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This product is part of the Pardee RAND Graduate School (PRGS) dissertation series.
PRGS dissertations are produced by graduate fellows of the Pardee RAND Graduate
School, the world’s leading producer of Ph.D.’s in policy analysis. The dissertation has
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PARDEE RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL
Three Essays on the Labor Supply, Savings and Investment Behavior of Older Workers
Jack W. Clift
This document was submitted as a dissertation in September 2012 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in public policy analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of Julie Zissimopoulos (Chair), Pierre-Carl Michaud, and Paul Heaton.
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iii
AcknowledgementsAfter a lengthy journey, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to all the people who have helped me along the
road.
Julie Zissimopoulos, the chair of my dissertation committee, was incredibly supportive at all stages of
this process, from exploring my earliest thoughts about these topics during her PRGS class through to
suggesting final edits in response to feedback at my formal dissertation defense, and stuck with me
through some extremely challenging times. It has been a pleasure to work for her on RAND projects and
then with her on our collaborative work, and I am very grateful that she was willing to continue to serve
as my chairperson even after leaving full‐time work at RAND.
Pierre‐Carl Michaud played a significant role in all aspects of my PRGS experience, as a teacher,
supervisor, colleague, committee member, and teammate on the PRGS softball team. I am particularly
grateful for the extensive support on my third dissertation paper, and, along with Raquel Fonseca (and
their cats), for welcoming me into their home in Quebec in July 2012 for a stay that was both highly
enjoyable and very productive. Paul Heaton provided me with astute feedback and comments
throughout my dissertation. His thoughts on what was interesting to him “from an outside perspective”
were always extremely helpful, adding direction to the research and clarity to the narrative. His
contributions were exactly what I hoped for when I asked him to be my third committee member.
Collectively, my committee members are responsible for much of what is good in this dissertation, and
blameless for what remains of the bad.
I received financial support for my dissertation work from James & Anne Rothenberg, and Kip & Mary
Ann Hagopian, through the PRGS Dissertation Awards that their generous gifts made possible. I received
additional support for my work from the Roybal Center for Financial Decision Making, and from National
Institutes of Aging Grant P01 AG022481.
My experience at RAND has also been both financed and enriched by work on numerous projects across
a range of units with a distinguished group of researchers. Aside from members of my committee, I
would like to give special thanks to Joanne Yoong, Angela Hung, Dick Neu, Emmett Keeler and Stijn
Hoorens for their mentorship and collegiality. I thank also the administration, faculty and staff of the
Pardee RAND Graduate School for their support and patience. Particular thanks are due to Rachel
Swanger, whose flexibility and compassion allowed me to stay, and Ira Krinsky, through whose
dedication and backing I have a good reason to leave.
I have received a large amount of academic, professional and social support from friends, particularly
those within the student body at PRGS and from students, faculty and fellow alumni of the UCLA Luskin
School of Public Affairs. I am grateful for the part they have played in my life to date and excited to have
them as my peers, friends and colleagues as I embark on my professional career.
Finally, I must thank the two people without whom I would literally not be here today: my parents Parry
John Clift and Patricia Ann Clift. Their unconditional love is appreciated and reciprocated, always.
v
Introduction
Populations across the ‘Western’ world are ageing: in the United States and EU‐15 countries, the ratio of
those aged 20‐64 to those aged 65 and over stood at 6.43 in 1950; by 2000, this ratio had decreased to
4.09; by 2050, this ratio is projected to decrease to 2.13.1 This shift in the age structure of societies is the
result of demographic trends over which government policies have relatively little control, and has
significant consequences both for the welfare of older individuals and for the sustainability of the public
social programs that support those individuals in old age.
As the demographic trends continue, government, business and private individuals must adapt to the
changed circumstances. Many countries instituted their old‐age support programs at a time where the
demographic structure allowed a large number of working‐age citizens to support a small number of
retirees; some reforms have been forthcoming (despite political challenges), but further reforms are
likely to be necessary. Businesses are adapting their benefit structures to take demographic changes
into account, reducing their long‐term legacy costs by moving from Defined Benefit pension plans to
Defined Contribution plans, and are still in the process of adapting to a labor force that contains a
greater proportion of older workers than in previous years. Individuals in turn can no longer rely so
heavily on their public and occupational pensions to sustain their standard of living in retirement, and
must find ways of working more, saving more or growing their savings more rapidly if they want to enjoy
a comfortable old age.
In this dissertation, I provide three distinct analyses addressing labor supply, saving and investment
behavior of (older) workers, in the context of the incentives and constraints they face due to employer
and government policies.
In the first paper, I examine labor supply flexibility and its effect on the labor supply decisions of older
workers. Previous literature suggests that people would like to reduce hours of work gradually over time
as they get older, but do not have the flexibility to do so in their job, and consequently may retire early
rather than continue to work high hours at older ages. If greater flexibility allows individuals to stay in
the labor force longer, this could increase total labor supply, helping to increase both private resources
for retirement and tax revenue to support public programs.
Following a sample of older Americans for 16 years from 1992 to 2008, I find that there are noticeable
differences in labor outcomes between those who had flexibility over their hours in 1992 and those who
were not able to adjust their hours: those with flexibility worked fewer hours in their 50s, but tended to
stay in the labor force longer; the major difference between groups occurred when individuals were in
their early‐mid 60s, at which time those who did not have flexibility in 1992 were much more likely to
retire than those with flexibility. This work provides support for the theory that people prefer gradual
retirement to more abrupt departures from the labor force, and indicates that flexibility around key
retirement ages might have an impact on behavior. The overall effect on total labor supply of providing
1 Author calculations using data from United Nations (2009). World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision
vi
flexibility at all points of the lifecycle is ambiguous, as small reductions in hours earlier in life may offset
any gains at older ages; when individuals enter our dataset, those with flexibility are already working
slightly fewer hours than those without.
In the second paper, we examine whether labor supply flexibility affects investment behavior.
Individuals can receive higher returns (on average) on their investments if they are willing to bear more
risk, which allows people to reach retirement with greater resources (on average) than if they had
pursued low‐risk strategies; but the fear of suffering big losses discourages people from taking risks.
Theoretical work has argued that individuals with flexibility over their labor supply over the lifecycle can
bear more risk in their portfolio of investments, as they can increase their labor to offset any losses they
might suffer.
Using a new survey we fielded in the American Life Panel (ALP), we examine how different measures of
labor supply flexibility are related to measures of risk‐taking in investments: individual participation in
the stock market, and the percentage of an individual’s financial wealth held in stocks. We find no
evidence that flexibility over number of hours worked per week is related to investments in stocks. We
find weak evidence that other flexibility measures – an individual’s belief that they would be able to
continue to work longer to make up for any negative wealth shocks, and the absence of factors that
make it difficult to sustain a job into old age – may be related to greater risk‐taking in investments.
These results are not robust across all specifications, and require further research for confirmation, but
may indicate that flexibility at the extensive margin (ability to extend a career) may be more relevant to
investment decision‐making than flexibility at the intensive margin (ability to adjust hours).
In the third paper, I describe the construction and characteristics of a unique dataset with which I lay the
foundations for understanding pension system incentives and how they influence work and savings
behavior over the lifecycle. Public pension systems across the developed world are in need of reform,
but it is important to understand how the incentives in these systems affect behavior if we are to predict
the consequences of different possible reforms. Previous literature has argued that public pensions
displace private savings, but with elasticity of less than 1; this suggests that possible reductions in
pension benefits through reforms would be partially (but not fully) offset by increases in private saving.
Using new retrospective earnings history data for five European countries, in conjunction with linked
survey data describing household wealth, I construct a dataset that captures the heterogeneous pension
system incentives faced, and labor supply decisions made, at each point in the lifecycle for a large group
of European men. My exploratory analysis of this dataset is consistent with the hypotheses that more
generous income replacement by pension plans leads to lower private wealth accumulation, and greater
reward within the pension system for continued work leads to later retirement. However, these
statistical associations admit of plausible alternative explanations; the work documented in this paper
cannot provide definitive answers on the incentive effects of pension systems, but provides the
groundwork for significant extensions of research in this field, and eventually for detailed policy
simulation of pension reform.
1
Paper1:LaborMarketRigiditiesandtheLaborSupplyofOlderWorkers
Introduction
As life expectancy in the United States increases and the Baby Boomers reach normal retirement age,
Social Security and Medicare face a serious threat of insolvency2. As with any mismatch of revenues and
costs, there are a number of possibilities for restoring balance to the finances, but political factors make
many of these solutions unpalatable: very few politicians wish to run on a platform of increased taxation
and benefit cuts for the elderly, policies which place visible concentrated costs on some voting members
of society but have only diffuse, abstract benefits.
However, examination of lifetime work patterns suggests some policy alternatives that may be less
contentious. It is possible that people at older ages are willing to work longer than they currently do, but
face rigidities in the labor market that prevent them from working the amount that suits them best, and
consequently drop out of the labor force prematurely. By dropping out, people reduce the size of the
labor force (and, from a fiscal perspective, tax revenue), and are also more likely to require support from
Medicare rather than from an employer‐based insurance plan. As a first step towards understanding the
potential benefits of policies that would provide older workers with more flexibility, in this paper I
examine what impact labor market rigidities have on the labor supply of older workers.
2 Population aging is projected to play the dominant role in the growth of Federal entitlement spending in the medium term (64 % of spending growth up to 2035) and a lesser – but still significant – role in long‐term spending growth (44% of spending growth up to 2080). Looking specifically at Medicare/Medicaid, population aging is projected to cause 44% (30%) of medium‐term (long‐term) expenditure growth in health‐related entitlement programs, with excess cost growth in age‐adjusted health care expenditures responsible for a majority of spending growth in these programs. Source: Box 1.2 of Congressional Budget Office (2009) The Long‐Term Budget Outlook, retrieved 8/15/2011 from http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10297/toc.html
2
BackgroundandLiterature
Examination of different cohorts in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) have shown that people in
the younger cohorts expect to work full‐time to older ages than people in previous cohorts (Mermin,
Johnson et al. 2006), largely due to changing retirement incentives, such as a decrease in the prevalence
of Defined Benefit pensions and a reduction in the number of workers receiving offers of retiree health
benefits; more recent cohorts may also be able to work to older ages in more rewarding and less
physically demanding jobs than older cohorts, due to their higher levels of education (Goldin and Katz
2007). At the same time as employment at older ages is increasing, a study of the changing workforce in
the United States found that among workers over the age of 50, 65% of men and 62% of women would
prefer to work fewer hours that they currently work (Bond, Galinsky et al. 2005). The expectation of
longer working lives but preference for fewer work hours later in life may make ‘gradual’ or ‘phased’
retirement (in which workers reduce their hours of work over time but remain in the workforce longer)
attractive to workers: researchers found that 57% of workers in the HRS want to reduce hours of work
as they age if they can3 (Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007).
However, workers may vary in their ability to reduce their hours of work as they age due to an
unwillingness of employers to accommodate this. In the most comprehensive examination of labor
market rigidities facing older workers, Hurd provides a series of indirect evidence for employer‐imposed
constraints on hours of work: 1) part‐time work is more common among self‐employed workers than
among waged workers, 2) if more flexible hours are possible for the self‐employed, we expect the self‐
employed should remain in the workforce at older ages, and some waged workers should transition to
self‐employment to obtain flexibility, 3) as expected, in cross‐section the proportion of self‐employed
workers increases with age, 4) in panel data from the Retirement History Survey (RHS), more self‐
employed workers transition to part‐time work than waged employees (Hurd 1996). More recent work
using the HRS and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) finds evidence consistent with Hurd’s
line of argument, showing that the increased prevalence of self‐employment with age in cross‐section is
driven primarily by differential retirement: older workers who became self‐employed before they were
50 years old are much less likely to withdraw fully from the labor force than wage and salary workers at
any given age in both the United States and England (Zissimopoulos, Maestas et al. 2007). However, as
noted by these authors, there are other differences in incentives between wage‐and‐salary workers and
self‐employed workers. For example, the differences in types of pensions used by the two groups are
shown to explain a considerable portion of the difference in age‐specific exit rates of the different
worker types within each country (Zissimopoulos, Maestas et al. 2007). A multinomial logit analysis of
the HRS suggests that self‐employed workers may be more likely to transition into partial retirement
and less likely to transition to full retirement, even after controlling for differences in assets (Kim and
DeVaney 2005).
3 Author calculation based on Table 3.1 of the cited work
3
Research on ‘bridge jobs’ provides further indirect evidence that wage‐and‐salary workers are often not
free to adjust their hours of work while retaining their hourly wage. Two influential studies in this field
note that older workers who switch jobs and reduce their hours of work have a much lower hourly wage
than the jobs that they leave (Gustman and Steinmeier 1985; Ruhm 1990). Theoretically, there may be
characteristics of these new jobs that are so attractive that workers are making a tradeoff that
compensates for the wage reduction (e.g. a worker may be moving into a lower‐paid occupation later in
life that they enjoy more, or that is more psychologically rewarding; or a worker may be so bored with
their previous workplace that any change is an improvement). However, the simpler conclusion that the
authors draw is that older workers who take these jobs wanted to reduce their hours of work and
increase their leisure time, could not do so in their career job, and so had to settle for a bundle of
increased leisure and disproportionately decreased earnings.4
There are a variety of reasons why wage‐and‐salary workers may face rigidities in the labor market that
prevent them from reducing hours in the same job, and also make it difficult to garner a high wage with
fewer hours of work with a different employer. Fixed costs of employment (such as health benefits or
training costs) and team production requirements mean lower wages must be offered to people who
are working part‐time: a greater percentage of the part‐time worker's product must go towards paying
the fixed employment costs, and team members operating on different schedules may reduce team
productivity (with variation across industry and occupation). These aspects make reduction of hours in a
career job unlikely, and make it unlikely that a worker can move to a job with the same industry and
occupation at a different firm with reduced hours (Hurd 1996). Some jobs, such as those with
management functions, may not easily be filled by a part‐time worker or shared among several part‐
time workers, and some industries may require more teamwork than others. Conversely, businesses
that already utilize large numbers of part‐time workers in their normal plan have been shown to be
more likely to be able to accommodate phased retirement within their company (Hutchens 2007); and
some organizations with unpredictably fluctuating labor requirements5 may benefit from maintaining a
pool of on‐call part‐time employees (Rappaport 2009). An interesting recent paper shows that
businesses in the United States that employ a relatively high proportion of female workers under the
age of 30 also have lower retirement hazard rates for their older workers: the argument is that some
firms have more flexible ‘technology’ and can accommodate workers who may wish to work non‐
standard work weeks – such as older workers who wish to reduce their work hours, or women of child‐
bearing age who may need to take a period of maternity leave and/or work part‐time at hours that can
be scheduled around child‐rearing duties (Blau and Shvydko 2011). The importance of flexibility in work
schedules is cited elsewhere as a reason for women and older workers to transition into self‐
employment, implicitly because this flexibility is not readily available in the wage sector (Lombard 2001;
Zissimopoulos and Karoly 2007).
4 Those with DB pensions may face an additional incentive to switch jobs rather than reducing hours in the same job, if their final pension benefits are dependent on final annual earnings 5 The cited article suggests that, e.g., major storms may lead utilities to require additional labor to restore power, insurance companies and banks to require additional labor to process claims and finance repairs, etc.
4
In addition to gradually reducing hours in a career job, changing jobs at older ages to reduce hours is
also problematic for business reasons: job‐specific human capital is no longer valuable, and employers
are unlikely to invest in training for workers with short expected service (Hurd 1996), although this may
be becoming a less pertinent issue than previously due to the declining average tenure of workers in
younger cohorts (Friedberg and Owyang 2004). In general, older workers may find their chances of
finding a new job hampered by the relatively high health insurance and pension costs associated with
older workers relative to younger workers (Scott, Berger et al. 1995). Older job‐seekers may also have to
grapple with age discrimination: while it can be difficult to measure discrimination directly, an audit
study found that submitting resumes of older women was more than 40% less likely to result in an
interview request than submitting otherwise identical resumes with more recent high school graduation
dates (Lahey 2008).
The significant importance of employer‐based health insurance in the United States provides a unique
challenge to achieving labor supply flexibility for older workers: the costs of providing health insurance
make employers less likely to offer full work flexibility to employees6, and reliance on employer‐based
health insurance can make it infeasible for a worker to reduce their labor supply below the level
required to receive full health benefits. For an employer, health insurance (if offered) is a fixed per‐
employee cost: faced with rising health insurance costs, employers have an incentive to maintain a
workforce with a smaller number of employees each working a larger number of hours, in order to
minimize the fixed costs (Cutler and Madrian 1998). As health insurance is typically a lumpy benefit –
either fully offered or not offered at all – an employer faces a disincentive to allowing workers to retain
health benefits and reduce their hours of work. On the employee side, a significant amount of literature
explores the “job‐lock” phenomenon, whereby workers are less likely to change jobs due to the fear of
losing health insurance benefits, through not having continuous coverage or through insurance
company underwriting rules concerning pre‐existing conditions (Gruber and Madrian 2002). Recent
work extends this idea to another aspect of labor supply: workers are discouraged from
entrepreneurship due to fear of losing health benefits, and are therefore more likely to enter into self‐
employment if they have low demand for health insurance or have coverage through their spouse
(Fairlie, Kapur et al. 2009). The same concept has been shown to apply to retirement decisions, with
retiree health insurance and Medicare eligibility7 increasing retirement hazard, and working spouses
also more likely to retire once their dependent spouse reaches Medicare eligibility (Gruber and Madrian
2002). While most literature in this field refers to staying in or leaving a particular job (hence “job‐lock”),
a logical extension is that workers in a particular job may face “labor‐lock”, whereby they are compelled
to supply some baseline number of hours in order to retain full health benefits for themselves (and
potentially for their dependents), making it infeasible to begin gradual retirement until some other
6 Employers can choose to offer different benefits to full‐time and part‐time workers, but cannot provide benefits to young (and inexpensive) part‐time workers while systematically excluding older (and more expensive) part‐time workers. Employers are also unlikely to wish to manage fine‐grained sliding scales of health benefits to accommodate fully flexible working arrangements. The most likely scenarios appear to be that employers will offer little‐to‐no flexibility for employees with benefits, and/or allow flexibility for part‐time workers but provide them no health benefits. Employers who provide no health benefits to any of their employees likely face fewer difficulties in offering flexible working options. 7 and continuation coverage from COBRA through to Medicare eligibility age
5
source of health insurance (such as Medicare) is available. A recent working paper finds that married
women who depend on their own employment for their health insurance and are diagnosed with breast
cancer reduce their labor supply by 5.5‐7% less than those who have access to health insurance through
their spouse’s insurance (Bradley, Neumark et al. 2012).
It is not clear a priori what the various effects would be of increased labor supply flexibility and
increased prevalence of gradual retirement; importantly, the effect on an individual’s total labor supply
is ambiguous. In an atypical labor setting (the University of North Carolina system), one study found that
workers choosing a newly offered phased retirement scheme would otherwise likely have continued in
full‐time work rather than fully retiring, so the net effect was to decrease labor supply; however, the
least productive professors (those who were previously receiving low or no annual pay rises) were much
more likely to enter phased retirement, such that the phased retirement scheme may have accelerated
the departure of less productive workers (Allen, Clark et al. 2004). In contrast to this narrow finding, a
much more general projection exercise suggested that allowing all workers the option of working half
time at half pay would lead to a modest increase in full time equivalent (FTE) employment, with the
increase in labor supply from those who would be persuaded not to fully retire more than offsetting the
decrease in labor supply from those who would take the opportunity to reduce from full‐time work to
half‐time work (Gustman and Steinmeier 2007).
Little work has directly addressed the effect of stated labor supply constraints on labor transitions at
older ages. In the paper closest to our approach, Charles and DeCicca compared the retirement hazards
of workers with different levels of flexibility over their working hours, finding that workers (aged 55‐64)
who reported no ability to reduce their working hours in 1992 were more likely to retire by 1996 than
workers who reported some flexibility (Charles and DeCicca 2007). However, their analysis does not
examine relevant labor outcomes other than retirement, ignores the possibility of effects of flexibility
that differ by age, and does not utilize the full information available to them regarding individual labor
flexibility. In particular, Charles and DeCicca’s theoretical model contrasts workers who are fully
constrained with those who face no constraints whatsoever regarding their personal labor supply, but
their empirical implementation includes in the ‘unconstrained’ category a significant number of workers
who are able to reduce their hours of work only at a lower wage, or with a reduction (or elimination) of
their health benefits or pension eligibility. In the present paper, I distinguish between those who cannot
reduce hours, those who can reduce hours but face some penalty for doing so, and those who are free
to reduce hours without any penalty. Additionally, I examine not only labor force participation, but also
hours worked, and examine the effects of labor supply constraints on hours worked at different ages.
6
DataI use data from the first nine waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a panel study of
Americans aged 50 and over, funded by the National Institute of Aging and administered by the Institute
for Social Research at the University of Michigan. I use a public‐use version of the data that has been
processed and augmented by researchers at the RAND Center for the Study of Aging.8 In my main
analyses, and descriptive statistics, I restrict the sample to include only those respondents from the
1931‐41 birth cohort who were present in the survey for all nine waves.9
Ability to Reduce Hours
The main variable of interest in this study is the ability of workers to reduce their hours of work at older
ages. For all workers, HRS has a question asking whether or not it is possible for the worker to reduce
their hours. For people working 30 hours a week or more, additional questions are asked about whether
the worker could reduce their work to half‐time and, if so, how this would affect their hourly wage,
health benefits and pension eligibility. Using the answer to these questions, I separate individuals into
three groups:
1) No Reduce: the individual cannot reduce their hours to half‐time (or at all)
2) Constrained Reduce: the individual can reduce their hours to half‐time, but reducing their
hours to half‐time would result in a drop in hourly wage or a negative consequence for their
health benefits or pension plan eligibility10
3) Free Reduce: the individual can reduce to half‐time at the same hourly wage rate
without any negative consequences to their health benefits or pension plan eligibility
Outcomes: hours change, retirement
The outcomes of interest pertain to labor force participation and labor supply. I measure changes
between waves in the hours worked by an individual, with one version of this outcome measuring
changes in hours worked conditional on remaining in the labor force, and an unconditional version
measuring changes in hours worked and counting people who have dropped out of the labor force
between waves as experiencing a reduction to zero hours of work between waves.11 I also investigate
8 See http://www.rand.org/labor/aging/dataprod.html for more details 9 At baseline, individuals present in all nine waves did not differ from those who were not present in all waves in regards their net wealth, income or age, but were more likely be female, married, better educated and in better health 10 Note that an individual must currently have health benefits or a pension plan in order to suffer negative consequences in relation to them 11 Given the very high prevalence of the 40 hour work week, I censor the hour changes at ‐40 and +40 to decrease the statistical influence of a small number of outliers
7
the transition to retirement, where individuals are considered retired if they both self‐report being
retired and are not working for pay.12
Income and wealth variables
A priori, income and wealth are likely to affect labor supply. There are some data issues and definitional
issues with these variables; my standard approach was to choose the definitions that provided the best
combination of practicality and conceptual applicability, and then rerun my analyses to ensure that my
results were not being driven by these definitional decisions.
Given the focus on changes in weekly hours worked and constraints on those changes, the most relevant
income measure is the marginal value (in terms of annual income) of a one hour change in weekly hours
worked. This measure conceptually provides the annual benefit of working an extra hour per week or
the annual cost of taking an extra hour of leisure per week, taking into account the fact that not all
workers work the same number of weeks. It is conceptually superior to a simple annual earnings
measure because workers who have flexibility over their working hours and have chosen to reduce
hours are likely to have systematically lower annual earnings than workers constrained to work more
hours, even if their hourly wage and weeks worked per year are identical. I construct this variable from
the hourly wage reported in the RAND HRS and the number of weeks worked per year.13
Turning to wealth, I define net wealth as the sum of primary residence wealth (net of mortgage owed),
financial wealth, retirement account wealth, business wealth, and other real estate wealth. This
measure does not include wealth associated with a secondary residence due to a data problem in wave
3 of the original HRS data that prevents consistent calculation of second home equity across waves. 14
12 The focus in this paper is on the constraints a worker faces in managing the transition to full retirement, and the consequences of these constraints; individuals who report being retired but are nonetheless working for pay are not ‘fully’ retired in the sense most relevant to this paper 13 It is also possible to calculate this by dividing Annual Earnings by Weekly Hours, but there are data differences that lead me to prefer the formulation above. The Annual Earnings variable is retrospective, asking about the previous year’s earnings, whereas the Weekly Hours, Hourly Wage and Annual Weeks variables refer to the current job. In dual‐earner households, each spouse/partner answers questions from which the Hourly Wage and Weekly Hours variables are created, but the Annual Earnings for each spouse/partner are reported by whichever is considered the ‘financial respondent’ at the household level. The Annual Earnings / Weekly Hours calculation produces fewer missing values than the Hourly Wage * Annual Weeks calculation. Looking within individuals over time, all variables appear to have some suspicious values, but there does not appear to be an advantage of one over another. Overall, because the Annual Earnings variable does not necessarily reflect the respondent’s current job, and other issues appear not to favor either measure strongly, I choose the Hourly Wage * Annual Weeks option. For all the analyses presented later in this paper, I verified that the choice of income variable does not materially influence the main results for the key variables of interest 14An alternative would be to use more full wealth measures but omit individuals in wave 3; this results in estimates that are less precise but not qualitatively different. I also rerun the analysis on the smaller sample, splitting out the 2nd home wealth / mortgage variables from net wealth to see if the omission of these 2nd home variables is likely to have an effect on the results; the coefficients on these variables were small and insignificant (implying they are conditionally unrelated to the main outcomes of interest), and the omission of these variables have virtually no effect on the coefficients on the other variables.
8
Other explanatory variables
I use various categorical variables for demographics and job characteristics. Health is self‐reported on a
5‐point Likert scale from Excellent to Fair; Education is constructed from various survey responses into 5
categories: Less than High School, GED holder, High School graduate, Some College, and College and
above. Race is defined as White/Caucasian, Black/African American, and Other. I code people as
‘married’ if they self‐report being married or partnered; I code people as ‘not married’ if they self‐report
being separated, divorced, widowed or never married.
Current jobs are coded into 13 industries and 17 occupations based on standard categorizations from
the 1980 census. Individuals report how often their job requires ‘lots of physical effort’ on a 4‐point
scale from Always/Almost Always to None/Almost None of the Time. I code people into four different
pension categories based on their description of their main pension plan on their current job: No
Pension, Defined Benefit pension, Defined Contribution pension, or Defined Benefit + Defined
Contribution pension.
DescriptiveStatisticsTable 1, Table 2 and Table 3 show descriptive statistics for the sample in Wave 1. The sample here is
restricted to age‐eligible members of the original HRS cohort, who work at least 30 hours per week in
Wave 1 and are present in each of the first nine waves of the survey. The statistics are broken out by the
worker’s ability to reduce hours in their current job; p‐values for adjusted Wald tests (in the case of the
continuous variables) and Chi‐squared tests (for discrete variables) are presented, testing the hypothesis
that these characteristics are the same across flexibility groups.
While the flexibility groups appear to be similar in many characteristics – a hypothesis of no difference
across groups cannot be rejected for age, race, education, marital status, health or wealth – they are
significantly different in several respects.
In Table 1, we see that the ‘no reduce’ and ‘constrained reduce’ group have higher hours worked and
more income per weekly hours worked than the ‘free reduce’ group. In Table 2, we see that there is a
significant gender difference, with females much more likely to be in the ‘constrained reduce’ or ‘free
reduce’ group than males; but other demographics appear similar.
Turning to job characteristics, there is a very dramatic difference in pension coverage across groups,
with the ‘free reduce’ group much less likely to have a pension than the other groups. There is also a
difference in types of plan: people in the ‘no reduce’ group are very likely to have a Defined Benefit
pension, while Defined Contribution plans are relatively more prevalent in the ‘constrained reduce’
group. Differences in the physical effort required on the job are not significant.
Given the possible occupation‐ and industry‐specific reasons for employer constraints on hours flexibility
mentioned in the background section, it is not surprising that people in different jobs have different
levels of flexibility. In Table 3 we see that people with occupations in the managerial specialty
operations category are particularly likely to be in the ‘no reduce’ group, and that people working in
sales are particularly likely to be in the ‘free reduce’ group. Various service occupations tend towards
the ‘free reduce’ group, while a broad range of mechanical/production/operator occupations tend
9
towards the ‘no reduce’ group. The ‘constrained reduce’ group has a notable spike in the health services
occupation. These occupational differences are mirrored in the industry distribution, where
manufacturing, transportation and public administration appear to be low‐flexibility industries, while
retail, business & repair services, and personal services appear to be high‐flexibility industries. People in
the ‘constrained reduce’ group appear relatively more likely to be in the professional & related services
industry.
To provide a crude summary: it appears that people in the ‘free reduce’ category are more likely to be
female, with jobs that are lower paying with very low pension coverage, often in sales or services.
Members of the ‘no reduce’ group tend to be more concentrated in production industries and
operational occupations, and are likely to have Defined Benefit pensions. Those in the ‘constrained
reduce’ group tend to work more in technical service roles, often with a Defined Contribution pension.
The groups do not differ on health, wealth or the physical requirements of their jobs, nor on age, race,
education and marital status. The differences in benefits across groups are potentially problematic and
require careful examination of controls: with a larger sample, it would be ideal to compare outcomes
based on flexibility among those with good health and pension benefits; with only a small percentage of
the small ‘free reduce’ group having good benefits, including controls for health and pension benefits
and seeing how these affect the models is the more feasible approach.
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15
LaborSupplyTrajectories
Before providing a quantitative empirical analysis of the effect of hours flexibility on individual labor
supply, it is helpful to show graphically how the labor supply decisions of the three groups vary over
time. In the graphical analysis, I limit the sample to those who were age 50‐57 in Wave 1 of HRS, but it is
otherwise the same sample described in the Data section above. I code individuals into groups based on
their Wave 1 ability to reduce hours, and then follow these groups as they age. I do not allow people to
switch between groups for two reasons: first, when people drop under 30 hours of work, they are no
longer asked the detailed questions that allow categorization into the three groups; second, while in the
earliest waves there is no statistically significant difference across the groups in the desire to reduce
hours gradually over time15, this does not hold true in later waves, suggesting non‐random switching
between groups at older ages and potentially conflating the effects of constraints on labor supply
trajectory with differences in desired labor supply trajectory.
In Figure 6, we see how average hours worked changed in the three groups, averaging across those in
each group who were still in the labor force in later waves and collaping individuals into 2‐year age
bands. As suggested by Table 1, the groups start off with different average hours worked, with the ‘no
reduce’ group somewhat higher than the other two groups. Each group has a mostly similar pattern,
with average hours decline moderately in the 50s and more steeply in the 60s. The difference in average
hours between the ‘free reduce’ and ‘no reduce’ groups widens in the early‐mid 50s, but narrows again
by age 62. The constrained group fluctuates more, with the smallest decrease in hours between 50 and
60, but the largest decrease between 60 and 68.
In Figure 7, the same graph is plotted for median hours; unsurprisingly, 40 hours remains the focal point
for each group up to age 58; the ‘free reduce’ group median drops below 40 from age 60 onwards, the
‘constrained reduce’ group median drops below 40 at age 62, and the ‘no reduce’ group median does
not drop below 40 until age 66.
15 See the Empirical Model section for further discussion of this issue and Table 4 for the statistics
16
Figure 6: Change in Average Hours of Work with Age, conditional on remaining in the labor force
2025
3035
4045
Ave
rage
Hou
rs w
orke
d pe
r W
OR
KE
R
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70Age
Reduce Status: No reduceConstrained reduce Free reduce
17
Figure 7: Change in Median Hours of Work with Age, conditional on remaining in the labor force
Turning to labor force participation in Figure 8, there is a steady decline in the proportion of people
working for pay in each group between age 50 and 58, with each group dropping 17‐18% in that time.
However, the groups begin to diverge at age 60 as the ‘no reduce’ and ‘constrained reduce’ groups drop
out of the much faster than the ‘free reduce’ group. The gap in participation is widest at age 62 and
mostly sustained through age 66 before narrowing significantly at age 68.
Combining these two effects – at the extensive and intensive margins – the mean hours of work
averaged across all members of each group are plotted in Figure 9. The ‘free reduce’ and ‘constrained
reduce’ group begin working fewer hours than the ‘no reduce’ group, and continue to work fewer hours
through age 58 as all three groups see a modest decline. However, while the ‘free reduce’ group
continues to follow a similar trend of moderate decline through their 60s, the ‘no reduce’ group and
‘constrained reduce’ groups experience accelerated decline in their early 60s, so that by age 62 the ‘free
reduce’ group is actually working more hours (25.0) on average than the ‘constrained reduce’ (19.4) and
‘no reduce’ (20.0) groups. This substantial gap persists until age 66, before narrowing at age 68.
Overall, the pattern seems to suggest that while those with the ability to reduce hours do take
advantage of this in their 50s and work less than those without the ability to reduce hours, this is offset
by their reduced retirement hazard in their 60s, particularly around key Social Security eligibility ages.
Or, stated another way, those with less flexibility over their working hours tend to work more in their
2530
3540
Med
ian
Ho
urs
wo
rked
per
WO
RK
ER
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70Age
Reduce Status: No reduceConstrained reduce Free reduce
18
50s , but then drop out of the labor force in large numbers as soon as they become eligible for Social
Security.
The relatively abrupt drops in labor supply from the ‘no reduce’ and ‘constrained reduce’ groups,
compared with a fairly smooth smooth labor supply path for the ‘free reduce’ group, provide prima facie
evidence of some workers being “over‐employed” in their 50s due to employer‐imposed constraints,
and then choosing “under‐employment” when they have access to pension income in their 60s. Looking
over the whole period, it is possible that total labor supply for a given individual might work out to be
the same whether he faces constraints or has a free choice of hours16, but the distribution of these
hours when constrained – too many in his 50s and too few in his 60s – could be associated with
significant loss of utility.17
Figure 8: Change in Labor Force Participation with Age
16 Over the age range studied, from 50‐51 to 68‐69, the ‘no reduce’ and ‘free reduce’ groups average 21.5 and 21.3 hours per person respectively. However, I do not capture work before age 50 (where it is possible the ‘free reduce’ group may already have been working less) or after 70 (where we might expect the ‘free reduce’ to continue the later trend of working more than the ‘no reduce’ group) 17 Nevertheless, this distribution of hours may have positive aspects for employers, who may prefer to employ a smaller number of people for a larger number of hours when there are fixed costs per employee rather than per employee‐hour
.2.4
.6.8
1P
rop
ortio
n w
ork
ing
for
pay
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70Age
Reduce Status: No reduceConstrained reduce Free reduce
19
Figure 9: Change in Average Hours of Work with Age, averaged across all individuals
EmpiricalModel
Unconditional on any other factors, it appears that demand‐side constraints on hours of work have a
noticeable effect on individual labor supply. However, it is possible that the difference in labor supply
trajectories between the groups are due to the influence of observed differences in characteristics
between the groups. In order to isolate the effect of demand‐side constraints, I estimate a series of
multivariate regressions, controlling for a wide range of observable characteristics. As my base models I
use pooled Ordinary Least Squares estimation18, and then examine the sensitivity of my results to
alternative estimation assumptions.
The basic models I estimate take the form:
18 With pooled OLS, it is important to consider possible autocorrelation in the error terms within individuals over time. In non‐survey‐weighted data, it is possible to create robust standard errors in Stata using clustering estimation subcommands. Using this method, it appears that there is negative autocorrelation in the within‐person error terms: the cluster standard errors are smaller than the normal standard errors. While Stata does not offer options to deal with the negative autocorrelation in pooled OLS with complex survey data, the standard errors I estimate may be considered to be conservatively large.
1020
3040
50A
vera
ge H
ours
wor
ked
per
PE
RS
ON
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70Age
Reduce Status: No reduceConstrained reduce Free reduce
20
Where is the individual’s ability to reduce hours of work (no reduce, constrained reduce, free
reduce) in wave 1, is a vector of demographic variables including age, race, gender, education and
marital status at time t, is a self‐reported assessment of health at time t, represents net worth at
time t, and is a vector of job characteristics at time t including industry, occupation, physical demands
and a standardized measure of income.
A few variables warrant further description. The labor change outcomes I estimate are change in weekly
working hours conditional on remaining in the labor force, change in retirement status, and a composite
measure of change in weekly working hours where retirees are treated as having working hours of zero.
Insofar as policy‐makers may be most interested in aggregate labor supply, the last outcome provides
the net effect of changes in labor participation and changes of working hours for those who remain
working. All changes are 1‐wave (2‐year) changes.
The standardized measure of income I use is the hourly wage multiplied by weeks worked per year: this
variable is the marginal change in annual income accompanying a one hour change in weekly working
hours, and thus is more closely related to the outcome variables than a simple measure of annual
income or hourly wage.
The ability to reduce hours of work variable is assigned to individuals in Wave 1 of the survey, and I then
keep this fixed for individuals throughout the nine waves over which I observe them. As mentioned
briefly in the Labor Supply Trajectory section, there are two reasons for making this choice, compared
with allowing this variable to change over time. First, the questions that allow me to distinguish
between my preferred categorization are only asked to people working more than 30 hours per week,
so people dropping below 30 hours can no longer be categorized contemporaneously. Second, the
identification of the model relies on the premise that – conditional on the rich set of covariates – there
are no relevant underlying differences between those who face constraints on their labor and those who
do not. However, if people select into these categories, that assumption may not hold, and this is likely
to be increasingly problematic as people approach retirement. In Wave 2, people across the three
groups express similar preferences when asked whether they would prefer to gradually reduce their
hours of work over time as they age19; but by Wave 3, there are statistically significant preference
differences, suggesting that some selection has taken place through job switching or (potentially)
negotiation of job characteristics with the employer. The ability of workers to reduce hours in Wave 1
thus allows me to follow labor trajectories when people dip below 30 hours per week, and also provide
the most plausible conditionally‐random assignment of demand‐side constraints on working hours.
19 See Table 4
21
Results
BaselineresultsGiven the labor supply trajectories seen in Figure 9, I separate individuals by age, to examine the effects
of the ability‐to‐reduce variables at different stages in the transition to retirement. The results from OLS
regressions are presented in Table 8, for change in hours worked (conditional on remaining in the labor
force), likelihood of retirement, and unconditional change in hours worked.
The ‘ability to reduce’ variables do not have much effect on hours changed for workers who continue to
work. The coefficients for both the ‘constrained reduce’ and ‘free reduce’ group are insignificant in all
three age categories, though some of these coefficients are substantively large.
Consistent with the labor supply trajectories seen in Figure 8, the OLS regression results for retirement
in Table 8 highlight that the main effects of the ‘ability to reduce’ variables are felt by those aged 60‐64,
who reach age 62‐66 by the following wave. At those ages, the ‘free reduce’ group were more than 7
percentage points less likely to retire than the ‘no reduce’ group. With an average 2‐year retirement
hazard of 0.25, this represents an effect size of 30%. There were no significant differences across groups
at either the younger (50‐59) or older (65 and over) ages.
The retirement results are mirrored in the unconditional hours‐change results – no difference across
groups at the younger or older ages, but for the people aged 60‐64 the hours change was more positive
(or , less negative) for the ‘free reduce’ group than for the no reduce baseline group. When the changes
in labor force participation and changes in average hours per worker are combined, the OLS estimates
suggest that the ‘no reduce’ group has a decline in hours per person that is 2.6 hours larger than the
‘free reduce’ group. With an average decline of 11.9 hours, 2.6 hours represents an effect size of 22%.
Turning to other variables: in Table 8, I do not report coefficients for model control dummy variables for
age, gender, race, marital status, education, industry, occupation, and physical effort required on the
job.20 The other variable coefficients reported suggest the expected health gradient, with less healthy
people more likely to retire, particularly at older ages. Wealth does not appear to affect hours of work
but may affect participation at older ages; the marginal income for an hour worked per week does not
affect the participation decision, but does seem to increase hours worked, particularly at older ages.
Having a Defined Benefit pension appeared to strongly increase the likelihood of retiring in the next 2
years, with a particularly strong effect at ages 60‐64; those with Defined Benefit pensions did not
decrease average hours per person significantly more than the no‐pension group prior to age 60, but did
reduce hours significantly more from 60 onwards. Those with Defined Contribution pensions were
neither more nor less likely to continue participating in the labor market than those without a pension
on their current job, at any age. However, at older ages, people with Defined Contribution pension plans
did reduce their average hours of work significantly more than the no‐pension group.
20 Gender, race, marital status, education and physical effort required on the job are insignificant for the most part. Unsurprisingly, older people were significantly more likely to retire across the whole age distribution, and tended to reduce their hours more than younger people. Industry/occupation variables appear to have more effect on hours changed and less effect on retirement.
22
AlternativespecificationsThe OLS baseline models described in the section above provide a simple model with intuitive
coefficients. In this section, I report the results of some alternative specifications suggested by the
nature of the data21, and examine alternative ways of capturing the ‘ability to reduce hours’.
Given that retirement is a binary outcome by my definition, I provide a comparison of OLS and probit
specifications in Table 9. The results are quite consistent between the two models, with nearly all
coefficients of interest maintaining the same sign and significance level. The main result of interest – the
statistically significant negative coefficient on ‘free reduce’ for 60‐64 year olds – is consistent across
models, with the Probit estimate of ‐0.278 implying a marginal effect of ‐0.078, compared with ‐0.075 in
the OLS model.
Turning to the hours‐change model, the outcome in this case is a continuous variable, but subject to
censoring. In particular, regardless of one’s disutility for work, it is impossible to drop below zero hours
of work, which places a bound on the maximum size of hours change for an individual depending on
their hours in the previous wave. Overall, left‐censored observations make up 12% of the 50‐59 year old
group, 28% of the 60‐64 year old group, and 27% of the 65+ year old group. I fit an interval regression
model taking into account individual‐level censoring, and present the results in Table 10.
In general, we see that point estimates are generally larger in absolute value but are less precisely
estimated. This is understandable, as the latent values of preferred changes in hours of work take on a
wider range than the observed changes, but we do not have data in that range. Nevertheless, it is worth
noting that a coefficient of particular interest – the effect on hours‐change of the ‘free reduce’ category
for 60‐64 year olds – is quite substantially larger for the interval regression (3.975) than for OLS (2.557).
Given that the outcome is censored on an individual basis depending on the initial hours of work, it is
unlikely that the assumption of normally distributed error terms on the latent variable is correct, and
therefore is not clearly an improvement on the original OLS model; but the interval regression results
make us more confident that the significant OLS coefficients are not an artifact of the way the data are
constructed.
Finally, Table 11 and Table 12 provide alternative versions of the key explanatory variable, ability to
reduce hours. For each age group, I compare the base model (3 categories set in Wave 1) with two
versions of an alternative binary model, combining the ‘constrained reduce’ and ‘free reduce’ groups to
form one ‘any reduce’ group and treating this either as fixed in Wave 1, or as changing over time.
For the most part, the ‘any reduce’ results fixed in Wave 1 are similar to the base models, with point
estimates for the ‘any reduce’ group falling between the point estimates for the ‘constrained reduce’
and ‘free reduce’ groups in the base models. The most notable difference between the base model and
the third model, where individuals are categorized as ‘no reduce’ or ‘any reduce’ based on their
contemporaneous employment, comes in the 65+ age group. Here we see the contemporaneous ‘any
21 As the ‘hours change [workers]’ and ‘hours change [all people]’ outcomes are similar in nature, I omit alternative specifications for the former
23
reduce’ variable seems to have a marginally negative effect on retirement (p‐value <0.1), and has a
statistically significant (and substantively large) positive effect on hours worked.
This difference in results is consistent with the concerns expressed earlier in the paper, that workers
with more flexible jobs at older ages are more likely to have selected into those jobs precisely because
of the flexibility to adjust hours of work. An alternative interpretation might be that workers intending
to work for many years to come are more willing to incur switching costs to a job that better suits their
preferences, while workers planning on complete retirement in the near future are more likely to just
put up with their (inflexible) job for a short period and then quit the workforce altogether. Thus, the
difference we see between the Wave‐1‐fixed and contemporaneous results, attributable to people
switching groups after Wave 1, may reflect differences in unobservable preferences or differences in
work horizon between those who switch groups and those who keep the same classification from Wave
1 onwards. Either way, these results reinforce the advantage of retaining the Wave 1 classifications as
the least likely to be subject to non‐random selection.
24
ConclusionIn this paper, I have demonstrated that people without constraints on their flexibility to reduce working
hours are likely to remain in the labor force longer, and consequently tend to provide greater aggregate
labor supply at older ages. The effect of flexibility is felt most strongly around key ages connected to
Social Security benefit eligibility: when workers reach the Social Security early retirement age of 62,
those with the least flexibility over their hours begin to drop out of the labor force more precipitously
than those who are free to adjust their hours.
However, the implications for total labor supply over the lifecycle are unclear: workers who had the
flexibility to reduce their hours were, on average, working fewer hours in their 50s than the workers
who did not have flexibility. We do not have information on hours of work prior to people entering the
HRS dataset, so we do not know if the initial difference in hours is the result of flexible workers
beginning to taper down their work output at some point earlier in life than the less flexible workers, or
reflects a persistently lower output over the lifecycle.
The results suggest that policies aimed at improving the part‐time work options for older workers over
the age of 60 might allow workers to stay in the labor force for longer. This may be of interest for both
employers and government (and government employers). Employers who wish to retain human capital,
in the form of experienced workers who can share knowledge with (and perhaps provide an example to)
younger workers, may find that they get more out of their older workers by allowing them to reduce
hours prior to normal retirement age. Government may be interested in increasing total labor supply for
fiscal reasons and reducing the reliance of older people on public programs, and may be generally
interested in enabling people to make their preferred ‘optimal’ choices rather than choosing between
suboptimal alternatives. While more research is required on the underlying causes of constraints on
hours of work, some areas of public policy seem particularly relevant: for example, employers may be
reluctant to allow workers to reduce their hours and maintain their health benefits, due to the fixed per‐
person costs involved; providing subsidies for health insurance for older part‐time workers, or allowing
Medicare to be the primary insurance for individuals over the age of 6522, could alleviate this barrier to
flexibility. Similarly, rules surrounding public and private pension systems should be examined to make
sure that people planning to slowly reduce their hours of work at older ages are not disadvantaged
compared with their colleagues who might work full‐time to a certain age and then retire completely.
Finally, while I have demonstrated a quantifiable effect of hours flexibility on labor output, I have not
estimated the utility lost by individuals when they are forced to choose between a limited set of
suboptimal alternatives, nor have I examined in this paper any other individual‐level consequences of
labor supply flexibility. In theory, the ability to adjust individual labor supply could affect a range of
other factors, such as: physical, mental or psychosocial health; savings and investment behavior;
22 In some cases, individuals ‘retire’ from their job on reaching Medicare eligibility, and then are re‐hired by the same employer into a position with a slightly different job description that doesn’t provide health benefits, because current law requires employer insurance to be the primary insurance plan, and employers are not allowed to discriminate in their benefit packages on the basis of age (i.e. for 2 people in identical jobs, it is not permitted to provide the 50‐year‐old with health insurance and deny health insurance to someone who happens to have reached Medicare eligibility age)
25
caregiving to a spouse or parent; or even the propensity to start a business. One might expect that
increased control of one’s labor options could only be beneficial, but testing this hypothesis, and
quantifying the size of any effects, fall beyond the scope of this paper and are left for future research.
26
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28
Tables
Ability to reduce hours on Wave 1 job
No reduce Constrained
reduce Free reduce
p‐value of
difference
test
Wave 1 Observations 2353 133 153
Continuous variable means
Age 55.08 55.03 55.42 0.57
Hours worked 43.09 42.42 39.83 0.00
Income 745.5 675.5 560.8 0.00
Net Wealth 191850 200490 202410 0.91
Table 1
Note: Income is calculated as hourly wage * weeks worked per year, to give annual income per hour in a normal work week (or, the opportunity cost in annual income of reducing a normal work week by one hour)
29
Ability to reduce hours on Wave 1 job
No reduce Constrained
reduce Free reduce
p‐value of
difference
test
Discrete variable proportion distribution
Individual Characteristics
Gender
Male 54.72 31.27 35.01
Female 45.28 68.73 64.99 0.00
Race
White/Caucasian 88.49 89.58 87.77
Black/African American 8.30 7.73 7.88
Other 3.22 2.69 4.34 0.85
Education
Less than high school 15.22 16.33 15.93
GED 5.78 3.31 5.40
High school graduate 32.36 33.37 39.20
Some college 20.66 18.94 20.52
College plus 25.98 28.05 18.96 0.54
Marital Status
Married/Partnered 77.32 76.02 71.84
Single 22.68 23.98 28.16 0.33
Health
Excellent 30.59 27.39 33.90
Very good 35.68 34.64 32.30
Good 25.70 29.49 22.66
Fair 6.50 7.50 8.65
30
Poor 1.52 0.98 2.49 0.75
Job Characteristics
Pension plan on current job
No pension 22.86 26.98 72.35
DB pension 48.75 39.48 14.97
DC pension 25.40 31.21 11.70
DB+DC pension 2.98 2.32 0.99 0.00
Source of Health Insurance
None 6.12 5.71 17.20
Employer 80.00 77.17 48.25
Spouse 10.77 13.18 24.84
Government 1.28 1.21 1.60
Other 1.82 2.73 8.11 0.00
Job requires physical effort
All/almost all the time 18.56 27.22 16.68
Most of the time 16.43 18.98 16.25
Some of the time 31.06 23.38 31.54
None/almost none of time 33.94 30.41 35.54 0.16
Table 2
31
Ability to reduce hours on Wave 1 job
No reduce Constrained
reduce Free reduce
p‐value of
difference
test
Occupation
Managerial specialty oper 19.00 7.91 12.40
Prof specialty opr/tech sup 19.85 22.98 15.57
Sales 5.65 14.26 18.77
Clerical/admin supp 17.84 16.16 17.54
Svc prv hhld/clean/bldg svc 0.35 0.29 2.25
Svc protection 1.91 1.08 1.93
Svc food prep 1.94 7.50 4.31
Health svc 1.06 10.96 5.31
Personal svc 4.24 5.63 6.85
Farming/forestry/fishing 1.20 0.00 1.77
Mechanics/repair 4.49 2.22 1.50
Constr trade/extractors 2.52 2.31 1.25
Precision production 4.20 2.06 0.71
Operators machine 8.31 1.91 2.29
Operators transport etc 4.84 1.93 4.48
Operators handlers etc 2.37 2.81 3.06
Member of armed forces 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
Industry
Agric/forest/fish 1.28 0.00 2.50
Mining and constr 5.37 3.77 3.47
Mnfg non‐durable 10.23 2.92 1.90
Mnfg durable 14.68 3.88 4.85
32
Transportation 8.33 6.66 1.71
Wholesale 3.83 4.44 4.96
Retail 7.25 19.23 20.64
Finan/ins/realest 5.90 7.99 9.61
Busns/repair svcs 2.82 5.32 10.07
Personal services 1.48 2.11 6.63
Entertn/recreatn 1.13 0.00 2.24
Prof/related svcs 30.06 43.24 28.06
Public administration 7.64 0.45 3.37 0.00
Table 3
Ability to reduce hours on Wave 1 job
No reduce Constrained
reduce Free reduce
p‐value of
difference
test
Prefer to reduce hours gradually
Strongly Agree 12.27 18.11 13.72
Agree 40.88 43.92 51.55
Disagree 41.48 35.98 31.88
Strongly Disagree 4.75 1.99 1.93 0.10
Table 4
33
age 51‐59 at t age 60‐64 at t age 65+ at t
Outcome: Hours Change [workers] Mean: ‐1.14Outcome: Hours Change [workers] Mean: ‐2.91Outcome: Hours Change [workers] Mean: ‐2.14
Reduce 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Constrain ‐0.405 ‐0.320 ‐0.328 ‐0.360 ‐0.199 ‐0.954 ‐0.788 ‐0.848 ‐0.759 ‐0.969 0.427 ‐0.593 ‐0.720 ‐0.550 ‐0.658
(0.432) (0.452) (0.450) (0.456) (0.499) (0.889) (0.800) (0.809) (0.814) (0.921) (1.111) (1.426) (1.410) (1.420) (1.438)
Free ‐0.0993 0.0910 0.149 0.161 0.226 0.134 0.235 0.00241 ‐0.150 ‐0.322 ‐0.692 ‐1.542 ‐1.646 ‐1.610 ‐1.603
(0.269) (0.371) (0.381) (0.388) (0.425) (0.680) (0.719) (0.710) (0.694) (0.777) (0.724) (0.961) (0.949) (0.994) (1.178)
Health
Very Good 0.0788 0.0913 0.111 0.0782 ‐0.684 ‐0.663 ‐0.582 ‐0.471 2.161 2.016 2.034 2.189
(0.329) (0.337) (0.343) (0.351) (0.561) (0.574) (0.567) (0.555) (1.136) (1.098) (1.084) (1.146)
Good 0.482 0.500 0.516 0.404 ‐1.526* ‐1.546* ‐1.543* ‐1.484* 2.484* 2.347 2.468* 2.639*
(0.290) (0.291) (0.295) (0.311) (0.584) (0.578) (0.581) (0.573) (1.227) (1.212) (1.207) (1.158)
Fair ‐0.890 ‐0.914 ‐0.931 ‐1.040 0.0683 0.178 0.0616 0.189 1.840 1.652 1.742 2.222
(0.534) (0.561) (0.554) (0.537) (0.923) (0.923) (0.908) (0.949) (1.388) (1.398) (1.424) (1.502)
Poor ‐0.393 ‐0.415 ‐0.482 ‐0.502 2.455 2.434 2.185 2.466 2.973 3.546 3.839 3.482
(1.460) (1.577) (1.555) (1.615) (2.889) (2.856) (2.882) (2.901) (1.919) (2.288) (2.130) (2.060)
Net ‐3.564 ‐3.476 ‐3.455 ‐3.316 ‐2.405 ‐2.383 ‐2.353 ‐2.308 2.871 2.618 2.364 3.750
34
Wealth
(2.056) (1.992) (1.961) (1.859) (2.810) (2.757) (2.731) (3.105) (4.340) (4.385) (4.498) (4.854)
Income 0.468*** 0.474*** 0.461*** 0.518*** 0.171 0.211 0.217 0.559 1.127** 1.316** 1.281** 1.085**
(0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.143) (0.200) (0.202) (0.198) (0.311) (0.405) (0.392) (0.374) (0.333)
Pension
DB Pen 0.264 0.278 0.275 ‐0.986* ‐0.573 ‐0.825 ‐2.905** ‐2.252* ‐2.443*
(0.308) (0.348) (0.359) (0.474) (0.482) (0.524) (0.896) (0.981) (1.130)
DC Pen ‐0.372 ‐0.352 ‐0.293 ‐0.604 ‐0.198 ‐0.410
‐
2.915*** ‐2.351** ‐2.289**
(0.344) (0.355) (0.377) (0.500) (0.531) (0.585) (0.720) (0.812) (0.821)
DB+DC
Pen ‐0.609 ‐0.585 ‐0.571 ‐2.572 ‐2.197 ‐1.567 ‐2.193 ‐1.376 ‐1.472
(0.743) (0.758) (0.767) (1.636) (1.637) (1.604) (3.063) (3.181) (2.863)
Health Ins.
Employer ‐0.849 ‐1.014 ‐2.482** ‐2.586** 11.42 12.82
(0.720) (0.741) (0.889) (0.903) (8.623) (7.922)
Spouse ‐1.301 ‐1.478 ‐2.434* ‐2.310 12.26 13.77
(0.777) (0.776) (1.188) (1.179) (8.454) (7.850)
Gov.plan ‐0.601 ‐0.275 ‐0.619 ‐1.279 12.74 13.74
35
(0.896) (1.017) (1.408) (1.453) (8.568) (7.840)
Other ‐1.635 ‐1.668 ‐1.400 ‐1.519 16.07 16.91*
(1.163) (1.171) (1.358) (1.376) (8.740) (8.245)
Obs. 5855 5461 5391 5391 5350 2992 2712 2663 2663 2620 1695 1451 1432 1432 1318
R‐squared 0.005 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.020 0.010 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.031 0.013 0.036 0.049 0.061 0.084
Notes:
all models include sex, education, race and marital status; models 5, 10, 15 include additional job dummies for industry/occupation/physical effort
required
omitted categories: Reduce ‐ None ; Health ‐ Excellent ; Pension ‐ None ; Health Insurance ‐ None. Income is $000s p.a. / hrs per wk. Net Wealth is
in $million
Table 5
36
age 51‐59 at t age 60‐64 at t age 65+ at t
Outcome: Retire by t+2 Mean: 0.12 Outcome: Retire by t+2 Mean: 0.42 Outcome: Retire by t+2 Mean: 0.64
Reduce 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Constrain ‐0.00277 ‐0.0119 ‐0.000478 0.00004960.000612 ‐0.0832 ‐0.0884* ‐0.0307 ‐0.0297 ‐0.0382 ‐0.107* ‐0.0766 0.0379 0.0380 0.0515
(0.029) (0.031) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.044) (0.043) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Free
‐
0.0604** ‐0.0665** ‐0.0279* ‐0.0314* ‐0.0274 ‐0.160***‐0.139*** ‐0.0829** ‐0.0835** ‐0.0737* ‐0.108* ‐0.0820* ‐0.0274 ‐0.0245 0.00314
(0.019) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.031) (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.041) (0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.035)
Health
Very Good ‐0.00530 ‐0.0171 ‐0.0177* ‐0.0185 0.0400* 0.0426* 0.0428* 0.0462* 0.0129 0.0435 0.0470 0.0567
(0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Good 0.0128 0.00287 0.00152 0.000155 0.0638*** 0.0513* 0.0511* 0.0479* 0.0485* 0.0746* 0.0791* 0.0832*
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)
Fair 0.0922*** 0.0360* 0.0357* 0.0332 0.115*** 0.0876** 0.0877** 0.0876** 0.0937*** 0.0519 0.0565 0.0624
(0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.041) (0.042) (0.049)
Poor 0.191*** 0.0775* 0.0753* 0.0750* 0.178*** 0.0791 0.0737 0.0486 0.151*** 0.0611 0.0641 0.0879
(0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.037) (0.095) (0.095) (0.102)
Net Wealth 0.300 0.106 0.112 0.113 0.173 ‐0.0341 ‐0.0323 ‐0.0398 0.433*** 0.0919* 0.0902* 0.114**
37
(0.261) (0.125) (0.128) (0.121) (0.179) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.101) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Income ‐0.0340*** ‐0.000761 ‐0.000583 ‐0.000884 ‐0.0957***‐0.00329 ‐0.00366 ‐0.00116 ‐0.188*** ‐0.0121* ‐0.0122* ‐0.0116
(0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.042) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Pension
DB Pen 0.0519***0.0618***0.0576*** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 0.0463 0.0389 0.0459
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038)
DC Pen ‐0.00707 0.00190 0.00305 0.00627 0.00790 0.00402 ‐0.0134 ‐0.0212 ‐0.00268
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025)
DB+DC Pen 0.0417 0.0517* 0.0458* 0.0437 0.0442 0.0245 0.00351 ‐0.00349 0.00758
(0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.071) (0.075) (0.080)
Health Ins.
Employer ‐0.0162 ‐0.0209 ‐0.00245 ‐0.00153 0.152 0.0912
(0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.078) (0.081)
Spouse 0.0241 0.0200 ‐0.000341 0.0115 0.0858 0.00874
(0.018) (0.019) (0.034) (0.036) (0.087) (0.093)
Gov.plan 0.0498 0.0247 0.0697 0.0897 0.141 0.0918
(0.052) (0.053) (0.068) (0.072) (0.077) (0.078)
Other ‐0.00286 ‐0.00612 ‐0.0102 0.00843 0.00808 ‐0.0575
(0.020) (0.020) (0.045) (0.045) (0.135) (0.137)
38
Obs. 7400 6895 6103 6103 6051 6632 6161 3749 3749 3683 7068 6604 2020 2020 1816
R‐squared 0.049 0.076 0.036 0.039 0.046 0.039 0.093 0.034 0.035 0.053 0.032 0.146 0.028 0.031 0.052
Notes: all models include sex, education, race and marital status; models 5, 10, 15 include additional job dummies for industry/occupation/physical effort required
omitted categories: Reduce ‐ None ; Health ‐ Excellent ; Pension ‐ None ; Health Insurance ‐ None. Income is hrly wage *wks per year. Net Wealth is in $million
Table 6
age 51‐59 at t age 60‐64 at t age 65+ at t
Outcome: Hours Change [all people] Mean: ‐3.88 Outcome: Hours Change [all people] Mean: ‐6.24 Outcome: Hours Change [all people] Mean: ‐2.20
Reduce 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Constrain 0.267 0.318 ‐0.218 ‐0.202 ‐0.151 0.0266 0.526 0.571 0.651 0.363 ‐0.366 ‐0.403 ‐0.0156 0.119 ‐0.194
(0.579) (0.710) (0.902) (0.874) (0.898) (0.736) (0.765) (1.015) (1.021) (1.145) (0.608) (0.606) (1.856) (1.840) (1.737)
Free 1.162* 1.315* 1.224 1.396 1.066 1.725* 2.322* 3.159** 2.967** 2.454* ‐1.030* ‐1.211* ‐0.416 ‐0.454 ‐0.914
(0.479) (0.532) (0.758) (0.773) (0.782) (0.725) (0.872) (1.075) (1.095) (1.178) (0.400) (0.466) (1.054) (1.075) (1.232)
Health
Very Good 0.643 0.745 0.769 0.791 ‐1.589* ‐1.968** ‐1.905** ‐1.978** ‐0.265 0.399 0.354 0.206
(0.479) (0.539) (0.540) (0.575) (0.698) (0.706) (0.706) (0.702) (0.553) (1.208) (1.238) (1.235)
Good ‐0.0387 ‐0.0826 ‐0.0188 0.0148 ‐1.951** ‐3.062*** ‐3.076*** ‐3.092*** 0.0240 ‐0.238 ‐0.214 ‐0.143
(0.534) (0.579) (0.581) (0.590) (0.660) (0.826) (0.823) (0.864) (0.537) (1.061) (1.050) (1.110)
Fair ‐1.997* ‐3.246** ‐3.211** ‐3.282** ‐0.978 ‐3.297** ‐3.393*** ‐3.381** ‐0.160 ‐1.277 ‐1.371 ‐0.654
39
(0.838) (1.062) (1.073) (1.092) (0.844) (0.977) (0.971) (1.035) (0.558) (1.537) (1.575) (1.714)
Poor 0.751 ‐5.190* ‐5.092* ‐5.153* 2.185 ‐1.561 ‐1.754 ‐0.737 0.524 0.563 0.478 ‐1.006
(1.213) (1.956) (1.998) (2.060) (1.322) (3.606) (3.613) (3.635) (0.577) (3.255) (3.361) (3.277)
Net Wealth ‐2.612 ‐5.739 ‐6.078 ‐6.160 4.710 0.304 0.384 0.763 5.139* ‐1.363 ‐1.343 ‐1.147
(2.945) (5.476) (5.639) (5.141) (2.412) (2.096) (2.075) (2.323) (2.454) (1.759) (1.787) (1.924)
Income ‐0.485 0.439* 0.433* 0.492** ‐2.361*** 0.422* 0.436* 0.740* ‐1.788* 1.396*** 1.361*** 1.301***
(0.271) (0.166) (0.167) (0.173) (0.557) (0.197) (0.194) (0.280) (0.855) (0.341) (0.325) (0.351)
Pension
DB Pen ‐1.079* ‐1.618** ‐1.660** ‐7.549*** ‐6.958*** ‐6.874*** ‐5.208*** ‐3.893** ‐4.108*
(0.483) (0.494) (0.530) (0.675) (0.766) (0.701) (1.370) (1.415) (1.557)
DC Pen 0.530 0.0322 ‐0.0598 ‐2.775*** ‐2.217** ‐2.096** ‐4.055*** ‐2.948** ‐3.150**
(0.508) (0.500) (0.534) (0.712) (0.739) (0.729) (1.030) (1.080) (1.045)
DB+DC Pen ‐1.186 ‐1.732 ‐1.552 ‐5.465** ‐4.962* ‐3.577 ‐4.099 ‐2.821 ‐2.620
(1.038) (1.036) (0.992) (1.937) (1.967) (1.871) (3.311) (3.293) (3.364)
Health Ins.
Employer 1.515 1.556 ‐2.636* ‐2.895* 2.519 5.152
(1.077) (1.101) (1.068) (1.244) (6.368) (5.796)
Spouse ‐0.414 ‐0.519 ‐1.721 ‐2.196 5.794 9.322
40
(1.191) (1.203) (1.301) (1.490) (6.538) (6.101)
Gov.plan ‐1.655 ‐0.972 ‐1.033 ‐2.302 5.215 7.529
(2.198) (2.290) (2.354) (2.531) (6.366) (5.775)
Other 1.447 1.666 ‐1.057 ‐1.720 10.96 12.65
(1.452) (1.512) (1.615) (1.655) (7.639) (7.276)
Obs. 7328 6858 6075 6075 6023 6512 6099 3707 3707 3642 6896 6535 1976 1976 1786
R‐squared 0.007 0.011 0.025 0.027 0.033 0.014 0.040 0.046 0.047 0.065 0.004 0.020 0.037 0.043 0.067
Notes: all models include sex, education, race and marital status; models 5, 10, 15 include additional job dummies for industry/occupation/physical effort required
omitted categories: Reduce ‐ None ; Health ‐ Excellent ; Pension ‐ None ; Health Insurance ‐ None. Income is hrly wage *wks per year. Net Wealth is in $million
Table 7
Hours Change [workers] Retire by t+2 Hours Change [all people]
Age groups Age groups Age groups
51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t
Ability to reduce (omitted: None)
Constrained Reduce ‐0.794 ‐1.202 ‐0.738 ‐0.00174 ‐0.0404 0.0536 ‐0.612 0.0882 ‐0.372
(0.586) (0.992) (1.489) (0.021) (0.031) (0.052) (0.997) (1.078) (1.780)
Free Reduce ‐0.235 ‐0.282 ‐1.329 ‐0.0194 ‐0.0749* 0.00834 0.278 2.557* ‐0.943
(0.581) (0.831) (1.105) (0.015) (0.033) (0.036) (0.901) (1.250) (1.273)
41
Health (omitted: Excellent)
Very Good ‐0.314 ‐0.668 2.099 ‐0.0193* 0.0532** 0.0487 0.348 ‐1.841* 0.385
(0.438) (0.671) (1.156) (0.009) (0.019) (0.029) (0.593) (0.750) (1.209)
Good 0.00960 ‐1.693* 2.540* 0.0122 0.0760** 0.0743* ‐0.692 ‐3.701*** 0.0487
(0.362) (0.805) (1.174) (0.011) (0.023) (0.034) (0.675) (0.983) (1.151)
Fair ‐0.916 0.195 1.952 0.0406* 0.0869** 0.0567 ‐3.685*** ‐2.798* ‐0.548
(0.554) (1.177) (1.475) (0.018) (0.029) (0.047) (0.996) (1.280) (1.649)
Poor ‐0.0133 4.273 3.378 0.103* 0.127 0.0870 ‐5.815* ‐2.300 ‐0.896
(1.871) (3.717) (2.273) (0.041) (0.084) (0.102) (2.341) (4.274) (3.242)
Wealth/Income
Net Wealth [$million] ‐2.525 ‐1.914 4.037 0.0768 ‐0.0405 0.114** ‐4.001 0.973 ‐1.046
(1.305) (3.079) (4.398) (0.100) (0.033) (0.042) (3.766) (2.304) (1.935)
Income [$000s p.a. / hrs per wk] 0.476 0.606 1.132** 0.00276 ‐0.00526 ‐0.0117 0.256 0.743* 1.348***
(0.247) (0.330) (0.332) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.253) (0.308) (0.357)
Pension on job (omitted: None)
DB Pension 0.405 ‐1.491* ‐2.876** 0.0383*** 0.111*** 0.0505 ‐0.767 ‐7.100*** ‐5.214**
(0.383) (0.560) (1.028) (0.010) (0.019) (0.040) (0.584) (0.720) (1.548)
DC Pension ‐0.137 ‐1.097 ‐2.491** ‐0.0127 ‐0.000875 0.00164 0.740 ‐2.681** ‐4.013***
(0.439) (0.617) (0.723) (0.011) (0.021) (0.026) (0.608) (0.815) (1.019)
42
DB+DC Pension 0.729 ‐2.763 ‐1.818 0.0242 ‐0.0210 ‐0.00740 0.460 ‐3.022 ‐2.854
(0.533) (2.004) (2.696) (0.026) (0.041) (0.072) (1.094) (2.131) (3.099)
Observations 4295 2196 1287 4864 3072 1776 4841 3045 1746
R‐squared 0.021 0.038 0.072 0.050 0.056 0.048 0.035 0.067 0.059
Table 8
43
Outcome: Retire by t+2 OLS Probit
51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t
Ability to reduce (omitted: None)
Constrained Reduce ‐0.00174 ‐0.0404 0.0536 0.0025 ‐0.0374 0.0514
(0.021) (0.031) (0.052) (0.0178) (0.0337) (0.053)
Free Reduce ‐0.0194 ‐0.0749* 0.00834 ‐0.0260 ‐0.0760* 0.0032
(0.015) (0.033) (0.036) (0.0122) (0.0315) (0.0378)
Health (omitted: Excellent)
Very Good ‐0.0193* 0.0532** 0.0487 ‐0.0148 0.0506* 0.0597
(0.009) (0.019) (0.029) (0.0085) (0.0202) (0.0343)
Good 0.0122 0.0760** 0.0743* 0.0003 0.0517* 0.0907*
(0.011) (0.023) (0.034) (0.0086) (0.0239) (0.0403)
Fair 0.0406* 0.0869** 0.0567 0.0311 0.0964** 0.0690
(0.018) (0.029) (0.047) (0.0188) (0.0305) (0.0587)
Poor 0.103* 0.127 0.0870 0.0771* 0.0603 0.0955
(0.041) (0.084) (0.102) (0.0387) (0.0841) (0.1153)
Wealth/Income
Net Wealth [$million] 0.0768 ‐0.0405 0.114** 0.0732 ‐0.0698 0.1273**
44
(0.100) (0.033) (0.042) (0.0558) (0.083) (0.049)
Income [$000s p.a. / hrs per wk] 0.00276 ‐0.00526 ‐0.0117 ‐0.0008 ‐0.0019 ‐0.0205
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.0029) (0.0109) (0.0151)
Pension on job (omitted: No
pension)
DB Pension 0.0383*** 0.111*** 0.0505 0.0550*** 0.1303*** 0.0462
(0.010) (0.019) (0.040) (0.01) (0.0216) (0.0404)
DC Pension ‐0.0127 ‐0.000875 0.00164 0.0027 0.0063 ‐0.0047
(0.011) (0.021) (0.026) (0.0111) (0.0215) (0.0273)
DB+DC Pension 0.0242 ‐0.0210 ‐0.00740 0.0520 0.0260 0.0055
(0.026) (0.041) (0.072) (0.0244) (0.042) (0.084)
Table 9
45
Hours change, all people: [t+2] ‐ t OLS Int Reg
51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t
Ability to reduce (omitted: None)
Constrained Reduce ‐0.612 0.0882 ‐0.372 ‐0.508 0.664 ‐1.344
(0.997) (1.078) (1.780) (1.134) (1.496) (2.440)
Free Reduce 0.278 2.557* ‐0.943 0.570 3.975* ‐0.845
(0.901) (1.250) (1.273) (1.021) (1.703) (1.674)
Health (omitted: Excellent)
Very Good 0.348 ‐1.841* 0.385 0.446 ‐2.508* 0.000359
(0.593) (0.750) (1.209) (0.658) (0.986) (1.672)
Good ‐0.692 ‐3.701*** 0.0487 ‐0.864 ‐5.007*** ‐0.920
(0.675) (0.983) (1.151) (0.763) (1.329) (1.579)
Fair ‐3.685*** ‐2.798* ‐0.548 ‐4.349*** ‐3.995* ‐1.063
(0.996) (1.280) (1.649) (1.174) (1.737) (2.236)
Poor ‐5.815* ‐2.300 ‐0.896 ‐7.143* ‐5.141 ‐1.887
(2.341) (4.274) (3.242) (2.777) (6.138) (4.339)
Wealth/Income
Net Wealth [$million] ‐4.001 0.973 ‐1.046 ‐4.573 1.341 ‐2.888
46
(3.766) (2.304) (1.935) (4.310) (2.766) (3.432)
Income [$000s p.a. / hrs per wk] 0.256 0.743* 1.348*** 0.277 0.889* 1.567***
(0.253) (0.308) (0.357) (0.278) (0.377) (0.427)
Pension on job (omitted: No
pension)
DB Pension ‐0.767 ‐7.100*** ‐5.214** ‐0.720 ‐8.685*** ‐5.480*
(0.584) (0.720) (1.548) (0.667) (1.077) (2.089)
DC Pension 0.740 ‐2.681** ‐4.013*** 1.119 ‐2.252* ‐3.817**
(0.608) (0.815) (1.019) (0.685) (1.110) (1.309)
DB+DC Pension 0.460 ‐3.022 ‐2.854 0.632 ‐2.449 ‐2.913
(1.094) (2.131) (3.099) (1.268) (2.883) (3.954)
Table 10
47
Outcome: Retire by t+2 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t
Ability to reduce (omitted: None)
Constrained Reduce [Wave 1] ‐0.00174 ‐0.0404 0.0536
(0.021) (0.031) (0.052)
Free Reduce [Wave1] ‐0.0194 ‐0.0749* 0.00834
(0.015) (0.033) (0.036)
Any Reduce [Wave 1] ‐0.00635 ‐0.0773*** ‐0.000607
(0.012) (0.018) (0.025)
Any Reduce [Contemp.] 0.00170 ‐0.0249 ‐0.0448
(0.010) (0.015) (0.026)
Health (omitted: Excellent)
Very Good ‐0.0193* ‐0.0196* ‐0.0193* 0.0532** 0.0505** 0.0560*** 0.0487 0.0538 0.0730*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Good 0.0122 0.0125 0.0101 0.0760** 0.0762** 0.0719** 0.0743* 0.0829* 0.0847*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.034) (0.034) (0.039)
Fair 0.0406* 0.0395* 0.0352* 0.0869** 0.0866** 0.0829** 0.0567 0.0606 0.0995*
(0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029) (0.026) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041)
Poor 0.103* 0.102* 0.105* 0.127 0.117 0.145 0.0870 0.0931 0.100
(0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.084) (0.077) (0.091) (0.102) (0.101) (0.100)
48
Wealth/Income
Net Wealth [$million] 0.0768 0.0698 0.0539 ‐0.0405 ‐0.0266 ‐0.0177 0.114** 0.105* 0.151
(0.100) (0.092) (0.086) (0.033) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.175)
Income [$000s p.a. / hrs per wk] 0.00276 0.00290 0.000825 ‐0.00526 ‐0.00454 ‐0.0130 ‐0.0117 ‐0.0112 ‐0.00787
(0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Pension on job (omitted: No pension)
DB Pension 0.0383*** 0.0404*** 0.0439*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.123*** 0.0505 0.0489 0.0428
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
DC Pension ‐0.0127 ‐0.0116 ‐0.00673 ‐0.000875 0.00482 0.0125 0.00164 ‐0.000164 ‐0.0254
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023)
DB+DC Pension 0.0242 0.0249 0.0299 ‐0.0210 ‐0.00613 ‐0.00713 ‐0.00740 ‐0.00280 ‐0.0377
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070)
Table 11
49
Hours change, all people: [t+2] ‐ t 51‐59 at t 60‐64 at t 65+ at t
Ability to reduce (omitted: None)
Constrained Reduce [Wave 1] ‐0.612 0.0882 ‐0.372
(0.997) (1.078) (1.780)
Free Reduce [Wave1] 0.278 2.557* ‐0.943
(0.901) (1.250) (1.273)
Any Reduce [Wave 1] ‐0.187 1.931** ‐0.420
(0.512) (0.675) (0.817)
Any Reduce [Contemp.] ‐0.196 2.157** 1.645*
(0.450) (0.660) (0.795)
Health (omitted: Excellent)
Very Good 0.348 0.386 0.225 ‐1.841* ‐1.792* ‐1.860* 0.385 0.196 ‐0.480
(0.593) (0.594) (0.570) (0.750) (0.752) (0.704) (1.209) (1.178) (1.216)
Good ‐0.692 ‐0.656 ‐0.690 ‐3.701*** ‐3.582*** ‐2.789** 0.0487 ‐0.332 ‐0.703
(0.675) (0.677) (0.588) (0.983) (0.966) (0.871) (1.151) (1.170) (1.191)
Fair ‐3.685*** ‐3.635*** ‐3.349*** ‐2.798* ‐2.759* ‐2.408 ‐0.548 ‐1.024 ‐1.008
(0.996) (0.973) (0.941) (1.280) (1.288) (1.248) (1.649) (1.675) (1.668)
Poor ‐5.815* ‐5.820* ‐5.788** ‐2.300 ‐1.433 ‐3.546 ‐0.896 ‐0.997 ‐2.241
(2.341) (2.332) (2.147) (4.274) (4.021) (4.646) (3.242) (3.239) (3.728)
50
Wealth/Income
Net Wealth [$million] ‐4.001 ‐3.857 ‐3.444 0.973 0.888 0.315 ‐1.046 ‐0.765 ‐7.625
(3.766) (3.615) (3.717) (2.304) (2.077) (2.872) (1.935) (1.998) (7.533)
Income [$000s p.a. / hrs per wk] 0.256 0.263 0.0750 0.743* 0.727* 1.087* 1.348*** 1.325*** 1.103*
(0.253) (0.253) (0.060) (0.308) (0.310) (0.521) (0.357) (0.370) (0.460)
Pension on job (omitted: No pension)
DB Pension ‐0.767 ‐0.906 ‐1.088 ‐7.100*** ‐7.034*** ‐6.495*** ‐5.214** ‐5.251** ‐5.406***
(0.584) (0.562) (0.573) (0.720) (0.680) (0.719) (1.548) (1.579) (1.545)
DC Pension 0.740 0.634 0.378 ‐2.681** ‐2.875*** ‐2.383** ‐4.013*** ‐3.858*** ‐3.206**
(0.608) (0.588) (0.579) (0.815) (0.807) (0.860) (1.019) (0.963) (1.001)
DB+DC Pension 0.460 0.327 0.0272 ‐3.022 ‐3.545 ‐2.563 ‐2.854 ‐2.816 ‐0.450
(1.094) (1.090) (1.085) (2.131) (2.127) (2.043) (3.099) (3.086) (2.989)
Table 12
51
Paper2:Laborsupplyflexibilityandportfoliochoice
Introduction23Life expectancy in the United States continues to increase (Miniño, Murphy et al. 2011), Defined Benefit
pensions are declining in prevalence (Poterba, Venti et al. 2009), and Social Security provides a lower
income replacement rate now than in previous generations (Butrica, Iams et al. 2004) . In order to
sustain their high standard of living at older ages, Americans need to accumulate significant wealth over
their lifetime by working, saving and investing. If opportunities exist, they may also wish to delay
retirement or supplement their retirement income with post‐retirement part‐time employment.
This paper provides new insights into three aspects of this lifetime work/save/invest decision process. At
older ages, workers may find it difficult to sustain the same workload as at younger ages; this paper
provides evidence on job stressors over time and the flexibility workers have to adjust their workload. At
older ages, a negative shock to an individual’s savings through unexpected costs or poor investment
performance can be very damaging; this paper provides new evidence on the extent to which workers
expect to be able to compensate for such shocks with increased work. Finally, most individuals make a
series of investment decisions over their lifetime, and these decisions may be related to their labor
behavior and expectations; this paper provides an empirical exploration of the relatively under‐
researched link between labor behavior and portfolio choice.
More specifically, our empirical work investigates how an individual’s ability to adjust their lifetime labor
supply affects their stock holding behavior. Building on a limited existing literature, we examine the
impact of labor supply flexibility at the intensive margin (the ability to adjust hours of work within a
career) on an individual’s investment in the stock market. Going beyond previous research, we also
examine how factors that affect labor supply at the extensive margin (job characteristics and demands
that make it easier or more difficult to continue a career at older ages) are related to stock investment
behavior. In contrast with previous work, we find little evidence of any impact from intensive margin
flexibility. However, we do find suggestive evidence supporting a link between extensive margin
flexibility and investment behavior.
BackgroundandPreviousLiterature
Theexistenceof‘rigidities’inthelabormarket,andtheireffectsonlaboroutcomesWhile the simplest lifecycle models of labor supply assume that workers are free to adjust their personal
labor supply over time, many workers face labor market rigidities: their employer offers a limited choice
23 Thanks are due to the Roybal Center for Financial Decision Making, which provided funding for our survey through a pilot project, and to Joanne Yoong and Angela Hung for providing access to data from their asset allocation survey
52
of work options, and switching employers can be prohibitively costly (particularly at older ages)24.
Several papers find indirect evidence of constraints on labor supply by examining work transitions at
older ages. Comparisons between the labor supply of employees and the self‐employed show that
employees do not transition from full‐time work to part‐time work at the same rates as the self‐
employed, implying that there are constraints preventing them from doing so (Hurd 1996). Similarly,
employees have been shown to be more likely to withdraw fully from the labor market than the self‐
employed, perhaps due in part to a lack of suitable part‐time work options25 (Zissimopoulos, Maestas et
al. 2007).
Research on ‘bridge jobs’ – part‐time employment taken as a bridge to retirement after leaving a ‘career
job’ – finds that workers who switch employers at older ages receive significantly lower hourly wages
than at their previous employer, and argues that these workers must therefore not have had the option
available to continue to work for their previous employer on a part‐time basis (Gustman and Steinmeier
1985; Ruhm 1990). Switching jobs at older ages may be difficult for several reasons: job‐specific human
capital is no longer valuable (Hurd 1996), relatively high health insurance and pension costs may
dissuade employers from hiring older workers (Scott, Berger et al. 1995), and older job‐seekers may face
discrimination (Lahey 2008). Thus, older workers may face real constraints on their labor supply
decision: their employer may not allow them to adjust their labor in their current job, and it may not be
feasible to effect an adjustment by switching to a new job.
The effect of labor supply constraints on overall labor supply is theoretically ambiguous: some
individuals might prefer to work part‐time, but due to constraints choose to work full time; other
individuals might most prefer to work part‐time, but prefer retirement to full‐time work; the net result
of these two effects is theoretically ambiguous. A study of the University of North Carolina system found
that allowing the flexibility of a phased retirement plan had the net effect of reducing an individual’s
labor supply (Allen, Clark et al. 2004). In contrast, a more general projection exercise suggested that
allowing workers to work half‐time at half‐pay would increase net labor supply (Gustman and
Steinmeier 2007).
Two papers examine longitudinal effects of labor supply constraints using the Health and Retirement
Study, in which workers are asked directly whether or not they are able to reduce their hours of work in
their main job. Charles and DeCicca found that older workers who faced a strong constraint on labor
supply in 1992 had increased an likelihood of retiring by 1996 (Charles and DeCicca 2007). Clift confirms
that older workers with greater flexibility tend to have lower retirement hazard (particularly around
Social Security’s early retirement age), but finds that by reducing their hours of work in their 50s, more
flexible workers may simply be smoothing labor supply over time; thus, labor supply constraints may
affect when an individual supplies labor without having much effect (negative or positive) on how much
labor an individual supplies (Clift 2012).
24 For more detailed discussion of literature on labor supply flexibility and its effect on labor outcomes, see discussion by Clift (Clift 2012) 25 Although (as the authors note) a large part of the observed difference in labor supply behavior can be explained by reference to pension differences and other factors
53
PortfoliochoiceandtheroleoflaborsupplyOver the life cycle, individuals decide not only how much to work and how much to save, but also how
to allocate those savings across a portfolio of assets that vary in their risk and return. Simple economic
models of asset allocation between a ‘safe’ and ‘risky’ asset – assuming stochastic asset returns and
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) – predict that individuals should keep the same balance between
safe and risky assets throughout the lifecycle; but this conflicts with the typical advice of financial
professionals, that individuals should reduce their exposure to risk as they age (Samuelson 1969; Gollier
2005).
However, various extensions of the standard CRRA lifecycle model can produce this type of time‐varying
investment strategy. For example, an intuitive explanation for having higher risk tolerance in investment
early in the life‐cycle is that if pension contributions can be adjusted over time, then an early wealth
shock can be smoothed through adjustments to savings and consumption over a long period, while later
wealth shocks require abrupt adjustments and steep declines in utility (Gollier 2005).
A potentially more interesting and nuanced explanation for time‐varying investment strategies is
examined in a number of papers examining the role of future labor income in determining optimal
portfolio allocation strategy. Future income represents a large portion of a young person’s wealth, but it
is not clear how it should be regarded in terms of expectations and risks. If future income is considered
to be a ‘safe’ asset with finite horizon, and this wealth diminishes over time as the individual approaches
retirement, then CRRA models suggest that the reduction in the riskless labor income asset over time
should be met with a rebalancing of financial wealth away from risky assets towards riskless assets, in
order to maintain the same balance of risk in the total wealth portfolio (Jagannathan and Kocherlakota
1996).
However, treating future labor income in this way may be too simplistic – a number of different
assumptions may be made to bring the modeling closer to reality. One modeling exercise shows that if
future income has a great deal of prospective uncertainty early in a career, but becomes revealed over
the course of a career, this might combine with the long‐term smoothing justification above to produce
an investment trajectory that is conservative when future income is uncertain, rises as future income
becomes more certain, and falls again as the ability to smooth future consumption and savings
decreases (Gollier 2005).
In addition to uncertainty, there may also be uninsurable risk involved in future labor income, and this
risk may be heterogeneously distributed across individuals. One study uses the 1979‐1990 Panel of
Individual Tax Returns to document significant heterogeneity in wage income and proprietary income
streams, and combines this with prior research on the holding of employer stocks by employees in order
to show differences in ‘background risk’ that might explain differences in portfolio behavior across
different people (Heaton and Lucas 2000). A further issue with future labor income risk is the extent to
which it is correlated with stock market risk, such that investments in stocks do not provide a diversified
risk portfolio: if future labor income is highly correlated with the performance of the stock market, this
will tend to reduce the optimal portfolio share invested in stocks. On the one hand, research to date
suggests that labor income is not strongly tied to stock market performance for most people
54
(Jagannathan and Kocherlakota 1996; Cocco, Gomes et al. 2005); on the other hand, other research has
found that modeling labor income and asset returns as jointly related to the business cycle leads to an
improved match of simulated asset profiles over the life‐cycle with those empirically observed (Lynch
and Tan 2011).
TheeffectoflaborsupplyconstraintsonportfoliochoiceOne other aspect of lifecycle labor income may affect portfolio allocation behavior: the degree to which
people have an ability to adjust their labor supply (and thus labor income) over time in response to
shocks. In the earliest full examination of the topic from a theoretical standpoint, researchers showed
that in a continuous‐time consumption and portfolio allocation model, optimal portfolio allocation rules
vary when labor supply is flexible, rather than predetermined over the lifecycle (Bodie, Merton et al.
1992). Specifically, a worker with flexibility over future labor supply should be able to bear more risk in
their investments than people with fixed labor supply, because in the event of a shock a flexible worker
can adjust not only their consumption/savings tradeoff, but also their leisure/consumption tradeoff – a
worker can work more hours to make up for poor performance in their investments, rather than just
cutting back on consumption.26 Additionally, the investment effect of labor flexibility may vary by age:
earlier in life, a worker has a long period over which work hours can be increased very slightly to make
up for a negative wealth shock; later in life, workers have a shorter period over which to adjust their
labor supply and may also have less flexibility to do so.
A subsequent theoretical paper confirms that workers with labor flexibility should be able to invest
more riskily at all ages (until retirement) than workers without labor flexibility. Furthermore, an
additional relevant source of labor supply flexibility is the ability to choose when to retire: flexibility to
choose timing of retirement or partial retirement allows more risky assets to be held at older ages than
otherwise would be advisable (Gollier 2005).
From the literature discussed thus far, simple CRRA models of savings and investment behavior can be
extended in various ways to justify the time‐varying portfolio allocation strategies typically proposed by
financial advisors.27 The most important extensions focus on the role that future labor income plays as
an asset, and the varying ability of workers to smooth past and present consumption and leisure in
response shocks. The ability to adjust labor supply is a potentially important smoothing mechanism,
reducing the lifetime utility losses associated with negative investment shocks (while also increasing the
lifetime utility gains associated with positive investment shocks).
To date, very little empirical work has addressed the relationship between labor supply flexibility and
portfolio allocation. In an unpublished working paper, Benitez‐Silva conducts an empirical analysis of the
26 Recent work on the effects of the financial crisis find that households near retirement reacted by reducing consumption, working longer, and reducing bequests (Hurd and Rohwedder 2010) 27 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, risk tolerance in investment behavior is also likely to be affected by other sources of background risk, such as medical expenditures. International differences in the medical expenditure risks over the life cycle have been cited as a reason for international differences in life cycle investments in risky assets (Kapteyn and Panis 2005); heterogeneity in the supplemental coverage held by Medicare recipients has been shown to be related to differences in risky asset holdings among older Americans (Goldman and Maestas 2012).
55
relationship between labor supply flexibility and portfolio decisions using panel data from HRS,
alternately using self‐employment status and self‐reported ability to increase28 working hours as
measures of labor supply flexibility for individuals aged 51 and over (Benitez‐Silva 2006). He chooses as
his outcome of interest the logarithm of an individual’s wealth held in stocks, while attempting to
control carefully for the individual’s level of wealth held in non‐risky assets. He finds that labor supply
flexibility increases wealth held in stocks by 12‐14%.
In contrast to Benitez‐Silva, we do not have the benefit of repeated observations over time for
individuals in our dataset. However, our dataset is unique in containing information on both labor
supply constraints and portfolio allocation for people aged 25‐67; as previously discussed, the effects of
labor supply flexibility on portfolio choices are predicted to be larger earlier in the lifecycle29. We also
attempt to control for heterogeneity in intrinsic risk‐aversion (potentially important for explaining
variation in portfolio risk exposure).
Finally, we use broader concepts of labor supply flexibility than Benitez‐Silva, examining flexibility on
both the intensive and extensive margin. While the discussion to this point has focused on the ability of
individuals to make small adjustments to the number of hours worked in a given period, an alternative
paradigm involves workers with relatively fixed weekly work hours over their working life but with
flexibility on the length of their career. While the results are open to interpretation30, we find that the
variables pertaining to labor supply flexibility on the extensive margin have a stronger relationship to
portfolio choice than the intensive margin flexibility variables.
We now go on to present a description of our data sources and sample characteristics. There follows an
array of descriptive statistics of interest; a section discussing the logic behind our choices in the
empirical modeling; a section detailing our empirical results; and a section discussing our findings. We
conclude with a conclusion.
28 He argues that the ability to reduce hours is less important for the interaction between labor supply and portfolio decisions, citing as supporting evidence that individuals did not react to the 2001 economic upturn with a reduction in hours worked 29 However, other factors (such as uncertainty about future income) may also be stronger earlier in the lifecycle 30 We do not have plausibly exogenous variation in job characteristics, reducing the level of causal inference we can draw; and the pathways through which our independent variables may affect investment behavior are also subject to alternative interpretations
56
DataDescriptionandSampleCharacteristics
TheAmericanLifePanelFor this research, we fielded a new survey31 in RAND’s American Life Panel (ALP)32, and combined this
data with previous ALP surveys answered by the same group of respondents.
The ALP is a large‐scale internet panel survey administered by RAND, fielded to approximately 5,000
participants aged 18 and above. The initial cohort of survey participants was recruited from the
University of Michigan Survey Research Center’s random digit dial Monthly Survey, and has been
supplemented with members of the Stanford / Abt SRBI National Survey Panel. In order to avoid a
common sample bias issue for internet surveys, RAND provides internet access and an internet browsing
device33 to the relatively small number of households that do not have their own access. Respondents
are compensated approximately $40 per hour of survey‐taking.
The ALP asks a detailed set of demographic questions each quarter, and these are used to construct
sampling weights to align the ALP sample with the larger benchmark Current Population Survey (CPS).
Efficient sampling weights require a parsimonious set of matching variables/categories. Given our
particular interest in job characteristics and their relationship to portfolio choice, we include among our
matching variables a parsimonious occupation variable, in addition to gender, age group, educational
level and income level. After weighting, the basic descriptive statistics for our dataset are generally as
expected, although our sample appears to be slightly more
educated than the CPS (the difference in the
Married/Partnered variable is likely to be definitional in
nature, with unmarried cohabiting partners included in the
definition in ALP).
31 The full survey protocol for the new survey we fielded is reproduced in Appendices
AppendixA 32 For full information on the American Life Panel, see https://mmicdata.rand.org/alp/ 33 Laptop or Microsoft TV2
ALP CPS
Male 0.51 0.53
White 0.79 0.80
Married/Partnered 0.70 0.64
Age
25‐40 0.41 0.41
41‐50 0.26 0.27
51‐60 0.25 0.24
61‐67 0.08 0.08
Education
High School or Less 0.34 0.40
Some College but no BA 0.31 0.27
Bachelor’s Degree 0.22 0.21
Higher Degree 0.14 0.11
N 1341 83,402
57
Table 13: Demographics
Occupation ALP CPS
Management 0.12 0.11
Business and Financial Operations 0.06 0.05
Computer and Mathematical 0.03 0.03
Architecture and Engineering 0.02 0.02
Life, Physical, and Social Science 0.01 0.01
Community and Social Services 0.02 0.02
Legal 0.01 0.01
Education, Training, and Library 0.07 0.07
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media 0.02 0.02
Healthcare Practitioner and Technical 0.06 0.06
Healthcare Support 0.04 0.02
Protective Service 0.02 0.02
Food Preparation and Serving Related 0.03 0.04
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance 0.02 0.04
Personal Care and Service 0.02 0.03
Sales and Related 0.10 0.10
Office and Administrative Support 0.13 0.13
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 0.01 0.01
Construction and Extraction 0.03 0.06
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 0.04 0.04
Production 0.08 0.06
Transportation and Material Moving 0.05 0.06
N 1341 83,402
Table 14: Occupations
58
OursurveyIn August 2011, we fielded a new survey in the ALP focusing on labor supply flexibility, and combined
the data with data from a previously fielded survey that focused on detailed asset holdings.
The survey was fielded to 1527 individuals who had responded to the previous asset survey and were
aged between 25 and 67 inclusively. Our survey received 1498 responses. Of these, 157 were dropped
because they indicated that they were not currently working. This gives a base sample of 1341 for
examining questions about labor supply flexibility and other job characteristics.
Of this 1341, 102 had not given complete information in the asset holding survey to determine their
complete wealth measure. Of the remaining 1239, a further 43 did not provide sufficient information to
determine whether they held stocks, so cannot be used for determining stock holdings. An additional
126 do not provide enough information to calculate their full financial holdings, with one respondent
providing enough information for gross wealth but not enough for net wealth. With the most restrictive
sample selection, the sample characteristics were very similar to those in tables 1 and 2; however, the
selected sample included a larger proportion of White respondents.
Our new survey included several variables that also appear for the age 51+ population in the Health and
Retirement Study. Of these, the key variables we will explore are: whether the individual can increase
hours of work in their current job; whether the individual can reduce hours of work in their current job;
how often the individual’s job requires lots of physical effort; how often the individual’s job requires
intense concentration.
We also included in the survey several new variables relating to labor supply flexibility, and the ability to
adjust labor supply in response to negative wealth shocks: whether the individual can “buy” additional
vacation days from their employer; whether the individual can “sell” surplus vacation days back to their
employer; how far the individual agrees that, in their current job, it is difficult to keep up with changes in
technology; how far the individual agrees with the statement “If I lost some of my savings, I would just
have to make do with less when I retired”; and how far the individual agrees with the statement “If I lost
some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it”.34 The first two are an extension of
being able to increase or reduce hours of paid work, looking at being able to increase or reduce days of
paid work. The third variable explores one of the ways in which workers may not be able to continue to
work indefinitely: obsolescence of technology‐specific skills. The last two variables are novel, and
attempt to understand whether people expect to be willing and able to work more intensely (or retire
later) if they had a negative wealth shock, or whether they would mostly have to cut back on
consumption. The logic expressed in the literature previously discussed is that individuals may
consciously choose to invest in more risky assets precisely because they believe that they can mitigate
potential negative consequences; these new variables attempt to capture that sentiment.
34ExactquestionphrasingisavailableinAppendicesAppendix A
59
OutcomemeasuresThere are several potential measures that could be used to summarize portfolio choice. The most basic
measure we will use is a simple binary outcome for whether or not an individual owns any stocks. We
can also examine the intensity of stock holdings: in their seminal theoretical paper, Bodie et al. mention
the proportion of financial wealth held in risky assets as one standard measure, and the proportion of
‘total’ wealth held in risky assets as the more relevant measure35 (where total wealth includes not only
financial and real assets but also an estimation of the asset equivalent of future labor income) (Bodie,
Merton et al. 1992).
While seemingly straightforward, the measures above pose some questions for implementation. In
order to focus on ‘active’ investment choices in liquid assets, we do not include assets held within
Defined Contribution (DC) plans in the calculation of financial wealth held in risky assets; this prevents
us from conflating employer‐driven pension effects with more active portfolio risk‐taking. Additionally,
the measures of DC wealth and allocation across asset classes in our dataset contain a significant
number of clear reporting errors; using measures of DC allocation and excluding the known errors would
reduce our sample without producing measures in which we have confidence. Nonetheless, in sensitivity
analysis we rerun our models incorporating DC assets on the reduced sample. For our main analyses, we
define financial wealth as the sum of stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, checking and savings account
balances.
Creating a variable describing the proportion of ‘total’ wealth held in risky assets poses additional
challenges. Bodie et al.’s measure is imagined to be bounded by 0 and 1, but given debts and liabilities
(particularly after the housing crash left some individuals with mortgage debt exceeding their home
values), it is possible for individuals to have net asset wealth that is less than their stock holdings, or
even to have negative net wealth; this would cause the ratio of stocks to net wealth to exceed 1 or be
less than 0. This particular challenge could be overcome by focusing on gross wealth, rather than net
wealth, ignoring debts and mortgages, but this would misrepresent an individual’s total wealth.
Furthermore, we lack sufficient data to judge the asset‐equivalent value of future labor income, and
therefore our ‘total’ wealth measure options fall far short of those suggested by Bodie et al.. We do not
believe that the potential ‘total’ wealth measures are a sufficient theoretical improvement to justify the
increased complexity described above.
35 Their concept of ‘total’ wealth includes a ‘human capital’ value placed on the potential future labor income in their theoretical model, divided into a ‘risk‐free’ and ‘risky’ portion to reflect the equivalent asset characteristics. Any attempt for us to do this in an empirical setting would be highly speculative. Nonetheless, our results relating portfolio choice to job characteristics can be interpreted in this spirit.
60
DescriptiveStatistics:ByGender,AgeandEducationLevel
HoursandvacationflexibilityBetween the ages of 25 and 60, there seems to be little change in the hours flexibility for men, hovering
around 20% who can reduce weekly work hours and around 30% who can increase work hours. Women
tend to have more flexibility to reduce hours than men at all ages, but women in the 51‐60 age group
have less flexibility than those in the 25‐40 range, for both increasing or reducing hours. This may reflect
women in the younger age group working more part‐time jobs in combination with raising children. An
alternative explanation is that there are differences between cohorts, such that older cohorts have been
subject to different opportunities throughout their lives and been placed in different types of work (or
different labor force statuses) from younger cohorts.36
Women in the oldest age category (61‐67) seem to have the most flexibility, but it is not clear whether
this reflects women switching to more flexible jobs at older ages, or that differences in retirement
hazard by flexibility status (as seen in Clift(2012)) lead to a biased sample in this age category. Buying
and selling of vacation days is not a common option for men or women, though it appears that the
option to sell vacation days may be more prevalent than the option to buy.
Male Female
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
Can reduce weekly work hours 0.15 0.14 0.23 0.25 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.38
Can increase weekly work hours 0.26 0.28 0.31 0.19 0.34 0.37 0.25 0.37
Can 'buy' extra vacation days 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.02
Can 'sell' back vacation days 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.10 Table 15: Hours and vacation flexibility by sex and age. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
Male Female
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
Chances of having a flexible job when approaching retirement
0: 0‐49% 0.45 0.60 0.55 0.57 0.41 0.41 0.58 0.52
1: 50% 0.26 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.34 0.27 0.19 0.10
2: 51‐100% 0.29 0.23 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.23 0.38 Table 16: Expected future hours flexibility by sex and age. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
In general, it appears that people with higher levels of education may work in less flexible jobs than
those with lower education ‐ men with higher education are less likely to be allowed to increase their
work hours, while women with higher education are less likely to be allowed to reduce their work hours.
36 Although the descriptive tables we present segmented by age groups generally seem to reflect plausible differences in work conditions, expectations and sorting over the lifecycle, all ‘age differences’ in our cross‐sectional data admit of cohort‐difference explanations. This may be particularly relevant for women, given the significant rise in female labor force participation: in 1970, when the oldest of our sample were in their early 20s, the female labor force participation rate was 43.3%; in 2006, when the youngest of our sample were in their early 20s, the rate was 59.4%. (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011)
61
This may reflect a preponderance of hourly sales and service jobs among the lower educated, with more
highly educated workers in more formal salaried positions.
Male Female
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
Can reduce weekly work hours 0.21 0.12 0.21 0.15 0.34 0.35 0.27 0.17
Can increase weekly work hours 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.17 0.26 0.38 0.31 0.30
Can 'buy' extra vacation days 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Can 'sell' back vacation days 0.13 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.04 Table 17: Hours and vacation flexibility by sex and education. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
Male Female
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
Chances of having a flexible job when approaching retirement
0: 0‐49% 0.56 0.52 0.44 0.58 0.64 0.37 0.39 0.47
1: 50% 0.15 0.25 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.23
2: 51‐100% 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.24 0.16 0.32 0.34 0.30 Table 18: Expected future hours flexibility by sex and education. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
62
JobstressorsOf the job stressors, it appears that older men may have jobs that require intense concentration less
often than younger men, while older women may have less physically demanding jobs than younger
women. We see the expected negative education / physical effort gradient across both sexes. Men with
high school education only may face more retirement pressure than those in other groups.
Male Female
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
Coworkers make people feel they should retire by 65
Agree 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.23 0.12 0.16 0.13 0.05
Disagree 0.69 0.78 0.82 0.67 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.88
DNA37 0.15 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.07
My job requires lots of physical effort
All or Most time 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.14 0.28 0.18 0.21 0.17
Some time 0.25 0.31 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.35 0.23 0.27
No time or DNA 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.58 0.49 0.46 0.56 0.56
My job requires intense concentration or attention
All or Most time 0.91 0.79 0.76 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.79 0.82
Some time 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.19 0.15
No time or DNA 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 Table 19: Job stressors by sex and age. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
Male Female
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
Coworkers make people feel they should retire by 65
Agree 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.14
Disagree 0.65 0.71 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.81
DNA 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.09 0.12 0.05
My job requires lots of physical effort
All or Most time 0.53 0.37 0.13 0.08 0.37 0.29 0.16 0.11
Some time 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.22
No time or DNA 0.18 0.31 0.60 0.70 0.37 0.40 0.59 0.67
My job requires intense concentration or attention
All or Most time 0.83 0.83 0.81 0.86 0.77 0.79 0.83 0.87
Some time 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.13
No time or DNA 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.00 Table 20: Job stressors by sex and education. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
37 Unless otherwise noted, all Agree/Disagree answers are recoded from a five point scale (Strong Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strong Disagree, Does Not Apply), and all ‘time’ answers are also recoded from a five point scale (All of the Time, Most of the Time, Some of the Time, None of the Time, Does Not Apply). We believe that for ‘time’ questions ‘Does Not Apply’ should be considered conceptually similar to a very strong negative (equivalent to ‘No time’, but the same cannot be said for Agree/Disagree questions
63
JobrequirementbeliefsWith the job requirement beliefs, the physical fitness variable mirrors the physical demand variable
from the previous section: higher importance for men, not much age gradient, and a negative
relationship between education level and the importance of physical fitness. The importance of learning
new skills tends to decline with age and increase with education, across both sexes. Men appear to find
it increasingly difficult to keep up with changes in technology at older ages, and, interestingly, find it
more difficult to keep up with changes in technology if they are more highly educated (perhaps because
they are in jobs that involve more quickly changing technology).
Male Female
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
Have to keep physically fit if you want to keep up
Agree 0.43 0.49 0.48 0.40 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.38
Disagree 0.52 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.59 0.56 0.51 0.35
DNA 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.26
Have to keep learning new skills if you want to keep up
Agree 0.82 0.85 0.74 0.80 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.86
Disagree 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.17 0.15 0.25 0.22 0.05
DNA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.09
Difficult to keep up with changes in technology
Agree 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.20 0.24 0.21 0.29
Disagree 0.78 0.76 0.64 0.58 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.67
DNA 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 Table 21: Job requirement beliefs by sex and age. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
Male Female
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
Have to keep physically fit if you want to keep up
Agree 0.63 0.55 0.26 0.22 0.36 0.33 0.21 0.22
Disagree 0.31 0.35 0.63 0.66 0.49 0.53 0.54 0.63
DNA 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.24 0.15
Have to keep learning new skills if you want to keep up
Agree 0.73 0.79 0.89 0.92 0.71 0.75 0.76 0.87
Disagree 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.10
DNA 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.04
Difficult to keep up with changes in technology
Agree 0.21 0.22 0.31 0.40 0.21 0.20 0.26 0.24
Disagree 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.59 0.70 0.74 0.70 0.74
DNA 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 Table 22: Job requirement beliefs by sex and education. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
64
LikelyresponsetosavingsshockUnsurprisingly, older workers are more likely to agree that they would have to ‘make do with less’ in the
event of a negative wealth shock, and less likely to agree that they could ‘work more to make up for it’.
Education patterns are less clear‐cut, and could be presented different ways by different groupings of
education or agreement categories: males with high education tend to be more likely to disagree that
they would have to ‘make do’, and more likely to agree that they could ‘work more’; highly educated
females, somewhat paradoxically, agree more with both statements more than less educated females,
agreeing that they would have to work more and that they would have to make do with less. For both
statements, the ‘5’ category is a major focal point, representing 1 out of 11 possible categories but being
selected roughly 20% of the time.
Male Female
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
If I lost some savings, would just have to make do with less
0‐4: Disagree 0.26 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.30 0.26 0.18 0.10
5 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.15
6‐10: Agree 0.49 0.62 0.63 0.67 0.45 0.51 0.64 0.75
If I lost some savings, could always work more to make up for it
0‐4: Disagree 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.26 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.25
5 0.19 0.11 0.25 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.17 0.24
6‐10: Agree 0.66 0.71 0.62 0.47 0.72 0.61 0.66 0.51 Table 23: Expected response to savings shock by sex and age. 10 point scale recoded to 0, 1‐9, 10. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
Male Female
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
If I lost some savings, would just have to make do with less
0‐4: Disagree 0.18 0.17 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.20 0.27 0.16
5 0.29 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.15 0.20
6‐10: Agree 0.54 0.64 0.60 0.50 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.64
If I lost some savings, could always work more to make up for it
0‐4: Disagree 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.10 0.09
5 0.27 0.18 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.14 0.10
6‐10: Agree 0.55 0.64 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.58 0.76 0.80 Table 24: Expected response to savings shock by sex and education. 10 point scale recoded to 0, 1‐9, 10. All figures are survey weighted proportions. [N=1072]
65
DistributionofportfolioallocationvariablesIn this section we report the distribution of several portfolio allocation variables: our main outcomes
(owns stocks, and the proportion of financial assets held in stocks); and three additional outcomes
(owns stocks as personal assets or within Defined Contribution (DC) employer‐based pension plans; and
the proportion of gross or net wealth held in stocks).
A consistent story appears across variables and sexes: stocks are more widely held and more important
the older and more educated a person is. This almost certainly reflects the positive relationship between
age/education and wealth, and the positive relationship between wealth and stock ownership, rather
than a rising preference for risk at older ages.
Male Female N
25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67 25‐40 41‐50 51‐60 61‐67
Owns Stocks 0.29 0.43 0.45 0.56 0.20 0.31 0.35 0.46 1196
Owns Stocks or DC Stocks 0.49 0.63 0.63 0.77 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 1196
Stocks / Financial Assets 0.17 0.31 0.29 0.35 0.15 0.20 0.21 0.29 1072
Stocks / Gross Wealth 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.18 1070
Stocks / Net Wealth 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.18 0.21 1069 Table 25: Distribution of portfolio allocation by sex and age
Male Female N
HS Coll BA MA+ HS Coll BA MA+
Owns Stocks 0.29 0.33 0.52 0.52 0.20 0.23 0.43 0.47 1196
Owns Stocks or DC Stocks 0.47 0.54 0.73 0.73 0.22 0.39 0.59 0.68 1196
Stocks / Financial Assets 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.27 1072
Stocks / Gross Wealth 0.10 0.14 0.17 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.15 1070
Stocks / Net Wealth 0.16 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.32 1069 Table 26: Distribution of portfolio allocation by sex and education
Finally, we present some differences by level of risk aversion. Using wealth‐gamble hypothetical
questions fielded in a previous survey, we can divide our sample into people with more or less risk‐
averse preferences.38 As we would hope to find if our measures are meaningful, the more risk‐averse
38 People were asked a series of three hypothetical questions designed to elicit risk preferences. Each
question was in the same format, presenting a hypothetical ‘risky investment’ that succeeds with
probability p % of the time, increasing the total value to X, and fails with probability (1‐p), decreasing the
value to Y. An example is presented in
Appendix B. In the series of questions, different values of p, X and Y, representing riskier or less risky investments, were presented to individuals based on their initial response, and allowing us to distinguish several categories of people, from those who were willing to accept very risky investments to those who were unwilling to accept any of the risky investments presented to them. The measure we use here is the simplest available, dividing the sample into two categories of roughly equal size, with the ‘less risk‐averse’ being those whose answers indicated willingness to accept more risky investments than those in the ‘more risk‐averse’ group.
66
individuals are less likely to own stocks, and stocks make up a relatively smaller proportion of their
wealth.
Male Female N
Less RA More RA Less RA More RA
Owns Stocks 0.43 0.32 0.35 0.23 1192
Owns Stocks or DC Stocks 0.62 0.52 0.51 0.32 1192
Stocks / Financial Assets 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.15 1068
Stocks / Gross Wealth 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.07 1067
Stocks / Net Wealth 0.27 0.21 0.24 0.15 1066Table 27: Distribution of portfolio allocation variables by sex and risk aversion
Methodology:Empiricallinksbetween‘flexibility’andportfoliochoice
ConceptionsofflexibilityandtheirrelationshiptoeachotherAs discussed previously, Bodie et al. consider a model with a fixed working lifetime, within which
individuals can choose to work more or fewer hours, and can make small adjustments for all future
periods in response to shocks in the present (Bodie, Merton et al. 1992). The most relevant empirical
variables we have to address this logic are what we might call ‘instantaneous hour flexibility’ variables –
whether people can increase or reduce hours in their current job. This is the type of variable Benitez‐
Silva uses to examine the relationship between labor supply flexibility and portfolio choice (Benitez‐Silva
2006). A more full version of this would include whether an individual has that flexibility at all relevant
points in the lifecycle; while this is impossible to determine fully, we do have a “future hour flexibility”
variable, which may also be the more relevant concept if we expect that the main response individuals
will have to savings shocks will be towards the tail end of their working life.
On the other hand, Gollier recognizes that the ability to prolong work life (i.e. delay retirement) may be
an important form of flexibility (Gollier 2005). Empirically speaking, most workers do not rebalance their
401(k) portfolios regularly39, so it is possible that the flexibility to make small adjustments to work over
the course of the working life is not as relevant to investment decisions as the ability to prolong the
working life if necessary. As mandatory retirement ages are now prohibited in most walks of life, and
age discrimination law offers further protections to older workers, workers now have more
opportunities to continue to work than previous generations; but the physical, mental and psychological
demands of work may prevent people from continuing to work indefinitely. To explore these issues, we
have ‘job sustainability’ variables, regarding the demands of work and the difficulty of meeting those
demands. In the analysis that follows, we focus on (a) the amount of time that a job involves lots of
39 Using a dataset featuring 1.2 million workers, Mitchell et al find that 80% of 401(k) participants did not make a single trade over a two‐year period (Mitchell, Mottola et al. 2008)
67
physical effort, (b) how often a job involves intense concentration and (c) how difficult it is to keep up
with technology on a job.40
Related to these variables we have two variables that directly ask individuals about their likely reaction
to negative savings shock: one asks the individual how far they agree with the statement “If I lost some
of my savings, I could always work more to make up for it”, the other asks how far they agree with the
statement “If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less”. While we might expect
those two variables to be mirror images of each other and thus provide no additional information, in
fact some people agreed (or disagreed) strongly with both statements, apparently suggesting that they
would engage in both (neither) courses of action in the event of a negative wealth shock. As they are
apparently distinct, we explore both variables.
ExploratoryRegressionModelWhile we do not have adequate multi‐period data to estimate a full dynamic model linking lifecycle
labor and portfolio allocation decisions, the theoretical models discussed in the background literature
sections of this paper suggest that greater flexibility over labor supply should enable individuals to take
on more risk in their investments. The intuition for this result is that in the event of a negative wealth
shock, individuals with fixed labor supply can only adjust their (current and future) consumption, while
individuals with flexible labor can adjust both their consumption and their leisure, working slightly more
in order to face a less drastic reduction in consumption.
In order to test whether this intuition is borne out in a statistically significant association, we fit an
exploratory regression model relating portfolio allocation to labor flexibility. This takes the basic form:
where Di is a vector of demographic characteristics including age, age2, education, race, partnership
status; Ri is a binary measure of risk aversion taken from a previous ALP survey; Wi is an indicator for net
wealth decile (including all financial wealth, business wealth, vehicles and housing); Ji is a vector of job
characteristics including detailed occupation information and income quintile; 0 is a common constant
term and is a stochastic error term.
As discussed previously, the ‘allocation’ outcome is either an indicator for stock ownership or a measure
of the percentage of financial assets held in stocks. For the ‘flexibility’ variables, we report results for
separate models with these variables entered in conceptual groups and individually.
For this exploratory work, we report results for simple OLS models (with Huber‐White robust standard
errors) for ease of interpretation. However, the direction and statistical significance of our results are
broadly robust to different model specifications (e.g. probit and logit for binary choice, tobit with two
censoring points for a continuous variable bounded by 0 and 1).
40 These variables were chosen because they address the different types of demand placed on a worker by a job, are not strongly correlated with each other, and (as demonstrated in the descriptive statistics) differ in their gender/age/education trends
68
ResultsIn this section, we report simple OLS results relating various labor supply flexibility variables to asset
allocation outcome variables. All regressions control for age, age2, race, partnership status (single or in a
marriage / long‐term partnership), education (four categories), risk aversion (a binary measure), wealth
decile, income quintile, and occupation (22 detailed categories).
First, we focus on labor flexibility at the intensive margin (flexibility over hours of labor supply). Second,
we examine variables pertaining to labor flexibility at the extensive margin (factors affecting the
sustainability of a career at older ages). Finally, we investigate the impact of intentions at the extensive
margin, and whether the intent to compensate for any negative savings shocks in the future by working
longer affects investment behavior in the present.
Currentandfuturehoursflexibility:intensivemarginoflaboradjustmentExamining the relationship between hours flexibility and portfolio outcomes, we do not find any
statistically significant relationships. In contrast to Benitez‐Silva (2006), who found a strong positive
relationship between the ability to increase hours and wealth held in stocks, we find a mixed set of
results for this variable, with none close to being statistically distinguishable from zero.41 The current
ability to reduce hours, and the prospective future ability to have hours flexibility, are similarly mixed
and insignificant. Results do not change much whether these flexibility variables are entered jointly or
separately into the models.
Outcome: Hold any stocks? [mean: 0.35]
Female Male
Can increase hours ‐0.00670 0.00262 ‐0.0594 ‐0.0380
(0.0356) (0.0349) (0.0564) (0.0545)
Can reduce hours ‐0.00206 0.00587 ‐0.0341 ‐0.0229
(0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0652) (0.0617)
Chances (0‐100) of having flexible job in future
0 ‐0.0574 ‐0.0567 0.00750 0.0166
(0.0488) (0.0492) (0.0664) (0.0662)
1‐49 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
50 ‐0.0145 ‐0.0152 0.0406 0.0367
(0.0451) (0.0448) (0.0654) (0.0652)
51‐99 ‐0.0180 ‐0.0196 0.0890 0.0720
(0.0508) (0.0499) (0.0717) (0.0710)
100 0.0871 0.0845 0.138 0.104
(0.0783) (0.0780) (0.102) (0.0968) Table 28: Effect of hours flexibility on holding stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
41 However, there are various differences between our data and model from that of Benitez‐Silva that may explain differences in outcome: see Discussion section.
69
Outcome: % of Fin. Wealth held in stocks [mean: 0.22, median: 0]
Female Male
Can increase hours 0.0171 0.0270 ‐0.0272 ‐0.0196
(0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0438) (0.0455)
Can reduce hours 0.000317 0.0162 ‐0.00608 ‐0.00431
(0.0310) (0.0324) (0.0511) (0.0491)
Chances (0‐100) of having flexible job in future
0 ‐0.0503 ‐0.0531 0.0348 0.0383
(0.0422) (0.0432) (0.0568) (0.0579)
1‐49 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
50 ‐0.0494 ‐0.0481 0.0250 0.0246
(0.0394) (0.0392) (0.0509) (0.0506)
51‐99 ‐0.0272 ‐0.0241 0.0519 0.0454
(0.0456) (0.0438) (0.0529) (0.0512)
100 0.113 0.118 0.0598 0.0474
(0.0781) (0.0779) (0.0849) (0.0807) Table 29: Effect of hours flexibility on percentage of financial wealth held in stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
70
Jobsustainability:extensivemarginoflaboradjustmentIn contrast to the hours flexibility variables which deal with flexibility on the intensive margin, we see
statistically stronger effects of several variables relating to job characteristics and demands which affect
an individual’s ability to have flexibility over their career length. In particular, working in a job where it is
difficult to keep up with technology is associated with lower propensity to own stocks for both men and
women, and is associated with lower percentages of financial wealth held in stocks for women. The
effect sizes for women are particularly large. In addition, working in the most physically demanding jobs
is associated with lower propensity to hold stock for men, and a lower percentage of financial wealth
held in stocks for women. However, differences in the intensity of concentration required are not
associated with portfolio differences.
Outcome: Hold any stocks? [mean: 0.35]
Female Male
Difficult to keep up with technology in job
Strong Agree ‐0.236*** ‐0.242*** ‐0.0780 ‐0.0876
(0.0543) (0.0502) (0.0955) (0.0902)
Agree 0.0226 0.0205 ‐0.122* ‐0.123*
(0.0542) (0.0539) (0.0578) (0.0568)
Disagree ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Strong Disagree ‐0.0711 ‐0.0677 ‐0.107 ‐0.112
(0.0412) (0.0414) (0.0590) (0.0610)
DNA ‐0.0397 ‐0.0638 ‐0.165 ‐0.214*
(0.0497) (0.0460) (0.0936) (0.0894)
Job requires intense concentration
All Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Most Time ‐0.0348 ‐0.00267 ‐0.0233 0.00657
(0.0414) (0.0406) (0.0543) (0.0538)
Some/No Time 0.00349 0.0340 0.0261 0.0611
(0.0495) (0.0475) (0.0710) (0.0698)
DNA ‐0.0711 ‐0.0702 ‐0.187 ‐0.260*
(0.113) (0.0904) (0.153) (0.109)
Job requires lots of physical effort
All Time ‐0.0762 ‐0.0843 ‐0.190* ‐0.188*
(0.0602) (0.0573) (0.0951) (0.0949)
Most Time 0.0427 0.0406 ‐0.129 ‐0.114
(0.0593) (0.0610) (0.0861) (0.0871)
Some Time ‐0.0378 ‐0.0353 ‐0.106 ‐0.0899
(0.0462) (0.0456) (0.0674) (0.0672)
No Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
DNA ‐0.0436 ‐0.0644 ‐0.138 ‐0.185*
(0.0680) (0.0650) (0.0866) (0.0826) Table 30: Effect of job sustainability on holding stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
71
Outcome: % of Fin. Wealth held in stocks [mean: 0.22, median: 0]
Female Male
Difficult to keep up with technology in job
Strong Agree ‐0.137** ‐0.168*** ‐0.0403 ‐0.0599
(0.0485) (0.0477) (0.0711) (0.0687)
Agree 0.0420 0.0369 ‐0.0819 ‐0.0883
(0.0472) (0.0482) (0.0467) (0.0475)
Disagree ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Strong Disagree ‐0.0427 ‐0.0396 ‐0.0651 ‐0.0711
(0.0333) (0.0339) (0.0500) (0.0505)
DNA ‐0.00641 ‐0.0520 ‐0.0714 ‐0.121
(0.0499) (0.0461) (0.0912) (0.0903)
Job requires intense concentration
All Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Most Time 0.00764 0.0247 0.0249 0.0480
(0.0351) (0.0353) (0.0451) (0.0431)
Some/No Time 0.0302 0.0482 0.0448 0.0747
(0.0437) (0.0415) (0.0596) (0.0595)
DNA ‐0.0360 ‐0.0772 ‐0.221 ‐0.220**
(0.102) (0.0914) (0.129) (0.0818)
Job requires lots of physical effort
All Time ‐0.0950 ‐0.106* ‐0.127 ‐0.129
(0.0512) (0.0477) (0.0717) (0.0702)
Most Time 0.00729 0.00534 ‐0.00280 0.0000815
(0.0540) (0.0549) (0.0719) (0.0728)
Some Time ‐0.0282 ‐0.0303 ‐0.00684 0.00344
(0.0387) (0.0383) (0.0525) (0.0524)
No Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
DNA ‐0.0852 ‐0.101* ‐0.0804 ‐0.108
(0.0478) (0.0444) (0.0645) (0.0624) Table 31: Effect of job sustainability on percentage of financial wealth held in stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
We present the most detailed coding of the relevant variables here in order to provide more
information rather than less. However, some of the statistically significant results might be thought to
be driven by relatively small categories or the choice of reference category. The results are not fully
robust to collapsing the categories into their simplest versions; alternative versions of these tables using
categories that have been further collapsed are available in the appendices.
72
Expectedreactiontosavingsshock:intenttoadjustlabor,consumption,orbothIn our final set of regressions, we examine the relationship between how individuals believe they would
react to negative wealth shocks in the future, and their current portfolio choices. While the previous
questions provide evidence on how having the ability to adjust labor affects investment behavior, these
questions directly address how the intent to adjust labor/consumption in the event of a negative savings
shock relates to investment behavior.
Here, we do not find any statistically significant results for women over any outcome or variable of
interest, but there are several interesting results for men. When we examine agreement with the
statement “If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired”,
controlling for the normal controls, men who disagree that they would have to ‘make do with less’ in the
event of negative wealth shocks are more likely to hold stocks, with statistical significance at the 5%
level when this variable is included without the ‘work longer’ variable, or at the 10% level when both
variables are included.
Table 32: Effect of expected reaction to savings shock on stock holding. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
Turning to our other outcome of interest, for men, expecting to work longer in the event of a future
negative wealth shock is associated with a greater percentage of financial wealth being held in stocks.
These results are slightly weaker but still statistically significant at the 5% level when controlling for
expectations about ‘making do with less’.
Outcome: Hold any stocks? [mean: 0.35]
Female Male
If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it
0‐4: Disagree ‐0.0334 ‐0.0187 0.0684 0.0984
(0.0600) (0.0560) (0.0795) (0.0755)
5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree ‐0.0000214 0.0152 0.0920 0.126
(0.0464) (0.0426) (0.0678) (0.0658) If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired
0‐4: Disagree 0.0625 0.0575 0.122 0.156*
(0.0553) (0.0524) (0.0704) (0.0695)
5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree 0.00781 0.00256 0.0621 0.0875
(0.0453) (0.0415) (0.0616) (0.0590)
73
Outcome: % of Fin. Wealth held in stocks [mean: 0.22, median: 0]
Female Male
If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it
0‐4: Disagree 0.0505 0.0557 0.0356 0.0642
(0.0581) (0.0561) (0.0559) (0.0536)
5
6‐10: Agree 0.0128 0.0227 0.0986* 0.114*
(0.0431) (0.0413) (0.0461) (0.0443) If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired
0‐4: Disagree 0.0442 0.0512 0.0282 0.0649
(0.0482) (0.0473) (0.0588) (0.0563)
5 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree 0.00411 0.0141 0.0652 0.0841
(0.0387) (0.0364) (0.0497) (0.0484) Table 33: Effect of expected reaction to savings shock on percentage of financial wealth held in stocks. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
As with the analysis in the preceding section, we present our preferred coding of variables in the
specifications above, but have run additional analyses. With the ‘5’ category being a focal point, we
prefer not to combine it with responses above it or below it. Nevertheless, while the main focus is on
statistically significant results, it may be noted that the statistically insignificant results do not
consistently have the sign that is expected under the hypotheses. For robustness, we provide alternative
analyses in the appendices folding the ‘5’ category into the 0‐4 category; the statistically significant
results are consistent with those above, fewer results are significant, but a greater proportion of non‐
significant results demonstrate the expected sign.
AdditionalAnalysesAs noted in the text, some additional analyses were conducted after the main analyses. One set of
analyses collapsed the ‘sustainability’ categorical independent variables into their simplest forms
(typically 3 categories including ‘does not apply’) in order to increase power. These analyses showed
generally slight improvements in precision, but led generally to smaller, statistically insignificant results.
We choose to present the more detailed results in the main text, but the less detailed results are
available in Appendix C. Also in Appendix C, we present the simplified version of the ‘expected reaction
to savings shock’ variables which, as noted above, also reduces the number of statistically significant
findings.
On a restricted sample, we also ran analyses incorporating information concerning DC pension plans.
One set of analyses incorporated the stocks held in DC plans into the outcome measures; another set of
analyses reran the original models but with a dummy controlling for an individual holding some stocks in
a DC plan. The results from these analyses were broadly consistent with the results presented in the
main analysis, with most differences largely attributable to sample selection effects when excluding
74
individuals with low quality data on their DC plan wealth and asset allocations. An additional finding
from these analyses is that holding stock in a DC plan is highly correlated with holding stocks outside DC
plans; insofar as both types of stock holding might be influenced by work factors, including DC stock
holdings as a control may have the effect of controlling for the outcome.42 These results are available on
request.
DiscussionIn our empirical work, we examined factors affecting individual labor supply flexibility and their
relationship to portfolio choice. We distinguished between two broad types of flexibility that might be
used to adjust to wealth shocks: the flexibility to increase or reduce hours within a career (intensive
margin), and the flexibility to extend a career (extensive margin). In theory, both of these types of
flexibility could affect the degree of risk an individual might be willing to accept in their investment
portfolio.
While our results are open to wide interpretation (and are not fully robust to alternative specification),
and are best thought of as descriptive rather than causal, they provide more support for the importance
of extensive margin flexibility than intensive margin flexibility. Men who believe that they would be able
to work longer in order to make up for negative wealth shocks are more likely to hold stocks and likely
to hold a larger proportion of their financial wealth in the stock market. Men and women who struggle
to keep up with technological change in their jobs ‐ and who may therefore be less able to sustain their
career as they age – are shown to be less likely to hold stocks. Individuals with very physically
demanding jobs may expect that the natural processes of aging may prevent them from continuing this
type of work indefinitely; we find that men with the most physically demanding jobs are less likely to
own stock than other men, and women with the most physically demanding jobs are likely to have a
lower percentage of their financial wealth held in stocks than other women.
In contrast, we do not find any evidence that differences at the intensive margin ‐ in the current or
future ability to adjust hours of work within a career – have any relationship whatsoever with portfolio
choice. Generally speaking, our results for those variables are mixed and fall far short of standard
thresholds for statistical significance.
In some ways, our intensive margin results are unsurprising: empirically speaking, work hours tend to be
lumpy rather than continuous, with extreme clumping at focal values such as 40 hours per week, with
little evidence that people are making adjustments; and making small marginal adjustments to labor
over the lifecycle in response to changing portfolio performance seems an unlikely behavioral model
given how little attention individuals tend to give to their portfolio on a monthly (or even yearly) basis.
42 It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the relationship between holdings inside and outside DC plans. The limited evidence in this paper might suggest that individuals do not look to balance very risky DC plans by taking less risky investment positions outside their DC plan, or vice versa (as might be the case if individuals were constrained in the choices available to them within their DC plans); rather, more risk‐tolerant individuals tend to tolerate more risk in all forms of their investments.
75
However, our results are surprising insofar as they run counter to the findings of previous empirical
work by Benitez‐Silva, who did not examine the extensive margin but found large and statistically
significant effects of intensive margin flexibility on the amount of stock wealth an individual had
(Benitez‐Silva 2006). There are several potential explanations for the discrepancy. The first possible
explanation is that we use different outcome measures and (additional / more detailed) control
variables from Benitez‐Silva, but our (non‐)findings here are robust to using the same outcome measure
and similar control variables as he did in his paper. A second possibility is that his dataset focuses on
workers over the age of 50, while ours includes workers as young as 25, and effects may be
concentrated in older workers. This explanation runs counter to the logic expressed by Bodie et al., who
anticipate smaller effects among older workers who have fewer remaining work years over which to
adjust their labor supply43 (Bodie, Merton et al. 1992), but might be correct if the uncertainty about
future labor income faced by younger workers dominates any effects of labor supply flexibility.
Moreover, when we run the intensive margin models on a sample restricted to older ages, we do not
see any evidence in support of this contention.44
A third possibility is that individuals in the Health and Retirement Study used by Benitez‐Silva differ in
other ways from the individuals in the American Life Panel; the waves of HRS used in his paper cover
people from 1992 to 2000, a period of rapidly rising stock values due to the dot‐com bubble; our ALP
data were collected in 2011, in the middle of the recession brought about by the sub‐prime mortgage
crisis. Finally, it is possible that the panel data techniques employed by Benitez‐Silva provide a better
control for unobserved heterogeneity than the cross‐sectional approach used in this paper; however,
the cross‐sectional results he reports are consistent with his panel results and inconsistent with our
results.
Before concluding, it is also worth taking a moment to discuss the interpretation of the effects seen for
women vs. men. Given that wealth is a household variable, and male labor supply has traditionally
played the larger role in household income, it is worth considering whether the effects seen for women
might be driven by their spouses. In sensitivity analysis of the significant effects seen for women, we
reran the models separately for single and partnered women.45 While the smaller sample sizes reduced
precision significantly, it appears that the variable concerning difficulty keeping up with technology has a
roughly similar effect for single and partnered women, while the variable concerning physical demands
of the job may have had a larger effect for single women. In neither case does it appear that the result is
driven by spousal effects.
43 Indeed, Benitez‐Silva uses this logic to assert that his own findings should be considered a lower bound estimate 44 Results available on request; the reduction in sample leads to imprecise estimates opposite in sign to those of Benitez‐Silva 45 Results available on request
76
ConclusionIn this research, we described a novel data set and a range of variables pertaining to labor supply
flexibility, broadly interpreted. Some of these questions are common to the Health and Retirement
Study, but are being applied to a broader age spectrum of respondents; others are completely novel.
We have documented how these various types of labor supply flexibility differ across sex, age and
education groups.
In our empirical work, we explored the relationship between labor supply flexibility and portfolio
allocation decisions, and found that the ability to prolong a career at older ages (extensive margin) may
be more important than the ability to adjust the intensity of work through a career (intensive margin).
These results contribute to a sparse empirical literature which has investigated the intensive margin
flexibility effects for older workers, but has not addressed the intensive margin effects for younger
workers or the extensive margin effects at all.
In general, the policy environment has changed over time – and continues to change ‐ in ways that can
increase labor supply flexibility at both the intensive and extensive margins. Legislation making
mandatory retirement ages illegal and prohibiting age‐based discrimination have helped to increase
employment opportunities at older ages and flexible working practices are more prevalent now than in
previous decades. In the future, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act may lead to decreased
reliance on employer‐based healthcare, which would in turn remove one of the barriers to flexible
working practices for pre‐Medicare‐age workers. It is unclear whether broader changes in the economy,
such as the move towards more highly educated workers and technology intensive industries, will allow
people to prolong their careers: although physically demanding work may be difficult to sustain at older
ages, in a knowledge‐based economy the mental demands and the pace of technological change may
also prove challenging at older ages.
Our work suggests that increases in the ability to prolong a career may result in individuals making
increased investment in risky assets, which on average in the long‐run is likely to lead to increased
wealth at retirement. Individuals with the flexibility to prolong their career thus have a double benefit:
they are likely to be financially better off at retirement age than people with fixed labor supply, and in
the event of other shocks (such as medical bills for a family member) would also be able to continue to
work. Workers without the ability to prolong their working life are faced with a challenge: they must
accumulate significant wealth over their fixed working life, but can ill‐afford to take on high‐risk, high‐
reward investments because they have limited ability to cope if the risks do not work out.
However, it is important to note two major limitations to the work. The first is the instability of our
results: given that several results are not robust to relatively small differences in specification, our work
may provide more value in highlighting under‐researched areas into which future research can delve
further, than in providing definitive answers to the questions we pose. The second major limitation is
common to nearly all work dealing with labor supply flexibility: despite using a rich set of covariates to
control for observed differences, we cannot rule out possible selection effects; as individuals sort into
jobs, there may be unobserved heterogeneity that leads to a spurious correlation between job
characteristics and investment behavior. Given the importance of ‘extensive margin’ flexibility suggested
77
by our work, it is possible that future research may be able to exploit quasi‐exogenous variation in
career extendibility due to legal changes (e.g. the abolition of mandatory retirement ages in most
professions, or the removal of disincentives to work after normal retirement age) in order to shed
further light on the impact of labor supply flexibility on investment behavior.
78
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Appendices
AppendixA:SurveyProtocol intro intro We would like to ask you a few questions about your current work, the flexibility you have in your current job, and your plans and expectations for the future. In previous surveys, you may already have answered some similar questions. Though you may have seen some of these questions before, we are still interested in your answers today, particularly as some circumstances may have changed. Q1 reduce paid hours in regular work schedule First we would like to ask some questions about job flexibility: Can you reduce the number of paid hours in your regular work schedule? 1 Yes 2 No Q2 increase paid hours in regular work schedule Can you increase the number of paid hours in your regular work schedule? 1 Yes 2 No Q3 employer allow buy or sell vacation days Some employers allow their employees to "buy" extra vacation days (work fewer days in the year but with a lower annual salary) or "sell" vacation days back to the employer (take less vacation but get a higher annual salary). Does your employer allow you to "buy" or "sell" vacation days? 1 Can neither "buy" nor "sell" 2 Can "buy" but cannot "sell" 3 Can "sell" but cannot "buy" 4 Can both "buy" and "sell" Q4 chances approach retirement job able to increase or decrease paid work hours Please answer the next two questions on a scale from 0 to 100, where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 equals absolutely certain: On a scale from 0 to 100, when you are approaching retirement, what are the chances you will have a job where you will be able to increase or decrease the number of paid hours in your regular work schedule? (please use whole numbers only and no %) Range: 0..100 Q5 chances lose job during next 3 years Sometimes people are permanently laid off from jobs that they want to keep. On a scale from 0 to 100, what are the chances that you will lose your job during the next three years? (please use whole numbers only and no %) Range: 0..100 [The following questions are displayed as a table] Q6_intro intro Now we would like to ask about the demands and characteristics of your current job: How often are these statements true? Q6 My job requires lots of physical effort
81
My job requires lots of physical effort 1 All or almost all of the time 2 Most of the time 3 Some of the time 4 None or almost none of the time 5 Does not apply Q7 My job requires intense concentration or attention My job requires intense concentration or attention 1 All or almost all of the time 2 Most of the time 3 Some of the time 4 None or almost none of the time 5 Does not apply [End of table display] [The following questions are displayed as a table] Q8_intro intro How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Q8 In my job, you have to keep learning new skills if you want to keep up with other workers In my job, you have to keep learning new skills if you want to keep up with other workers 1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree 5 Does not apply Q9 In my job, you have to keep physically fit if you want to keep up with other workers In my job, you have to keep physically fit if you want to keep up with other workers 1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree 5 Does not apply Q10 In my job, it is difficult to keep up with changes in technology In my job, it is difficult to keep up with changes in technology 1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree 5 Does not apply Q11 My co-workers make older workers feel that they ought to retire before age 65 My co-workers make older workers feel that they ought to retire before age 65 1 Strongly agree 2 Agree 3 Disagree 4 Strongly disagree 5 Does not apply
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[End of table display] Q12 impairment or health problem Now we would like to know how your health affects your work: Do you have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid work you can do? 1 Yes 2 No Q13 chances health limit work next 10 years On a scale from 0 to 100 where 0 equals absolutely no chance and 100 equals absolutely certain, what are the chances that your health will limit your work activity during the next 10 years? (please use whole numbers only and no %) Range: 0..100 [The following questions are displayed as a table] Q14_intro intro As people grow older, they sometimes have to pay for unexpected costs out of their savings, and sometimes their investments or retirement pension plans lose value. For example, people sometimes face unexpected medical bills at older ages, or lose money when there is a stock market crash. On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 equals very strongly disagree and 10 equals very strongly agree, to what extent do you agree with the following statements? Q14 If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired Range: 0..10 Q15 If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it Range: 0..10 [End of table display] CS_001 HOW PLEASANT INTERVIEW Could you tell us how interesting or uninteresting you found the questions in this interview? 1 Very interesting 2 Interesting 3 Neither interesting nor uninteresting 4 Uninteresting 5 Very uninteresting
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AppendixB:RiskAversionWealthGamble
Wealth Gamble hypothetical questions: initial question
Suppose that you unexpectedly inherited 1 million dollars. You have the chance to take a risky but possibly rewarding investment option that has a 50‐50 chance of doubling the money to 2 million dollars in a month, and a 50‐50 chance of reducing the money by one third, to 667 thousand dollars in a month. In other words, you could keep $1,000,000 or invest in a risky asset that has an equal chance of doubling your money to $2,000,000 or reducing it to $667,000.
Would you choose to invest in the risky asset?
84
AppendixC:AlternativeAnalyses
Outcome: Hold any stocks? [mean: 0.35]
Female Male
Difficult to keep up with technology in job
Agree 0.00324 ‐0.00281 ‐0.0745 ‐0.0722
(0.0455) (0.0450) (0.0484) (0.0471)
Disagree ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
[DNA] ‐0.00962 ‐0.0263 ‐0.142 ‐0.175*
(0.0442) (0.0404) (0.0892) (0.0760)
Job requires intense concentration
All Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Not All Time ‐0.0188 ‐0.0226 ‐0.00748 ‐0.0192
(0.0352) (0.0349) (0.0484) (0.0488)
[DNA] ‐0.0283 ‐0.0543 ‐0.0807 ‐0.203
(0.0916) (0.0744) (0.164) (0.105)
Job requires lots of physical effort
No Time 0.0371 0.0394 0.132* 0.126*
(0.0434) (0.0422) (0.0624) (0.0625)
Not No Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
[DNA] ‐0.00989 ‐0.0134 0.00336 ‐0.0403
(0.0660) (0.0621) (0.0890) (0.0781) Table 34: Effect of job sustainability on holding stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
Outcome: % of Fin. Wealth held in stocks [mean: 0.22, median: 0]
Female Male
Difficult to keep up with technology in job
Agree 0.0394 0.0285 ‐0.0404 ‐0.0440
(0.0397) (0.0404) (0.0398) (0.0394)
Disagree ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
[DNA] 0.00611 ‐0.0220 ‐0.0878 ‐0.125
(0.0454) (0.0406) (0.0913) (0.0831)
Job requires intense concentration
All Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Not All Time ‐0.0367 ‐0.0389 ‐0.0498 ‐0.0567
(0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0399) (0.0395)
[DNA] ‐0.0265 ‐0.0789 ‐0.188 ‐0.255**
(0.0713) (0.0564) (0.123) (0.0806)
85
Job requires lots of physical effort
No Time 0.0434 0.0451 0.0338 0.0302
(0.0366) (0.0355) (0.0464) (0.0465)
Not No Time ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
[DNA] ‐0.0446 ‐0.0484 ‐0.0360 ‐0.0680
(0.0448) (0.0420) (0.0650) (0.0627) Table 35: Effect of job sustainability on percentage of financial wealth held in stock. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
Table 36: Effect of expected reaction to savings shock on stock holding. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
Outcome: % of Fin. Wealth held in stocks [mean: 0.22, median: 0]
Female Male
If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it
0‐5: Disagree/Neutral ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree ‐0.00238 ‐0.00248 0.0871* 0.0842*
(0.0358) (0.0357) (0.0360) (0.0357) If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired
0‐5: Disagree/Neutral ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree ‐0.0114 ‐0.0114 0.0573 0.0533
(0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0386) (0.0390) Table 37: Effect of expected reaction to savings shock on percentage of financial wealth held in stocks. OLS with controls: age, age2, race, partnership status, education, risk aversion, wealth decile, income quintile, and occupation
Outcome: Hold any stocks? [mean: 0.35]
Female Male
If I lost some of my savings, I could always work longer to make up for it
0‐5: Disagree/Neutral ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree 0.0255 0.0238 0.0817 0.0813
(0.0369) (0.0364) (0.0527) (0.0526) If I lost some of my savings, I would just have to make do with less when I retired
0‐5: Disagree/Neutral ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
6‐10: Agree ‐0.0288 ‐0.0272 0.0162 0.0155
(0.0360) (0.0355) (0.0492) (0.0494)
86
Introduction46Public pension systems around the world play a vital part in providing retirement income security for the
elderly, and in most Western countries comprise a significant portion of government spending. As
populations age, many countries will have (or have had) to reform unsustainable pension systems,
expecting individuals to take on greater responsibility for their income in retirement by saving and
investing during their working life. To understand the consequences of current and future pension
reforms, it is important to understand how individuals will change their behavior in response to any
changes in incentives; but this is generally difficult to predict.
In this paper, we lay the foundations for significant extensions to research in this field to date,
constructing a multi‐country quasi‐panel of individual‐level lifetime earnings histories, along with
detailed modeling of the different incentives created by institutional differences in pension systems
between countries. This dataset features a combination of individual‐level detail and national‐level
structures that provides unique opportunities to exploit cross‐national variation in order to identify
models of individual behavior, which can provide crucial insights into the likely effects of pension
reforms. While standardized cross‐national measures of pension system generosity and progressivity
have been produced by other researchers, these have typically been based on stylized hypothetical
workers with simple (often, flat) earnings trajectories over the lifecycle (OECD 2011); in contrast, we are
able to generate pensions for real individuals and their reported earnings, and, importantly can capture
for each individual at every age the marginal effect on pension income of working for an additional year,
including both accrual and deferral effects. The interaction of real earnings trajectories with pension
systems produces effects that might not be seen in in stylized models: two individuals with the same
total lifetime earnings may be entitled to very different pensions if they have different trajectories, if
(for example) the pension system emphasizes earnings at older ages, or has a binding cap on
pensionable earnings.
In our use of data on real individuals across several countries, our work is closest in spirit to the series of
parallel analyses described in Gruber and Wise’s seminal volume (Gruber and Wise 1999). In that work,
national research teams produced standardized analyses using the most appropriate data available to
them. In our work, we are able to construct a single dataset with data that are harmonized across
countries and earnings information for specific individuals over their whole life, which is better suited
for exploiting cross‐national variation in institutional structures and lifecycle behavior.
After documenting the construction and describing the characteristics of this unique dataset, we
demonstrate the clear relationships between measures of realized replacement rates from pensions and
the financial wealth individuals accumulate, and between pension accrual incentives and the age at
which individuals choose to retire, which confirm the pivotal role that the institutional environment
plays in determining individual work, savings and retirement decisions.
46 This work was supported by a grant from the National Institutes of Aging (NIA P01 AG022481). Thanks are also due to Alessandro Malchiodi and Jose Castillo for their assistance with national websites.
87
ModelTo help motivate the usefulness of this dataset, and foreshadow the exploratory analysis we conduct in
the closing sections of this paper, we here present the simple lifecycle model that underpins this paper.
The model is similar to that discussed by Hurd et al., to be applied to observed lifetime earnings
histories rather than the synthetic earnings histories used in that paper (Hurd, Michaud et al. 2012); we
draw heavily on their discussion in our presentation here.
We assume an individual optimizing labor and consumption decisions over a lifecycle from time t=0 to
their death at t=T. Individuals are assumed to be rational and to have perfect information over their
future potential earnings and potential pension income, and do not face any uncertainty about
mortality, asset returns or any other potential shock. The individual works from time t=0 until retiring at
time t=R, earning income yt when working and receiving pension benefit bt in retirement, where bt is a
function of prior income and retirement age R. The individual makes a decision about when to retire,
and how much to consume in each period, in order to maximize lifetime utility.
Assume that the individual derives utility from consumption prior to retirement, and from consumption
and leisure after retirement, such that
1
is utility while working and
is utility once retired. The individual discounts future utility with discount rate ρ . Preference parameters
in this model are therefore γ which determines the marginal utility of consumption; Γ , which determines the marginal utility of leisure from retiring (or, the marginal disutility of work from delaying
retirement), and the time preference ρ which determines consumption growth over the life‐cycle.
Assume also that the individual has no bequest motive but must die with non‐negative assets a, and starts with no assets. Assets (and liabilities) grow with at a certain real interest rate of r; in this set‐up, the individual does not face liquidity constraints.
The individual then solves the following optimization, selecting the retirement time R that maximizes
utility given optimal consumption over the lifecycle, subject to the inter‐temporal constraint on assets:
max ,
s.t.
, 0, 0
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The solution for optimal consumption given retirement age R is then:
1 ,
where Y(R) and B(R) are the discounted present value of lifetime income from earnings and retirement
benefits respectively; / 1 and .
Thus the initial consumption given any retirement age is a fraction of total lifetime income, determined
by the asset growth rate r and the preference parameters ρ and γ. Consumption changes by a fixed
factor from period to period, rising over time if the real interest rate is greater than the discount rate, or
remaining flat if r= ρ. The rate of change in consumption in inversely related to the parameter γ that
defines the curvature of the utility function. When γ approaches zero, the utility function approaches a
linear function of consumption, leading to extreme distributions of optimal consumption (either
consuming a very high proportion of lifetime wealth early if ρ> r, or consuming very little and allowing
assets to build for very high later consumption if ρ<r). Conversely, when γ is large, there are sharply
diminishing marginal returns to consumption and consumption will tend to be spread more evenly
across the life cycle.
Turning to the decision variable R, the first order condition can be written as
where B’(R) represents the marginal change in pension wealth for a change in R.
This yields the familiar intuition equating marginal utilities: at the optimal value of R, the consumption
utility to be gained by additional work (due to both an additional year of income, and a larger pension in
retirement) is equal to the leisure utility lost. This leads to some additional insights: when the marginal
benefit of additional consumption is relatively low, the individual is likely to retire earlier; if the
individual will earn a large amount in the marginal year relative to his lifetime earnings, they are more
likely to delay retirement; and if the increase in pension wealth for an additional year of work is
relatively large, retirement is more likely to be delayed.
This last point is relevant for comparisons across countries, comparisons within countries over time, and
between individuals with different earnings profiles. In countries with stiff penalties for early retirement,
for example, the increase in pension for an additional year of work may be larger than for countries with
lesser penalties. In countries with pensions calculated based on the basis of some number of last or best
years of earnings, a high earning year at the end of a career may significantly increase pension benefits
in retirement; the magnitude of this effect, in turn, will be strongly affected by whether a worker has
had a steep earning profile over time or has had flat earnings for a large number of years. Under certain
circumstances, a low earning year may have a minimal or even negative effect on pension benefits.
Capturing these differences between individuals within and across countries at different ages is one of
the key motivations and contributions of this paper.
89
Data
IntroductiontoSHAREandSHARELIFEThe Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a large panel survey of the 50+
population in Europe, modeled after the US Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the English
Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA). The first wave was fielded in 2004; the second wave was fielded in
2006 with a broadly similar survey.
The survey covers a wide range of important topics for understanding the behavior of the older
population across Europe: demographics, health, economic status, family and social networks, and other
topics. Full details of the survey construction and implementation, including imputation of missing
values, are available in the SHARE methodology book (Borsch‐Supan and Jurges 2005). Particularly
valuable for our work are the detailed income, wealth, and standardized cross‐national educational
attainment variables, which we employ directly or indirectly in constructing our analytic dataset.
In 2008, the third wave of the SHARE project, dubbed ‘SHARELIFE’, was fielded. In contrast with the first
two waves, which dealt primarily with the contemporaneous condition of older people at the time the
survey was fielded, SHARELIFE focused on retrospective life histories, eliciting details on key life events
from childhood to the present day. The survey was designed to allow analysis of the European welfare
state by providing information on a range of life decisions that could then be placed in a national
institutional context. For our purpose, the most useful variables are those dealing with employment
status and earnings at different times in the individual’s life: these allow us to construct full earnings
histories for retirees, and partial earnings histories for those still in the work force.
There are many practical benefits to the retrospective life history method47, and it provides access to a
great deal of information that cannot be obtained in the present by other means48. However, there are
some clear difficulties with using retrospective life history as a substitute for a panel survey conducted
at regular intervals over an individual’s life. The most problematic is data quality: when asking older
individuals to recall events from 50 years ago, an element of error is expected, some of which may be
systematic rather than random.
To minimize the potential problems with dating specific events, SHARELIFE implemented a state‐of‐the‐
art event history calendar structure based on an earlier ELSA survey. This survey technique begins with
the interviewer asking questions about highly salient life events (the birth (and, if applicable, death) of
children, the beginning and ending of cohabiting relationships, places of living), and placing these events
on a computerized calendar grid that both the interviewer and respondent can see. The interviewer
goes on to other survey modules, where events might be subject to greater error, using the calendar of
life events to help enhance recall by relating these other life events (such as the start of a particular job)
to the salient life events (e.g. prompting recall by asking “Did you start that job before or after your
47 The SHARELIFE team cite speed and cost as important benefits 48 In some cases, it may be possible to link survey data to national administrative data (such as tax returns) to obtain information on certain aspects of life, but this is often difficult and the scope of administrative data is often narrowly focused around the purpose for which the data is being collected
90
wedding?”). The SHARELIFE interface also allowed interviewers to relate the date of an individual’s life
events to notable country or world events, providing the interviewer with a searchable database of
relevant events that the interviewer could use to anchor an event date (e.g. a respondent might indicate
that an event took place a few months after the first moon landing; the SHARELIFE survey interface
would allow the interviewer to search for that date. Alternatively, the respondent might indicate with
uncertainty that a life event took place in 1969 or 1970, and the interviewer can then find salient public
events from those years and ask (e.g.) whether the life event took place before or after the moon
landing). A full discussion of the challenges of retrospective lifecycle data collection, and the means by
which the event history calendar seeks to mitigate these challenges, is available in the SHARELIFE
methodology book (Schröder 2011). While the SHARELIFE data undergoes a meticulous data cleaning
process before being released, it is important to note that the cleaning team takes a conservative
approach to altering original responses and does not make edits to the data based purely on grounds of
subjective implausibility. In the next sub‐section, we describe the variables we use and the additional
processing that we conduct.
CleaningandProcessingtheSHARELIFEEarningsDataIn this section we describe our processing of the SHARELIFE earnings data to produce lifetime earnings
profiles for each individual in our final dataset, the validation of the data, and sample trimming to
remove low quality data.
To provide structure for the following section, the basic building blocks of our dataset are questions that
cover for each individual:
a) the start year of each job
b) the starting monthly salary of each job, net of taxes
c) (for those still working) the net monthly salary on the current job
d) (for those who are retired) the end net monthly salary on the ‘main’ job of the career
Our basic strategy is to take these known salary points (every starting salary and one current/end
salary), and impute the salary for the intervening years.
Cleaningthedata:initialsampleselection;ambiguous,misrememberedandforgottendataThe initial selection criteria restricted the sample to individuals who were male; still alive; and aged 50‐
75 at the time of the SHARELIFE survey, and for whom it was possible to obtain education level data
from SHARE Wave 1 or 2.
We then conducted a number of internal quality checks on the data, and removed individuals from the
data who exhibited clear errors of coding or recall.
We removed individuals who claim to finish a job before starting it (Nth job end year < Nth job start year)
or who claim to start one job before starting a preceding job ((N+1)th job start year < Nth job start year).
To simplify the eventual imputation, we also drop individuals who report starting a new job before
ending a previous job ((N+1)th job start year < Nth job end year). Note that in the questionnaire,
91
individuals are asked to combine series of small part‐time jobs into a single reported ‘job’, so this last
restriction only excludes a small number of people who report substantial overlapping jobs.
For each salary point, the individual was asked in which currency the salary was denominated. In some
cases this currency was not codable, and the individual was removed. In other cases, the currency was
ambiguous (e.g. the generic “Francs” could theoretically refer to French, Belgian, Swiss, or some other
currency); when choosing among possible currencies, we assumed that the currency was the national
currency of the individual wherever possible, and otherwise excluded the individual.
We also took the simplifying step of excluding the relatively small number of individuals who reported a
currency that was not the currency of their home country. We believe these currency reports are
subject to above average degrees of error, but the exclusion also dramatically simplifies pension
modeling by not requiring that we calculate partial pensions based on work across different countries.
Finally on currency, we assumed that individuals who reported an amount in a currency that does not fit
the timing of the introduction of the Euro (i.e. reporting in Euros prior to its launch, or in national
currencies after they had been replaced by the Euro) were nonetheless representing a correct ‘value’. By
inspection of countries with large fixed exchange rates against the Euro, it appeared clear that the
majority of these temporal currency discrepancies represented people reporting a national‐currency‐
equivalent amount in national currency, rather than reporting a Euro amount and misreporting the
name of the currency (and, vice versa for the corollary discrepancy of reporting values in Euros prior to
the introduction). Moreover, survey respondents were permitted to give answers in whichever currency
they felt they could give the most accurate answer, and so we would expect these apparent
discrepancies. Based on this decision, we convert all these amounts into their temporally correct
currency via the fixed exchange rates.
In some cases individuals reported that they did not remember the starting salary on one or more jobs.
We excluded individuals who started their career with 2 or more jobs for which they forgot the salary,
who began their career with more than 5 years of jobs with forgotten wages, or have more than 10
years of forgotten wages.
ProcessingtheData:RealGrossValues,PlausibilityChecksandInterpolationWe converted all known income values to real PPP‐adjusted 2009 German Euros, using standardized
national CPI values and PPP conversions from the OECD where possible, and extending the date range
using national websites where possible.49 Where values were not available for the earliest years of the
dataset, we imputed values backwards using an average of the 10 earliest years available.
After converting all values to real income, we made some additional trims to the data before imputing
values. First, we remove anyone who claims (after conversion to real currency) to earn a net income of
more than 40,000 Euros per month. These people most likely represent data errors, and even if correct
are extreme earnings outliers. We also remove individuals whose real income values show a drop of
49 For a starting point, several useful suggestions and sources are provided in a SHARE working paper (Trevisan, Pasini et al. 2011)
92
more than 10% on their main or current job (the only jobs for which we have both a reported start and a
reported end/current value). While it is possible for wages to decrease in real terms, a large number of
these cases appear likely to be memory recall errors, most likely underestimating how currency has
changed over time with inflation: these cases typically report modest nominal increases over time that
are overwhelmed by compounded inflation.
SHARELIFE income values are reported as net income rather than gross income, but gross income is used
for calculating pensions. We therefore used OECD taxation programs to create conversion factors for net
income to gross income. For years prior to the collection of OECD taxation program data, we used the
same tax brackets (in real terms) and tax levels as the earliest year of data.
After converting to gross income, we interpolated between known income points. Several combinations
of known income points were possible:
1) Known start and end salary of main or last job: we interpolate between the two points log‐
linearly
2) Known start salary of one job and start of a following higher salary job: as above, we interpolate
log‐linearly
3) Known start salary of one job and start of a following lower salary job: as we generally believe
wages are sticky, and it is more likely to be a step down to a lower salary than a gradual process
over the course of the previous job, we keep real salary flat on the original job
4) Known start salary of one job followed by a known period of zero earnings: as with point (3), we
hold real earnings flat
After this imputation, we convert these calendar‐year income histories into age‐year income histories
using the individual’s birth year and compared the resulting data with income values from SHARE Waves
1 and 2. In general our constructed dataset seemed to be of high quality. One possible source of error in
the SHARELIFE responses was giving annual income responses to questions about monthly income:
when an individual in our dataset had income values that differed from observed values in SHARE Waves
1 and 2 by a factor of 10, we flagged these observations as suspicious and excluded them from our final
analyses. Finally, because we need an estimate of a person’s potential earnings at a given age even if
they have retired, we create a version of our earnings variable which imputes salaries for individuals up
to age 70 on a flat real trajectory, assuming that wage increases at this age will tend to be in line with
increases in the cost of living.
CountryselectionSHARELIFE includes 13 countries. From this 13, we dropped the Czech Republic and Poland at the outset,
as their earnings histories would include periods of communist rule during which real earnings would be
difficult to calculate and non‐comparable to Western European countries. We also dropped Denmark
due to difficulties modeling the overall retirement structure: despite a normal retirement age of 67,
many Danes effectively retire as early as 60 with unemployment benefits that may be larger than future
pension benefits, but vary with income and contributions to unemployment insurance funds over their
lifetime. Other countries were dropped from the analysis for this paper after the cleaning process due to
93
small country‐education cell sizes, excessively high prevalence of suspicious values after cross‐validation
with other sources, or both.
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does not g
in the larg
Figure 11: M
These ear
trajectorie
last or bes
pension t
On the ot
comparison o
countries. Wit
es, which in t
D definitions
education”. A
edian at age 2
the highest ea
the differenc
nds, the two l
ucation group
grow much a
gest income d
Median Annual E
rnings trajecto
es in differen
st earning yea
han a person
her hand, pe
of countries i
thin countrie
urn affect pe
correspondin
As is to be exp
20 (as most w
arners in all c
ces between
ower educati
ps seem more
fter age 30, b
disparity by ed
Earnings by Edu
ories are imp
t ways. For ex
ars, a person
with the iden
nsion system
n the previou
s, different g
nsions and sa
ng to “less tha
pected, in all c
ill not have co
ountries.
education gr
ion groups ha
e distinct. In m
but in France
ducational st
cation within co
ortant, becau
xample, in pe
with a steep
ntical lifetime
s with caps o
us graph, in th
roups have d
avings. We ch
an secondary
countries the
ompleted edu
oups vary acr
ave fairly simi
most countrie
the gap conti
atus of any o
ountries
use different
ension system
ly increasing
e earnings spr
on pensionabl
he set of grap
ifferent lifeti
hoose to disag
y education”,
e tertiary edu
ucation), but
ross countries
ilar earnings,
es, the gap be
inues to wide
f the countrie
pension syste
ms based on t
earnings traje
read more ev
le earnings te
phs below the
me earnings
ggregate by e
“secondary e
cated group h
rise sharply s
s: in Germany
while in Italy
etween high a
en until the la
es.
ems interact
he average o
ectory will re
venly across t
end to give hig
e main compa
and earning
education gro
education” an
have zero ear
so that by age
y, France and
y and Belgium
and low educa
ate 50s, result
with real ear
of some numb
ceive a highe
their working
gher pension
95
arison
oup,
nd
rnings
e 30
d the
m the
ated
ting
nings
ber of
er
life.
s to
96
those who earn at the capped amount every year than those who earn the same total amount with
some years below the cap and some above the cap.
InstitutionalDetailsonPensionsIn this section we describe institutional differences across countries regarding the calculation of
pensions. In gathering this information we found the OECD’s ‘Pensions at a Glance’ series particularly
helpful, along with chapters from the NBER volume on Social Security programs and retirement around
the world and the European edition of the International Social Security Association’s review of Social
Security programs around the world (Gruber and Wise 2007; OECD 2011; International Social Security
Association 2012). Where relevant, we also consulted websites of the relevant national governmental
departments, particularly in order to understand how reforms enacted during the lifetime of our sample
are applied.
GermanyIn Germany, the main pension system is a points‐based scheme, in which workers earn ‘points’ based on
their earnings each year, and the pension received on retirement is calculated by multiplying the sum of
accumulated points by the redemption value of the points. The ‘cost’ of a point varies year to year, and
is equal to the average earnings of all the contributors in a given calendar year. Pensionable earnings are
also subject to a cap, slightly more than 200% of average earnings.
In 2008, the cost of a pension point was 30,625 Euros, with a redemption value of 317 Euros. This
implies that an individual working at the average level for 44 years from 21 to 65 would receive a
pension that replaced approximately 46% of earnings. Given the accrual structure, there is no
progressivity in the pension system at lower levels: low earners and average earners receive the same
replacement rate. High earners are subject to the earnings cap on pensionable earnings, and so receive
a lower replacement rate than low and average earners. Two workers with the same average earnings
may earn different pension amounts if one has a steeper earnings trajectory, as they will be more
affected by the earnings cap.
Normal retirement age for members of our sample50 is 65. Early retirement age is 63; there are no
actuarial penalties for retiring early if the individual has an earnings history with at least 35 years of
contributions, otherwise the adjustment is a 3.6% reduction for each year early. Late retirement is
rewarded with a 6% increase in pension for each year the pension is deferred. Overall, the pension rules
increase the pension by approximately 1% for each year worked at average earnings, and then by 6% for
each year of deferral.
FranceIn contrast with Germany, France has a complex pension system, made more complicated to model by
the changes in policy that have been enacted during the working lives of our analytic sample members.
We model two overarching tiers: the public earnings‐based contributory pension, and the mandatory
occupational pension.
50 At the time of writing, pension reform in Germany is set to increase the retirement age incrementally up to 67 for the cohort born in 1964
97
The public earnings‐based pension is a defined benefit pension, calculated as 50% of the average
earnings over some number of ‘best years’, subject to reduction factors. The number of ‘best years’ was
25 in 2008, having incrementally increased from a base of only 10 years in 1993. For given individuals
with similar average earnings over their entire careers, this pension may therefore be very different
depending on the earnings trajectory and cohort: ceteris paribus, steeper earnings trajectories lead to
higher pensions, particularly for those retiring in 1993 or earlier. The pensionable earnings are subject to
a cap, which is approximately equal to national average earnings, which reduces the effective
replacement rate received by higher earners from this pension. Reduction factors depend on both the
age at which the individual retires and the number of quarters of contribution required for a full career;
this latter number incrementally increased from the 150 (37.5 years) to 160 (40 years) between 1993
and 2003. Normal retirement age for this tier is 60. Deferral is rewarded with a 5% increase per year. If
an individual works a full career but still generates a very low pension, the pension value is raised to the
‘minimum contributif’ level, but this mostly applies to those with very low wages and/or significant
amounts of part‐time work.
France has several occupational pension systems. We model the ARRCO system which covers the
majority of private sector workers. This scheme is a points‐based system, with contributions made each
year divided by the cost of a pension point, and the final pension depending on the redemption value of
the total number of points accrued. Benefits are earned on 6% of earnings under the public sector
earnings cap, and on 16% of earnings between the public sector earnings cap and three times that cap.
Earnings higher than three times the public sector earnings cap earn no additional points. However, this
upper threshold affects only very high earners (approximately: those earning more than 100,000 Euros
per year). As with the public pension, any reductions for early retirement depend on age and number of
years of contribution. Late retirement does not lead to actuarial adjustment, but the worker continues
to accrue ARRCO points.
ItalyWhile the Italian pension system has undergone several reforms in the past 20 years, nearly all the
individuals in our sample are grandfathered under the old pre‐reform system, so it is this that we
describe here.
The Italian pension system (as modeled) has one main component: a public defined benefit pension. The
pension aims to provide a replacement rate of 80% of the last 5 years of earnings, accruing at a rate of
2% per year for a maximum of 40 years of work, with no cap on earnings. A relatively low minimum
pension (around 6300 Euros) provides a floor on pensions for those with extremely low pension
entitlements. The system is only slightly progressive (few full‐career workers fall under the minimum
pension), and the focus on just five years of earnings for calculating the base amount means that
workers with fairly high average earnings can receive a lower pension than workers who had lower
earnings on average over their career but received a high wage in the last five years of their career.
Normal retirement age is 60 (with at least 15 years of work), though it is possible at a younger age after
35 years of work; there are no actuarial adjustments made for deferred pensions, though an individual
may wish to prolong their career if this will significantly raise the average of their final five years of
earnings.
98
BelgiumThe main pension provision in Belgium is a public defined benefit system. This system aims to replace
60% of average lifetime income (or 75% if the individual has a dependent spouse), with a cap on
pensionable earnings in a given year of roughly 47,000 Euros (around 120% of average earnings in
Belgium); earnings less than roughly 19,000 Euros are credited with this value through the minimum
annual credit for low earners. A minimum pension of roughly 12,000 Euros is available to those who
have worked full careers but have not earned enough to qualify for a higher pension. The system is
therefore progressive for low earners and capped for high earners.
The full pension requires 45 years of work, and is reduced proportionally for shorter careers. Normal
retirement age is 65, but retirement is possible from 60 after 35 years of work. No actuarial adjustments
are made for earlier retirement, but most early retirees will face reduced pension due to not having
contributed a full 45 years. No actuarial adjustment is made for deferring retirement, but delaying may
allow an individual to increase their pension by filling in gaps in their contributions to reach 45 years, or
allow the base amount to increase (the pension is based on the last 45 years of earnings, so an
additional year of high earnings at the end of the career may displace a year of low earnings at the start
of the career in the pension calculation); but for most individuals, there is little to gain from additional
years of work at older ages.
NetherlandsThe pension system in the Netherlands consists of two main components: a basic fixed pension that
does not depend on earnings, and an array of occupational pensions that cover the vast majority of
Dutch workers. For a single person, the basic pension amount is roughly 13,000 Euros (around 30% of
average earnings), accrues at 2% for each year of living or working in the Netherlands, and is payable
from age 65 with no early receipt or deferral possible.
The occupational schemes have significant heterogeneity, with hundreds of significant pension funds
and the option for employers to offer their own schemes. A large majority of these plans are defined
benefit plans, and a large majority of defined benefit plans are based on lifetime average earnings. A
typical plan provides an accrual rate of 2% of pensionable earnings per year of work; pensionable
earnings are not subject to any maximum cap, but a ‘franchise’ amount (typically: 10/7 of the public
pension amount) is subtracted from the raw earnings. Thus, an individual who earns exactly this
franchise amount every year over the course of their working life would receive no occupational
pension, but the public pension would be sufficient to replace 70% of the individual’s average earnings.
An individual with lower earnings would receive a greater replacement rate; the overall system is very
progressive for low earners, but individuals with high earnings receive similar replacement rates to
those with average earnings.
Normal age of pension receipt is 65. Different occupational pension plans vary in their rules on pension
deferral; based on a sampling of large firm plans, we assume that deferral of an occupational pension
leads to an 8.5% increase per year of deferral.
99
PENSIONCALCULATIONIn this section, we provide more detail on the assumptions and modeling we used for each country, and
demonstrate graphically the generosity, progressivity, and accrual properties of the modeled pension
systems.
GermanyPublic pension:
The pension calculation in Germany is a simple multiplication of total ‘points’ accrued by the
redemption value of a point:
∗ , /
where ycap is the maximum pensionable earnings in a given year, pcost is the cost of a pension point in
a given year, and pvalue is the value of a pension point in the year it is drawn.
Normal retirement age is 65. Early retirement results in a reduction of 3.6% for each year. Delayed
retirement results in an increase of 6% for each year.
FrancePublic pension:
The French public pension is a defined benefit based on a number of years of salary, with a replacement
factor that varies with age and years of contribution, calculated as:
Z ∗ min 1, ∗ ,
/
where q is the number of years of work, qreq is the number of years required for a full pension (which
ranges from 40 to 42 for people for our sample based on cohort), X is the number of ‘best years’ over
which the pension is calculated (which ranges from 10 to 25 for people in our sample), and Z is a
replacement factor, calculated as
0.50 0.05 ∗ 0, 65 ,
Deferred retirement provides a gain of 5% per year of deferral.
The value is raised to the ‘minimum contributif’ pension value if an individual has a full career but still
generates a pension below this floor.
Mandatory occupational pension:
The mandatory occupational pension is a points‐based system, with the total points accrued multiplied
by the redemption value, calculated as:
100
∗ /
pvalue is the value of a pension point, and pcost is the cost of a pension point in a given year.
ypens is the pensionable earnings in a given year, equal to the sum of:
6% of earnings below threshold k ; and
16% of earnings between threshold k and the earnings cap of 3k.
Early retirement from occupational plans is possible, subject to a similarly structured penalty as in the
reduction of the replacement factor in the public pension: the occupational pension is reduced by
approximately 4% for each year of age/work the individual is short from the normal retirement age or
the required number of years of work, whichever results in the smaller deduction.
BelgiumPublic pension:
The Belgian public pension is a defined benefit, based on 45 years of pensionable earnings (subject to a
cap and floor), calculated as:
∗ min45
, 1 ∗ ⟨ , , ⟩ /
where Targ is the target rate of 0.6 for independent individuals or 0.75 for individuals with a dependent
spouse, ycap is the limit on pensionable earnings, yfloor is the minimum entitlement to which very low
earnings are raised, and q is the number of years worked.
If this pension calculated does not meet the minimum pension level, it is replaced by the minimum
pension at public retirement age.
ItalyPublic pension:
The Italian public pension modeled is a simple defined benefit based on the last 5 years of salary,
calculated as:
40, ∗ 0.02 ∗ /5
where q is the number of years worked.
101
NetherlandsPublic pension:
The basic public pension in the Netherlands is assumed to be flat amount for all people who have lived
in the Netherlands for at least 50 years; it is received at age 65, with no early receipt or deferral
possible.
Quasi‐mandatory occupational pension:
The typical occupational pension in the Netherlands is a defined benefit, based on average lifetime
pensionable earnings (earnings over a threshold tied to the public pension), calculated as
∗ 0.02 ∗ max 0,107
/
where q is the number of years worked, and frch is the ‘franchise’ deduction equal in size to the public
pension. The actuarial adjustment for deferral is assumed to be 8.5% per year.
PensionThe simpl
the figure
earnings f
amount a
divided by
various pe
highest in
salary of t
lifetime g
cost of pe
Figure 12: G
However,
the progr
51 The rankmodeling ograndfathe
SystemChaest comparis
e below, we s
for each coun
n individual w
y their averag
ension charac
n Italy, where
the last 5 yea
iven the earn
ension points
Generosity of Pe
these countr
essivity of pe
k order is the sof the new Italered – places It
aracteristicson to be mad
ummarize the
ntry in the dat
would receive
ge lifetime ea
cteristics, it d
under the old
rs of their car
nings trajecto
and redeema
ensions
ry‐level medi
nsions. Figure
ame as that caian pension sytaly as the seco
sAcrossCoude across cou
e median rep
taset, as accr
e on reaching
arnings up to
oes demonst
d system it w
reer, which m
ries shown pr
able value of
ans obscure s
e 4 is not sca
alculated for ststem – rather ond most gene
untriesntries is a ver
placement rat
ued by age 60
g retirement a
age 60. While
trate a basic le
was typically p
might easily tr
reviously. It is
pension poin
several impor
led to empha
tylized individuthan the pensierous rather th
ry basic meas
te from pensi
0. This is calc
age if they cea
e this measur
evel of gener
possible to rec
ranslate to 10
s lowest in Ge
nts keep repla
rtant features
asize the diffe
uals by OECD (Oion system intohan the most g
sure of pensio
ons of averag
culated as the
ased working
re is not perfe
rosity across c
ceive 80% of
00% of averag
ermany, whe
acement rates
s of pensions
erent pension
OECD 2011), exo which our sagenerous.
on generosity
ge lifetime
e annual pens
g at age 60,
ect and confla
countries. Th
their average
ge salary over
re the relativ
s low.51
s. Next we tur
n levels across
xcept that theiample was
102
y. In
sion
ates
is is
e
r the
e
rn to
s
ir
countries,
on the ave
Here we s
due to the
standard
demonstr
built into
earnings –
calculate
will receiv
Figure 13: P
The progr
need very
systems m
for low‐m
accumula
, but to demo
erage lifetime
see sharply pr
e relatively hi
of living, but
rate steadily d
the pension s
– vary widely,
pensions. Ita
ve a very low
Pension Replace
ressive pensio
y little financi
may replace m
mid earners in
tion as indivi
onstrate with
e earnings.
rogressive pe
igh minimum
becoming les
downwards s
system, and t
, due to the s
lians with hig
pension relat
ment Rates by C
on systems in
al wealth at r
more than 100
Belgium and
duals move f
in countries h
ension system
pensions off
ss progressive
loping relatio
the replacem
small number
gh earning job
tive to lifetim
Country and Me
most countr
retirement wi
0% for these
the Netherla
rom low earn
how the repla
ms in Belgium
fered in those
e for mid‐to‐h
onships in the
ent rates – as
r of years at th
bs early in the
me earnings.
ean Lifetime Ear
ries suggest th
ith which to s
people; and t
ands might le
nings to slight
acement rate
and the Neth
e countries to
high earners.
ese graphs. Ita
s measured c
he end of the
eir career who
rnings
hat individua
sustain their s
the precipito
ad to particu
tly higher ear
es differ for in
herlands for v
o guarantee a
France and G
aly has very li
ompared wit
e career that a
o take lower
ls with very lo
standard of li
us drops in re
lar difference
nings.
ndividuals bas
very low earn
minimum
Germany both
ittle progress
h average life
are used to
earning jobs
ow earnings m
ving, as pens
eplacement r
es in wealth
103
sed
ers,
h
sivity
etime
later
may
ion
ate
An alterna
(accrued b
pensionab
flattening
wide disp
across the
that come
earnings t
system, a
relatively
scatterplo
Figure 14: P
ative way of p
by age 60) on
ble earnings:
g of the pensio
ersion in Ger
eir lifetime w
es into play at
trajectories a
nd the overa
generous mi
ots at low ear
Pension Entitlem
portraying th
n the y‐axis. H
Germany has
on when mea
many, reflect
ill be more or
t higher earn
nd the cap. F
ll effect of the
nimum pensi
rnings, and Ita
ments by Countr
e same inform
Here we get a
s the most bin
an lifetime ea
ting the fact t
r less affected
ings, and aga
rance has dif
ese is not obv
ons in Belgiu
aly displays lit
ry and Mean Life
mation is give
better sense
nding earning
arnings appro
that individua
d by the earn
in there is dis
ferent earnin
vious in the g
m and the Ne
ttle progressi
etime Earnings
en below, wit
e of the impac
gs cap in our
oach 40,000 E
als with differ
ings cap. Belg
spersion caus
ngs caps for d
graph. As in th
etherlands af
ivity and a lot
th pension en
ct of the earn
dataset, refle
uros. There is
ring distributi
gium also has
sed by the int
ifferent pillar
he previous se
ffect the patte
t of dispersion
ntitlements
nings caps on
ected in the se
s also reason
ion of income
s an earnings
teraction betw
rs in the pens
et of graphs,
ern of the
n.
104
evere
ably
e
cap
ween
sion
the
The third
the effect
additiona
years of c
amount is
dependin
calculatio
(particula
if pension
Figure 15: A
There are
Netherlan
retiremen
in pension
60 years o
Netherlan
dramatic
systems fa
to continu
key characte
tive rate of ac
l year of work
ontributions
s increased –
g on the earn
n of the base
rly Germany
ns are deferre
Accrual of Annua
e clear differe
nds have big k
nt age is reach
n values repre
old to 70 year
nds, but only
difference in
acing relative
ue, and worke
ristic of pens
ccrual and adj
k. Prior to no
(up to a limit
for example,
nings trajecto
e amount. Aft
and the Neth
ed, while othe
al Pension by Co
nces across c
kinks in the m
hed, significa
esented by th
rs old leads to
a moderate i
incentives ac
ely little incen
ers in German
ion systems t
justment in p
rmal retireme
t), along with
in Germany,
ry, it may inv
er normal ret
herlands) mak
ers do not. Th
ountry and Educ
countries in th
marginal pens
ntly changing
he slopes of t
o extremely la
ncrease in Be
cross countrie
ntive to contin
ny and the Ne
that affect the
pensions: how
ent age, this t
country‐spec
it is simply a
volve increasin
tirement age,
ke significant
hese effects le
cation Group
he way pensio
ion increase f
g the incentiv
hese lines dif
arge increase
elgium and vir
es, with work
nue, workers
etherlands fa
e marginal de
w much the pe
typically invo
cific ways in w
n accrual of p
ng the averag
, pension syst
actuarial adj
ead to the pa
ons increase
for an additio
e to stay in th
ffers greatly a
es in pension
rtually no inc
kers under the
in France fac
cing moderat
ecisions of ind
ension increa
olves increasin
which the prim
points; in Fran
ge of the sala
tems in some
ustments to p
tterns seen b
over time. Ge
onal year of w
he labor force
across countr
in Germany,
rease in Italy
e Belgian and
cing a relative
te incentives
dividual work
ases for each
ng a number
mary pension
nce and Italy,
ry years used
e countries
pension amo
below.
ermany and t
work when no
e. Also, the ch
ies: working f
France and th
. This leads to
d Italian pensi
ely high incen
for a time
105
kers is
of
n
,
d for
unts
the
ormal
hange
from
he
o
on
tive
followed
impact on
Recasting
payable c
the next y
Figure 16: Pby mortality
Here we s
the multip
pension a
some fina
decreases
Belgium a
account. T
expect to
by stronger in
n retirement d
g the same da
hanges from
year.
Percentage Chany risk and 2% di
see that Frenc
ple ways early
mount possib
al years of ear
s prior to norm
are fairly cons
These effects
influence ret
ncentives at o
decisions.
ta in a differe
year to year,
nge in Pension Ascount factor.
ch pensions i
y retirement
ble by workin
rnings. The sy
mal retireme
sistently nega
influence the
tirement beha
older ages. W
ent way, the g
assuming a d
Accrued by Coun
ncrease more
and receipt o
ng a few more
ystems for Ge
nt age but pr
ative once dis
e retirement
avior.
We expect that
graph below s
discount rate
ntry and Educati
e than other p
of pensions ar
e high earning
ermany and th
rovide an incr
counting and
date that ma
t these differ
shows how m
of 2% and co
ion. Pension acc
pensions in th
re penalized a
g years in a p
he Netherlan
rease after no
d survival pro
aximizes pens
rences should
much the ann
ountry‐specifi
crued by followi
he years up to
and the large
ension system
ds generally
ormal retirem
babilities are
sion wealth, w
d have a signif
ual pension
ic survival rat
ing year discoun
o age 60, due
e increase in b
m that focuse
produce sma
ment age. Italy
taken into
which in turn
106
ficant
te to
nted
e to
base
es on
ll
y and
we
107
EffectofPensionsonRetirementandSavingsDecisionsHaving documented the significant differences across countries in the functioning of their pension
systems, we now relate these differences to variation in observed behavior across and within countries.
We restrict our sample to individuals who had retired by the time of SHARE Wave 2, to ensure our
wealth measures do not reflect people who are still in the wealth acquisition phase of life and to allow
us to use a consistent sample for both our wealth analysis and retirement age analysis.
In the graph below, we relate pension replacement rates for individuals in our dataset (as calculated
using SHARELIFE earnings histories and our own country‐specific pension calculators) to a standardized
measure of financial wealth derived from SHARE Wave 2. Each data point represents a country‐
education cell, as previously defined. 52 Our wealth measure is the financial wealth (checking accounts,
stocks, bonds and balances held in Individual Retirement Accounts) held by the individual in SHARE
Wave 2, divided by the mean lifetime earnings of the individual between age 20 and age 60. On the x‐
axis, we have the average income replacement rate accrued by age 60, calculated as the pension
entitlement accrued by age 60 divided by mean lifetime earnings of the individual. This replacement
rate reflects a combination of the generosity and progressivity of the pension systems, as applied to the
real life earnings histories in our dataset.
52 With the exception of Germany, for whom we omit the less‐than‐secondary education cell due to insufficient sample size after restricting to those who had retired by SHARE Wave 2
Figure 17: Rlevel indicat
It appears
accumula
rates, the
it is very p
financial w
average li
accumula
with varia
other cou
Our prefe
typically m
total wea
sources o
undeniab
53 And, ind
Replacement Rated by parenthe
s that there is
ted wealth in
re is low accu
plausible to b
wealth: indivi
fetime level c
ted savings a
ation both bet
untry‐specific
erred measure
most liquid an
lth, including
f heterogene
le that some
eed, differenti
tes and Accumueses: (1) less tha
s a clear nega
n the graph ab
umulation of
elieve that hi
duals who ca
can maintain
nd investmen
tween and w
factors that w
e of wealth a
nd most easily
housing and
ity in housing
people may f
ial access to th
ulated Financial an secondary; (2
tive relations
bove. For cou
financial wea
igh replaceme
an rely on the
their average
nts. It is also i
ithin countrie
we are not m
bove is a mea
y used to fina
other assets,
g markets acr
finance consu
he housing mar
Wealth. Cells co2) secondary; (3)
ship between
untry‐educatio
alth. While th
ent rates from
eir pensions m
e lifetime stan
interesting to
es, decreasing
odeling.
asure of finan
ance consump
, as an altern
ross countries
umption in re
rket for differe
ollapsed at the c) tertiary
n pension rep
on cells with
e result admi
m pensions d
maintaining th
ndard of livin
o note that th
g the likelihoo
ncial wealth, t
ption. We can
ative; althoug
s53 and the w
etirement par
ent socio‐econo
country‐educat
lacement rate
high median
its of alternat
iscourage acc
heir income a
ng without rel
his relationshi
od that this is
the type of w
n also look at
gh there are
ealth may be
rtly by downs
omic groups ac
ion level. Educa
es and
replacement
tive explanati
cumulation o
around their
lying on
ip is borne ou
s driven by so
wealth that is
t a measure o
likely major
e less liquid, it
izing their
cross countries
108
ation
t
ions,
f
ut
ome
of
t is
s
housing, e
wealth. In
/ equity re
schemes a
omitting h
similar an
relationsh
Next we t
represent
measure i
individual
Figure 18: Mlevel indicat
Here, as w
additiona
actuarial a
adjustme
entering into
n general, the
elease schem
are more pre
housing wealt
nalysis using a
hip driven by
turn to the im
ts a country‐e
is the margin
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mes, as compa
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th dramatica
a net wealth m
cross‐country
mpact of accru
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ared to the En
‐Renaud, Pére
lly misstates
measure (see
y variation.
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strong positi
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higher retirem
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are not count
nglish‐speakin
ez‐Carillo et a
retirement re
Appendix). T
s on retiremen
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working an a
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ive relationsh
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ment ages; co
This again is
er method fo
tries who hav
ng countries o
al. 2010). This
esources, but
The result is a
nt age. Again
n retirement a
dditional yea
apsed at the co) tertiary.
hip between t
. Countries w
ountries with
a very plausi
r realizing the
ve embraced
of the OECD w
s reduces our
t nonetheless
a marginally s
, each cell in
age within th
ar at age 65, c
untry‐education
the benefit of
here pension
little to no ac
ible result; ho
e value of ho
reverse mort
where these
r concern tha
we perform
ignificant neg
the graph be
e cell. The x‐a
calculated for
n level. Educatio
f working an
ns receive a st
ctuarial
owever, in thi
109
using
tgage
t
a
gative
elow
axis
r
on
trong
is
case the r
countries
countries
Next, we
one year a
given age
schedule
pension in
the accrua
Figure 19: Dindicated by
In Figure 1
increased
appears t
support fr
the lowes
appears t
result is less p
to drive the r
.
look at longe
at a specific a
must take in
of benefit inc
ncentives invo
al kinks in Ge
Decade Pension y parentheses: (
10 we see a s
benefits from
o be mostly d
rom the with
st median gain
o have the op
persuasive tha
relationship,
r term incent
age; but the k
to account no
creases. In the
olved with wo
rmany and th
Deferral and Re(1) less than sec
similar relatio
m working to
driven by diffe
in‐country va
n also has the
pposite relati
an the previo
without such
tives. The prio
kinked accrua
ot only the m
e graph below
orking a deca
he Netherland
etirement Age. Ccondary; (2) seco
onship betwee
older ages as
erences betw
ariation – in th
e lowest mea
onship betwe
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h a clear corol
or graph deal
l curves mea
marginal benef
w, we examin
ade from age
ds).
Cells collapsed aondary; (3) terti
en gains from
ssociated wit
ween countrie
hree countrie
n retirement
een pension g
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t with the ca
n that individ
fit of a single
ne how retire
60 to age 70
at the country‐eiary.
m pension def
th increased r
es; but here w
es (Belgium, It
age, and it is
gain and retir
nce on differe
n education g
pacity to incr
duals making
year, but als
ment ages ar
(a period tha
education level.
ferral and reti
retirement ag
we perhaps se
taly, German
s only the Net
rement age.
ences betwee
groups within
rease pension
a decision at
o the future
re related to t
at averages ou
Education level
irement age,
ges. Again, thi
ee a little mor
y), the group
therlands wh
110
en
ns in
a
the
ut
l
with
is
re
with
ich
Finally in t
Here, we
income st
rates. The
maximize
which like
but does
systems.
In the gra
the year a
relationsh
country d
the earlie
Figure 20: Plevel indicat
Clearly, pe
wealth, as
additiona
this section, w
estimate the
treams into p
e resulting ne
s pension we
ely causes peo
provide an al
ph below, we
at which the p
hip between t
ifferences, w
st date at wh
Pension Benefit ted by parenthe
eople do not
s the best fit
l years involv
we adapt a co
value of pen
resent value
t present valu
ealth. This doe
ople to retire
ternative me
e again plot m
present value
the pension b
which reflect a
hich people ca
Peak Year and Meses: (1) less tha
choose retire
line does not
ves a loss of le
oncept from t
sion wealth a
using a perso
ues of pensio
es not take in
earlier than t
asure of the p
mean retireme
e of pension b
benefit peak y
a combination
an begin rece
Mean Retiremenan secondary; (2
ement purely
have a slope
eisure utility (
the “peak val
at each possib
onal discount
on wealth allo
nto account th
the date at w
purely financ
ent age on th
benefits are m
year and retir
n of the accru
iving a pensio
nt Age. Cells col2) secondary; (3)
y to maximize
e of exactly 1.
(and may also
ue” literature
ble retiremen
rate of 2% an
ow us to estim
he disutility o
which pension
cial incentives
he y‐axis, and
maximized. W
rement age, a
ual difference
on.
llapsed at the co) tertiary.
discounted p
This is unsur
o displace oth
e (Coile and G
nt age, discou
nd country‐sp
mate the age
of work / utilit
n wealth wou
s built into the
on the x‐axis
We see a signif
again mostly d
es seen in prev
ountry‐educatio
present value
rprising, given
her productiv
Gruber 2007)
unting future
pecific morta
of retirement
ty of leisure,
ld be maximi
e pension
s take the me
ficant positive
driven by cro
vious graphs
on level. Educati
e of retiremen
n that workin
e activity). A
111
.
lity
t that
zed,
ean of
e
ss‐
and
ion
nt
g
112
further step to take would be to use an “option value” framework to capture the value of consumption
and leisure at each age more explicitly (Stock and Wise 1990). This approach requires explicit
specification of utility functions and parameters (as in the model that motivates this paper), is sensitive
to parameter values that must be chosen, and would benefit from work that has yet to be done
estimating these parameters. Therefore, this is left for future research.
Overall, these analyses of pension institutions taken together provide prima facie evidence that pension
incentives influence work, saving and retirement decisions. Using a unique dataset to capture the real
pension environment unique to each real individual, we were able to show that groups with high
replacement rates tend to accumulate less financial wealth and groups with low accrual/adjustment
rates tend to retire earlier. Helpfully, our set of countries include at least one in each quadrant of the set
[High Replacement Rates, Low Replacement Rates],[Strong Accrual Incentive, Weak Accrual Incentive],
which means these two effects are unlikely to be conflating each other. Nonetheless, these basic
patterns at the aggregate level could certainly be explained by other factors at the country level, with
national pension systems designed to reflect national preferences in the balance between private and
public retirement provision. The analyses presented here are best seen as a first step in describing broad
correlations in our dataset between wealth accumulation and labor supply outcomes at the individual
level and the incentives created by institutional pension structures. The next section describes future
directions for research.
113
Futureresearch:fromaggregateanalysistotheestimationoflife‐cyclemodelsFinally, we turn to future directions for research using this unique dataset with dynamic programming
models, which can more completely model individual behavior and provide a better basis for policy
simulation than the aggregate analyses we have performed in this paper.
The dataset we have constructed includes for the first time the lifetime earnings histories of a large
number of people across several countries, together with a detailed modeling of the pension incentives
faced by each individual at each stage of their working lives, the age at which the individual retired, and
a measure of their accumulated wealth. This provides unique opportunities for the type of lifecycle
model discussed at the beginning of this paper, which in turn can provide useful insights into the likely
reaction of individuals to different types of pension reform.
More sophisticated models can be applied to this data in the future, utilizing a range of additional
information to help capture individual circumstances more precisely, and relaxing assumptions that
allowed for exploratory analysis but which may be unrealistic. On the informational side: as an adjunct
to the main thrust of our work, we imputed spousal income for each person in our dataset at each age
of life, using regression coefficients derived from the larger European Community Household Panel
(ECHP) dataset. Household income measures can therefore be constructed and analyzed. Similarly, we
have processed the SHARELIFE family variables to ascertain household size at each age: variations in
family size may have a significant impact on consumption over the lifecycle, and likely are related to
country and education level. Real asset returns have been treated as common to all individuals, but data
on historic asset returns across countries could be easily incorporated.
The model can also be extended in a number of ways. As a consequence of the decision rule driving the
program, consumption is a given fraction of a known discounted lifetime income. We found in
exploratory modeling that this decision rule often led those in countries with high pension replacement
rates to get into very large amounts of debt in young and middle age, which might not be feasible in the
real world, as it is not easy to borrow against future income and pension entitlements. So, liquidity
constraints may be a sensible extension, particularly for modeling the generous replacement rate
countries.
As mentioned, individuals are treated in the model as having perfect information on lifetime income,
and also on asset returns. Relaxing these assumptions to allow for uncertainty and concern about
possible shocks may bring the model closer to reality. In addition, our modeling of the utility of
retirement leisure / disutility of work as an age‐independent parameter could be adjusted simply to
allow tastes for leisure to depend on age.
Finally, the model as constructed focuses exclusively on individual decision‐making, but other research
has developed concepts of joint decision‐making for couples and noted its importance for understanding
labor force behavior (Hurd 1990; Blau 1998; Gustman and Steinmeier 2000). While data limitations do
not allow us to construct lifetime labor histories for a full set of matched husband‐wife pairs, a range of
spousal characteristics are available through SHARE and could be incorporated into further extensions of
this work.
114
ConclusionIn this paper, we describe the construction, characteristics and value of a novel dataset that combines
lifetime earnings histories with a detailed modeling of national pension institutions, uniquely capturing
the interaction between lifetime earnings levels and trajectories with the rules of pension systems in a
way that allows us to understand the pension incentives and decisions faced by individuals in each year
of their working lives. With a large quasi‐panel of respondents with comparable data across multiple
countries, this dataset provides new opportunities to exploit cross‐national institutional variation for
research purposes without resorting to stylized assumptions about individual income over the lifecycle.
In addition, we have provided additional support to two hypotheses: pension systems that provide more
generous replacement rates are associated with lower accumulation of wealth to finance retirement;
and sharper incentives to continue working at older ages are associated with later retirement. The
former effect receives stronger support from our analysis, with both within‐ and between‐country
variation showing a negative relationship between replacement rates and wealth, while the retirement
age effect is mostly driven by between‐country variation.
The main findings in this paper are based on an aggregation of individual pension situations up to the
country‐education cell level, but the greatest value in our dataset lies in future work that can calibrate
lifecycle models to explain individual behavior as a function of the incentives facing them. In turn, this
will allow more accurate policy simulations to address the likely consequences of (necessary) future
pension reforms both at an aggregate and an individual level. These important modeling tasks are far
from straightforward, but our work has provided a solid foundation on which they can be built.
115
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Append
Figure 21: Rindicated by
dix
Replacement Ray parentheses: (
tes and Accumu(1) less than sec
ulated Net Wealcondary; (2) seco
lth. Cells collapsondary; (3) terti
sed at the countiary
try‐education leevel. Education l
116
level