Download - Project Management Individual Report - Large Hadron Collider Analysis and Recommendations
MICHAEL SMURFIT GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS
The Large Hadron Collider Project
Analysis and Recommendations
Laura Halpin. 12252990
Wed 21st Aug 2013
MiM. BMGT44210. Sem. 3
"I confirm that the work submitted here is entirely my own work, and that any work of others which is included has been properly referenced and acknowledged according to normal academic
guidelines."
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Executive Summary 1
Introduction 2
Risk Management 3
Risk Types and Approach to Risk 3
Critical Analysis 4
Planning 6
CERN's Project Planning Steps 6
Implementation 9
Start-up Confusion 9
More Delays and Problems 10
Causes of Poor Implementation 10
1. Conflict of interest of Project Leader and Others 11
2. Project Nature and Globally-Dispersed Management 11
3. Optimism Bias in Planning 12
Conclusion 13
References 15
Bibliography 18
Appendices 19
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report contains details on the planning, implementation and risk management of the
large-scale project involving the construction and initial operation of the Large Hadron
Collider (hereafter referred to as the LHC) at CERN (Conseil Européen pour la Recherche
Nucléaire) in Geneva, Switzerland.
An executive decision has been taken by this consultant to define the temporal scope of the
project within certain limits for the purpose of this report; in reality, that scope was at best ill-
defined for the LHC project - an issue of concern, and of relevance in an educational capacity
in the conclusion of this report. Here, the project timeframe is said to be from 1994 (the
official approval of the project by CERN) to 2009 (the beginning of prolonged LHC
operation without fault). Specific information is drawn from official CERN documentation,
as well as firsthand accounts from engineers/scientists/managers who worked on the project,
and numerous other journal articles and media sources.
The introduction explains who CERN are, and what the project entailed - its scope, purpose,
and the nature of the project.
Risk management is assessed first, with the aim of emphasizing its importance throughout
each phase of the project. Various risks and their complexity are identified, as well as a brief
outline of CERN's techniques in approaching risk and critical analysis of this approach.
Planning, the foundation of any project, is explored in the following section, and CERN's
planning and scheduling techniques laid out. Critical insight into the planning phase of the
LHC is mentioned briefly, and investigated in more detail in conjunction with the
implementation phase - where plans are tested and their efficacy appears most clearly.
Implementation is the final section, in which we delve into problems which arose, as well as
analyze the implementation in the context of the project as a whole.
The concluding section draws together learnings from the report to create an advisory
guideline to ensure the effective and safe management of future large-scale, LHC-type
projects at CERN.
2
INTRODUCTION
Founded in 1954, CERN is an international organization dedicated to pioneering work in the
field of particle physics. It is composed of 20 member, and 7 observer states, all of which
contribute to funding and other investments in its operations.
On 16 December 1994, after over ten years of technical feasibility studies and R&D, the
CERN Council approved the construction of the LHC. The accelerator was to be built by
CERN and a close partner division Fermilab, under the project leadership of scientist Lyn
Evans. It would be built within an existing infrastructure - that constructed from 1984-1989
for CERN's Large Electron-Positron machine (LEP), another particle accelerator. The new
accelerator would thus be 26.7km in circumference, and between 50m and 175m
underground - the tunnel being sloped "for reasons of cost".1
The machine's primary objective was to "provide proton-proton collisions with a centre of
mass energy of 7 TeV and an unprecedented luminosity of lO34 cmm2 s-l."2 In layman's
terms: to smash protons into one another, producing energy on collision as a result of
acceleration at almost the speed of light, with a luminosity (a measurement of how well the
particles can be detected) high enough for the potential discovery of new or previously
unobservable particles. The challenge, according to Steve Myers, CERN's director of
accelerators and technology, would be similar to "firing needles across the Atlantic and
getting them to collide half way."3 The primary goal of the project was, put simply, "to build
a working accelerator on time".4
Around the primary objective floated other goals which arose as their respective experiments
were given the go-ahead by the CERN council. As the project progressed, a total of 6
experiments were approved - ATLAS, CMS, ALICE and LHC-b between 1996 and 1998,
and two smaller ones after that - TOTEM and LHCf. These experiments each required
specific detection activities, carried out by large detector machines at different points in the
collider's rings. Operation would be carried out at -271.3°C, the machine cooled to this
temperature by liquid helium. An overall view of the LHC's structure can be seen in
Appendix A.
The LHC was a long-term megascience project. This meant that although it was subject to
many of the same conventions as other projects in project management, its large scale and
technical complexity presented additional risks and difficulties for management.
3
RISK MANAGEMENT
With a project of the scale and scope of the LHC, the primary approach to risk must be
complete prevention. The nature of the experiments to be carried out by the machine involve
speeds and energies so high that any slight errors in design or implementation could be
catastrophic. In order to do this, quality management is the most essential tool, and
communication its inarguable prerequisite. In a complex, long-term project, uncertainty is
magnified. The longer the project runs and the more complexity it entails, the more
uncertainty it involves. One of the greatest risks is change in the project environment over
time, and in order to mitigate this overall risk, the project must place enormous emphasis on
the temporal-scope and prioritization of risk. Usually, the risks with the highest impact will
gain high prioritization for mitigation. In the case of the LHC, the risks in this category fell
into the domain of hysteria-risks, and scientific impossibilities (according to the scientists at
CERN). Still, to maximize chances of success, these risk had to be dealt with - even if this
meant simply disproving/dispelling the theories, often physicist to physicist.
Risk Types and Approach to Risk
The three most severe risks identified with the LHC experiments involved the potential
destruction of matter, and the earth itself - inarguably the most serious risk imaginable.
These potential risks were:
1. The creation of a black hole, or micro black holes - phenomena which would cause all
matter to collapse into a point of infinite density, resulting in the destruction of the earth.
2. Strangelets - material with a gravitational force so strong it would, if it was created,
destroy all life
3. Monopoles - theoretical particles which could be created by the machine's operations and
which would rip matter asunder.5
The interesting thing about these ultimate risks with the LHC, was that they existed largely in
the minds of a minority of physicists, and, due to the unfortunate nature of public tendency
towards hysteria in the face of unknown concepts (particularly in this highly specialised field
of particle physics), in the media. In reality, these risks, along with others which had been
4
raised, were thrown out in 2003 by a safety study conducted at CERN, which concluded that
there was "no basis for any conceivable threat" of this kind.6 (In fact, a later account related
CERN's registration at Lloyds of London for the world's first 'Global Destruction with Black
Hole Indemnity' policy,7 but this source is unconfirmed, and likely to have been a hoax )
This disconfirmation of the extreme risks, however, did not render the construction and
operation project risk-free by any means. Other risks to be considered were:
- Risk of faulty design
- Risk of incorrect implementation of good design
- Risk of poor quality components/materials
- Risk of miscommunication among those working on the project, either at a temporal point,
or between those working on the project at different points in time (i.e.: poor
information/knowledge management)
- Risk of public fear causing internal/external sabotage
- Risk of over-running on budget or time
- Risk of injury to/loss of key personnel
- Risk of damage to components over time
The list is by no means exhaustive, and with these, and other risks, in mind, CERN's
approach to risk was comprehensive - accounting for both external and internal risks - and of
a twofold nature:
1. Qualitative - involving Monte Carlo simulations
2. Qualitative - involving risk identification at each stage of the project with the help of a
work breakdown structure, and subsequent risk assessment using what-if analyses.8
Critical Analysis
From all of the above it is clear to see that the risks involved with the LHC project included
PR management, for external risks, and quality management for internal, technical risks.
What has yet to be considered, however, is the overall risk which comes with changes over
time. For example, the length of this project meant that during its life-cycle, incredible
technological advances occurred. Floricel and Miller propose a view on risk in large-scale
5
engineering projects which explores the need for robustness and flexibility in mega projects.
They contend that in order to achieve these essential elements of managing environmental
turbulence and risk, an organization's structure must be comprised of concrete strategic
systems complemented by institutional anchoring measures, all held together by the shared
vision of the project - returning once again to the importance of clear communication.9 The
attitude to risk management in a global organization like CERN is complicated. This idea of
flexibility within a robust system is crucial for risk response in a long-term, constantly
changing project, and as we will see in the later Implementation section, was impaired by
both quality issues, and cognitive biases.
Some of these involved an important element of risk management, namely
testing/prototyping. Although test and prototypes were scheduled into the LHC project, they
were incomplete and occasionally, dangerously so. In response to the 2008 quench incident
(detailed later), James Gillies, a spokesperson for the CERN laboratory, admitted "this thing
is its own prototype".10
Extensive testing was carried out on the machine, but it later proved
inadequate, with even internal personnel sceptical of the quality assurance levels at the
facility. Director general of accelerators and technology at CERN, Steve Myers, even
referred to the team's response to the 2008 incident as "playing musical chairs with helium".11
The message to take from the risk management of the LHC project is a cautionary one.
When it comes to risk, management is vital. It is no use waiting for the explosion to happen
in order to develop a plan. No matter how long-term the project scope, risk management
must be extended throughout the planning, implementation and control stages, and any and
all risks must be prepared for. Failing that, a robust, flexible system must be securely in
place to readjust the approach when unanticipated risks occur. If this is impossible, it is
worth considering whether the scope of the project itself may be the critical failure factor.
6
PLANNING
The first thing to be taken into account when planning a project are constraints. The LHC
construction project initially had a budget constraint of about 4.6m Swiss Francs, and, based
on the decision to construct the LHC within the existing LEP tunnel, a serious space
constraint.
These constraints were the reasons behind many of the early decisions in the LHC planning
process. One of these decisions was to re-use as much of the LEP's infrastructure as possible
(although additional caverns had to be created for several of the collider's detectors)12
in
order to take advantage of previous investments.
With this in mind, we begin examination of the LHC project planning process.
CERN's Project Planning Steps
A project of this size, complexity and globally managed nature, meant tremendous
coordination was needed, which in turn meant the need for a holistic outlook by the
management, and efficient flows of information across the whole project. Thus the planning
process for the LHC followed a number of well-defined and detailed steps - these are laid out
by Bachy, Bonnal and Tarrant in CERN's LHC Note.355.13
1. Creation of an action plan, the highest level definition of the project, contributed to by all
interested parties (physicists, CERN Council etc.) and including a summary of the entire
project and its purpose.
2. Detailed PBSs (Product Breakdown Structure), including manufacturing and quality
control information, design rules, and detailing of each technical component - Some of
the most critical components necessary to reach this objective were superconducting
dipole magnets - these create a linear magnetic field to guide beams of ionized particles
on their circular path, in opposite directions, within the machine's giant rings.14
Detailed ABSs (Assembly Breakdown Structures), including the sequence of activities
for assembly of the project and how best to use the LEP infrastructure. These were
drawn up for each of the main construction sites and major machine parts, and assisted in
7
defining and controlling exactly what needed to be done/produced, and how. (See
Appendix B for samples). These PBSs/ABSs, along with an OBS (Organizational
Breakdown Structure), were then cross-referenced and merged to create the WBS (Work
Breakdown Structure). This WBS is a matrix structure made up of work packages, and
includes definition of specific tasks to be completed, which work groups are to complete
them, and cost estimates. It serves to provide guidance to all those involved, as well as
to enable management of risk (in the LHC case, carried out with the use of risk flotation
reserves between co-ordination schedules), and to track performance against these stated
intentions of necessary task activities.
3. In a long-term, complex project like the LHC, changes are inevitable over time. Thus the
planning system was based on multi-level hierarchy style planning, where the work
packages of the WBS were decoupled - meaning that changes impacted only the work
package involved, not the entire planning system. The top level of this hierarchy was a
Master Production Schedule, which covers the whole duration of the project, and
functions as the management overview segment of planning. The middle level was a
series of co-ordination schedules, and the lower level comprised various detailed
schedules drawn up and overseen by technical work units. These detailed schedules
ensure resources were available, and that the specific tasks, in their decomposed states,
were feasible within the temporal constraints of the project. (See Appendix C)
4. Employment of planning hardware and software.
Software for planning the LHC was chosen based on its ability to process the
complexities of the project, and user-friendly nature. CERN chose Microsoft Project,
version 4.0 for Windows 3.1.15
5. Planning co-ordination meetings were held regularly to facilitate updates and
adjustments, attended by the planning co-ordinators and planning leaders for various
technical groups, as well as progress reports published at project milestones.
A CERN publication entitled ' A Deliverable-Oriented EVM System Suited to a Large-Scale
Project' outlined the importance of developing frameworks for adjustment of plans within a
long-term project. This systematic approach means that newcomers, as well as current
8
contributors, to the project are clear on how to approach the management of their section, and
reduces the risk of omission or duplication of information.16
We can see from CERN documentation that the planning and scheduling system of the LHC
was carried out meticulously. But it is necessary to call to mind that old project management
adage: 'the proof of the planning is in the…implementation'. To fully understand the
planning process and its contribution to the success/failure of the LHC, we must view it
within the context of the project as a whole - in particular, its implementation, and the
problems which arose therein.
9
IMPLEMENTATION
After consideration of the risk management and planning aspects of the LHC project, we turn
to its implementation phase. Although the scope of the LHC construction project does not
include the experiments to be run, it does include the construction of a working accelerator.
Thus the implementation segment of this report focuses on the final construction phase and
the initial attempts at operating the machine.
Start-up Confusion
This is where we see cracks in the walls beginning to occur (both figuratively and literally).
Originally, the machine was scheduled to begin operations in 2007, according to project
manager Lyn Evans, who claimed:
“[O]ur commitment is still firmly behind the objective of colliding beams in the summer of
2007,” ".17
However, according to the CERN outreach website, this was not the case - it claims, instead,
that the planned completion date was 2008.18
Other sources say the machine was scheduled
to run as early as early as 2005, with Physics World claiming it was "Originally slated for
2005 start-up",19
and a Report of the US ATLAS Pixel Baseline Review Committee
mentioning: "the LHC 7/1/2005-startup date".20
These various sources - a sample range of those available - indicate two possibilities for the
discrepancies in projected start-up date:
1. Nobody knew when the LHC was supposed to start, or
2. Some people knew, but communication structures - both internal and external to the
immediate project team - were ineffective in conveying the information clearly
The first possibility indicates lack of clear definition of objectives, and the second possibility
would mean poor communication by the project coordinators. In a project of this magnitude
and public nature, both of those options are simply unacceptable.
10
More Delays and Problems
Aside from the start date issue, the project's implementation was fraught with delays and
setbacks.
In 2002, overrunning on cost resulted in a long delay.
In 2004, 3 kilometres of equipment had to be replaced following a manufacturing error.21
In 2007, the machine "suffered a serious setback when a support structure for key magnets
failed during routine tests".22
According to Fermilab, the reason for this error is traceable
back to tests carried out of the magnets between 1998/2002 - "none of which appear to have
addressed the asymmetric loads. The only tests on the magnets while they were still at
Fermilab were performed on single magnets, which would never develop such loads."23
By the planned startup date in 2008, the machine had already "been delayed several years and
[was] significantly over budget.24
Even when the machine began functioning in September 2008, the delays continued. Just
nine days after its initial start-up - after a host of media fanfare celebrating its success, (along
with semi-serious relief that the world continued to exist), a massive magnet quench caused it
to shut down. This meant a number of magnets were damaged when a faulty electrical
connection caused the freezing liquid helium to escape into the tunnel. The damage to the
dipole magnets was so great that repairs would take months - a delay which, in reality, turned
into a year.
Causes of Poor Implementation
These delays are representative of the many others which appeared to plague the LHC. The
question is: why did so many occur?
And the answer, I believe, consists of three elements:
1. Conflict of interest of the project leader. This leads to the bias where the person
managing the project (Lyn Evans) identifies primarily with the stakeholder group who
will use the product, not with that which builds it. This feeds into the vast media and
industry pressures to complete the machine and begin its operations.
2. The nature of the project and its globally dispersed management, and
3. Optimism bias in planning.
11
In an endeavour to understand these causes for application in and improvement of future
projects, let us explore each one in more detail.
1. Conflict of interest of the project leader, and media/industry pressures to complete the
machine and begin its operations.
Lyn Evans was, by profession, a scientist. His motivation in building the LHC was to
achieve the results of particle physics experiment which had previously been impossible to
obtain. This was compounded by the huge community of physicists who waited so eagerly
for the same, or similar results, and the media frenzy over the so-called 'doomsday machine'.
The result of these various pressures meant the LHC was built in an atmosphere of fraught
anticipation. And although this should not have meant any aspect of project management
was neglected, the myriad delays, faults, errors and setbacks indicate that they were.
Quality management, although well-documented by CERN and in evidence throughout, fell
short of that required for such a huge project. Critically, the machine suffered from one of
the most dangerous features of human functioning: assumption. In fact, following the 2008
quench incident, Jim Strait, and accelerator physicist, admitted that the tolerances of the
valves in place for relief in case of incident "were based on "incorrect assumptions" about
how much helium might escape in an accident. "The total amount of helium released was
larger than the valves were designed to handle...You could call it a design error".25
2. The nature of the project and its globally dispersed management.
A 1997 article by Ari-Pekka Hameri, a scientist involved with configuration/communication
management at CERN during the LHC project, classifies the project as a "long-term and
global one-of-a-kind project".26
The paper consolidates various research results into a list of
fundamental reasons for failure in this type of undertaking, which include inconsistent
understanding of the project's objectives among its management and users, rigid planning
structures, poor response to sudden changes in the environment, and unforeseen risks
associated with technical complexity.27
From the analysis of the LHC thus far, all of these
problems are clearly present.
Although the planning mechanisms and procedures put in place by CERN were extensive, the
documents contain little room for manoeuvre - they are rigid and inflexible. As discussed,
12
there are large discrepancies regarding schedule-related objectives and various different
groups hoping for different outcomes on completion of the project. Changes in the
environment and technical complexity, manifesting here as technical faults and changing
public attitudes to the safety and usefulness of the machine, are met with slow response and
poorly communicated progress. The communication problem is one which stems from the
project's global nature and dispersed management, with contributing member states from all
over the world.
3. Optimism bias in planning.
The main difficulty with optimism bias is that it is, by nature, almost (if not completely)
impossible to perceive at the time of planning. It is only when a project runs overtime/over-
budget that hindsight allows us to see how optimistic, rather than realistic, our estimates
were. An article titled 'Performers, Trackers, Lemmings and the Lost: Sustained False
Optimism in Forecasting Project Outcomes' explores this topic, identifying two factors which
come into play with optimism bias in a project management setting: "over-optimism in
estimates, and overconfidence in the reliability of those estimates."28
The article details
contributing factors to this optimism bias - among them motivated reasoning, outcome
attribution, and the paradox of dispositional optimism. 29
The significance of these
psychological biases reaches full gravity on realisation that the immense power of accelerator
physics lies in the hands of the project team - real people with real cognitive biases.
Crucially, the article explores the tendency of optimism bias to extend throughout the life-
cycle of the project. Accounts of management reaction to setbacks during implementation
are peppered with the evidence of this extension: the massive quench in 2008 was dismissed
as "teething problems" in a CERN press release four days after the incident, the same
document stating a scheduled re-start in Spring 2009.30
In Spring 2009, that date was pushed
back to late Summer31
and the re-start did not actually occur until later that year. This is one
of many similar examples throughout the LHC project lifecycle.
13
CONCLUSION
The LHC project overran both budget and time constraints, with delays and repairs to the
machine needing almost constant capital injection from member countries. Despite a
substantial amount of documentation by CERN on the planning, scheduling, safety and
implementation procedures, as well as technicalities of the machine's dimensions and
capabilities in terms of groundbreaking research in particle physics, a clear list of objectives
or critical success factors for the project is nowhere to be found. This leads to the ultimate
conclusion that the project was viewed, by its primary users and management team, as more
of a long-awaited scientific experiment than as an engineering, or project management feat.
Although this summary is reductive to the extreme, I believe the findings detailed in this
report provide ample guidance for the improvement of future projects, not least with respect
to the opportunities offered by advances in project management literature in the 20 years
since the project's official start.
The following guidelines for the effective management of future projects of this scale are thus
recommended:
- Clearly defined and communicated objectives
- A shared vision of the outcome and critical success factors of the project
- Complete and accurate quality management, testing and prototyping in all critical functions
- Clearly defined and communicated safety features for public peace of mind
- Standardization of all planning procedures, as well as clear guidelines on how to manage
planning and implementation within all management and technical divisions involved. These
standardized frameworks should include robustness and flexibility to deal with the inevitable
uncertainty in a long-term project.
- Awareness of biases in the process - conflicts of interest should be noted and, if their impact
is considered severe enough on the potential success of the project, removed. Cognitive
biases should be researched and mitigated where possible.
14
Two final points must be considered by CERN in undertaking LHC-like projects in the
future.
1. It is worth noting that the technology used in the construction and operation of these
groundbreaking scientific devices, and the highly theoretical particle physics for which
they are produced, are two very different fields. Although CERN operates within a highly
specialized area, the project management discipline is constantly evolving and new tools
and techniques are produced constantly. CERN is thus advised that greater cross-
functional teaming and external advice should be sought on construction/operation
projects such as this.
2. It is vitally important that the planning and implementation processes in any project are
suited to the project type. Thus a megascience project should be properly researched, and
due regard given to its extreme size and international stakeholders. Criteria outside of the
iron triangle's cost, time and scope should be taken into account,32
and all aspects of the
project should contribute to the learning process for future projects.
Thus I conclude with a quotation from Jim Strait, who commented on the LHC project: "In
Italian we say, Chi non fa, non sbaglia: 'He who doesn't work makes no mistakes'. What we
have to do is learn from our mistakes and make it better."33
15
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at: http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1843296,00.html (Accessed 16 Aug
2013)
25. , G. (2008) 'Eight-Month Delay for LHC'. Available at:
http://www.nature.com/news/2008/081017/full/4551015a.html (Accessed 13 Aug 2013)
26. Hameri, A. (1997) 'Project Management in a Long-term and Global One-of-a-Kind
Project'. International Journal of Project Management, 15(3) : pp.151-157
27. Ibid
28. Kutsch, E., Maylor, H., Weyer, B., Lupson, J., (2011) 'Performers, Trackers, Lemmings
and the Lost: Sustained False Optimism in Forecasting Project Outcomes - Evidence from a
Quasi-Experiment'. International Journal of Project Management, 29(8) : p.1073
17
29. Ibid
30. CERN Press Office (2008) 'LHC Re-start Scheduled for 2009'. Available at:
http://press.web.cern.ch/press-releases/2008/09/lhc-re-start-scheduled-2009 (Accessed 16
Aug 2013)
31. Meyer, D. (2008) 'LHC Restart Gets Reset to June'. Available at:
http://news.cnet.com/8301-11386_3-10101366-76.html (Accessed 16 Aug 2013)
32. Toor, S., Ogunlana, S. (2010) 'Beyond the ‘iron triangle’: Stakeholder Perception of Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Large-scale Public Sector Development Projects'.
International Journal of Project Management, 28 (3) : pp. 228-236
33. Brumfiel, G. (2010) 'Did Design Flaws Doom the LHC?' Available at:
http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100223/full/4631008a.html (Accessed 17 Aug 2013)
34. Appendix A and C images from:
Bachy, G., Bonnal, P, Tarrant, M (1995) A Planning & Scheduling System for the LHC
Project [CERN MT/95-09 (DI); LHC Note 355] Available at:
https://cds.cern.ch/record/294011/holdings?ln=en (Accessed 11 Aug 2013)
18
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APPENDIX A34
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APPENDIX B
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APPENDIX C