Strategy and Nuclear Weapons
National National SecurityGoals Strategy
Global Environment
But: technology influences strategy
Developments and Debates
• Early 20th century: Airpower• Mid to late 20th century: nuclear weapons• 21st century: cyberweapons
US Strategy to 1890s
Total War: Richmond 1865
1890s: Naval Power
• Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914)
The Rise of Airpower: 20th century
Two Views•Airpower is a novelty•Airpower is decisive–Giulio Douhet (Italy)–William Mitchell (US)
WW II Strategic Bombing
Tokyo May 9-19, 1945
August 6, 1945 Hiroshima
HiroshimaBefore After
August 9, 1945 Nagasaki
Nagasaki: Before and After
“The Absolute Weapon”
Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, 1946
First Nuclear Age, 1945-90s
1. Bipolarity– balance
2. Deterrence– vulnerability
3. Arms Control– Managing rivalry
4. Rationality
Second Nuclear Age, 1990s to present
1. Multipolarity– asymmetry
2. Deterrence– missile defense
3. Arms Control– coercion
4. Rationality
First Nuclear Age 1945-90s
1. Bipolarity– balance
2. Deterrence– vulnerability
3. Arms Control– Managing rivalry
4. Rationality
1. Bipolarity• An Arms Race– Spiral theory
• US and USSR rough equality• Balance of power• Triad– ICBMs– SLBMs– Bombers
ICBMIntercontinental Ballistic Missile
SLBM – Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile
Launch Tube Hatches on USS Alabama
Strategic Bombers
Two Arms Races by 1960s
1. Offense-offense2. Offense-defense
Early ABM Systems
• Johnson Administration: “Sentinel”
2. Deterrence
Strategies of Deterrence1.Warfighting– JFK: Flexible Response– Nixon: Limited Nuclear Options: NSDM-242– Carter: Countervailing Strategy: PD-59– Reagan: Prevailing Strategy: NSDD-13
MIRVsMultiple Independently Targeted Reentry
Vehicles
Strategies of Deterrence2. Assured DestructionDeterrence = Second Strike capability• “Balance of Terror” – Albert Wohlstetter, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2
(January 1959): 211-234
Soviet First Strike: Successful: USSR “wins”
US Second strike
US USSR
US Second Strike CapabilitySoviet First StrikeUS Second strikeScenario: Everyone Dies
US USSR
US and Soviet Nuclear Arsenals
ICBM SLBM Bombers launchers/warheads launchers/warheads launchers/warheads
US Strategic Nuclear Forces
1950 0 0 0 0 462 330
1960 12 12 32 32 1515 3083
1970 1054 1244 656 1552 390 3339
1980 1054 2144 512 5056 376 3568
1990 1000 2440 608 5312 267 4648
2000 550 2000 432 3456 73 1376
2013 450 500 288 1152 60 300
US and Soviet Nuclear Arsenals
ICBM SLBM Bombers launchers/warheads launchers/warheads launchers/warheads
USSR/Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces
1956 0 0 0 0 40 120
1960 2 2 30 30 121 354
1970 1472 1472 317 287 157 568
1980 1338 5362 990 1558 157 568
1990 1297 6857 908 2900 127 1402
2000 756 3540 348 1576 112 790
2013 326 1050 160 624 72 810
Sources:•Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook•Natural Resources defense Council Archive of Nuclear Data
3. Arms Control
• Management of the arms race• Cut costs• Increase predictability• Increase transparency• “Essential equivalence”
Strategic Nuclear Weapons Treaties
Cold War Era• SALT I– Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms 1972– ABM Treaty 1972
• SALT II Agreement 1979
Strategic Nuclear Weapons Treaties
End of the Cold War• Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I
1991• START II 1993
Strategic Nuclear Weapons Treaties
Post-Cold War Era• Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
2002• New START Treaty 2010
Critics of Arms Control
• Soviet ICBM Superiority?• “Window of Vulnerability”
US launchers warheads Soviet launchers warheads
Titan 54 54 SS-17 108 432
Minuteman II 450 450 SS-18 308 3,080
Minuteman III 550 1,650 SS-19 330 1,980
Total 1,054 2,154 Total 746 5,492
Solutions to Window of VulnerabilityNixon to Reagan1. Mobile Missiles– MX Multiple Protective Shelters system
Solutions to Window of VulnerabilityReagan to present2. Missile DefenseReagan’s SDI speech, March 23, 1983
4. Rationality
• The logic of parity/equality• The logic of deterrence• The logic of management of the arms race• STRATEGIC STABILITY