Download - Promoting Women's Rights and Gender Equality in the Middle East and North Africa

&IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

PROMOTING

A publication by

FEPS

www.feps-europe.eu

SOLIDAR

www.solidar.org

Responsible editors: Dr. E. Stetter, C. ReuterEditors: J. Tánczos, M. Claassens, M. Vingerhoedt, S. Hammerton

Cover design: Chiqui Garcia, Beltza

Copyright: FEPS SOLIDAR , 2014

With the fi nancial support of the

This book represents not the collective views of FEPS and SOLIDAR, but only the opinions of the respective authors.

Designed by: Ofi cyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JRISBN 978-83-7545-545-8

5PROMOTING WOMEN’S RIGHTS & GENDER EQUALITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Table of Contents

Foreword ................................................................. 7Ernst Stetter and Conny Reuter

Women’s empowerment in the MENA region ......... 11Zita Gurmai

The role of women and women’s organisations in the search for gender equality in the MENA region . 15Judit Tánczos and Margot Vingerhoedt The women’s movement faced with the challenges of transition and the Islamist movement in Tunisia .. 23Awatef Ketiti

Gender Codifi cation in the Family Code and the Constitution in Morocco: Social Movement and Feminist Approaches ....................................... 47Rachid Touhtou

The feminist movement, equality and qiwama in Morocco: Perspectives and prospects ...................... 71Ilyass Bouzghaia

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Political Empowerment of the Algerian Woman: A Sociolinguistic Analysis ........................................ 93Fatma-Zohra Nedjai-Mebtouche and Souryana Yassine

The Arab Spring: Women shaping the public sphere in Morocco ............................................... 117Jaouad Radouani

Change and Persistence in the Tunisian organisational network for the promotion of women ............................................................ 135Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes and Belhassen Ennouri

Physical, social and aspirational mobility: The involvement of female Palestinian activists in international activities .......................................... 155Paladia Ziss


Foreword

Strengthening women’s rights and promoting gender equality are essential to guaranteeing social justice for all. Without empowerment, without awareness of their rights, or the opportunity to participate in decision making processes, women are often unable to claim and defend their social, economic and cultural rights. Women throughout the world face systematic gender-based discrimination and are regularly denied fundamental human rights such as the right to life and security of the person, self-determination, health care, education, decent working conditions, social protection, marriage with free consent and freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association.

Women often do not have full access to economic and political decision-making processes at the local, national or international level. In many countries governments allow crimes against women to go unpunished, continuing a culture of impunity for family members, agents of the state and others who discriminate or commit violence against women.

Numerous international covenants aim to ensure women’s rights. These include the Universal Declaration

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of Human Rights (Article 16), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Wom-en (CEDAW) of 1979 and the UN General Assembly Dec-laration on the Elimination of Violence against Women of 1993. Through these internationally recognised docu-ments, especially CEDAW, governments have pledged to actively bridge three gaps in the legal provisions designed to put an end to discrimination against women with regard to property, family, employment and citizenship: (1) ending explicit legal discrimination, (2) extending the protection of the rule of law and (3) taking responsibility for the law’s impact.

Against this general background, women’s associations and movements in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have been suffering from growing pressures. While women’s involvement was largely recognised, hopes that the Arab Spring would lead to the enhancement of women’s rights and a change in gender roles have given way to disappointment. Women in the region still have no or only very limited access to their entitlements.

The aim of this Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) and SOLIDAR publication is to defi ne the main challenges in promoting women’s rights and gender equality and enhancing the equal participation of women in social, organisational, democratic, economic, political and cultural life. The joint research programme by the two organisations was carried out under the patronage of Zita Gurmai, Member of the European Parliament, President of PES Women and FEPS Vice-President.


The research programme was based on an initial meeting and continued discussions with local partners from the MENA region to identify and examine the possible research areas, as well as an open call for academic papers. The aim was to design an effective strategy for increasing the impact of women’s organisations in the region. To this end, the publication is based on fi ve complementary elements, namely: renegotiating the public and private sphere to bring about a change in mentality in society at large, advocating for legal changes and for implementation, women’s socio-economic empowerment, shaping the future to achieve greater pluralism and building global solidarity among women. The publication starts with an introduction that presents the main fi ndings of the articles and puts forward their recommendations.

We hope that this publication will serve as useful reading for all actors concerned in the fi eld and that it will contribute to the fulfi lment of the promise of change heralded by the Arab Spring.

Ernst Stetter Conny ReuterFEPS Secretary General SOLIDAR Secretary General


Women’s empowerment in the MENA region

Zita GurmaiPresident, PES Women and Vice-President, FEPS

While we mark the third anniversary of the start of the revolution in Egypt and we welcome the adoption of a new Constitution in Tunisia that recognises and defends women’s rights, the countries of the MENA Region are still going through an important and historical transition period.

Challenges and objectives still lie ahead of the governments and the citizens of the countries in the MENA Region, but 2013 has been an important and active year contributing to today’s fruitful outcomes. I would like to refl ect upon what has been done in 2013 before putting forward our 2014 objectives.

In 2013, our political family and partners not only closely followed developments in democratisation, we have been actively building bridges with progressive movements and organisations in the MENA Region. Building bridges and strengthening solidarity among progressives has been essential to defi ning our common

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vision, objectives and priorities for the region and to ensuring positive and progressive development for all women and men in the region.

Part of this progressive vision and the democratisation process is the role we see for and give to women. Women have been front-runners in the revolutions and the demands for social and economic change. While women were visible and vocal during the revolutions, as a Central European politician and grass-roots activist, I know from personal experience that keeping women at the centre of decision-making - be it political, economic or social - in the democratisation process is still a diffi cult challenge.

This is why, together with the PES Ministers for Gender Equality, I signed a common declaration in September 2013 on the fringes of the EUROMED meeting on ‘Strengthening the role of women in society’ organised by the French government in Paris, thanks to the strong and personal commitment of the French Minister of Women’s Rights, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem, towards women’s empowerment in the MENA region. We called for support for women as actors of change and progress in the MENA region and underlined the common challenges we face on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea. We also underlined women’s crucial role as political and economic actors to bring about progress in society.

Women should remain active players in the democratisation and peace-building processes. Women should be leading fi gures in the democratisation processes and the forming of governments, political parties, trade-unions and civil organisations.


I am glad to have met at the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2013, women MPs and grass root members putting pressure on governments and parliaments to ensure that women’s rights and gender equality are an integral part of legislative and judicial developments. Without a strong political and civil society women’s movement, achieving and keeping gender equality and women’s rights on the political agenda is diffi cult.

Moreover, among our common progressive goals, we want to ensure women’s employment and education, women’s participation in political and public life, that we combat violence against women and guarantee sexual and reproductive rights; “the same rights, the same fi ghts”.

These inter-related issues will subsequently increase women’s economic independence and social development and have a positive effect on lowering violence against women, including domestic violence, honour killings, Female Genital Mutilation and forced marriages.

In this context, PES Women hosted on 2 October 2013 in the European Parliament the premiere of the documentary “Threshold of the Desert” by Vision Films, which tells the real life story of Najat Aziz, a Moroccan woman from a rural area, who through education has empowered herself and the community she lives in. Education has brought Najat access to the labour market, the possibility of fi nding a job, of setting up her own business, creating employment for other women and men and allowing access to education in the most remote areas.

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It is these types of cooperation, exchange programmes, resources and social actions that support women’s initiatives and ambitions that we want to focus on and foster as social democrats and progressives. It is also for this reason that PES Women strongly supports the launch of a research programme, facilitated by FEPS and SOLIDAR, which seeks to promote the empowerment of women in the region and to shape socio-economic development based on the principles of equality and social justice.

As a last point, another crucial step will be to set up a network of Progressive women who can build effi cient Euro-MENA cooperation and exchange programmes that support women’s initiatives and ambitions on both sides of the Mediterranean Sea.


The role of women and women’s organisations in the search for gender equality in the MENA region

Judit Tánczos Policy Advisor, Foundation for European Progressive Studies

Margot VingerhoedtInternational Cooperation Offi cer, SOLIDAR

The images of spring 2011 are seared into the memories of the whole world. Women and men stood side by side as equals, shouting out loud that they had had enough of dictatorial regimes, of having no hope and no prospects for the future. These courageous women and men took to the streets protesting against the old regime and fi ghting for change, for the full respect of their fundamental rights and freedoms. But while all agreed on the need for change, there was no unifi ed vision of how that should be achieved and no common understanding of what the newly claimed freedom would bring.

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In the fi eld of gender equality, freedom has led to a proliferation of diverse opinions on women’s role in society. However, many progressive women’s organisations lack institutional, human and fi nancial capacity, hence the current debate cannot take place in an equal and balanced manner. As the region rebuilds its societies on new foundations, it is important to encourage the fulfi lment of both women’s and men’s aspirations to play an active and constructive role. In the many debates taking place this view is often presented, falsely, as a Western interpretation of equality and as a colonialist intrusion against local traditions. The biggest challenge that progressive women’s organisations face in the region is the constant attacks aimed at discrediting the equality agenda through this line of reasoning.

Against this background, the articles in this publication give an overview of the achievements, challenges and future prospects of progressive women’s organisations and movements in the MENA region. They have played a multifaceted role during this period of social transition. On the basis of these articles, FEPS and SOLIDAR advocate for the strengthening of progressive women’s organisations in the region and make the following recommendations.

A more equal society:Renegotiating relations between the private and public sphere

On the positive side, one of women’s most important achievements was increasing their visibility in the public


sphere. Hence, women have become more effective in presenting and supporting their claims for more equality, both in terms of political and socio-economic empowerment. Before offering an extensive overview of the challenges of the transitional period in the fi rst article, Awatef Ketiti welcomes the fact that “women from all social strata invaded the public arena and occupied every social and political stage to demand the right to employment, democracy and social justice.” She goes on to say that the emergence of new issues has not discouraged women’s organisations and that “they did not leave the streets, even after the fall of the dictator Ben Ali, despite all the attempts by the new Islamist authorities to send them back to the home and take away their rights.” In a similar manner, Rachid Touhtou argues that the events around and following the Arab Spring were essential in allowing for women in the region to take part in the renegotiation of the division between the private and public sphere. He states that “competing interpretations of gender, development and rights give rise to a modern public sphere where various actors (secularists, Islamists, feminists and state organisations) use discursive strategies to impose meanings and counter rival discourses.”

Women’s rights: Initiating legislation and monitoring implementation

Ilyass Bouzghaia continues by adding that “In Morocco, it is true that the feminist movement has accumulated signifi cant legislative triumphs to position

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Morocco among the most progressive countries in women’s rights” as a result of this renegotiation. Hence, as active participants in the transitional period, women’s organisations have been successful in advocating for legislative changes. Nevertheless he reminds the readers that “the intricate relationship between religion, ideology, legislation, and social change continue to trigger contentious debates”, hence the introduction of new laws can only be a possible catalyst for societal change, but not a guarantee. Indeed, implementation is often hindered by misogyny, disguised as a different interpretation of equality, in compliance with local traditions. De facto, this method leaves the reigning inequality untouched. The analysis by Fatma-Zohra Nedjai-Mebtouche and Souryana Yassine shows that in relation to all the legal changes, traditional, patriarchal views are still dominant and “the political empowerment of Algerian women is still being resisted by both men and women, a fact that could explain to a large extent why women have been excluded from being effectively involved in the different elective institutions of the country”. Hence, strengthening the capacity of progressive women’s organisations is also essential for allowing them to better monitor implementation. Otherwise, they will not be able to fulfi l their role as actors for a sustainable transformation of gender roles within society. Their hard-won presence in the public sphere can easily and rapidly disappear, making them once again invisible.


Women’s empowerment: Strengthening’s women’s socio-economic rights

While there has been a strong emphasis on the political empowerment of women in the region, women’s organisations would need further support to keep socio-economic empowerment on the agenda. In Jaouad Radouani’s article presenting the leading fi gures of the current Moroccan women’s movement, he points out that “most importantly, there is the massive group of women who have basic or no education at all and feel they are betrayed and that many of their basic needs such as healthcare, lodging, work, and living in dignity are neglected by the ruling classes, and that they are denied many of their rights as Moroccan citizens.” The deprivation of these basic rights was one of the reasons leading to the Arab Spring. After the regime change, neglecting these demands has led to renewed tensions in the region. While the lack of basic socio-economic rights can lead to mounting dissatisfaction, it also prevents citizens fully enjoying democratic political empowerment, making it harder for them to express that dissatisfaction in a way to bring about effective change.

Gender roles: Shaping the future of gender equality

Against this background, various interpretations emerge about future trends and the possibility of a backlash. Some argue that the mere fact of having an

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increased presence of women in the public sphere will ensure the continuation of the societal transition that has been launched. Nevertheless, the majority argue against such an automatic causal relation. When analysing the distinctive features of Tunisian associationism in three different political contexts, Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes and Belhassen Ennouri come to the conclusion that “it is worth warning that the current profi le of this structure of socio-political actors is not defi nitive; it is still in a transitory state, like the political system in which it interacts.” Linked to the role of women’s associations in shaping the future, it gives rise to concerns that “now a triangulation of discursive fronts and action have been established: the leftist secular pole, moderate conservative Islamism and ultraconservative Salafi sm” with the latter representing an increasing political and economic power with a clearly anti-feminist agenda.

Global solidarity among women: Strengthening international cooperation for increasing social mobility

Finally, the article by Paladia Ziss gives the debate an international dimension by analysing the relations between international and local organisations. She studies the enhancing affect of international activities on women’s physical, social and aspirational mobility. Contrary to an often criticised top down international approach, she describes how women’s mobility and empowerment have increased through being involved with an international environment


and how “transnational networking and interaction with international solidarity groups was one means to enhance personal agency, independence and freedom that was not otherwise available.” Sharing the same vision and the same ambition, FEPS and SOLIDAR would like to contribute with this inspiring publication to the shaping of a more equal society in the MENA region.

Equality is not an automatic process – but the ideas and recommendations put forward in the following articles can contribute to its realisation.


The women’s movement faced with the challenges of transition and the Islamist movement in Tunisia

Awatef KetitiProfessor of Communication, Department of Language Theory and Communication Sciences, University of Valencia

They came out onto the streets in their thousands to demand the fall of the dictator from the beginning of the popular riots in Tunisia at the end of December 2010. Women from all social strata invaded the public arena and occupied every social and political stage to demand the right to employment, democracy and social justice. Three years later, Tunisian women are still occupying the public arena in all the demonstrations. They did not leave the streets, even after the fall of the dictator Ben Ali, despite all the attempts by the new Islamist authorities to send them back to the home and take away their rights: “The women’s fi ght against political and social dictatorship is far from over, indeed it has taken off even

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more strongly since the revolution” said Faiza Zouaoui Skandrani, president of the new association Parity and Equality created, like many other women’s associations, after the revolution.1. She believes that the mobilisation of women and their struggle to defend their rights is an urgent need in face of the imminent dangers they face as citizens.

The same sense of urgency resonates throughout almost all the statements by the members and activists of the secular women’s associations in Tunisia ever since the ruling Islamist movement Ennahda introduced a bill proposing to replace the principle of equality between men and women in the constitution by that of complementarity2. After its numerous electoral promises to protect women’s rights and to retain the law on personal status promulgated in 1956, “the Islamic party did a U-turn when it came to power and turned against the laws guaranteeing the best legal status for women in the Arab world” explains Saloua Guiga, president of the Coalition for Women’s Rights, a network created in 2012 that brings together several associations that take a gender approach to their strategies and action. According to Aida Ben Chaabane, the vice-president of the Coalition, there is a strategy of systematic

1 From an interview with Faiza Zouaoui Skandrani, president of the association Parity and Equality, 23 April 2012, in Tunis.

2 The draft of the Constitutional article proposed on 1 Au-gust 2012 in the Constituent Assembly does not speak of equality between the sexes. It stipulates that: “The State will ensure the protection of the rights of women, their acquired rights, under the principle of complementarity with men within the family and as the associates of men in the development of the homeland”.


harassment of women by the government which is part of a premeditated policy aimed at dismantling the whole legal arsenal and replacing it with religious laws restoring the superiority of men over women as well as practices that have been abolished since 1956 such as polygamy, repudiation, religious marriage, limitations on the age of marriage, etc. “Women are at the heart of the Islamists’ project” says Ben Chaabane, “because their domination and control forms the basis of the model of the religious and patriarchal society they want to establish in Tunisia”.

An incident that took place over a year ago at one of Tunisia’s biggest universities, Manouba, deeply shocked Tunisian society and confi rmed the fears of these women activists. A young Islamist wearing a qamis scaled the roof of a university building to take down the Tunisian fl ag and replace it with the black fl ag of Al-Qaida. Among all the people who watched the incident impassively a young woman student reacted quickly, joining the young man on the top of the roof to stop him fi nishing his task, bravely facing his insults and physical aggression alone. Immortalised in pictures that have appeared in all the media and on social networks, this duel between a woman and a man defending two opposing social projects symbolised by fl ags has in a sense become an icon of the Tunisian transition.

This scene symbolises the ideological confrontation taking place in Tunisia between the Islamists and the defenders of secularism since the beginning of the political transition, and in which women have been the driving force. Today it is the women’s movement

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that is leading the fi ght to safeguard Tunisian women’s legal and social gains and to protect society from the fundamentalist project introduced by the ruling Islamists.

How is this ideological confrontation being played out? What are the dangers that lie in wait for Tunisian women since the revolution? And what strategies does the women’s movement have to counteract the Islamists’ political and social project?

To gain a closer understanding of the new sociopolitical context facing women in the transition, we have chosen to give the fl oor to members and activists from women’s associations to let them talk about their experiences and their analyses of the situation. Their stories and the information gathered in the course of this study are all part of an empirical approach based on three methodologies: interviews with the presidents of women’s associations, participatory observation during visits to activities by the associations and the organisation of a discussion group which brought together the representatives of 11 women’s associations in the Tunisian capital1.

1 The discussion group was organised in Tunis on 18 March 2013. It was attended by: Radhia Jubi, Union des femmes tu-nisiennes (Tunisian Women’s Union); Lamia Debbabi, Association tunisienne des femmes juristes (Tunisian Association of Women Lawyers); Emna Aouadi, Commission de la femme de l’Union générale des travailleurs tunisiens (Women’s Committee of the General Union of Tunisian Workers); Houda Noomen, Chemin de la dignité (Path of Dignity) association; Saloua Guiga, Coalition des femmes pour la Tunisie (the Coalition of Women for Tunisia); Imane Nora Azouz of the El Joumhouri party’s Women’s Com-mittee; Amel Radhouani Watad Women’s Organisation « Horra»;


From revolution to transition

The major changes that have taken place in Tunisia after the popular uprising that led to the fall of the dictator Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 have thrown the country’s sociopolitical situation into disarray and triggered tensions that had been contained by the old regime. The emergence of political Islam in the new post-revolutionary landscape and its electoral victory2 are no doubt the most important sociological events. Identity and religion are now at the heart of the Islamists’ political and social project, while they have pushed into the background the principal demands of the popular uprising for the right to jobs, social justice and freedom.

When it came to power, the Ennahda Islamist party frantically set about Islamising society and imposing religion as the sole frame of reference for political and social legislation. Alarmed at the authoritarian and autocratic drift of the new government and the weakness of the secular opposition parties, civil society responded from the outset in a dynamic and concerted manner to confront the new dangers threatening the republican political system and the modern achievements

Ayda Jerbi, Forum des femmes (Women’s Forum); Zohra Marrak-chi, Femmes et dignité (Women and Dignity) association; Sondos Darbouche, Women’s section, Amnesty International ; Sonia Gh-nima, Women and leadership.

2 The Islamists won the Constituent Assembly elections on 23 October 2011 with a simple majority of 37% of seats. They formed a tripartite government with two other political forma-tions, the Ettakattol Party and the Congress for the Republic.

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of Tunisian society. That has triggered a duel within Tunisian society, creating an ideological divide between the secularists and the Islamists. This divide, which is a common thread running through all domains, has become an integral part of Tunisian society today.

The women’s movement, shaken by all this upheaval, has gained new momentum since the outbreak of the riots. Thanks to the new 2011 law on associations which removed the restrictions on the creation of non-governmental organisations, it has been able to develop its grass roots and regional structures. The number of women’s associations has tripled in three years, from 1 in 2010 to 68 associations in 20133. The representatives of the women’s associations attribute this growth to certain decisive factors such as:

The importance of the political and social role • of women during the riots and the political and associative space gained after the fall of the dictator. Women’s awareness of what is at play in the new • political context in terms of their rights and freedoms under threat from the fundamentalism opposed to gender equality.The focusing of development projects on the • development of women’s associations and women’s capacity building.The huge growth in the number of women’s

associations after the revolution was accompanied

3 Statistics from the Centre d’investigation, de formation, d’études et de documentation sur les associations (IFADA), Tunis, 2012.


by diversity in their areas of intervention and in their ideological and political tendencies. For the fi rst time since independence in 1956, Islamist women’s associations have seen the light of day. Once such example is the Union des Femmes Libres (Free Women’s Union) which groups together four associations created in 2011 with the aim of “strengthening the presence of women in public life” according to their fi rst statement4. In their statement, these Islamist-leaning associations, namely the Tunisian Women’s Association, Hawa Association, Women and Complementarity Associations and Tounissiet Association, stress the defence of the Arab-Muslim identity of Tunisia and the need to “submit to popular referendum the international conventions on women’s rights as well as educational and cultural projects likely to affect our Arab-Muslim identity”.

Nothing in the Islamist plans of the Union des Femmes Libres, therefore, is in line with the emancipation plans of the secular women. On the contrary, as far as the latter group are concerned, it is about “using women to reinforce the position of the ruling Islamists and establishing a religious regime”, according to the representatives of the women’s associations. Aida Jerbi from the Forum des Femmes states that the Islamist party demonstrated the height of cynicism when it mobilised Islamist women to demonstrate against the CEDAW convention on International Women’s Day,

4 “Birth of the ‘Union des femmes libres” in « Businessnews » published on 07/09/2011 and accessed on 4 November 2013. Link: http://www.businessnews.com.tn/Tunisie---Naissance-de-lUnion-des-femmes-libres-,520,26478,3

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8 March 2012. “We were shocked to see, for the fi rst time in Tunisia, women carrying placards denouncing articles in the CEDAW” she said. “We thought Tunisia couldn’t go backwards after the avant-garde laws of the Personal Status Code”.

Despair and indignation are evident in the words and expressions of the women activists talking about their hopes and fears at this friendly meeting. Happy to be together, removed from daily pressures and political tensions, they give free rein to their overriding need to release their tension through words and discussions. They constantly repeat, almost obsessively, that they could not tolerate a return to the past. “We cannot accept any return to a state of submission after being considered as citizens with full rights by our constitution and our Personal Status Code” they say fi rmly.

It is indeed this legal statute promulgated in 1956 that has become the symbol of the modern social model which women are called on to play a leading role in building. The avant-garde laws in favour of equality, despite the persistence of certain discriminatory laws5 have marked Tunisia out as an exception compared to the other countries in the region. The abolition of polygamy, equality in divorce, the end of repudiation and the recognition of the principle of equality in the Constitution have all strengthened the status of women

5 The discrimination in law that still remains relates to inherit-ance law - women receive half a man’s share - the ban on Tuni-sian women marrying non-Muslims, the loss of custody of their children if a woman remarries, and a reduced penalty for a rapist if they marry their victim.


and their participation in social and public life. Moreover, the policy of support for free and universal education, reproductive health and family planning developed in the ‘60s by Bourguiba, the fi rst President of the Republic, kept the birth rate in check and give women access to education and employment. In the following decades, women’s legal rights were consolidated thanks to the mobilisation of the women’s movement which exerted constant pressure for the elimination of certain discriminatory laws. As a result, in 1993 the authorities removed the principle of a wife’s obedience to her husband and replaced it with the concept of “family responsibility shared between spouses”. In 2004, the penal code was altered to introduce measures that penalised sexual harassment (art.226). Equality between the sexes as regards marriageable age, set at 18 years in 2007, put an end to the marriage of minors at the age of 17. For divorced mothers, greater protection was given with the law of 2008 granting them the right to the conjugal home. Finally, women married to foreigners have been able since 2010 to pass on their nationality to their children thanks to the legal measure that lifted a social taboo deeply rooted in Muslim culture.

“Holy” discrimination

All these rights are currently under threat from the Muslim authorities who have imposed new and hitherto unsuspected ideological and political obstacles on women. Islamist policies have targeted the status of women in particular and their freedom. Multiple abuses

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have occurred since they came to power, all part of a strategy of premeditated harassment. The campaign to undermine the CEDAW convention that began in 2012 by means of disinformation and deformation presented the Convention as a dangerous legal instrument that threatened Arab-Muslim identity. This campaign aims to block the progress of the women’s movement that has been calling for the signature of the Convention since 1985, keeping up constant pressure on the different governments. Tunisia had already ratifi ed the Convention, expressing certain reservations about the articles it considered contrary to the measures linked to Article 1 of the Tunisian Constitution which stipulates that the offi cial religion of Tunisia is Islam (Ben Achour, 2007). After the revolution, women intensifi ed their pressure on the interim government which had promised to lift the reservations and sign the Convention, but this initiative was soon blocked by the Islamist party which openly showed its hostility to the Convention.

Finding themselves virtually alone in face of the Islamists, the women used all the mobilising strength at their disposal to raise the awareness of national and international social and political players of the imminent threat to their status. “We have organised campaigns to denounce the behaviour of the new Islamist government and we have approached international women’s rights and human rights organisations to ask them to put pressure on the authorities” explains Lamia Debbebi, representative of the Tunisian Association of Women Lawyers. Women’s demonstrations and the presence of women at all social protest events and events


specifi cally concerned with women’s rights are also a means of keeping up the pressure which they have no intention of giving up. The presence and visibility of women’s demands in the public arena is for them an essential political struggle and a means of resistance against the authorities’ attempts to remove them from professional life. Opposition political parties and civil society organisations have also been approached to form a common front and take part in collective and concerted action. “It is thanks to our persistence that we have been able to overcome our differences and organise a network of associations and political parties who are committed to adopting a gender perspective in their programmes and actions and helping to support us in our struggle by every means available to them” said Saloua Guiga of the Tunisian Coalition for Women. In fact, these people were present at all the actions organised by the women’s movement. The presence of male activists in civil society and political parties is still noticeable in all demonstrations. “It is because we consider women the pillars of social change and development in the country” explains Rami Slhi, president of the Euromed Human Rights Network in Tunisia6 who admitted that he had not missed a single event to demonstrate his support for equality and Tunisian women’s rights. In addition to logistic and moral support, his organisation fi nances several development projects that target the female population, particularly in rural areas. It also

6 Interview with Rami Salhi, president of the Euromed Hu-man Rights Network, 18 March 2013 in Tunis.

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provides specifi c support to strengthen and train the most dynamic women’s associations and above all the new organisations created by young women. The task of women’s associations during this time of transition is particularly diffi cult because they are active on several fronts, confronting many problems, each more urgent that the other.

Despite the tensions and confusions created by this situation, the women activists have not lost sight of their overriding priority. “Our demand right now is the constitutionalisation of women’s rights and the ratifi cation of the CEDAW convention as essential preconditions to guarantee our rights in the new constitution” say the activists. There is a lot at stake for them, and the whole future of Tunisian women depends on it.

Nevertheless, they are also aware that they are fi ghting on the same battle ground as the Islamists, whose goal is to take away women’s rights to impose their social model. “This will be a diffi cult and exhausting battle” says a realistic Sonia Ghenima, representative of the Women and Leadership association. She adds that the support of civil society and the political parties is not enough, because they are facing a particularly daunting adversary whose plans are predicated on the subjugation of women: “This is not a simple ideological confl ict, we are fi ghting for survival, between two totally opposed visions of society” explains Sondos Darbouche, president of the women’s section of Amnesty International in Tunisia.

Feminist activists point out that the Islamist movement in Tunisia, in all its variations and component


parts, began to be active following the legalisation of the Islamist Ennahda party, after the revolution in March 2011. They openly voice their fears and anxiety at the scale of the movement’s action, because it uses every possible form of symbolism and coercion to convince the population, invading the public arena, mosques and educational institutions with speeches and slogans. Backed by vast fi nancial resources provided by amongst others international Islamist networks and some Gulf States which support the establishment of an Islamic state in Tunisia (Ketiti, 2012), the Islamists have been able in the space of three years to establish a proselytising infrastructure throughout the country. They have taken control of the mosques, imposing partisan imams who throughout the day broadcast sermons hostile to women and their legal status and call for the application of Islamic laws.

“Their tactics are clear! They use religion to justify their hatred of women, whom they accuse of being the root cause of the debauchery and moral deprivation of society and appeal to men’s underlying machismo to bolster their sense of superiority” says Zohra Marrakchi of the Women and Dignity association. These practices, which have characterised the unprecedented revival of the offi cial political discourse against women, have provoked an increase in sexist violence, stirred up by a climate of impunity deliberately maintained by the authorities. Since 2012, Wahhabit fundamentalist preachers from the Middle East and Gulf States, known for their misogynistic messages, have visited Tunisia regularly, in an organised way. Invited by the

36

Islamist authorities, they have triggered a major social controversy. Tunisian society was even more shocked when the Egyptian preacher Wajdi Ghonim, famed for being a fervent defender of female circumcision, was invited to give a series of lectures in several Tunisian towns. These practices have been rejected outright by Tunisian society which sees in them a dangerous attempt to introduce a barbaric practice which is completely alien to Tunisian values and customs. The women’s associations see this as an unprecedentedly disturbing manoeuvre to make violence against women, which has risen steadily over the last two years, seem normal. In a statement published in April the Tunisian Association of Women Democrats (ATFD) denounced the “resurgence of violence” and the “unrelenting misogynistic hate campaigns” against women in the public arena and on social networks7. According to the results of a national survey on violence against women presented by the Offi ce National de la Famille et de la Population in 2012, physical violence against women has reached a level of 31.7%. Psychological violence affects 28.9% of women and sexual violence 17.5%. This is the fi rst real survey of the population carried out on this subject, which is still considered taboo. The women activists of the ATFD were the fi rst to break this taboo in the ‘90s. They carried out a big awareness-raising campaign to denounce violence against women and were the fi rst to create a reception centre to help

7 The statement was published on 23 April 2013. It was accessed on 25 April 2013. http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.com/2013/04/ 24/latfd-denonce-la-recrudescence-des-violences/.


women victims of violence, providing both psychological and legal support. In this way they help attenuate the fl agrant lack of state structures and mechanisms to support women victims of violence, whose numbers have increased sharply since the revolution.

Without denigrating the Islamist campaign of slander and libel against them, the association’s members continue to denounce the generalisation of violence against women after the revolution. Through press conferences and meetings they report on serious incidents of pressure and threats against women to make them wear the veil, attacks on some women university students because of their “un-Islamic” clothing, coercive restrictions on women’s freedom of movement, the return to gender segregation in some public spaces and educational establishments, after a sustained policy of co-education, and the indoctrination of little girls in religious kindergartens. Added to all this is the huge media campaign run by the ruling Islamists to urge women to wear the veil by means of television programmes and posters and leafl ets on public transport, as well as the entire reactivated Islamist teaching corps which propagates a hostile view of women.

In response to these threats ATFD activists warn against the “attempts to control women and their bodies” in their statement, adding that “we reject all attempts at using religion or a pseudo-morality to justify attacks on women’s dignity, on their physical, moral and psychological integrity”.

This written statement is a warning in face of the new phenomena now emerging aimed at hiding

38

women’s bodies away and violating the existing laws that protect them, such as the wearing of the niqab, customary marriages, of which some have been registered particularly in the universities between Islamist students8, the birth of children from these marriages, usually not recognised by their biological fathers, and the practice of polygamy despite it being banned in Tunisian law. Feminist activists explain that the laxity of the authorities in face of these practices is a strategy to undermine the laws that protect Tunisian women, and to replace them with religious laws. The president of the AFTD, Ahlem Belhaji, notes that the Ennahda Islamist party is entirely responsible, because impunity encourages such action. “I think this is a deliberate strategy by Ennahda, as confi rmed by the words of the movement’s historic leader Rache Ghannouchi, when he says that his movement does not want to change the situation from above but from below”9.

In the case of the young girl raped by police offi cers that aroused public outrage in September 2012, the authorities went beyond the bounds of permissiveness, and became party to the institutionalisation of violence.

8 According to offi cial fi gures, 500 customary marriages have taken place in the last two years. For more information go to: http://geopolis.francetvinfo.fr/la-journaliste-olfa-belhassine-sur-le-retour-du-mariage-coutumier-en-tunisie-14135

9 „Tunisie : Mobilisation contre le Procès intenté à une femme victime de viol”, (Tunisia: Mobilising against the trial of a woman victim of rape) published in Tout est à nous ! (11 October 2012), accessed on 25 December 2013. http://npa2009.org/content/tunisie%E2%80%89-mobilisation-contre-le-proc%C3%A8s-intent%C3%A9-%C3%A0-une-femme-victime-dun-viol


The affair could have been hushed up if the young victim had not had the courage to report her rape despite threats and extortion by three police offi cers. But against all expectations, instead of the three police offi cers being charged, the girl was called to appear before the investigating judge not as the victim but as the accused, on charges of “indecency”. She was supposedly “found in an indecent position with her companion” according to the Islamist Minister of Justice. Social mobilisation and the national and international campaigns by women’s associations and civil society to denounce the abuse of power by the authorities led the investigating judge to declare that there was no case to answer for the young girl and to charge the police offi cers with rape and extortion.

Radhia Jubi, of the National Union of Tunisian Women, comments that “We cannot drop our guard for even a moment, because the slightest lack of attention could cost us dearly”. If women do not report the constant abuses by the authorities, they risk become legal and institutionalised, she adds. Women’s associations use some of their energy to monitor abuses by the authorities and to bring legal proceedings against their violations of women’s rights. “Instead of spending our time improving women’s rights and living conditions, we fi nd ourselves caught up in an absurd battle to protect the minimum threshold of rights. It is very frustrating after a revolution for social justice and freedom” bemoans Amel Radhouani, president of the Women’s Organisation of the Democratic Patriotic Party.

40

The social landscape surrounding these associations is very discouraging and only serves to further complicate the task of civil society and of women’s associations in particular. In addition to the marked deterioration in the social fi eld, the economic and political situation of women has also receded sharply.

At the economic level, several reports10 show a clear trend towards the feminisation of poverty and the exclusion of women in Tunisia over the last three years, making them all the more vulnerable, particularly when it comes to defending their rights.

Although unemployment has affected all regions and social groups, women’s unemployment is showing a particularly alarming trend. According to statistics from National Employment Strategy (2013-2017), women’s unemployment reached 28.2% in 2012, compared to 15% for men. According to Emna Aouadi, president of the Women’s Committee of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), the economic crisis has affected the whole of Tunisian society, but when analysing the causes of high unemployment among women, it is important to include the Islamists campaign that accuses women who work of being responsible for men’s unemployment. Islamists insist on given priority to jobs for men because they are considered the heads of households. “Not only has this campaign encouraged several enterprises to only hire men, the Islamists have gone even further in their

10 AFTURD, (2011). “Economic precariousness and support for women’s rights”. Giz Coopération technique allemande, (2012) «La réglementation et la participation des femmes au marché du travail en Tunisie».


electoral campaign by promising a salary for women who stop working and stay at home”. Even though this promise is insulting to women, it goes without saying that it was not fulfi lled after the Islamists came to power, concludes Mrs. Aouadi.

Women’s unemployment in the formal economy has driven up their participation in non-registered informal activity, increasing their exclusion from the offi cial economic circuit. The employment rate for women in the formal sector, which was 27.9% in 2012 according to World Bank statistics, does not accurately refl ect their full range of activity. According to a study by the Institute for Freedom and Democracy, in 201211 the informal sector, which is almost exclusively urban or peri-urban, absorbs between 35% and 42% of the unregistered working population, the majority of whom are women. The harmful consequences of confi ning women to the informal sector have been well documented in economic analyses: it increases their exploitation, it makes their economic rights and their social protection more vulnerable and accentuates their invisibility in offi cial statistics.

As regards the new political challenges, women activists have reported a noticeable reduction in the representation of women in political bodies during the transition period, which quickly put an end to the euphoria felt at the adoption of the law on electoral parity in March 2012.

11 “Women’s work in the informal sector”. Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Craftsmanship (2012).

42

“Before the elections we fought for the real representation of women in political bodies and we campaigned nationally to get the legislators to include parity in electoral law” says Faiza Zouaoui, president of the Equality and Parity association. She described the determination of activists who sent out lists of competent women to all the political parties and decision-makers to remind them that the Tunisian women who had participated en masse in the revolution had the right to equal representation in the new Assembly. “On the day the electoral law was debated, we equipped ourselves with placards displaying our demands and we camped outside the Parliament, making sure that every MP who went through the front door was given a leafl et that set out our demands” explains Mme Zouaoui. These efforts were not in vain. The unanimous approval of the law was the fi rst political victory for the women’s movement after the revolution and put Tunisia in the spotlight at the regional and international level. However, the high hopes and expectations aroused by the law on parity quickly evaporated after the elections. The fact of not applying the pegged alternating system in the electoral lists prevented real parity taking place. The result was that the number of women elected to the Constituent Assembly under the terms of a parity law (27.19%) was similar to the amount of women represented in the parliament under the Ben Ali government thanks to the quota law (27.5% in 2010). The representation of women in political bodies has fallen considerably compared to the previous regime. While the Ben Ali government had four women out of a total of 45


ministers, there is only one female minister and two female Secretaries of State.

Furthermore, women have been excluded from the most important bodies such as the Council of the Wise (le Conseil des Savants), a new consultative body created in February 2013 responsible for evaluating the situation in the country and proposing solutions to the political and social crisis. No women have been appointed to this body composed of thirteen well-known national fi gures.

Political party and trade union activists have said that women are also under-represented in the political parties and trade unions. “It’s a serious problem that we have noted with concern since the political change. We believed that the participation of women in the revolution would increase their political representation but we have observed that a sexist mentality prevails in these structures” says Imane Azouzi of the Republican Party. The trade unionist Emna Aouadi spoke at length about the causes of women’s under-representation in the trade unions; among the causes she mentions is the exclusion of women from the electoral process by grass roots activists and leaders who see the trade union struggle as the prerogative of men, and the harmful effects of the campaigns led by Islamists in recent years opposing women’s activism in public life.

The members of the women’s associations know full well that they are never going to win any policies in favour of women from the current Islamist government or from the Islamist women leaders. Zohra Marrakchi from the Women and Dignity association comments

44

that “Ironically the majority of women who were elected to the Constituent Assembly thanks to the law on electoral parity belong to the political parties which are promoting a social project that goes against gender equality”.

Despite all the unfavourable icy winds blowing on the Tunisian spring, the women activists are not giving up. They are determined to continue their fi ght and to face up to all the political obstacles and defamatory campaigns against them. They are aware that that is the price to pay for the liberty that has never come for free for women and they are also aware that they are fi ghting a decisive and vital battle upon which will depend the future of Tunisian women and the whole of Tunisian society. “Our daughters and our granddaughters will never forgive us if we do not fi ght now for their rights” they all say.

Outside the room of the cultural club in the centre of Tunis where the women activists are holding their meeting, for three intense hours of highly charged emotions, fears, determination and hope, life continues at the pace of all these contradictory emotions. Floods of information reach our ears, Tunisia is bubbling over with endless events, debates, confl icts and confrontations. It is a country that is breathing deeply of its newfound freedom of expression that risks being snatched away from it yet again. There is talk of the indignation of the opposition and civil society at the Islamist party’s refusal to include a reference to universal human rights in the preamble of the new constitution. And so the drafting of the constitution has come to a standstill yet again.


We also hear commentary on the case of the young Tunisian woman Amina, a member of the international FEMEN movement, imprisoned for “disturbing public order”. Some consider her a “depraved and dangerous woman” while others organise campaigns to support her fi ght against what she calls “the hypocrisy of social morals” which she denounced with a message on her bare chest.

Whether they wear the veil or exhibit their chest, all Tunisian women are considered by the new Islamist authorities as a real danger that threatens public order. For this reason, their presence in the public arena must be reduced as much as possible in the man’s world that they seek to create. For the time being, this is only hypothetical, as women are not ready to give up the fi ght and the public role that has enabled them to grow.

“The battle has only just begun” they repeat, before leaving the meeting room in the cultural club and going back out onto the street.

46

References

Ben Achour, S. (2007). Le Code tunisien du statut personnel, 50 ans après : les dimensions de l’ambivalence. L’Année du Maghreb, II 55-70.

Femmes et révolution, étude sur la participation des femmes après la révolution tunisienne. CREDIF (2012). Tunisia.

Ketiti, A. (2012). Revoluciones árabes e islamismo: hacia el control espacio-temporal de lo simbólico. Pasajes, de pensamiento contemporáneo, Volume 39, pp. 4-19


Gender Codifi cation in the Family Code and the Constitution in Morocco: Social Movement and Feminist Approaches

Rachid Touhtou National School of Statistics and Applied Economics, Rabat, Morocco

Introduction

In Morocco, the years 2004 and 2011 were a turning point in the social, cultural and political fi elds, when social movements, including the feminist and the youth movement, invaded the public sphere to protest and called for the reform of the Family Code and the Constitution; gender dynamics and democratisation in Morocco have challenged the discourse on rights, questioning and refuting the single interpretation of gender equality along private and the public divides (Sater, 2007; Touhtou, 2012; Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006; Cavatorta, 2006).

48

Historically speaking, gender inequalities are at the heart of social debates in modern Morocco. The issue of gender divided Moroccans into two groups (secularists and Islamists) in 2000. It created a divide between Moroccan civil society actors and the organisations of the state, the latter having emerged as a powerful rival to civil society institutions, turning the project of empowering women into a battleground over the meaning of gender and equality, a discursive argument over semantics (Touhtou, 2012).

The history of the feminist movement in Morocco, and in the Maghreb in general (Charrad, 2001), is fi rmly connected to activism and calls for the reform of the Family Code or the Personal Status Code (or in Arabic the Mudawwana). The reform of the Family Code has been of central importance to the struggle for equal rights and gender empowerment by the feminist movement throughout the history of Morocco (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006). Another distinguishing aspect of the feminist movement is its linkages to the monarchy in Morocco1. Historically speaking, the three monarchs (Mohamed V, 1956-1961; Hassan II, 1961-1999; and Mohamed VI, from 1999) have intervened to various degrees, taking different approaches and styles depending on the political, cultural and religious context of their era.

Gender equality and democratisation are intertwined in the social and political fabric of Morocco. From the sixties onwards, the active involvement of social

1 Belarbi, A. (2012). Egalité-Parité, Histoire Inachevée,.Edi-tions Le Fennec, p.40.


movements in contentious politics, campaigning for democratisation, has brought private, taboo issues out into the public sphere. This paper attempts to highlight how gender and the law interact with social movements in the public sphere as a space for renegotiating the public-private boundary, and the changing relations between state and social movements in Morocco before, during and after the Arab Spring. The public-private divide cannot be studied without an analysis of the gender system, as gender is central to the structure of social relations and a primary way of defi ning power relationships. Because the interaction of state and social movements is characterised by strategies of legitimacy and co-optation, the two actors appropriate gender to their ends through needs satisfaction.

This paper is a contribution to an ongoing debate on integrating gender ideals in fundamental laws in the MENA region to empower women politically, socially, economically and culturally; today, the landscape of women’s activism is both more diverse and more organised. During decades of autocratic rule, women have been active in a range of social and religious organisations, associations, charities, political parties and NGOs both nationally and transnationally.

The paper is structured into four main sections; the fi rst section examines the political context of the reforms in both the Family Code in 2004 and in the Constitution in 2011; it looks at the background of the social movements’ activism in the public sphere and how they use political opportunities to challenge the system and push for reforms. The second section tries to analyse

50

the 2004 reforms of the Personal Status Code, the new rights for women, assesses advances in the 2004 Family Code and its implementation. The third section focuses on the 2011 Constitution and its wording on gender and equality based on the supremacy of international laws over national legislation and how the human rights framework empowers women. The last section concludes with an attempt at rethinking gender as an analytical and a cultural/identity tool and a subtext within social movements and politics in the Moroccan context. Here the author adopts Nancy Fraser’s approach to gender framing within state interventions (Fraser, 1989), and gender justice as trespassing gender codifi cation of laws (Fraser, 2003).

Social movements and the public sphere in Morocco: Gender dynamics, democratisation, and reforms

The democratisation process and women’s equality are becoming key features of the social changes occurring in political governance and within social movements. From the ‘90s onwards, the question of equality along with democracy marked Morocco as a country where Islamisation, radicalisation and a fragile process of democratisation coexist. On the political front, the new King launched many reforms concerning women’s rights, recognition of the Amazigh culture and language, human rights, and poverty alleviation. Social movements changed their strategies and renewed their discourses and political demands. This led to the appearance of new


social movements with new forms of activism and new cultural, economic and civic rights claims.

The uprisings of 2011 left no MENA country untouched. With the advent of the Arab Spring and the 20 February Movement, many new protest groups and organisations have emerged in Morocco. The surge in the number and diversity of groups–including feminists, Amazigh, human rights activists, youth, and Islamists - created a dynamism in Morocco’s public sphere that did not previously exist. Although the effi cacy of new organisations remains to be seen, the paper stresses the historical signifi cance of these new civil society organisations and protest movements. Given the dynamism of Morocco’s social movements, it argues that these protest movements may help bridge the gap between the public and private spheres and formal and informal ways of doing politics in Morocco.

The Moroccan regime under the reign of the late Hassan II foreshadowed the fragile transition to development and democracy, paved the way for a reconciliation phase that started in the ‘90s with the release of the fi rst wave of political detainees, the spectacular million signatures in 1992 and the fi rst reform, in 1993, of the original 1957 Family Code. In 1996, the fi rst revision of the Constitution and the appointment of the leader of the USFP, the socialist opposition in 1997, culminated in the formation of the ‘Alternance’ government in 1998. The new King, Mohamed VI, succeeded his late father Hassan II in 19992.

2 Belarbi, A. (2012). pp.71-142.

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The year 1999 was a milestone in the country’s history. It is the date when the fi rst serious attempt at empowering women in an Islamic country (excluding Tunisia and Turkey) was initiated. Needless to say that the initiative which sought to plant the seedlings of gender equality in Morocco was met with fi erce opposition; even the government did not show any real support for the initiative. The bone of contention was the unfair status of women in the outdated Moroccan Family Code.

In the spring of 2000, two distinct and different marches mobilised a huge number of demonstrators. For the majority of those opposing the plan, the women’s cause seemed a bourgeois pastime. They rejected the whole project because they were convinced that it was imposed by some western states who wanted to wipe out the Moroccan/Islamic identity. In the face of such violent opposition and governmental inertia, feminist associations and civil society decided to call for the King’s arbitration over the matter.

The result was that in 2003, the King appointed a royal commission to evaluate the 50 years of development in Morocco. The commission published a report known as “50 Years of Human Development and Perspectives to 2025”3. The year 2004 was another milestone in the history of Morocco, as it witnessed the fi rst historical moment of reconciliation with the violent past of the

3 See http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/undp/hdr/ 2005/morocco-e.pdf

and also the website of the National Observatory of Human Development: http://www.ondh.ma/


Moroccan regime. King Mohamed VI set up the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (ERC)4 to deal with the past grave violations of human rights in Morocco between the years 1965 to 1999, a period that became known as the years of lead or the black years.

During the reconciliation phase, there appeared many written testimonies narrating personal experiences, documenting this historical epoch in Morocco. These testimonial narratives, written by both women and men, shed light on the past by making their stories known and bringing alive oral, undocumented history into the public sphere5. The year 2004 also saw the reform of the Family Code under the reign of the new King and the recognition of the Amazigh culture as a component of the Moroccan cultural makeup with the setting up of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture (IRCAM)6. The path leading to the 2011 reform of the Constitution was founded on gender, cultural memory and human development - the three pillars on which the monarchy relies today to assert its popularity, continuity, renewal of legitimacy and visibility in the public sphere. The religious factor is more importantly one of the symbolic and historical foundations of the monarchy (Tozy, 1999). Political intervention in the codifi cation of laws

4 See the website of the ERC: http://www.ier.ma, also the website of the National Council of Human Rights D: http://www.ccdh.org.ma.

5 Aziza,B. (2012). Testimony in the Public Sphere in Morocco, Women and Prison Narratives in Morocco, LAP; also El Hachimi, M.. Debating Transitional Justice in Morocco: Truth, Justice and Democracy in a Reconciliation Phase. LAP.

6 See the website of the IRCAM: http://www.ircam.ma/.

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is a form of state patriarchy and a form of patronage (Jamel, 2007). Gender legislation epitomises further democratisation in the region. It goes to the heart of the organisation of power in society.

The Moroccan Family Code of 2004: Equality in the private sphere

Immediately after independence in 1957, the fi rst Family Code was drafted by male religious scholars from the nationalist movement and was based on a strict application of the Malekite School regulating marriage, divorce and polygamy. The monarchy in alliance with the Nationalists and tribal leaders drew up the Family Code undermining women’s issues (Dalmasso & Cavatorta, 2010) because Islam was a unifi er of resistance and the nationalists were all fi ghting the French with an Islamic ideology. The idea of Islam became more important than Arabism. Islam was a mobilising ideology (Belhachmi, 2005. Baker, 1998).

The Mudawwana treated women throughout their lives as inferior entities. It obliged wives to unconditionally submit to and respect their husbands and their close relatives; it permitted polygamy, gave the right of divorce predominantly to men and implied that the sexes were complementary rather than equal. Women’s consciousness during the resistance movement may be described as an invisible feminism, to quote Alison Baker (1998, p.16), meaning that the battle of tahrir (liberation) did not lead to taharur (meaning emancipation) (Brigui, 2012). The nationalist


ideology was based on the argument that the family is the mother of all social institutions7. This explains why subsequent generations of feminists were to focus their battle on the Family Code as the last bastion of patriarchy in the Arab World (Fatima, 2003 and 2006).

The codifi cation of the 1957 Family Code was considered an ijtihad8 by its very nature. The codifi cation itself was an act of desacralisation of a sacred law, to be subject to alteration in the future depending on the evolution of society (Charrad, 2007, 2011). Gender law as manifested in the Family Code is a gendered policy regulating the private sphere and how values from the private sphere are to be transposed into the public, creating a gender ideology and a reference for individuals at birth, during education and in political participation in society as a whole. From the outset the Family Code recognised a dual paradigm where the private is traditional and the public is modern; the battle between tradition and modernity will emerge and become omnipresent whenever gender and family law is to be debated (Charrad, 2007, 2011).

The revision of the Code after the one million signatures of 1992 gathered by the feminist movement

7 Allal El Fassi, 1952, An-Naqd ad-dati (Autocritique). Beirut: Dar el-Kechaf, 1952.

8 This is an established method of going back to the sources in order to reinterpret the general principles of Islam in the light of the current situation; this method justifi es the reform from within as an advancement and modernising of Islamic sharia’. The same meth-od was then applied to all subsequent reforms till the latest one in 2004.Even during the reform of the Constitution, the debate on Islam was fervent among political parties and social movements.

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led by the Feminine Action NGO (UAF) refl ected the polarisation between Islamists and secularists. The Moroccan King realised the importance of women’s rights in this schism and used it to his ends (Dalmasso & Cavatorta, 2010). The late King, Hassan II, gave a speech where he announced that he was the only person who had the right to handle this question as Commander of the Faithful, Amir Al Muominin, after a polemical debate between pro and anti-reform groups. There are two key features of the fi rst reform from which lessons could be learnt. The fi rst is the absence of women in the royal commission appointed by the King; only men drafted the code. The second point is that the six amended articles fell short of the goals ardently pursued by the women activists of the ‘90s (Daoud, 1993) for dignity and equality. However, this was a step towards opening doors for future revisions, as the contents of the Code were now in the domain of secular law, to be debated, reformed and revised whenever societal needs emerged demanding social and cultural repairs.

This revision paved the way for feminists to push for more gains. In 1993, Morocco ratifi ed the CEDAW convention, albeit with strong reservations. The ‘90s saw the fl ourishing of the feminist movement, its diversifi cation and its independence from political parties. The feminist movement joined civil society and began the long battle for equality and empowerment. Zakia Daoud (1993) described this phase as the explosion of potentials. Despite its long history (Daoud, 1993), the feminist movement emerged strongly after the ‘80s. In fact, 82% of the associations active today appeared at that time.


In the ‘90s, women activists in political parties, trade unions and student unions reached the conviction that autonomy was the key to their gender interests. They believed that affi liation to political parties hinders the progress of the women’s cause. These women chose civil society to defend their gender interests. Their gender consciousness confl icted with political affi liation. The ‘90s witnessed the emergence of the Islamist associations, federating a network of 50 associations across the country. This historical moment helped the secular feminist movement to weigh itself against an emerging Islamist feminism which begins to gain ground especially after 2000 and during the latest Family Code reform in 2003 (Sadiqi, 2006; El Moussali, 2011).

The feminist movement in Morocco gained momentum in the whole of society, in universities, and in research centres; but most importantly, intellectuals internationally begin to refl ect on the feminist movement and its role in democratising society and the state, especially after the quota debate in the 2002 elections and the question of political representativeness. (Darhour & Dahelrup, 2013; Sadiqi, 2011).

The feminists’ strategy was to shock society by showing how women had suffered because of the old Family Code. They disseminated their message in the written media and on television, showing the lessons learned by the feminist movement during the previous period. They changed tactics and returned to the masses in a strategic move. In this regard, their relation to the political remains complex and hence

58

issues of independence emerged within the movement because they needed the political umbrella of political parties but at the same time they sought autonomy in making decisions. The feminist movement’s linkage to the political and the social highlights their dialectical interrelatedness to patriarchy in all its manifestations.

The 2004 reform was drafted by a royal commission under the close guidance of the King but certifi ed by the legislature in the parliament. It was an unprecedented event, as it was the fi rst time the parliament debated the Family Code and women took part in the drafting. Three aspects of the Family Code made it novel. First, it admitted the principle of equality in marriage. Second, the reforms were achieved after decades of feminist activism for equality and equity. Third, the reform was an example of ijtihad from within Islamic jurisprudence. For feminists, the secularisation of a sacred law was a qualitative leap in forging new paradigms when approaching the feminist cause in the MENA countries. It stood as an alternative conceptualisation and an evolving rethinking of Islam and modernity. Despite the political context of Islamisation in these countries, gender and equality values opened debates and the rereading of sacred texts to the public and to feminists, both liberal or Islamists (Sadiqi, 2006, 2011).

Several important rights were secured for Moroccan women via the 2004 reform, including the right to self-guardianship, the right to divorce, and to child custody (Sadiqi, 2006). The age of marriage for girls was raised from 15 to 18 years of age, and girls were no longer required to have a male guardian approve their


marriage9. The revised Code did not abolish polygamy completely, but restricted access to it by men. Men now must obtain judicial authorisation to take a second wife. Importantly, the fi rst wife must be present when the husband appears before the judge to seek authorisation. From 2005 to 2006 there was a 12.5% decrease in the percentage of polygamous marriage relative to all marriages, from 32% to 28%10. Thanks to the new law, women can pass their Moroccan nationality on to their children.

Moreover, sexual harassment was made punishable by law under the new text11. Despite this, gender-based violence is still a concern for the feminist movement due to the lack of enforcement of the new decree (Ennaji & Sadiqi, 2011). Feminist networks mobilised against the conservative decree as presented by the Islamist government and wrote a memorandum to the government calling for the integration of a gender

9 During the year 2008, only 21% of all marriages exercised the right to marry without a male guardian according the Ministry of Justice.

10 Based on court records and statistics available in the Min-istry of Justice.

11 Gender-based violence is a major battle of the feminist movement in Morocco; there are associations which receive bat-tered women and provide them with shelter; there are listen-ing centres and legal support centres helping and empowering women to pursue their cases in court; recently, Morocco adopted a new law on violence against women; the law number 13.13 created a hot debate between the Ministry responsible for social development and the feminist NGOs. Sexual harassment has been criminalised, be it verbal, or non-verbal.

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approach in conceptualising violence against women.12 The reform of Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) enabled women to have equal access to the courts to take civil action against their husbands without prior authorisation from the court.13

Despite the advancement in the codifi cation and in the drafting of the revised Family Code, there are still obstacles to and shortcomings in the implementation of the new Code, from a gender equality perspective. Hence true equality remains a distant goal. In this context, this paper attempts to outline fi ve diffi culties in implementation which researchers, policy-makers and some legislatures are agreed on.14

The fi rst diffi culty lies in the wording of some articles, in the sense that they are open to different interpretations

12 See the website of the feminist network: http://www.adfm.ma/index.php?lang=fr

13 Article 446 of the CCP was redrafted to authorise health care workers to waive professional confi dentiality rules in cases of sus-pected violence between spouses or gender-based violence and to report such incidents to judicial or administrative authorities.

14 This year (2013) marks the celebration of the 10th anniver-sary of the adoption of the new Family Code; feminist judges and stockholders evaluate the impact of the law on the situation of women in Morocco from 2004. There is a need to research this impact not only on women in both private and public spheres but also in politics, the economy and the changes in mentali-ties. There are two major obstacles to evaluating the law. First, there is the absence of updated statistics on marriages, divorces and problems related to the implementation of the new Code in courts. Second, there is the absence of legal aid and access to the law for illiterate and rural women (see the latest research of 2013 on rural women by the feminist NGO “Ytto Foundation” for ac-commodating and rehabilitating Women Victims of Violence).


depending on the context, the case, the mood and the gender of the judge. As far as the age of marriage is concerned, the Code does not specify a threshold age below which exceptional permission to marry before the legal age of 18 may not be granted.15 Moreover, the Code’s provisions on the joint administration of property acquired during marriage do not include standards for evaluating the wife’s contribution in the form of domestic duties, where there is no contract between the spouses.16 The Moudawana did not completely abolish polygamy, unilateral repudiation of the wife by the husband, separation by compensation (khula) or discrimination in inheritance rules. All these weaknesses mean that there is a big gap between what is written into legislation and how family law is applied in practice.17

15 Marriage under the legal age of 18 is still common practice in some poor and rural areas. The case of a 16-year-old girl who committed suicide after she was forced to marry her rapist has spurred outrage among Morocco’s internet activists and calls for changes to the country’s laws.

16 The law stipulates that the spouses can, if they chose to, write a contract of their property prior to marriage; however, women do not practice it for fear that it would ruin their mar-riage from the outset. This fear is attributed to the gender division of roles during the socialisation process.

17 There are also other shortcomings; feminists group them in the following areas: legal assistance for rural women, fi nancial funding for feminist NGOs for sensitisation and advocacy matters, training of judges according to gender ideals, perception and ac-ceptance of the law.

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The Moroccan Constitution of 2011: Equality in the public sphere

Although all Morocco’s post-independence Constitutions have stressed the principle of equality between men and women, this has not been implemented in practice. Morocco’s 2011 Constitution institutionalised women’s rights by adopting the principle of the primacy of the international conventions ratifi ed by the Kingdom over domestic laws.18 The new Constitution was announced on 9 March 2011 amidst the turmoil in the MENA region. It was a quick and preventive response to the 20 February Movement (the Moroccan version of the Arab Spring) demanding a change in the Constitution.19 The King appointed a royal commission to draft the new Constitution. This political context gave birth to a new constitution reworked within the palace and rejected by the 20 February Movement as a “Makhzen” offer20 because the Movement asked for a Constituent Assembly, an unimaginable step given the nature of the monarchy in Morocco which takes Islam as its frame of reference.21

18 See the translation of the 2011 Constitution: http://www.anclradc.org.za/sites/default/fi les/morocco_eng.pdf

19 See the paper by Fernández Molina, I. (2011). The Monar-chy vs. the 20 February Movement: Who Holds the Reins of Politi-cal Change in Morocco?, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 16, Issue3. See also the paper available online: http://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/fi les/art_bh2.pdf.

20 See the study online : http://www.idea.int/publications/the_2011_moroccan_constitution/

21 The King has the title of “Amir AL Muaminin”, meaning the Commander of the Faithful. See Waterbury, J. (1982). The Com-mander of the Faithful. Columbia University Press.


The novelty in the new Constitution is the importance given to human rights as a frame of reference for domestic laws. The 2011 Constitution sets out a list of new rights that were not included in the 1996 constitutional text. However, several items are simple statements without precise normative content and refer to ordinary or organic laws. The rights to life and physical integrity have not been accompanied by a clear abolition of the death penalty.

Article 19 has been symbolically altered from the same article in the old Constitution that was dedicated to the King as a sacred person. Despite the fact that feminists judged this as a symbolic act to valorise gender equality by Article 19, it was written in a contradictory way. Article 19 establishes equality between women and men, but paradoxically, it adheres to the principle of the permanent characteristics of the Kingdom (constantes du royaume). One of the most important questions is how to guarantee the rights that are listed above. For example, the right to health care, social welfare, modern education, vocational training, work, decent housing, and access to public service based on merit, and access to water and sustainable development all seem to depend more on an individual’s means and ability to achieve them rather than on outcomes that will be at the cost of the state, public institutions and local authorities (Article 31).

Moreover, there is room for interpreting gender equality laws with a conservative meaning when they seem to contradict Shari’a law. Feminists argued in their memorandum both during the drafting and

64

when the text was adopted offi cially after a national referendum organised in July 2011 that these important developments cannot overshadow the diffi culties of the project in deciding clearly and precisely certain challenges, namely the frame of reference of the legislation. The feminist movement expressed their satisfaction at the institutionalisation of gender equality in the 2011 text. They argued that the new text is based on several principles of civil liberties, fundamental rights and obligations, and constitutes a step towards effective citizenship. These shared values, now entrenched in the Constitution, will become part of the common core of Moroccan citizenship. The Constitution, which derives its strength from human rights, fi nally recognises women on an equal footing with men.

Indeed, Title II of the Constitution opens with the consecration of equality between men and women in terms of civil, political, economic, cultural and environmental rights. In response to the claims of the feminist movement, which has long asserted that the political, economic and social recognition of women in the 1996 constitution was ineffective in practice, the reform project introduced the concept of effectiveness. To this end, the reforms call for affi rmative action and other mechanisms, including the Authority for Equality and the Fight Against All Forms of Discrimination, which will go beyond the constitutional recognition of rights to their promotion and implementation. One of the main demands of the human rights movement in Morocco, notably the feminist movement, included in the recommendations of the Forum for Equity


and Reconciliation (IER) concerns the question of the hierarchy of laws. The draft Constitution is an important step in this direction, by its recognition of the supremacy of international conventions ratifi ed by Morocco over national laws and the need to harmonise these laws accordingly. The feminist networks believe that the new Constitution, if it were to be sanctioned by referendum, would represent an important step towards the effective citizenship of Moroccans, provided that its passage is followed by real implementation. To this end, Moroccan legal codes need to be reformed to comply with the vision and spirit governing the development of the drafted constitution.

The Kingdom, through Article 19, has committed itself to international conventions and pacts duly ratifi ed by Morocco and this, with respect to the provisions of the Constitution, to the permanent characteristics and to the laws of the Kingdom. Accordingly, the new Constitution does not clearly establish the supremacy of international treaties over domestic law and this confusion does not facilitate the work of the judiciary, for there is no clear obligation for judges to uphold international law, including the protection of human rights.

Conclusion: Gender justice in Morocco between need satisfaction and need interpretation

Feminist rethinking of the public sphere is grounded on multi-dimensional battlegrounds over competing defi nitions of social reality. Nancy Fraser attempted to

66

fi ll the gender lacuna within this framework.22 Nancy Fraser (1989:113-143) questions the notions of public and private through a gender lens. For Nancy Fraser, the public sphere model failed to theorise the gendered relations within public/private spheres. Nancy Fraser comments that “gender identity is lived out in all arenas of life. It is one (if not the) “medium of exchange” among all of them, a basic element of the social glue that binds them to one another” (1989:127-128). The inclusion of the gender dimension in the public sphere necessitates a transformation of the nature of public/private duality and of all spaces in which gendered identities interact and also the gender roles within the whole of society.

A redefi nition of citizenship needs a major reworking for this politics of needs interpretation model by Nancy Fraser (1989:144-160). She argued that the battle over welfare and social spending dominates the political paradigms. This politics of needs satisfaction addresses women as a gender in society. She calls this new societal arena the social. She explains that the social is a site of discourse about people’s needs, specifi cally about those needs that have broken out of the domestic and/or offi cial economic spheres that earlier contained them as private matters. She goes on to explain that the social is by defi nition a terrain of contestation in the sense that everyone brings their own interpretation of social needs. In the social, it is the power of interpretation

22 This refers to the theory of the public sphere as defi ned by Jurgen Habermas mainly in his book: (1989) The Structural Trans-formation of the Public Sphere. Burger, T. & Lawrence, F., (trans). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Germany, 1962]


that counts. Thus Nancy Fraser concludes that it is a new arena for the State and a new terrain of political contestation (1989:157).

The debate on discourses on needs is a very competitive area where different strategies are used to secure a place in the arena of interpretations. The social and the local in Morocco are both new fi elds for State intervention and a site of contestation for social movements, bringing their own interpretations of the social and hence needs. Social movements in Morocco emerged strongly during the democratisation phase in the ‘90s linking the social to the political. Interestingly, the monarchy in Morocco got engaged in the social too to counter the emergence of these new social actors where Islamists, secularists and feminists coexist to change the face of the public sphere to win the battle of needs interpretation. Scholars studying transnational movements argue that collective action framed in the local/global nexus is inscribed within norms of making and managing meaning. It is a search over meaning, hence over power and empowerment.

Equality then becomes a site of contestation and a discursive struggle for meanings. The interaction in Morocco between the religious and the politics of needs questions the shifting paradigm in the study of social movements and civil society in Islamic states. In Morocco, gender inequalities are at the heart of social debates; gender was able to divide different actors on the political stage during the Plan of Action for integrating women in development (1999), during the Family Code reform in 2004 and during the latest

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revision of the Constitution in 2011. Gender justice is an arena where modernity and democracy are tested in Morocco.

The social struggles for equality and democracy in Morocco was over whose needs discourse is more powerful and more legitimate. Nancy Fraser (1989:158) argues that, “the focus should be as much on need interpretation as on need satisfaction. And this is as it should be since any satisfactions we are lucky enough to win will be problematic to the degree that we fail to fi ght and win the battle of interpretation.” Competing interpretations of gender, development and rights give rise to a modern public sphere where various actors (secularists, Islamists, feminists and state organisations) use discursive strategies to impose meanings and counter rival discourses. At times when calls for justice, dignity and democracy in the MENA region are escalating in the emerging public spheres, gender equality and women’s empowerment are at the heart of transformations in the right of citizens to access modernity and democracy equally.


References

Baker, A. (1998). Voices of Resistance: Oral Histories of Moroccan Women. New York: State of New York University Press.

Belarbi, A. (2012). Egalité-Parité: Histoire Inachevé. Casablanca. Editions Le Fennec.

Belhachmi, Z. (2004). Al-salafi yya, Feminism, and Reforms in the Nineteenth-Century Arab-Islamic Society. Journal of North African Studies. Volume 9, Issue 4, January 2004, pages 63-90.

Brigui, A. (2012). Testimony in the Public Sphere: Women and Prison Narratives in Morocco. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing.

Cavatorta, F. (2006). Civil Society, Islamism and Democratization: the Case of Morocco. Journal of Modern African Studies, 44, 2: 2003-222.

Charrad, M.M. (2011). Gender in the Middle East: Islam, State and Agency. The Annual Review of Sociology, 37:20.1-20.21.

Charrad, M.M. (2007). Contexts, Concepts and Contentions: Gender Legislation in the Middle East. Hawwa: Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Islamic World, 5(1), 55-72.

Charrad, M.M. (2001). States and Women’s Rights: the Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dalmasso, E. & Cavatorta, F. (2010). Reforming the Family Code in Tunisia and Morocco - the Struggle between Religion, Globalisation and Democracy. Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, 213–228.

Daoud, Z., (1993). Feminisme et Politique au Maghreb : Septs Decennies de Lutte. Casablanca: Eddif.

Darhour, H. & Drude, D. (2013). Sustainable Representation of Women through Gender Quotas: A Decade’s Experience in Morocco. Women’s Studies International Forum, Volume 41, Part 2, November–December 2013, Pages 132–142.

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El Moussalli, J. (2011). The Feminist Movement in Modern Morocco: Directions and Issues (In Arabic). Rabat. Publications of the Moroccan Centre for Studies and Modern Research. Top Press.

Fraser,N. (1989). Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Fraser, N. (2003). Scales of Justice: Reimagining Political Space in a Globalizing World. USA: Polity Press.

Jamal, A. A. (2007). Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World. Princeton University Press.

Sadiqi, F. (2003). Women, Gender and Language in Morocco. Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic.

Sadiqi, F. (2006). The Impact of Islamisation on Moroccan Feminisms. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 32(1):32-40.

Sadiqi, F. & Ennaji, M. (2006). The Feminisation of Public Space: Women’s Activism, the Family Law, and Social Change in Morocco. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies 2(2) (Spring):86-114.

Sadiqi, F. & Ennaji, M. (2011). Women in the Middle East and North Africa: Agents of Change. USA and Canada: Routledge.

Sater, J. (2007). Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco. New York. Routledge.

Touhtou, R. (2012). Debating Civil Society in Morocco: Dynamics of Gender, Development and Social Capital. Germany. Lambert Academic Publishing.

Tozy, M. (1999). Monarchie et Islam Politique au Maroc. Paris: Presses de Sciences PO.


The feminist movement, equality and qiwama in Morocco: Perspectives and prospects

Ilyass Bouzghaia Researcher, Studies and Research Centre on Women’s Issues in Islam

Introduction

Feminism is an umbrella term that encompasses diverse views and perspectives on what equality and women’s rights mean. In Morocco, the concept of qiwama (male-guardianship)1 stands as a challenge to the feminist demands for equality. The Moroccan feminist movement is divided into two main trends (the secularist2 and the

1 The term qiwama has always been an issue of controversy in its defi nition. ‘Male guardianship’ is only one way of viewing it.qiwama can also mean presidency, responsibility, fi nancial support…etc

2 I choose the term secularist to refer to the opposition be-tween the religious based feminism and the materialist human based one. (The term is not intended to judge feminists as non-Muslims. Sometimes terms like modernist, liberal can be used)

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Islamic); which are in disagreement about the source of reference that inspires the reform of women’s rights. In the last few decades, Morocco has taken progressive steps in promoting the condition of women and their rights. With the advancement of its Family Code in 2004 and the new Constitution of 2011, along with ratifying the UN conventions (CEDAW), Morocco subscribes to high standards of legislative and constitutional reforms. However, debate is still open about the intricate relationship between Islam, social work, legislation and society. While the concept of qiwama has gone through diverse theological and legislative scrutiny based on the Islamic ijtihad (reasoning), it continues to pose critical questions about its compatibility and closeness to the Islamic Shari’a or to the western understandings of equality. Debate now is centred on the different paradigms that inform equality in different contexts and its implications that leave feminist discourses, legislation and social values oscillating between the modernists and the conservatives.

The Moroccan feminist movement: Historical evolution and discourse

Historical evolution

The emergence of an organised feminist network in Morocco dates back to the period of French colonisation, when feminist ideas had to merge within the nationalist movement to promote women’s rights and resist colonisation (Akhawat Safaa). It was


diffi cult then to do more than providing charitable aid to women. After independence, the women’s movement formed alliances with political parties and shaped ideological agendas. Later, the issue of women’s rights started to take on an international dimension and the Moroccan feminist movement put forward more progressive demands, especially within the leftist parties. Two factors later infl uenced the work of the feminists starting from the ‘80s: the Islamic revival after the Iranian revolution and the democratisation process that began in the ‘90s, which allowed not only for a proliferation of women’s associations, but also a diversifi cation of feminist views and agendas.3

Feminist discourses

Along with the increase in women’s associations in Morocco, a number of issues emerged calling for a revision of the status of women in society. Among these was the relationship between men and women in the family household. At this point, feminist agendas and visions revealed a clear disagreement; while feminist associations with secularist and liberal views underpinned their demands with the notion of full equality, Islamic feminists resisted this by justifying,

3 Moussalli, J. Almonadamat Annisaeiya Bilmaghreb Al-moassir: kiraa fi Tajriba. [Women’s organisations in modern Mo-rocco. A reading in the experience]. Paper presented at the con-ference: Dawr Almaraa Alarabiya fi Ttanmiya Almosatadama [The role of the Arab woman in sustainable development]. ARADO, 2008, P.175

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explaining, or denouncing certain social norms about women from an Islamic perspective.4

During every phase of the feminist struggle, the issue of the source of reference was very controversial among all social activists. The debate became a popular discussion that shaped and polarised the struggle, dividing society into conservatives and modernists who vary in their opinions and trends according to Professor Malika Benradi:

There is the laicistic vision that pleads for the • historicity of the law and a differentiation between fi qh, Shari’a and law. Advocates of modernism think that fi qh should not • be narrow-mindedly seen as the sole framework for discussion and interpretation. Reformers are in favour of revising the Maliki rites, • in order to account for the changes in society.Traditionalists fi ght against equality as a Western • product which infringes upon the cultural identity of the country.5 Discussions and feminist discourses that manifested

the above trends always agreed on the need to revise women’s rights, but diverged in the theoretical and practical steps to be taken. Thus, this issue became a real challenge for both camps of reform. On the one

4 Hajjami, A (2004). Ichkaliat Almarji’iya fi Lmasaala Bilmaghreb. [The problematic of sources of reference in the feminist issue in Mo-rocco. Al majalla Lmeghribiya Lilidara Almahalliya]. [The Moroccan journal for local administration and development] No: 59. 2004.

5 Benradi, M.(2008). “Women in Islam – Feminist Orientations and Strategies for the 21st Century”. (Ed). Johannes Kandel. Trans. James Turner (English). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference, 2008. P. 25


hand, conservatives had to revise their religious legacy in a way that helps change laws and accounts for social transformations. On the other hand, modernists were compelled to respect the cultural and contextual specifi cities of Moroccan society. Thus, the concept of Qiwama and equality entered a phase of negotiation.

The feminist movement andqiwama: The Moroccan context and the law

The Moroccan context

Feminist demands and struggles are the result of the need to change the status of women in society and the family. In her article “Ijtihad as a Tool for Islamic Legal Reform”, Amna Arshad (2007) describes brilliantly women’s status under the former Family Code (Code of Personal Status):

“Imagine that you are a Muslim woman in Morocco 50 years ago. A legal patriarchal family code defi nes your role in life. For the fi rst part of your life, you are a daughter. In the next part, you may only be a wife and mother. Your father, or a designated guardian, contracts your marriage for you. Once married, you are expected to take care of the home and be obedient to your husband, despite knowing that he may divorce you at any time. He may also marry up to three more wives without either your consent or knowledge.6”

6 Arshad, A. Ijtihad As a Tool For Islamic Legal Reform: Ad-vancing Women’s Rights in Morocco. (Ed), Andrea Clark. 136 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy. [Vol. XVI:2. P. 138

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Interpretations of Islamic texts also played a great role in inspiring patriarchal legal and cultural practices. For instance, the concept of qiwama and wilaya (Male guardianship in the family) became associated with the term bayt al-ta‘a (lit.” house of obedience”) especially in laws enacted in the 1920s in most Muslim societies.7 This became reinforced by many popular proverbs that perpetuate women’s inferior position8. In addition to this, an offi cial study revealed that 62.8 % of Moroccan women between 18 and 64 years old have undergone a form of domestic violence9. Another study showed that the number of female headed families has increased to reach 19.1% of the total Moroccan families10. In the light of this, feminist movements have obviously gained legitimacy in their decision to react and take action to change both law and culture.

7 Musawah (2009). An Initiative of Sisters in Islam. Anwar, (Ed.). Wanted: Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family. www.musawah.org/sites/default/fi les/WANTED-EN-2edition_0.pdf. Ma-laysia. Accessed on 26 Oct. 2013

8 Babawi, A. Sidi Almajdob. Amthal maghribiya fi Almar’a wa zaman. [Sidi Almajdoub. Moroccan proverbs on women and time]. http://www.diwanalarab.com/spip.php?article1191. Re-trieved on 26 Oct. 2013. From http://www.diwanalarab.com/spip.php?article1191

9 Almaghrib yoharibo al’nf dida Almar’a wasata mo’ashirat ala tafachih. [Morocco combats violence against women while it is increasing]. Alittihad newspaper. Retrieved on 26 Oct. 2013. http://www.alittihad.ae/details.php?id=19841&y=2012&article=full.

10 19% mina nisa’a yo’anina fi samt. [19 % of women suffer in silence]. Forum Azzahra website. Retrieved on 26 Oct. 2013. http://www.fz.ma/news141.html


Feminist struggles and achievements

From the Code of Personal Status to the Family Law

The legislative system was a fundamental starting point for changing the status of women. In 1991, the women’s branch of the Marxist Leninist political party (OADP) launched a campaign to collect one million signatures to call for reform of the Code of Personal Status. The amendments that were made in response to this campaign in 1993 were superfi cial and disappointing for women activists (with the exception of the abolition of the father’s authority to compel his daughter into marriage, jabr). However, qiwama continued to give men the full privilege of presiding over and supporting the family in return for their women’s obedience as understood by traditional scholars.11

More importantly, the minor changes introduced to the Code of Personal status in 1993 marked a signifi cant step towards breaking away from the notion of the sacredness of this text and allowed for further steps to be taken.

In March 1999, the debate about women’s rights was raised again with the plan to integrate women in development, presented by the Secretary of State for Childhood and Family, Said Saadi, who was accused of serving foreign agendas as he linked his proposals to the

11 Harrak, F. (2009). The History and Signifi cance of the New Moroccan Family Code. (Ed): The Roberta Buffett Center for In-ternational and Comparative Studies. Institute for the Study of Is-lamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series No. 09-002. Northwestern University. March 2009. p: 3

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UN declarations and the 1995 Beijing Convention. The plan included the call to abolish repudiation, polygamy, guardianship over grown up women, and called for equal division of property acquired in the course of marriage after divorce, as well as the creation of family courts.12

This initiative was the fl ame that sparked a huge societal debate about women’s rights between the liberals and the conservatives. Soon, this culminated in the organising of two rallies in March 2000 in favour of and in opposition to the plan. As a result, the project was frozen and the parties appealed to the King for arbitration as the amir al-mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful). For the modernists, only the King had the right to exercise ijtihad and decide the content of Islamic law. For the conservatives, it’s the King in addition to the ulama (scholars) who are entitled to change the Family Code. King Mohammed VI appointed a commission composed of 12 men and three women who represent different orientations, religious scholars, political parties, intellectuals and human rights activists. This created a sense of consensus among all different actors and was called later a calm revolution.13 In regard to qiwama and equality, the new provisions can be summarised as follows:

12 Brand, L.A. (1988). Women, the State, and Political Liberali-sation. Middle Eastern and North African experiences. New York. Columbia University Press.

13 Harrak, F. (2009). The History and Signifi cance of the New Moroccan Family Code. (Ed): The Roberta Buffett Center for In-ternational and Comparative Studies. Institute for the Study of Is-lamic Thought in Africa (ISITA) Working Paper Series No. 09-002. Northwestern University. March 2009. P. 4


The raising of the legal age of marriage for women • from 15 to 18. But exceptions can occur after the judge’s approval. Annulment of tutorship (• wilaya) over the mature woman: a woman can marry without authorisation from her father. Equality of the spouses’ rights and obligations: the • family is considered to be under the responsibility of both the husband and the wife. Reinforcement of the tribunal’s part in marriage • and divorce: couples must go to the court before contracting marriage and when suing for divorce.Regulation of divorce by the Ministry of Justice: the • judge in the Family Court is in charge of divorce; a husband cannot divorce his wife for just any reason. Equal sharing of property: the possessions amassed • by a household during marriage must be shared between spouses in case of divorce. Women’s right to custody over their children even • though they marry anew.Protection of children’s rights: such a fundamental • item was overlooked by the old Moudawana.14

The 2011 Constitution and women’s rights

Thanks to the long process of civil struggle, diffi cult negotiations, and the arbitration of the King

14 Summarised from Moha. (Ed.), “Women’s NGOs and social change in Morocco”. Femme Mediterranean et Leurs Droits. Tra-vaux de Colloque International 28,29,30 April 2005. Imprimerie Fedala. Mohammedia. 2006. Pp. 81- 91

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Mohamed VI, the Islamic Shari’a and modern laws were brought together to reconcile and match the social transformations with new legislation. Using the same logic, and in the context of the Arab Spring, the notion of equality was emphasised in the new Moroccan Constitution (2011) through article 19 which states: “The man and the woman enjoy, in equality, the rights and freedoms of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and environmental character.”15 To this end, Recommendations were made to establish a Parity Commission and fi ght against all forms of discrimination, as the secularist trend of feminism proposed.16 Likewise, the Constitution stipulated the establishment of the Consultative Council on the Family and Childhood17 in light of the proposals made by the Islamic feminist movement.18

15 World Constitutions Illustrated. Ed. Jefri Jay Ruchti. Draft Text of the Constitution Adopted at the Referendum of 1 July 2011. Trans. Jefri J. Ruchti. William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Buffalo, New York 2011. Retrieved on 26 October 2013. http://www.ancl-radc.org.za/sites/default/fi les/morocco_eng.pdf

16 Constitutional Reform: ADFM Memorandum. ADFM. (2011). Retrieved from www.adfm.ma: http://www.adfm.ma/IMG/pdf_Memorandum_ADFM_Ang.pdf

17 Based on article 32 in the Constitution which states that “The State works to guarantee by the law the protection of the family under the juridical, social and economic plans, in a manner to guarantee its unity, its stability and its preservation.”

18 Montada Zahrae yarfa’o mothakkira hawla Almajlis listich-ari lil osra wa tofola. [Forum Azzahrae proposes a Memorandum about the Consultative Council on the family and childhood]. Retrieved on 26 October 2013. http://www.alislah.org/2011-04-10-21-55-26/2012-11-13-12-25-45/item/26729-2013-05-14-09-55-35.html


By doing so, the Constitution clearly refl ects a tendency to conciliate and combine the notions of equality, as prescribed in the UN declarations (CEDAW), and the notions of the Islamic Shari’a where qiwama exists. Thus Morocco doesn’t give supremacy in legislation to any of the frameworks of reference, and this generates debate on how to make Islam and the UN declarations coexist in one country. The fact that Morocco announces Islam as the religion of the State, but meanwhile declares its commitment to the UN conventions, creates ambiguity for many researchers and calls for more efforts to disclose the degree to which they can be compatible.

The feminist movement, qiwama and CEDAW

Morocco ratifi ed CEDAW in 1993, with reservations regarding articles 2, 9 (2), 15(4), 16, and 29. These reservations deal with legal and constitutional equality between men and women, among which rights and duties within the family are stated specifi cally in article 16. The feminist movement has certainly succeeded in advancing many reforms in favour of women’s rights that sometimes confront the notion of qiwama. The new Family Code in 2004, the King’s speech in 2008 celebrating the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Morocco’s complete withdrawal of reservations on CEDAW in April 2011, are all important events that trigger a continuous discussion on the relation between religion, legislation and society.

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Family issues are always at the heart of the controversy, and demands for equality are usually seen to oppose the cultural specifi city of Morocco. This constitutes the main challenge of matching the national laws and Islamic Shari’a with the UN provisions of equality. Article 16 for example has been under reservation on the basis that “An equality of this kind is considered incompatible with the Islamic Shari’a, which guarantees to each of the spouses rights and responsibilities within a framework of equilibrium and complementarity in order to preserve the sacred bond of matrimony.”19 In other words, full equality as indicated in the UN conventions seem to be in contradiction with the equality ordained in the Islamic paradigm. This specifi cally touches upon issues like providing the wife’s dowry upon marriage, the husband’s support of the family, maintenance in case of divorce, the division of property, and inheritance. This is besides article 15(4) about women’s right to choose their residence and domicile which is declared to be incompatible with “the mutual rights and duties between spouses is lawful cohabitation on the basis of good conjugal relations”.

Despite the fact that Morocco has lifted its reservations on CEDAW since 2011, the extent of applicability and effectiveness of this convention on the Moroccan legal authority remains under inspection20.

19 Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW. UN Women (2013). Retrieved on 26 October 2013. From http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm

20 The levels of joining the CEDAW convention varies accord-ing to the glossary of terms according to Treaty actions. Retrieved


The secularist feminist movement welcomed the lifting of the reservations and urged a complete ratifi cation of the convention, “equality without reservations”, claiming that “the extent and nature of reservations on the most important articles of CEDAW (Articles 2-9-15-16) emptied the ratifi cation of its purpose and its essence“21. The Islamic and conservative activists on the other hand, expressed resentment and deep concern about lifting these reservations, noting that they confl ict with the Islamic Shari’a on issues concerning the right of women to marry non-Muslim men, the obligation of the men to provide the dowry, the male’s support and maintenance of the family as the guardian (qawwam).22 Therefore, for most opponents of the CEDAW, withdrawing the reservations contributes to destroying Moroccan family values and the Islamic source of reference, along with the Moroccan sovereignty23

on 26 October 2013. http://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page1_en.xml&clang=_en

21 The withdrawal of the reservations to CEDAW by Morocco. Press Release by the Democratic Association of the Moroccan Woman. Retrieved on 26 Oct. 2013. http://www.adfm.ma/spip.php?article695&var_recherche=reservation&lang=en

22 Hespress. (2013). Hayaat Al-iftaa tahsimo fi Lmosawat fi Lirt wa Talak biyadi Zawja. [the Fatwa institution decides about equality in inheritance and divorce in the hand of the woman]. Retrieved on 26 Oct. 2013. http://hespress.com/societe/77229.html

23 Islamonline. (2013). Jadal Bayna Ahzab Islamiya wa Mona-damatNisaaiya hawla Ttifakiyat “cedaw” dawliya. [The controver-sy between Islamic parties and feminist organisations about the CEDAW convention]. http://islamonline.net/reports/1736

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Perspectives on the debate

The debate has become more complex and intricate as many factors and actors interfere in directing its trajectory of change. Issues are usually viewed and analysed from a sole perspective and questions that are posed regarding the feminist movement are yet to be answered. In essence, one can highlight questions like: what is changing and what is static in the Islamic Shari’a about women’s rights? What should be considered a local specifi city or a universal value? Is there a binary opposition or common ground between the two trends of Moroccan feminism in theory and practice?

The changing and the static in Islamic Shari’a

Islam as a religion that informs the legislative systems in the Muslim world has never been unifi ed and applied comprehensively. For this reason, the two concepts Shari’a (law) and fi qh (Jurisprudence) stand as essential components in this debate; while Shari’a is defi ned as the set of regulations and rules emanating from Quran and Sunna, fi qh is the set of regulations and rules produced by the Islamic scholars. Fiqh therefore, gains no sacredness as it is open to scholars’ juridical reasoning ijtihad. By this token, for Aicha Hajjami, changing Moroccan law concerning women’s rights was legitimate, and enlarging the circle of ijtihad as a historical necessity does not harm the ultimate


goals of the Shari’a.24 According to this, the concept of qiwama may lean into a more fl exible understanding close to the concept of equality, and in this way, bridges between the two extremes can be established.

The local and the universal in women’s rights

To allow more progressive interpretations of religious texts entails an accusation of submitting to the universal paradigms of what equality means. This is why the Moroccan resistance front rejects cultural hegemony and standardisation of women’s rights according to the western model. Notably, this rejection goes along with a confession that the status of women should be promoted, and the achieved reforms might be signifi cant enough in this regard.25

Almost ten years after introducing the new Family Code, Professor Rajaa Naji El-Makkaoui explains that Morocco does not need to ratify the conventions because they are no longer valid, in the light of the progressive provisions in the new Family Code, which guarantee equality between spouses before, during, and after marriage (…) The Code even goes beyond this equality by stipulating more privileges for the

24 Hajjami, A. (2004). Ichkaliat Almarji’iya fi Lmasaala Bil-maghreb. [The problematic of sources of reference in the femi-nist issue in Morocco. Al majalla Lmeghribiya Lilidara Almahalliya]. [The Moroccan journal for local administration and development] No: 59. 2004.

25 Jørgensen, P.J.. New Female Voices within the Islamist Move-ment in Morocco. IPRIS Maghreb Review. October/November 2010. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen.

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wife.26 Thus, Morocco only kept reservations about the mathematical equality that contradicts the “rights and responsibilities within a framework of equilibrium and complementarity in order to preserve the sacred bond of matrimony”27. Makkaoui also notes that interpretations of these reservations remain controversial because of ideological sensitivities.28

Feminisms in Morocco and qiwama: Convergence and divergence

Based on the author’s thesis “The feminist Movement and Social Change in Morocco. Trends and Impacts”29, fi eld work was conducted to study the attitudes of representatives of the two main trends of feminism in Morocco. The interviews resulted in shaping a picture of the similarities and differences that exist between the Islamic and the secularist feminist agendas.

Basically, the relationship between men and women is understood within different ideological paradigms

26 Rajae Naji Mekkaoui. Rajae Mekkaoui Taroddo ala Lkhaaifi n min Tifakiyat Rafe Tamyiz dida Lmaraa. [Rajae Mekkaoui Answers those afraid of the CEDAW] «Akhbar Alyawm newspaper». 16 November 2011.

27 Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW. UN Women. (2013) Retrieved on 26 Oct. 2013. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm

28 Rajae Naji Mekkaoui. Rajae Mekkaoui Taroddo ala Lkhaaifi n min Tifakiyat Rafe Tamyiz dida Lmaraa. [Rajae Mekkaoui Answers those afraid of the CEDAW] « Akhbar Alyawm newspaper ». 16 November 2011.

29 The M.A thesis is published by Lambert Academic Publishing House. Germany. 2011. Available for sale at http://www.amazon.fr/Feminist-Movement-Social-Change-Morocco/dp/3659166847


which establish the source of reference for each feminist trend. While the secularists clearly declare adoption of the international conventions of women’s rights, the Islamic feminists stick to the Islamic Shari’a as a framework for understanding men/women relations. The concept of gender as entrenched in the CEDAW convention entails the emphasis on the full equality as a pre-requisite of citizenship in society (same rights and duties).30 The Islamic feminists consider how this might contribute to weakening the family institution where the woman plays a complementary role to her husband to fulfi l Islamic ends.31

Such differences in theoretical backgrounds are extended to the approach used by each trend; while the secularist trend approaches women’s rights from a legislative perspective as demonstrated in the main functions of listening centres (the Najma centre affi liated with ADFM association)32, the Islamic trend gives more priority to the social approach with the aim of conciliating and mediating to solve family confl icts33 (the Al-wiaam centre which belongs to the Azzahrae network of associations)34.

30 Fouzia Y. & Fatiha A. Recorded Interview. 14 April 201131 Mousalli, J.. Recorded Interview. 14 April 201132 Democratic Association of the Moroccan Woman. Nejma

Center for women victims of violence. Retrieved on 26 October 2013. http://www.adfm.ma/spip.php?article429

33 Azzahrae Forum for the Moroccan Woman. Al Irchad Al Osari: Adwaa Ala Tajriba. [Family consulting: lights on the experi-ence]. Issue 1. Rabat: Rabat Net. 2010.

34 This centre is part of the Azzahrae network and directed by Jamila Moussali with whom the interview was conducted

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Despite the seemingly contradictory agendas of the two feminist trends, one fi nding the research arrived at is that they both equally contribute to the dynamics of social change in Morocco, and work complementarily to serve the public interest. As the secularist movement underlines the importance of equality through legislation, this serves to combat patriarchal mentalities that believe in the dogma of women’s inferiority. Meanwhile, with the focus of the Islamic feminists on strengthening the family institution, this serves to bridge gender confl icts within a conciliatory approach to promote solidarity in the family and society.

Conclusion

Equality and qiwama as they exist in their ideological discourses and actual practices stand at the heart of feminist concerns today. In Morocco, it is true that the feminist movement has accumulated signifi cant legislative triumphs to position Morocco among the most progressive countries as regards women’s rights. However, the intricate relationship between religion, ideology, legislation, and social change continue to trigger contentious debates. Within this dynamic, the binary notions of full equality and authoritative qiwama constitute a pool of struggle to change each other’s paradigms and practices. Thus, the current feminist trends in Morocco shoulder the burden, with a process of mutual infl uence over shaping future regulations of men/women relationships within the 21st century family.35

35 Salime, Zakia. Dynamics of Movements, Islamist and Feminist Struggles over Family Law Reform in Morocco. Paper presented at


References

ADFM (2011). Constitutional Reform: ADFM Memorandum. Retrieved from www.adfm.ma. http://www.adfm.ma/IMG/pdf_Memorandum_ADFM_Ang.pdf

ADFM (2013). The withdrawal of the reservations to CEDAW by Morocco. ADFM Press Release (15 December 2008). Retrieved 26 October 2013. http://www.adfm.ma/spip.php?article695&var_recherche=reservation&lang=en

Al Irchad Al Osari: Adwaa Ala Tajriba. [Family consulting: lights on the experience]. Forum Azzahrae de la Femme Marocaine. (Issue 1 2010). Rabat: Rabat Net.

Anwar, Z. (2009). Musawah: an Initiative of Sisters in Islam. Wanted: Equality and Justice in the Muslim Family. Retrieved October 26, 2013, from http://www.musawah.org/. www.musawah.org/sites/default/fi les/WANTED-EN-2edition_0.pdf

Arshad, A. 1. (2006 ). “Ijtihad As a Tool for Islamic Legal Reform: Advancing Women’s Rights in Morocco”. Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy, p. 136

Benradi, M. (2008). “Women in Islam – Feminist Orientations and Strategies for the 21st Century”. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Conference: FES.

Bouzghaia, I. (2011). The Feminist Movement and Social Change in Morocco. Trends and Impacts. Berlin. (M.A dissertation). Available for sale at http://www.amazon.fr/Feminist-Movement-Social-Change-Morocco/dp/. Lambert Academic Publishing House.

Brand, A. L. (1998). Women, the State, and Political Liberalisation: Middle Eastern and North African Experiences. New York: Columbia University Press.

the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Hilton San Francisco, San Francisco, CA. 8 August 2009.

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Hajjami, A. (2004). Ichkaliat Almarji’iya fi Lmasaala Bilmaghreb. [The problematic of sources of reference in the feminist issue in Morocco. Al majalla Lmeghribiya Lilidara Almahalliya]. The Moroc-can journal for local administration and development. No: 59.

Harrak, F. (2009, March ). The History and Signifi cance of the New Moroccan Family Code. The Roberta Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies. Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa (ISITA). Northwestern University, pp. No. 09-002

Hayaat Al-iftaa tahsimo fi Lmosawat fi Lirt wa Talak biyadi Zawja. [The Fatwa institution decides about equality in inheritance and divorce in the hand of the woman]. Retrieved on 26 October 2013. www.hespress.com/societe/77229.html

Jadal Bayna Ahzab Islamiya wa MonadamatNisaaiya hawla Ttifakiyat “cedaw” dawliya. [Controversy between Islamic parties and feminist organisations about CEDAW international convention]. (2011). Retrieved on 26 October 2013. http://islamonline.net/reports/173

Jørgensen, P. J. ( October/November 2010.). New Female Voices within the Islamist Movement in Morocco. IPRIS Maghreb Review. Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), Copenhagen.

Memorandum about the Constitutional Reforms. Forum Azzahrae de la Femme Marocaine (2011). Retrieved from www.fz.ma. http://fafm.ma/IMG/pdf/_-22.pdf

Mekkaoui, R. N. (2011). Rajae Mekkaoui Taroddo ala Lkhaaifi n min Tifakiyat Rafe Tamyiz dida Lmaraa. [Rajae Mekkaoui Answers those afraid of the CEDAW]. Akhbar Alyawm (16 November 2011).

Moroccan Reservations on CEDAW. Retrieved 26 October 2013. http://www.bayefsky.com/html/morocco_t2_cedaw.php

Naji, M. (2005). “Women’s NGOs and Social Change in Morocco.” Femme Mediterranean et Leurs Droits (28 April 2005, p. 2006). Mohammedia: Imprimerie Fedala.


Salime, Z. (2009). “Dynamics of Movements, Islamist and Feminist Struggles over Family Law Reform in Morocco”. The American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco Hilton, San Francisco, 8 August 2009.

UN Women (2013). Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW. Retrieved on 26 October 2013. http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/rese rvations-country.htm


Political Empowerment of the Algerian Woman: A Sociolinguistic Analysis

Fatma-Zohra Nedjai-Mebtouche Lecturer in Language Sciences and Applied Linguistics, Department of English, University of Algiers

Souryana YassineFaculty of Letters and Languages, University of Tizi Ouzou

Introduction

For centuries, women were excluded from political spheres. It was in England, France and later in other countries that women started struggling for their political rights and share the same sociopolitical advantages as men. (Merzouki, 1996: 14).This feminist awareness spread all over the world, reaching the Maghrebian countries: Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, during the colonial period (Grriba, 2008-2009). In Algeria women actively took part in the fi ght to gain their country’s independence (Fanon, Bennoun, 1999). However, the post-independence period witnessed a decline in woman’s participation in

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politics in spite of legislative provisions in the Algerian Constitution that claim parity between women and men as eligible voters. The gap between men and women led to women’s invisibility in the public sphere in general and in politics in particular, a fact that seemed to be related to the conservative patriarchal Berbero-Arabo-Islamic tradition. This paper aims at highlighting the attitudes towards Algerian women’s political empowerment in Algeria within a gender perspective. To achieve our goal we opted for a sociolinguistic analysis based on a quantitative and qualitative analysis of a questionnaire addressed to a mixed group of teachers and students of the Department of Political Sciences of Tizi Ouzou University.

The fi ndings revealed that controversial ideas on the ability/inability, visibility/invisibility of woman in the public sphere remain widespread in contemporary Algerian society (Hanache, 2010). Even if the limited size of our sample prevents us from generalising these results, they are indeed, a clear indication that the political empowerment of the Algerian woman still faces resistance from both men and women, a fact that could justify, to a large extent, why women have been excluded from being effectively involved in the different institutions of the country.

Much of the early research on gender has confi rmed the persistence of some stereotypes that maintained men’s superiority and women’s inferiority, a fact that could justify to a great extent why men are perceived to be more liable than women to practise politics (Romaine, 1999, Bourdieu, 2000, Bennoune, 1999).


Through their participation in politics, women rise against those who claimed that they have not the ability to deal with politics as supported by Gustav Cedershiold, who then wrongly noted that women had trouble with the genre of political language due to their emotionality and spontaneity (Cedershiold, 1990, cited in Romaine, 1998: 18). These prejudices continue to prevail in the present day, though many women in the past and present, throughout the world, have proved their ability to lead political action successfully (MerzoukiI l. 1996: 14) as was the case in Algeria.

This paper aims at highlighting the confl icting attitudes in Algeria towards women’s political empowerment within IMRAD methodology and the gender perspective approach. In order to achieve our goal, a sociolinguistic analysis of a questionnaire addressed to a mixed group is presented.

Method and material

Questionnaire and profi le of the respondents

The questionnaire contained eleven questions, of open and closed type. It was given to 40 individuals split into 20 women and 20 men. The former included ten female students and ten female teachers and the latter six male teachers and fourteen male students from the Faculty of Political Sciences of Tizi Ouzou. The age of these respondents goes from 20 to 60 years.

During the distribution of the questionnaire, both teachers and students were interested in answering

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the questions, especially the teachers who stood in the teachers’ room and took a lot of time to respond to the questions.

Note that although it was submitted in 2009, the discussion of the data has been updated to take into account recent events.

Quantitative study

This section displays the answers given by the respondents which reveal attitudes towards woman’s position in politics.

Do women and men have the same right to contribute to politics?

Out of all respondents 42.5% answered no, while 25% said yes. 25% of male and 17.5% of female students declared that men and women do not have the same right to contribute to politics, whereas 12.5% of both male and female teachers asserted the contrary.

In your perception, women’s status in the political domain is: a) Inferior to that of men; b) Equal with that of men; c) Superior to that of men.

65% of the total asserted that women had an inferior status. Female students and teachers have a similar view of the inferiority of women’s status at a rate of 32.5%, while male students scored twice as high as male teachers at 35%, in contrast to female students. It


seems amazing that younger men have a relatively more pessimistic view.

How do you see women’s participation in politics? Justify.

The majority of the respondents (82%) had a negative opinion of woman’s participation in politics, 42.5% of the men and 40% of the women shared this view. They justifi ed their answers by saying that a woman’s place was at home and that she was not able to succeed in the political domain. One female student said: “on ne lui a pas donné tous les droits” (women have not been given all the rights). Many said the reason was related to traditions and society. A male student said: “parce que la participation de la femme ne fait pas partie de notre tradition, et la société ne donne pas beaucoup de valeur à la femme algérienne” (because women’s participation is not part of our traditions, and society does not attach much value to women). Some affi rmed that lack of confi dence was another cause which limited women’s participation, whereas others added: “la femme est considérée comme inapte à l’activité politique” (Women are considered as incapable of dealing with political matters). Another male student declared that the Algerians have no confi dence in women because it is so diffi cult for a woman to lead a nation. Finally, another main factor according to our respondents was that of religion. A male student stated that religion indirectly prevents women from participating in this domain. Those who had a positive point of view

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towards women’s political activity tended to say that modern Algerian women are educated, cultivated and have a signifi cant place in society.

In your perception, do Algerian parents permit their daughters to participate in politics? Justify.

The large majority of respondents, 80%, asserted that Algerian parents cannot permit their daughters to be activists in such a domain. Only 12.5% of female teachers affi rmed the opposite. On the one hand, the majority of our respondents justifi ed their answers by saying that Algerian parents want to protect their daughters from the many problems they could face. To explain his idea, a male student said: “ils ont peur que leur fi lles vont être insultées par les gens” (they are afraid that their daughters will be insulted). Another male teacher affi rmed: “le terrain politique est un peu violent et plein de risques” (the political arena is rather violent and full of risks). There were other respondents who related this issue to cultural and religious reasons like the male student who said that Algerian society considered politics as a domain reserved for men only. On the other hand, there was a minority that affi rmed that there are some parents who trust their daughters’ competence and allowed them to take part in politics.

Do you favour woman’s participation in politics?

A majority of 87.5% of our respondents did not favour women’s participation in politics. Twice as many male students are against women’s contribution to


politics than female students. We also noticed that a higher percentage of students, both male and female felt more reticent about the political participation of women than teachers. We conclude from this that the youth hold more conservative attitudes than adults.

Are Algerian women able to take good political decisions? Justify.

What is striking in the student’s opinion is that they show a more exclusive attitude towards women’s inability in decision-making, with 35% saying no to this question, compared to 7.5% of teachers. Does this mean that audio-centric speech is more infl uential now than it used to be in the past? The students’ opinion is based on three major reasons generally related to woman’s mistrust, sensitivity, and illiteracy. One male student declared: “elles n’ont pas confi ance dans leurs décisions” (women lack confi dence in their decisions). Another female student said: “la femme suit ses émotions” (women follow their emotions).

However, female students and teachers believed more in women’s capacity to take good political decisions, with 20% in each group saying yes. Is this due to an emerging feeling of self-esteem in female students’ group? When giving their reasons for this idea, many related it to the offi cial statistics claiming that girls are more successful in their studies. This could be seen as a new incentive that has changed the representation of women from a negative image to a positive one. Therefore, woman could not be only perceived as good

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learners at the educational level, but also as effi cient deciders at the political level as well. Those who believe in women’s ability argued that women had an individual freedom. One female teacher affi rmed that if she were given a chance she would even be capable of doing things that men could not.

Do you attach much importance to woman’s political discourse?

Surprisingly, women themselves didn’t attach much importance to political discourse by their own sex, with 35% saying no and only 15% saying yes. Moreover, 37.5% of men considered women’s discourse as unimportant. The predominantly negative responses to this question clearly reaffi rmed that political discourse belongs to the male power sphere while women are excluded because their importance is minimised. This is a striking illustration of gender power relations that shows how women adhere to the ideology of the dominant forces that have shaped the representation of women’s inferiority, identifi ed as ‘la douce violence’ (Bourdieu,1998) or the subtle violence (Mebtouche Nedjai, 2011)

Why are Algerian women employed most of the time in subordinate roles in the country’s institutions?

There are various reasons which led to this situation. Many teachers and students argued that the main factors are illiteracy and a conservative culture that limit women’s activities and impose male domination.


A female teacher said: “c’est par rapport à notre culture et aussi c’est la position de l’homme qui s’impose” (it is related to our culture and it is men’s dominance which imposes that). A male student added: “c’est notre gouvernement qui n’accepte pas cette idée, et encore l’absence d’une veritable démocratie” (it is our government which does not accept this idea, in addition to the absence of true democracy). Another male student related this issue to the fact that women have been the victims of a patriarchal political system from independence to the present.

How do you see the participation of women in the past presidential elections? Justify.

It’s clear that a majority of 80% believed women’s participation in the presidential elections was weak. Only 2.5% of female students and teachers, and 5% of male teachers argued that woman’s participation in past presidential elections was strong. They gave the example of Louiza Hanoune who succeeded in winning second place behind the current president, though her share of the vote was low (6.7%). The respondents attributed women’s weakness to psycho-cultural causes. They claimed that women seemed not to be ambitious enough. For example, a male student reported: “la majorité des femmes préfèrent rester à la maison et elles ne donnent pas une grande importance aux élections” (The majority of women prefer staying at home and do not attach much importance to elections). A female student stated that there was no encouragement from

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society. Moreover, a male teacher declared: “parce que la femme Algérienne n’a pas les moyens qu’il faut pour imposer son existence au sein de la société” (because the Algerian woman does not have the means to impose herself in society).

Would you accept to be governed by a woman?

A total of 80% of our respondents answered that they don’t want to be governed by a woman. There is a clear indication of the persistence of the patriarchal discourse which privileges male domination embodied in male leadership. A female teacher asserted: “à cause de la mentalité orientale de l’Algérie et le manque de confi ance dans la capacité de la femme Algérienne” (because of the Oriental mentality in Algeria and lack of confi dence in abilities of Algerian women). In addition, many believed that women are weak and incapable of governing a nation or making a radical change. Only a few respondents said they could accept being governed by a woman. This category represented an average of 12.5% for female and male students, 7.5% for male teachers and 0% for female teachers.

In your perception, how do you see the future of women’s position in politics?

The largest portion of respondents, especially teachers from the two sexes, predicted a good future for women’s position in politics. They affi rmed that there would be an improvement but not like that of men. The position of women would surely develop but it would never reach


equality. Other answers revealed that was a lot to do if women were to have an effective role and a voice in decision making. A male teacher said: “une meilleure position, si elle se bat et s’affi rme en tant qu’être fort, compétant, ambitieux et responsable” (she will have a better position if she fi ghts as a strong, competent and responsible being). However, there was a minority who was pessimistic about women’s future. In this context, one female student claimed: “je suis pessimiste concernant son avenir car il n’y a pas de volonté politique qui vise à changer la position de la femme” (I am pessimistic concerning women’s future because there is no political will that aims at changing their position.)

Discussion

The analysis of the results of this survey on whether women could/could not contribute to politics refl ected, to a large extent, confl icting views between theory and practice, between beliefs and aspirations. The discriminatory discourse, which still seemed to be under the infl uence of the patriarchal system values, highlighted the lack of political will, gender inequality and conservative traditions that could account for the visibility/invisibility of women in politics.

Absence of political will

Arguably, the Algerian woman’s political empowerment is considered as weak and insuffi cient through the lens of our respondents who, in their

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answers to question 7, confi rmed the lack of political will, partly due to the absence of democracy and, partly, to cultural factors. For example, some respondents claimed that the majority of women prefer staying at home and attach no great importance to elections, backing their answers with the fact that women were not encouraged by society to aspire to being active in the political sphere. Whether the lack of encouragement is due to external or internal factors is not explicitly expressed. Who has to endorse the responsibility, the woman as a person or the group to which she belongs? In the same way, the male teacher who declared: “parce que la femme Algérienne n’a pas les moyens qu’il faut pour imposer son existence au sein de la société” (because the Algerian woman does not have the means to impose herself within society), is ambiguous. Is he trying to dissipate a woman‘s responsibility by saying that she has not the means to negotiate her place or is he implicitly referring to male dominance that has usurped her rights? To answer this question we have to go back to the legal institutional texts and social practices.

According to Algerian legislation, women are not excluded from participating in the country’s politics. For example, women have been guaranteed the right to vote and to be elected by article 50 of the Constitution since Algeria’s independence in 1962. Moreover, a draft law concerning the promotion of women’s empowerment in the elected institutions, calling for a quota of 30% on each electoral list, was proposed by the president (Sai 2009). The 30% was in fact adopted at the UN Conference in Beijing in 1995 by 87 countries, including


Algeria, as reported by the Minister of Justice, Mr. Tayeb Belaiz (El Watan, 17 October 2011).

Recently, however, this draft law has led to violent reactions within different parties namely the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) and the MSP (Mouvement Islah et Ennahda). The former symbolised the totalitarian post-independent regime, while the latter stemmed from the multiparty era and adhered to Islamist ideology. Unfortunately, on 13 October 2011, the National Popular Assembly voted to reject making the 30% quota for women‘s representation law and chose instead to set it at the reduced rate of 20%. The quota was meant to promote woman’s participation, which is still very low, offi cial statistics show. El Watan, a daily newspaper, in its issue of 13 October 2011, reported alarming information about the rate of woman’s political representation: only 7% of members of the National Popular Assembly (APN) are women, while the Council of the Nation (le Conseil de la Nation) includes only 4% women out of 144 senators. At the level of local assemblies, (Assemblée Populaire Communale, APC), the situation is more dramatic, since only two women are presidents of APCs out of a total of 1,541 throughout the country. Indeed, the limited number of women in local and national Assemblies demonstrates the failure of different political regimes to implement their emancipating discourse in the fi eld and activate women’s emancipation, as observed by Benoune (1999). The roots of this gender political discrimination are to be sought in social gender inequality that could account for woman’s invisibility.

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Gender inequality

In reality, power and social status were shaped unequally among males and females by the symbolic dominating forces of society, as demonstrated by Bordieu (1989). Men have always tried to affi rm and maintain the superior role attributed to them by society and religion, while women are stereotyped to be politically inactive and ineffective citizens either because of the division of roles or because Islamic law, Shari’a, conferred on women the status of minors, putting them under the guardianship of men regardless of their age or level of education achieved, however high (Algerian Family Code, Article 11). This inequality between the two sexes led to a situation where the quest for political power is seemingly restricted to the strong, perceived to be men only. In light of women’s legal status as minors, and the minimising of their political action, 80% of respondents said that women’s political deeds were considered as ineffective and unimportant. On the other hand, the respondents believed that the political fi eld is seen as violent and risky because of the power interests it represents. Anyone who intends to challenge the interest groups may be confronted with hostility, particularly if they are a woman. Benoune (1999) argued that those who attempted to claim equality were frequently marginalised, isolated and excluded from the decision-making and political spheres. The biased attitudes that tend to minimise woman’s political deeds are reinforced by entrenched stereotypes and traditions.


Stereotypes and traditions

According to our respondents, women have always been held back by the severe rules of traditions and society, and as a result, their social status continues to be inferior. These social stereotypes and conservative postures played an important role in shaping women’s and men’s position with regard to the political fi eld. While men’s positions are valued, women’s seem to be devalued and marginalised. For instance, according to our study, parents prevent their daughters from entering the political arena because they want to protect them from being stigmatised or insulted, as was reported by one of the respondents. The use of the verb insulted speaks volumes. Usually, the one who transgresses the limits of the established order could expose himself or herself to attacks and insults. But in what way can a woman be subject to insults if she practices politics?

One can infer a lot from the answers of the respondents who emphasised so-called innate features such as motherhood, emotions, sensitivity and their God-given roles as homemakers. They suggest that women who want to be politically active are perceived to be violating the aforementioned characteristics deemed to be natural. To justify this view, the respondents concur in devaluating women’s participation in politics, either by claiming that they are unable to take decisions or to face the risks of this violent fi eld. Obviously, these attitudes deny what Simone de Beauvoir claimed, that one is not born but becomes. In other words, they have ignored the role of arbitrary social constructs in

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shaping masculinity and femininity (Mebtouche Nedjai, 2009), on the one hand, and contradicted historical facts in the Algerian community itself, on the other hand. According to James Currey, Algeria’s history is full of events and actions led by women in the political domain. For instance, Tinhinan is an example of women’s political empowerment in Algeria’s history. She was the fi rst leader to unify Touaregs and to establish a kingdom in the Ahaggar Mountains. She was both heroine and matriarch and became the fi rst Tamenkolt (Queen) of the Touaregs. Her fame was so great that it is remembered even today. Another women’s power fi gure is Al Kahina, a Berber Queen warrior of North Africa, who led the Africans in their fi ght back against the Arab Army in order not to abandon her religion. Her death in 705 AD at the hands of Hassan Ben Numan ended one of the most violent confl icts to save Africa for the Africans. It is said that she died like a warrior with the sword in her hand. Lalla Fatma Nsoumer is another famous fi gure, she was one of the leaders of the Algerian resistance movement during the early years of the colonial conquest of Algeria. The impact of her involvement was such that she has been seen as the embodiment of the struggle and has been called the Joan of Arc of Kabylie. (Currey, 1992)

According to Cherrifa Bouatta, prior to the War of Liberation (1954-1962), there were three women’s associations, created between 1934 and 1947. During the War of Liberation, Algerian women started to have a great infl uence and participated actively in the National Movement. According to Mehfoud Benoune,


the presence of Algerian women in the anti-colonialist public protest was encouraged by many leaders. For him, all the pioneers of Algerian women activists were exceptional. They were conscious of their mission to free the country. In February 1947, the members of the (PPA) Parti Politique Algérien decided to involve women in the army. Those women tried to reach out to as many more women as possible by participating in political parties, making political discourses, denouncing colonialism and claiming independence. (Benoune, 1999).

Mouloud Feraoun (1962) depicted their courageous action and involvement during the War of Liberation : “A présent » he wrote, « les femmes veillent sur les blessés, les portent sur leurs dos, en cas d’alerte, font le guet. Les maquisards mobilisent les femmes et les soldats commencent à arrêter et à torturer les femmes”. (“At present the women are taking care of the wounded, carrying them on their backs, and are on the lookout when the alert sounds. The resistance is mobilising women and the soldiers are beginning to arrest and torture women.”) (Feraoun, 1962, cited in Benoune, 1999) This allows us to recall, among others, the heroine Djamila Bouhired (Tamzali, 2005) who has become a symbol of Algerian women’s bravery during the war of Liberation. However, the well-known heroism and political involvement of these historical women are mentioned for commemoration in specifi c circumstances as if they belonged to strictly historically exceptional times, but are never presented as stemming from the deep social changes that affect contemporary women’s identity, and the realisation that they were

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and could be real actors in the same way as men. On the opposite side, in order to preserve male dominance, many misogynistic attitudes persist in the minds of many people whose stereotyped discourse describes women as weak and emotional creatures, incapable of taking decisions, as has been seen repeatedly in the answers given by both the male and female respondents of this study. It seems, therefore, illogical and hard to understand that the children of such heroines could display such an anti-feminist discourse today.

One possible response is the role played by the rise of political religious fundamentalism, aided by the mass media, and based on a static and historical interpretation of some religious texts, that has instilled these anti-feminist attitudes.

Religion

The results of the questionnaire show that the majority of our respondents see Algerian women as having an inferior position in politics owing to religious Islamic considerations. Reluctance to accept women’s political empowerment has become more widespread with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, associated with conservative forces, as stressed by Imane Hayef. (Hayef, October 1995:03). How did the rejection of woman’s political empowerment become entrenched in the social groups represented in our sample? The majority of the respondents who declared that they did not want to be governed by a woman justifi ed this view with a hadith which says:


(The Prophet said that Allah has cursed people who permit a woman lead them). The hadith represents an unquestionable authority for the Sunni Muslims. Fatima Mernissi (1987) analysed this hadith thouroughly in Le Harem Politique to end the idea that those who brandished it as a tool to prevent woman from getting involved in politics purposely ignored the context in which it was pronounced. She briefl y explained the historical conditions of the Camel Battle which happened during a crisis of leadership after the Prophet’s death. The Camel Battle was led by Aicha, one of the most infl uential of the Prophet’s wives against Ali Ibn Abou Taleb. Aicha lost the battle which led to the loss of many lives among her military troops and paved the way for Mouwiya’s victory over Ali (Fatima Mernissi, 1987). Henceforth, this failure was exploited and generalised to say that any woman’s leadership in political affairs will be doomed to failure. But why was the equation between women’s incompetence and political leadership maintained and made use of, while famous men who failed to win battles were not held up as proof of incompetence?

Assia Djebar (2001) in Loin de Médine (Far from Medina), highlighted evidence that many women during the Prophet’s life were quite powerful, in the sense that their subversive or critical thinking was listened to, recognised, and applied and that they used to have a voice in public affairs. As a case in point, many outstanding female fi gures, such as Khadidja, the rich trade woman, Oum Salama, the sharp thinking

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woman (Mernissi, 1987), and Aicha the memory teller who became the storehouse of the prophet’s religious practices, all were acknowledged as having played a role in public affairs.

It is fair to wonder why conservative religious men today focus on some texts and reject the ijtihad (reinterpretation), though many Islamologists have proved that some interpretations were erroneous and superfi cial and even contradicted the revealed text because infl uenced by the conservative and misogynistic views.

Arkoun stressed the fact that many Salafi sts wanted to keep the interpretation of the sacred text far from its context and promoted the static and misleading interpretations of Tabari’s mythico-historical views, which should be considered as non-sacred, distinct from God’s revelations, and open to many possible human interpretations (Arkoun, 1984, 2007). These contradictions between God’s revelations and human interpretations urgently needed to be reconsidered in order to restore to Islam its tolerant aspect and to fi ght against the obscurantist misogynistic ideology, in the interests of woman’s emancipation.

Predictions for the future of women

There is an amazing contradiction to be found between reality and predictions for the future among the male and female respondents and their attitudes towards the current position of Algerian women in politics and the future outlook. While, the majority do not believe in


women’s political empowerment, in the here and now, they predict a good future for them. Moreover, they trust in the competence and ability of women to take good political decisions provided they are given a chance to operate in the fi eld. They forecast better prospects for them, but this is to happen only if Algerian women decide to fi ght and to negotiate a new role for themselves.

Khodja affi rmed that women are the best defenders of their right not to suffer prejudice, injustice and humiliation: “Quoi qu’il en soit, c’est encore la femme, qui reste le meilleur défenseur de ses propres comportements et ses qualités, que pour une lutte inlassable contre les préjugés, les injustices et les humiliations”. (In any case, women are the best defenders of their own behaviour and qualities, in the fi ght against prejudice, injustice and humiliation.) (Khoudja, 1991:17). Worryingly, this individualist approach shifts the responsibility from society to women themselves.

On the bright side, Gribba points out that in spite of the low representation of women in the different decision making spheres, progress is obvious. What is important is the fact that women are present in almost all the sectors that used to be closed to them. In addition, progress in education and training would lead to the prospect of the job market receiving a higher number of qualifi ed women workers. (Gribba, 2008-2009). In other words, women’s empowerment, in general, is possible if through social effort and personal emancipation the value and strength of women in contemporary Algerian society is recognised, in spite of the pessimistic attitudes still held by some informants.

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Conclusion

Even if the limited size of our sample prevents us from generalising these results, they are indeed, a clear indication that the political empowerment of Algerian women is still being resisted by both men and women, a fact that could explain to a large extent why women have been excluded from being effectively involved in the different elected institutions of the country. However, patriarchal values and male domination are starting to decline within families and couples in spite of resistance from young females and males as social actors, thus generating confl icting views. The opposing ideas on women’s future outlook revealed the social dynamics at play, which suggests opposing spheres of interest. Second, it undeniably means that this social dynamic will foster social and political change, the ideological colour of which will depend on the interests of the dominant forces in Algerian society.


References

Arkoun, M. (1984). Pour une critique de la raison islamique.Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose.

Arkoun, M. (2006). Humanisme et Islam.Algiers: Barzakh Editions

Benhabib, D. (2010) Ma vie à contre –Coran. Algiers: Koukou Editions.

Benoune, M. (1999).Victime d’une Société Neopatriarchale. Algiers: Marinoor.

Bourdieu, P. (2000). Esquisse d’une Théorie de la Pratique, Procédé de trois Etudes Ethnologiques. France: Ed. du Seuil.

Bouatta, C. (1997). Evolution of the Women’s Movement in Contemporary Algeria: Organisations, Objectives and Prospects. The United Nations University: WIDER.

Currey, J. (1992). General History of Africa. California: UNESED.

Djebar,A. (2011).Loin de Médine. Paris: Librairie générale française.

Grriba, B. (2008-2009). Mapping the Situation of Women’s Participation in politics in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. California. Project Regional Adviser.

Hayef, I. (1995). Algerian Women and Political Choice at Time of Transition: Gender Development. Oxfam, vol. 21.

Henache, D. (2010). Algerian Women’s Chances in Politics. Echorok, Vol. 3.

Khodja, S. (1991). A Comme Algériennes. Algiers: Entreprise Nationale de Livre.

Kopola, N. (1997). Ethic Encounter and Culture Change. London : Bergen.

Mebtouche, F. Z . M. (2009). L’arbitraire et la construction de la représentation de la féminité/ masculinité à travers le sobriquet aîcharajel. Actes de Colloque. December 2007.

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Colloque International sur les passeurs féminins de civilisation, Université Mouloud Mammeri de Tizi-Ouzou.

Mernissi,M. (1987). Le Harem Politique, Le Prophète et les femmes. Paris: Albin Michel

Merzouki, I. (1996). Le Mouvement des Femmes en Tunisie. Tunis: Collection Enjeux.

Moukachi, M. (1997). Histoire des Femmes au Maghreb. Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes des Sciences Sociales.

Romaine, S. (1999). Communicating Gender. New Jersey: Laurence

Smail Salhi, Z . (2010). Algerian Women’s Resistance against the Islamist Femicide. Paper presented to the First International Symposium on Gender, Negotiation and Resistance, organised by Dept. of English, University Mouloud Mammeri de Tizi Ouzou, 21-22 November 2011.

Telmatine, M. (1992). Mouvement Collectif des Femmes. Algiers: Cahier d’Etude Maghribin.

Yahia, Z. (2008). Women’s Reality. New York: Fernandez.

Websites:

File://G:/Algeria-TheWomen’sMovement.htm

http://Atheismabout. Com/library/FAOS/Islam/countries /b/Algerianwomen.htm


The Arab Spring:Women shaping the public sphere in Morocco

Jaouad RadouaniProfessor of English language, Mohamed Ben Abdellah University

Women are newcomers to the political scene in Morocco. Their presence has not been substantially felt or taken into consideration in Moroccan politics until the last two decades. But, however new, their strong presence has been very noticeable in different social and political sectors. More specifi cally, the events around the Arab Spring brought women to the fore and marked them as a fundamental sociopolitical players whose weight in Moroccan society must be given due importance. Such enhanced participation creates a feeling that everything is possible, especially when other experiences in neighbouring countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Syria are taken into consideration. In this paper I seek to explore the theme of protest as an organised form of sociopolitical action and the way

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women’s presence on the streets and in the central plazas of big Moroccan cities affected the public sphere and gave it a feminine dimension. This paper’s aim is to shed light on the role Moroccan women played in determining the features of revolution and how they adopted clear ideas, took to the streets, organised protests and expressed defi nite needs. The objective is to locate women’s call for change, democracy and more rights within the national political current and assess the effects and results in terms of what has already been included in the newly charted constitution and what may be expected in the future thanks to the outstanding political action by women.

Women as a political phenomenon in Morocco

In Morocco, women have for about two decades been trying to agitate and move the social and political still waters of change. Before declaring their views, attitudes, and democratic project, women activists tried at fi rst to fi nd a way into national institutions and civil society associations and NGOs as a means of imposing themselves as a sociopolitical reality and thus a movement.1 After succeeding in entering schools, universities, political parties, ministries, human rights organisations, and social associations with multiple

1 Rachel Newcomb explains in detail what obstacles women are faced with on their way toward recognition in inside Moroc-can society. See Rachel Newcomb (2009) Women of Fez: Ambi-guities of Urban Life in Morocco Philadelphia: University of Penn-sylvania Press. p. 4.


goals, and fi lling important positions both in the public and private sectors, they organised into a feminist group that took it upon itself to campaign for women’s equality and justice in social, political and economic life.2 Their main target is the right to their due, impartial and legitimate space in Moroccan offi cial life and discourse. Since then, the Moroccan women’s movement has grown and has tirelessly carried on its fi ght for rights both as a feminist movement and, for its members, as independent women.3

Women’s contribution to shaping the Arab Spring in Morocco comes as a result of the feminist activism which Moroccan society has witnessed. Having succeeded in imposing themselves as a sociopolitical factor, they established themselves as an undeniable social, economic, political, and cultural component of Moroccan society. This allowed them to expose women’s plight to the public, present the feminist project, and openly express their demands and ask for rights that basically amount to a call for gender justice and equality. History also played its part, when the new

2 Fatima Sadiqi (2003). Women, Gender and Language in Morocco.Leiden.Koninklijke Brill NV. p. 162. In chapter three, entitled “Social Differences,” the author explains in detail the six factors responsible for the social heterogeneity and diversity of Moroccan women. These factors played a major role in the foundation of a movement that had a desire to be recognised at a national level.

3 One of the most important accomplishments that women realised during the last decade is the new Family Code (Mouda-wana), a basic law giving the Moroccan woman due value and full recognition.

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King, Mohamed VI4 succeeded his father the ‘supreme ruler’, Hassan II. The feminist movement was given a new lease of life in the slightly more democratic and freer political atmosphere that has reigned from 2000 until the present.

By dint of experience, with a growing awareness of the importance of political action, women transformed into an important voice and broke into the mainstream Moroccan sociopolitical scene. Eventually, they started mobilising in defence of different issues related to women and those that affect other social classes. As ministers, party leaders, public offi cials, school and university teachers, NGO board members, blue collar workers, and housewives, women set foot in Moroccan political life and had a decisive view on every social, political, economic, or cultural issue. They became an undeniable political actor whose voice can no longer be ignored, on every national matter. Over the last ten years women have constructed a political identity and became an offi cially recognised section of society as well as a signifi cant political phenomenon.5

4 Mohamed VI’s reign as King of Morocco began in July 1999, following the demise of his father King Hassan II. According to of-fi cial international reports, his reign has in a relatively short time witnessed radical changes in the domain of freedom of expres-sion, rule of law, and application of certain democratic measures. Although the democracy achieved still does not meet minimum standards, the situation is fundamentally different and is charac-terised with some degree of liberty.

5 Skalli, L.H. (2006). Through a Local Prism: Gender, Globali-sation, and Identity in Moroccan Women’s Magazines. USA: Lex-ington Books. p. 32


The importance of the women’s movement may be clearly seen from their participation in many national affairs as well as their weighty presence in important social dialogues and society transforming events. However, one of the main recent developments that testifi es to women’s power and their effective role in Moroccan society are the events around the Arab Spring. During this sensitive phase, women were recognised not only as participants protesting among their fellow men, but as leaders initiating the struggle and the fi ght against corruption and the mishandling of public affairs. They were seen to be initiating angry demonstrations, mobilising armies of women and taking to the streets by day and by night, organising marches and gatherings, delivering talks, loudly chanting slogans, calling for change, and proving, to themselves as women, and to the whole of society and the world around, their ability to individually and collaboratively organise inside a movement, foster change, and enforce the rule of law and application of democracy.6

The Arab Spring, women, and political action in Morocco

The Arab Spring brought about many changes. In some countries, the ruling system was overturned

6 For a detailed idea of women’s liberties in Morocco and the role feminism plays in this country, see the introductory chap-ter entitled “Introduction: Struggles over Political Power: Entan-gled Feminist and Islamist Movements” in Zakia Salime (2011). Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Sharia Law in Morocco. Minnesota: Minnesota University Press,. p. xi-xxx.

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and completely deracinated with the toppling of its dictatorships that had ruled their nations with hands of steel for more than 20 years. In other countries, major changes were immediately adopted during the uprisings and those countries escaped a political quake that might have turned the situation upside down. They quickly absorbed street anger through practical reform-projects and the will to implement new laws and regulations that met a large portion of the masses’ demands. One of the countries that swiftly catered to the demands of the wave of protest was Morocco. In this country, the revolution brought about major changes in the constitution and the government. The main targets of the protests were not the monarchy but the government and many corrupt public offi cials.7 And women were a t the forefront of this battle against corruption.

The fact that Moroccan women participated massively in the Arab Spring protests is the outcome of nearly two decades of work. The amount of women participants

7 The demands of the Moroccan Arab Spring revolution as de-clared in the founding statement of the 20 February Youth Move-ment are: A democratic constitution in both form and substance, and which represents the true will of the people - The dissolution of the government and the parliament and the formation of an interim transitional government that is subject to the will of the people - An independent and impartial judiciary - Trial of those involved in corruption issues, power abuse, and the plunder of national resources - Recognition of the Amazigh language as an offi cial language alongside Arabic with particular attention to Morocco’s linguistic and cultural history - The release of all politi-cal prisoners, prisoners of opinion, and the prosecution of those responsible.


in the demonstrations reveals the fact that the female members of Moroccan society have a certain degree of political consciousness. Women have been taking action for a long time now. They tried to deconstruct prejudices and inequalities at the social and the political level, and hence develop a solid identity. The Moroccan women’s movement can be divided into various types according to social, political and ideological background and these are symbolised by the names of certain famous fi gures

Firstly, there are activists who work from inside the Civil Rights Organisation such as Khadija Ryadi and others. Secondly, there are women who spent considerable time working from inside political parties in an attempt to give women an offi cial voice in the political order, such as Nabila Mounib. Thirdly, a group of women belong to an Islamist group or movement and believe in the need to stick to the Sharia (religious law) when fi ghting for, deriving, or implementing rights, and these are pioneered by Nadia Yassine. Fourthly, a younger generation of women believe in the need for change, collaborative organised work, and are deeply engaged in certain feminist, religious, and humanitarian objectives, and have supported the idea of forming a movement and organising peaceful demonstrations in favour and defence of the poor, the marginalised, the neglected, and the wronged, and these are represented by such youths as Amina Boughalbi. Lastly, but most importantly, there is the massive group of women who have basic or no education at all and feel they are betrayed and that many of their basic needs such as healthcare, lodging, work, and living in dignity are

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neglected by the ruling classes, and that they are denied many of their rights as Moroccan citizens.

Politically speaking, women contributed to the formation of the movement that initiated the revolution and launched the Arab Spring. They were at the forefront, fi ghting for their rights from the very beginning. Women had a share in the events of the Arab Spring that took place in Morocco and shaped it in many ways. The manner and means through which the above-mentioned categories of women participated in the Spring were part of a logical historical progression, more than a sudden and an immediate product of the instant and the situation. Although practical action is what counts when judging the degree of action of a movement, its authentic historical birth and path of development is decisive as well. The above-mentioned Moroccan women are famous female political fi gures whose action, and of course that of other similar women too, helped a great deal to develop and shape not only a Moroccan female consciousness, but a national one too. Such awareness is clearly seen in women’s active participation in the events of the Arab Spring and the reliance of Moroccan society as a whole on the female agent as a major factor and driver of change. The following are examples of women representatives of different social factions and their role in fostering reform and change in Moroccan politics.

Khadija Ryadi is the head of the AMDH, known in English as the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (MAHR). It is a Moroccan non-profi t human rights organisation founded on 24 June 1979 in Rabat,


Morocco by the Socialist Union of Popular Forces party (USFP).8 Ryadi, and a lot of other women and men belonging to the Association, have fought heavily during the last decade against many types of stereotypes, discriminations, and prejudices that infect Moroccan society. They have been involved in the struggles against poverty, child rape, inequality, and bribery. Their objective was to initiate change and implement new reforms that would democratise Moroccan society and thus guarantee certain rights for all social classes.9 Therefore, Ryadi, and many other women, either members of the Association or those who believe in its goals and respond to its calls to demonstrations, gatherings, and conscious raising formations, have fundamentally contributed to the establishment and dissemination of a certain national as well as individual consciousness. This did much to foster many changes in Moroccan society and paved the way towards a responsible revolution during the Arab Spring, one of whose basic achievements is the reform of the Moroccan constitution.10

8 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Association_marocaine_des_droit s_humains

9 The New Constitution’s top fi ve reforms are: Giving prior-ity to gender equality / Putting human rights in the spotlight / Guaranteeing freedom of expression / Formal recognition of the Amazigh language / Reinforcing Moroccan citizenship.

10 See Khadija Skalli’s article on the relationship between the AMDH and 20 February Movement in Le Soir newspaper, issue of the 12 October 2012. The article can be accessed at: http://www.lesoir-echos.com/l%E2%80%99amdh-reveille-les-coordinations/societe/. The following video provides a detailed idea of who Khadija Ryadi is and what kind of support the AMDH offers.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lurOVw7LGJk

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Nabila Mounib is a Professor of biology teaching at Hassan II University in Casablanca. She is also an active political fi gure and is currently the secretary general of the Unifi ed Socialist Party (PSU) in Morocco. She became the fi rst woman to lead a political party in the history of the Moroccan Sherifi an Kingdom. The day of her election, she said: “My election is another battle won by all women, for an egalitarian society. The presence of only one woman in the government is meanwhile a very serious recession.”11 Mounib is a symbol of the Moroccan woman activist who works from inside political parties with commitment and a determination to impose change. In fact, there are many Mounibs, or women working from inside the partisan political body in Morocco, whose efforts foster change and the democratisation of Moroccan society and thus earn esteem and admiration. Women of this kind are the ones holding the torch of enlightenment in Morocco. They are the ones who encourage action and make the women’s movement advance. As a symbolic icon, women, inside Moroccan traditional society, listen to the voice of Mounib and that of other women at the summit of the feminine national social and political pyramid, get active, and believe in the possibility of improving their situation as well as that of their fellow men as Moroccan citizens.12 Nabila Mounib and women

11 http://maghreb.minutebuzz.com/2012/01/18/nabila-moun ib -premiere-femme-a-diriger-un-parti-politique-au-maroc/

12 This video shows Nabila Mounib giving a talk in Al-Akha-wayn University, Ifran, Morocco, on the subject: Women and Citizen Engagement in Morocco. http://maghreb.minutebuzz.


like her represent, in a way, the infrastructure on which Moroccan women in general stand and rely. The fact that women in Morocco took to the streets and made their presence felt in the demonstrations of the Arab Spring is thanks to women such as Nabila Mounib.

Nadia Yassine is the head of the women’s branch of the Moroccan Islamist movement known as Al-Adl Wa Al-Ihssane (Justice and Spirituality). She is the daughter of the founder of the same organisation, Cheikh Abdessalam Yassine.13 Firmly adhering to the organisation’s religious principles, and inspired by Sharia, she continues guiding women either inside the movement or outside it toward free expression, greater political, cultural, and national consciousness, the demand for more rights, and the use of religion as the foundation on which every action or demand should be based. Nadia Yassine is the symbol of the Moroccan religious woman who represents the female section of Moroccan society. Through her political, religious, and cultural presence, she stands as the prototype of the Moroccan Islamic woman. Nadia Yassine, and the Adl Wa Al-Ihssane Organisation behind her, mobilised a huge number of women to take action and participate in 20 February Movement demonstrations during Morocco’s Arab Spring. Asked in an interview about the role of the organisation in supporting the 20 February Youth Movement, she said: “I think that any peaceful, civilised, and organised demonstration, which is certain not to turn into violent mutiny, can defi nitely

com/2012/01/18/nabila-mounib-premiere-femme-a-diriger-un-parti-politique-au-maroc/

13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nadia_Yassine

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count on our support.”14 According to the committed Moroccan Islamist female intellectual, “we are not born with undemocratic genes. What block us are the sociopolitical parameters accumulated throughout our history of confi scating power from us.”15 Therefore, the future is in the hands of the people and they are the ones directly responsible for any future mistreatment, neglect, or denial of rights. With organisations that legitimately defend the rights of the Moroccan citizen, such as Justice and Spirituality, the people must stand for their rights, actively participate in the social and political action taking place, and call for more rights and freedoms. Women such as Nadia have political weight in Morocco. They can impact on the political conditions in the country.

Amina Boughalbi is a Moroccan student studying at the Higher Institute of Information and Communication (ISIC) in Rabat. She is considered one of the founders of the 20 February Movement. Her career as an activist began when she joined the Moroccan Association of Human Rights. She said in an interview: “when I fi rst moved to Rabat I did not easily get used to the atmosphere, I felt the need to return to associative work, and I decided to engage in the Moroccan Association of Human Rights.”16 The Association played a substantial role in the

14 Schmachtel, F. (2011). For Nadia Yassine, Morocco Lives the State of Calm that Precedes the Storm. YABILADI net Magazine (9 February 2011). http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/4515/pour-nadia-yassine-maroc-actuellement.html

15 Nadia Yassine (2011), All the Ingredients of an Explosion are Present in Morocco. AL-OUMMA net Magazine (23 February 2011). http://oumma.com/Nadia-Yassine-Tous-les-ingredients

16 Hayam Behraoui (2011). Amina Boughalebi … or when


formation of her political consciousness.17 Amina’s active role within the Human Rights Association is remarkable. Yet, she is most famous for her active participation in the formation of the 20 February Youth Movement whose board she constituted together with Najib Chaouki.18 Unlike the previous socially, economically and politically established fi gures, Amina is the emblem of the young generation of women who are fearlessly chopping their way through the dense Moroccan political jungle. She is the symbol of the active young literate female who actively participates in the shaping and formation of a Moroccan society where freedom of expression, justice, equality, rule of law, and democracy reign. During one of the sessions organised in France by the Coordination of Maghrebi Women in which women’s participation in the Arab Spring was discussed, Amina Boughalebi said: “I am happy to have had the opportunity to talk about the role of girls and women in general in the 20 February Movement (…) change is obligatory in spite of the seeming marginalisation of our voices.”19 Amina, through diligence, hard work both at school and in the

Protest is Feminised inside the 20 February Movement. Maghress net magazine (23 June 2011). http://www.maghress.com/almas-sae/134926

17 Ibid.18 Mohamed Jaabouk (2011). The 20 February Movement is

looking for Sponsors. Le Soir Newspaper (10 June 2011). http://www.lesoir-echos.com/le-20-fevrier-cherche-des-sponsors/pres-se-maroc/23866/

19 Boualam Ghabshi, Elaph. (2011). “Different Testimonies, One Demand: Equality in political Life.” The First Daily Electronic Newspaper (21 June 2011). http://www.elaph.com/Web/WebForm/PrinterFriendlyVersion.aspx?isArchive=False&ArticleId=663774

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political domain, and courage, prompted young women in Moroccan society to move on and fearlessly overcome their shame and passiveness and play a role in the on-going Arab Spring. There are many Aminas in fact, and these are worth mentioning, and being remembered in the future, as actors for change who honourably initiated the fi ght for a new constitution in Morocco, realised their dream of saying no to humiliation and exploitation, and carried on militating for more liberties, freedoms, and the prosperity of Moroccan society as a whole.

These activists all work and defend the rights of the vast majority of Moroccan women, who too often remain socially and politically silent. They constitute half of the population or more, and are a recognisable social, political, economic, and cultural power.20 These women are the ones whose action and participation in political affairs can enforce change, can impose it, and have the ability to put an end to any unjust policy. While the elite of the women’s movement work on offi cial fi les and spreads consciousness, the power of the grass roots to hold demonstrations is an important factor which helps shape any social action or change in Morocco. During the Arab Spring, these women stood fi rm on the front line, with male fellows, against the odds, and drove the train of social dissent, which took place in 54 Moroccan cities, toward the realisation of sociopolitical reform.

20 For an overview of the demographics of Morocco, see the article on Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Morocco


Moroccan politics, women, and the future

An observer of the progress of the women’s movement on the Moroccan social and political scene could not fail to notice the speed of change.21 Within the same scene, there is the diligence of feminist action and the developments in women’s status. Hence, the future immediately takes on a positive shape for the observer. This fact would surely bring about profound changes that would improve the status of women and help them enjoy more rights.

This might be perceived as a naïve approach, but the author is convinced that the trends are indeed more positive. One of the main signs that the future status of women in Morocco should be seen in a positive light is the roles women now play in society. This includes their active participation in the protest movements of the Arab Spring. As noted earlier, women have demonstrated in practice that they are able not simply to help men challenge the ruling class for the application of more rights, but to themselves initiate struggles and projects for more rights, to carry them out, negotiate on behalf of the female community, monitor the governmental and institutional application of democracy-related feminist laws and regulations, organise demonstrations and

21 James N. Sater chronologically enumerates the political changes that Moroccan society has witnessed since the year 1985 and explains the type and nature of the ‘civil society’ atmosphere within which the feminist movement grew. Sater, J.N. (2007). Civil Society and Political Change in Morocco. New York: Taylor & Fran-cis Group.pp 52-80.

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protests, and participate in the ongoing process of the democratisation of Moroccan society.

Hence there is hope for a positive future. The fact that women, in 2011, initiated and carried out protests speaks loudly of their ability not only to participate in the wave of protests but also to impose their own methods and clear goals.

As a movement that grew out of the fi ght for their rights as well as for others’, the women’s campaign won’t stop at rallying for more privileges, justice, equity, integrity, and honour. They will always be there standing for their rights and those of the community as a whole. In the long run, thanks to civil action such as the Arab Spring, in which women played a major role from the start, women’s action will continue to grow and their form of protest will surely develop. The Arab Spring, the sociopolitical action shaped by women through demonstrations, protests, initiating struggles, giving speeches and interviews, highlighting demands, and setting out their own and other’s needs will be re-enacted in other new forms, and women will play their part again. They will demonstrate their will to live in a free society where democracy, human rights, and the rule of law reign.


References

Behraoui, H. (2011). Amina Boughalebi … or when Protest is Feminised inside the 20 February Movement. Maghress net magazine (13 June 2011). http://www.maghress.com/almassae/134926

Ghabshi, B. (2011). Different Testimonies, One Demand: Equality in political Life. Elaph: The First Daily Electronic Newspaper (21 June 2011). http://www.elaph.com/Web/WebForm/PrinterFriendlyVersion.aspx?isArchive=False&ArticleId=663774

Interview with Nadia Yassine. All the Ingredients of an Explosion are Present in Morocco. AL-OUMMA net Magazine (23 February 2011). http://oumma.com/Nadia-Yassine-Tous-les-ingredients

Jaabouk, M. (2011). The 20th February Movement is Looking for Sponsors. Le Soir (10 June 2011). http://www.lesoir-echos.com/le-20-fevrier-cherche-des-sponsors/presse-maroc/23866/

McTighe, C. (2012). Moroccan Youth Demand Action, Not Words. New York Times, 11 May 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/world/middleeast/12iht-M12-MOROCCO MOVEMENT.html?pagewanted=all

Newcomb, R. (2009). Women of Fez: Ambiguities of Urban Life in Morocco. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Sadiqi, F. (2003). Women, Gender and Language in Morocco. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV.

Skalli, L. H. (2006). Through a Local Prism: Gender, Globalisation and Identity in Moroccan Women’s Magazines. USA: Lexington Books.

Salime, Z. (2011). Between Feminism and Islam: Human Rights and Shari’a Law in Morocco. Minnesota: Minnesota University Press.

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Sater, J. N. (2007). Civil society and political change in Morocco. New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

Schmachtel, F. (2011). For Nadia Yassine, Morocco Lives the State of Calm that Precedes the Storm. YABILADI net Magazine (9 February 2011). http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/4515/pour-nadia-yassine-maroc-actuellement.html

Skalli, K. (2012). The relationship between the AMDH and the 20 February Movement. Le Soir, 12 October 2012. http://www.lesoir-echos.com/l%E2%80%99amdh-reveille-les-coordinations/societe/.

Video: on who Khadija Ryadi is, and what kind of support the AMDH offers Moroccan citizens, including the 20 February Youth Movement. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lurOVw7LGJk http://maghreb.minutebuzz.com/2012/01/18/nabila-mounib-premiere-femme-a-diriger-un-parti-politique-au-maroc/

Video: Al Akhawayn University Archive. Nabila Mounib giving a talk in Al-Akhawayn University, Ifran, Morocco, on the subject: Women and Citizen Engagement in Morocco. http://maghreb.minutebuzz.com/2012/01/18/nabila-mounib-premiere-femme-a-diriger-un-parti-politique-au-maroc/

Wikipedia: Biography of Nadia Yassine. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nadia_Yassine


Change and Persistence in the Tunisian organisational network for the promotion of women

Guadalupe Martínez-Fuentes Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, University of Granada

Belhassen EnnouriPhD Candidate, University of Tunis-Carthage

Introduction1

This study aims to evaluate the impact of distinct Tunisian political contexts on the network of organisations for the support and promotion of women. In doing so, it reveals the mechanisms that have underpinned their capacity to adapt and change from 1987 to the present.

1 This work has been developed within the framework of the Research project fi nanced by Ministerio de Economía y Competi-tividad: “Authoritarianism persistence and political change proc-esses in North Africa and Middle East: consequences on political regimes and international scene” (CSO2012-32917)

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For the purposes of analysis, this period is split into three politically signifi cant sub-processes. The fi rst corresponds to the Presidency of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (from 7 November 1987 to 14 January 2011). The second relates to the period of the acting Presidency of Foued Mebazaa (between 15 January 2011 and 11 December 2011). The third, which is still in place, is defi ned by the Presidency of Moncef Marzouki.

In each of these temporal contexts variations in, and/or the persistence of, fi ve analytical approaches can be observed that relate to the confi guration of the Tunisian organisational promotion of women. The fi rst variable relates to the density of the associative framework, and considers the number of legal organisational participants involved. The second criterion of analysis refers to the identity of the associative framework, and observes the organisational identities of those that comprise the network, which are assessed according to the relationships that they establish between politics, religion and gender. The third relates to the internal interactivity of the associative framework, and contemplates the disposition of the organisations of this network to act in an isolated way, or instead to establish cooperative relationships of solidarity with others of the same type. The fourth refers to the external interactivity of the associative framework, and focuses attention on the relational policy of these actors with others of a different nature: political parties and unions. The fi fth variable concerns the institutional impact of the associative framework, and ponders the position that these organisations occupy in the political system.


This paper is split into four parts. The fi rst considers the legacy of Habib Bourguiba and synthesises the changes and continuities there were in the feminist organisational network throughout the regime of ex-President Ben Ali. The second emphasises both the persisting and original elements in this network during the temporary mandate of President Mebazaa. The third highlights the innovations and the continuation of older practices revealed during the constituent process when Marzouki held the Presidency. It closes with a section that debates and systemises the main fi ndings.

Ben Ali’s presidency

The successive mandates of Ben Ali represented the conservation and intensifi cation of strategic state feminism bequeathed by Bourguiba by means of the legalisation of old and new organisations, increasingly recognising the activist spectrum that up to 1987 had been forcibly limited to the National Union of Tunisian Women (UNFT) – in practice, the female political organ of Bourguiba’s party. In 1989 the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) and the Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development (AFTURD) acquired legal status (they had been illegally active since the 1970s). Later the Tunisian Mothers Association (ATM) was endorsed, originally in 1992 as a Tunisian section of the World Movement of Mothers, and from 1996 as an independent entity.

From the identity point of view this network of organisations was markedly homogenous, in that

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their members all presented a progressive secular profi le. Furthermore, they coincided in demanding the institutionalisation of equality between men and women and protection against a dogmatic reading of Islam and other instrumental practices orientated towards the manipulation of religious sentiment and of the Tunisian Arab-Muslim heritage (Murphy, 2003). In this sense they had total affi nity with the anti-Islamist discourse disseminated by the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) and imitated by the opposition parties present in the House of Deputies.

Nevertheless, this shared identity did not lead to cooperative practices between the members of this organisational network (Tchaicha and Arfaoui, 2012). Among the reasons for the absence of solidarity ties was the distinct relational dynamics that they maintained with the ruling party and their parliamentary opposition. Praise or criticism of presidential policy established itself as the principal point of division between these groupings. This structure, at the same time, had repercussions for the level of political co-option of their leaders. Furthermore, this circumstance contributed to the polarisation of the associative panorama of women between the regime’s clientelistic entities and its critics.

If it is true to say that in its fi rst stage the UNFT had been instrumentalised by Bourguiba, under Ben Ali’s regime this organisation operated under the orders and the supervision of the fi rst lady, Leila Trabelsi. Also the ATM managed to combine to perfection militant feminist tasks with militant pro-regime activities. Both formations became known for – beyond their contribution to the


support of activities for women – their involvement in the design of the RCD party electoral programmes, its mobilisation in the parliamentary and presidential electoral campaigns, and the search for and capture of female votes. Both organisations also stood out because of the presence of their leaders in senior political posts in the governments of Ben Ali and the RCD structure.

The ATFD and the AFTURD became, on the other hand, representatives of independent feminism (Labidi, 2007). Their criticism of the dictatorial drift of the regime and their condemnation of the existing barriers to full gender equality brought into question the Benalist democratising commitment to the promotion of women. For these two reasons neither organisation enjoyed the regime’s favour. Consequently, although both always maintained their legal status, they never accessed the resources and positions of political and institutional infl uence that the UNFT and the ATM monopolised by virtue of their instrumental relationship with the regime.

The absence of support from the government motivated the ATFD and the AFTURD to look for collaborative links with opposition political parties and non-governmental actors, such as labour unions and human rights organisations. Consequently, they joined the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) and the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) in 2001 to set up the project Space Tanassof. Later their connection went further, as they cooperated again to campaign for the removal of all Tunisian reservations relating to CEDAW and to organise the Tunisian Social Forum, in

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2005 and 2006 respectively. The rebellious discourse of the ATFD and the AFTURD in these platforms placed them in the same sphere of political concern as the dissident parties and associations. For this reason, their leaders were professionally and personally harassed, their organisational activities were frequently sabotaged and their efforts to enlarge representation throughout Tunisian territory were cut short. Moreover, tension between the ATFD, the AFTURD and Ben Alí’s regime reached its highest point when the former approached the minority parliamentary opposition Ettajdid Movement and operated as a channel for political mobilisation for the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2009 and the municipal elections of 2010.

In sum, it can be argued that in this period an associative network was woven for the support and defence of women’s rights that was defi ned by fi ve main characteristics. The fi rst was the densifi cation of the organisational network. The second related to the homogenisation of their secular identity. The third, their relational diversifi cation with the authorities, expressed in the differentiation between clientelistic institutionalised organisations and critical organisations excluded from institutions and access to resources. As a consequence of this, the fourth characteristic is permanent representation of the UNFT and AMT organisations as principal nodules of infl uence in the network of organisations for the support of women. The fi fth is two-fold: the absence of cooperative initiatives between supporting associations and detractors of the regime, and the presence of inter-


organisational projects between the latter and other competing social actors.

Mebazaa’s presidency

On 15 January 2011 Mebazaa – up until that time President of the House of Deputies – was sworn in as acting President of the Republic according to political procedure established in article 42 of the Tunisian Constitution. Gripped by the social tension maintained by powerful revolutionaries in the streets of the capital, he implemented fi ve main measures. One was the illegalisation of the RCD, and another, the start of a process of liberalisation of the associative and partisan spheres. To these demands was added the holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly that would be entrusted to write a new fundamental text. In fourth place Mebazaa decreed the creation of the Higher Authority for the Achievement of Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (HA) – an extra-constitutional institution that offered space for both old dissidents and new revolutionary actors, and that in an informal way became an alternative parliamentary house. Completing this programme the Higher Independent Authority for the Elections (ISIE) was created, an independent organism given responsibility for managing the constituent electoral process. These political commitments had an indirect but profound impact on the pre-existing structure of organisations that sought to defend women’s rights in the country.

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The liberalisation of the associative space encouraged an explosion of new secular and Islamic organisational initiatives in all areas of civic action, among them, that of women. At the start of the year the associations Women and Dignity, Front of Women for Equality, Women’s Image and Words, Equality and Parity, Forum of Tunisian Women, Tunisian Association of Progressive Women, Voices of Women, Women and Leadership, Women and Citizenship, Beity, Association for the Promotion of Arab Women, The Tunisian Association of Women Lawyers and League of Tunisian Voters were particularly active. In September four organisations met under the cooperative structure Union of Free Women for Equal Rights (UFLED): Haouwa, Tunisian Women, Women and Complementarity and Tounissiet Association for Women and Development.

A second development featured the emergence of two antagonistic fronts at the heart of the new broadened feminist spectrum: the progressive secular pole and the moderate Islamic pole. Like its predecessors, the new secular modernist organisations shared a well-defi ned anti-Islamist discourse. However, the new organisations brought together under the UFLED banner assumed as a starting identity a moderate Islamic posture. Their declared objective was to meld the defence of the Tunisian Arab-Muslim identity with the achievement of three goals: the establishment of democracy, the reinforcement of women’s presence in public life as a guarantee of the principle of gender equality and resolution of the problems of poverty and female under-development in the rural interior of the


country. Since these organisations came to represent the legalisation of organised Islamic feminism, the notion of the relationship between religion and state became a new axis of differentiation among the organisations of the Tunisian feminist movement.

The degree of institutional involvement of these actors continued to be revealed in this period as a factor of differentiation between them. The new organisations, established after the new institutions were created, remained at the margin of the institutional scenario – with rare exceptions. Regarding the classic organisations, the order of institutional inclusion and exclusion changed drastically in contrast to the previous period. Those organisations that were previously predominant in the state protection of feminist associationism ended up out of the game. Conversely, those that previously had been situated at the periphery of decision-making and representation came to occupy the leading role.

For the ATDF and AFTURD – strongly identifi ed with revolutionary values – this transitory period represented a two-fold opportunity. Firstly, some of their leaders gained representation in the HA and the ISIE. Secondly, from this new institutional space they promoted the introduction of the principle of parity in the structure of electoral lists and the Republican Pact that demanded that the parties commit to respecting, among other issues, the equality of all citizens before the law and the principles of the Code of Personal Status. For the UNFT and the AMT, on the other hand, the policy of dismantling the social apparatus of the RCD resulted in the rupture of its institutional links and its programmatic infl uence on

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the centres of political decision-making. Both sought to adapt themselves to the new circumstances by holding extraordinary congresses for the renewal of their leaders, and by changing their slogans and their names. The ATM became the Tunisian Mothers’ Organisation (OMT). From the UNFT emerged the initiative for a new, independent and progressive UNFT. However, these efforts to re-brand the organisations were insuffi cient to rid themselves of their past reputation as propaganda structures at the service of the old regime and to avoid the collapse of their structures.

Taking advantage of the period of civil society activation, the ATDF and AFTURD sought to intensify their inter-organisational activities by adding new platforms and/or civic campaigns. In April 2011 the ATFD coordinated its action with the efforts of the LTDH, the National Union of Tunisian Journalists and fi fteen other organisations to set up a platform to monitor the constituent elections. In the same month the Lam Echaml network was created, made up of 60 organisations linked by traditional principles defended by the ATFD and the AFTURD such as democracy, gender equality, and separation of religion and the state. In August the ATFD and the AFTURD championed the creation of the platform Tunisian Women for Women’s Rights, Equality and Citizenship, together with their previous partners LTDH and UGTT.

Finally, the political alliances of old and new organisations continued to clearly demonstrate the distinction between them. This phenomenon became especially visible during the electoral campaign for


the constituent election of October 2011 – which was profoundly marked by the concern of secular progressives about the risk of theocratic authoritarianism being imposed as a result of a potential electoral victory by Ennahda (Murphy, 2013). The ATFD maintained its close relationship with Ettajdid’s political environment – in the framework of the new coalition Modernist Democratic Pole (PDM). The fact that this platform was unique in presenting as many women as men on their lists is evidence of the involvement of feminist activism (Mulrine, 2011). The new modernist secular organisations did not manifest their voting intentions, but declared themselves to be in favour of progressive lists of candidates. For their part, the organisations grouped together under UFLED found shelter in the least conservative faction of Ennahda (Martínez-Fuentes, 2013). Finally, the UNFT and the OMT continued to seek new political partners without being able to capitalise on this effort before the elections.

As a corollary, it can be concluded that in this period there were profound transformations in the Tunisian associative feminist spectrum. This was marked by fi ve main dynamics. The fi rst involved its redensifi cation. The second is the dichotomy of identity between secular progressive feminism and the conservatism of Islamic feminism. The third was the new state of political isolation of organisations that were key in Ben Ali’s regime and, conversely, the institutional integration of organisations that had criticised him into new institutional structures. This led to a relocation of the principle nodules of infl uence in this network,

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now mainly being represented by the organisations ATFD and AFTURD, but also involving the Association of Women Lawyers. The fourth was the activation of inter-organisational cooperative policies, both between new and old associations of the progressive front and between the most recent representatives of the Islamic pole, without being able to establish relations between both fronts. The fi fth was the continuation of the interdependence between feminist associationism and political parties.

Marzouki’s presidency

On 12 December 2011 Marzouki, leader of the left nationalist party Congress for the Republic (CPR), was chosen by the Tunisian Constituent Assembly to carry out the tasks of the Presidency of the Republic. The moderate Islamist Hamadi Jebali – secretary general of Ennahda and new President of the Government – and Mustapha Ben Jaafar – historic leader of the leftist party Ettakatol and new President of the Assembly – acquired the highest responsibilities of State.

Marzouki brought considerable experience to the post as a militant defender of public freedoms, human rights and women’s rights. Ben Jaafar’s party had always been both one of the most responsive towards gender issues and relatively close to the project of independent feminism during Ben Ali’s regime. Various interpretations of the relationship between state, religion and democracy coexist within Ennahda (Alexander, 2012), and for that reason there are distinct views about the role of women


in the party (Gray, 2012). However, neither offi cial Nahdhauí action nor that of its two allies included any notable legislative or institutional innovations aimed at deepening the promotion of Tunisian women.

The behaviour of the three leaders in this respect has been negatively evaluated by various sectors of Tunisian society. While from the most progressive point of view their work has been shown to be a barrier to the improvement of women’s status in the country, for the most conservative, aligned with increasingly prominent Salfi st postures, Islam’s values and fundamental principles regarding the role of women are being betrayed. In this new stage the behaviour of the authorities and the state of public opinion in this regard continues to condition the confi guration of the structure of Tunisian organisations for the support of women.

In this last phase, more organisations have been added to pre-existing networks, prolonging the expansion and strengthening process. These are: Doustourna, Equality, Women and Dignity, Women Show Your Muscles, Kolna Tounes, Nawarni, Tounes Amenaty and Khilafha. The inclusion of the fi rst six – both secular and of the left – has increased the density of the progressive pole of this entwinement. However, the inclusion of Khilafha has introduced the ultraconservative Salafi st vision into the mix. The organisation advocates the prohibition of practices considered contrary to Islam and defends the establishment of a caliphate in Tunisia as a guarantee of the protection of rights. While there was a dichotomy – the secular and Islamic feminist fronts – of associations

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in the previous period, a triangulation of discursive fronts and action have now been established: the leftist secular pole, moderate conservative Islamism and ultraconservative Salafi sm.

Of the three poles, the progressives have been the most politically active in the extra-institutional dimension in 2012 and 2013. One of their most well-known cooperative initiatives was the creation of the Coalition for Tunisian Women in September 2012, grouping Destourna, Equality and Parity, Women and Citizens, Women and Dignity, Women Show Your Muscles, Kolna Tounes, Mouatna and Tawassol, Nawarni, Tounes Amenaty, the Tunisian Association of Progressive Women, and the Forum of Tunisian Women (FFT) – among others. In July 2013, the members of this coalition met ATDF, AFTURD, the Tunisian Association of Women Lawyers and the League of Tunisian Voters, which all grouped together under the Collective of Associations for the Defence of Values of the Republic.

Further cooperative networks among progressive feminists, trade unions and human rights organisations were established in 2013. In August the UGTT and the LTDH supported a massive street demonstration, organised by another network of feminist organisations, Free Tunisian Women (Hrayer Tounes), to call for the protection of all women’s rights and to argue for equality with men. This new platform, as a gesture of conciliation, brought together the UNFT – excluded from collective initiatives until that time – and ATDF, AFTURD, Doustourna, Women and Leadership, Baity, Voices of


Women, Equality and Association for the Promotion of Arab Women, among others.

On the progressive front, both established and new feminist organisations developed new links with the opposition political parties Nida Tounes and Popular Front. In July 2013 the creation of the so-called National Salvation Front brought together on the one hand a number of opposition political parties – including the Popular Front and Nida Tounes – and, on the other hand, the women’s organisations AFTURD, Doustourna, Kolna Tounes and Baity and collectively they demanded the dismissal of the government. In August, the Popular Front and Nida Tounes supported the activities of Free Tunisian Women. For its part, the Salafi st variant Khilafha, linked to the Hizb al-Tahrir party, is acquiring a certain relative extra-institutional infl uence thanks to: the legalisation of its reference party in 2012; the role of interlocutor/mediator that it has adopted between the government and some violent radical Salafi st groups; its echo in the mosques; and its broad task of social assistance among the most disadvantaged.

In sum, from the emergence of the tripartite to date, the development of Tunisian feminist associations has fi ve main characteristics. The fi rst is the continuation of their process of densifi cation. The second, an evolution from a dichotomous identity to the triangulated identity differentiation that now distinguishes a progressive front, a moderate Islamic sector and a signifi cant ultraconservative Salafi st element. The third dimension is the prolongation of inter-organisational cooperative practices between the members of the network, especially

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among the most recent organisations of the progressive front. The specifi c inclusion in feminist collectives of some of those who previously supported Ben Ali suggests the possible dissolution of old cleavages. However, the absence of organisational solidarity between members of the three identity groups continues to manifest itself as a key feature of this developmental stage. The fourth defi ning characteristic is the consolidation of links between associations, trade unions and human rights organisations. The connection between political parties and feminist organisations seems to be another key variable. The last point to be highlighted is the loss of national institutional representation that the consecrated progressive organisations achieved in the immediately preceding stage. As a consequence, a further relocation of the nodules of infl uence in the organisational structure has taken place.

Conclusions

This article highlights the impact of distinct political contexts on the confi guration of Tunisian associationism for the support and/or promotion of women and the capacity of their response in moments of change.

In fi rst place it is worth emphasising that under Bourguiba only one association managed to operate in the country with legal status, while throughout Ben Alí’s regime there was a (limited) structure of legal organisations for the support and/or protection of Tunisian women. However the emergence of civil society following the revolution and the rapid increase


in the number of organisations, favoured by the liberalisation of the associative sphere, contributed to the densifi cation of this constellation of actors. This associative network has become even more dense in the constituent period.

The second key fi nding is that the progressive strengthening of the Tunisian organisational structure has been accompanied, at its heart, by a gradual diversifi cation of political identities. In other words we conclude that throughout the period under analysis, three phases of identity development can be distinguished. The fi rst corresponds to the hegemony of secular feminism; the second, to the coexistence of secular feminism and Islamic feminism; and the third to the coexistence of feminist organisations (secular/Islamic) and those that are not feminist.

The third fi nding is that the logic of these organisations’ action has evolved to increasingly provide more space for cooperative behaviour in activities of recognition, protest or social action between entities within the same identity spectrum. The lack of solidarity between representative organisations of secular feminism and Islamic feminism is noticeable, although in rhetoric their respective projects might not seem so far apart and even overlap in some aspects. The question arises as to whether the tensions between these two fronts produce more losses than gains for the social collective that they seek to support and promote.

The fourth fi nding is that the relationship between members of this social articulation with political parties is a constant. The progressives and moderate Islamists

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that emerged during the regime change seem to have found a lever in specifi c parliamentary groups with which they can transfer their respective agendas to the institutions. The Salafi sts on the other hand, linked to a party now legal although extra-parliamentary, wait to see if their own programme will also be refl ected in the institutional debate; to date it has only been exceptionally, timidly and unsuccessfully defended by the most conservative deputies of Ennahda, who are at the margin of the offi cial party doctrine.

In fi fth place it is worth emphasising that the relevance and relative infl uence of each one of these organisational fronts has varied in line with the changing location of the centres of decision-making in the Tunisian political system throughout the three political systems under analysis. Under the mandates of Ben Ali the associations that maintained clientelistic relationships with the regime represented the key nodules of infl uence in the network. During the mandates of successive managers of political change they have been replaced by others more capable of identifying with the new revolutionary values. The consecrated progressive organisations of anti-Islamist discourse experienced their biggest boost under the Presidency of Mebazaa. The decline of his institutional predominance has coincided with the access of a sector of moderate Tunisian Islamists to posts of political power. Therefore it is reasonable to forecast that in the short term the confi guration of this dimension of the associative feminist network will depend on the result of the next government and parliament formation.


Lastly, it is worth warning that the current profi le of this structure of sociopolitical actors is not defi nitive; it is still in a transitory state, like the political system in which it interacts. The defi nitive constitutional text and the result of the following elections appear on the near horizon as a new catalyst for the evolution both of the Tunisian political regime and the increasingly visible constellation of organisations for the promotion of women. Therefore we shall have to remain alert to these processes in which, without doubt, these Tunisian associations will employ all their energy to acquiring a leading role.

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References

Alexander, C. (2012). Tunisia: The Best Bet. In R. Wright (Ed.) Islamists Are Coming: Who They Really Are. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/United States Institute of Peace Press. Accessed 8 March 2013. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/islamists/tunisia-the-best-bet

Gray, D. H. (2012). Tunisia after the Uprising: Islamist and Secular Quests for Women’s Rights. Mediterranean Politics, 17(3), 285-302

Labidi, L. (2007). The Nature of Transnational Alliances in Women’s Associations in the Maghreb: The Case of AFTURD and ATFD in Tunisia. Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 3(1): 6-34

Martínez-Fuentes, G. (2013). El islamismo político en Túnez: un paisaje en cambio. In F. Izquierdo Brichs (Ed.) El Islam político en el Mediterráneo, 269-29. Barcelona. CIDOB.

Mulrine, C. (2011). Women’s Organisations in Tunisia: Transforming Feminist Discourse in a Transitioning State. Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection. Paper 1136. Accessed 19 April 2013. http://digitalcollections.sit.edu/isp_collection/1136

Murphy, E.C. (2003). Women in Tunisia: Between state feminism and economic reform. In E. Doumato & M. Pripstein-Posusney (Eds). Women and Globalisation in the Arab Middle East,169-193. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Murphy, E.C. (2013). The Tunisian elections of October 2011: a democratic consensus. The Journal of North African Studies, 18(2), 231-247.

Tchaicha, J.D. & Arfaoui, K. (2012). Tunisian women in the twenty-fi rst century: past achievements and present uncertainties in the wake of the Jasmine Revolution. The Journal of North African Studies, 17(2), 215-238.


Physical, social and aspirational mobility: The involvement of female Palestinian activists in international activities

Paladia ZissFreelance writer and researcher, Wiesbaden, Germany

Introduction

This paper will address the question of how increased transnational activities affect Palestinian female activists and their work. Based on interviews with 34 female activists in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as focus groups and participant observation, it employs an intersectional approach to argue that transnational debates and activities confer mobility to women who otherwise struggle with few opportunities for travel and personal development. This mobility can take several forms: physical mobility is achieved when women are allowed to travel despite familial and societal gender

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restrictions, as a result of international organisations explicitly supporting gender equality. Second, women also have greater access to social mobility through the development of networks, and employment skills necessary to access the fi nancially desirable NGO and governmental sector in the West Bank. They thus become increasingly empowered economically. Finally, the interaction with transnational networks and individual activists confers aspirational mobility. Female activists who work with an international dimension sense a continuation of hope and burden sharing. Thus, despite little actual progress, aspirations are being kept alive, fl exible and supple in an era of political disintegration and disillusion.

Women have always had a major role in the Palestinian political and societal debates. Yet they have always found themselves struggling both within and against gender hierarchies as well as within and against military occupation. This paper looks at the ways women are active in contemporary Palestinian society and what effects changing forms of activism have on women’s lives. Over the past decade or so these activities have become increasingly international and transnational. Palestinian women increasingly consider these grassroots international links as central to the advancement of their situation, at a time when the political elite seems to focus merely on keeping the fl ow of international aid. For example, the Boycott, Divestments and Sanctions (BDS) movement is one of these outward oriented strategies, and so are international conferences on the question of Palestine within the realms of the World Social Fora.


This transnational orientation is visible on the ground with international activists travelling to the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT) to support demonstrations, witness and document human rights abuses. Women participate in all these activities in large numbers, although they remain a minority in overall political participation. For the purpose of this paper1 the way women negotiate these forms of political organisation that occur in a transnational space will be analysed. How is transnational activism gendered, and how does this activism infl uence the context of gender inequalities that accompany liberation movements?

Based on primary research in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, it is argued that a transnational dimension of activism brings particular benefi ts to women. They have the potential to transform not only the political but also the social domains that restrict them. In the sociopolitical context of Palestine, one of the main impediments on everyday life are restrictions on mobility, both conceived as the ability to move around freely and the ability to improve one’s economic and social situation. Transnationally oriented activism for women confers three types of mobility: physical, social and aspirational mobility. First, through their political work, women acquire access

1 Arguments in this paper are based on research conducted for my unpublished master’s thesis (Ziss 2013). Fieldwork re-search was possible through generous support from St Hugh’s College and the Department for International Development, both at the University of Oxford. The author bears all responsibility for content and any errors.

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to networking at conferences, cultural exchanges or speaking tours and thus overcome the restrictions on international travel in Palestine, thereby becoming physically comparatively mobile. Second, women acquire skills that are useful for future employability, especially in terms of English language and accessing work in the third sector which is much more profi table than private sector employment. Third, aspirational mobility means that the knowledge of getting some international support provides a means to bracket out the otherwise atrophied political vision and maintain hope for a political solution. Through these forms of activist mobility female activists not only limit their national collective experience of occupation but also the individual and gendered experience of restrictions of female mobility although socio-economic status is a confounding factor. Thus, the new transnational dimension of Palestinian resistance enables social change and improved positions for women within.

The paper proceeds as follows: fi rstly a brief background is provided on the nature of activism in Palestine, its global dimension, and the intersectional restrictions that women face in these according to their gender, class and belonging to the national category “Palestinian”. After outlining the methodology, the analysis continues on how women manage these restrictions through interaction with international support.


Life under occupation: resistance against physical, social, and political restrictions

Continued construction of the separation wall, settlements and checkpoints in the West Bank, house demolitions, economic marginality, and diffi culties in obtaining foreign visas remain central features of Palestinian life in the OPT.2 Hanafi (2013) has termed this phenomenon spacio-cide, the deliberate restriction of spaces for Palestinians with the aim of making everyday life increasingly burdensome. To add to this physical immobility, there are limited possibilities for youth to get jobs despite high rates of secondary and tertiary education (Hilal, 2006). Gender and class differences exacerbate immobility further. Women, especially single women, have fewer opportunities to migrate for education or work due to social norms against women travelling alone (Johnson, 2010). The ability to migrate or even to travel abroad also primarily hinges on the ability to pay for it. The Palestinian globalised elite, well-paid employees of the Palestinian Authority and some NGOs, are able to live a jetset lifestyle of international conferences and multiple homes while the majority of Palestinians remain physically immobile. For women, gender inequalities in the experience of the occupation interact with continuing power inequalities with regards to men (Amireh, 2012).

2 Erratic openings of the Rafah border crossing and the eco-nomic siege in Gaza, and the social, economic and political exclu-sion of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and, increasingly, Syria pose problems in themselves. For the purposes of this paper I fo-cus on the West Bank.

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Political resistance against the occupation continues to be organised within political factions such as the ruling Fatah, but also Hamas and a variety of Left parties (e.g. PFLP, DFLP, PPP). Each of these parties are affi liated with particular NGOs that are fi nanced through partnerships with international foundations or partnerships. There are also small but persistent independent groups, such as the weekly demonstrations against the separation wall and settlements by the popular resistance committees, the independent youth movement mobilising against the authoritarian tendencies of the Palestinian Authority. Other activists are focusing on community building, such as education or cultural activities, which are considered political in the sense of re-creating social cohesion in the face of fragmentation.

Over the past decade or so, all of these forms of political activism have increasingly turned global. First, not only the Palestinian Authority but also non-governmental organisations depend on foreign fi nancing, resulting in the highest per-capita ratio of aid assistance worldwide. But there is the broader phenomenon that Collins (2011) terms as global Palestine: the high interest of the Palestinian situation in the media, the symbol of Palestine for anti-capitalist movements worldwide, coupled with a growing interconnection of international activists and grassroots activists in Palestine in sustaining resistance. International, usually American and European, activists come to visit Palestine to take part in demonstrations and sit ins; activists travel abroad to participate in conferences and speaking tours; the international media and independent bloggers are


a central feature of bringing alternative discourses to the fore (Beinin, 2012; Seitz 2003). Of course, the Palestinian struggle has always had a global dimension. The exile-based Palestinian Liberation Organisation was in itself transnational. Yet, political organisation in Palestine has become a global issue in itself, through the integration into the wider global justice movement, not only abroad, but also on the ground. Literature on transnational activism has suggested that local movements garner international support for material reasons (Bob, 2005), or out of pragmatic considerations that domestic action alone remains ineffective (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This literature has mostly focused on organisational ties, however. The NGOs that employed some of the participants to the study did rely on international donors, but in this paper focus is on the personal material and other effects of these ties.

Women take part in all these transnational activities. This is not new, rather a continuation of their well-documented role in Palestinian resistance since the beginnings of British colonialism to the second intifada (see for example Fleischmann, 2010; Gerner, 2007; Hasso 2005). It nevertheless seems as if today this activism is less organised in women-specifi c or feminist organisations, but more so in shared grassroots activities alongside men. However, in line with general political fragmentation since the Oslo accords (Jamal, 2005), nowadays political activism is relatively uncommon. This poses the question not only why are women involved but also how do they personally benefi t from this involvement? As Hasso (2001) has argued, many female

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activists who used to participate in the DFLP women’s committee during and after the fi rst intifada continued to benefi t with high degrees of economic independence even a decade after the committee disintegrated. The effects of political activism therefore may be diverse.

Political activism of women in Palestine today: Methods and people

The fi eldwork to answer these questions was conducted in the summer of 2012 as part of the author’s master’s thesis research. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 34 women active in some form of political activity, two focus groups, some participant observation and dozens of informal talks with male activists and non-activists in the West Bank and East Jerusalem (for full background, see Ziss, 2013). The participants were identifi ed through snowball sampling with a variety of REF entry-points. They came from all walks of life, with an age range of 19 to 70, although the majority was educated to high-school or even degree level, and from all political backgrounds: from members of Left wing factions (such as the PFLP and DFLP) via Fatah and Hamas affi liates to women independent from any political party. Their local activism broadly resembled a cross-section of the diverse political landscape in Palestine. Of the 34 participants, the majority (17) regularly participated in some form of direct action, such as demonstrations against the PA, the separation wall or settlements, or for the release of prisoners. Those 15 who were active


in political parties were also generally members of women’s organisations working specifi cally towards the economic or political empowerment of women. Others were mainly involved in cultural preservation through the running of community centres, cultural education or campaigning for environmental protection. Despite the diversity of their main local activities, all were in regular contact with internationals. For example they interacted with activists in weekly demonstrations, during speaking tours and travels abroad, or with foreign volunteers working in children’s or women’s centres. Moreover, many participated in the documentation of human rights abuses with Israeli and international NGOs or published articles in the international media and on blogs. This interaction was not the main aspect of their political activities for any of them, and few included the involvement explicitly when asked about activism in general. However, this involvement with internationals remained a uniting factor despite the diversity of locally-oriented activism.

In the case of Nourhan3, a 31-year old teacher from near Bethlehem, the interaction with internationals was limited to yearly summer camps in her youth centre. All other activists involved in community or women’s centres worked either for organisations with strong global links, or with international volunteers year round. Activists mostly involved in direct action interacted with international solidarity activists at

3 All names have been changed to protect the identity of the participants.

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weekly demonstrations, and sometimes hosted delegations during the week. Most of the party-based women’s activists received delegations of international supporters, led tours around the West Bank and, last but not least, were well-versed in giving interviews to Western journalists and researchers, like me. Twenty-one women actively worked with the international media, trying to infl uence public opinion abroad either as full-time journalists or writers, or volunteering as human rights observers, documenting Israeli violations with cameras and photos in Hebron and villages near the separation wall and settlements. This centrality of interaction with internationals was compounded by regular travels abroad.

The Gender and Class of Mobility

Access to physical mobility is scarce in Palestine, and in particular for women who are less mobile compared to men in terms of educational and labour migration (Hilal, 2006). Yet, the majority of women, 27 out of 34, had travelled abroad to conferences, speaking tours or cultural exchanges. Since the imposition of Israeli social control through restrictions on physical mobility, women’s ability to leave their immediate environs has been particularly constricted, and even more so for single women who constituted a comparatively high proportion of my sample (Johnson, 2010; Peteet, 2005). Thus, travelling through transnational activism granted women physical mobility they otherwise found diffi cult to access both as Palestinians and as women.


This physical mobility was to some extent class-stratifi ed. For the younger activists Ayat (21) and Dalaal (19), who live in areas that are vulnerable to settler violence, the restriction of their freedom of movement was one of the most unsettling aspects of life. By contrast, some women such as Halaa (30), Taghreed (33) and Haneen (25) came from comparatively wealthy families and had always been able to travel privately. As Halaa explained, “I’m very blessed with my family. So, very, very blessed. Because from the beginning they gave me that freedom to be involved in politics or to travel. Even to travel. Because I know here girls whose family… they allow their boys to travel but they do not allow their girls to travel” (Halaa, 30, 2012).

In addition to coming from a well-educated and professional background Halaa was involved in an NGO affi liated to the Fatah movement. Like others who had strong institutional backing, she took part in regular travels abroad to participate in conferences and meetings internationally. Transnational feminist networking, both to international women’s conferences on the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and regional networks such as the AISHA network conferred signifi cant mobility to all activists involved in feminist organisations of the leftist parties and independent women’s organisations (Farr, 2011; see also Gilman, 2007). Some women also participated in the global justice movement at World Social Fora (WSF) or Socialist International for those involved in the Fatah movement. Iman, a member of one of the Islamist parties in her 50s, had travelled to conferences with Islamic organisations

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as part of a “global Islam” that has also started to adopt the practices of transnational networking by liberal and leftist political groups (Moghadam, 2009).

Nevertheless, participation at conferences was generally a prerogative of members of the “Palestinian globalised elite” (Hanafi and Tabar, 2005), who were not only politically active but also full-time employees in NGOs. One exception was 24-year old Wala’a who at the time of the interview was preparing herself to travel to Porto Alegre, Brazil, to participate in the Special Forum on Palestine in November 2012 as part of an environmental group. She was the only independent, young and comparatively poor participant who took part in one of these large-scale conferences.

Nevertheless, in contrast to Hanafi and Tabar’s expectation, the class-differences were partly transcended by the opportunities that transnational networking and political involvement brought about. The connection to international solidarity and support organisations which fi nanced scholarships to participate in speaking tours and cultural exchanges enabled even comparatively poor women like 24 year old Rania from near Bethlehem and 19 year old Dalaal from the South West Bank to travel abroad. Dalaal told me that her parents allowed her greater freedoms to participate in what could be dangerous political activism than was generally common for women of her age and in her social environment. The experience of travelling to Europe as part of a confl ict mediation project enabled her to experience freedom of mobility, which was almost as important as experiencing the absence of confl ict: “I want to see the world where


there is no confl ict [switching from Arabic to English] no confl ict. […] When I went to [Europe], I could go to places. I could go to the cinema, go to parks. But here I can’t go anywhere, I can’t go to Jerusalem. I can’t even go to Jerusalem.” (Dalaal, 19, 2012)

Dalaal expresses a pervasive desire for normality and a carefree life (going to the cinema and to parks). However, she also articulates that her immobility severs her from national cultural symbols like Jerusalem. The ability to travel abroad therefore affi rmed her conscious experience of unfairness of the physical restrictions in Palestine by way of comparison. This was also the case for Taghreed, who worked in international organisations. Seeing her colleagues crossing the checkpoints easily to go to the beach, travel to cities like Yaffa and Ashkelon, “opened her eyes” because she realised “okay, this is my country and I cannot look at it. I cannot just go and visit while all these internationals enjoy my country and they have freedom of movement”. Both Dalaal and Taghreed temporarily were able to escape the gendered, classed and collective physical restrictions when travelling or interacting with internationals in Palestine. However, both also were reminded of the differences, realising that these restrictions should not be considered a normal part of life. They therefore became more determined to politically counter them upon return.

In addition to physical restrictions that make everyday life unbearable many young Palestinian adults sense of a lack of future prospects in the absence of ‘wasta’, that is, family or party connections (Christophersen et al., 2012). For those without ‘wasta’, the pervasive

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presence of the international donor community in the West Bank as employers renders the skills acquired through transnational networking valuable assets in the competition for employment. Research on transnational organising shows that activists often personally benefi t from the networks they participate in and can develop personally, just as they achieve their political goals (Smith, 2003).

This was also the case for participants in my sample. Travelling and interaction with other activists opened trajectories towards personal development and social mobility. Skills learned included: effi ciency in managing time and people in both business and organisations, especially the scheduling of meetings and long-term planning (Wala’a, Taghreed, Ayah, Nadia); how to better implement transitions of governmental power between parties (Reham); and the separation of personal and public interests in the management of political parties (Halaa). These capacities were reported to be acquired not only through travelling but also through the work with international organisations in Palestine (e.g. Taghreed). Moreover, language skills, in particular English, practiced in the interaction with international volunteers and activists in Palestine itself was considered essential for effective transnational coalition building (Yasmeen, Dalaal, Noor).

Nevertheless, the effect of the development of skills appeared to be greater for those activists who worked in an NGO with international funding compared to those who participated in protest movements or community activism with international volunteers.


During my fi eldwork, several people suggested that higher enrolment of women in tertiary education (PCBS 2012a) and their cleaner police record (i.e. rarely having been arrested and tried by the Israeli army or Palestinian police forces), rendered women more attractive candidates for work in international organisations and internationally funded local NGOs. While causality cannot be established, the fact that most of the study participants were in full-time employment or attending university despite comparatively low average female workforce participation and access to higher education (PCBS 2012b) suggests that they were able to use the skills acquired as part of transnational activism to access this employment. Both physical and social restrictions on female mobility due to both the Israeli occupation and, although not independent from the former, societal constraints were thus potentially reduced or mediated through travelling and the interaction with international activists and volunteers at home.

Travelling and the interaction with internationals in Palestine itself were also reported to be linked to an increased sense of individual empowerment and self-worth (e.g. Ayah, Ayat, Noor). This translated into a greater desire to become active back home, as was the case for Ayah, a 50 year old founder of a community centre. Ayah travelled to Khartoum, Sudan, for one week to meet with women involved in politics and business there. She explained that the special treatment that she received by virtue of being Palestinian was one of the defi ning moments of her life. “I thought before that maybe we are alone. But when I went to Sudan and

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I got this special treatment, being a special guest, ... it did change my mind a lot. It gave me a lot of support to... work harder and harder and harder for the sake of women. […] [the Sudanese women] have more plans for the future that I should start working on. To be as equal as they are,[to be inspiring like them].” (Ayah, 50, 2012)

She was inspired to not be satisfi ed with her own skills and, more importantly, aspire towards greater social change in her community. One prominent consequence of Israeli occupation of the land captured in 1967, the West Bank, is the internal fragmentation and deepening of physical and affective cleavages between Palestinians across the world and demobilisation of unifi ed nationalist politics (Pasquetti 2012). In Ayah’s case, as in others, the interaction with outsiders, non-Palestinians, was connected to the feeling that there was still hope to be aspired to. The physical and social mobility of political activism in a transnational context was therefore linked to aspirational mobility - the continued motivation to be politically active while a large proportion of the population is losing hope.“If you see the faces of people here, I can see there is no hope. And once there is no hope, there is no hope for solving the part of the confl ict and giving people freedom or respect again. … For Palestinians, seeing that people are coming from all over the world and supporting Palestinians, it means: ok, we are still alive; our confl ict is [still] there.” (Halaa, 30, 2012)

In the adverse climate of continued occupation, the interactions with international solidarity activists both coming to Palestine and outside helped in keeping


the Palestinian issue not only in the international consciousness but according to Halaa also in the consciousness of Palestinians as a collective. While there is some reason for pessimism over the resolution of the Palestinian issue through political negotiations, the interaction with other people across the world allowed activists to feel less alone and continue to hope for a solution to the political stalemate.

Practices of socially acceptable political activism reduced the devastating restrictions on social and physical mobility imposed on them, not only as Palestinians but as Palestinian women. The ability to feel connected to the world outside Palestine helped in supporting the continued activism to change social and political relations on the ground. Transnational networking and interaction with international solidarity groups was one means to enhance personal agency, independence and freedom that was not otherwise available. The activism of women in my study was not necessarily directed at changing gender relations. Only two explicitly defi ned themselves as feminists and only half of them worked in women’s organisations. However, as Saba Mahmood (2005) argues, practices can be considered forms of agency even if they reproduce dominant structures of power because all reiterations of norms are incomplete and thus potentially subversive. This “ineluctable relationship between the consolidation and destabilisation of norms” (Mahmood, 2005, 21) is evident in how they challenged and subverted, though not always consciously, restrictive structures that caused their activism in the fi rst place: the occupation and

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expectations by family and society which have become more restrictive in interaction with the occupation. While the potential for subversion was stratifi ed according to class, education and family background – and, to some extent, generation – even for comparatively lower class women activism opened up opportunities. The fact that the physical and social mobility achieved through activism was supported by the feeling that Palestine as an issue was still important to the rest of the world supports the notion that collective and individual experiences are not independent from each other.

Conclusion

The interaction with internationals and transnational networking has become a core aspect of Palestinian political life. Palestinian women and men try to engage the transnational political sphere in order to infl uence the stalemate of party politics in the OPT. Nevertheless, it was argued, women involved in these forms of transnational activism are also able to personally benefi t through the temporary mediation of physical and social restrictions as women and as Palestinians. Physical mobility through transnational activism conferred skills that the women were able to use for upwards social mobility and improve their situation in Palestine itself. Simultaneously, many felt that their activism was worthwhile when they saw how other people across the world supported Palestine. They remained mobile in their aspirations and refused to be limited personally and collectively against all odds.


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