged to establish party organizations in the north and the south of the country. See Chen Shaokang, “Shanghai gongchandang zhuyi xiaozu zongshu” (A General Account of the Shanghai Communist Small Group), in Committee for the Collection of Materials on CCP CC Party History (ed.), Gongchan zhuyi xiaozu (Communist Party Small Groups) (Beijing, 1987) 1, p. 24. 35 Shevelyov, “On the History of the Formation of the Communist Party of China,” p. 130.
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36 For an interesting discussion of the study societies and their politicization see van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, pp. 38-50. 37 For the earlier period see Martin Bernal, Chinese Socialism to 1907 (Ithaca, 1976). For the most complete analysis of the influence of anarchism in early twentieth century China that traces its origins and reviews its main contents of utopianism, revolutionary theory, feminism, and culture and nation see Peter Zarrow, Anarchism and Chinese Political Culture (New York, 1990). 38 On Li Dazhao see Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism (Cambridge, Mass., 1967). For Chen Duxiu see Lee Feigon, Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party (Lawrenceville, 1983). Li Da’s importance in the founding of the CCP has been recognized by Chinese communist historians, as have his important theoretical contributions during the early years. Indeed, he published and edited the CCP’s first official organ, Gongchandang (The Communist). See, for example, Li Qiju et. al., “Gongchandang yuekan yu Li Da tongzhi” (The Communist Monthly and Comrade Li Da), Guangming ribao (Illuminated Daily) 2 July 1979 and “Jiandang qianhou de Li Da tongzhi” (Comrade Li Da Around the Time of the Establishment of the Party), Lishi yanjiu (Historical Research), No. 8, 1979, pp. 15-31. For an assessment of his early ideas on party organization see Hans van de Ven, The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the Search for a New Political Order, 1920-1927 (Harvard University: Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1987), pp. 62-65. On his contribution to the dissemination of marxist ideas see V. Burov, “Li Da and the Dissemination of Marxist Ideas in China,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 3, 1983, pp. 102-13. 39 In September 1920, it became the organ of the Shanghai communist “small group.” 40 Maurice Meisner, Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism. 41 Chesneaux, The Chinese Labor Movement, p. 405 and passim. 42 Perry, Shanghai on Strike, p. 4. For other nuanced treatments of labor in China see Gail Hershatter, The Workers of Tianjin, 1900-1949 (Stanford, 1986) and Emily Honig, Sisters and Strangers: Women in the Shanghai Cotton Mills, 1911-1949 (Stanford, 1986). 43 Formerly it was suggested that this group was founded in May but this is more likely the founding date of the Marxist Research Society. More recently, a Chinese scholar has suggested the date of June, basing this on the fact that Shi Cuntong, who was an original member, left for Japan on 20 June 1920. However, the situation was very fluid and changed rapidly. It is still quite probable that Shi and the other sources were referring to the Marxist Study Society and that the formal establishment of the communist group came later. See, Jin Liren, “Zhonggong Shanghai faqizu chengli qianhou rougan shi shikao” (An Investigation into Some Historical Questions Around the Time of the Establishment of the Initial Shanghai Organizations of the CCP) part 1, Dang de wenxian (Party Documents), No. 6, 1997, pp. 78-83.
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44 See Tony Saich, “Through the Past Darkly: Some New Sources on the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party,” International Review of Social History, 30, 2, 1986, pp. 167-76 for details concerning the founding of the organizations in Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan, Changsha, Guangzhou and Jinan. A written report by an early communist, Zhang Tailei, states that by 1 May 1921, there were communist organizations in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Beijing, Tianjin, Wuhan and Hong Kong among others. See “Zhang Tailei xiang gongchan guoji yuandong shujichu de baogao” (Report of Zhang Tailei to the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern), in Research Group on Contemporary History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), Qingnian gongchan guoji yu Zhongguo qingnian yundong (The Communist Youth International and the Chinese Youth Movement) (Beijing, 1986), p. 44. There appears to be no information on the activities of the group in Tianjin. The activities of the Chongqing group are mentioned in a report that was delivered to the Comintern. It is important to note that this group had no representation at the First Party Congress and appears to have developed in isolation from the rest of the centers. For the report see “Sichuan sheng Chongqing gongchan zhuyi zuzhi baogao” (Report of the Communist Organization of Chongqing in Sichuan Province), in Central Archives (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang diyi ci daibiao dahui dang’an ziliao zeng ding ben (Archival Materials on the First Congress of the CCP, Expanded Edition) (Beijing, 1984), pp. 27-32. The report and its significance is analyzed in van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, pp. 73-75. 45 Of the eight original members six were said to have been anarchists. 46 See Saich, “Through the Past Darkly” for details concerning the establishment date of all these organizations. 47 See “The First Program of the CCP” and “The First Decision as to the Objects of the CCP,” in Ch’en Kung-po (Chen Gongbo), The Communist Movement in China: An Essay Written in 1924 by Ch’en Kung-po (New York, 1966). Edited with an introduction by C. Martin Wilbur. 48 Wang Jianying (ed.), Zhongguo gongchandang zuzhishi ziliao huibian (Collection of Materials on the Organizational History of the CCP) (Beijing, 1982), p. 2. 49 “Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyangju tonggao--guanyu jianli yu fazhan dang, tuan, gonghui zuzhi ji xuanchuan gongzuo deng” (Circular of the Central Bureau--Concerning Building and Developing the Party, the Youth League, Labor Unions, and Propaganda Work) in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 27-28. 50 This is clearly seen in his report of July 1922 to the ECCI. “Bericht des Genossen H. Maring fur die Executive,” v. Ravesteyn Papers, No. 79, International Institute of Social History. 51 An English translation of the letter can be found in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 34.
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52 Dalin had been in Canton during the months of April to June to help with arrangements for the Congress of the Socialist Youth League. During this period he engaged in discussions about the feasibility of a united front with the GMD. 53 The Congress was attended by 12 delegates and they represented some 195 members. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Gao Junyu, and Deng Zhongxia were elected to the CEC with Chen as Chair of the Central Bureau, Zhang the head or organization, Cai head of propaganda. Xiang Jingyu, who was elected as an alternate member of the CEC, was appointed head of the Women’s Department. CCP policy towards women and the role of Xiang Jingyu is interestingly analyzed in Christina Kelly Gilmartin, Engendering the Chinese Revolution. Radical Women, Communist Politics, and Mass Movements in the 1920s (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995). She demonstrates how difficult it was to establish a women’s voice in the communist literature and to establish a presence in the Shanghai party structure. Despite their proclamations, the structures remained male dominated. It was, in fact, the Comintern that compelled the party to set up a formal women’s bureau at the Second Party Congress. 54 The Labor Secretariat had been set up in August 1921 and Maring wrote its original declaration. 55 For the text see Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China, 1, pp. 328-39. 56 After the Congress, as noted below, there were severe problems with implementation of the policy. 57 Exact attendance at the Congress is unclear from documentary evidence, and the memoirs are contradictory. Most reliably it seems that some 30 delegates represented 420 party members. 58 The main opponents were Zhang Guotao and Cai Hesen. The fact that opposition ran deep is shown by the fact that the vote on the resolution was only passed by a margin of 21 to 16. 59 In November 1922, the Central Bureau of the party moved to Beijing to take advantage of warlord Wu Peifu's patronage. Wu was seen by the Narkomindel as a "democrat" and a progressive force who could be worked with in the national movement. He had supported the labor movement and allowed the dissemination of communist propaganda in return for its support against opponents such as Zhang Zuolin. However, on 1 February 1923, troops broke up the meeting to establish a union for the Beijing-Hankou Railway. The resulting strike was brutally put down by soldiers under Wu Peifu's command. For a first hand account see Luo Zhanglong, “Jing-Han gongren liuxue ji” (The Bloodshed of the Jing-Han Workers), March 1923, in Beifang diqu gongren yundong ziliao xuanbian (Selected Materials on the Workers’ Movement in the Northern District) (Beijing, 1981), pp. 433-583. In February it was decided to move the Party Center back to Shanghai
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where it was still operating in late-March/early April despite a decision to relocate to Guangzhou to operate in the more relaxed climate there. 60 For an English translation of Chen’s report see Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 60-63. For an analysis of the debates concerning the cooperation with the GMD and relevant documentation from the Congress see Saich, The Origins of the First United Front in China, 1, pp. 175-86, 2, pp. 570-629. 61 The new full CEC members with the number of votes received in brackets were as follows: Chen Duxiu (40), Cai Hesen (37), Li Dazhao (37), Wang Hebo (34), Mao Zedong (34), Zhu Shaolian (32), Tan Pingshan (30), Xiang Ying (27) and Luo Zhanglong (25). Five alternates were elected. The five members of the Central Bureau were Chen Duxiu, Mao Zedong, Cai Hesen, Tan Pingshan, and Luo Zhanglong. Chen was elected Chair, Mao secretary, and Luo accountant. 62 On the Soviet see Fernando Galbiati, P’eng P’ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet (Stanford, 1985). 63 “Istoricheskie korni chentusiuizma” (Historical Roots of Chen Duxiu-ism), Problemly Kitaia (Problems of China), No. 3, 1930, p. 210, quoted in L. Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923-1925 (New York, 1979), pp. 376a-377. 64 Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, pp. 254-56. 65 “Sun Zhongshan dui tanhe gongchandang chengwen zhi pishi” (Sun Yat-sen’s Comments on a Petition to Impeach the Communist Party), in Tanhe gongchandang liangda yao’an (Two Important Cases of Impeachment of the Communist Party) (n.p., September 1927), in Geming wenxian (Documents of the Revolution), No. 9, June 1955, p. 2. 66 Twenty delegates attended representing 994 members. Voitinsky attended on behalf of the Comintern. The Congress elected a new nine-person CEC comprising Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Cai Hesen, Zhang Guotao, Xiang Ying, Qu Qiubai, Peng Shuzhi, Tan Pingshan, and Li Weihan. There were five alternates. Chen was elected General Secretary by the CEC, the post replacing that of Chair of the Central Bureau. 67 “Guanyu minzu geming yundong zhi yijuean” (Resolution on the National Revolutionary Movement) in The Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Center) (Beijing, 1989), 1, pp. 329-41. 68 “Dui zhigong yundongzhi yijuean,” (Resolution on the Labor Movement) in ibid., pp. 342-357. 69 “Duiyu nongmin yundongzhi yijuean,” (Resolution on the Peasant Movement), in ibid., pp. 358-64.
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70 “Duiyu zuzhi wenti zhi yijuean” (Resolution on the Organization Question) in ibid., pp. 379-82. 71 See Gilmartin, Engendering the Chinese Revolution, pp. 134-36. The Movement also enabled the CCP to expand its women’s organizations extensively outside of Shanghai. Of particular importance was the communist-sponsored Guangdong Women’s Emancipation Association founded in May 1925. It had about 1,000 members. 72 For the most detailed account see Richard W. Rigby, The May Thirtieth Movement: Events and Themes (Canberra, 1980). 73 For an analysis of this meeting and a translation of the relevant documents see Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 106-09 and pp. 152-66. 74 The workers’ committee was headed by Zhang Guotao. The peasants’ committee was not set up until November 1926 and then it was headed by Mao Zedong. In addition, a military committee was set up and was also headed by Zhang. 75 C. Martin Wilbur and Julie L.Y. How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisers in China 1918-1927, (New York, 1956), p. 228. 76 Ibid., pp. 225-27. 77 The “Theses” can be found in Jane Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents (Oxford, 1953), 2, pp. 336-48. 78 A policy that was being pursued quasi-independently by Mao Zedong and Peng Pai. 79 Eighty delegates attended representing 57,967 party members. The most important Comintern delegate was the Indian M. N. Roy. The Congress elected a 29-person Central Committee with ten alternates. Now the top organization was the Politburo that had seven members and four alternates. Chen Duxiu, Zhang Guotao, Cai Hesen, Qu Qiubai, and Li Weihan formed its Standing Committee with Chen remaining as General Secretary. 80 “Chen Duxiu zai Zhongguo gongchandang diwuci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de baogao” (Report of Chen Duxiu to the Fifth Congress of the CCP), in Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials on CCP History), No. 3, pp. 26-59. Extracts are translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 228-43. 81 See “Resolution of the Eighth ECCI Plenum on the China Question,” in Degras (ed.), The Communist International 1919-1943, 2, pp. 384-90.
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82 See “Guogong liangdang guanxi jueyian” (CCP Resolution on Relations Between the Two Parties). The most important contents of this resolution were transmitted to party members in a letter dated 7 August 1927. It was drafted at the 7 August Emergency Conference that is discussed below. The Chinese text of the letter can be found in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Archives (ed.), Baqi huiyi (The 7 August Conference) (Beijing, 1986), pp. 5-37. 83 Xenia J. Eudin and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey (Stanford, 1957), p. 304 and Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin, M. N. Roy’s Mission to China, p. 107. 84 According to Zhang Guotao, Chen handed in a letter of resignation on 15 July 1927. His reason for withdrawal was said to be that the Comintern’s insistence that the CCP develop its own policies combined with its insistence that the CCP not withdraw from the GMD made work impossible. Chang Kuo-t’ao (Zhang Guotao), The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party/1921-1927 (Lawrence, 1971), 1, pp. 655 and 715. However, this is not quite accurate as in accordance with Comintern instructions, the CCP central authorities were reorganized and Chen’s leadership stopped on 12 July 1927. See Political Academy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ed.). Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials on CCP History) (Beijing, February 1982), pp. 57-58. 85 To this day, 1 August is marked as the founding of the Red Army and is celebrated as army day. 86 “Shanghai gongzuo jihua jueyian” (Resolution on the Shanghai Work Plan), in Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 2, pp. 259-63 and Perry, Shanghai on Strike, passim. Indeed the 12 April repression of the CCP and its supporters was carried out by various groups of gangsters, some of which were linked to Chiang and the GMD. 87 See Mao Zedong, “Hunan nongmin yundong baogao” (A Report on the Peasant Movement in Hunan), in Minoru Takeuchi (ed.), Mao Zedong ji (Collected Works of Mao Zedong) (Tokyo, 1983), 1, pp. 207-49. 88 “Duiyu Guangdong nongmin yundong yijuean” (Resolution on the Peasant Movement in Guangdong), in Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 2, pp. 163-79. 89 Obviously one cannot go into all the details here and discussion will focus on the case of Li Lisan’s leadership and the formation of a second united front with the GMD. 90 “Zhongyang tonggao nongzi dijiuhao--muqian nongmin yundong zong celue” (CC Circular No. 9 on the Peasantry--The General Strategy for Peasant Movement at the Present Time) in the Committee for Collection of Materials on CCP History and the Central Archives (ed.), Baqi huiyi, 1986), pp. 84-89.
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91 The conference was attended by 22 CCP members and three Soviet advisors. The newly arrived Comintern representative, Lominadze, had called the meeting. The preparatory work was conducted in collaboration with Qu Qiubai, Li Weihan, and Zhang Tailei. 92 These are translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 296-313. 93 This view differs somewhat from that expressed in Conrad Brandt et al. The authors attribute the mention of continued cooperation with the GMD to Stalin’s need to “to hide the ugly faces which belied his infallibility.” Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John King Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (New York, 1966), p. 98. 94 B. Lominadze had arrived in China as the Comintern representative to replace Borodin and Roy. He participated in drafting the “Circular Letter” adopted by the meeting. He returned to the Soviet Union at the end of 1927. 95 The members were: Su Zhaozheng, Xiang Zhongfa, Qu Qiubai, Luo Yinong, Gu Shunzhang, Wang Hebo, Li Weihan, Peng Pai, and Ren Bishi. Seven alternates were elected including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Li Lisan, and Zhang Guotao. 96 The suggestion that the Congress be held in Moscow had been made by Qu Qiubai as head of the temporary Politburo and a Comintern representative in China, O. A. Mitkevich. This was accepted by the ECCI. Alexander Grigoriev and Konstatin Shevelyov, “On the 60th Anniversary of the 6th CPC Congress,” Far Eastern Affairs, No. 5, 1988, pp. 81-82. The Congress was attended by 142 deputies of whom 84 had the right to vote and they represented an estimated 130,000 party members. Party History Research Center of the CC of the CCP, History of the Chinese Communist Party--A Chronology of Events (1919-1990) (Beijing, 1991), p. 60. The figure was an estimate provided by Zhou Enlai in his report to the Congress. 97 “Zhengzhi jueyian” (Political Resolution of the Sixth National Congress), in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai--dangnei mimi wenjian (Since the Sixth Party Congress--Secret Inner-Party Documents) (originally compiled in Yan’an in 1941 and republished Beijing, 1952 and 1981), 1, pp. 1-17. Extracts are translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 341-58. 98 Chen Duxiu’s policies were denounced as opportunist right-deviation. However, the “leftism” of Qu was seen as the greatest danger within the party at the present time. Chen was later denounced as a Trotskyite and, as is discussed below his later analysis did move close to that of Trotsky and he became sympathetic to the Trotskyite movement in China.
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99 “Resolution on the Chinese Question”, February 1928 in Xenia J. Eudin and Robert Slusser (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934; Documents and Materials (University Park, 1967), pp. 83-86. 100 Key extracts of the “Resolution on the Peasant Question” can be found in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 369-76. The full text can be found in The Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 39-45. 101 In fact, party membership was already becoming increasingly dominated by peasants. Membership at the time of the Congress was calculated to be 130,194 of whom 76.6 percent were said to be peasants and only 10.9 percent workers. Intellectuals accounted for 7.2 percent and rank-and-file soldiers 0.82 percent. It is debatable how reliable a figure this is. 102 “Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui gei Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui de xin,” in Institute of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), Gongchan guoji youguan Zhongguo geming de wenxian ziliao (Materials of the Comintern Concerning the Chinese Revolution) (Beijing, 1982), 2, pp. 1-18. 103 “Zhongyang dui guoji eryue bari guanyu Zhongguo dang ying zhendui muqian xingshi zenyang zhengque de yunyong liuci dahui he guoji dahui de zhengque luxian de xunling de jueyi” (Resolution of the CCP CC Concerning the Implementation of the Comintern’s 8 February Letter and the Correct Line of the Sixth Congress and the Comintern), in the Central Party School (ed.), Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao (Reference Materials on Teaching CCP History) (Beijing, 1978), 2, pp. 6-19. The Resolution is dated 15 May 1929. 104 The letter was published in Pravda on 29 December 1929. 105 See “Zhongguo gongchandang jieshou gongchan guoji dishici quanti huiyi jueyi de jueyi” (Resolution of the CCP Acceptance of the Resolution of the Comintern’s Tenth Plenum) 20 December 1929 in The Central Party School (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 5, pp. 523-29 and “Jieshou guoji yijiuerjiunian shiyue ershiliuri zhishixin de jueyi – guanyu lun Guomindang gaizu pai he Zhongguo gongchandang de renwu” (Decision Accepting the Comintern’s Directive of 26 October 1929 – Concerning Discussion of the Reform Faction of the GMD and the Tasks of the CCP) in ibid., 6, pp. 1-11. One of first victims of this attack on rightism was Chen Duxiu who was denounced viciously for his “Trotskyite” and “liquidationist” tendencies. 106 For analysis of the movement see Gregor Benton, China’s Urban Revolutionaries: the History of Chinese Trotskyism, 1921-1952 (Atlantic highlands, NJ, 1996). For Chen’s later pro-Trotskyite writings see Gregor Benton (ed.), Chen Duxiu’s Last Articles and Letters, 1937-1942 (Amsterdam, 1995). Foe memoirs see Wang Fan-hsi (Wang Fanxi) Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, translated and edited by Gregor Benton (New York, 1991) and, for a very different view see C. Cadart and Cheng Yingxiang, Memoires
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de Peng Shuzhi: L’Envol du Communisme en Chine (Memoirs of Peng Shuzhi: The Origins of Communism in China) (Paris, 1983). 107 “Xin de geming gaochao yu yi huo ji sheng de shouxian shengli” (The New Revolutionary High Tide and an Initial Victory in one or More Provinces), Hongqi (Red Flag), No. 121, 19 July 1930, pp. 1-4. 108 The agent of the Far Eastern Bureau of the ECCI in Shanghai did reply in letter of 20 June. He expressed his disagreement with resolution and requested that it not be distributed. This seems to have angered Li Lisan sufficiently that he wrote to ECCI calling for his dismissal and the dissolution of the Bureau. Yang Yunruo, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi jishi, 1919-1943 (Records of the Relations Between the Comintern and the Chinese Revolution) (Beijing, 1983), p. 86. 109 See Benjamin Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), p. 143: “Far from condemning the Politburo 11 June letter, the ECCI letter of 23 July actually endorses its basic strategic suggestions”; Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930-1934 (Seattle, 1961), 1, p. 25: “A close examination of the Comintern directive of 23 July 1930 and the CCP Politburo resolution of 11 June shows discrepancies which go beyond the scope of timing and tactics”; and Robert Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931 (Seattle, 1969), p. 175: “The Comintern’s analyses then stripped Li of any theoretical ambiguities he might have attempted to use to maintain his position.” 110 There was no direct telegraphic communication between the Party Center and the Comintern before early 1931. 111 The “returned students” groups refers to those who had come back to China from studies in Soviet Russia. They formed a group under the leadership of Wang Ming, Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian. The group is also referred to as the “28 Bolsheviks” after the group of students who returned from Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Pavel Mif had been their patron and had influenced them through his positions as director of the ECCI’s Chinese Commission, deputy director of the Comintern’s Far Eastern Secretariat, and president of Sun Yat-sen University. 112 Shao Yu [Wang Ming], “The Current War Among the Warlords and the Tasks of the Party,” Bolshevik, 5 June 1930. 113 This letter is often referred to as the letter of 16 November 1930 because of the date of its arrival in China. “ Gongchan guoji zhixing weiyuanhui guanyu Li Lisan luxian wenti gei Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang weiyuanhui de xin” (Letter from the ECCI to Members of the CCP CC Concerning the Li Lisan line), in The Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (ed.), Gongchan guoji youguan zhongguo geming de wenxian ziliao, pp. 103-12.
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114 “Zhonggong sizhong quanhui jueyian,” in The Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 114-18. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 457-63. 115 The list of Politburo members had been approved prior to the Plenum by the Politburo and the Comintern’s Far Eastern Bureau. The members of the new Politburo were: Xiang Zhongfa, Xiang Ying, Xu Xigen, Zhang Guotao, Chen Yu, Zhou Enlai, Lu Futan, Ren Bishi, and Wang Ming. There were seven alternates including Liu Shaoqi and Mao Zedong. The Standing Committee of the Politburo comprised Xiang Zhongfa, Zhou Enlai, and Zhang Guotao. 116 Luo Zhanglong was not caught. 117 See Patricia Stranahan, Underground. The Shanghai Communist Party and the Politics of Survival, 1927-1937 (Lanham and Boulder, 1998), pp. 111 and 154. This is an excellent account of the party organization and its struggle to survive during the years of GMD repression. 118 Perry, Shanghai on Strike, p. 105. 119 Xiang also betrayed the party to the GMD. 120 Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai, 1927-1937 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1995), pp. 151-56 and Stranahan, Underground, pp. 116-18. 121 After an international campaign of protest, the Noulenses were released from prison in August 1937 and left China in July 1939. The real name of Noulens was Yakov Rudnik. The Bureau probably finally wound up activities in 1934. For an amazing piece of detective work see Frederick S. Litten, “The Noulens Affair,” pp. 492-512. 122 See Stranahan, Underground, pp. 147-84 on which the following is based. 123 Yang Yunruo, Gongchan guoji he Zhongguo geming guanxi jishi 1919-1943. 124 This is the date that is used in official publications and its still followed by historians in the People’s Republic of China. See, for example, The Research Department on Party History of the CCP CC, Zhonggong dangshi dashi nianbao (Annual Chronology of Major Events in CCP History) (Beijing, 1987), p. 91. Some Contemporary evidence suggests that the Party Center moved as early as 1931. Here it is suggested that movement of key personnel did begin in 1931 but that the formal organization did not move until January 1933. However, the Provisional Party Center in Shanghai was a largely ineffectual rump at this time. 125 For studies of the Jiangxi Soviet see Derek Waller, The Kiangsi Soviet Republic: Mao and the Two National Congresses of 1931 and 1934 (Berkeley and Los Angeles,
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1973) and Trygve Lotveit, Chinese Communism 1931-1934. Experience in Civil Government (Scandinavian Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. 16, 1973). For documents and analysis see Hsiao Tso-liang, Power Relations within the Chinese Communist Movement 1930-1934 (Seattle, 1961 and 1967), Two volumes. 126 On the E-Yu-Wan see Odoric Y. K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses. Building Revolution in Henan (Stanford, 1994), pp. 98-162. This study centers on the interaction between the CCP and various social groups: workers, religious sectarians, rural elites, students, intellectuals, the military, and the peasantry. It shows how the CCP adopted its tactics to the varying conditions confronted in the revolutionary process. 127 For a collection of all Mao’s writings at this time and an analysis of the soviet between 1931 and 1934 see Mao’s Road to Power, Revolutionary Writings 1912-1949: Volume IV, The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Soviet Republic 1931-1934, edited by Stuart R. Schram, associate editor Nancy J. Rhoades, guest associate editor Stephen C. Averill (Armonk, NY, 1997). 128 “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo xianhefa” (Outline of the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic), Hongqi zhoubao (Red Flag Weekly), 25, 4 December 1931, pp. 2-7. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 552-56. 129 “Zhonghua suweiai gongheguo tudifa” (Land Law of the Soviet Republic), in The Secretariat of the CCP CC, Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 181-83. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 556-58. 130 Chiang Kai-shek personally assumed command and committed around 1 million troops. It was a more thoughtful campaign than those previously and gradually a noose was tightened around the soviet. 131 For Luo’s views see “Dui gongzuo de yidian yijian” (Some Opinions About Our Current Work), reprinted in the Political Academy of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (ed.), Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials on CCP History) (Beijing, 1982). For the Party Center’s response see “Suqu zhongyangju guanyu MinYueGan shengwei de jueding” (Decision of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area Regarding the Fujian-Guangdong-Jiangxi Provincial Committee), in the Secretariat of the CCP CC, Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 384-85. They are translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 596-602. 132 This was not the first purge in the Jiangxi Soviet. Shortly after returning to Jiangxi during the summer of 1930 after the failure of an attack on Changsha, a part of the attempted program of uprisings to seize major cities, Mao came into conflict with other local communist forces. Mao used the Jiangxi Soviet government to begin a purge of the Jiangxi Action Committee, which had been created just before the July 1930 attempted uprising in line with Li Lisan’s policy. Mao’s opponents were accused of being members
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of a nationalist secret organization known as the “A.B. League” (Anti-Bolshevik League) and of being guilty of “liquidationist” tendencies. In response to the purge, a local Red Army battalion rebelled and was massacred at Futian in early December 1930. While both sides claimed they were acting in accordance with ideological principles, the struggle really was one to assert the power of the newly arrived Red Army forces over local communists. This was a pattern repeated throughout the base areas in the thirties and forties. For the fullest account of the Futian events see Stephen C. Averill, “The Origins of the Futian Incident,” in Tony Saich and Hans van de Ven (eds.), New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution (Armonk, NY, 1995), pp. 79-115. Averill points out that the origins of the name A.B. League are uncertain. While popularly referred to as the Anti-Bolshevik League, he suggests that the name derives from the two levels (the “A” or provincial level and “B” or local level) at which the group operated. 133 “Muqian de xingshi yu dangde renwu jueyi” (Resolution on the Current Situation and the Party’s Tasks), Douzheng (Struggle), 47, 16 February 1934, pp. 1-16. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 609-22. 134 The Resolution can be found in the Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 10, pp. 50-70. 135 The Politburo probably had twelve members with five alternates. The Politburo members were: Bo Gu (Qin Bangxian), Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Xiang Ying, Wang Ming, Chen Yun, Kang Sheng, Ren Bishi, Zhang Guotao, Mao Zedong and Gu Zuolin. Liu Shaoqi was among the alternates. The Plenum also established a Central Secretariat (also referred to as the Standing Committee of the Politburo) with Bo Gu, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Xiang Ying as members. Bo Gu had overall responsibility. 136 “Yichu weile baowei suai,” Hongse Zhonghua (Red China), No. 239, 29 September 1934, pp. 1-2. 137 On the history of this group who stayed behind before they were rescued by the Second United Front that began in 1937 see Gregor Benton, Mountain Fires. The Red Army’s Three-Year War in South China 1934-1938 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1992). 138 For an analytical account that adopts a more journalistic style for this epic adventure see Harrison E. Salisbury, The Long March: The Untold Story (New York, 1985) and for a more academic account see Benjamin Yang, From Revolution to Politics: Chinese Communism on the Long March (Boulder, Colorado, 1990). 139 On the meeting see Thomas Kampen, “The Zunyi Conference and Further Steps in Mao’s Rise to Power,” The China Quarterly, No. 117, March 1989; Benjamin Yang, “The
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Zunyi Conference as One Step in Mao’s Rise to Power: A Survey of Historical Studies of the Chinese Communist Party,” The China Quarterly, No. 106, June 1986; and the much earlier Jerome Ch’en, “Resolution of the Tsunyi Conference,” The China Quarterly, No. 40, December 1965. The meeting was attended by Politburo members Mao Zedong, Zhu De, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian and Bo Gu and alternate members Wang Jiaxiang, Deng Fa, Liu Shaoqi, and Kai Feng. Seven military leaders were present as was Otto Braun and his interpreter, Wu Xiuquan. Deng Xiaoping was present probably as the note-taker. 140 A long resolution and a short one were drafted. The longer version was probably for dissemination in the party while the short one that names names was for senior officials. 141 The short resolution is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 640-43. 142 On how he was outmaneuvered see David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic (Cambridge, Mass., 1994), pp. 39-49. 143 For Zhang’s highly colorful but not entirely reliable autobiography see Chang Kuo-t’ao, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol. 1: 1921-1927; Vol. 2: 1928-1938 (Lawrence, Kansas, 1971-72). 144 On this see Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front (1935-1945) (Oxford, 1988), pp. 18-27. 145 Shum suggests that this policy derived from Wang Ming’s ideas. Shum Kui-kwong, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power, p. 19. For the letter see “Zhongyang gei Manzhou geji quanti dangyuan de xin. Lun Manzhou de zhuangkuang he women dang de renwu” (Letter from the Party Center to Party Organizations at All Levels and all Party Members in Manchuria. On the Situation in Manchuria and Our Party’s Tasks), Douzheng (Struggle), No. 18, June 15, 1933, pp. 1-5; No. 19, July 25, 1933, pp. 14-16; and No. 20, August 5, 1933, pp. 14-16. 146 Because the announcement had been submitted to and approved by Dimitrov and Stalin at the Comintern Congress in August, it is commonly referred to as the “August First Declaration.” According to Wang Ming, he drafted the Declaration while convalescing from an illness in June 1935. Wang Ming, Mao’s Betrayal (Moscow, 1979), p. 68. Previously, the origins of this declaration had been subjected to much debate but now it is quite clear that it was prepared by Wang Ming in Moscow. 147 “Zhongyang wei muqian fan-Ri tao-Jiang de mimi zhishi shu” (The Party Center’s Secret Letter of Instruction on Opposing Japan and Condemning Chiang at the Present Time), in The Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 10, pp. 561-71. A translation can be found in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 698-705.
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148 Those probably in attendance were: Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Bo Gu, Liu Shaoqi, Wang Jiaxiang, Kai Feng, Deng Fa, Li Weihan, Peng Dehuai, Wu Liangping, Yang Shangkun, Otto Braun, Guo Hongtao, and Zhang Hao. 149 See the Political Resolution drafted by Zhang Wentian in The Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 734-45. 150 The resolution can be found in ibid., 2, pp. 286-89. The CC had already sent out a circular on developing guerrilla warfare in Shaanxi-Gansu area on 21 November 1935. 151 Mao led the men under his command in the First and Third Red Armies to north Shaanxi where he arrived at Wuqizhen in October 1935. Here, together with the local red armies, he was able to create a new base. This became the Shaan-Gan-Ging Border Region when the second united front was formalized in 1937. By contrast, Zhang Guotao and his troops had headed south to the Chengdu plain and after several inconclusive battles with GMD troops, it moved to winter on the Tibet-Xikang border. Zhang tried to set up a stable base area here and even demanded that his base be recognized as the Party Center. In February 1937, he suffered another defeat at the hands of the GMD and eventually his troops pushed him to move north to rejoin with Mao and the others. 152 The resolution can be found in the Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 779-82. 153 Apart from the Shaan-Gan-Ning (Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia) there were major base areas in the Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu (Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan) and the Jin-Cha-Ji (Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei). Recent research has revealed not only how varied the conditions were from base area to base area but even within particular base areas. In general the research shows that the CCP was successful at putting down local roots only where it showed flexibility in adapting policy to local circumstances, where initially it was good at micro-politics. By contrast, attempts to transform local environments to conform with predetermined ideology was unsuccessful. For studies of the various base areas see the essays by Saich, David S. G. Goodman, Pauline Keating, and Joseph W. Esherick in The China Quarterly, No. 140, December 1994, pp. 1000-79; and the essays in Kathleen Hartford and Steven M. Goldstein (eds.), Single Sparks. China’s Rural Revolutions (Armonk, NY, 1989. In addition see Lyman van Slyke, “The Chinese Communist Movement During the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945,” in John King Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker (eds.), The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 13. Republican China 1912-1949, part 2 (Cambridge, 1986). On the Shaan-Gan-Ning see Mark Selden, China in Revolution. The Yenan Way Revisited (Armonk, NY, 1995); Pauline Keating, Two Revolutions: Village Reconstruction and Cooperativization in North Shaanxi, 1934-1945 (Canberra: Ph.D. dissertation, Australian National University, 1989); and David E. Apter and Tony Saich, Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s China. For Anhui and Jiangsu see Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution. The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central
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China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1986). For Henan see Odoric Y. K. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses, pp. 165-327. For the Jin-Cha-Ji see Kathleen Hartford, Step by Step: Reform, Resistance and Revolution in Chin-Ch’a-Chi Border Region 1937-1945 (Stanford: Ph. D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1980). On the Jin-Ji-Yu-Lu see Ralph Thaxton, China Turned Right Side Up: Revolutionary Legitimacy in the Peasant World (New Haven, 1983). 154 Shum, The Chinese Communists’ Road to Power, p. 114. 155 Ibid., p. 117. 156 See “Wanjiu shijude guanjian” (The Key to the Salvation of the Nation), in Wang Ming yanlun xuanji (Collected Speeches of Wang Ming) (Beijing, 1982), pp. 546-54. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 795-802. 157 The Politburo comprised: Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Zhang Guotao, Wang Jiaxiang, Bo Gu, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai, Xiang Ying, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, Wang Ming, Deng Fa, and Kai Feng. 158 “Sanyue zhengzhiju huiyi de zongjie--muqian kangzhan xingshi yu ruhe jixu kangzhan he zhengqu kangzhan shengli” (Summary of the March Politburo Meeting--The Current Situation in the War of Resistance and to Continue the War and Win Victory) in The Secretariat of the CCP CC, Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 923-39. 159 “Zhongyang guanyu xinsijun xingdong fangzhen de zhishi” (Instructions of the CC on the Policy for Movement of the New Fourth Army) and “Zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang xiangcun youji zhanzheng he chuanli youji genjudi wenti gei Jiangsu shengwei de zhishi” (Instruction of the CC to the Jiangsu Provincial Committee on Strengthening Guerrilla Warfare in the Rural Areas and the Establishment of Guerrilla Bases), in The Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 10, pp. 512-13. 160 The Plenum was attended by 56 delegates and was run by a Presidium of twelve. The presidium comprised Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Xiang Ying, Wang Jiaxiang, Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, Peng Dehuai, Bo Gu, and Wang Ming. 161 Wang reported the news to a Politburo meeting on 14 September. The directive also approved the expulsion of Zhang Guotao. See “Gongchanguoji zhixing weiyuanhui zhuxituan de jueding” (Decision of the Presidium of the ECCI) in the Central Archives (ed.), Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji, 10, pp. 574-75. 162 Mao Zedong, “Lun xin jieduan” (On the New Stage) in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), Mao Zedong ji, 6, pp. 163-240.
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163 “The Question of Independence and Initiative Within the United Front,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, 2 (Beijing, 1965), pp. 213-17. 164 “Problems of War and Strategy,” in ibid, pp. 219-34. 165 Although defeated politically, Wang was still useful to Mao as a “straw man” to attack as a part of Mao's justification to become the sole voice interpreting the Chinese revolution. Thus, Wang’s political defeat was the necessary prelude to his humiliation in the campaign to study party history and the Rectification Campaign (1941-44). The campaigns ended in the adoption of the “Resolution on Some Historical Questions” in April 1945. This Resolution adopted Mao’s analysis of party history that crticized the policy of the thirties when Wang Ming, Bo Gu and the Returned Russian Students held sway as “leftist.” Wang’s demise coincided with Mao’s desire to place himself as the unchallenged interpreter of China’s revolutionary experience. The Resolution is in The Secretariat of the CCP CC (ed.), Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 1179-1200. For an analysis of the Resolution and the role its drafting played in discrediting Wang Ming and consolidating Mao’s power see Tony Saich, “Writing or Rewriting History? The Construction of the Maoist Resolution on Party History,” in Saich and van de Ven (eds.), New Perspectives on the Chinese Communist Revolution, pp. 299-338. 166 The three resolutions on organizational issues can be found in The Secretariat of the CCP CC, Liuda yilai, 2, pp. 203-09. 167 Liu’s critique was outlined in four letters to the CC. For the most important see The Secretariat of the CCP CC, Liuda yilai, 1, pp. 803-12. 168 Perry, Shanghai on Strike, pp. 110-11. 169 On the Association see Parks M. Coble, “The National Salvation Association as a Political Party,” in Robert B. Jeans (ed.), Roads Not Taken: The Struggle of Opposition Parties in Twentieth-Century China (Boulder, 1992). 170 Ibid., p. 117. 171 See “Gongchandangren fakanci” (Introducing the Communist) in Takeuchi Minoru (ed.), Mao Zedong ji, 7, pp. 69-83. 172 “Xinminzhu de zhengzhi yu xinminzhu de wenhua” (New Democratic Politics and New Democratic Culture) in Zhongguo wenhua (Chinese Culture), No. 1, February 1940. 173 For Mao’s most extensive analysis of economic policy see Andrew Watson, Mao Zedong and the Political Economy of the Border Region: A Translation of Mao’s Economic and Financial Problems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
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174 The statement can be found in Xin Zhonghua bao (New China News), 16 April 1941. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 963-65. 175 See Jiefang ribao (Liberation Daily), 10 December 1941. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 965-66. 176 See Jiefang ribao, 27 May 1943. It is translated in Saich, The Rise to Power of the Chinese Communist Party, pp. 1143-45. 177 See William W. Moss, “Dang’an: Contemporary Chinese Archives,” in The China Quarterly, No. 145, March 1996, pp. 112-29. 178 These memoirs were published in four parts in Zhonggong dangshi ziliao (Materials of CCP History), No. 1, 1980, pp. 114-79; No. 2, 1982, pp. 169-218; No. 4, 1982, pp. 50-135; and No. 7, 1983, pp. 143-225.