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www.pwc.com
Riding the stormGlobal Shipping BenchmarkingAnalysis 2011
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Transportation & Logistics
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Contents
Foreword 5
1. Market developments 6
1.1 General Outlook 6
1.2 Supply and demand characteristics 9
1.3 Concluding remarks 12
2. Financial performance benchmark 13
2.1 Background 13
2.2 Benchmark model 13
2.3 Results summary by subsector 14
2.4 Performance indicators 19
3. Companies covered by the analysis 27
Appendices 31Ratio defnitions 31
List of shipping companies covered 32
Contacts 36
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Foreword
I believe almost everyone would agree that it has been a tough last couple of years for the world economy, global trade
and the shipping industry. The markets have been particularly volatile and this has been reected across the board, from
commodity prices to freight rates, vessel values and bunker prices. Nevertheless, global trade in 2010 recovered to the same
levels as in 2008 and as indicated by the results of our benchmarking analysis, the overall performance of s hipping companies
improved somewhat in 2010 compared to 2009.
This is not to say that the shipping industry is now on a safe path to recovery. There are many more challenges ahead and
a signicant amount of uncertainty in the markets and this is reected in the 2011 half year results of shipping companies
which have been worse than the same period in 2010. In July 2011, Moodys published a negative outlook for the shipping
industry for the next 12 to 18 months, saying the business from container carriers to bulk operators is f acing overcapacity.
Tankers are also projected to have a rather difcult year in 2011 as full year forecasts for oil demand are revised downwards
and more tankers are delivered in an already crowded market, driving some companies to place vessels in lay-up.
As in prior years, in preparing this third Global Benchmarking Analysis we have analysed the performance of 150 shipping
companies across the various subsectors through some basic Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) derived from t heir 2010
annual reports and monitored how these have evolved over the last 5 years. We have also tried to give some insight on the
recent challenges and drivers of the industry on the basis of some of the qualitative information and disclosures in those
annual reports. We trust that this analysis adds value to shipping companies and other participants in the shipping industry
who wish to understand the impact of recent developments on the industry and facilitate their decision making.
A more detailed analysis can be prepared and tailored to individual needs upon request. We will be pleased to receive
feedback from you on this publication and discuss how to further assist and provide insight into current shipping industry
issues.
Socrates Leptos-BourgiGlobal Shipping & Ports Leader
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n 2010 the world economy embarkedn a recovery path with grossomestic product (GDP) growing at9% over the previous year and therong correlation between industrial
ctivity, GDP growth, merchandise andeaborne trade continuing unabated.igher than expected trade volumes
n 2010 resulted in the improvement
f market conditions for the shippingector.
ccording to the World Traderganization, world trade increasedy approximately 14.5% during010, compared to a decreasef approximately 12% in 2009.
The contribution of the emergingeconomies, which for the last ten yearshave dominated world shipping, wasof great signicance. High levels ofutilisation rates were achieved forvessels and resumption in orderingactivity, especially in the dry bulksector, are indicators of a possiblerecovery, which remains, however, still
at an early stage.Inevitably, the recent developments inthe global economy raise signicantconcerns for the shipping sector.This is compounded by the challengeof absorbing record deliveries ofnew vessels and an order book that
continues to be substantial.According to shipbrokers Clarksons,new building deliveries in 2010amounted to approximately 142mdwt and marked the peak of the longshipbuilding cycle starting as farback as 1975. Specically, the drybulk eet grew by some 17% last yearand is expected to grow at around
13% in 2011 and a further 11% in2012. The tanker eet grew by 4.2%in 2010, however, this is after takinginto account the phase-out of somesingle-hulled tankers, some of whichwere sent for demolition and some forconversion. In the containership sectorthere had been approximately 1.4m teuof deliveries in full year 2010.
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1 Market developments
.1 General Outlook
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espite the signicant number ofeliveries, freight rates in the dry bulkector were marginally higher than in009. The Handysize, Supramax andanamax categories performed betterhan in 2009, with only the Capesizeserforming slightly lower than 2009.ccording to shipbroker Clarksons, theverage earnings per day of a Capesizeessel (1990-built) were $34,147 in009 and $27,683 in 2010 while foranamaxes the average earnings were15,089 in 2009 and $20,221 in 2010.
he tanker market was characterisedy a strong rst half of the year and a
weak second half of the year, a pattern
which was most evident in the largeressel categories. For example, VLCCschieved on average approximately51,000/day in the rst half of 2010nd $19,000/day in the second half ofhe year.
lobal container trade grew bypproximately 12% in full year 2010er Clarksons reports, following a
contraction of 8.9% recorded in 2009.Containership charter rates registeredan upward trend over the year as awhole, although rates remain belowlong term averages.
While the world economy continuesto be fragile and faced with increasedvolatility and uncertainty, businessescontinue to face tightening creditconditions and limited liquidity.Financial institutions have toughenedtheir positions, both for existingexposures and when making newfacilities available.
These factors and the overall economic
environment has led many companiesto restructure their loan facilities inan attempt to rectify existing issueswith their facilities or in preparingfor a tougher year ahead. Among thecompanies covered by our analysis, thecontainer sector companies appearedto have been the rst and hardest hit,as approximately 60% of the containervessel owners covered by our analysis
have reported a restructuring of theirloan obligations during 2010. Thecorresponding percentage for thedry bulk sector was 29% and for thetanker sector 12%. Signicantly lessship owners foresee debt restructuringin 2011 with the exception of tankerowners which seem to foresee moredifcult market conditions forcingthem to restructure their debt at similarlevels as 2010.
1.2 Supply and demand
characteristics
While new building deliveries in 2010were at a historical peak, these couldhave been even higher had it not beenfor order cancellations or delays andpostponements of delivery, whichaccording to shipbrokers R.S. Platou,have reduced the growth rate of the
world eet by some 3 percentage pointsin the year.
Despite the difculties in establishingthe exact number of order cancellationsin the market, it is estimated t hat
around 640 vessels were conrmed ascancelled in 2010, compared to around700 in 2009. Brokers estimate that only
60% of the dry bulk and containershiporder book at the beginning of 2010scheduled to be delivered during theyear was actually built. The remainingcapacity was rescheduled for laterdelivery, cancelled or removed fromthe order book. In the tanker sectorit is estimated that of the 64 milliondwt tankers and chemical carriers thatwere scheduled to be delivered in 2010,only some 40 million dwt of these wereactually delivered to ship owners, asorders totalling 10 million dwt were
postponed, while 14 million dwt werecancelled or otherwise removed fromthe order book.
Our analysis shows clearly lower levelsof cancellations compared to 2009among the companies we have covered,with the exception of the ferry sectorwhich reported new building ordercancellations in 2010 at the same levelas 2009. In the dry bulk sector therewas a dramatic reduction of vesselcancellations as only 2 companiescovered by our analysis reportedthat they cancelled vessel orderscompared to 11 companies in 2009. Theremaining companies participating in
our survey provided no information intheir annual reports on this matter.
The reduced shipbuilding cancellationswere accompanied with a resumptionof ordering activity. Several companiesfollowed an aggressive policy in orderto place themselves in a strongerposition after the economic downturn.Clarksons estimates that orders for130.5m dwt of new vessels worth US$96 billion were placed in 2010, of which81m dwt for bulk carriers and 35.6mdwt for tankers, which account forapproximately 30% of the total order
book in each of these two sectors, whileapproximately 8.4m dwt correspondedto orders for containerships (15% of thetotal order book for containerships) anda handful of other vessel types.
This may have been a result of botha resumption of cargo demand andlower shipbuilding prices followingdownward trend during the rst halfof 2010, (although this trend wassomewhat reversed in the second half
of the year). Notably, these trends fornew building orders are expected tochange in 2011 as slower growth inworld trade than originally expectedcombined with a signicant increase insupply of new vessels drive ship ownersinterest to other sectors such as gascarriers (LNG, LPG) and vessels offeringperceived economic advantages (e.g.post-Panamax containerships).
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n 2010, the number of orders forew vessels in the dry bulk sector
ncreased two-fold. The rming ofeight rates likely had an impact giving
hip owners an incentive to invest inew tonnage. Part of the reason for all
hese new orders may also be that newuilding prices for bulk carriers weregnicantly lower in 2010 than during
heir peak two years ago. According tolarksons, a Capesize vessel which cost88m to build in 2008, could be built
or $57m in 2010. Similarly, the priceor a new-built Panamax in 2008 wasround $46.5m, while this had droppedo around $34.5m in 2010.
Such patterns in contracting for newvessels are a familiar characteristicof the cyclical shipping markets.While a signicant order book maybe an indication of a supply-demandimbalance that will depress freight ratesin the future, owners are tempted bylower new-built prices that will providebetter returns when the marketsrecover. This in effect continues to buildthe order book putting further pressureon freight rates.According to our analysis, the newbuilding ratio (calculated as thenumber of vessels on order divided bythe average number of vessels operated
for the companies in our sample),stands at 25% for dry bulk vessels, 7%for tankers and 10% for containerships.For the whole shipping market, theorder book as a percentage of the eetfor each subsector is reported at 49%for dry bulk, 22% for tankers and28% for containers. This indicates arelatively more conservative approachfor companies in our sample, possiblybecause most of these companies arelisted companies and are accountable toa number of shareholders in the publicmarkets, while private companiescontrolled by a single person or familymay take a more aggressive view of themarket.
crapping activity declined in 2010ompared to 2009, although marketnalysts expected much higher levelsf scrapping or recycling. Despiteery strong scrap prices (on average490/ldt for tankers and $435/ldt forulkers) and relatively weak hire rates,he total capacity of vessels that werecrapped in the year of 26.5m dwtepresented approximately 2% of theeet which is considered to be withinistorical norms.
Scrapping remained relatively non-existent in the dry bulk sector in thesecond half of 2010. Public companymanagement teams have beenhighlighting for two years how theremoval of older vessels from the eetcan help offset some of the new-builtdeliveries, yet with the exception ofa brief pick-up in scrapping activityduring the depths of the credit crisis,these older ships have generallycontinued to trade. This reluctance
to scrap may be changing, though, asscrap prices are now exceeding the$500/lightweight ton (ldt) threshold(relative to a long-term scrap priceaverage of about $200/ldt) and asfreight rates remain depressed.
Little or no information was providedin the annual reports of the companiesparticipating in our survey on theirvessel scrapping activities or policyon this matter. However in last years
benchmarking analysis that weperformed, approximately 50% of thecompanies in the container segmentand 45% of the companies in themiscellaneous vessels segment haddisclosed their intention to proceed tosome level of vessel recycling within2010 or later.
Scrapping activity declinedin 2010, despite very strong
scrap prices and relativelyweak hire rates
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Amountsinvested inoperating assets
Tangiblefixed assets
Other operatingexpenses
Depreciation andimpairment charges
Staffexpenses
Grossmargin
Working capital
Incomefrom operatingactivities
Earningsbeforeinterestand teaxes (EBIT)
Net operating assets
RONOA
= =
+
RONOA
Net operating assets EBIT
Corporateincometaxes
Financial incomeand expenses
Non operating assets
Net incomeafter taxesTotal net assets
ROCE
+ +-
- -
-
= =
Net fixedassets
Earningsbefore interestandtaxes(EBIT)
econd hand vessel sale & purchasectivity was considerably lower in010 than in 2009. The number ofeported sales was down by close to0% compared to 2009. Vessel values
were under pressure reecting a weakereight market, an increasing concernbout the order book and in generallarge number of potential salesandidates.
Of the companies covered by ouranalysis, 24% reported vesselsimpairment in 2010. Our analysisindicates that asset impairments are atlower levels in 2010 compared to 2009in most sectors, especially in the drybulk and the tanker sector. As shownin the diagram below (showing the
percentage of companies reportingimpairment to the total companieswe have analysed), the containersector reported the largest share ofimpairments on vessels with 42% ofthe companies belonging in this sectorincurring impairment losses.
.3 Concluding
emarks
o conclude, the shipping industryserformance in 2010 has probablyxceeded the expectations of most
market participants. Increasingemand in the rst half of 2010nd positive trading conditionshroughout the remainder of the year,aw lifting volumes nearing 2008vels. Improvements in freight rates
cross all trades, combined with costavings implemented in 2009, haveroduced improved prots for shippingperations in 2010.
How bad or good things will get inthe future depends on how well theworld economy copes with the postnancial easing problems that theUS are facing, the resolution of theEuropean sovereign debt crisis, thechallenge of rebuilding northernJapan and the prospects of the Chineseeconomy. However, given supply sidepressures in shipping, it will requirean extraordinary performance on allaccounts to bring the shipping industryback into a period where returnsbecome relatively attractive again.
In the meantime, as fuel and othercost pressures are again re-emerging,companies are likely to continue todo some necessary house-keeping.Continued focus on operationalefciency and effective cost control willaccordingly remain important in thecurrent year.
Our benchmark analyses keyperformance indicators (KPIs) ofcompanies in different subsectorsof the shipping industry, namelycontainer, tanker, dry bulk, off shore,ferries and miscellaneous (companiesactive in different or several sectorsof the shipping industry). More than
150 companies have been selectedfor this analysis. Financial data havebeen derived from publicly availablenancial statements and annual reportsof these companies from 2006 to 2010.
The purpose of this analysis ismeasuring the nancial performanceof individual companies in subsectors,comparing performance betweensubsectors and the overall shippingindustry and identifying trends anddevelopments.
In this publication we present theaverage nancial performance ineach subsector. Individual companiescan obtain tailor made benchmarkpresentations upon request. Anindividual report enables a shippingcompany to benchmark its ownnancial performance with othercompanies in its subsector on thebasis of key performance indicators.Individual reports can be commissioned
by contacting any of our shippingindustry group contacts at your localPwC ofce as presented at the end ofthis publication.
2.2 Benchmark model
The nancial performance of theshipping companies has been measuredon the basis of the following keyperformance indicators:
Proftability ratios
RONOAbeing Return On Net
Operating Assets, is one of the mostimportant performance indicators formeasuring returns on investments incompanies. RONOA measures returnson operating activities of a company.To calculate RONOA the ratiosWorking Capital / net sales, Net
fxed assets / net sales and EBIT /net sales are measured in our analysis.
If a company has also invested moneyin other companies or grantedloans, ROCE is another importantperformance indicator. ROCE beingReturn On Capital Employed,
presents total net returns on all assets,not just on operating assets.
The following graph presents abreakdown of the components ofRONOA and ROCE:
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2 Financial performance benchmark
2.1 Background
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n addition to RONOA and ROCE weave also measured Return on EquityROE), dened as net income afteraxes over average shareholders equity.
inance structure ratios
o assess the nancing structure of the
ompanies surveyed, as well as theirbility to pay their long term liabilities,we have measured the Solvency Ratio.n addition to RONOA and ROCE, theolvency Ratio is of special interest forompanies that invest money in (ornd money to) a shipping company
uch as banks. For the same reason,we have measured the Net Debt Ratio
f the companies analysed. Maximumequirements for net debt ratios areften included in bank covenants.
nother ratio that is regularly includedn bank covenants is EBITDA /et Finance Costwhich has been
dded to the KPIs we measure in ourenchmarking analysis. This ratio
ndicates how many times a companysnterest expenses can be covered fromperating cash earnings (earningsefore interest, depreciation andmortisation).
iquidity
Meeting long term liabilities is onlyelevant when a company is able toay its short term liabilities in thehort run. To obtain an understandingf the liquidity of the shipping sector
ncluding the developments in the lastyear we have measured the Currentatio of the companies covered by ournalysis.
2.3 Results summary bysubsector
The radar charts on the followingpages show the outcomes of the keyperformance indicators by subsector in2010.
The outcomes of the ratios have beenranked on a scale from zero to ten.A score of 10 (the outside line of thechart) means a favourable outcome onthat ratio and a score of zero (centreof the graph) a very unfavourableoutcome of the ratio.
The radar charts we have presentedinclude the following scores:
Average score overall shippingindustry 2010 (yellow area)
Average score subsector 2010 (pinkline)
Best in class in subsector 2010 (redline)
The radar chart provides a very quickoverview of the nancial performanceof the subsector and overall shippingindustry.
As demonstrated by this summary,the container sector and the dry bulkshipping sector have been the mostattractive subsectors in 2010 followedby the offshore shipping sector. In 2009the dry bulk shipping sector was themost attractive sector, followed by the
offshore shipping sector.
The container subsector was the leastattractive subsector in 2009, while ithas become one of the most attractivesubsectors in 2010. The improvement ofthe container shipping sector comparedto 2009 is mainly due to improvementof the protability of this subsector in2010.
The tanker subsector was the leastattractive subsector in 2010.
The container sectorand the dry bulk
shipping sector havebeen the most attractive
subsectors in 2010followed by the offshoreshipping sector
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n the following radar chart we have presented the development in the performance indicators in the years 2009 and 2010 forhe overall shipping industry:
With the exception of the net debt ratio and the ratio of net xed assets to sales, a ll nancial performance indicatorsabilised or improved in 2010 compared to 2009.
he 2008 nancial crisis and economic downturn that followed it had a huge impact on freight volumes and rates in almostl shipping subsectors in 2009. Year 2010 shows a mild recovery, although results are mixed between subsectors.
2.4 Performance indicators
Return On Net Operating Assets (RONOA)
The following charts present the RONOA by subsector over the last 5 years, and the evolution of some of the components thataffect RONOA, such as Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT), working capital and xed assets.
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With the exception of the container andtanker subsectors which increased by19 percentage points and decreased by3 percentage points respectively during2010, RONOA has remained relativelystable compared to the previous year.
The container subsector RONOA washigher than the dry bulk subsectorsin 2010 on the back of a recovery incontainer trade volumes, higher freightrates and improved results followingmeasures taken primarily by linercompanies, such as slow steaming,
rescheduling of non-core/loss-makingroutes and the lay-up of a numbervessels.
The dry bulk sector had consistentlybeen the best performing subsectorover the last 5 years, but its RONOA hassuffered in 2010, primarily as a resultof moderate commodities trading anda substantial growth in new tonnagebeing delivered in this subsector. Thisis a trend that is likely to continue in2011.
Working capital to net sales andxed assets to net sales have bothincurred an increasing trend in 2010for all subsectors, when compared to2007/2008. This is caused primarilyby decreasing net sales as a result ofweak freight and hire rates across theshipping industry.
ROCE is structurally lower than RONOAwhich can be explained by the factthat net income after taxes is generallylower than EBIT in a normal courseof business and all investments aretaken into account. Another factorimpacting the ROCE in 2010 wouldbe higher interest margins incurredon borrowings, as lenders had takenadvantage of restructurings and waiver
requirements to push for increasedmargins that reect the higher cost ofcapital of the banking sector.
The trends over the last 5 years inROCE trace the trends evidenced inthe RONOA, except for the offshoresubsector in 2009 and 2010.
In 2009 ROCE and RONOA in the
offshore sector are in line, however, in2010 ROCE deteriorates while RONOAimproves compared to 2009. Thesedevelopments are possibly due topositive hedge results and large positiveexchange rate translation differencesin 2009 on foreign currencies at severalNorwegian companies that comprisethe majority of the companies in thissector.
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Return on capital employed (ROCE)
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eturn on equity
Developments in return on equity in theyears 2006 2010 are very different ineach subsector.
In 2009 return on equity decreasedsignicantly in all subsectors but not inthe offshore and ferry industry. Returns
on equity deteriorated even to negativeoutcomes for the container andmiscellaneous subsectors in 2009.
In 2010 return on equity decreasedin all subsectors, except for thecontainer and miscellaneous subsector.However the miscellaneous sectorstill has a negative outcome in 2010.The improvement of the ratio of thecontainer industry is due to increasedprotability of this sector in 2010.
Notably, the dry bulk sector continuesto have the highest return on equitythan all other subsectors in 2010, whichis consistent to the previous four years,although as indicated previously, this isnot reected in either RONOA or ROCE,whereby the dry bulk subsector was
the second best performing trailing thecontainer subsector. This is possiblyan impact of a higher leverage in thissubsector compared to the others.
Solvency
Solvency rates are relatively high inall shipping sectors and do not showsignicant changes during the last 5years.
Due to the impact of the economicdownturn, one would have expected
decreasing solvency rates in 2009, butthe rates stabilised or even increasedin 2009. This is possibly the resultof nancial restructuring in manyshipping companies in 2009. Anotherexplanation is that companies havealready impaired their vessels andother assets in 2008 (which indicatesthe most signicant decrease in thisratio), and thus it had stabilised in thesubsequent periods. For 2010 the ratiodecreases slightly for the offshore andmiscellaneous subsectors.
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iquidity
The current ratio indicates the abilityof the company to pay its short termliabilities in the short run and iscalculated by dividing the amount ofcurrent assets by the amount of currentliabilities. As a rule of thumb, a currentratio of approximately 1.5 is generallydeemed to be healthy while current
ratios less than 1 are generally deemedto be unhealthy.
In 2010 the average liquidity inthe container and tanker industryincreased up to the level of 2008,before the economic downturn.In 2010, two container shippingcompanies have a critical score lessthan 1, compared to 7 containercompanies in 2009. In 2010, 6 tankercompanies have a critical scoreless than 1, compared to 9 tankercompanies in 2009.
The current ratio in the dry bulksector decreased signicantly in 2010compared to 2009, the 2010 level ismore or less in line with the 2008level. In 2010, 6 companies have acritical score less than 1, compared to 5companies in 2009.
The 2010 liquidity ratio of the offshoreindustry is the lowest of the period2006-2010. For the offshore industry in2010, 3 companies have a critical scorecompared to 2 in 2009.
Net debt
The net debt ratio is calculated as theratio of interest bearing debt less cashdivided by total assets. The higher theratio the more the company has beennanced by interest bearing liabilities.Borrowing capacity of the companydecreases when net debt on total assetsincreases. For this reason, this ratio is
usually monitored by banks or othernance providers.
The developments in this ratio inthe years 2006-2010 vary betweensubsectors, however the averagetotals have a clear increasing trend.
This is primarily driven by the drybulk subsector and the miscellaneoussubsector. A likely cause of thetrends observed relate to increasedimpairments at the end of 2008 (whenthis ratio had a notable increase formost subsectors) and the impactof deteriorating cash positions in
following years.
Net debt has been the highest in thetanker industry for six years in a row.Net debt is the lowest in the dry bulkindustry for the last four years. Thedry bulk industry also has the highestaverage solvency rate and highestcurrent ratio.
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BITDA/Net fnance cost
The ratio EBITDA/net nance cost isincluded in our benchmark as from2009 and therefore only available forthe years 2008 till 2010. This ratioindicates how many times interestexpenses (after deduction of interestincome) can be paid from earningsbefore interest, taxes, depreciation andamortisation. This ratio is importantfor credit institutions as it indicatesthe ability of the company to pay the
interest expenses on the debts. Thisratio is often monitored as part of bankcovenants.
In 2009 the EBITDA/net nance costratio decreased in all sectors, whilein 2010 the developments vary fromsubsector to subsector. In 2010 the ratiofor the container, offshore, ferry andmiscellaneous subsectors signicantlyincreases while the ratio in the tankerand dry bulk subsectors decreases.These trends mirror how freight andhire rates have fared in these subsectorsduring these years.
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3 Companies covered by the analysis
Our benchmark analysis was basedon the participating companies(as presented in Appendix List ofparticipating shipping companies)nancial statements over the last 5years and the review of the 2010 annualreports for information on currentrelevant themes.
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The shipping companies participatingin the analysis operate in t he tanker,container, dry bulk, offshore or ferryindustry. Companies operating indifferent or several subsectors and havebeen categorised as miscellaneous.
The following chart presents the
segmentation of the shippingcompanies in our analysis:
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hipping companies of different sizesave been included in our analysis.he composition of our population,sing the 2010 sales as benchmark, is as
ollows:
f the companies included in our sur vey, 83% are public companies listed onarious stock exchanges, mainly in Europe and the US. A categorisation of thestings on stock exchanges is presented in the following chart:
The ratios for the nancial performancebenchmark have been calculated on thebasis of their publicly available nancialstatements and annual reports withoutany adjustment for possible differencesin generally accepted accountingprinciples (GAAP) applied.
A signicant number of the companiesin our analysis have prepared theirnancial statements based on theInternational Financial ReportingStandards (IFRS). Application of IFRSis required when listed in Europeand further accepted in several otherjurisdictions. Up until the end of 2007nancial reporting under US GAAP was
a requirement for companies listed on aUS stock exchange. From 2008 onwardsreporting for these companies applyingIFRS is also a llowed.
As shown on the graph below, 18%of companies are using accountingprinciples other than IFRS or US GAAP,for example Greek GAAP, Dutch GAAP,Hong Kong GAAP etc.
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he distribution of shipping companiesarticipating in the benchmarkingnalysis is as follows:
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Appendices
Ratio defnitions
RETURN ON NET OPERATIONAL ASSETS (RONOA)EBIT / average NOA* reected as a percentage
EBIT: Earnings Before Interest and Taxation .NOA: Net Operational Assets calculated as net xed assets (excluding nancialassets) + working capital (excluding cash) + net xed assets (excluding nancialassets
WORKING CAPITAL / NET SALESAverage working capital* / net sales - reected as a percentage
Working capital: Current assets minus non-interest bearing current liabilities
NET FIXED ASSETS / NET SALESAverage of net xed assets* / net sales - reected as a percentage
EBIT / NET SALESEBIT / net sales - reected as a percentage.
RETURN ON CAPITAL EMPLOYED (ROCE)Income after taxation / average of capital employed* - reected as a percentage.
Capital employed: intangible, tangible and nancial xed assets + working capital
RETURN ON EQUITYNet income after taxation / average shareholders equity* - reected as apercentage
SOLVENCYShareholders equity / total assets
LIQUIDITY (CURRENT RATIO)Current assets / current liabilities.
NET DEBT / TOTAL ASSETSInterest bearing liabilities less cash / total as sets
EBITDA / NET FINANCE COSTEBITDA / (interest expenses after deduction of interest income)
EBITDA: Earnings Before Interest, Taxation, Depreciation and Amortization
* Average is calculated by balance as at year end 2009 + balance as at year end 2010 divided by 2
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List of shipping companies covered
...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
ompany Name Country...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
egean Marine Greece
lgoma Central Corporation Canada
nek Lines Greece
nthony Veder The Netherlands
spo Group Finland
ttica Enterprises Greece
altic Trading United States+H Ocean Carriers Greece
elships Norway
erlian Laju Tanker Indonesia
ourbon France
W Gas Norway
aledonian Macbrayne United Kingdom
amilo Eitzen Norway
apital Product Partners Greece
hina Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) China
MB GROUP Belgium
olor Group Norway
oncordia Maritime Sweden
osco China
ostamare Greece
rude Carriers Greece
SAV Chile
anaos Greece
Amico International Shipping Luxemburg
FDS Denmark
iana Shipping Greece
ockwise The Netherlands
of Norway
ouble Hull Tankers Norway
ryShips Greece
agle Bulk Shpg. United States
idsiva Norway
imskip Iceland
ktank Sweden
ssar Shipping India
uroceanica United Kingdom
uronav Belgium
uroseas Greece
vergreen Marine Taiwan
xcel Maritime Greece
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Company Name Country....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Exmar Belgium
Fairmount Marine The Netherlands
Farstad Norway
Fesco Russia
Finaval Norway
Finnlines Finland
Flinter Group The NetherlandsFreeseas Greece
Frontline Norway/United Kingdom
Genco Shipping United States
General Maritime Corporation United States
Globus Maritime Greece
Golar LNG Norway
Golden Ocean Norway
Goldenport Greece
Great Eastern Shipping India
Greenreefers Norway
Grindrod Ltd South Africa
GulfMark Offshore United States
Hanjin Shipping South Korea
Hapag Lloyd Germany
Havila Shipping Norway
Hellenic Carriers UK (Jersey)
Horizon Lines LLC United States
Hornbeck Offshore United States
Hyundai Merchant Marine Korea
International Shipholding Corp United States/Shanghai
Irish Continental Ireland
Jadroplov Croatia
Jinhui Hong Kong/Norway
Kawasaki Kisen (K-Line) Japan
Knightsbridge Norway
Koninklijke Wagenborg The Netherland s
Latvian Shipping Company Latvia
Lauritzen Denmark
Limarko Lithuania
Maersk Denmark
Mercator Lines Singapore
Minoan Lines Greece
Mitsui OSK Lines Japan
Mols-Linien Denmark
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...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
ompany Name Country...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
avios Greece
eptune Orient Lines Singapore
ewlead Holdings Greece
ile Dutch Holding The Netherlands
ippon Yussen Kabushiki (NYK) Japan
orden Denmark
ordic American Tankers Corp United States
ovoship Russia
cean Freight Greece
dfjell Norway
mega Navigation Greece
rient Overseas International Hong Kong
SG Inc. United States
acic Basin Shipping Hong Kong
aragon shipping Greece
recious Shipping Thailand
remuda Italy
ederi ab Gotland Sweden
ickmers Maritime Singapore
ieber shipping Norway
oyal Arctic Denmark
afe Bulkers Greece
aga Tankers Norway
amudera Shipping Singapore
candferries Germany
corpio Tankers United States
eacor Holdings Inc. United States
eanergy Maritime Greece
easpan Corporation Canada/Hong Kong
eatrade Holding The Netherlands
hip Finance Norway
hreyas India
iem Offshore Norway
incere Navigation Taiwan
inotrans Ltd Hong Kong
kaugen Norway
loman Neptun Germany
olstad Norway
olvang Norway
pliethoffs Bevrachtingskantoor The Netherlands
RAB shipping Sweden
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Company Name Country....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Star Bulk Greece
Star Reefers United Kingdom
Stealthgas Greece
Stolt-Nielsen United Kingdom, Norway
STX Panocean Korea
Subsea 7 Norway
Tallink Estonia
Tarbit Shipping Sweden
TBS International United States
Teekay Corp. Canada
Temas Lines Indonesia
Thoresen Thai Thailand
Tide Norway
Tidewater Marine United States
Tirrenia Italy
Top Ships Greece
Torm Denmark
Transatlantic Rederi Sweden
Trico Marine United States
Tsakos Greece
U Ming Marine Transport Taiwan
Ultrapetrol Ltd Bahamas
Union Transport United Kingdom
United European Car Carriers Norway
US Shipping Partners United States
Van Weelde Beheer The Netherlands
Varun Shipping India
Viking Line Finland
Vroon The Netherlands
Wan Hai Lines Ltd Taiwan
Wilhelmsen Norway
Wilson Carriers United Kingdom
Yang Ming Marine Transport Taiwan
Financial statements for year 2010 of companies printed in red have not been included in thebenchmark survey as the 2010 nancial statements were not yet available at the time the datawas collected.
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Contacts
ey contacts for the global shipping benchmark
lobal Shipping & Ports leaderocrates Leptos-Bourgi30 210 6874630
is Bindels31 [email protected]
Hong KongAlan Ng+852 2289 [email protected]
IndiaBharti Gupta Ramola+91 124 [email protected]
IndonesiaThomson Batubara+62 21 527 [email protected]
ItalyLuciano Festa+39 0 6 57025 [email protected]
JapanYasuhisa Furusawa+813 6266 [email protected]
LuxemburgAnne Murrath+352 4948 [email protected]
MalaysiaAzizan Zakaria+60 (3) 2173 [email protected]
ricewaterhouseCoopers transportation & logistics practice provides industry-focusedssurance, tax and advisory services to public and private T&L companies throughout the
world. For more information, please contact the transportation & logistics leader in yourountry.
lobal leader Transportation & Logisticslaus-Dieter Ruske49 211 981 [email protected]
lobal Transportation & Logisticsusiness Developmenteter Kauschke49 211 981 2167
lobal Transportation & Logisticsnowledge Managementsha Bahl-Schneider49 30 2636 5425
frica Centralishal Agarwal254 20 2855581
ustraliaeter le Huray61 3 8603 6192
elgiumeter Van den Eynde32 0 3 259 33 32
anadatephen Shepherdson1 403 509 [email protected]
Central and Eastern EuropeNick C. Allen+42 0 [email protected]
ChinaAlan Ng+852 2289 [email protected]
CyprusLiakos Theodorou+357 0 25 555 [email protected]
DenmarkBo Schou-Jacobsen+45 39 45 36 [email protected]
FranceVincent Gaide+33 1 56 57 [email protected]
GermanyClaus Brandt+49 406 378 [email protected]
GreeceSocrates Leptos-Bourgi+30 210 [email protected]
MexicoMartha Elena Gonzalez+52 55 5263 [email protected]
The NetherlandsJeroen Boonacker+31 88 792 [email protected]
New ZealandGrant Burns+64 9 355 [email protected]
NorwayRita Granlund+47 0 95 26 02 [email protected]
PhilippinesRodel Acosta+63 2 [email protected]
PortugalJorge Costa+351 213 [email protected]
RussiaAlexander Sinyavsky+7 495 232 [email protected]
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ingaporeok Leong Soh
+65 6236 [email protected]
outh Africakhter Moosa
+27 12 429 [email protected]
outh and Central Americauciano Sampaio
+55 11 3674 [email protected]
outh Koreaae-Eun Lee
paingnacio Rel Pla
+34 963 032 [email protected]
wedenlaeys Thimfors
+46 0 31 [email protected]
SwitzerlandThomas Bruederlin+41 58 792 [email protected]
TaiwanCharles Lai+886 2 2729 [email protected]
TurkeyCenk Ulu+90 212 [email protected]
United Arab EmiratesAlistair Kett+44 (0) [email protected]
United KingdomClive Hinds+44 0 1727 [email protected]
United States of AmericaKenneth Evans+1 646 471 [email protected]
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